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Summit Workshop for Subject Matter Experts Somalia and al-Shabaab

David Last Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society Royal Military College of Canada CSA: James W. Moore, 416-635-2000 Ext.3035 The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

Defence R&D Canada

Contract Report DRDC Toronto CR 2011-173 November 2011

Summit Workshop for Subject Matter Experts Somalia and al-Shabaab

David Last Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society Royal Military College of Canada Prepared By: David Last Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society Royal Military College of Canada CSA: James W. Moore, 416-635-2000 Ext.3035 The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.

Defence R&D Canada – Toronto Contract Report DRDC Toronto CR 2011-173 November 2011

Principal Author

Original signed by David Last, Ph.D.

David Last, Ph.D.

Politics and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada

Approved by

Original signed by James W. Moore, LL.M., Ph.D.

James W. Moore, LL.M., Ph.D.

Socio-Cognitive Systems Section

Approved for release by

Original signed by Dr. Stergio Stergiopoulos

Dr. Stergio Stergiopoulos

Acting Chair, Knowledge and Information Management Committee, Acting Chief Scientist

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011

© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2011

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Abstract ……..

This Contract Report summarizes the presentations given and discussions held at the Summit Workshop for Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on Somalia and the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab, held at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, 28-29 July 2011. This Workshop was organized as part of Phase 2 Framework Calibration of the research program for the Technology Investment Fund (TIF) Project 10az01 “A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics.” The aim of the Workshop was to provide the contracting teams for Phase 2 field work with essential background on the political, security and socio-cultural context within which al-Shabaab operates, as well as to provide the broader Government of Canada policy and intelligence community with a forum in which to discuss issues of pressing relevance to Canada’s engagement in the Horn of Africa.

Résumé ….....

Le présent rapport résume les exposés présentés et les discussions tenues lors de l’Atelier à l’intention des experts en la matière (EM) sur la Somalie et le groupe djihadiste somalien Al-Shabaab, qui a eu lieu les 28 et 29 juillet 2011 à l’Université Queen’s, à Kingston (Ontario). Cet atelier a été organisé dans le cadre de la Phase 2, Calibrage du cadre conceptuel du programme de recherche pour le projet du Fonds d’investissement technologique (FIT) intitulé « A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics » (code de projet : 10az01). L’atelier visait à transmettre aux équipes embauchées à titre contractuel pour effectuer des travaux sur le terrain pendant la Phase 2 du programme les connaissances essentielles sur le contexte politique, socioculturel et de sécurité dans lequel Al-Shabaab mène ses activités. L’atelier avait également pour but de fournir à l’ensemble de la communauté des politiques et du renseignement du gouvernement du Canada une tribune pour discuter des questions qui revêtent une grande importance pour l’engagement du Canada dans la Corne de l’Afrique.

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Executive summary

Summit Workshop for Subject Matter Experts: Somalia and al-Shabaab

David Last; DRDC Toronto CR 2011-173; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto; November 2011.

Introduction

At the request of the Socio-Cognitive Systems Section of DRDC Toronto, the Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society, Royal Military College of Canada, in conjunction with the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University, organized a Summit Workshop for Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on Somalia and al-Shabaab, held at Queen’s University, Kingston, 28-29 July 2011. This workshop served two purposes. It provided a forum for substantive discussion of the issues surrounding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs) in the Horn of Africa, in particular the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab, focusing on questions of identity and motivation. It also brought together area specialists in the field of Somali studies with experts in the disciplines of social psychology, intergroup conflict and group decision making, as well as Government of Canada (GoC) policy and intelligence officials tasked with the support and execution of Canadian policy in the Horn of Africa, for an open and frank exchange of ideas and information. The overarching aim of the Workshop was to advance the research agenda of the Technology Investment Fund (TIF) Project 10az01 “A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Armed Non-State Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics” (see Moore 2011 for an overview of this Project). This Executive Summary Report reviews the presentations given in the Workshop and the wide-ranging policy discussions that followed, the latter under the Chatham House rule of non-attribution.

Political and Security Challenges

Ken Menkhaus (Davidson College) provided an overview of the political and security challenges arising from Somalia.

The 1993 intervention was not a success, but did generate a $1.5 billion local economy based on aid. The local business class made alliances across clan lines, which persist because they are functional. 1.5 million of 10 million Somalis now reside outside the country, and the current exodus of another 750,000 puts almost a third of the population of south Somalia outside the country. The powerful obligation to remit funds is the major source of economic subsistence, and this drives the continued export of people, mainly through Kenya.

The arrival of al-Qaeda cells from East Africa in 2005, and their alliance with Sharia Courts and the militias that eventually became al-Shabaab has caused a sharp deterioration as civil war has shattered the limited order of the post-1993 period. Western support for Ethiopia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), propping up a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that appeared predatory, permitted al-Shabaab to conflate Islamic and anti-Western ideology.

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In the stalemate since 2008, Puntland and Somaliland appear to have made the most progress towards stable economy and governability, although there is no recognition of their secession from Somalia. The south remains the main problem. Al-Shabaab continues to recruit from the global diaspora, seeking interpreters, technical support, leaders, and suicide bombers (youth with no exit). Al-Shabaab’s budget of $70 million to $100 million per year comes mainly from local taxes and charcoal exports to the Gulf States, through Kismayo; diaspora funding is not important, but Kismayo is critical. Charcoal manufacture is also having a serious environmental impact through acacia deforestation.

Islamists in Somalia have no incentive to attack Kenya, however there appears to be a growing presence of East Africans, including Swahili speakers and recent converts from Kenya’s highlands, training in Somalia, raising the possibility of future incursions into Kenya and Tanzania.

Discussion highlighted the views that the refugee crisis is a much larger problem than the famine for East African stability, and that exports through Kismayo are more important to al-Shabaab’s finances than are remittances.

Clan and Islamic Identity

Peter Pham (Director, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic Council) presented on clan and Islamic identity, emphasizing that the political impasse is fundamentally one of legitimacy: clan and Islam are the bearers of legitimacy. Clan identities are fluid, and blend with Islam, with Sufi saints tied to the origin of clans. In his drive to modernization, Siad Barre tried to root out clannism, but ultimately resorted to governing through his affiliated clans. At times he eschewed the noble nomadic clans and powerful pastoral clans, choosing ministers from lowly craft clans because they were less threatening. The resettlement of more than a million internally displaced Somalis after the Ogaden war (1977-1978) helped disrupt the pattern of clan life, and Barre’s brutal counter-insurgency campaigns help to explain Somaliland’s drive for secession.

The TFG is not working because there is no effective policing; policing depends on legitimacy. Somali clans are very effective at self-policing. An assembly of elders talks problems through to consensus, and the outcome is policed and controlled by all. When the international community selects interlocutors, it divorces them from the context that confers legitimacy. The “4.5 formula” applied by the TFG (one for each of the three major clan federations and half for each minor clan) works more like a quota than an effective system of representation, and some appointments actually undermine legitimacy. The TFG is also notoriously corrupt, with ministers absorbing most of the resources.

Military training assistance to the TFG has not yielded many positive results. The US, France and European Union (EU)-NATO have trained more than 9,000 troops for the TFG, and the EU pays salaries for 3,000, but there is little evidence of more than 1,000 on the ground, with only a weak commitment evident to the TFG. Clan identities remain strong, even in areas controlled by al-Shabaab, and clan militias may support TFG yesterday, al-Shabaab today, and something else tomorrow.

Somali Islam has also been uprooted from its traditional context, and is mainly a problem in the south. Many so-called sheikhs are semi-literate.

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Somaliland has run a model election campaign, in which three major parties campaigned on separate days to avoid any conflict between their supporters. There was high voter turnout, the opposition won convincingly, and took power peacefully with a smooth transition. With this record of stability and successful governance, the international community cannot leave Somaliland in limbo forever.

Puntland has a piracy-based economy, but is integrating successful pirate-businessmen into politics and society, as they use their financial power to enter local elections and buy influence in port cities.

Islam is more attractive to youth in the diaspora because they may feel alienated, and are less integrated in clans. To the extent that clans transfer to diasporas, there is also a generation gap between the elder patriarchs and the youth with mixed cultural influences. It is worth studying diaspora communities because they are an integral part of the Somali economy and society, for good or ill.

Armed Non-State Actors

Andrew Grant (Queen’s University) researches armed non-state actors and rebel groups, including conflict over natural resources, particularly in West Africa. Somalia’s instability has continent-wide implications. Ethiopia and Kenya are particularly affected by the current crisis.

Ethnicity is a broad label; it does not displace historical, social, religious, political or economic choices in identity. Focusing on clans and religion in Somalia might lead to missing the regional context of identity choices, including relations across the border in Kenya and Ethiopia. The constructivist idea that identity is fluid is more persuasive than the primordial idea that identity is biologically determined through family relations.

There are micro-level factors in choices about identity; when state protections break down, individuals will select identity to increase certainty and security. Clan identities can be flexible, but they also emerge over generations and can be resistant to change. They can also be vehicles for adoption of new practices, as when Islamic practices quite quickly become embedded in daily life in a clan or extended family through patriarchal influence.

Clan and Islamic identities are not the only influences at work, particularly in coastal communities supporting piracy. Islamic influences on pirates have been explored, and the conclusion is that motivations are primarily commercial; neither Islamic nor clan influence is particularly strong. Commercial links also cut across clan lines. Ransoms support a large economy including construction, telecommunications, transportation and merchandise trade. Large financial incentives induce pragmatic cooperation. Piracy itself is a rational response to economic pressures.

Inevitable instability?

Ian Spears (University of Guelph) an African studies specialist, pointed to several reasons for pessimism about the prospects for establishing a stable Somali state. There are multiple layers of Somali identity, including the former British and Italian colonies in the region, the boundaries of which form the basis for Somaliland’s claim to independence. There is a pan-Somali identity, but

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the number of players, the nature of divisions, the armed population, and the geometry of local-regional-global conflicts make Somali instability particularly intractable. His study, Civil Wars in African States: Why Conflict Resolution Fails, explains that the current pattern of African borders predisposes the continent to instability.

Somalia had the same problem as other post-colonial governments: asserting control over a large, diverse and hostile landscape. Clans are an insurance policy, generally more trustworthy than predatory governments. As happened elsewhere in post-colonial Africa, the absence of effective institutions led government to revert to a combination of patronage and coercion – almost universal in Africa.

Somalia enjoyed a period of effective democracy from 1960 to 1969, based on a parliamentary system and clan compromises. It was unique amongst African states of the era in having an ex-president who was both safe and influential. A complicated system of proportional representation was used to gain access to resources. Political parties increased from 5 to 62 in number, and over a 1,000 candidates vied for office in the country’s last election in 1969. Siad Barre’s coup in that same year sought to impose a disciplined government that would solve problems without reference to archaic clan loyalties. Barre banned clan identities, pushed aside the Islamic agenda to pursue emancipation of women, and established a common script for the Somali language. Although remembered for brutality, many Somalis see the regime as a worthy government that misstepped, in the end relying on the clans that he tried to supplant.

Since the fall of Barre’s government in 1991, Somalia has been described as a toxic state. UNITAF and UNOSOM failed to restore national government. Peace processes have failed to achieve reconciliation, often being crass exercises in pie-sharing and seat-banking. One source of pessimism is that these are unavoidable in Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) seemed to be different – a broad mosque that brought together many strands of Islam, but in the end too disparate to be sustained. It did not exercise moderate or consistent judgment, and was incompatible with both regional and global interests. When the TFG was established with a mandate to bring about an Islamic state, the UIC had to demonstrate that it offered more coherent governance. Sheikh Sharif has been ineffective, and al-Shabaab has been stridently hostile. A hazard of inclusive conflict resolution is that it may be perceived as an attempt to weaken and divide in order to lend legitimacy to Western-backed forces. Efforts to appeal to moderates tend to radicalize other groups, and this has often been a precursor to escalating conflict.

If Somalia’s glass is half full, then there have been some successes like the period of democracy from 1960 to 1969, and some periods of enlightened authoritarianism under Barre; if half empty, then the problems are persistent and resilient, and all efforts to build a democratic state in Somalia have failed. There has never been a coherent state of Somalia, and governments have been little more than fragile mayors of Mogadishu. Every effort to establish a regime has fostered processes to undermine it.

Consequences of Non-State Recognition

Pierre Jolicoeur (Royal Military College of Canada), a scholar with an interest in secessionist movements considered the geography and demography of independence movements in the Horn of Africa. There are three logical parts to Somalia: Somaliland and Puntland in the north, and Somalia in the south. The Somali people share a language, religion, traditions, elements of an

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economy, and ethnicity. This is unusual in Africa. Why, then, do we find a strong movement in Somaliland to secede from this relatively coherent ethnic identity?

A map of the geographic distribution of Somali clans shows that the Isaaq make up about 66 percent of the population of Somaliland. The complex clan overlaps occur in the south, not in the north, but there is an overlap in territorial claims made by Somaliland in Puntland, and by Puntland in Somaliland, amounting to about a third of each of these potential nascent states.

Somaliland has had enviable stability despite the instability around it. They have achieved a level of reconstruction of infrastructure largely with local resources, but they face the continuing problems of non-recognition and a territorial dispute with Puntland. It bases its territorial claims not on the distribution of clans, but on the British-Ethiopian agreement of 1897. Its economy is comparatively sound, with a large pastoral sector and significant foreign aid; remittances of about $500 million per year are larger than the aid and livestock sectors together.

Somaliland’s political institutions are the most effective in Somalia. The president is elected for five years, cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary approval, the upper house is appointed and the lower house of the bicameral parliament is directly elected for six-year terms. The judiciary appears to be independent and effective. Elections in July 2010 were free and fair, won by the opposition, which took power in a smooth transition. Even its military forces have been largely brought under civilian control.

There are historical justifications for Somaliland’s independence, recognized before 1960 by 35 states. The discrimination and attacks against Somaliland under the Barre regime reinforced determination for independence, and the May 2001 constitutional referendum was a plebiscite on independence which garnered more than 90 percent popular support.

Many NGOs and aid agencies maintain relations with the Somaliland government. Some argue that it must have access to aid and diplomacy for the sake of stability, but having been cut off for almost a decade it has relied largely on its own resources, and this may be one of the sources of its success. The main reason for international reluctance to recognize it, however, is that it would open a Pandora’s box of secessionist claims. In other cases, the international community has intervened to prevent secession, but this is now an old story, and there are counter-examples like Eritrea, South Sudan and Kosovo.

As the problem of piracy expands and Puntland seeks a state, we have to ask whether sovereignty is a recipe for greater control over armed non-state actors in ungoverned spaces. Discussion suggested divided opinion. Spears argued that recognition of Somaliland could undo its fragile progress. Somaliland’s progress has been in the old pattern of realpolitik state building: “If you can defend it, it’s yours; but if you can’t, it never was.” It still has a strong sense of statehood and cohesion, which inoculates it against some of the problems faced by the south, including the rise of al-Shabaab as a rival authority. Nevertheless there are two ongoing clan conflicts in the north, in which blood payments often serve a stabilizing function.

There are about 2,000 ethnic groups in the world, about 200 countries, and only about 20 states that come close to ethnic homogeneity. State boundaries will never conform to ethnic identities, and even where they do, people move. However, in the case of Somaliland, 98 percent of the population supported sovereignty, although only 66 percent are of the Isaaq clan. It is in many

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ways analogous to the situation of Kosovo, which declared unilateral independence on the basis of previous conflict and oppression.

Somaliland is a special case because of its strong political institutions, but Somalia in general illustrates the capacity for groups to form and reform on the basis of shared experience, narratives of oppression, and claims of identity, which change over generations. The same patterns may emerge in the Congo and in West Africa. In Eritrea-Ethiopia, and Sudan-South Sudan, the larger state ceded its authority. Any Canadian recognition of Somaliland would have to involve similar acknowledgement, and a role for the African Union.

In a final comment relevant to any future fieldwork on armed non-state actors in Somalia, it was noted that while South Africa and Somalia are equally violent, Canada has consular assistance in South Africa. This has implications for insurance and the practical business of insertion, research and extraction of any research team.

Applied Social Science

Marissa Schuffler (University of Central Florida) cooperating with the social psychology contracting team at McGill and Carleton Universities, and working under Eduardo Salas (also of UCF), introduced the ways in which social psychology can help us to situate and understand the behaviour of armed non-state actors. This led to a general discussion of the ways in which specific knowledge of circumstances in Somalia can help to inform the social science project, and vice versa.

At the University of Central Florida, Eduardo Salas is trying to understand how groups and teams make decisions in a stressful environment. A report has been published linking insights from psychology, sociology and politics to provide an overarching framework of what influences decision-making. There are three groups of factors that seem to affect the way decisions are made: individual factors affecting perception; group factors that influence the sense-making process; and hierarchy factors that affect decision outcomes. The next phase is to dig into the details of the model and apply it to the Somalia case. Interviews provide one tool, but the research team is also applying archival and historiometric analysis: what happened in critical incidents? Another approach is thematic analysis: does the framework hold up? Are there generalizable and specific factors in particular cases?

An important consideration is how the research team can gain access to this sort of data. One approach has been to draw on data collected from US Army teams involved in decision-making in operations, such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan or Civil-Military Affairs Teams working after Hurricane Katrina. Another source is the SITE Intelligence Group, which transcribes and translates Jihadist web postings. This includes about 400 al-Shabaab Internet postings dating back to end-2006.

The use of this sort of translated data raises other questions about the reliability of research that relies on coding translations from other languages. Because the researchers don’t speak or read Arabic or Somali, they rely on translations. There are many words and phrases without direct translations in English. Researchers have found large differences when comparing English language translations of the Koran, for example. DRDC Toronto is working with Peter Suedfeld’s (University of British Columbia) concept of integrative complexity to find the structure

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underlying the semantic differences between translations. Lianne McLellan (DRDC Toronto) pointed to some success in determining underlying patterns of text that indicated either hostility or cooperation. For example, 16 passages from the Koran about jihad all had comparable levels of integrative complexity, regardless of translation, indicating that as long as the translation is semantically and grammatically correct, it should not matter which translation is used. Adding content analysis from the Florida team should permit triangulation.

What the researchers expect to find is insights into the factors that influence decision-making, particularly the decision to engage in violence. Asked what psychological factors might induce a person to join a group and engage in violence, the researchers indicated that collective identities like clan and Islamic identity are a start, but that we need to know more about how group-level emotions tend to push individuals towards or away from violence. We are also exploring collective narratives—hierarchy-enhancing legitimising myths (HELM) (see Last 2011)—as vehicles for inciting groups to violence.

The McGill-Carleton team – Don Taylor (McGill University), Michael Wohl (Carleton University), and Michael King (McGill University) – is working from the perspective of social identity theory, pursuing the research line of selecting and interviewing Somali-Canadians to assess perceptions of the situation in Somalia, and their willingness to engage in activities, provide funds here or abroad, and the rationale for doing so. They are particularly focused on inter-group emotions, including collective angst, fear for the future vitality of the group, and perceptions of action or inaction.

Researchers were struck by the complexity of the situation in Somalia and the Somali diaspora. If identities are “fluid” or “situational” then we really don’t know much about what they are, and the question becomes, what drives the changes to expressions of identity? We need to know what identities are salient and why. What needs or functions are served by collective identity? Identities serve as a map for action, especially under duress. We need to know more about the short- and long-term signposts provided by collective identity. Do armed non-state groups even have long-term views? Don Taylor pointed to the different signposts of community commitment by Hmong and Albanian immigrants in the US. Hmong focused on education first, while Albanians focused on money first; each community had a long-term game plan, but the latter led to drugs and organized crime. Perhaps the one thing that is worse than a bad game plan is no game plan at all. As a host society, we don’t necessarily want to win hearts and minds; we need to negotiate contingencies.

Canada’s foreign Policy on Somalia

The second day of the workshop invoked the Chatham House rule; the material can be used, but remarks will not be attributed to individuals or organizations.

Canada did not formally recognize the TFG, because it does not meet the test of statehood that is normally applied. It does not exchange ambassadors, and is unlikely to receive officials. Almost by definition, those who arrive in Canada must hold the passports of another country. Canada has no bilateral aid program with Somalia, but contributes to the regional program for Economic Growth and Agricultural Development (EGAD) through the African Union. The Amanda Lindhout kidnapping in Mogadishu consumed a great deal of consular time and energy, and not wanting to see this repeated, travel to the region is discouraged.

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Somalia is on the political radar. As Minister for International Cooperation, the Honourable Bev Oda met in Nairobi with international and non-governmental officials, travelled to the Dadaab Refugee Camp on the Somali border, and announced Canadian aid. The problems, however, are daunting: piracy, corruption, lawlessness, international terrorist involvement, and institutional collapse over more than two decades. It remains to be seen whether the draw-down of Canadian resources devoted to Afghanistan will free assets to be deployed to Somalia. Canada supports African Union (AU) efforts that arise from the Djibouti peace process. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a purely AU mission, not a hybrid UN-AU mission like the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). It consists only of troops from Uganda and Burundi, with those from Burundi being more effective. The mandate includes facilitating humanitarian aid, but much of this is limited by insecurity outside Mogadishu.

There is general agreement that a renewed effort at national reconciliation and peace building is necessary, but Canada has doubts that an expensive international conference would contribute much. So far, resources have not been linked to outcomes, and there are no benchmarks for progress. The next step is to tie donation pledges to measurable outcomes.

Canada condemns al-Shabaab attacks, and listed the group as a terrorist organization in 2010. This presents challenges for CIDA in programming and aid delivery, but Canada has not gone as far as the US, which denies all programming or dealings with agencies that might provide any material benefit to al-Shabaab.

Canada continues as part of the NATO contact group on piracy, but has been more active in the past, with up to three frigates in the Indian Ocean at various times. This may recur, but there are no plans currently for further deployments. Legal support to Seychelles and Kenya helps to ensure trials of pirates.

Canada participates with the UN, EU and China in an international contact group on Somalia three times a year, most recently in Kampala, with the aim of encouraging the TFG to move in the right direction. Much of its effort is financial, having contributed $81 million since December 2006, with an additional $50 million to address the drought crisis. The East Africa Drought Relief Fund matches private Canadian contributions and is not capped. Canada also makes contributions to AMISOM and the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) of $10 million per year. Finally, there are small local disbursements directly from Canada’s High Commissioner in Nairobi, which can be spent in Somaliland.

Canada’s main interest in Somalia stems from the large diaspora population. There are at least 37,000 Somali Canadians, with some estimates of more than 170,000. CSIS is concerned about al-Shabaab recruiting Canadians, and there is a possibility of anti-Canadian reactions as this country deals successfully with that threat. The US is more directly engaged in security support, and Canada anticipates an invitation to do more, but the Government is cautious because this would increase the threat to Canadians exponentially.

On the piracy side, it has been alleged that there is a direct link between merchants, ransoms and terrorism, and there is a question as to whether the international community is resisting admission of this link in order to avoid charging merchants who pay ransoms with supporting terrorism; this would increase pressure to deal with terrorism. Most organizations argue that the link is not clear; there is a lot of conflicting information.

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In the larger regional picture, refugees flowing into Kenya are more important than the famine. Kenya cannot reasonably return refugees, nor do anything to slow or stop the flow, so they will be looking for more help. There is a real risk that the large refugee flows, particularly if they cannot move on to third countries in the West, will begin to destabilize east Kenya and Tanzania.

The Humanitarian Situation and Canadian Response

More than 12 million people are affected by famine in the Horn of Africa region. There is a recurring drought cycle. The current drought is not as bad as the droughts of the 1990s, but a larger population is affected, partly because of the success of previous aid efforts. Overall, this makes 2010-2011 the worst famine in 60 years.

South Somalia is controlled by al-Shabaab, and they are particularly opposed to food aid. Health and hygiene aid tends to get in. One of al-Shabaab’s concerns is that food aid will undermine Somali farmers. Of the 3.1 million needing food assistance, 2.5 million are in areas controlled by al-Shabaab. Male adults and teens are staying, but families, women and children are leaving to get food aid. Sixty thousand were displaced in July, 90 percent of these by drought rather than conflict. Those fleeing drought may not meet the technical criteria to be considered refugees, so although we keep talking about conflict, the fact that these are environmental migrants rather than political refugees will continue to be an issue.

Canada’s overall goals in Somalia are to save lives and preserve human dignity; it is not about development. Two areas have effectively collapsed, and eight others will be declared famine zones in the near future. All are under al-Shabaab control, where the World Food Program (WFP) has no access. A famine is declared when acute malnutrition among children exceeds 30 percent; it is now at 50 percent in famine-stricken areas. The last declaration of famine in Somalia was in 1991.

To get to camps in Kenya, Somalis have to walk 80 km from the border—15 or 20 days with very little food and water—so they are arriving in very poor condition. Canada has been pushing Kenya to open the border crossing to assist movement, intercepting the weakest to help them. Those who are leaving Somalia are the ones with the means and the physical capacity; those who remain in famine zones are likely to die.

In addition to the failed rains, food prices have risen. NGOs have started cash programming, but this can easily be redirected, particularly in al-Shabaab areas where there is efficient local tax collection.

Part of al-Shabaab is opposed, but others want to receive aid. WFP is still banned. NGOs might be able to establish food distribution in less dire circumstances, but in these conditions of famine, only the WFP has the capacity to deliver the volume of food necessary.

The Dadaab camps were built for 90,000 but now house 388,000. It is taking about two months to register for aid in the camps, and there are about 25,000 waiting outside the camps; 97 percent of the refugees are Somali, and some have been there as long as 10 or 20 years, so they know how to work the system. This means that problems are beginning to arise in the camps between different types of residents – the old hands and the new arrivals. Security problems are beginning to multiply. There are also empty camps because of disputes between the UNHCR and the

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Kenyan government. Kenya wants to establish new camps in third countries, including Ethiopia, with the aim of encouraging settlement.

The UN has launched numerous humanitarian appeals. $2 billion of pledges have been collected, but another $4 billion in need has been identified. Traditional donors are tapped out, and a special effort is being made to raise money from non-traditional donors, particularly wealthy Middle Eastern states.

Canada supports the UN, Red Cross, and Canadian-based NGOs such as Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children, and World Vision. CIDA supported two projects in Somalia outside al-Shabaab areas, with assurances that the resources would not be diverted to al-Shabaab. Terrorism legislation is vague, referring to “indirect funding”, but how indirect and according to what criteria? Our legislation has not been tested, for example, do taxes levied at roadblocks or taxes on employees constitute indirect funding? For Americans, the US Presidential Directive is clear: the US cannot operate in areas controlled by al-Shabaab.

The continuing conflict in southern Somalia means that there is no security, no development, no new infrastructure. Since the last drought in 2009, agriculture has been less productive, and this year’s famine is part of a long-term and cyclical problem. There are three solutions to recurring refugee crises: resettlement in third countries (the preferred option for many Somalis, including those relying on the remittance economy); return to Somalia; and integration into the country of refuge. Since none of these is working, there needs to be another solution.

Discussion of this grim picture indicated that al-Shabaab is not the only problem. The TFG is also obstructing food aid in some areas to protect agricultural interests. All food aid is intensely political. The UN and WFP are often seen as large players that do not take the time to create the trust that makes it possible to provide aid effectively. Somalis are suspicious of the UN because in addition to its humanitarian branches like UNHCR and WFP, it has political and military branches.

Periods of drought in Somalia are more severe and closer together than they used to be. Deforestation and overgrazing are documented problems, and recurring famines are likely to get worse. There were diverging views expressed about the utility of aid. One view is that food aid in the region has always been used politically, and locals are right to be sceptical about Western motives. It is likely that this famine is affecting more people than the last because successful mitigation strategies in 2009 saved lives. The humanitarian motive is distinct from development, and several participants expressed the existential responsibility towards the starving, distinct from any national interest. On the other hand, if famine is contained and helps bring population into line with the land’s capacity to support it, and displaced populations are destabilizing for the entire region, then al-Shabaab might be seen as an unwitting ally in a regional stabilization strategy.

One of Canada’s national interests is to prevent the narrative of neglect from circulating in the Somali-Canadian community. Radicalization of Somali-Canadian youth is more likely in the face of indifference and inaction, and the agents of radicalization are already active in the Canadian diaspora.

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Assessment of Regional Security Issues

The final speaker made four points. First, al-Shabaab is becoming weaker. Second, the problems in the region will not go away. Third, the terror threat may actually be increasing. Finally, one cause of the decline in al-Shabaab has been inattention to its economic base.

Although 2010 looked like a stalemate, by the summer of 2011, al-Shabaab looked much weaker. It lost a lot of ground in Mogadishu, and AMISOM was poised to push into new areas. Famine changed some international priorities, but Kenya and Ethiopia supported proxies, which have defeated parts of al-Shabaab, reducing the flow of goods and taxes. Many al-Shabaab commanders have been killed in Mogadishu, and the group can’t pay competitive salaries to fighters, leading to defections. It has been reduced to press-ganging children and old men, and shooting defectors. Although foreign jihadis are still fighting in the south, they have resorted to guerrilla tactics – IEDs and suicide bombers. Although it still controls a lot of territory, morale is bad and the group is retrenching. There is stress between leaders and organizational friction. Somalis are attuned to power shifts, and as they understand al-Shabaab’s waning power, they are rejecting it more. Trying to control the narrative, al-Shabaab is blaming the West for its reversals, but if it loses this narrative battle, this may contribute to its continued demise.

Despite these problems, al-Shabaab remains a robust insurgency and will not disappear quickly. The TFG remains weak and divided. Most of its internal conflicts are about money and short term logic. Sheikh Sharif’s initial optimism has been replaced by cynical abuse of power, and there is no real prospect of improvement, despite the Kampala accord. Without effective governance, AMISOM advances will not have much impact. The international community is aware of these problems, but has no solution for them. The fragmentation of Somalia is accelerating, and there are no courses of action that will improve the situation. There is a general sense of fatigue, and no one seems to know what to do.

As al-Shabaab retreats into the Somali interior, it becomes more like an insurgency. It can launch multiple attacks in the south, but the motivation to do so is unclear. Terror attacks outside the region are comparatively low-cost, and may come to be seen as an alternative to demonstrate al-Shabaab’s continued relevance. The organization’s control over its core fighters has remained relatively strong, but is loosened somewhat by recent retreats, and many foreign fighters may begin to act more independently.

The decline of al-Shabaab has a lot to do with lack of access to and control over resources. Just as the TFG has always been a kind of fiction, al-Shabaab’s narrative can be questioned. The key to understanding patronage politics is that people seek power in order to control resources and redistribute them. Michael Woldemariam’s PhD thesis, Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies, demonstrates that rebel groups elsewhere in Africa tend to stay together if they face stalemate or slow gains, but they fall apart if there are rapid gains or setbacks. This now appears to be afflicting al-Shabaab, and the needs of individuals in command positions are driving the organization without any clear sense of purpose.

Discussion disputed some of these claims. At least one participant saw al-Shabaab as continuing to show cohesion and purpose, governed by a Shura council with stable membership. The leaders give direction and people follow. They have demonstrated over time that they can control the movement.

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Another suggestion was that declining local jihadi groups have produced the most prominent global leaders, as the group shifts its attention from the near to the far enemy. Al-Shabaab’s crafting of the anti-Western narrative may be a precursor to this shift, and recruitment of North American teenagers may be a precursor to that move.

There was a question about how the leadership exerts control and what the organization looks like. Money, ideology and personal authority are the main vehicles of control. Somalis recognize power; they are attracted by success, but may fall away in adversity. The top tier of al-Shabaab is quite flat – there is one leader, but many around him are key to the organization’s functioning. Abdi does not have a constituency and is running the organization without a clan base of support. He has military acumen and experience from Afghanistan. Al Hamami, an American jihadist, may be the key to controlling the foreign fighter section of the Shura. There are others in the top echelon, but it is quite flat. Clan warlords were important when al-Shabaab was one of many armed groups, but its strategy has changed over time. It began by cooperating with clan groups, then coopted, controlled and took over or took out opposition. Al-Shabaab’s leaders always saw themselves as heading an insurgency, and used local government structures to govern rather than governing directly. Now they are moving back towards insurgent patterns rather than taking and holding territory. They may be getting some funds from piracy, but most pirates are geographically distant and ideologically distinct. If there are alliances, they are limited to alliances of convenience.

It may be possible to test how the “narrative war” might play in the diaspora. What do expatriate Somalis think of the causes of Somali misery and the role of the West? (This could dovetail with the study to determine methods of eliciting hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths – see Last 2011.)

The organizing ideology of al-Shabaab is a bit loose. One speaker suggested that they make things up as they go along – to implement sharia, for example, but without any clear idea about what that comprises.

It is not necessarily false to assume that Somalia would be better off under an Islamist regime. A framework without the radical egoism of the individual might be much easier to live with in the harsh environment of drought, climate change and scarcity facing Somalis, though undoubtedly worse for women. Some women, on the other hand, argue that they were better off under the rule of the UIC, when they felt safer and more respected.

In the final analysis, there are differences in the worldviews of terrorists and insurgent organizations, and these worldviews shape the actions of groups like al-Shabaab. Ideas do matter, and we need to understand them if we are to deal with these groups effectively.

Concluding remarks

The purpose of this summary has been to provide an account of the Workshop for the use of the participants and other interested parties, not to offer any conclusions or recommendations. In the chapters that follow in the body of this Report, the presentation slides and/or speaking notes for a selection of the Workshop presentations are reproduced to elaborate on the comments and observations in this Executive Summary.

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Sommaire .....

Atelier à l’intention des experts en la matière : la Somalie et Al-Shabaab

David Last ; DRDC Toronto CR 2011-173 ; R & D pour la défense Canada – Toronto; novembre 2011.

Introduction

À la demande de la Section des systèmes sociocognitifs de RDDC Toronto, le Centre pour la sécurité, les forces armées et la société du Collège militaire royal du Canada, en collaboration avec le Centre for International and Defence Policy de l’Université Queen’s, a organisé un atelier à l’intention des experts en la matière (EM) sur la Somalie et Al-Shabaab. Cet atelier, qui a eu lieu les 28 et 29 juillet 2011 à l’Université Queen’s, à Kingston, a permis d’atteindre deux objectifs. Il a offert une tribune pour discuter des enjeux relatifs aux acteurs non étatiques armés dans la Corne de l’Afrique, plus particulièrement le groupe djihadiste somalien Al-Shabaab, tout en mettant l’accent sur les questions de l’identité et de la motivation. L’atelier a également favorisé un échange ouvert et franc d’idées et de renseignements entre des spécialistes des études somaliennes, des experts des domaines de la psychologie sociale, des conflits intergroupes et de la prise de décisions en groupe, ainsi que des agents des politiques et du renseignement du gouvernement du Canada chargés d’appuyer et d’appliquer la politique du Canada dans la Corne de l’Afrique. En fait, le but principal de cet atelier était de faire progresser le programme de recherche pour le projet du Fonds d’investissement technologique (FIT) intitulé « A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics » (code de projet : 10az01) (voir Moore 2011 pour un aperçu de ce projet). Le présent rapport sommaire porte sur les exposés présentés lors de l’atelier et les vastes discussions stratégiques qui ont suivi. Celles-ci ont été menées selon la règle de Chatham House; de ce fait, on ne divulgue pas l’identité des participants.

Défis en matière de politique et de sécurité

Ken Menkhaus (Collège de Davidson) a donné un aperçu des défis en matière de politique et de sécurité auxquels est confrontée la Somalie.

Bien que l’intervention de 1993 n’ait pas été un succès, elle a tout de même généré une économie locale de 1,5 milliard de dollars, laquelle repose sur l’aide humanitaire. Le milieu des affaires local a conclu des alliances avec divers clans, et comme celles-ci sont fonctionnelles, elles sont toujours en vigueur. À l’heure actuelle, 1,5 million des 10 millions de Somaliens habitent à l’extérieur du pays et 750 000 autres Somaliens se sont expatriés. Par conséquent, presque le tiers de la population du sud de la Somalie demeure toujours à l’extérieur de son pays. Les incontournables transferts de fonds, qui sont la principale source de subsistance économique, ont entraîné le départ continu des Somaliens, principalement par le Kenya.

La situation s’est grandement détériorée en raison de l’arrivée de cellules d’Al-Qaeda de l’Afrique de l’Est en 2005 et de leur alliance avec les tribunaux islamiques et les milices qui ont

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formé ce qui est devenu Al-Shabaab. En effet, la guerre civile a brusquement mis fin à l’ordre qui régnait dans le pays depuis 1993. Le soutien offert par les pays occidentaux à l’Éthiopie et à la Mission de l’Union africaine en Somalie (AMISOM), et par le fait même à un gouvernement fédéral de transition (GFT) qui semblait abusif, a permis à Al-Shabaab d’amalgamer les idéologies islamiques et antioccidentales.

Dans l’impasse depuis 2008, et même si leur sécession de la Somalie n’a pas été reconnue, le Puntland et le Somaliland semblent avoir réalisé le plus de progrès vers l’instauration d’une gouvernance et d’une économie stables. Le principal problème demeure le sud du pays. Al-Shabaab continue de recruter de nouveaux membres parmi la diaspora mondiale et est à la recherche d’interprètes, de soutien technique, de leaders et de kamikazes (des jeunes sans issue). Le budget d’Al-Shabaab, qui s’élève entre 70 et 100 millions de dollars par année, provient principalement des taxes locales et de l’exportation de charbon de bois vers les États du Golfe par la ville de Kismayo; les fonds qui proviennent de la diaspora sont marginaux, mais la collaboration de Kismayo est essentielle. En outre, la production de charbon de bois entraîne de graves répercussions environnementales, par exemple la destruction des forêts d’acacias.

Les islamistes qui se trouvent en Somalie n’ont aucune raison d’attaquer le Kenya. Toutefois, le nombre croissant d’Est-Africains, dont des conférenciers swahilis et de nouveaux convertis des hautes terres du Kenya, qui semblent venir en Somalie pour suivre de la formation soulève la possibilité de futures incursions au Kenya et en Tanzanie.

Lors des discussions, on a souligné que la crise liée aux réfugiés pose un problème beaucoup plus grand que le besoin de stabilité en Afrique de l’Est, et que les exportations par la ville de Kismayo ont une plus grande importance que les transferts de fonds pour les finances d’Al-Shabaab.

Identités claniques et islamiques

Peter Pham (directeur, Michael S. Ansari Africa Center, Atlantic Council) a présenté un exposé sur les identités claniques et islamiques, et a souligné que l’impasse politique repose essentiellement sur la légitimité : le clan et l’islam sont les porteurs de la légitimité. Les identités claniques sont fluides et s’adaptent à l’islam, car les saints soufis sont liés à l’origine des clans. Dans son élan de modernisation, Siad Barre a tenté d’extirper le clanisme, mais a finalement décidé de gouverner par l’entremise des clans qui lui sont affiliés. Il a parfois évité les clans nomades et nobles et les puissants clans pastoraux, et choisi des ministres dans les clans de caste inférieure parce qu’ils étaient moins menaçants. La réinstallation de plus d’un million de Somaliens déplacés à la suite de la guerre de l’Ogaden (1977-1978) a contribué à perturber le mode de vie clanique, et les campagnes brutales de contre-insurrection de Barre permettent d’expliquer l’aspiration du Somaliland vers la sécession.

Le GFT ne fonctionne pas bien, car il ne dispose pas de services policiers efficaces; les services policiers reposent sur la légitimité. Les clans somaliens sont très efficaces pour s’autodiscipliner. Une assemblée des anciens résout les problèmes par consensus, et l’ensemble de la population assure l’application et le contrôle des mesures adoptées. Lorsque la communauté internationale nomme des interlocuteurs, elle se trouve à dissocier les clans du contexte qui leur confère une légitimité. La formule 4,5 qu’applique le GFT (soit quatre familles des clans majeurs et quelques sièges [0,5] pour les clans minoritaires) fonctionne davantage comme un système de

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contingentement et non comme un système efficace de représentation, et certaines nominations risquent en réalité de miner la légitimité. Par ailleurs, le GFT est notoirement corrompu; en effet, les ministres absorbent la plupart des ressources.

Le fait de procurer une aide militaire au GFT n’a pas entraîné de nombreux résultats positifs. Bien que les États-Unis, la France, l’Union européenne (UE) et l’OTAN aient formé plus de 9 000 militaires pour le GFT, et que l’UE paie les salaires de 3 000 d’entre eux, il ne semble pas y avoir plus de 1 000 militaires sur le terrain et peu d’engagements sont démontrés envers le GFT. Les identités claniques demeurent solides, même dans les zones contrôlées par Al-Shabaab. Même si les milices claniques appuyaient le GFT dans le passé et qu’elles donnent maintenant leur soutien à Al-Shabaab, elles peuvent très bien appuyer un autre groupe dans le futur.

Par ailleurs, l’identité islamique somalienne a été arrachée à son contexte traditionnel et est surtout problématique dans le sud du pays. De nombreux soi-disant cheiks sont partiellement analphabètes.

Le Somaliland a mené une campagne électorale exemplaire au cours de laquelle les trois principaux partis n’ont pas fait campagne le même jour afin d’éviter les conflits entre leurs partisans. Le taux de participation électorale a été élevé. L’opposition a remporté les élections de manière convaincante, a pris le pouvoir pacifiquement et a assuré une transition en douceur. Étant donné la stabilité et le cadre de gouvernance efficace du Somaliland, la communauté internationale ne peut pas continuer éternellement de le mettre de côté.

Le Puntland, dont l’économie est fondée sur la piraterie, intègre des hommes d’affaires pirates fortunés à la classe politique et à la société, car ils exercent leur pouvoir financier pour se présenter aux élections locales et acquérir une influence dans les villes portuaires.

L’islam est plus attrayant pour les jeunes de la diaspora, car ils peuvent se sentir aliénés et dissociés des clans. Dans la mesure où les structures claniques se transposent dans les diasporas, on note d’autre part un écart générationnel entre les patriarches plus âgés et les jeunes aux influences culturelles variées. Les diasporas gagneraient à être étudiées, car elles font partie intégrante de la société et de l’économie somaliennes, pour le meilleur et pour le pire.

Acteurs non étatiques armés

Andrew Grant (Université Queen’s) mène des recherches sur les groupes rebelles et les acteurs non étatiques armés, y compris les conflits liés aux ressources naturelles, particulièrement en Afrique de l’Ouest. L’instabilité de la Somalie a des conséquences sur l’ensemble du continent. L’Éthiopie et le Kenya sont particulièrement touchés par la crise actuelle.

L’ethnicité est un terme dont l'acception est vaste; elle ne supplante pas les choix historiques, sociaux, religieux, politiques et économiques en ce qui concerne l’identité. Le fait de nous concentrer sur les clans et la religion en Somalie pourrait nous amener à ne pas tenir compte du contexte régional des choix identitaires, notamment les relations établies au-delà des frontières au Kenya et en Éthiopie. On accorde plus de poids au concept constructiviste selon lequel l’identité est fluide qu’au fait que l’identité est déterminée biologiquement par l’entremise des relations familiales.

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Certains facteurs au niveau mirolocal influent les choix qui concernent l’identité; lorsque les mesures de protection de l’État s’effondrent, les gens se tournent vers l’identité en vue de se rassurer et d’accroître leur sécurité. Les identités claniques peuvent être souples, mais elles peuvent aussi se perpétuer d’une génération à l’autre et résister aux changements. Elles peuvent également être des vecteurs pour l’adoption de nouvelles pratiques, comme lorsque les pratiques islamiques sont rapidement intégrées à la vie quotidienne d’un clan ou d’une famille élargie au moyen de l’influence patriarcale.

Les identités claniques et islamiques ne sont pas les seules influences à l’œuvre, surtout dans les collectivités côtières qui soutiennent la piraterie. Les influences islamiques sur les pirates ont été étudiées, et il a été conclu que les motivations sont principalement de nature commerciale; l’influence des identités islamique et clanique n’est pas particulièrement forte. De plus, les liens commerciaux touchent tous les clans. Les rançons soutiennent une vaste économie, y compris la construction, les télécommunications, le transport et le commerce des marchandises. Les incitatifs économiques importants donnent lieu à une coopération pragmatique. La piraterie en soi est une réaction rationnelle aux pressions économiques.

Instabilité inévitable?

Ian Spears (Université de Guelph), un spécialiste des études africaines, a relevé plusieurs raisons justifiant le pessimisme en ce qui concerne les possibilités d’établir un État somalien stable. L’identité somalienne est un assemblage d’influences multiples incluant celles des anciennes colonies britanniques et italiennes dans la région, dont les limites constituent la base de la revendication d’indépendance du Somaliland. Il existe une identité pansomalienne, mais le nombre d’acteurs, la nature des divisions, la population armée et la géométrie des conflits locaux, régionaux et mondiaux rendent l’instabilité de la Somalie particulièrement insoluble. Dans son étude intitulée Civil Wars in African States: Why Conflict Resolution Fails, M. Spears explique que la disposition actuelle des frontières africaines prédispose le continent à l’instabilité.

Le gouvernement de la Somalie a rencontré le même problème que d’autres gouvernements postcoloniaux, soit d’exercer un contrôle sur un pays vaste, diversifié et hostile. Les clans représentent une police d’assurance et sont généralement plus dignes de confiance que les gouvernements voraces. Comme cela est arrivé en Afrique postcoloniale, l’absence d’institutions efficaces a amené le gouvernement à revenir à une combinaison de favoritisme politique et de coercition – laquelle est presque universelle en Afrique.

De 1960 à 1969, la Somalie a connu une période de démocratie efficace, fondée sur un système parlementaire et l’établissement de compromis entre les clans. Il était particulier au sein des États africains de l’époque d’avoir un ancien président qui était à la fois modéré et influent. Un système complexe de représentation proportionnelle a été utilisé pour avoir accès aux ressources. Le nombre de partis politiques est passé de 5 à 62, et plus de 1 000 candidats se sont présentés aux dernières élections du pays en 1969. Au cours de la même année, le coup d’État de Siad Barre visait à imposer un gouvernement discipliné qui réglerait les problèmes sans égard aux anciennes appartenances claniques. Barre a interdit les identités claniques, mis de côté le programme islamique visant l’émancipation des femmes et établi une langue somalie commune. Même si l’histoire se rappellera la brutalité du régime, de nombreux Somaliens le considèrent comme un gouvernement louable qui a commis des erreurs et qui a fini par s’appuyer sur les clans qu’il avait tenté d’éliminer.

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Depuis la chute du gouvernement de Barre en 1991, la Somalie a été qualifiée d’État toxique. La Force opérationnelle unifiée affectée en Somalie (UNITAF) et l’Opération des Nations Unies en Somalie (ONUSOM) n’ont pas été en mesure de rétablir un gouvernement national. Les processus de paix en vue d’une réconciliation n’ont pas été fructueux et étaient souvent de simples manœuvres d’opportunisme politique pour obtenir des ressources et des sièges. Une autre raison justifiant le pessimisme est que cette façon de faire est inévitable en Somalie. L'Union des tribunaux islamiques (UTI) semblait être différente – une grande mosquée qui réunissait de nombreux volets de l’islam, mais qui, au bout du compte, était trop disparate pour être viable. Elle n’exerçait pas son jugement de façon modérée et cohérente, et allait à l’encontre des intérêts régionaux et mondiaux. Lorsque le GFT a été chargé d’instaurer un État islamique, l’UTI devait prouver qu’elle pouvait gouverner de façon plus cohérente. Sheikh Sharif a été inefficace, et Al-Shabaab farouchement hostile. Le danger qui se pose dans la résolution inclusive de conflits est qu’on la perçoive comme une tentative de fragiliser et de diviser la population dans le but de donner un semblant de légitimité aux forces soutenues par l’Occident. Les efforts déployés pour susciter l’intérêt des modérés ont tendance à radicaliser d’autres groupes et contribuent souvent à l’escalade de conflits.

Si on dit que le verre de la Somalie est à moitié plein, c’est qu’elle a connu certaines réussites comme la période de démocratie de 1960 à 1969, et certaines périodes d’autoritarisme éclairé sous le régime Barre. S’il est à moitié vide, c’est que les problèmes persistent et que tous les efforts visant à faire de la Somalie un État démocratique ont échoué. La structure de gouvernance de la Somalie n’a jamais été cohérente, et les chefs du gouvernement semblent avoir été à peine plus que des maires fragiles de Mogadishu. Tous les efforts déployés en vue d’établir un régime ont engendré des processus visant à le contrecarrer.

Conséquences de la non-reconnaissance de l’État

Pierre Jolicoeur (Collège militaire royal du Canada), un universitaire ayant un intérêt pour les mouvements sécessionnistes, a étudié les mouvements indépendantistes dans la Corne de l’Afrique sur le plan géographique et démographique. La Somalie peut être divisée logiquement en trois parties : le Somaliland et le Puntland au nord, et la Somalie au sud. Les Somaliens ont des antécédents communs en ce qui concerne la langue, la religion, les traditions, l’économie et l’ethnicité. Cette situation est inhabituelle en Afrique. Alors, pourquoi existe-t-il un important mouvement au Somaliland visant à se séparer de cette identité ethnique relativement cohérente?

Une carte de la répartition géographique des clans somaliens montre que les Isaaq représentent près de 66 p. 100 de la population du Somaliland. C’est au sud qu’on assiste à un chevauchement complexe entre les clans. Par ailleurs, les revendications territoriales faites par le Somaliland au Puntland, et par le Puntland au Somaliland, se chevauchent, et concernent environ le tiers de chacun de ces États émergents potentiels.

Le Somaliland jouit d’une stabilité enviable malgré l’instabilité qui l’entoure. Bien qu’il ait réussi à reconstruire les infrastructures en utilisant principalement des ressources locales, il continue de faire face aux problèmes liés à la non-reconnaissance ainsi qu’à un conflit territorial avec le Puntland. Les revendications territoriales du Somaliland ne sont pas fondées sur la répartition des clans, mais sur l’accord qu’ont conclu le Somaliland britannique et l'Éthiopie en 1897. L’économie du Somaliland est relativement solide et compte sur un important secteur pastoral et

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une aide considérable de l’étranger; les transferts de fonds, qui totalisent environ 500 millions de dollars par année, sont plus importants que les secteurs de l’aide et de l’élevage réunis.

Les institutions politiques du Somaliland sont les plus efficaces en Somalie. Le président est élu pour un mandat de cinq ans, les ministres sont sujets à la ratification du Parlement, les membres de la chambre haute sont nommés et ceux de la chambre basse du parlement bicaméral sont élus au suffrage direct pour un mandat de six ans. L’appareil judiciaire semble être indépendant et efficace. Les élections qui ont eu lieu en juillet 2010 étaient libres et équitables. L’opposition, qui a remporté ces élections, a pris le pouvoir et assuré une transition en douceur. Même les forces militaires ont été en grande partie placées sous le contrôle civil.

Il existe des motifs historiques pour lesquels le Somaliland, reconnu par 35 États avant 1960, cherche à obtenir l’indépendance. La discrimination et les attaques dont le Somaliland a été victime sous le régime Barre ont renforcé son désir d’indépendance. Lors du référendum constitutionnel de mai 2001, la population a voté à plus de 90 p. 100 pour l’indépendance.

De nombreuses organisations non gouvernementales (ONG) et organismes d’aide entretiennent des relations avec le gouvernement somalilandais. Certains soutiennent qu’il doit avoir accès aux activités en matière d’aide et de diplomatie pour des raisons de stabilité, mais comme il est isolé depuis plus de dix ans, il a principalement compté sur ses propres ressources, et c’est peut-être l’une des raisons qui expliquent sa réussite. Toutefois, la principale raison pour laquelle la communauté internationale hésite à reconnaître le Somaliland est que cela ouvrirait la porte aux revendications sécessionnistes. Il est arrivé que la communauté internationale soit intervenue pour empêcher la sécession, mais c’est maintenant de l’histoire ancienne. D’ailleurs, la communauté internationale a fait le contraire, comme dans le cas de l’Érythrée, du Soudan du Sud et du Kosovo.

À mesure que le problème de la piraterie prend de l’ampleur et que le Puntland cherche à devenir un État, nous devons nous demander si la souveraineté permettra d’exercer un plus grand contrôle sur les acteurs non étatiques armés dans les régions non gouvernées. Lors de la discussion, les avis étaient partagés. M. Spears a soutenu que le fait de reconnaître le Somaliland pourrait annuler les progrès fragiles qu’il a réalisés. Ceux-ci tiennent de l’ancienne formule de renforcement de l’État de la realpolitik : « Si vous pouvez le défendre, il vous appartient; si vous ne le pouvez pas, il ne vous a jamais appartenu. » Le Somaliland a toujours le sentiment d’être un État, ce qui le met à l’abri de certains des problèmes auxquels est confronté le sud, y compris l’importance accrue d’Al-Shabaab à titre d’autorité rivale. Néanmoins, il existe deux conflits permanents opposant différents clans dans le nord, dans lesquels des vies sont souvent sacrifiées au profit de la stabilisation.

Il existe environ 2 000 groupes ethniques dans le monde, près de 200 pays et seulement 20 États qui se rapprochent de l’homogénéité ethnique. Les frontières des États ne correspondront jamais aux identités ethniques, et même lorsque c’est le cas, les gens déménagent. Dans le cas du Somaliland, 98 p. 100 de la population sont en faveur de la souveraineté, mais seulement 66 p. 100 font partie du clan Isaaq. Cette situation s’apparente à bien des égards à celle du Kosovo, qui a déclaré unilatéralement son indépendance en raison des conflits antérieurs et de l’oppression.

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Le Somaliland est unique en son genre en raison de ses institutions politiques solides. Or, la situation générale en Somalie illustre la capacité des groupes de se former et de se réformer en fonction des expériences communes, des récits d’oppression et des revendications concernant l’identité qui varient d’une génération à une autre. Les mêmes tendances pourraient apparaître au Congo et en Afrique de l’Ouest. En ce qui concerne l’Érythrée et l’Éthiopie, et le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud, l’État principal a cédé ses pouvoirs. Toute reconnaissance du Somaliland par le Canada exigerait une reconnaissance similaire et une intervention de l’Union africaine (UA).

Une dernière observation a été faite à l’égard des futurs travaux sur le terrain concernant les acteurs non étatiques armés en Somalie. On a souligné que, même si l’Afrique du Sud et la Somalie sont des États tout aussi violents, le Canada n’apporte une aide consulaire qu’en Afrique du Sud. Cette situation a des conséquences pour les assurances et les aspects pratiques de l’insertion, de la recherche et du rapatriement de toute équipe de recherche.

Sciences sociales appliquées

Marissa Schuffler (Université du Centre de la Floride), qui a collaboré avec l’équipe embauchée à titre contractuel se spécialisant en psychologie sociale des universités McGill et Carleton, et qui a travaillé sous la direction d’Eduardo Salas (aussi de l’Université du Centre de la Floride), a présenté les façons dont la psychologie sociale peut nous aider à situer et à comprendre le comportement des acteurs non étatiques armés. Cette présentation a été suivie d’une discussion générale sur les façons dont le fait de posséder une connaissance particulière de la situation en Somalie peut aider à orienter le projet de sciences sociales, et vice-versa.

À l’Université du Centre de la Floride, Eduardo Salas tente de comprendre la façon dont les groupes et les équipes prennent des décisions dans un climat de tension. Un rapport qui a été rendu public permet d’établir des liens entre la psychologie, la sociologie et les politiques afin de constituer un cadre global des facteurs qui influent sur la prise de décisions. Il existe trois catégories de facteurs qui semblent avoir une incidence sur la façon dont les décisions sont prises : des facteurs individuels influant sur la perception; des facteurs liés au groupe influant sur le processus d’interprétation; et des facteurs liés à la hiérarchie influant sur les résultats des décisions. La prochaine phase consistera à examiner le modèle en détail et à l’appliquer au cas de la Somalie. Les entretiens constituent un outil en soi, mais l’équipe de recherche réalisera également des analyses historiométriques et des archives afin de se concentrer sur ce qui s’est produit lors des incidents critiques. L’équipe pourrait aussi mener une analyse thématique et se poser les questions suivantes : Le cadre global est-il valable? Existe-t-il des facteurs généralisables et particuliers à prendre en considération dans des cas précis?

L’un des importants sujets de préoccupation est la façon dont l’équipe de recherche peut obtenir l’accès à ce type de données. Une des approches adoptées a été d’utiliser les données recueillies par les équipes de l’armée américaine qui ont participé à la prise de décisions concernant les opérations, comme les équipes provinciales de reconstruction en Afghanistan ou les équipes chargées des affaires civiles et militaires à la suite de l’ouragan Katrina. L’équipe de recherche a également compté sur le SITE Intelligence Group, qui est responsable de la transcription et de la traduction des articles djihadistes publiés sur le Web. La base de données compte près de 400 articles qu’Al-Shabaab a affichés sur Internet depuis la fin de 2006.

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Le fait d’utiliser ce type de données traduites soulève d’autres questions quant à la fiabilité des recherches qui s’appuient sur le codage de traductions d’autres langues. Comme les chercheurs ne parlent ni ne lisent l’arabe ou le somali, ils se fient à des traductions. Un grand nombre de termes et d’expressions ne peuvent être traduits directement en anglais. Par exemple, des chercheurs ont observé des différences importantes entre diverses traductions anglaises du Coran. RDDC Toronto travaille avec la notion de complexité intégrative de Peter Suedfeld (Université de la Colombie-Britannique) afin de trouver la structure sous-jacente des différences sémantiques entre les différentes traductions. Lianne McLellan (RDDC Toronto) a indiqué que les chercheurs avaient connu un certain succès pour ce qui est de cerner les formules sous-jacentes qui laissaient transparaître l’hostilité ou la collaboration. Par exemple, 16 passages du Coran à propos du djihad avaient des niveaux comparables de complexité intégrative, peu importe leur traduction. Et, dans la mesure où la traduction est correcte sur les plans sémantique et grammatical, le choix de la traduction utilisée importe peu. Le fait de recourir aux analyses du contenu de l’équipe de la Floride devrait permettre la triangulation.

Les chercheurs s’attendent à découvrir les facteurs qui influent sur la prise de décisions, particulièrement la décision de recourir à la violence. Lorsqu’on leur a demandé quels facteurs psychologiques pourraient inciter une personne à se joindre à un groupe et à recourir à la violence, les chercheurs ont indiqué que les identités collectives comme les identités claniques et islamiques constituent un bon départ, mais que nous devrions en apprendre davantage sur la façon dont les émotions liées au groupe amènent les gens à user de la violence ou à la rejeter. Nous nous penchons également sur les discours collectifs — les mythes qui renforcent la hiérarchie (voir Last 2011) — qui incitent les groupes à recourir à la violence.

L’équipe des universités McGill et Carleton – Don Taylor (Université McGill), Michael Wohl (Université Carleton) et Michael King (Université McGill) – travaille sous l’angle de la théorie de l’identité sociale, sélectionne des Canadiens d’origine somalienne et s’entretient avec eux en vue de connaître leur perception de la situation en Somalie et leur volonté de participer à certaines activités et à envoyer des fonds au Canada ou à l’étranger, et le raisonnement justifiant leur décision. L’équipe porte une attention particulière aux émotions liées aux groupes, y compris l’angoisse collective, la crainte relative à la viabilité future du groupe et les perceptions de l’action et de l’inaction.

Les chercheurs ont été frappés par la complexité de la situation en Somalie et de la diaspora somalienne. Si les identités sont « fluides » ou « situationnelles », alors nous n’en savons pas beaucoup à leur sujet. Nous devons par conséquent nous demander ce qui explique les changements associés aux expressions de l’identité. Nous devons savoir quelles identités sont fondamentales et pour quelles raisons. Quels besoins ou fonctions sont assurés par l’identité collective? Les identités ont pour effet d’orienter l’action, particulièrement sous la contrainte. Nous devons en savoir plus sur les indicateurs à court et à long terme que présente l’identité collective. Les groupes non étatiques armés ont-ils une perspective à long terme? Don Taylor a présenté différents indicateurs de l’engagement communautaire des immigrants hmong et albanais aux États-Unis. Les Hmong mettaient d’abord l’accent sur l’éducation tandis que les Albanais accordaient plus d’importance à l’argent; chaque communauté avait un plan d’action à long terme, mais celui des Albanais a mené au trafic de stupéfiants et à la criminalité organisée. Or, le fait de ne pas avoir de plan d’action peut s’avérer bien pire que d’en avoir un mauvais. En tant que société hôte, nous ne voulons pas nécessairement conquérir les cœurs et les esprits; nous devons négocier des plans d’urgence.

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Politique étrangère du Canada à l’égard de la Somalie

Lors de la deuxième journée de l’atelier, on a invoqué la règle de Chatham House; c’est-à-dire que le matériel peut être utilisé, mais que les commentaires ne seront pas attribués à une personne ou à une organisation en particulier.

Le Canada n’a pas reconnu officiellement le GFT, car il ne répond pas aux critères de l’accession au statut d’État qui sont habituellement appliqués. Il n’a pas convenu d’échanger des ambassadeurs et est peu susceptible de recevoir la visite de représentants d’autres pays. Presque par définition, les personnes qui entrent au Canada doivent être munies d'un passeport d’un autre pays. Le Canada n'a pas de programme d'aide bilatérale avec la Somalie, mais participe au programme régional pour la croissance économique et le développement agricole par l’entremise de l’UA. Lors d’enlèvement d’Amanda Lindhout à Mogadishu, les agents consulaires ont consacré énormément de temps et d’énergie, et comme on ne veut pas qu’une telle situation se reproduise, on recommande aux gens de ne pas voyager dans cette région.

La Somalie a beaucoup d’importance sur le plan politique : la ministre de la Coopération internationale, l’honorable Beverly Oda a rencontré des représentants d’organisations internationales et non gouvernementales à Nairobi, s’est rendue au camp de réfugiés de Dadaab à la frontière somalienne et a annoncé une aide canadienne importante. Cependant, les problèmes sont importants : piraterie, corruption, manquement aux règles, présence d’organisations terroristes internationales et défaillance institutionnelle depuis plus de vingt ans. Il reste à déterminer si le fait de diminuer les ressources du Canada consacrées à l’Afghanistan permettra de venir en aide à la Somalie. Le Canada appuie les efforts déployés par l’UA dans le cadre du processus de paix de Djibouti. L’AMISOM est une mission qui relève uniquement de l’UA, contrairement à la mission hybride Union-africaine–Nations Unies au Darfour (MINUAD). L’AMISOM se compose uniquement de troupes de l’Ouganda et du Burundi, les dernières étant les plus efficaces. Son mandat consiste entre autres à faciliter l’aide humanitaire, mais celle-ci est limitée en raison de l’insécurité qui règne à l’extérieur de Mogadishu.

On s’entend généralement pour dire qu’il est nécessaire de renouveler les efforts visant la réconciliation nationale et la consolidation de la paix, mais le Canada doute qu’une conférence internationale coûteuse apporte une grande contribution. Jusqu’à maintenant, les ressources n’ont pas entraîné de résultats, et aucun indicateur de rendement n’a été établi. La prochaine étape consiste à rattacher les promesses de dons à des résultats mesurables.

Le Canada condamne les attaques perpétrées par le groupe Al-Shabaab qu’il a inscrit sur sa liste des organisations terroristes en 2010. Cette mesure présente des défis pour l’Agence canadienne de développement international (ACDI) en ce qui concerne la prestation de programmes et l’acheminement de l’aide. Toutefois, le Canada n’est pas allé aussi loin que les États-Unis, qui interdisent de mener des programmes et de faire des affaires avec tous les organismes qui pourraient procurer un quelconque avantage matériel à Al-Shabaab.

Le Canada continue de faire partie du Groupe de contact contre la piraterie de l’OTAN, bien que celui-ci ait été plus actif dans le passé; il possédait alors jusqu’à trois frégates dans l’océan Indien à différents moments. Même si cette situation pourrait se reproduire, de nouveaux déploiements ne sont pas prévus à l’heure actuelle. La prestation d’un soutien juridique aux Seychelles et au Kenya contribue à traduire les pirates en justice.

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De concert avec les Nations Unies, l’UE et la Chine, le Canada participe trois fois par année à un Groupe de contact international pour la Somalie. La plus récente réunion du Groupe a eu lieu à Kampala et visait à encourager le GFT à faire un pas dans la bonne direction. Son appui est principalement financier; le Groupe a octroyé 81 millions de dollars depuis décembre 2006 ainsi qu’une somme supplémentaire de 50 millions de dollars pour faire face à la sécheresse. Le Fonds d'aide aux victimes de la sécheresse en Afrique de l'Est, qui n’est pas assujetti à un plafond, fournit une contribution égale à celle des particuliers canadiens. Le Canada verse également 10 millions de dollars par année à l’AMISOM et au Bureau d’appui des Nations Unies à l’AMISOM. Enfin, le haut-commissaire du Canada à Nairobi effectue directement de petits décaissements à l’échelle locale, lesquels peuvent être dépensés au Somaliland.

Le principal intérêt du Canada en Somalie découle de sa vaste diaspora. On y compte au moins 37 000 Canadiens d’origine somalienne et certains estiment qu’il y en a plus de 170 000. Le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité (SCRS) est préoccupé par le fait qu’Al-Shabaab pourrait recruter des Canadiens. De plus, il se peut que l’on réagisse de manière défavorable à la présence de Canadiens dans le pays. Les États-Unis participent plus directement à la prestation de soutien lié à la sécurité. Le Canada s’attend à ce qu’on lui demande d’en faire plus, mais le gouvernement fait preuve de prudence, car une participation accrue entraînerait une augmentation exponentielle de la menace encourue par les Canadiens.

En ce qui concerne la piraterie, certains ont prétendu qu’il existe un lien direct entre les marchands, les rançons et le terrorisme, et on peut se demander si la communauté internationale refuse d’admettre l’existence de ce lien dans le but d’éviter d’accuser les marchands qui paient des rançons d’appuyer le terrorisme; cela augmenterait la pression pour régler les problèmes liés au terrorisme. La plupart des organisations soutiennent que le lien n’a pas été clairement établi; bref, il y a beaucoup de renseignements contradictoires.

Dans l’ensemble, à l’échelle régionale, les réfugiés qui affluent au Kenya occupent une place plus importante que la famine. Comme le Kenya ne peut pas raisonnablement renvoyer les réfugiés et qu’il ne peut rien faire pour ralentir ou arrêter leur afflux, il cherchera à obtenir de l’aide supplémentaire. Il existe un risque réel que les mouvements importants de réfugiés commencent à déstabiliser l’est du Kenya et de la Tanzanie, particulièrement si les réfugiés ne sont pas en mesure de se rendre à l’Ouest, dans des pays tiers.

Situation humanitaire et réponse du Canada

Plus de 12 millions de personnes sont touchées par la famine dans la région de la Corne de l’Afrique. La région est aux prises avec des périodes de sécheresse récurrentes. La sécheresse qui sévit actuellement n’est pas aussi sévère que celles des années 1990, mais un segment plus important de la population est touché, en partie en raison de la réussite des activités antérieures d’aide humanitaire. Dans l’ensemble, on a connu en 2010-2011 la plus grande famine depuis 60 ans.

Le sud de la Somalie est contrôlé par les membres d’Al-Shabaab, lesquels sont particulièrement opposés à l’aide alimentaire. On arrive habituellement à acheminer de l’aide en matière de santé et d’hygiène. Al-Shabaab est notamment préoccupé par le fait que la prestation d’une aide alimentaire pourrait porter atteinte aux agriculteurs somaliens. Des 3,1 millions de personnes qui ont besoin d’une aide alimentaire, 2,5 millions se trouvent dans des zones contrôlées par

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Al-Shabaab. Les hommes et les adolescents restent derrière, mais les familles, les femmes et les enfants quittent la région pour avoir accès à une aide alimentaire. En juillet, 60 000 personnes étaient déplacées, 90 p. 100 d’entre elles en raison de la sécheresse plutôt que des conflits. Les personnes qui fuient la sécheresse pourraient ne pas satisfaire aux critères techniques qui permettraient de les considérer comme des réfugiés. Par conséquent, même si nous cessons de parler des conflits, le fait que ces personnes soient considérées comme des réfugiés de l’environnement plutôt que des réfugiés politiques continuera à représenter un problème.

Le Canada a pour objectifs généraux en Somalie de sauver des vies et de préserver la dignité humaine; ceux-ci ne sont pas axés sur le développement. En effet, deux régions se sont écroulées et huit autres seront très bientôt déclarées zones de famine. Celles-ci sont toutes contrôlées par Al-Shabaab et sont interdites d’accès au Programme alimentaire mondial (PAM). Une famine est déclarée lorsque le taux de malnutrition aiguë chez les enfants excède 30 p. 100; le taux de malnutrition atteint maintenant 50 p. 100 dans les régions frappées par la famine. En Somalie, la dernière famine a été déclarée en 1991.

Pour se rendre dans les camps au Kenya, situés à 80 km de la frontière, les Somaliens doivent marcher pendant 15 ou 20 jours avec très peu d’eau et de nourriture. Ainsi, ils sont en très mauvais état de santé au moment de leur arrivée. Le Canada a insisté pour que le Kenya ouvre les points de passage en vue de guider les mouvements et d’intercepter les plus faibles pour leur venir en aide. Les Somaliens qui quittent leur pays ont les moyens et la capacité physique de le faire; ceux qui restent dans les zones de famine risquent fort d’y mourir.

En plus de l’absence de pluie, les prix des aliments ont augmenté. Les ONG ont commencé à mettre en œuvre des programmes d'aide en espèces, mais celles-ci peuvent être facilement redirigées, particulièrement dans les zones contrôlées par Al-Shabaab, où l’on exerce une perception efficace de l'impôt.

Bien que certains membres d’Al-Shabaab s’y opposent, d’autres désirent obtenir de l’aide. Le PAM est toujours interdit d’entrée dans la région. Les ONG pourraient être en mesure de distribuer des vivres lorsque la situation est moins grave, mais dans le cas d’une famine, seul le PAM a la capacité de fournir la quantité de nourriture nécessaire.

Les camps de Dadaab ont été construits pour accueillir 90 000 personnes, mais ils en abritent maintenant 388 000. Il faut près de deux mois pour s’inscrire au registre de l’aide dans les camps et on compte environ 25 000 personnes qui attendent à l'extérieur de ceux-ci; 97 p. 100 des réfugiés sont des Somaliens, et comme certains d’entre eux habitent dans ces camps depuis 10 ou 20 ans, ils savent comment exploiter le système. Cela signifie qu’il commence à y avoir des problèmes dans les camps entre différents types de résidents – les anciens réfugiés et les nouveaux arrivés. Les problèmes de sécurité commencent à se multiplier. De plus, certains camps sont déserts en raison de différends entre le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés (HCR) et le gouvernement du Kenya. Le Kenya désire mettre sur pied de nouveaux camps dans des pays tiers, y compris en Éthiopie, dans le but d’encourager le règlement des conflits.

Les Nations Unies ont lancé de nombreux appels humanitaires. Des contributions totales annoncées totalisant deux milliards de dollars ont été versées, mais un montant supplémentaire de quatre milliards de dollars est nécessaire pour répondre aux besoins. Les donateurs traditionnels

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n'ont plus de capitaux disponibles, et des efforts spéciaux sont déployés pour amasser des fonds auprès de donateurs non traditionnels, particulièrement les États mieux nantis du Moyen-Orient.

Le Canada appuie les Nations Unies, la Croix-Rouge et des ONG canadiennes comme Oxfam, CARE, Aide à l'enfance et Vision mondiale. L’ACDI a financé deux projets en Somalie, à l’extérieur des zones contrôlées par Al-Shabaab, après avoir reçu l’assurance que les ressources ne profiteraient pas à Al-Shabaab. Les lois antiterrorisme canadiennes sont vagues; par exemple, elles font référence au « financement indirect ». Mais que signifie « indirect » et quels sont les critères utilisés? L’efficacité de nos lois reste à démontrer. Par exemple, les impôts routiers ou les taxes perçues auprès des employés constituent-ils un financement indirect? Pour les Américains, la directive présidentielle est claire : les États-Unis ne peuvent œuvrer dans les zones contrôlées par Al-Shabaab.

La poursuite du conflit dans le sud de la Somalie signifie que les gens n’y sont pas en sécurité, que le pays n’est pas en mesure de se développer et que l’établissement de nouvelles infrastructures est impossible. Depuis la dernière sécheresse en 2009, le secteur agricole est moins productif, et la famine que connaît la population cette année fait partie d’un problème cyclique et à long terme. Il existe trois solutions aux crises récurrentes liées aux réfugiés : la réinstallation dans des pays tiers (l'option privilégiée pour de nombreux Somaliens, y compris ceux qui dépendent de l’économie reposant sur les transferts de fonds); le retour en Somalie; et l’intégration dans le pays d’accueil. Comme aucune de ces solutions ne semble fonctionner, on doit en trouver une autre.

Les discussions au sujet de ce sombre tableau ont révélé qu’Al-Shabaab n’est pas le seul problème. Le GFT entrave également la fourniture d’une aide alimentaire dans certaines régions en vue de protéger les intérêts agricoles. La fourniture d’aide alimentaire est une affaire hautement politique. Les Nations Unies et le PAM sont souvent perçus comme des intervenants importants qui ne prennent pas le temps d’instaurer un climat de confiance propice à la prestation efficace de l’aide. Les Somaliens se méfient des Nations Unies, car en plus de ses organismes à vocation humanitaire comme le HCR et le PAM, elles possèdent des sections politiques et militaires.

Les périodes de sécheresse en Somalie sont plus sévères et rapprochées qu’elles ne l’étaient auparavant. La déforestation et le surpâturage sont des problèmes bien connus, et les famines récurrentes vont probablement empirer. Des opinions divergentes ont été exprimées quant à l’utilité de l’aide. D’une part, on considère que l’aide alimentaire dans la région a toujours été utilisée à des fins politiques et que les membres de la collectivité locale ont raison de se méfier des motifs des pays occidentaux. Il est probable que cette famine touche un plus grand nombre de personnes parce que les stratégies d’atténuation de 2009 ont permis de sauver des vies. Les motifs humanitaires ne sont pas liés au développement, et plusieurs participants ont souligné que nous avions une responsabilité existentielle envers la population affamée et que cette responsabilité est distincte de tout intérêt national. D’autre part, si la famine est maîtrisée et contribue à amener la population à un niveau correspondant à la capacité des terres à la nourrir, et que les personnes déplacées déstabilisent l’ensemble de la région, Al-Shabaab pourrait alors être perçu comme un allié involontaire dans le cadre d’une stratégie régionale de stabilisation.

L’un des intérêts nationaux du Canada consiste à empêcher que des messages qui feraient état d’un manque d’intérêt du gouvernement ne circulent dans la collectivité canado-somalienne. La

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radicalisation des jeunes Canadiens d’origine somalienne est probablement davantage attribuable à l’indifférence et à l’inaction des dirigeants. En outre, les agents de la radicalisation sont déjà actifs dans la diaspora canadienne.

Évaluation des questions relatives à la sécurité régionale

Le dernier conférencier a soulevé quatre points. Tout d’abord, Al-Shabaab s’affaiblit. Ensuite, les problèmes dans la région ne disparaîtront pas. Puis, le niveau de menace terroriste pourrait, en fait, augmenter. Enfin, l’une des causes du déclin d’Al-Shabaab est attribuable à l’absence d’attention accordée à sa base économique.

Même si on semblait être dans une impasse en 2010, Al-Shabaab occupait une position beaucoup plus faible à l’été 2011. Il a perdu beaucoup de terrain à Mogadishu, et l’AMISOM était prête à cibler de nouvelles régions. La famine a modifié certaines priorités internationales, mais le Kenya et l’Éthiopie ont donné leur appui aux fondés de pouvoir, lesquels ont défait une partie de l’appareil d’Al-Shabaab, réduisant ainsi les impôts et la circulation des marchandises. De nombreux commandants d’Al-Shabaab ont été tués à Mogadishu, et comme le groupe n’est pas en mesure de payer des salaires concurrentiels aux combattants, certains d’entre eux préfèrent abandonner. Al-Shabaab se contente désormais de recruter de force des enfants et des hommes âgés et de tuer les transfuges. Les djihadistes étrangers combattent toujours dans le sud et ont maintenant recours à des tactiques de guérilla – engins explosifs improvisés et kamikazes. Même s’il contrôle toujours une grande part du territoire, le moral est bas et le groupe est en période de repli. Les relations sont tendues entre les dirigeants et on a observé des frictions entre certaines organisations. Les Somaliens sont bien au fait de l’évolution des rapports de forces, et comme ils constatent l’essoufflement du pouvoir d’Al-Shabaab, ils le rejettent encore davantage. Dans le but de contrôler les messages, Al-Shabaab accuse les pays occidentaux d’avoir revu leurs positions. Mais s’il ne réussit pas à remporter cette guerre de messages, Al-Shabaab risque de contribuer à la poursuite de son propre effondrement.

Malgré ces problèmes, Al-Shabaab demeure un groupe d’insurgés solide et ne disparaîtra pas rapidement. Le GFT demeure faible et divisé. La plupart de ses conflits internes concernent l’argent et la logique à court terme. L’optimisme initial de Sheikh Sharif a fait place à un abus flagrant de pouvoir, et il n’y a pas de possibilité réelle que la situation s’améliore, et ce, malgré l’accord de Kampala. En l’absence d’une gouvernance efficace, les progrès réalisés par l’AMISOM n’auront pas de répercussions majeures. La communauté internationale est consciente de ces problèmes, mais n’a pas trouvé de solution pour les résoudre. La fragmentation de la Somalie s’accélère, et on ne dispose d’aucune mesure qui permettrait d’améliorer la situation. On observe un sentiment de fatigue généralisé, et personne ne semble savoir quoi faire.

À mesure qu’Al-Shabaab recule vers l’intérieur de la Somalie, il s’apparente davantage à un mouvement insurrectionnel. Même s’il peut lancer plusieurs attaques dans le sud, ses motifs ne sont pas clairs. Les attentats terroristes à l’extérieur de la région entraînent relativement peu de coûts et pourraient être considérés comme une solution de rechange pour démontrer la pertinence continue d’Al-Shabaab. L’organisation exerce toujours un puissant contrôle sur ses principaux combattants. Toutefois, le récent recul d’Al-Shabaab a quelque peu affaibli ce contrôle, et de nombreux combattants étrangers pourraient commencer à agir de façon plus indépendante.

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Le déclin d’Al-Shabaab est grandement attribuable à l’accès limité aux ressources et à l’absence de contrôle sur celles-ci. Tout comme le GFT a toujours été une sorte de vue de l’esprit, le discours d’Al-Shabaab peut lui aussi être remis en question. Pour bien comprendre le favoritisme politique, il faut savoir que les gens cherchent à obtenir le pouvoir en vue de contrôler les ressources et de les redistribuer. Dans sa thèse de doctorat intitulée Why Rebels Collide: Factionalism and Fragmentation in African Insurgencies, Michael Woldemariam démontre que les groupes rebelles qui sont présents dans d’autres régions de l’Afrique ont tendance à rester unis s’ils se trouvent dans une impasse ou s’ils ne réalisent que peu de progrès. Cependant, ils s’effondrent si des progrès rapides sont réalisés ou si on note un recul. Cette situation semble maintenant avoir une incidence sur Al-Shabaab, et les personnes qui occupent des postes de commandement dirigent l’organisation sans connaître exactement sa raison d’être.

Lors des discussions, on a contesté certaines de ces allégations. Selon au moins un participant, Al-Shabaab, gouverné par un Conseil de la Choura dont la composition change peu avec le temps, continue de faire preuve de cohésion et d’avoir une raison d’être. Les dirigeants donnent des directives et la population les suit. Ils ont démontré au fil du temps qu’ils sont en mesure de contrôler le mouvement.

On a également suggéré que le déclin des groupes djihadistes locaux a formé les plus importants dirigeants mondiaux, alors que le groupe porte moins d’attention à l’ennemi proche et attache une plus grande priorité à l’ennemi lointain. La construction du discours anti-occidental d’Al-Shabaab pourrait être un signe précurseur de ce changement de priorités, tout comme le recrutement d’adolescents nord-américains.

On se demande également comment les dirigeants exercent leur contrôle et à quoi ressemble l’organisation. Les principaux instruments de contrôle sont l’argent, les idéologies et l’autorité personnelle. Les Somaliens reconnaissent le pouvoir; ils sont attirés par le succès, mais peuvent fléchir dans l’adversité. La haute direction d’Al-Shabaab est relativement fixe – il n’y a qu’un chef, mais les gens qui l’entourent sont essentiels au fonctionnement de l’organisation. Abdi n’a pas de circonscription et dirige l’organisation sans pouvoir compter sur l’appui des clans. Il peut compter sur l’expérience et les compétences militaires de l’Afghanistan. Al Hamami, un djihadiste américain, est peut-être la clé du succès pour ce qui est de contrôler les combattants étrangers de la Choura. La haute direction compte d’autres membres, mais ceux-ci ne défient pas l’autorité du chef. Les chefs de guerre des clans s’avéraient importants pour Al-Shabaab lorsqu’il était l’un des nombreux groupes armés, mais sa stratégie a changé avec le temps. Il a commencé à collaborer avec certains clans, puis a assimilé et contrôlé l’opposition, et a pris sa direction ou l’a éliminée. Les dirigeants d’Al-Shabaab ont toujours considéré qu’ils dirigeaient un groupe d’insurgés et se sont servis des structures administratives locales pour gouverner plutôt que de gouverner eux-mêmes. Ils reviennent maintenant aux modèles de comportement des insurgés plutôt que de s’emparer du territoire et de le défendre. Même s’ils reçoivent des fonds de la piraterie, la plupart des pirates sont géographiquement éloignés et ne partagent pas la même idéologie. S’il existe des alliances, il ne s’agit que d’alliances de convenance.

Il pourrait être possible de voir quelle serait l’incidence de cette « guerre de messages » sur la diaspora. Que pensent les Somaliens expatriés des causes de la misère en Somalie et du rôle des pays occidentaux? (Ces questions pourraient s’inscrire dans le cadre d’une étude visant à déterminer quelles sont les méthodes permettant d’élaborer des mythes qui renforcent la hiérarchie – voir Last 2011.)

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L’idéologie d’Al-Shabaab n’est pas claire. Selon un participant, Al-Shabaab improvise au gré des événements – par exemple, pour appliquer la charia sans savoir véritablement en quoi cela consiste.

Il n'est pas nécessairement faux de présumer qu’il serait dans l’intérêt de la Somalie d’instaurer un régime islamiste. Un cadre qui écarte l’idéologie de l’individualisme radical pourrait être beaucoup plus facile à gérer dans le milieu austère marqué par la sécheresse, les changements climatiques et la rareté des ressources auquel sont confrontés les Somaliens, mais ce cadre serait sans aucun doute désavantageux pour les femmes. D’autre part, certaines femmes soutiennent qu’elles se trouvaient dans une meilleure situation lorsque l’UTI était au pouvoir, car elles se sentaient plus en sécurité et étaient traitées avec plus de respect.

En dernière analyse, on remarque qu’il existe différentes façons de définir les terroristes et les organisations d’insurgés à l’échelle mondiale, et que celles-ci déterminent les actions des groupes comme Al-Shabaab. Les idées sont importantes, et nous devons les comprendre si nous voulons mener des discussions efficaces à propos de ces groupes.

Conclusion

Le présent sommaire avait pour but de fournir aux participants et aux autres parties intéressées un aperçu de l’atelier et non pas de tirer des conclusions ou de formuler des recommandations. Dans les prochains chapitres du rapport, les diapositives et/ou les notes d’allocution pour certains exposés qui ont été données au cours de l’atelier ont été reproduites afin d’apporter des précisions aux observations et commentaires présentés dans ce sommaire.

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Table of contents

Abstract …….. ................................................................................................................................. iRésumé …..... ................................................................................................................................... iExecutive summary ........................................................................................................................ iii

Introduction .............................................................................................................................. iiiPolitical and Security Challenges ...................................................................................... iiiClan and Islamic Identity .................................................................................................. ivArmed Non-State Actors .................................................................................................... vInevitable instability? ......................................................................................................... vConsequences of Non-State Recognition .......................................................................... viApplied Social Science ................................................................................................... viiiCanada’s foreign Policy on Somalia ................................................................................. ixThe Humanitarian Situation and Canadian Response ....................................................... xiAssessment of Regional Security Issues ......................................................................... xiii

Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................... xivSommaire ..... ................................................................................................................................. xv

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. xvDéfis en matière de politique et de sécurité ..................................................................... xvIdentités claniques et islamiques ..................................................................................... xviActeurs non étatiques armés ........................................................................................... xviiInstabilité inévitable? .................................................................................................... xviiiConséquences de la non-reconnaissance de l’État .......................................................... xixSciences sociales appliquées ........................................................................................... xxiPolitique étrangère du Canada à l’égard de la Somalie ................................................. xxiiiSituation humanitaire et réponse du Canada ................................................................. xxivÉvaluation des questions relatives à la sécurité régionale ............................................ xxvii

Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... xxixTable of contents ........................................................................................................................ xxxiAcknowledgements .................................................................................................................. xxxiii1 Current Political and Security Challenges in Somalia .............................................................. 12 The Inevitability of Instability in Somalia: Why Somalis Endure Chronic Violence ............. 15

2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 152.2 The Democratic Period ................................................................................................ 152.3 The Siad Barre Era ...................................................................................................... 162.4 State Collapse and Conflict Management in the Post-Siad Barre Era ......................... 172.5 The Government of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed ...................................................... 182.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 19

3 Canada in Somalia .................................................................................................................. 21

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4 Humanitarian Situation in Somalia and the Canadian Response ............................................ 25References ..................................................................................................................................... 33

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Acknowledgements

The Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society would like to acknowledge the sponsorship and participation of DRDC Toronto, particularly James Moore and Matthew Lauder, in supporting this workshop. The participation of members of the public service under Chatham House rules is gratefully acknowledged. Organization and note-taking by Tony Seaboyer, Will Chalmers, Xiren Wang, Elizabeth Kellett, and assistance by Queen’s University, particularly Kim Nossal and Maureen Bartram, are greatly appreciated.

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1 Current Political and Security Challenges in Somalia

Ken Menkhaus (Davidson College, Davidson, North Carolina)

Editor’s Note: No speaking notes are available for this presentation.

SME Workshop: SME Workshop: Somalia and alSomalia and al--ShabaabShabaab

““Current Political and Security Challenges in SomaliaCurrent Political and Security Challenges in Somalia””Ken MenkhausKen Menkhaus

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The backdrop The backdrop The 20 year crisisThe 20 year crisisCounterCounter--veiling trends in veiling trends in governance, security, and governance, security, and livelihoods 1995livelihoods 1995--20062006Clannism then and now Clannism then and now Diasporization of Somalia and rise Diasporization of Somalia and rise of remittance economy, 1991of remittance economy, 1991--Islamic Courts, Islamism, East Islamic Courts, Islamism, East Africa Al Qaeda cell, and the rise Africa Al Qaeda cell, and the rise of CT concerns, 1998of CT concerns, 1998--The TFG and the rise of the stateThe TFG and the rise of the state--building agenda, 2005building agenda, 2005--

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Coastal port towns and commerceCoastal port towns and commerce

New real estate New real estate investments, 1994investments, 1994--; ; universities, celluniversities, cell--

phone companies, phone companies, and Coca Cola and Coca Cola bottling plantsbottling plants

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Diasporization and RemittancesDiasporization and Remittances1.5 million Somalis outs ide of country, 1.5 million Somalis outside of country, now 700,000 more now 700,000 more –– 20% of population20% of population““diasporizationdiasporization ”” of politics, civil of politics, civil society, and economysociety, and economyPowerful ethical obligation to remit, to Powerful ethical obligation to remit, to extended familyextended familyRemittances and national economy Remittances and national economy ----$1.5 to $2 billion annually$1.5 to $2 billion annuallyRole of hawala and teleRole of hawala and tele--com companiescom companies

The question of generation and The question of generation and sustainability of remittance flowssustainability of remittance flowsRemittance companies since 9/11 Remittance companies since 9/11 –– strains of compliance strains of compliance Problems of Somali assimilation Problems of Somali assimilation abroadabroad

Somali lineagesSomali lineages

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Somalia: Somalia: Kinship, clan, and Kinship, clan, and governancegovernance

Clannism as form of social Clannism as form of social identityidentityWhat is a clan? Lineage What is a clan? Lineage –– clanclan--family, clan, subfamily, clan, sub--can, diyacan, diya--groupgroupThe interThe inter--play of clan and other play of clan and other social idenitiessocial idenities

Positive rolesPositive roles of clan of clan ––Security in times of danger, Security in times of danger, Social safety netSocial safety netRole of diyaRole of diya--paying groups paying groups ----collective responsibility and collective responsibility and compensational justicecompensational justiceRole of clan elders and Role of clan elders and customary law (customary law (xeerxeer) as main ) as main source of rule of law and order source of rule of law and order and conflict management and conflict management at at local levellocal level

Kinship, clan, and governanceKinship, clan, and governanceNegative roleNegative role of clannism of clannism ––

Divisive and dysfunctional at Divisive and dysfunctional at national level national level Mobilized by political elites for Mobilized by political elites for parochial agendasparochial agendasUneven source of protection Uneven source of protection –– weak weak clans, those outside clan structure clans, those outside clan structure vulnerablevulnerableUsed by external actors Used by external actors –– divide & divide & rule tactics rule tactics Creates resource allocation systems Creates resource allocation systems based on lineage balance not merit based on lineage balance not merit Enshrines role of clan elders, can be Enshrines role of clan elders, can be reactionary, venal, illreactionary, venal, ill--informed informed Enshrines Enshrines xeer xeer and diyaand diya--payments, payments, which are extrawhich are extra--constitutional, fall constitutional, fall short of human rights standards, short of human rights standards, create disincentives for statecreate disincentives for state--buildingbuilding

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The catastrophe since 2006The catastrophe since 2006

Rise and fall of the ICU 2006Rise and fall of the ICU 2006Ethiopian occupation and its consequencesEthiopian occupation and its consequencesTFG misruleTFG misruleRise of shabaabRise of shabaabHopes dashed in 2009 Hopes dashed in 2009 AMISOMAMISOMStalemate and paralysis since 2008 Stalemate and paralysis since 2008 –– subsub--optimal optimal but acceptable outcome for most actors?but acceptable outcome for most actors?

Areas of control Areas of control as of 2011as of 2011

ShabaabShabaab’’s s ““controlcontrol’’ over most over most of southof south--central Somalia is central Somalia is loose loose –– very thin presence in very thin presence in rural area; evolving but only rural area; evolving but only basic administrationbasic administrationHisbul Islam surrendered to Hisbul Islam surrendered to shabaaab December 2010shabaaab December 2010TFG areas of Mogadishu not TFG areas of Mogadishu not under full control of govt; under full control of govt; indpindp ’’t militias working with t militias working with AMISOM control much of the AMISOM control much of the TFG zoneTFG zonePuntland autonomous from Puntland autonomous from TFGTFGNew weak polities emerging New weak polities emerging along Kenya and Ethiopia along Kenya and Ethiopia borders borders –– ‘‘AzaniaAzania’’

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Kismaayo and JubbalandKismaayo and Jubbaland

KismayoKismayo’’s critical roles critical roleEthiopia and Kenya Ethiopia and Kenya military plansmilitary plansOgaden and ONLF Ogaden and ONLF factorfactorimplicationsimplications

Shabaab and the rise of radical Shabaab and the rise of radical Islamism in SomaliaIslamism in Somalia

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Shabaab: Anatomy of a jihadist Shabaab: Anatomy of a jihadist insurgency insurgency

IdeologyIdeologyTacticsTacticsSuicide bombingsSuicide bombingsLocal recruitmentLocal recruitmentGlobal recruitmentGlobal recruitmentNumbersNumbersIntelligenceIntelligence--gatheringgatheringMedia campaignMedia campaign

Shabaab Shabaab ---- financesfinancesLatest estimates: $70Latest estimates: $70--100 million/yr:100 million/yr:

Taxes on main markets/ businesses, Taxes on main markets/ businesses, checkpoints (est. $30 million)checkpoints (est. $30 million)

Charcoal exports out of Kismayo (est. Charcoal exports out of Kismayo (est. $30$30--40 million)40 million)

Other Other –– businesses in Kenya, fundbusinesses in Kenya, fund--raising, etc. (est. $10 million)raising, etc. (est. $10 million)Implications: diaspora fundImplications: diaspora fund--raising not raising not a major part of shabaab portfolio; AQ a major part of shabaab portfolio; AQ not a significant source; shabaab is a not a significant source; shabaab is a moneymoney--making venture; its funding making venture; its funding linked to environmental devastation; linked to environmental devastation; Kismayo port is criticalKismayo port is critical

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Shabaab Shabaab ––strengths and weaknessesstrengths and weaknesses

Strengths:Strengths:Conflation of jihadism and Conflation of jihadism and nationalism, esp. antinationalism, esp. anti--foreign foreign sentimentsentimentUtter weakness of oppositionUtter weakness of oppositionIntimidationIntimidationExternal supportExternal supportDiscipline and commitment Discipline and commitment Strong networkStrong networkLocal revenuesLocal revenues

Weaknesses:Weaknesses:Internal divisions over Internal divisions over tactics, objectives, clan, tactics, objectives, clan, leadership, A/Q linksleadership, A/Q linksWeak Islamist credentials and Weak Islamist credentials and vision vision CounterCounter--productive tactics productive tactics Declining local supportDeclining local supportA/Q affiliationA/Q affiliationTerrorist designationTerrorist designationLow morale?Low morale?

Shabaab and Al QaShabaab and Al Qa’’idaidaAffiliation, not franchiseAffiliation, not franchiseA/Q foreign presence in Somalia A/Q foreign presence in Somalia ––numbers, rolesnumbers, rolesForeign advisors , or leaders? Increasingly Foreign advisors, or leaders? Increasingly seen as commandersseen as commandersMedia supportMedia supportWhat does A/Q want from Somalia? What does A/Q want from Somalia? Dabbling Dabbling –– high yield, low cost, low risk high yield, low cost, low risk irritant to US and allies; appropriation of irritant to US and allies; appropriation of shabaab victory; transit point and safe shabaab victory; transit point and safe haven; base of operations?haven; base of operations?What does shabaab want from A/Q What does shabaab want from A/Q affillitiation?affillitiation?

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ShabaabShabaab’’s links with AQ s links with AQ affiliates: the EAAQ and AQAPaffiliates: the EAAQ and AQAP

Shabaab and AQAP:Shabaab and AQAP:Communication, mutual support, transit, Communication, mutual support, transit,

weaponsweaponsAnwar AlAnwar Al--Awlaki as ideological leader, Awlaki as ideological leader,

source of radicalization source of radicalization –– Inspire magazineInspire magazineEast African cell: greater danger East African cell: greater danger hundreds training in Jubba areahundreds training in Jubba areaMost are upcountry converts to IslamMost are upcountry converts to IslamLinked to Kampala bombingsLinked to Kampala bombingsShabaab as a flag of convenience for themShabaab as a flag of convenience for themNot controlled by old EEAQ cellNot controlled by old EEAQ cell

Shabaab and terror threats in Shabaab and terror threats in regionregion

ShabaabShabaab’’s capacity to reach soft targets s capacity to reach soft targets in East Africain East AfricaShabaabShabaab’’s threats in pasts threats in pastSomaliland/Puntland bombings Oct Somaliland/Puntland bombings Oct 20082008Why did shabaab not make good on Why did shabaab not make good on threats? Theories . . . threats? Theories . . . Attack in Kenya border areaAttack in Kenya border areaEast African cell as separate threatEast African cell as separate threat

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Threat assessment of shabaab Threat assessment of shabaab attacks in or on North Americaattacks in or on North America

Inventory of threats:Inventory of threats:1. Somali diaspora in shabaab 1. Somali diaspora in shabaab ----sleeper cell scenariosleeper cell scenario2. Infiltration through Mexico 2. Infiltration through Mexico 3. 3. ““HomeHome--growngrown”” terrorist threat terrorist threat –– of Somaliof Somali--American and American and SomaliSomali--Canadian Canadian ““jihobbyistsjihobbyists”” selfself--recruited through websites, chat recruited through websites, chat rooms rooms 4. Attacks on Western citizens or sites abroad, especially in Ho4. Attacks on Western citizens or sites abroad, especially in HornrnAssessment: Assessment:

Risks to shabaab Risks to shabaab –– defection; blowbackdefection; blowbackShabaab weakness increases likelihood of attackShabaab weakness increases likelihood of attackDanger of Danger of ““global jihadglobal jihad”” wing emerging from shabaabwing emerging from shabaabDanger of selfDanger of self--radicalized, uncontrolled individual jihadiradicalized, uncontrolled individual jihadi

The Somali diaspora, shabaab The Somali diaspora, shabaab and Islamic extremismand Islamic extremism

Most Somali diaspora just trying to make a living, not politicalMost Somali diaspora just trying to make a living, not politically active ly active at allat allIn past, almost no Somali recruitment into A/Q In past, almost no Somali recruitment into A/Q But susceptible But susceptible –– many Somalimany Somali--Americans isolated, poorly integrated, Americans isolated, poorly integrated, esp. young menesp. young menSomaliSomali--American support for ICU in 2006, volunteers, fundAmerican support for ICU in 2006, volunteers, fund--raisingraisingRadical anger among SomaliRadical anger among Somali--Americans over destruction caused by Americans over destruction caused by Ethiopian occupation in 2007Ethiopian occupation in 2007--0808Fierce spike in antiFierce spike in anti--Americanism Americanism –– US/West blamed for the US/West blamed for the catastrophe in Somalia catastrophe in Somalia Shabaab viewed by many as legitimate form of national resistanceShabaab viewed by many as legitimate form of national resistance, not , not terrorism terrorism –– defensive jihad or defensive jihad or ““just warjust war””

NOTE: shabaab not designated a terrorist group until March 08NOTE: shabaab not designated a terrorist group until March 08 fears of fears of retroactive charges, confusion. retroactive charges, confusion.

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Shabaab recruitment in diasporaShabaab recruitment in diasporaTotal of 40 or so SomaliTotal of 40 or so Somali--Americans recruited into Americans recruited into shabaabshabaabMost recruited or selfMost recruited or self--recruited in 2007recruited in 2007--08, 08, response to Ethiopian occupationresponse to Ethiopian occupationWhy the heavy shabaab recruitment campaign Why the heavy shabaab recruitment campaign directed at the diaspora?directed at the diaspora?How does shabaab recruit in the diaspora? How does shabaab recruit in the diaspora? Extensive use of internetExtensive use of internetOf the 2007Of the 2007--08 class 08 class –– some killed, a few defected some killed, a few defected and reintegrated, some remain. and reintegrated, some remain. Suicide bombers and the diasporaSuicide bombers and the diasporaProfiles of recruited youthProfiles of recruited youthFinancial backers of travel for youthFinancial backers of travel for youthInitial Somali community reactionInitial Somali community reactionDiaspora as source of leadership in shabaabDiaspora as source of leadership in shabaabIs the TFGIs the TFG--shabaab conflict a shabaab conflict a ““diaspora war?diaspora war?””nonnon--Somali Americans attracted to shabaabSomali Americans attracted to shabaab

Current situation re: diaspora and Current situation re: diaspora and ShabaabShabaab

Good news:Good news:Declining reputation of shabaab Declining reputation of shabaab

and al Qaedaand al QaedaShabaab defections and Shabaab defections and

desertionsdesertionsImpact of death of Fazul, 6/11Impact of death of Fazul, 6/11Quiet effort by diaspora to regain Quiet effort by diaspora to regain

control of youthcontrol of youth

Concerns:Concerns:Instances of SomaliInstances of Somali--

Americans selfAmericans self--recruiting recruiting directly into Al Qadirectly into Al Qa’’ida ida (Portland case)(Portland case)

PostPost--2009 recruits into 2009 recruits into shabaab shabaab –– ex: Abdullah Ahmedex: Abdullah Ahmed

Desperate conditions in Desperate conditions in Somalia, refugee campsSomalia, refugee camps

Enduring Somali bitterness, Enduring Somali bitterness, identity crisis, alienation in identity crisis, alienation in WestWest

Enduring existence of internet Enduring existence of internet ““jihobbyistsjihobbyists”” among Somali among Somali youthyouth

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Other crises and issuesOther crises and issues

The famine, OFAC, and food aidThe famine, OFAC, and food aidRefugee crisisRefugee crisisPiracyPiracyTFG todayTFG todayEngaging subEngaging sub--state actorsstate actorsRegional dynamics and interestsRegional dynamics and interestsprognosisprognosis

Current humanitarian crisisCurrent humanitarian crisis

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2 The Inevitability of Instability in Somalia: Why Somalis Endure Chronic Violence

Ian Spears (University of Guelph, Guelph, Ontario)

Abstract: This presentation considers the incipient nature of the Somali state. It seeks to explain why successive Somali governments have been unable to extend their authority over their territory in ways that prevent the emergence of rebel factions or ANSAs such as al-Shabaab. The problem of state authority and “ungoverned territory” is felt across Africa but it is a problem that has been particularly acute in Somalia. Contemporary approaches to conflict resolution and state building have done little to alleviate this problem.

2.1 Introduction

I am one of those who is pessimistic about the prospects of establishing a new and viable Somali government in the current state framework. This is not to say that mistakes have not been made which have prevented more favourable outcomes. Rather it is to say that the dynamic nature of Somalia’s political process, the number of players, the nature of their respective identities and divisions, and the geometry of local, regional and global interests all conspire—in the absence of existing state institutions—to make Somalia’s an extremely intractable conflict. It is not clear to me that any approach will lead to sustained and authoritative government in the foreseeable future or that groups such as al-Shabaab can be managed.

I am currently in the early stages of a project which focuses on the problems of conflict resolution. My view is not that all forms of conflict resolution fail but rather that outside efforts to manage conflict often do. I am also of the belief that the current state system—the grid of borders that criss-cross Africa—predispose the continent’s states to perpetual instability. Somalia is perhaps the most troubled example of state’s giving rise to instability. But on top of this, I argue that outside efforts to manage the ongoing Somali crisis—regardless of whether their objectives are well-intentioned or self-interested—contribute to this problem. The case of Somalia is particularly difficult given that is also now infused with the challenge of a global counter-terrorism effort.

So my view is that the sources of conflict exist on two levels: First, there are factors inherent to all African states—but particularly Somalia—that predispose them to instability; and, second, interference by outsiders in an effort to make things better or to prevent terrorist groups often have unintended consequences, and give rise to more radical groups such as al-Shabaab, which are the central concern of the West.

2.2 The Democratic Period

Post-colonial governments in Somalia have had to face the same challenge that virtually all African governments have had to face. That is, how to extend authority over large and diverse territory. Somalis have resisted efforts to concentrate power that come with a modern state

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precisely because, in the Horn’s inhospitable environment, clan has long provided a more reliable “insurance company” than state power which has all too often been used against them (Drysdale 2000: 65, 140). In the absence of political institutions as they are known in the West, most governments have resorted to a combination of patronage and coercion. Both are regarded as lamentable maladies of Africa’s colonial state system. And Somalis have had experience with both.

Often forgotten, however, is that Somalia did have a brief democratic era from independence in 1960 until 1969. In fact, during this time Somalia was regarded as a promising and reasonably democratic state. Somalia under civilian rule appeared to respect democratic principles, and, while its survival hinged precariously on the ability of its clan representatives to negotiate compromises on various clan demands, for nine years Somalis clung to its parliamentary system. The sometimes-chaotic politics gave rise to elections and much-admired freedom of expression. In fact, complimenting Somalia’s democratic progress, Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda remarked, “I have known no other country in Africa where former Prime Ministers or Presidents are not only put in a position to continue to be influential by expressing freely their views either in favour of the current government or the opposition, but also who have, in effect, no cause to fear for their lives as they continue to make this contribution” (Legum & Drysdale 1969: 200).

2.3 The Siad Barre Era

But with Somali democracy, came other problems. The complicated system of proportional representation exacerbated clan divisions, and the many weak and small political parties were less a platform for aggregating interests than a means for clans to get access to the resources of the state. Indeed, from the first election in 1960 to Somalia’s tumultuous last election in 1969, the number of political parties ballooned from 5 to 62, while the number of candidates contesting the 123 seats was over 1,000. Needless to say, corruption was rife.

In this sense, the October 1969 coup of Siad Barre brought much welcome relief. The coup delivered many of the assets that observers of military rule had long promised: a disciplined and vigorous government that did not need to concern itself with the corrupt politics of clan and which, in turn, could act upon reforms that had long eluded the previous civilian government. “One of them was the writing of the Somali script. The other was Somalia’s membership of the Arab League. None of these [it has been said] could have been realized without a dictatorial regime, for both lacked any common parliamentary consensus during the previous civilian governments” (Ghalib 1995: 141). (The regime legally banned public acknowledgment of clan and demanded that individuals be referred to as “comrade”.)

On the first anniversary of the coup, the regime declared Somalia would be governed by “scientific socialism,” a doctrine that was also, conveniently, above the politics of clan. Then, in 1971, Siad Barre banned tribalism outright, claiming it was associated with nepotism and corruption. Siad Barre was also troubled by those with an Islamist agenda and clerics who organized against his government and its policies. In 1975, Siad had a confrontation with religious conservatives over the roles of women in Somalia’s Islamic society (ICG 2010: 2-3).

Today, Siad Barre is often remembered for his brutality and for the corrupt ways of his regime. I think it is important to remember that in its early days, Siad’s regime was, for many Somalis, a

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worthy government. But after a series of egregious missteps—the most notable of which was the invasion of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia—Siad relied increasingly on patronage and, subsequently, coercion to maintain order. In its last years, the regime was increasingly corrupt and narrowly based on his own family’s clans. By this time, the regime had descended to the most extreme forms of coercion and had become almost entirely dependent on foreign assistance. My colleague Matt Bryden has referred to Somalia at this time as a “toxic state.”

2.4 State Collapse and Conflict Management in the Post-Siad Barre Era

Everyone here will be familiar with the events of the early 1990s, starting with the collapse of the regime, and the efforts of UNITAF and UNOSOM to disarm the Somali warlords, provide food to starving Somalis, and engage in a process of statebuilding. Suffice it to say that none of these were successful. Peace processes, such as the one at Arta in Djibouti, offered some promise. But squabbling amongst the representatives led to the departure of a key faction and eventual rejection by most Somali citizens. Ken Menkhaus himself has described this process as a “crass” exercise in pie-sharing and seat-banking, where there was little gained in terms of reconciliation, and delegates and self-appointed representatives feuded over the meagre provisions expected from the international community once the government was recognized.

The brief rule of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) was more highly regarded for what it delivered to many Somalis. Particularly from the perspective of what came after, it will appear to many as having been a “Golden Age” (Barnes & Hassan 2007: 157). It succeeded in the achievement of significant and visible public actions that won it considerable support. It ended road blocks, disposed of piles of garbage, opened the airport and seaport, restored property, and generally provided law and order to Somalis who were, until then, in desperate need. In meeting these objectives, the Courts brought “an alternative means of governance to Somalia through Sharia law” (Ibid.: 155). Since this “alternative means of governance” represented a move away from warlordism and clan, it was embraced by many Somalis.

But the ICU had its own contradictions. Its rule extended only from June until the end of December 2006—hardly a sufficient test for its ability to govern. Despite its promising start, however, others claimed that cracks were already apparent before the December 2006 invasion by Ethiopia. For all of its accomplishments, the ICU was a “broad mosque” and brought together moderates and extreme elements of political Islam (Ibid.). While ordinarily this might have been a good thing, in the context of the post- 9/11 era, it created new problems. First, it is not clear that such a disparate group of Islamists was in fact sustainable. Second, and accordingly, the statements and actions of various ICU wings suggested not only that there were differences between leaders of al-Shabaab and mainstream members of the ICU but the ICU was not exercising moderate or consistent judgement in the formulation of its policies.

The notable missteps in terms of public statements banning certain activities are well known to most people here. They certainly caught the attention of American policy makers who were concerned about a radical Islamist regime in Mogadishu.

Ethiopia next door has long had an existential fear of Muslim Somalia. Statements that a refashioned Somalia might return to past policies of irredentism were evidently incompatible with Ethiopian security interests.

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In other words, there was a fundamental antagonism between the establishment of the ICU and other regional and global interests.

2.5 The Government of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed

The most recent government in Mogadishu, that of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, might be seen as having corrected many of the problems of previous efforts to build a new government in Mogadishu. Having an Islamist whose government declared its intention to codify and implement Sharia law—and had served in the earlier ICU government of 2006—was expected to put the proverbial ball in the court of the Islamists. After all, observed the ICG, hardline Islamists would now have to explain why “their project to Islamise the country was better or different from that of the new TFG” (ICG 2010: 6).

But the outcome was not necessarily received in favourable ways. To be sure, the move caused “shock waves” within al-Shabaab. But as the ICG reported, al-Shabaab’s response,

“was overwhelmingly negative and stridently adversarial. Sharif was a traitor. His Islamist credentials were dubious and his intentions to implement Sharia suspect. He was a Western puppet, a tool to dismember the Islamist movement” (Ibid.).

Today, despite high hopes when he became President in 2009, Sheik Sharif has proved to be “ineffective as well” (Gettleman 2011).

This is, indeed, a hazard of an inclusive approach to conflict resolution. Efforts to be accommodating are often not seen as well-meaning efforts or genuinely inclusive. Rather they are regarded for what they may in fact be: efforts to weaken and divide opponents by slicing off and peeling away the moderates with tempting offers of the perquisites of government.

Indeed, the ICG adds that some Islamists,

“viewed the entire Djibouti process as an elaborate Western ‘conspiracy’ to further divide the Islamists and lend legitimacy to a flawed partial peace process aimed at disempowering ‘true nationalist forces’ committed to the creation of ‘a genuine Islamic state’ in Somalia. As far as they were concerned, Sharif’s installation and the profuse Western praise for his ‘moderate’ views were deeply disingenuous—a cynical ploy designed to ensure the continuation of the status quo ante” (ICG 2010: 10).

While outcomes can cut a number of different ways, the fear that the rug is being pulled from beneath them can have the effect of further radicalization. Depending on how these groups break down—and the relative political and military significance of those who leave and those who stay—this can be the worst possible outcome if working with moderates only further radicalizes the fringes.

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2.6 Conclusions

I think it is possible to see this discussion in terms of whether a glass is half full or half empty. If the glass is half full, there have been successes which should not be overlooked. Somalia has experienced limited democracy and enlightened authoritarian rule. There have also been brief moments of progress in terms of the erection of reasonably inclusive national or federal government. And when things have been done wrong—and over several years now Ken Menkhaus has done a superb job of high-lighting mistakes—these have often been identifiable.

But I, like many of you, tend to see the glass as half empty. At the end of the day—that is after 20 years of effort—there is still no sign of government in Somalia. Nor is it clear that progress is being made to reverse processes of fragmentation and radicalization. And finally, it is not clear that the rise of Islamists has been effectively managed or contained. On the contrary, it has been efforts to manipulate governments by outsiders that have done most to give rise to Islamic groups such as al-Shabaab. Given the resilience of these movements, there is no realistic scenario on the table for advancing their demise (Barnes & Hassan 2007: 152, 153).

Indeed, if Islamic groups are believed to be the only ones able to solve the problem of governance—as Islamic courts did following Siad Barre’s demise and as the ICU did in its brief period of rule—they will continue to thrive in the absence of effective administration in Mogadishu. In this sense it is worth recalling that since independence virtually all efforts to build a state along the lines of Western states have broken down. In the end, all of these governments have been subject to the same challenge—which is the near impossible task of establishing a coherent and sustainable state and projecting its authority to the extent of Somalia’s existing borders. As was the case in the last days of the Siad Barre regime, most transitional governments are better seen as no more than fragile “mayors of Mogadishu”.

While I cannot stress enough the importance of being fully informed, these problems cannot be overcome simply by having a better understanding of Somali politics. On how far knowledge will take you, the International Crisis Group writes:

“... better understanding of the ideological nuances [of Somalia’s Islamic groups] will not—in and of itself—help to produce a clearer image. These groups are evolving and mutating in a fluid political environment in which alliances are constantly shifting” (ICG 2010: p.5, fn.25).

The problem is not merely the impossible complexity of the problem but its ongoing dynamism. Virtually every effort to establish a regime sets in train a process whereby those who are excluded or whose interests are jeopardized mobilize against the government. No reasonable amount of inclusion can overcome this problem because, aside from being materially unsustainable, the process of being inclusive has itself been prone to exploitation by self-interested warlords. Within each success have been the seeds of its own dissolution if not destruction. The tendency of the Somali state continues to be—as it always has been—towards fragmentation rather than consolidation. That model may be the correct one.

Finally, conflict resolution literature has often claimed that the international community has been unwilling to commit the resources and time necessary to fully engage in state-building. But the opposite may also be true: that prolonged efforts to impose a particular agenda or defend a

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government—one that is Western-friendly, democratic and market-oriented—can also generate resentment. Attacks on foreign troops are rationalized by claims that they are only present to defend an illegitimate government. Indeed, this appears to have been the case with groups such as al-Shabaab. On the other hand, while their transition was not without its own violence, regions such as Somaliland that have not had extensive foreign involvement have demonstrated more promise in their ability to establish a sustainable government.

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3 Canada in Somalia

Editor’s Note: The following presentation was given by an official of the Government of Canada. No speaking notes are available for this presentation.

11/7/2011 Title 2

Plan1. Canadian policy on Somalia

2. Canadian engagement

3. Canada’s financial contributions

4. Canada’s interests

11/7/2011 Title 3

Canadian Policy on Somalia• Canada is deeply concerned by the problems that presently

confront Somalia, such as lawlessness, piracy, ongoing conflict and their devastating toll on the civilian population.

• Canada supports the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and welcomes the leadership of the African Union in addressing the crisis in Somalia.

• Together with other members of the international community Canada is seriously concerned by the inability of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to deliver on its core commitments and its decision to extend its mandate.

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Canadian Policy on Somalia (cont’d)• Canada urges the TFG leadership, the Transitional Federal

Institutions and all Somalis to work together to restore peace and stability to their country.

• Canada believes that the conclusion of a follow-on political dispensation in Somalia must be Somali-led and must include a realistic and measurable plan for stabilization and development.

• Canada condemns in the strongest possible terms Al-Shabaab’s terrorist attacks on the Somali Transitional Federal Government,AMISOM, humanitarian personnel, Somali civilians, and in Nairobi, Kenya and Kampala, Uganda.

11/7/2011 Title 4

Canadian Policy on Somalia (cont’d)• Canada listed Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization in March

2010 thereby criminalizing the financing of, and participation in, Al-Shabaab’s activities.

• Canada is concerned about the rise in piracy off the coast of eastern Africa. Canada strongly supports international action, including through NATO and the international community, to counter piracy and ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia.

11/7/2011 5

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Canadian Engagement in the Region• Canada participates in the International Contact Group on Somalia

which brings together those international actors at the forefront of efforts to support regional stabilization and reconstruction in Somalia.

• In addition to f inancial support for regional capacity building efforts, Canada has co-sponsored four UNSC resolutions on counter-piracy and participated in international fora, including the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia.

• Canada is committed to NATO’s and the international community’s efforts to prevent and suppress acts of piracy off the coast of Eastern Africa and has deployed three frigates to the Horn of Africa since 2008.

11/7/2011 Title 6

11/7/2011 7

Canada’s Financial Contribution• Support of humanitarian operations: $81 million since December

2006

• On July 22nd, Canada’s Minister for International Cooperation, Bev Oda, announced that Canada will be increasing its humanitarian assistance for the region by $50 million in order to bring relief to those affected by the drought in East Africa. She also announced the launch of the East Africa Drought Relief Fund, whereby donations by individual Canadians to registered Canadian charities for drought response to the crisis will be matched.

• Assessed contributions to the UN UN Support Off ice for AMISOM (UNSOA): approximately $9,8 million in 2011-2012

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Canada’s Financial Contribution (cont’d)• Assessed contributions to the UN UN Political Office for Somalia

(UNPOS): USD $520,000 in 2012

• Contribution to the Global Peace and Security Fund to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime: $740,000

• Canada Fund for Local Initiatives: $500,000 annually

11/7/2011 Title 8

Canada’s Interests• Domestic:

– Host to one of the largest Somali Diasporas outside of Africa

– Security: Al-Shabaab is one of Canada’s most serious security threats

• International:– Like-minded countries and international

organisations continue to lobby for increased Canadian engagement, particularly in the security sector

11/7/2011 Title 9

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4 Humanitarian Situation in Somalia and the Canadian Response

Editor’s Note: The following presentation was given by an official of the Government of Canada.

Objectives of Canadian Humanitarian Action

• To meet humanitarian needs: save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain human dignity

• To ensure consistency with international legal obligations and principles

• To ensure a coherent, timely and coordinated response

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In addition to drought and food security issues, ongoing fighting between the terrorist group al-Shabaab and the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces has created significant internal displacements and refugee movements to neighbouring countries.

Since June 16th, over 60,000 new IDPs displaced within Somalia, mostly due to drought.

Current Situation

• The Horn of Africa is experiencing its worst drought in 60 years

• Somalia: the drought is exacerbated by lack of humanitarian access and continued conflict

• 3.7 million people in need of emergency humanitarian assistance

• 1.5 million people displaced by conflict and drought within Somalia

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According to the United Nations, a famine is declared when global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates among children exceed 30 per cent, more than two people per every 10,000 die per day, and people are not able to access food and other basic necessities.

The World Food Program (WFP) has been able to step up its activities in Mogadishu, flying in food from Kenya (first flight arrived on July 27th). There are now approximately 400,000 IDPs in Mogadishu.

Concerns that those who have crossed into Kenya, Ethiopia or travelled to Mogadishu are those people with the economic means to travel and the physical ability to walk long distances, meaning that those left in rural inaccessible areas are likely to be the most vulnerable within society.

Somalia

• Bakool and Lower Shebelle are experiencing a famine

• 8 other areas in Somalia are at risk of famine

• In addition to the failed rains, food prices have risen 200-300% in the past year in some areas

• Pastoral communities moving into Mogadishu to obtain food aid

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Key humanitarian actors such as the World Food Program and most NGOs remain cautious with regards to widening the scope of their activities in south-central Somalia due to continued concerns for their safety. They are requesting protection guarantees from al-Shabaab in order to go back in.

Local NGOs, Islamic NGOs and some international NGOs do continue to have access in southern Somalia (Médecins Sans Frontière, UNICEF, etc). Al-Shabaab is most concerned about organizations which provide food aid, as they see this as taking away from Somali farmers.

NGOs are sometimes receiving different messages from local AS officials vs the more hardline leadership of AS.

Humanitarian access and the safety of aid workers will continue as a key challenge in terms of the international humanitarian response to this crisis.

Access Constraints in Somalia• Al Shabaab has restricted access to areas under

their control to certain humanitarian actors. • Though they announced on July 6th that their

ban on humanitarian organizations was being lifted, on July 22nd, they reiterated that banned organizations, such as the WFP, remained banned and denied that a famine was ongoing.

• Fractured leadership in AS leading to mixed messages to NGOs.

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The majority of refugees at Dadaab are Somali. The camps were first established in 1992 with a capacity of 90,000. There are still 3,500 new arrivals in Kenya and Ethiopia every day.

The Government of Kenya announced on July 14th that it would allow the opening of a 4th camp at Dadaab, Ifo II.

The opening of the border crossing at Liboi would provide organizations the ability to provide humanitarian assistance to those refugees walking/travelling between Somalia and Dadaab, as the long distance between the border and the camps (100km) is further exacerbating the dire humanitarian situation, as there is no food or water along the route.

According to media reports, the Kenyan Government has petitioned the African Union and humanitarian organizations to consider opening a new refugee camp in a “third country.” The Government has also requested that assistance be provided inside Somalia, instead of waiting for Somalis to leave.

Humanitarian organizations have stated that the priority is to assist people in the affected areas (if access permits) to avoid further displacement, but this is not always possible.

There are also over 160,000 Somali refugees in eastern Ethiopia, mostly in the overcrowded Dolo Ado camps.

Canada continues to engage with the Government of Kenya and to urge the Government to allow the opening of an additional camp and the border crossing, including during Minister Oda’s recent visit.

Dadaab Camps• As of July 25th overall registered population

stood at 388,804 persons residing in Ifo, Dahagaley and Hagadera camps.

• The Government of Kenya’s promise to open the Ifo Camp 2 and the border crossing at Liboi have yet to materialize.

• Over 25,000 people waiting outside the camps to register, some wait as long as 2 months.

• Security concerns in the camps – AS recruitment

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Canada has repeatedly also called for full, safe, unhindered access and for all parties to ensure the protection of civilians, including the safety and security of aid workers.

UN Response• UN Security Council has urged all parties in Somalia to ensure “full,

safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of humanitarian aid to persons in need of assistance” and called on armed groups to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of humanitarian personnel and supplies.

• Appeals: The Annual Humanitarian Appeals for Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia (Humanitarian requirements identified by the Governmentof Ethiopia) and Djibouti total almost $2 billion.

• Current funding needs: Approximately $1.2 billion still required.• To date, WFP has reached 1.5 million people in Somalia and is

trying to reach a further 2.2 million in areas of the south that have been inaccessible.

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Following her visit to the Dadaab camps, Minister Oda announced an additional $50 million in humanitarian assistance to support drought-affected populations in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. Of the $50 million, approximately half will go to food aid through WFP, the remaining funds will be used for non-food allocations, including to UN agencies and NGOs. The non-food allocations will cover such needs as nutrition, water/sanitation/hygiene (WASH), protection, health, shelter and non-food items (NFIs).

In addition, the Government of Canada has announced the creation of a “matching fund”, the East Africa Drought Relief Fund, for all donations made by Canadians to people in the Horn region. The Government of Canada will match donations by Canadians until September 16th.

This brings Canada’s total humanitarian contribution to the Horn of Africa to $72 million in 2011.

Canadian Response

• Additional $50 million in response to the drought in the Horn of Africa

• East Africa Drought Relief Fund –Matching fund

• Total contribution in 2011: $72 million to the Horn of Africa

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US example on Government regulations: US AID cannot provide assistance in areas under AS control due to terrorism legislation and possible diversion. Although the US announced that they would resume providing aid in AS areas, they also stated that they would require assurances from the World Food Programme and other organizations working in Somalia that they are not being taxed by al-Shabaab, they are not being subjected to bribes from al-Shabaab and that they can operate unfettered.

Conflict: no end in sight, will lead to further humanitarian needs, impede access, does not allow for development to take place.

Droughts will continue to occur, approximately every 2 years, long term agricultural, economic and development programming required. The humanitarian crisis in the Horn is a long-standing cyclical problem. Beyond the immediate crisis, the root causes – conflict and terrorism, mismanagement and short-term uncoordinated responses that do not address long-term food security issues – will have to be addressed to avoid a repeat of such a crisis in the future.

Refugees in neighbouring countries: some have been in camps for over 20 years, they are not able to return home, Kenya and Ethiopia not willing to nationalize refugees or allow work, etc., options for resettlement in third countries is limited.

Current Challenges to Humanitarian Response

• Access constraints: both by AS and due to government regulations

• Continued conflict, no stable government• Recurring drought in region: need for long-

term solutions• Durable solutions for Refugees

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References

[1] Barnes, Cedric & Hassan, Harun (2007). The rise and fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1(2), 151-160.

[2] Drysdale, John (2000). Stoics without pillows: A way forward for the Somalilands. London, UK: Haan.

[3] Gettleman, Jeffrey (2011). Opportunity in Somalia after killing of Qaeda militant. The New York Times, 14 June.

[4] Ghalib, Jama Mohamed (1995). The cost of dictatorship: The Somali experience. New York, NY: Lillian Barber Press.

[5] International Crisis Group (ICG) (2010). Somalia’s divided Islamists. Africa Briefing No.74. Nairobi, KE/Brussels, BE: International Crisis Group.

[6] Last, David (2011). Eliciting Hierarchy-Enhancing Legitimizing Myths (E-HELM): How do we learn about the stories that groups tell to justify their actions? DRDC Toronto CR 2011-144. Defence R&D Canada – Toronto.

[7] Legum, Colin & Drysdale, John (1969). Africa contemporary record: Annual survey and documents, 1968-1969. London, UK: Africa Research Ltd.

[8] Moore, James (2011). Project overview – A conceptual framework for understanding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic roles and operational dynamics. Informal publication. Defence R&D Canada – Toronto. Available upon request from the author.

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA (Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.) David Last Centre for Security, Armed Forces and Society Royal Military College of Canada

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UNCLASSIFIED (NON-CONTROLLED GOODS) DMC A REVIEW: GCEC JUNE 2010

3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U) in parentheses after the title.) Summit Workshop for Subject Matter Experts: Somalia and al-Shabaab

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e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.) Contract Report

8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.) Defence R&D Canada – Toronto 1133 Sheppard Avenue West P.O. Box 2000 Toronto, Ontario M3M 3B9

9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)

10az01

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13. ABSTRACT (A brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual.)

This Contract Report summarizes the presentations given and discussions held at the SummitWorkshop for Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) on Somalia and the Somali jihadist group al-Shabaab, held at Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario, 28-29 July 2011. This Workshop was organized as part of Phase 2 Framework Calibration of the research program for the Technology Investment Fund (TIF) Project 10az01 “A Conceptual Framework for UnderstandingArmed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics.” The aim of the Workshop was to provide the contracting teams for Phase 2 field work with essentialbackground on the political, security and socio-cultural context within which al-Shabaab operates, as well as to provide the broader Government of Canada policy and intelligence community with a forum in which to discuss issues of pressing relevance to Canada’sengagement in the Horn of Africa.

Le présent rapport résume les exposés présentés et les discussions tenues lors de l’Atelier àl’intention des experts en la matière (EM) sur la Somalie et le groupe djihadiste somalienAl-Shabaab, qui a eu lieu les 28 et 29 juillet 2011 à l’Université Queen’s, à Kingston (Ontario). Cet atelier a été organisé dans le cadre de la Phase 2, Calibrage du cadre conceptuel du programme de recherche pour le projet du Fonds d’investissement technologique (FIT) intitulé « A Conceptual Framework for Understanding Armed Non-state Actors (ANSAs): Strategic Roles and Operational Dynamics » (code de projet : 10az01). L’atelier visait à transmettre aux équipes embauchées à titre contractuel pour effectuer des travaux sur le terrain pendant laPhase 2 du programme les connaissances essentielles sur le contexte politique, socioculturel etde sécurité dans lequel Al-Shabaab mène ses activités. L’atelier avait également pour but de fournir à l’ensemble de la communauté des politiques et du renseignement du gouvernement duCanada une tribune pour discuter des questions qui revêtent une grande importance pourl’engagement du Canada dans la Corne de l’Afrique.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.) Armed Non-state Actors; Somalia; al-Shabaab