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„MIHAI VITEAZUL” NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACADEMY
„INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY” DOCTORAL SCHOOL
SUMMARY OF DOCTORAL THESIS
TRENDS IN TERRORISM OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST ORIGIN:
THE DAESH PHENOMENON AND TURKEY
SCIENTIFIC COORDINATOR:
Prof. univ. dr. Adrian Lesenciuc
Ph.D. CANDIDATE:
Drd. Andreea Stoian-Karadeli
BUCHAREST
-2019
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………………….7
SUBJECT OF RESEARCH………………………………………………………….8
MOTIVATION AND PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH ………………………………………8
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ………………………………………………………….10
STRUCTURE ………………………………………………………………………….11
CHAPTER 1. THE DAESH PHENOMENON ………………………………………….….13
1. CONCEPTUAL DELIMITATIONS…………………………………………………14
1.1 TERRORISM……………………………………………………………………….14
1.1.1 ACTIONS DEFINING TERRORISM………………………………………………...15
1.1.2 STAGES IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERRORIST PHENOMENON………………...15
1.1.3 TERRORISM OF RELIGIOUS INSPIRATION ……………………………………….23
2. FROM AL-QAEDA TO THE DAESH…………………………………………………..32
2.1 AL-QAEDA ……………………………………………………………………….32
2.2 AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ AND ABU MUSAB AL-ZARQAWI…………………………….37
3. THE CONTEXT OF DAESH FORMATION……………………………………………..42
4. DAESH AND THE FIFTH WAVE OF TERRORISM ……………………………………..43
5. THE UNIQUENESS OF THE DAESH ORGANIZATION…………………………………45
6. DAESH IDEOLOGY………………………………………………………………….47
6.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE IDEOLOGY ADOPTED BY DAESH………...…………………47
6.2 IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DAESH AND AL-QAEDA………………….51
6.3 THE IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECLARATION OF THE CALIPHATE…...54
7. STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF DAESH………………………………………56
8. DAESH ECONOMY………………………………………………………………….63
9. DAESH PROPAGANDA………………………………………………………………70
10. THE PHENOMENON OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS DAESH…………………...73
11. EVOLUTION OF THE DAESH PHENOMENON SO FAR……………………………….82
12. ISIS 2.0…………………………………………………………………………...86
13. SWOT ANALYSIS OF DAESH……………………………………………………...90
CHAPTER 2. THE DAESH AND TURKEY PHENOMENON……………………………….95
1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES. THE OVERALL METHODOLOGICAL PROJECTION………….95
1.1 GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH………………………………………….95
1.2 RESEARCH METHODS……………………………………………………………..96
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1.3 DEFINING THE CONCEPTS OF SECURITY AND TERRORISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF TURKEY. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH……………………………………...98
1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF RESEARCH……………………………………….99
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS…………………………………………………………..101
1.6 OTHER THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF RESEARCH. THEORIES WITH AVERAGE
DEGREE OF GENERALITY…………………………………………………………………..102
2. FORMS OF MANIFESTATION OF TERRORISM IN TURKEY………………………….109
2.1 THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY. …………………………………….109
2.2 THE ROLE OF TURKEY IN THE GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM……………113
2.3 TERRORISM IN TURKEY - CHRONOLOGICAL ANALYSIS………………………...119
3. THE CONTEXT OF THE EMERGENCE OF THE DAESH PHENOMENON IN TURKEY…..129
3.1 EVOLUTION OF THE TURKEY-SYRIA RELATIONSHIP…………………………….129
3.2 RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND DAESH…………………………………….131
4. EVOLUTION OF DAESH ACTIVITY IN TURKEY…………………………………….134
4.1 MAIN CENTERS OF THE DAESH NETWORK IN THE TERRITORY OF TURKEY……..134
4.2 THE DAESH SYSTEM IN TURKEY - COLLABORATION BETWEEN CELLS………….145
5. ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENON OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS (FTF) WITHIN
DAESH IN TURKEY………………………………………………………………………...148
5.1 THE PROCESS OF RECRUITING TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN TURKEY……………….148
5.2 NUMBER OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS FROM TURKEY…………………….153
5.3 RELEVANT PROFILE ELEMENTS OF TURKISH TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN DAESH….155
5.4 FACTORS AND MOTIVATIONS IN THE DAESH RADICALIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY
…………………………………………………………………………………………….158
5.5 TRANSIT OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS THROUGH TURKEY………………..175
6. DAESH PROPAGANDA TARGETING TURKEY………………………………………176
7. DAESH ATTACKS TARGETING TURKEY…………………………………………...182
7.1 DAESH-INSPIRED ATTACKS ON TURKEY. THE ATTACKS CLAIMED BY THE DAESH
ORGANIZATION……………………………………………………………….……………184
7.2 ANALYSIS OF ATTACKS AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS…………………….189
8. LOGISTICS NETWORKS WITHIN THE DAESH PHENOMENON IN TURKEY…………..195
8.1 ORIGIN AND TRANSFER OF FDI RAW MATERIAL………………………………...197
9. SECURITY POLICIES AND MEASURES ADOPTED BY TURKEY IN THE FIGHT AGAINST
DAESH……………………………………………………………………………………..201
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CHAPTER 3. COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE DAESH PHENOMENON IN TURKEY AND IN
THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION……………………………………………….209
1. DAESH RADICALIZATION AND THE PHENOMENON OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS
…………………………………………………………………………………………….210
2. DAESH ATTACKS WITH TURKEY VS TARGET EU………………………………….218
3. TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE FIGHT AGAINST DAESH……………234
3.1 INTERNATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DAESH………………………………….234
3.2 SECURITY MEASURES AGAINST DAESH: TURKEY VS EU………………………..247
CONCLUSIONS……………………………………………………………………….265
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………271
ANNEXES…………………………………………………………………………….285
ANNEX 1 - DAESH STRUCTURE…………………………………………………….285
APPENDIX 2 - ANATOMY OF DAESH LEADERSHIP…………………………………..287
APPENDIX 3 - DOCUMENT REPRESENTING THE DAESH STRUCTURE OF AL-KHILAWI'S
HOUSE……………………………………………………………………………………..289
APPENDIX 4 - DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK DIVAN
(PROOF OF PAYMENT OF THE DAILY TAX FOR AGRICULTURAL INCOMES) ………………..291
ANNEX 5 - REVIEW OF THE ESTIMATED FLOW OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS….293
ANNEX 6. MAP OF THE "ISLAMIC CALIPHATE" ACCORDING TO DAESH 'ASPIRATIONS
…………………………………………………………………………………………….295
ANNEX 7. MAP OF TURKEY UNDER THE TREATY OF SEVRES (1920) ………………297
ANNEX 8 - ACTIVITY OF THE DAESH TERRORIST NETWORK IN TURKEY (2014-2017)
…………………………………………………………………………………………….299
ANNEX 9 - DAESH NETWORK IN TURKEY………………………………………….301
ANNEX 10 - MAIN CENTERS OF THE DAESH NETWORK IN TURKEY…………………303
ANNEX 11 - LIST OF TERRORISTS FROM THE DAESH NETWORK - TURKEY………….305
ANNEX 12 - DAESH RADICALIZATION PROCESS……………………………………..311
ANNEX 13 - TRACES FOLLOWED BY FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS………………..313
ANNEX 14 - TURKEY-SYRIA BORDER POINTS………………………………………315
ANNEX 15 - TRACES OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS THROUGH TURKEY………..317
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TRENDS IN TERRORISM OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST ORIGIN: THE DAESH PHENOMENON AND TURKEY
O people of the Book! Do not exceed the measure in your faith!
Do not speak of God but the Truth! (Qur'an, 4: 171)
Introduction The history of terrorism is common to the history of humanity, dating from the time of
the first communities of people. Terrorism seems to perfectly embody the legend of the
Phoenix bird resurrecting from its ashes, each time stronger, more challenging and more
difficult to fight. Paradoxically, just like the Phoenix bird, terrorist groups are never
definitively defeated, always having the chance to reform.
One of the latest and most feared forms of the terrorist phenomenon, "al-Dawla al-
Islamiyya al-Iraq and al-Sham" / Daesh / Islamic State of Iraq and Sham / ISIS / Islamic State
of Iraq and Levant / ISIL / the Islamic States / IS is a terrorist organization adapted to the
opportunities of modern society. Daesh has set a precedent for all religious-inspired terrorist
organizations in general, and salafist-jihadists in particular: it self-proclaimed Islamic
Caliphate on June 29, 2014.
Daesh is an embodiment of jihadism that was reinvented in a form adapted to the
contemporary society, fully aware of the potential offered by the evolution of technology and
means of communication, and using them to its advantage. The evolution of this terrorist
organization together with the effects of its activity in the short, medium, but especially long
term, represents a subject that needs to be analyzed contextually and understood in the
smallest detail in order to develop an effective strategy against it. So far, the international
community has tended to consider itself all-knowing against the adversary in the fight against
terrorism, and this has had devastating consequences. In the present case, the wrong decisions
made in the past based on a superficial knowledge of the phenomenon and the late action
against the organization in its previous forms have favored its evolution.
At present, the organization is territorially defeated, but, withdrawn in insurgency and
branched at global level, it continues to represent a threat to international security in different
forms: through its presence in conflict zones or with deteriorating stability, through affiliated
terrorist organizations, through declared members and hidden supporters, through the
reorganization into clandestine forms that make it difficult to track, through the "virtual
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Islamic Caliphate" and its presence in the online environment and through the discourse that
continues to attract and radicalize.
As such, the fight against Daesh has not come to an end, the organization perfectly
reflecting a complex phenomenon that must be understood in depth, with all its global
ramifications.
Subject of research
This research represents the doctoral thesis within the doctoral program in the field of
"Information and National Security", held at "Mihai Viteazul" National Intelligence
Academy. As reflected in the title – "Trends in terrorism of islamic fundamentalist origin: the
Daesh phenomenon and Turkey" – this thesis is an analysis of the religiously inspired
terrorism, through the case of Daesh, observing its evolution in relation to one of the states
directly involved as an active actor in the region, in the process of accession to the European
Union and a NATO member - Turkey.
The research is conducted on a double-level analysis: the description of the Daesh
phenomenon as a reflection of a new wave of terrorism and its evolution in the regional
context, more precisely in Turkey, through a comparative analysis with the European Union,
providing the international community information in the form of good practice
recommendations, useful in the long term in the fight against terrorism.
The motivation and purpose of the research
In August 2010, I first became a student in Syria, at Damascus University. I spent here
almost one year and, in June 2011, I witnessed the development of "Arab Spring"
phenomenon. The chaos gradually began to erupt in the Levant, with peaceful protests
becoming an opportunity for extremist groups to manipulate and take control, gaining
members and supporters.
Since the end of 2011, when the terrorist organization al-Nusra Front, the al-Qaeda
affiliate in Syria, became more and more visible, I was watching with interest the dynamics of
the terrorist phenomenon in the region, analyzing information obtained from both local,
regional and international sources. One fact was certain even in the initial period of the
"Syrian Spring": the extremist groups that were already present in the region were going to
manipulate the protests and, in the absence of a timely intervention, Syria would become a
terrorist chaos strongly inflamed by the reorganized remnants of the terrorist groups from the
neighboring state - Iraq.
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Unfortunately, the situation has evolved in accordance with the forecasts, and the group
that was to become the terrorist phenomenon Daesh has attracted my interest even more,
especially from the perspective of the researcher who was in the region and knows the local
context, aware of its importance in the evolution of events.
The experience in the region has helped me to discover and understand the Daesh
phenomenon from a complex perspective, based on information obtained from verified
sources and analyzed in context, while paying attention to the multitude of factors involved in
the formation and evolution of the Daesh group. Thus, I realized that the only way to gain a
deep understanding of the phenomenon was to analyze it in relation to one of the countries
directly involved, both in terms of geographical proximity and in terms of the effects
produced by the evolution of the organization to a large scale. Turkey has been a pivot both in
the evolution of Daesh and in the fight against it, and this paradox has aroused my interest and
pushed me towards a more detailed research. At the same time, my location in Turkey and my
knowledge of the language facilitated my access to national and regional sources of
information.
The chosen theme reflects a current threat with national and international relevance. In
an interconnected society, any event in any corner of the world affects us, whether we feel the
consequences directly or indirectly. Bearing in mind that many of the followers of the
organization are citizens from western states who threaten or may threaten the security of
their country of origin, it is extremely important to understand the new wave of terrorism
represented by Daesh.
Part of the European Union and a NATO member, even if it was not a target of interest
for the attacks claimed by Daesh or for radicalization, Romania must be aware of the danger
posed by the organization in the long term, not by its physical existence in the territory, but by
the precedent created and by the ideas sown deep in the minds and souls of its declared or
hidden followers.
Research methodology
This thesis is the result of a research conducted both in the territory, as well as through
the analysis of literature and other specialized research. Starting from the theoretical part
rendered by the chapter of conceptual delimitations and realized by synthesizing the literature
referring to the main concept - terrorism - and to elements from the history of the terrorist
phenomenon, the aim is achieved by collecting information from primary and secondary
sources, their verification and synthesis in a research database to be processed and analyzed.
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In the case of the Daesh phenomenon in Turkey, the analysis is performed on the basis of
information obtained from official sources - the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs - and
from secondary sources rendering research in the territory.
In order to elaborate the thesis, Iused mainly qualitative research methods, in a
transversal approach (assuming the measurement of the research variables only once). The
main research methods used were observational research and data analysis. In order to deduce
the research approach and fix the research questions (equivalent to the working hypotheses in
quantitative research), I went through two stages:
- the inductive stage which, through direct experience in the cultural space that hosted
the emergence of the Daesh phenomenon, Syria, and later in a neighboring space, directly
involved in the conflict in the region, determined and motivated the focus on the research
topic. In line with this approach, I appealed to the first of the research methods, observational
research, capable of providing the information needed to confirm the general framework of
the projection, inductively fixed;
- the deductive stage throughout which I studied the specialized bibliography,
configuring the general framework of the theories - for example, the wave theory of David C.
Rapoport - that is, of the widely applicable hypotheses, with a high degree of generality,
continuing with the fixation of the regional framework, with the study the intermediate level
assumptions, the broad range theories of generality, both indirectly testable, to stop me from
the low generality assumptions, applicable to the cultural space of Turkey, as a country
directly confronted with the Daesh phenomenon. Starting from the set of regional studies,
which constituted the baggage of data needed to carry out the research, doubled by the official
data provided by the Turkish government or by local government structures, I constituted the
research corpus and called on the second working method - data analysis.
Following the double approach, I tried to compare and calibrate the data collected
through the two working methods, using the comparative analysis, which allowed the
adjustment of the course (by adding an additional research question) and its analysis in
relation to the data within the European Union for designing a set of recommendations, of
action models of good practice useful to the states facing the terrorist phenomenon in general,
and the Daesh phenomenon in particular, taking into account the local context.
The structure of the thesis
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The research begins with the first chapter called "The Daesh Phenomenon". Its initial
part is meant to analyze the main concepts to provide the theoretical foundation needed for
the research. Terrorism is analyzed in particular from an action-focused perspective, passing
through the stages of its evolution identified by Rapoport (2002) and gradually reaching the
terrorism of religious inspiration and its exemplification within the polytheistic and
monotheistic religions. Starting from the premise that no terrorist organization is pure and or
belongs to a single doctrine, in the case of religious-inspired terrorism, the present paper
admits that it is not religion itself that imposes radical action, but the context determined by a
variety of factors: social, economic, political. At the same time, the review of several terrorist
organizations of religious inspiration is carried out with the purpose of canceling from the
beginning the stereotype that Islam is the only source of religious inspiration terrorism.
"The Daesh Phenomenon" describes the context of Daesh formation, starting from the
older organization - al-Qaeda. The foundations of the organization are analyzed in this part of
the paper in order to highlight both the wrong decisions and the late measures taken by the
international community, as well as the contextual factors that led to its appearance and which
could have been prevented. From this chapter we can see the tendency of the thesiis to serve
as an analytical reflection on the counter-terrorism fight carried out by the international
community and the lessons that are to be learned in order to keep up with the future threats.
The analysis of the Daesh organization is based on the following main pillars: the
modern element brought by the group and the factors that give it novelty in relation to the
other terrorist organizations, the analysis of its ideology and the ideological differentiation
from al-Qaeda, the structure of the organization, propaganda, finances, the phenomenon of
foreign terrorist fighters who have become Daesh members and, last but not least, the
evolution of the organization so far. The results of the research presented in this chapter are
intended to provide the opportunity for a detailed knowledge of the organization, by
accumulating the information necessary to fight with this long-term enemy. The research in
this chapter is analytical in nature, based on the data available from the main sources
(documents, video and audio recordings of Daesh) and secondary (existing works on the
organization and its past, articles, analyzes, official reports).
The second chapter - "The Daesh phenomenon and Turkey" - links the Daesh terrorist
phenomenon with Turkey, starting from the contextual analysis of Turkey's perspective on
national security and terrorism. Starting from the brief presentation of the terrorist threats that
the Turkish state has faced so far, it is gradually reaching Daesh. This information is relevant
for the analysis of the Daesh phenomenon in Turkey, in particular for tracing the cause-and-
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effect logic in the relationship between Daesh and three other terrorist organizations with
which Turkey has so far fought: Hezbollah (Turkish / Kurd), PKK (Workers' Party of
Kurdistan) and al-Qaeda. Subsequently, the Daesh analysis in the case of Turkey is based on a
structure similar to the one in the previous chapter: the context of the formation and evolution
of Daesh activity in Turkey, the Daesh network in Turkey, the phenomenon of foreign
terrorist fighters from the Turkish perpective, the Daesh propaganda in Turkey, the Daesh
attacks in Turkey and internal and external anti-Daesh policies / measures taken by Turkey.
The third chapter is a comparative study of the Daesh phenomenon in Turkey and in the
countries of the European Union. Based on the research presented in the context of Turkey,
data on foreign terrorist fighters, Daesh attacks and security policies / measures in the fight
against Daesh are treated in this chapter through a comparative analysis with information on
the evolution of the phenomenon in the European Union. The comparative analysis carried
out on these three main pillars highlights both the similarities and the specific elements for
each experience and outlines the framework necessary to design a set of recommendations, of
good practice action models, useful in the long term in the fight against Daesh, taking into
account the context local. Considering that, unlike the European Union states, Turkey has no
longer experienced a major terrorist attack by Daesh since the terrorist attack of January 1st,
2017, the analysis in this chapter is relevant to provide an explanation to this fact and an
advantage in developing an effective, long-term strategy against Daesh.
The evolution and the result of the research Starting from the concept of terrorism from the perspective of the Turkish state and
explaining the motivations behind this perception, I initially contextualized the term and
presented the evolution of terrorism in Turkey and in the territories relevant to the chosen
topic. Subsequently, I analyzed the Daesh phenomenon focusing on its emergence and
evolution in Turkey based on the following pillars of the research projection: the evolution of
the Daesh-Turkey relationship, the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters in the context of
Turkey (both those from Turkey and those who transit the country on the road to Syria and
Iraq), the Daesh attacks that targeted the Turkish state and, last but not least, Turkey's security
policies and anti-Daesh strategy. All these elements are facets that can reproduce the
polyhedral image of the Daesh phenomenon in Turkey. Starting from this projection, I have
defined the general objective of the research as: the analysis of the evolution of the terrorist
phenomenon in Turkey and, in particular, of the Daesh phenomenon in the Turkish territory.
To achieve the research objective, I designed the analysis of the events, position and
official responses of the Turkish state, of the cultural context and of the complexes pertaining
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the psychology of the Turkish people and I identified the ways of highlighting the appropriate
ways of responding to the Daesh challenge as lessons learned or models of good practice,
needed to be provided to Europe and in order to strengthen its security in relation to a
phenomenon that manifests itself on a global scale and has many harmful effects on regional
and global security.
The observational research of the Daesh phenomenon in Turkey was done according to
a pre-structured grid of elements taken into account (for example, the process of recruiting
foreign terrorist fighters in Turkey, the recruitment of Turkish citizens as potential Daesh
fighters, the transit of Daesh fighters, propaganda of terrorist fighters the attacks of the
organization targeting people and institutions from Turkish territory). Qualitative
observational research was carried out for the purpose of surprise in the case study regarding
the Daesh phenomenon in Turkey, of the aspects regarding the daily life in Turkey influenced
by the reality of the transit of foreign terrorists and migrant fighters and of the recruitment of
terrorists among the Turkish population (especially from south-eastern Turkey), but also of
the effects of imposing security measures taken by the Turkish state in order to stop the
phenomenon. By rendering / describing them, I also sought to highlight some deep issues
regarding Turkish fears and complexes (Sèvres Syndrome, for example), the local context and
its evolution with the phenomenon.
Observational research was the first methodological element designed from the direct
experience with the realities of the Middle East, in Syria (2010). Starting from the direct
contact with the observed reality, I designed a first draft of emergent research design, which
was subsequently folded on a broad methodological scheme, which also included data
analysis. This qualitative method represented in the case of the present study the research
mode through which I put together the general theoretical field, highlighted later by the
theoretical framework of the research, respectively the Turkish legislative framework on
combating the terrorist phenomenon, also highlighted during the paper, with the reality of
data collected through observational research.
In the case study, in order to provide the information needed to analyze the Daesh
phenomenon in the Turkish context, it was necessary to set the following specific objectives:
to analyze the Turkish state's perspective on terrorism and the motivation behind this
perspective, to identify the role it played until present in the Turkish state’s strategy in the
fight against terrorism at international level, to identify and analyze the organizations that
have marked the evolution of terrorism in the country which, by its geopolitical position,
represents the bridge between Europe and Asia.
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The specific objectives for the Daesh phenomenon in Turkey were analyzed on the basis
of three main questions:
Q1: What is the motivation behind the Turkish state's perception of terrorism as a threat
(most often both internal and external) to national sovereignty?
Q2: What are the implications of this perspective on Turkey's ability to overcome issues
regarding internal and external terrorism from its borders?
Q3: What are the factors that led to the radicalization of Daesh members in Turkey?
According to the research, the present work highlighted the relevance of certain
elements in the history of the Republic of Turkey, such as: the period of the fall of the
Ottoman Empire, the internal revolts of the minorities in the Ottoman space, the Treaty of
Sevres, the evolution of terrorist organizations as a continuation of the dissatisfaction of the
minorities during the period of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the perception of the Turkish state
regarding terrorism as a threat to national sovereignty comes from the fear of losing the
territory and of the "regional divide" deeply rooted in the collective memory of the Turkish
people, since the time of the Balkan Wars and, in particular, by the Treaty of Sevres. As such,
since the formation of the Republic of Turkey, the fear of a possible danger to the national
unity represented by the minorities present in the territory (especially of the Kurdish
ethnicity), is reflected in the internal and external policies of the state that have influenced the
terrorist activity in the territory: internally, by the forced migration of the Kurdish ethnic
population which subsequently favored the radicalization of Daesh; externally, through
relations with neighboring countries that could influence the minority population or have
territorial claims (Syria, for example, supported the PKK terrorist organization and hosted its
leader for 11 years in Damascus). As such, in the context of the Daesh organization in
Turkey, the Turkish state has been required to prove that it is fully aware of its history and of
past mistakes. At the same time, this moment represented an opportunity for Turkey to
overcome its own fears and impose itself as an important player in the region.
In the case of the radicalization factors identified in the analysis of the Daesh
phenomenon in Turkey, the paper highlighted two main categories: the push factors (personal
motivation, socio-economic environment, forced migration in the case of the population of
Kurdish origin, ethnic and religious context) and attraction factors (online propaganda in
Turkish, personalized radicalization networks, the existence of terrorist veterans and their
speech, opposition to the Assad regime, antagonism with Kurdish political groups and PKK,
speech against the Turkish government). At the same time, in the context of Daesh
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radicalization in the Turkish territory, we have observed a predominance of radicalization
within the Kurdish community, especially among the youth of this ethnic group.
The most important conclusions drawn from the research are related to Daesh as a very
complex phenomenon, marking a fifth wave of terrorism, and to its regional and global
implications. At the same time, the conclusions refer to the lessons learned from the Turkish
experience, applicable in other security environments (Black Sea, European Union, Balkans).
The conclusion regarding Daesh also provide a personal contribution in the work
developed by two main pillars: the SWOT analysis of the phenomenon and the description of
a fifth wave of terrorism represented by Daesh and its affiliated organizations. The
characteristics that define the new wave of terrorism represented by Daesh are: territorial
location, but, at the same time, "neoglobal jihadism", very strongly anchored at virtual level
(online, through international networks, through affiliated groups in different corners of the
world); achieving the main objective of creating an "Islamic Caliphate", even for a short time
(this is a set precedent and motivates future generations of jihadists); the phenomenon of
"homegrown terrorism"; the phenomenon of "lonely wolves", through successive attacks
planned and carried out by authors who acted alone, but on behalf of the organization whose
ideology radicalized them; communication in the virtual environment and its effects both for
radicalization, but also for the continuous motivation of the supporters and the coordination of
the terrorist activity; combining the jihadist-Salafi ideology with the Baas governance
structure and military strategy, proving a new form that terrorist organizations have adopted
in the Daesh context; obtaining financial resources through the controlled territories.
The lessons learned from the Turkish experience relate to the assessment of threats
according to the (terrorist) organization, the correct use of public diplomacy, the adaptation of
the security sector to new threats, the strategic flexibility in diplomacy, the programming of
time in the military operation, the counter-terrorism based on the local population, the
modernization of military equipment through local production, collaboration of all structures
of the security apparatus, both nationally and internationally, the relevance of the local
context.
The limitations identified in the research are related to the origin of the information
regarding the total members of Daesh in Turkey, their profile data - especially ethnicity -, the
verification of the data obtained from several sources and the updating of the data until the
moment of the completion of the work.
Located in different geographical, political, social, cultural, historical and economic
contexts, Turkey and the European Union have adopted their own security strategies in the
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fight against Daesh. In Turkey, the measures have had a rapid impact, and, as a result, the
terrorist attacks claimed by Daesh have ceased after January 2017, the flow of foreign
terrorist fighters from Turkey has been stopped, and the Daesh network in Turkey has been
gradually identified and annihilated. In the European Union, the attacks continued, many of
the foreign terrorist fighters returned or are about to return, and the Daesh networks,
especially at the virtual level, have not been fully identified. Given these elements, the
comparative analysis section aimed at comparing the two strategies and highlighting the
similarities, differences, but also their consequences.
Turkey's strategy in the fight against Daesh was influenced, as in the case of the other
elements in the analysis of the Daesh phenomenon (attacks, foreign terrorist fighters,
networks, radicalization) by its proximity to the conflict area. As such, Turkey was forced to
adopt "hard power" measures, such as interventions and operations by the Turkish army and
special forces in key points in Syria and Iraq, but also in the Turkish territory. Unlike the
European Union, where much of the strategy focused on "soft power" - combating online
radicalization, border security measures, combating Daesh financing, measures on firearms
and explosive material legislation, combating ideology - Turkey has has been forced by the
context to adopt the necessary strategy. In its case, the strategy had the expected effect, but in
the case of the European Union, the "soft power" approach has not proved sufficient to ensure
the safety of citizens. However, the European Union does not have the option of a hard power
strategy because of its state.
Some EU member states have been involved in the International Coalition in military
terms, providing the necessary support for the victory over the Daesh organization in Syria
and Iraq, but this did not have the same effect as in Turkey. It also attracted more terrorist
attacks, these countries being identified as direct targets. Both Turkey and the European
Union, including Member States at national level, have developed a strategy against Daesh as
they have been hit by the consequences of the organization's activity. Terrorist attacks have
prompted both the European Union and Turkey to take concrete action against Daesh. As in
the case of diseases in the human body, terrorism must be prevented, the subsequent reaction
to its occurrence being late and, in most cases, inefficient. In this case, another extremely
important element must be considered: the bureaucratic process. Terrorist organizations do
not have a bureaucratic process by which to define and subsequently apply their strategies.
This gives them precious time and gives them unpredictable character. States (Turkey and EU
member states) and political and economic unions (European Union) are limited by a
bureaucratic process that provides predictability and slows their response to terrorist activity.
15
The bureaucratic process is much more complex when we refer to the European Union, of
which 28 member states belong.
The Daesh phenomenon has adapted to the context in which it has evolved, its presence
within the European Union being much more decentralized and harder to track and control in
comparison to its version in Turkey. This fact is also reflected by the phenomenon of the
"lone wolf" that we encounter in the attacks on the territory of the European Union, but not in
Turkey. As such, the importance given by the European Union to combating online
radicalization and the Daesh ideology is correct and, in the long term, effective in this context.
In the case of Turkey, such an approach would not have been complete nor effective, with
physical cells playing a leading role in his case.
Border measures and restrictions to travel to the conflict zone for foreign terrorist
fighters have proven to be effective in recent times, but they were certainly late on both sides.
This is evidenced by the number of foreign terrorists who arrived in Syria before being
identified and stopped. Some of them returned and committed the attacks claimed by Daesh,
presenting a direct consequence of the insufficient control measures in the border areas and of
the poor international cooperation in this respect, reflected by the low interoperability of the
databases. Both the European Union and Turkey were aware of the threat posed by foreign
terrorists relatively late and suffered the consequences, learning the necessary lessons the hard
way. While Turkey is focusing its efforts on the region close to its borders and within its own
territory, the European Union is proving a deep knowledge of the Deash organization and an
understanding of its decentralized and globalized character. As such, the European Union's
strategy also includes the international ramifications of Daesh, in the geographical areas that
may represent opportunities for the organization. This element within the strategy of the
European Union reflects the fact that it has realized the importance of prevention in the fight
against terrorism.
The strategy of the European Union and that of Turkey in combating Daesh are not
entirely effective, applied separately. But the elements of the two strategies complement each
other and can form, based on the experience of the two regions in the fight against Daesh, a
new, international strategy, adapted to the new status of the Daesh organization, but also to
the regional, national, local contexts.
This strategy is extremely important within the Coalition of which Turkey and the
European Union are part. Although it has succeeded in defeating Daesh on the ground, the
International Coalition still has a long way to go to defeat the terrorist organization
completely. Without a clear political strategy to guide Daesh's efforts, these military gains
16
could be quickly lost. Given the lack of security and stability, both Iraq and Syria could once
again become reasons for growing conflicts and extremism, exacerbating European security
and migration challenges. Given that Daesh is even more dangerous now in insurgency than it
was as a proto-state, the Coalition should redefine its strategy and become more united than
ever. Without deepening cooperation against Daesh, the group has every chance of gaining
power again. But countries need incentives to work together, to share information, to change
their laws and to protect communities vulnerable to radicalization. Instead of overlapping
with hardness and unilateralism, the core power of the international community in truly
defeating terrorist organizations lies in cooperation. The collective impact of joint efforts is
most powerful in isolating and distinguishing the danger posed by terrorists.
In the last five years, the issue of radicalization in Europe has been aggravated by two
contexts: Salafi-jihadism promoted by Daesh and right-wing extremism. This paper has dealt
with the topic of Daesh and as such, current threats will be presented from this perspective.
With the defeats suffered by Daesh in the territory, foreign terrorist fighters began to return to
Europe, while the virtual presence of the organization was strengthened by the "virtual
caliphate". In response, the European Union has set up some of the best anti-radicalization
programs to combat these threats. However, these measures have failed to prevent some of the
worst terrorist attacks ever to occur on European territory. This research has proved this fact
and argued the cause as the lack of true coordination and cooperation between the approaches
of the Member States and at the wider level of the European Union.
As discussed in the first chapter of this paper, extremist propaganda has undergone a
transformation that has ensured their success. Daesh began producing quality propaganda
videos, with graphic details and narratives aimed at radicalization along with online
publications of the same quality and brutality. The evolution of social networks has given an
advantage to the communication of the message Daesh and its promotion, from member to
member. The Daesh propaganda and the virtual activity of the organization even undermined
the defeats in the territory, turning them into opportunities to instigate the violence by which
the terrorist fighters at home encouraged to act, provoking devastating attacks. Recent
findings suggest that increased use of encrypted communications applications (Telegram &
WhatsApp) have been essential for successfully distributing Daesh propaganda and for
communicating among its members. In the case of Turkey, lesser-known programs were also
discovered, difficult to be followed by the security forces.
The issue of repatriation of foreign terrorist fighters and their families is a current issue
and a major concern for European countries. Some states initially refused the repatriation of
17
foreign terrorist fighters, but the possibility of withdrawing US troops from the territory
prompted this decision to be reconsidered. With the attacks in Sri Lanka, another dimension
of this issue has attracted even more attention: the repatriation of women in Daesh. These
may, in some cases, be much more radicalized and may lead to individual attacks (Speckhard,
2019). Alongside women, there is the problem of minors in Daesh, whose mental and
physical traumas are difficult to imagine and treat. The long-term Daesh effect is, most
importantly, reflected in these minors.
Another major concern is the rehabilitation of prisoners. Instead of functioning as
rehabilitation centers, prisons in many European countries have emerged as a new ground for
radicalization. The penitentiaries have provided and offers a space where militants of varying
degrees of radicalization can come into contact and influence prisoners who are not
radicalized. Thus, a prisoner or a person with a lower level of radicalization can become fully
radicalized. This fact is observed in the case of Daesh attacks in the territory of the European
Union, but also as one of the common elements Daesh profiles: legacy of its founder, al-
Zarqawi, radicalized by al-Maqdisi in prison.
As part of the "ISIS 2.0" threat, the Interpol warns precisely about the danger of foreign
terrorist fighters who were imprisoned for trying to travel to Syria in the first stage of the
phenomenon, and are about to be released.
To combat radicalization in prison, each European country has implemented different
measures. Some of the most illustrative are those in Belgium and Germany. In 2018, Belgium
developed a program known as "Deradex". Under this program, radicalized prisoners were
isolated and were allowed only limited contact with other prisoners considered radicalized at
the same level. The opposite approach was adopted in Germany, where the idea of isolating
the radicalized prisoners was rejected, favoring instead the implementation of an intensive
monitoring and intervention program to prevent the emergence of new radicalizations. These
are just two examples of the different approaches that EU Member States have chosen. These
differences prevent the European Union and its law enforcement agencies from implementing
more effective and uniform action. The detention and prosecution of returning warriors may
provide comfort for some time, however, new home warriors will grow unless the root causes
of extremism are addressed. Undetected radicalized European citizens can exploit their
anonymity to cause more disasters and can become fighters if a new front is opened, as is
currently observed in the UK.
In conclusion, the national approaches to counter radicalization within the European
Union have not been fully effective, proving the need for advanced cooperation both at
18
European level to complement the national approach, as well as between the European Union
and Turkey, for the exchange of experience and information. about foreign terrorist fighters.
At the same time, Turkey and the European Union can share their experiences in the case of
radicalization of the Kurdish ethnic population, on both sides. The recent wave of attacks has
strengthened the current European transnational cooperation and proved its necessity. At the
same time, European counter-propaganda campaigns and programs offer effective support to
Member States, which are not limited to national territories, in the fight against radicalization.
However, the lack of coordination and differences in national commitment to tackle
radicalization undermines the overall effectiveness of anti-radicalization in Europe.
Therefore, there should be more cooperation with European law enforcement institutions to
enable them to work as bridges between the various law enforcement bodies in Europe,
significantly increasing overall operational effectiveness.
Given the current context, important steps need to be taken for the Coalition's actions to
continue and be successful in the fight against Daesh. First and foremost, all members should
develop the ability to share information with each other to combat a "decentralized jihad". In
order to locate and combat the linear transnational phenomenon of Salafi jihadism represented
by Daesh, the application of local law and the exchange of information will be crucial,
beyond the military dimension. Many of the Daesh attacks that took place in Europe could
have been prevented if a change of information between Coalition members had been
ensured.
Recognizing that the instability and lack of central control have facilitated the
organization's return to the past, it is extremely important that the Coalition provides the
necessary support to the Iraqi government and ensure a peaceful process of transition and
normalization in Syria.
In addition, the Coalition should provide a platform to discuss and develop new
effective ways to combat Daesh. The main topics that this platform should focus on are:
supporting humanitarian assistance, liquidating land mines, stabilization efforts inside Syria,
continuing to build strategic border security, exchanging information, providing counter-
narratives based on lessons learned and experiences. .
The Daesh phenomenon is still evolving, and the international community will continue
to struggle with it in the future. The commitment to creating a better and safer place for future
generations should certainly provide the motivation to listen to and understand the opposite
perspectives to develop new strategies to combat terrorism.
19
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