G.R. No. L-26615. April 30, 1970.]

REV. FATHER LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE PRAGA, MARIA NATIVIDAD DE JESUS AND DR. JAIME ROSARIO,Petitioners, v. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch and CONSUELO GONZALES VDA. DE PRECILLA,Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-26884. April 30, 1970.]

REV. FATHER LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE PRAGA, MARIA NATIVIDAD DE JESUS AND DR. JAIME ROSARIO,Petitioners, v. HON. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch V, REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA, and CONSUELO GONZALES VDA. DE PRECILLA,Respondents.

[G.R. No. L-27200. April 30, 1970.]

TESTATE ESTATE OF GLICERIA A. DEL ROSARIO, deceased CONSUELO S. GONZALES VDA. DE PRECILLA, petitioner administratrix, v. SEVERINA NARCISO, ROSA NARCISO, JOSEFINA NARCISO, VICENTE MAURICIO, DELFIN MAURICIO, REMEDIOS NARCISO, ENCARNACION, NARCISO, MARIA NARCISO, EDUARDO NARCISO, FR. LUCIO V. GARCIA, ANTONIO JESUS DE PRAGA, MARIA NATIVIDAD DE JESUS, DR. JAIME DEL ROSARIO, ET AL., NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO-SARMIENTO and PASCUALA NARCISO-MANAHAN,Oppositors-Appellants.

Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioner Rev. Father Lucio V. Garcia.

Pedro V. Garcia for petitioner Antonio Jesus de Praga, Et. Al.

Leandro Sevilla & Ramon C. Aquino and Melquiades M. Virata, Jr. for respondent Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla.

Lorenzo C. Gella for respondent Register of Deeds of Manila. Leandro Sevilla & Ramon C. Aquino for petitioner administratrix.

Castro, Makalintal & Associates for oppositors-appellants Encarnacion Narciso, Et. Al.

Pedro Garcia for oppositors-appellants Dr. Jaime Rosario, Et. Al.

Antonio Enrile Inton for oppositors-appellants Fr. Lucio V. Garcia and Antonio Jesus de Praga.

Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for oppositors-appellants Severina Narciso, Et. Al.

George G. Arbolario and Sixto R. Reyes & Vicente Redor for oppositors-appellants Natividad del Rosario Sarmiento, Et. Al.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION, WILLS; PROBATE OF WILLS; GROUND FOR DISALLOWANCE; TESTATRIXS DEFECTIVE EYESIGHT AS UNABLING HER TO READ THE PROVISIONS OF LATER WILL. The declarations in court of the opthalmologist as to the condition of the testatrixs eyesight fully establish the fact that her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print; that she was, at the time of the execution of the second will on December 29, 1960, incapable of reading and could not have read the provisions of the will supposedly signed by her.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IRREGULARITIES IN THE EXECUTION OF THE WILL; CASE AT BAR. Upon its face, the testamentary provisions, the attestation clause and acknowledgment were crammed together into a single sheet of paper, apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was not prepared with any regard for the defective vision of Da. Gliceria, the typographical errors remained uncorrected thereby indicating that the execution thereof must have been characterized by haste. It is difficult to understand that so important a document containing the final disposition of ones worldly possessions should be embodied in an informal and untidy written instrument; or that the glaring spelling errors should have escaped her notice if she had actually retained the ability to read the purported will and had done so.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF WILLS; REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY; ART. 808, NEW CIVIL CODE READING OF THE WILL TWICE TO A BLIND TESTATOR; PURPOSE. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT COMPLIED WITH IN INSTANT CASE. Where as in the 1960 will there is nothing in the record to show that the requisites of Art. 808 of the Civil Code of the Philippines that "if the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice," have not been complied with, the said 1960 will suffer from infirmity that affects its due execution.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; ADMINISTRATORS; GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL; ACQUISITION OF INTEREST ADVERSE TO THAT OF THE ESTATE MAKES THE ADMINISTRATOR UNSUITABLE TO DISCHARGE THE TRUST; CASE AT BAR. Considering that the alleged deed of sale was executed when Gliceria del Rosario was already practically blind and that the consideration given seems unconscionably small for the properties, there was likelihood that a case for annulment might be filed against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla. And the administratrix being the widow and heir of the alleged transferee, cannot be expected to sue herself in an action to recover property that may turn out to belong to the estate. This, plus her conduct in securing new copies of the owners duplicate of titles without the courts knowledge and authority and having the contract bind the land through issuance of new titles in her husbands name, cannot but expose her to the charge of unfitness or unsuitability to discharge the trust, justifying her removal from the administration of the estate.

6. REMEDIAL LAW; NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS; ACTION MUST AFFECT "THE TITLE OR THE RIGHT OF POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY." On the matter of lis pendens, the provisions of the Rules of Court are clear: notice of the pendency of an action may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the property is situated, if the action affects "the title or the right of possession of (such) real property."cralaw virtua1aw library

7. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT APPLICABLE TO INSTANT CASE. The issue in controversy here is simply the fitness or unfitness of said special administratrix to continue holding the trust, it does not involve or affect at all the title to, or possession of, the properties covered by TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 and 81737. Clearly, the pendency of such case (L-26615) is not an action that can properly be annotated in the record of the titles to the properties.

D E C I S I O N

REYES, J.B.L.,J.:

G.R. No. L-27200 is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Sp. Proc. No. 62618) admitting to probate the alleged last will an, testament of the late Gliceria Avelino del Rosario dated 29 December 1960. G.R. Nos. L-26615 and L-2684 are separate petitions for mandamus filed by certain alleged heirs of said decedent seeking (1) to compel the probate court to remove Consuelo S. Gonzales-Precilla as special administratrix of the estate, for conflict of interest, to appoint a new one in her stead; and (2) to order the Register of Deeds of Manila to annotate notice of lis pendens in TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 ,and 81737, registered in the name of Alfonso Precilla, married to Consuelo Gonzales y Narciso, and said to be properly belonging to the estate of the deceased Gliceria A. del Rosario.

Insofar as pertinent to the issues involved herein, the facts of these cases may be stated as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Gliceria Avelino del Rosario died unmarried in the City of Manila on 2 September 1965, leaving no descendents, ascendants, brother or sister. At the time of her death, she was said to be 90 years old more or less, and possessed of an estate consisting mostly of real properties.

On 17 September 1965, Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, a niece of the deceased, petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila for probate of the alleged last will and testament of Gliceria A. del Rosario, executed on 29 December 1960, and for her appointment as special administratrix of the latters estate, said to be valued at about P100,000.00, pending the appointment of a regular administrator thereof.

The petition was opposed separately by several groups of alleged heirs: (1) Rev. Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, a legatee named in an earlier will executed by Gliceria A. del Rosario on 9 June 1956; (2) Jaime Rosario and children, relatives and legatees in both the 1956 and 1960 wills; Antonio Jesus de Praga and Marta Natividad de Jesus, wards of the deceased and legatees in the 1956 and 1960 wills; (3) Remedios, Encarnacion, and Eduardo, all surnamed Narciso; (4) Natividad del Rosario-Sarmiento; (5) Maria Narciso; (6) Pascuala Narciso de Manahan; (7) Severina, Rosa and Josefa, surnamed Narciso, and Vicente and Delfin, surnamed Mauricio, the latter five groups of persons all claiming to be relatives of Doa Gliceria within the fifth civil degree. The oppositions invariably charged that the instrument executed in 1960 was not intended by the deceased to be her true will; that the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will was procured through undue and improper pressure and influence the part of the beneficiaries and/or other persons; that the testatrix did not know the object of her bounty; that the instrument itself reveals irregularities in its execution, and that the formalities required by law for such execution have not been complied with.

Oppositor Lucio V. Garcia, who also presented for probate the 1956 will of the deceased, joined the group of Dr. Jaime Rosario in registering opposition to the appointment of petitioner Consuelo S. Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix, on the ground that the latter possesses interest adverse to the estate. After the parties were duly heard, the probate court, in its order of 2 October 1965, granted petitioners prayer and appointed her special administratrix of the estate upon a bond for P30,000.00. The order was premised on the fact the petitioner was managing the properties belonging to the estate even during the lifetime of the deceased, and to appoint another person as administrator or co administrator at that stage of the proceeding would only result in further confusion and difficulties.

On 30 September 1965, oppositors Jaime Rosario, Et. Al. filed with the probate court an urgent motion to require the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank to report all withdrawals made against the funds of the deceased after 2 September 1965. The court denied this motion on 22 October 1965 for being premature, it being unaware that such deposit in the name of the deceased existed. 1

On 14 December 1965, the same sets of oppositors, Dr. Jaime Rosario and children, Antonio Jesus de Praga, Natividad de Jesus and Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, petitioned the court for the immediate removal of the special administratrix. It was their claim that the special administratrix and her deceased husband, Alfonso Precilla, 2 had caused Gliceria A. del Rosario to execute a simulated and fraudulent deed of absolute sale dated 10 January 1961 allegedly conveying unto said spouses for the paltry sum of P30,000.00 ownership of 3 parcels of land and the improvements thereon located on Quiapo and San Nicolas, Manila, with a total assessed value of P334,050.00. Oppositors contended that since it is the duty of the administrator to protect and conserve the properties of the estate, and it may become necessary that, an action for the annulment of the deed of sale land for recovery of the aforementioned parcels of land be filed against the special administratrix, as wife and heir of Alfonso Precilla, the removal of the said administratrix was imperative.

On 17 December 1965, the same oppositors prayed the court for an order directing the Special Administratrix to deposit with the Clerk of Court all certificates of title belonging to the estate. It was alleged that on 22 October 1965, or after her appointment, petitioner Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, in her capacity as special administratrix of the estate of the deceased Gliceria A. del Rosario, filed with Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Manila a motion for the issuance of new copies of the owners duplicates of certain certificates of title in the name of Gliceria del Rosario, supposedly needed by her "in the preparation of the inventory" of the properties constituting the estate. The motion having been granted, new copies of the owners duplicates of certificates appearing the name of Gliceria del Rosario (among which were TCT Nos. 66201, 66202 and 66204) were issued on 15 November 1965. On 8 December 1965, according to the oppositors, the same special administratrix presented to the Register of Deeds the deed of sale involving properties covered by TCT Nos. 66201, 66202 and 66204 supposedly executed by Gliceria del Rosario on 10 January 1961 in favor of Alfonso Precilla, and, in consequence, said certificates of title were cancelled and new certificates (Nos. 81735, 81736 and 81737) were issued in the name of Alfonso Precilla, married to Consuelo S. Gonzales y Narciso.

On 25 August 1966, the Court issued an order admitting to probate the 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario (Exhibit "D"). In declaring the due execution of the will, the probate court took note that no evidence had been presented to establish that the testatrix was not of sound mind when the will was executed; that the fact that she had prepared an earlier will did not, prevent her from executing another one thereafter; that the fact that the 1956 will consisted of 12 pages whereas the 1960 testament was contained in one page does not render the latter invalid; that, the erasures and alterations in the instrument were insignificant to warrant rejection; that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the instrumental witnesses which were noted by the oppositors are even indicative of their truthfulness. The probate court, also considering that petitioner had already shown capacity to administer the properties of the estate and that from the provisions of the will she stands as the person most concerned and interested therein, appointed said petitioner regular administratrix with a bond for P50,000.00. From this order all the oppositors appealed, the case being docketed in this Court as G.R. No. L-27200.

Then, on 13 September 1966, the probate court resolved the oppositors motion of 14 December 1965 for the removal of the then special administratrix, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It would seem that the main purpose of the motion to remove the special administratrix and to appoint another one in her stead, is in order that an action may be filed against the special administratrix for the annulment of the deed of sale executed by the decedent on January 10, 1961. Under existing documents, the properties sold pursuant to the said deed of absolute sale no longer forms part of the estate. The alleged conflict of interest is accordingly not between different claimants of the same estate. If it is desired by the movants that an action be filed by them to annul the aforesaid deed absolute sale, it is not necessary that the special administratrix be removed and that another one be appointed to file such action. Such a course of action would only produce confusion and difficulties in the settlement of the estate. The movants may file the aforesaid proceedings, preferably in an independent action, to secure the nullity of the deed of absolute even without leave of this court:"

As regard the motion of 17 December 1965 asking for the deposit in court of the titles in the name of the decedent, the same was also denied, for the reason that if the movants were referring to the old titles, they could no longer be produced, and if they meant the new duplicate copies thereof that were issued at the instance of the special administratrix, there would be no necessity therefor, because they were already cancelled and other certificates were issued in the name of Alfonso Precilla. This order precipitated the oppositors filing in this Court of a petition for mandamus (G.R. No. L-26615, Rev. Fr. Lucio V. Garcia, Et. Al. v. Hon. Judge Conrado M. Vasquez, Et. Al.), which was given due course on 6 October 1966.

On 15 December 1965, with that motion for removal pending in the court, the oppositors requested the Register of Deeds of Manila to annotate a notice of lis pendens in the records of TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737 in the name of Alfonso Precilla. And when said official refused to do so, they applied to the probate court (in Sp. Proc. No. 62618) for an order to compel the Register of Deeds to annotate a lis pendens notice in the aforementioned titles contending that the matter of removal and appointment of the administratrix, involving TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737, was already before the Supreme Court. Upon denial of this motion on 12 November 1966, oppositors filed another mandamus action, this time against the probate court and the Register of Deeds. The case was docketed and given due course in this Court as G.R. No. L-26864.

Foremost of the questions to be determined here concerns the correctness of the order allowing the probate of the 1960 will.

The records of the probate proceeding fully establish the fact that the testatrix, Gliceria A. del Rosario, during her lifetime, executed two wills: one on 9 June 1956 consisting of 12 pages and written in Spanish, a language that she knew and spoke, witnessed by Messrs. Antonio Cabrera, Jesus Y. Ayala and Valentin Marquez, and acknowledged before notary public Jose Ayala; and another dated 29 December 1960, consisting of 1 page and written in Tagalog, witnessed by Messrs. Vicente Rosales, Francisco Decena, and Francisco Lopez and acknowledged before notary public Remigio M. Tividad.

Called to testify on the due execution of the 1960 will, instrumental witnesses Decena, Lopez and Rosales uniformly declared that they were individually requested by Alfonso Precilla (the late husband of petitioner special administratrix) to witness the execution of the last will of Doa Gliceria A. del Rosario; that they arrived at the house of the old lady at No. 2074 Azcarraga, Manila, one after the other, in the afternoon of 29 December 1960; that the testatrix at the time was apparently of clear and sound mind, although she was being aided by Precilla when she walked; 3 that the will, which was already prepared, was first read "silently" by the testatrix herself before she signed it; 4 that he three witnesses thereafter signed the will in the presence of the testatrix and the notary public and of one another. There is also testimony that after the testatrix and the witnesses to the will acknowledged the instrument to be their voluntary act and deed, the notary public asked for their respective residence certificates which were handed to him by Alfonso Precilla, clipped together; 5 that after comparing them with the numbers already written on the will, the notary public filled in the blanks in the instrument with the date, 29 January 1960, before he affixed his signature and seal thereto. 6 They also testified that on that occasion no pressure or influence has been exerted by any person upon the testatrix to execute the will.

Of course, the interest and active participation of Alfonso Precilla in the signing of this 1960 will are evident from the records. The will appeared to have been prepared by one who is not conversant with the spelling of Tagalog words, and it has been shown that Alfonso Precilla is a Cebuano who speaks Tagalog with a Visayan accent. 7 The witnesses to the will, two of whom are fellow Visayans, 8 admitted their relationship or closeness to Precilla. 9 It was Precilla who instructed them to go to the house of Gliceria del Rosario on 29 December 1960 to witness an important document, 10 and who took their residence certificates from them a few days before the will was signed. 11 Precilla had met the notary public and witnesses Rosales and Lopez at the door of the residence of the old woman; he ushered them to the room at the second floor where the signing of the document took place; 12 then he fetched witness Decena from the latters haberdashery shop a few doors away and brought him to, the house the testatrix. 13 And when the will was actually executed Precilla was present. 14

The oppositors-appellants in the present case, however, challenging the correctness of the probate courts ruling, maintain that on 29 December 1960 the eyesight of Gliceria del Rosario was so poor and defective that she could not have read the provisions of the will, contrary to the testimonies of witnesses Decena, Lopez and Rosales.

On this point, we find the declarations in court of Dr. Jesus V. Tamesis very material and illuminating. Said ophthalmologist, whose expertise was admitted by both parties, testified, among other things, that when Doa Gliceria del Rosario saw him for consultation on 11 March 1960 he found her left eye to have cataract (opaque lens), 15 and that it was "above normal in pressure", denoting a possible glaucoma, a disease that leads to blindness 16 As to the conditions of her right eye, Dr. Tamesis declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q But is there anything here in the entry appearing in the other documents Exhibits 3-B, 3-C and 3-D from which you could inform the court as to the condition of the vision of the patient as to the right eve?

"A Under date of August 30, 1960, is the record of refraction. that is setting of glass by myself which showed that the right eye with my prescription of glasses had a vision of 2 over 60 (20/60) and for the left eye with her correction 20 over 300 (20/300).

"Q In laymans language, Doctor, what is the significance of that notation that the right had a degree of 20 over 60 (20/60)?

"A It meant that eye at least would be able to recognize objects or persons at a minimum distance of twenty feet.

"Q But would that grade enable the patient to read print?

"A Apparently that is only a record for distance vision, for distance sight, not for near."cralaw virtua1aw library

(pages 20-21, t.s.n., hearing of 23 March 1966)

The records also show that although Dr. Tamesis operated of the left eye of the decedent at the Lourdes Hospital on 8 August 1960; as of 23 August 1960, inspite of the glasses her vision was only "counting fingers," 17 at five feet. The cross-examination of the doctor further elicited the following responses:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q After she was discharged from the hospital you prescribed lenses for her, or glasses?

"A After her discharge from the hospital, she was coming to my clinic for further examination and then sometime later glasses were prescribed.xxx

"Q And the glasses prescribed by you enabled her to read, Doctor?

"A As far as my record is concerned, with the glasses for the left eye which I prescribed the eye which I operated she could see only forms but not read. That is on the left eye.

"Q How about the right eye?

"A The same, although the vision on the right eye is even better than the left eye." (pages 34. 85. t.s.n., hearing of 23 March 1966).

Then, confronted with a medical certificate (Exhibit H) issued by him on 29 November 1965 certifying that Gliceria del Rosario was provided with aphakic lenses and "had been under medical supervision up to 1963 with apparently good vision", the doctor had this to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q When yon said that she had apparently good vision you mean that she was able to read?

"A No, not necessarily, only able to go around, take care of herself and see. This I can tell you, this report was made on pure recollections and I recall she was using her glasses although I recall also that we have to give her medicines to improve her vision, some medicines to improve her identification some more.xxx

"Q What about the vision in the right eve, was that corrected by the glasses?

"A Yes, with the new prescription which I issued on 80 August 1960. It is in the clinical record.

"Q The vision in the right eye was corrected?

"A Yes That is the vision for distant objects."cralaw virtua1aw library

(pages 38, 39, 40. t.s.n., hearing of 23 March 1966).

The foregoing testimony of the ophthalmologist who treated the deceased and, therefore, has first hand knowledge of the actual condition of her eyesight from August, 1960 up to 1963, fully establish the fact that notwithstanding the operation and removal of the cataract in her left eye and her being fitted with aphakic lens (used by cataract patients), her vision remained mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print. Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that with the condition of her eyesight in August, 1960, and there is no evidence that it had improved by 29 December 1960, Gliceria del Rosario was incapable f reading, and could not have read the provisions of the will supposedly signed by her on 29 December 1960. It is worth noting that the instrumental witnesses stated that she read the instrument "silently" (t.s.n., pages 164-165). which is a conclusion and not a fact.

Against the background of defective eyesight of the alleged testatrix, the appearance of the will, Exhibit "D", acquires striking significance. Upon its face, the testamentary provisions, the attestation clause and acknowledgment were crammed together into a single sheet of paper, to much so that the words had to be written very close on the top, bottom and two sides of the paper, leaving no margin whatsoever; the word "and" had to be written by the symbol" &", apparently to save on space. Plainly, the testament was not prepared with any regard for the defective vision of Doa Gliceria. Further, typographical errors like "HULINH" for "HULING" (last), "Alfonsa" ;or "Alfonso", "MERCRDRS" for MERCEDES", "instrumental" for "Instrumental", and "acknowledged" for "acknowledge, remained uncorrected, thereby indicating that execution thereof must have been characterized by haste. It is difficult to understand that so important a document containing the final disposition of ones worldly possessions should be embodied in an informal and untidily written instrument; or that the glaring spelling errors should have escaped her notice if she had actually retained the ability to read the purported will and had done so. The record is thus convincing that the supposed testatrix could not have physically read or understood the alleged testament, Exhibit "D", and that its admission to probate was erroneous and should be reversed.

That Doa Gliceria should be able to greet her guests on her birthday, arrange flowers and attend to kitchen tasks shortly prior to the alleged execution of the testament Exhibit "D", as appears from the photographs, Exhibits "E" to "E-1", in no way proves; that she was able to read a closely typed page, since the acts shown do not require vision at close range. It must be remembered that with the natural lenses removed, her eyes had lost the power of adjustment to near vision, the substituted glass lenses being rigid and uncontrollable by her. Neither is the signing of checks (Exhibits "G" to "G-3") by her indicative of ability to see at normal reading distances. Writing or signing of ones name, when sufficiently practiced, becomes automatic, so that one need only to have a rough indication of the place where the signature is to be affixed in order to be able to write it. Indeed, a close examination of the checks, amplified in the photograph, Exhibit "O", et seq., reinforces the contention of oppositors that the alleged testatrix could not see at normal reading distance: the signatures in the checks are written far above the printed base, lines, and the names of the payees as well as the amounts written do not appear to be in the handwriting of the alleged testatrix, being in a much firmer and more fluid hand than hers.

Thus, for all intents and purpose of the rules on probate, the deceased Gliceria del Rosario was, as appellant oppositors contend, not unlike a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of the provisions of Article 808 of the Civil Code.

"ART. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged."cralaw virtua1aw library

The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), 18 is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes. That the aim of the law is to insure that the dispositions of the will are properly communicated to and understood by the handicapped testator, thus making them truly reflective of his desire, is evidenced by the requirement that the will should be read to the latter, not only once but twice, by two different persons, and that the witnesses have to act within the range of his (the testators) other senses. 19

In connection with the will here in question, there is nothing in the records to show that the above requisites have been complied with. Clearly, as already stated, the 1960 will sought to be probated suffers from infirmity that affects its due execution.

We also find merit in the complaint of oppositors Lucio V. Garcia, Et Al., against the denial by the probate court of their petition for the removal of Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix of the estate of the deceased Doa Gliceria (Petition, G.R. No. L-26615, Annex "B").

The oppositors petition was based allegedly on the existence in the special administratrix of an interest adverse to that of the estate. It was their contention that through fraud her husband had caused the deceased Gliceria del Rosario to execute a deed of sale, dated 10 January 1961, by virtue of which the latter purportedly conveyed unto said Alfonso D. Precilla, married to Consuelo Gonzales y Narciso, the ownership of 3 parcels of land and the improvements thereon, assessed at P334,050.00, for the sum of P30,000.00.

In denying the petition, the probate court, in its order of 13 September 1966 (Annex "P", Petition) reasoned out that since the properties were already sold no longer form part of the estate. The conflict of interest would not be between the estate and third parties, but among the different claimants of said properties, in which case, according to the court, the participation of the special administratrix in the action for annulment that may be brought would not be necessary.

The error in this line of reasoning lies in the fact that what was being questioned was precisely the validity of the conveyance or sale of the properties. In short, if proper, the action for annulment would have to be undertaken on behalf of the estate by the special administratrix, affecting as it does the property or rights of the deceased. 20 For the rule is that only where there is no special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased may the legal heirs commence an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor. 21

There is no doubt that to settle the question of the due execution and validity of the deed of sale, an ordinary and separate action would have to be instituted, the matter not falling within the competence of the probate court. 22 Considering the facts then before it, i.e., the alleged deed of sale having been executed by Gliceria del Rosario on 10 January 1961, when she was already practically blind; and that the consideration of P30,000.00 seems to be unconscionably small for properties with a total assessed value of P334,050.00, there was likelihood that a case for annulment might indeed be filed against the estate or heirs of Alfonso Precilla. And the administratrix, being the widow and heir of the alleged transferee, cannot be expected to sue herself in an action to recover property that may turn out to belong to the estate. 22 Not only this, but the conduct of the special administratrix in securing new copies of the owners duplicates of TCT Nos. 66201, 66202, and 66204, without the courts knowledge or authority, and on the pretext that she needed them in the preparation of the inventory of the estate, when she must have already known by then that the properties covered therein were already "conveyed" to her husband by the deceased, being the latters successor, and having the contract bind the land through issuance of new titles in her husbands name cannot but expose her to the charge of unfitness or unsuitableness to discharge the trust, justifying her removal from the administration of the estate.

With respect to the orders of the court a quo denying (1) the oppositors motion to require the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank to report all withdrawals made against the funds of the deceased after 2 September 1965 and (2) the motion for annotation of a lis pendens notice on TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 and 81737, the same are to be affirmed.

The probate court pointed out in its order of 22 October 1965 (Annex "H") that it could not have taken action on the complaint against the alleged withdrawals from the bank deposits of the deceased, because as of that time the court had not yet been apprised that such deposits exist. Furthermore, as explained by the special administratrix in her pleading of 30 October 1965, the withdrawals referred to by the oppositors could be those covered by checks issued in the name of Gliceria del Rosario during her lifetime but cleared only after her death. That explanation, which not only appears plausible but has not been rebutted by the petitioners-oppositors, negates any charge of grave abuse in connection with the issuance of the order here in question.

On the matter of lis pendens (G.R. No. L-26864), the provisions of the Rules of Court are clear: notice of the pendency of an action may be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the province in which the property is situated, if the action affects "the title or the right of possession of (such) real property." 23 In the case at bar, the pending action which oppositors seek to annotate in the records of TCT Nos. 81735, 81736, and 81737 is the mandamus proceeding filed in this Court (G.R. No. L-26615). As previously discussed in this opinion, however, that case is concerned merely with the correctness of the denial by the probate court of the motion for the removal of Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla as special administratrix of the estate of the late Gliceria del Rosario. In short, the issue in controversy there is simply the fitness or unfitness of said special administratrix to continue holding the trust; it does not involve or affect at all the title to, or possession of, the properties covered by said TCT Nos. 81735, 81736 and 81737. Clearly, the pendency of such case (L-26615) is not an action that can properly be annotated in the record of the titles to the properties.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of the court below allowing to probate the alleged 1960 will of Gliceria A. del Rosario is hereby reversed and set aside. The petition in G.R. No. L-26615 being meritorious, the appealed order is set aside and the court below is ordered to remove the administratrix, Consuelo Gonzales Vda. de Precilla, and appoint one of the heirs intestate of the deceased Doa Gliceria Avelino del Rosario as special administrator for the purpose of instituting action on behalf of her estate to recover the properties allegedly sold by her to the late Alfonso D. Precilla. And in Case G.R. No. L-26864, petition is dismissed. No costs.

G.R. No. 74695 September 14, 1993In the Matter of the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of the Deceased Brigido Alvarado, CESAR ALVARADO,petitioner,vs.HON. RAMON G. GAVIOLA, JR., Presiding Justice, HON. MA. ROSARIO QUETULIO LOSA and HON. LEONOR INES LUCIANO, Associate Justices, Intermediate Appellate Court, First Division (Civil Cases), and BAYANI MA. RINO,respondents.Vicente R. Redor for petitioner.Bayani Ma. Rino for and in his own behalf.BELLOSILLO,J.:Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated 11 April 19861of the First Civil Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Order dated 27 June 19832of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, admitting to probate the last will and testament3with codicil4of the late Brigido Alvarado.On 5 November 1977, the 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a notarial will entitled "Huling Habilin" wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son (petitioner) and expressly revoked a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of sta. Cruz, Laguna.As testified to by the three instrumental witnesses, the notary public and by private respondent who were present at the execution, the testator did not read the final draft of the will himself. Instead, private respondent, as the lawyer who drafted the eight-paged document, read the same aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them.Meanwhile, Brigido's holographic will was subsequently admitted to probate on 9 December 1977. On the 29th day of the same month, a codicil entitled "Kasulatan ng Pagbabago sa Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na may Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado" was executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the testator's eye operation. Brigido was then suffering from glaucoma. But the disinheritance and revocatory clauses were unchanged. As in the case of the notarial will, the testator did not personally read the final draft of the codicil. Instead, it was private respondent who read it aloud in his presence and in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses (same as those of the notarial will) and the notary public who followed the reading using their own copies.A petition for the probate of the notarial will and codicil was filed upon the testator's death on 3 January 1979 by private respondent as executor with the Court of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Siniloan, Laguna.5Petitioner, in turn, filed an Opposition on the following grounds: that the will sought to be probated was not executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was insane or otherwise mentally incapacitated to make a will at the time of its execution due to senility and old age; that the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear and threats; that it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary who stands to get the lion's share of the testator's estate; and lastly, that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.When the oppositor (petitioner) failed to substantiate the grounds relied upon in the Opposition, a Probate Order was issued on 27 June 1983 from which an appeal was made to respondent court. The main thrust of the appeal was that the deceased was blind within the meaning of the law at the time his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto was executed; that since the reading required by Art. 808 of the Civil Code was admittedly not complied with, probate of the deceased's last will and codicil should have been denied.On 11 April 1986, the Court of Appeals rendered the decision under review with the following findings: that Brigido Alvarado was not blind at the time his last will and codicil were executed; that assuming his blindness, the reading requirement of Art. 808 was substantially complied with when both documents were read aloud to the testator with each of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public following the reading with their respective copies of the instruments. The appellate court then concluded that although Art. 808 was not followed to the letter, there was substantial compliance since its purpose of making known to the testator the contents of the drafted will was served.The issues now before us can be stated thus: Was Brigido Alvarado blind for purpose of Art, 808 at the time his "Huling Habilin" and its codicil were executed? If so, was the double-reading requirement of said article complied with?Regarding the first issue, there is no dispute on the following facts: Brigido Alvarado was not totally blind at the time the will and codicil were executed. However, his vision on both eyes was only of "counting fingers at three (3) feet" by reason of the glaucoma which he had been suffering from for several years and even prior to his first consultation with an eye specialist on14 December 1977.The point of dispute is whether the foregoing circumstances would qualify Brigido as a "blind" testator under Art. 808 which reads:Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice; once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary public before whom the will is acknowledged.Petitioner contends that although his father was not totally blind when the will and codicil were executed, he can be so considered within the scope of the term as it is used in Art. 808. To support his stand, petitioner presented before the trial court a medical certificate issued by Dr. Salvador R. Salceda, Director of the Institute of Opthalmology (Philippine Eye Research Institute),6the contents of which were interpreted in layman's terms by Dr. Ruperto Roasa, whose expertise was admitted by private respondent.7Dr. Roasa explained that although the testator could visualize fingers at three (3) feet, he could no longer read either printed or handwritten matters as of 14 December 1977, the day of his first consultation.8On the other hand, the Court of Appeals, contrary to the medical testimony, held that the testator could still read on the day the will and the codicil were executed but chose not to do so because of "poor eyesight."9Since the testator was still capable of reading at that time, the courta quoconcluded that Art. 808 need not be complied with.We agree with petitioner in this respect.Regardless of respondent's staunch contention that the testator was still capable of reading at the time his will and codicil were prepared, the fact remains and this was testified to by his witnesses, that Brigido did not do so because of his "poor,"10"defective,"11or "blurred"12vision making it necessary for private respondent to do the actual reading for him.The following pronouncement inGarcia vs.Vasquez13provides an insight into the scope of the term "blindness" as used in Art. 808, to wit:The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testatorifhe isblind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes . . .Clear from the foregoing is that Art. 808 applies not only to blind testators but also to those who, for one reason or another, are "incapable of reading the(ir) will(s)." Since Brigido Alvarado was incapable of reading the final drafts of his will and codicil on the separate occasions of their execution due to his "poor," "defective," or "blurred" vision, there can be no other course for us but to conclude that Brigido Alvarado comes within the scope of the term "blind" as it is used in Art. 808. Unless the contents were read to him, he had no way of ascertaining whether or not the lawyer who drafted the will and codicil did so confortably with his instructions. Hence, to consider his will as validly executed and entitled to probate, it is essential that we ascertain whether Art. 808 had been complied with.Article 808 requires that in case of testators like Brigido Alvarado, the will shall be read twice; once, by one of the instrumental witnesses and, again, by the notary public before whom the will was acknowledged. The purpose is to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the document before signing and to give him an opportunity to object if anything is contrary to his instructions.That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil. Instead of the notary public and an instrumental witness, it was the lawyer (private respondent) who drafted the eight-paged will and the five-paged codicil who read the same aloud to the testator, and read them only once, not twice as Art. 808 requires.Private respondent however insists that there was substantial compliance and that the single reading suffices for purposes of the law. On the other hand, petitioner maintains that the only valid compliance or compliance to the letter and since it is admitted that neither the notary public nor an instrumental witness read the contents of the will and codicil to Brigido, probate of the latter's will and codicil should have been disallowed.We sustain private respondent's stand and necessarily, the petition must be denied.This Court has held in a number of occasions that substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege.14In the case at bar, private respondent read the testator's will and codicil aloud in the presence of the testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public. Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions. Only then did the signing and acknowledgement take place. There is no evidence, and petitioner does not so allege, that the contents of the will and codicil were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the testator. On the contrary, with respect to the "Huling Habilin," the day of the execution was not the first time that Brigido had affirmed the truth and authenticity of the contents of the draft. The uncontradicted testimony of Atty. Rino is that Brigido Alvarado already acknowledged that the will was drafted in accordance with his expressed wishes even prior to 5 November 1977 when Atty. Rino went to the testator's residence precisely for the purpose of securing his conformity to the draft.15Moreover, it was not only Atty. Rino who read the documents on5 November and 29 December 1977. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. Afterwards, Atty. Nonia de la Pena (the notary public) and Dr. Crescente O. Evidente (one of the three instrumental witnesses and the testator's physician) asked the testator whether the contents of the document were of his own free will. Brigido answered in the affirmative.16With four persons following the reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten documents. This is especially true when we consider the fact that the three instrumental witnesses were persons known to the testator, one being his physician (Dr. Evidente) and another (Potenciano C. Ranieses) being known to him since childhood.The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will.17As a final word to convince petitioner of the propriety of the trial court's Probate Order and its affirmance by the Court of Appeals, we quote the following pronouncement inAbangan v.Abangan,18to wit:The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid the substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on the subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact thatit is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will.So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's will, must be disregarded(emphasis supplied).Brigido Alvarado had expressed his last wishes in clear and unmistakable terms in his "Huling Habilin" and the codicil attached thereto. We are unwilling to cast these aside fro the mere reason that a legal requirement intended for his protection was not followed strictly when such compliance had been rendered unnecessary by the fact that the purpose of the law,i.e., to make known to the incapacitated testator the contents of the draft of his will, had already been accomplished. To reiterate, substantial compliance suffices where the purpose has been served.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated 11 April 1986 is AFFIRMED. Considering the length of time that this case has remained pending, this decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176943 October 17, 2008DANILO ALUAD, LEONORA ALUAD, DIVINA ALUAD, PROSPERO ALUAD, and CONNIE ALUAD,petitioners,vs.ZENAIDO ALUAD,respondent.D E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:Petitioners mother, Maria Aluad (Maria), and respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless spouses Matilde Aluad (Matilde) and Crispin Aluad (Crispin).Crispin was the owner of six lots identified as Lot Nos. 674, 675, 676, 677, 680, and 682 of the Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After Crispin died, his wife Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself.1On November 14, 1981, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos"2(Deed of Donation) in favor of petitioners mother Maria3covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her husband Crispin. The Deed of Donation provided:That, for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR [Matilde] for the DONEE [Maria],the latter being adopted and hav[ing] been brought up by the former the DONOR, by these presents, transfer and convey, BY WAY OF DONATION, unto the DONEE the property above-described,to become effective upon the death of the DONOR, but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescindedand [of] no further force and effect; Provided, however, thatanytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive, they could use[,] encumber or even dispose of any or even all of the parcels of landherein donated.4(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)On September 30, 1986, Original Certificates of Title over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 were issued in Matildes name.On August 26, 1991, Matilde sold Lot No.676to respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.5Subsequently or on January 14, 1992, Matilde executed a last will and testament,6devising Lot Nos. 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria, and her "remaining properties" including Lot No.674to respondent.Matilde died on January 25, 1994, while Maria died on September 24 of the same year.7On August 21, 1995, Marias heirs-herein petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a Complaint,8for declaration and recovery of ownership and possession of Lot Nos.674and676, and damages against respondent, alleging:That in 1978, plaintiff[s] possessed the two (2) parcels of land above-described until January 1991 when defendant entered and possessed the two (2) parcels of land claiming as the adopted son of Crispin Aluad who refused to give back possession until Matilde Aluad died in [1994] and then retained the possession thereof up to and until the present time, thus, depriving the plaintiffs of the enjoyment of said parcels of land x x x;That after the death of Matilde R. Aluad, the plaintiffs succeeded by inheritance by right of representation from their deceased mother, Maria Aluad who is the sole and only daughter of Matilde Aluad[.]9To the complaint respondent alleged in his Answer.10ThatLot 674 is owned by the defendant as this lot was adjudicated to him in the Last Will and Testament of Matilde Aluad x x x while Lot 676 was purchased by him from Matilde Aluad. These two lots are in his possession as true owners thereof.11(Underscoring supplied)Petitioners later filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Already Filed to Conform to Evidence12to which it annexed an Amended Complaint13which cited the donation of the six lots via Deed of Donation in favor of their mother Maria. Branch 15 of the RTC granted the motion and admitted the Amended Complaint.14Respondent filed an Amended Answer15contending, inter alia, that the Deed of Donation is forged and falsified and petitioners change of theory showed that "said document was not existing at the time they filed their complaint and was concocted by them after realizing that their false claim that their mother was the only daughter of Matild[e] Aluad cannot in anyway be established by them";16and thatifever said document does exist, the same was already revoked by Matilde"when [she] exercised all acts of dominion over said properties until she sold Lot 676 to defendant and until her death with respect to the other lots without any opposition from Maria Aluad."17The trial court, by Decision18of September 20, 1996, held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right over Lot Nos.674and676to respondent, she having previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of Donation. Thus it disposed:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:1. Declaring the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject Lots Nos. 674 and 676, Pilar Cadastre;2. Ordering the defendant to deliver the possession of the subject lots to the plaintiffs;3. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs:a. Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorneys fees;b. Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), representing the income from subject Lot 676, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, together with the interest thereof at the legal rate until fully paid;c. Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00), representing the income from the subject Lot No. 674, a year from 1991 up to the time said lot is delivered to the plaintiffs, plus legal interest thereof at the legal rate until fully paid; andd. The costs of the suit.Defendants counterclaim is ordered dismissed for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.19On petitioners motion, the trial court directed the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal.20Possession of the subject lots appears to have in fact been taken by petitioners.By Decision21of August 10, 2006, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision, it holding that the Deed of Donation was actually a donationmortis causa, notinter vivos, and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will. Thus, it found that the Deed of Donation was witnessed by only two witnesses and had no attestation clause which is not in accordance with Article 805 of the Civil Code, reading:Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will shall, also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last on the left margin and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that that testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator, and of one another.If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.While the appellate court declared respondent as the rightful owner of Lot No.676,it did not so declare with respect to Lot No. 674, as Matildes last will and testament had not yet been probated. Thus the Court of Appeals disposed:WHEREFORE,finding the instant petition worthy of merit, the same is herebyGRANTEDand the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15, dated 20 September 1996, in Civil Case No. V-6686 for declaration of ownership, recovery of ownership and possession, and damages isREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.A new one is entered in its steaddeclaring defendant-appellant as the lawful owner of Lot [No.] 676of the Pilar Cadastre. Accordingly,plaintiffs-appellees are directed to return the possession of the said lot to the defendant-appellant.Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay P40,000.00 to defendant-appellant as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.SO ORDERED.22(Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)Their Motion for Reconsideration23having been denied,24petitioners filed the present Petition for Review,25contending that the Court of Appeals erredIX X X WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE COURT BELOW (RTC, Branch 15, Roxas City) HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS MOTHER IS IN FACT A DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.IIX X X WHEN IT RULED THAT RESPONDENT IS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 676 AS LOT BUYER ON THE BASIS OF A DEED OF SALE EXECUTED BY THE DONOR WHO HAD NO MORE RIGHT TO SELL THE SAME.IIIX X X WHEN IT FAILED TO DECLARE PETITIONERS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER OF LOT NO. 674 AFTER HAVING RULED WHEN IT HELD THAT RESPONDENT CANNOT BE DECLARED OWNER THEREOF.IVX X X WHEN IT HELD THAT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL IS IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH (a) SECTION 2, RULE 39, OF THE RULES OF COURT (AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RETURN POSSESSION OF LOT 676 TO RESPONDENT) AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY ATTORNEYS FEES AND COST[S] OF SUIT.26As did the appellate court, the Court finds the donation to petitioners mother one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:(1)It conveys no title or ownership to the transfereebeforethe death of the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;(2) Thatbefore the death of the transferor, the transfer should be revocableby the transferor at will,ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; and(3) Thatthe transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.27(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)The phrase in the earlier-quoted Deed of Donation "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no other interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer the ownership of the six lots to petitioners mother during her (Matildes) lifetime.28The statement in the Deed of Donation reading "anytime during the lifetime of the DONORor anyone of them who should survive, they coulduse, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the parcels of land herein donated"29means that Matilde retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law is an attribute of ownership.30The phrase in the Deed of Donation "oranyone of themwho should survive" is of course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the donor Matilde. Petitioners themselves concede that such phrase does not refer to the donee, thus:x x x [I]t is well to point out that the last provision (sentence) in the disputed paragraphshould only refer to Matilde Aluad, the donor, because she was the only surviving spouse at the time the donation was executedon 14 November 1981, as her husband Crispin Aluad [] had long been dead as early as 1975.31The trial court, in holding that the donation wasinter vivos, reasoned:x x x The donation in question is subject to a resolutory term or period when the donor provides in the aforequoted provisions, "but in the event that the DONEE should die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect". When the donor provides that should the "DONEE" xxx die before the DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" the logical construction thereof is thatafter the execution of the subject donation, the same became effective immediately and shall be "deemed rescinded and [of] no further force and effect" upon the arrival of a resolutory term or period, i.e., the death of the donee which shall occur before that of the donor. Understandably, the arrival of this resolutory term or period cannot rescind and render of no further force and effect a donation which has never become effective, because, certainly what donation is there to be rescinded and rendered of no further force and effect upon the arrival of said resolutory term or period if there was no donation which was already effective at the time when the donee died?32(Underscoring supplied)A similar ratio in a case had been brushed aside by this Court, however, thus:x x x [P]etitioners contend that the stipulation on rescission in case petitioners [donee] die ahead of [donor] Cabatingan is a resolutory condition that confirms the nature of the donation asinter vivos.Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.33x x x xx x x The herein subject deeds expressly provide that the donation shall be rescinded in case [donees] the petitioners predecease [the donor] Conchita Cabatingan. As stated inReyes v. Mosqueda,one of the decisive characteristics of a donationmortis causais that the transfer should be considered void if the donor should survive the donee. This is exactly what Cabatingan provided for in her donations. If she really intended that the donation should take effect during her lifetime and that the ownership of the properties donated to the donee or independently of, and not by reason of her death, she would not have expressed such proviso in the subject deeds.34(Underscoring supplied)As the Court of Appeals observed, "x x x [t]hat the donation ismortis causais fortified by Matildes acts of possession as she continued to pay the taxes for the said properties which remained under her name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free patents for which OCTs were issued under her name."35The donation being thenmortis causa, the formalities of a will should have been observed36but they were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.37Further, the witnesses did not even sign the attestation clause38the execution of which clause is a requirementseparatefrom the subscription of the will and the affixing of signatures on the left-hand margins of the pages of the will. So the Court has emphasized:x x x Article 805 particularlysegregates the requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will from the requisite that the will be "attested and subscribedby [the instrumental witnesses]. The respective intents behind these two classes of signature[s] are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify, among others, that thewitnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that thewitnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will.An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.x x xIt is the witnesses, and not the testator,who are requiredunder Article 805 to state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.39(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)Furthermore, the witnesses did not acknowledge the will before the notary public,40which is not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of the Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.More. The requirement that all the pages of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page was not also followed.41The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed, one of mortis causa, not having followed theformalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no right to petitioners mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were observed, since it was not probated, no right to Lot Nos. 674 and 676 was transmitted to Maria.42Matilde thus validly disposed of Lot No. 674 to respondent by her last will and testament, subject of course to the qualification that her (Matildes) will must be probated. With respect to Lot No. 676, the same had, as mentioned earlier, been sold by Matilde to respondent on August 26, 1991.Petitioners nevertheless argue that assuming that the donation of Lot No. 674 in favor of their mother is indeedmortis causa,hence, Matilde could devise it to respondent, the lot should nevertheless have been awarded to them because they had acquired it by acquisitive prescription, they having been in continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, open, and public possession of it in good faith and in the concept of an owner since 1978.43Petitioners failed to raise the issue of acquisitive prescription before the lower courts, however, they having laid their claim on the basis of inheritance from their mother. As a general rule, points of law, theories, and issues not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.44For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.45WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED.SO ORDERED.G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS,petitioners,vs.ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR.,respondent.Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners.Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas.Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa and A. R. de Jesus.GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding Judge Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are undisputed.After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After Letters of Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26, 1973, respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July 21, 1973.Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my win which I want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer. ...The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting of their mother and positively Identified her signature. They further testified that their deceased mother understood English, the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when said Will was executed by their mother.Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in accordance with law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the holographic Will which he found to have been duly executed in accordance with law.Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia that the alleged holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the word "dated" has generally been held to include the month, day, and year. The dispositive portion of the order reads:WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic Will of Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for not having been executed as required by the law. The order of August 24, 1973 is hereby set aside.The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which reads:ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase Ao mes y dia and simply requires that the holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the holographic Will should prevail.Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic Will is void for non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that the date must contain the year, month, and day of its execution. The respondent contends that Article 810 of the Civil Code was patterned after Section 1277 of the California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose Supreme Courts had consistently ruled that the required date includes the year, month, and day, and that if any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further contends that the petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the Civil Code because statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills are strictly construed.We agree with the petitioner.This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We should not overlook the liberal trend of the Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent intestacy The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law on wigs in this Project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with respect to the formalities in the execution of wills. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 103)In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs ofRaymundo Castro v. Bustos(27 SCRA 327) he emphasized that:xxx xxx xxx... The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed in his last will and testament on the ground that any disposition made by the testator is better than that which the law can make. For this reason, intestate succession is nothing more than a disposition based upon the presumed will of the decedent.Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary privilegeIcasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,xxx xxx xxx... More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances point to a regular execution of the wilt and the instrument appears to have been executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards its admission to probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection of language, or other non-essential defect. ... (Leynez v. Leynez 68 Phil. 745).If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator.The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been expounded by this Court inAbangan v. Abanga40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is reinstated.G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR. SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR,petitioners-appellants,vs.COURT OF APPEALS,1GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR,respondents-appellees.Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents.

PARAS,J.:The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador isdated, as provided for in Article 8102of the New Civil Code.The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs, namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the courta quoa petition for the probate docketed as Special Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial court rendered a joint decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring null and void the Deed of Absolute sale. The courta quohad also directed the respondents (the defendants in Civil Case No. 934-I) to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the redemption price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest thereon from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to vendeea retro.Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on March 10, 1988 modified said joint decision of the courta quoby denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being undated and reversing the order of reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision was denied by the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence, this petition.Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by respondent court, to wit:ITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AND APPROVING THE PROBATE OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE TESTATOR MELECIO LABRADOR; andIITHE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT DIRECTING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE THOUSAND PESOS REPRESENTING THE REDEMPTION PRICE WAS ERRONEOUS.The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, is quoted as follows:ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL OF THELATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN ILOCANOBY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZI First PageThis is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned and shared or the partition in favor of SAGRADO LABRADOR which is the fishpond located and known place as Tagale.And this place that is given as the share to him, there is a measurement of more or less one hectare, and the boundary at the South is the property and assignment share of ENRICA LABRADOR, also their sister, and the boundary in the West is the sea, known as the SEA as it is, and the boundary on the NORTH is assignment belonging to CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, who likewise is also their brother. That because it is now the time for me being now ninety three (93) years, then I feel it is the right time for me to partition the fishponds which were and had been bought or acquired by us, meaning with their two mothers, hence there shall be no differences among themselves, those among brothers and sisters, for it is I myself their father who am making the apportionment and delivering to each and everyone of them the said portion and assignment so that there shall not be any cause of troubles or differences among the brothers and sisters.II Second PageAnd this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is this that should be followed and complied with in order that any differences or troubles may be forestalled and nothing will happen along these troubles among my children, and that they will be in good relations among themselves, brothers and sisters;And those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos and all coconut trees and all others like the other kind of bamboo by name of Bayog, it is their right to get if they so need, in order that there shall be nothing that anyone of them shall complain against the other, and against anyone of the brothers and sisters.III THIRD PAGEAnd that referring to the other places of property, where the said property is located, the same being the fruits of our earnings of the two mothers of my children, there shall be equal portion of each share among themselves, and or to be benefitted with all those property, which property we have been able to acquire.That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing (WILL) which I am here hereof manifesting of the truth and of the fruits of our labor which their two mothers, I am signing my signature below hereof, and that this is what should be complied with, by all the brothers and sisters, the children of their two mothers JULIANA QUINTERO PILARISA and CASIANA AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your father who made this writing (WILL), and he is, MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p. 46,Rollo)The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated, although the date is not in its usual place, is impressed with merit.The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810.1wphi1It is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will,viz:And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month ofMarch, 17th day, in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed. And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father. (emphasis supplied) (p. 46,Rollo)The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These requirements are present in the subject will.Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of the holographic will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his death."Respondents are in error. The intention to show17 March 1968as the date of the execution of the will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a means to control the disposition of his estate.Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing the redemption price as erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect. When private respondents sold the property (fishpond) with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were actually selling property belonging to another and which they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void. Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession of the property for its disposition in accordance with the will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be reimbursed the P5,000.PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The private respondents are directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00).SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN,petitioner-appellant,vs.ILDEFONSO YAP,oppositor-appellee.Benedicto C. Belran, Crispin D. Baizas and Roberto H. Benitez for appellant.Arturo M. Tolentino for appellee.BENGZON,J.:On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased, substantially in these words:Nobyembre 5, 1951.

Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip, ay nagsasalaysay na ang aking kayamanan sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan ay aking ipinamamana sa aking mga kamag-anakang sumusunod:Vicente Esguerra, Sr. .............................................5 Bahagi

Fausto E. Gan .........................................................2 Bahagi

Rosario E. Gan .........................................................2 Bahagi

Filomena Alto ..........................................................1 Bahagi

Beatriz Alto ..............................................................1 Bahagi

At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking ipinamamana sa aking asawang si Idelfonso D. Yap sa kondisyong siya'y magpapagawa ng isang Health Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking pangalang Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At kun