surrogates for government? ngos and the state in kenya by

SurrogatesforGovernment?NGOsandtheStateinKenya

by

JenniferNaomiBrass

Adissertationsubmittedinpartialsatisfactionofthe

Requirementsforthedegreeof

DoctorofPhilosophyin

PoliticalScience

inthe

GraduateDivision

ofthe

UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley

Committeeincharge:

Professor(Emeritus)DavidK.Leonard(Chair)AssociateProfessorChristopherAnsellAssistantProfessorLeonardoArriola

ProfessorMichaelWatts

Fall2010

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Abstract

SurrogatesforGovernment?NGOsandtheStateinKenyaby

JenniferNaomiBrass

DoctorofPhilosophyinPoliticalScience

UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley

Professor(Emeritus)DavidK.Leonard,Chair

ThisdissertationexaminestheimpactontheKenyanstateoftheexplosivegrowthofnon‐governmentalorganizations(NGOs)providingsocialservicesinthecountrysincetheearly1990s.WhileNGOshavebeenpresentinKenyasincebeforeindependence,theirnumbersgrew15‐foldbetween1991and2008,fromabout400toover6,000,andmostoftheirfundingnowderivesfromforeignsources.Whatimpactdotheseorganizationshaveonthestate?Thedissertationanswersthisquestion,examininghowserviceprovisionineducation,healthcare,agricultureandwaterbyinternationally‐fundedNGOsaffectsthesocialcontractbetweenthestateanditscitizens,thecountry’sgovernance,anditsadministrativecapacity.Insodoing,itaddressesboththetheoreticaldebateonthestrengthofdevelopingstatesinaglobalized,privatizedworld,andthepracticaldebateonNGOs’roleinbolsteringorunderminingthestate.

Fourcrucial“elementsofstateness”areexamined:territoriality,capacity,governance,andlegitimacy.Examiningeachelementinturn,thedissertationfindsthatNGOshavehelpedtostrengthentheKenyanstate.Territorially,NGOshaveextendedthereachofthestatebyprovidingservicesinplacesthatthegovernmenthasbeenunabletoreach,particularlyinarid,sparselypopulatedareas.NGOshaveimprovedstatecapacitybyextendingservicestosectorsorcommunitiesforwhichpublicagenciesdonothaveadequateresources.Thisextensioncanbequiteliteral,aswhenNGOsprovidefuelorvehiclesforcivilservants’transportationtooutlyingareas.NGOshavealsobecomeincreasinglyactivepartnersingovernance,helpingtoformulatenationalsocialpoliciesregardingserviceprovision.GovernmentactorsoftennowmimicthetoolstypicallyemployedbyNGOs,callingforparticipatorydevelopmentandciviceducation.Thishasinstigatedaslowturntowardmoredemocraticgovernanceprocesses.Finally,NGOshaveincreasedthelegitimacyofthestate,astheprovisionofserviceslowerspopularfrustrationbelowthepointwherecitizensmightbecomealienated.Surveyresearchshows,forinstance,thatcitizensassociateNGOs’gooddeedswithlocalgovernmentadministration,whichoftengetscreditforbringingNGOstothecommunity.

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Thedissertationarguesthat,takentogether,thesechangesindicatethattheorganizationalformofthestateischanginginAfrica.NGOsexpandthenatureofserviceprovisioninsuchawaythatwestarttothinkofthembelongingundertheaegisof“thestate.”Inmanysituationspertainingtoserviceprovision,NGOsperformthefunctionsofgovernment,handinhandwithactualgovernmentactors.JustasTocqueville'sAmericawasfilledwithnon‐governmentalactorsprovidingsocialservicestostrengthena“weak”state,NGOsactinAfrica.AsNGOandgovernmentworkhand‐in‐hand,thelinebetweenpublicagencyandprivateNGOblurs.Thelargerimplicationisthatinthiseraofglobalization,thestateremainsanimportantactor–onlyitscompositionhaschangedslightly.

Thisdissertationemploysamixed‐methodapproach,whichweavestogetherstatisticalanalysis,in‐depthinterviews,casestudiesandotherinformationgatheredduringtwenty‐onemonthsoffieldresearch.Quantitatively,thefindingsrelyonoveronehundredsemi‐structuredinterviews,twooriginalsurveysof500individualsinthreedistricts,andanalysisofthegovernment’sregistryofover4200NGOsspreadacross72administrativedistrictsofthecountry.

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Dedication

ToNGA,forgettingmestarted;BCM,forkeepingmeatit;and

CD,forsupportthroughtotheend.

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TableofContents

Preface ....................................................................................................................................... iv

Acknowledgements ..............................................................................................................vii

ChapterOne:Territoriality,Legitimacy,Capacity,Governance:NGOsandtheStateinAfrica............................................................................................................................ 1Introduction............................................................................................................................................................ 1ASummaryoftheArgument ........................................................................................................................... 2History:ServiceProvisionandtheRiseofNGOsinAfrica ................................................................. 5NGOsinKenya:AnOverview .......................................................................................................................... 8UnderstandingtheState..................................................................................................................................15UndermineorSupporttheState?................................................................................................................19Methodology&Data..........................................................................................................................................25WhyWorkonKenya? .......................................................................................................................................26ARoadmapoftheChaptersAhead .............................................................................................................27References .............................................................................................................................................................29

ChapterTwo:WhyDoNGOsGoWhereTheyGo?TerritorialEvidenceattheNationalLevel .........................................................................................................................37Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................37ExistingExplanationsofNGOPlacement:SaintlyorSelf‐CenteredNGOs? ..............................38Data&Methods ...................................................................................................................................................41AnalysisofNGOPlacement ............................................................................................................................45TestsofRobustness...........................................................................................................................................49Conclusions ...........................................................................................................................................................50References .............................................................................................................................................................61

ChapterThree:MakingaDifference?NGOsandServiceProvisionCapacity....64Introduction..........................................................................................................................................................64OnCapacity ...........................................................................................................................................................65NGOsandtheCapacityLiterature:Tocqueville,PutnamandPrivatization .............................67EvidencefromMachakosandMbeereDistricts....................................................................................69TheWorkNGOsDo:AnOverview...............................................................................................................72NGOsandGovernmentCollaboration:ExtendingtheArmofServiceProvision....................77GovernmentResponsestoNGOs .................................................................................................................81SummaryandImplications ............................................................................................................................87References .............................................................................................................................................................89

ChapterFour:NGOsandChangingPatternsofGovernance:ClearRolesorGrowingComplexity? ........................................................................................................101Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................101OnGovernance .................................................................................................................................................102Fromintimidationtointegration:NGO‐governmentrelationsunderMoiandKibaki .....104MovementtowarddemocraticvaluesthroughNGOintegration ...............................................111ADegreeofConflictualRelationsStillExists.......................................................................................115Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................................................119References ..........................................................................................................................................................121

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ChapterFive:DoNGOsAccountforDecreasingLegitimacyinKenya? ............125Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................125Replicationofa1960sSurvey....................................................................................................................128Legitimacy,ChangeoverTimeandNGOs .............................................................................................131Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................................137References ..........................................................................................................................................................141

ChapterSix:IncreaseStateLegitimacyorUnderminePopularSupport?.......143Introduction.......................................................................................................................................................143TheData...............................................................................................................................................................144Findings ...............................................................................................................................................................145NGOImpactonLegitimacy?........................................................................................................................150MakingSenseoftheData .............................................................................................................................159TheRealDriversofLegitimacy .................................................................................................................163Summary&Conclusions...............................................................................................................................164References ..........................................................................................................................................................171

ChapterSeven:BlurringtheBoundaries:NGOsandtheStateinAfrica ..........173NGOs,LegitimacyandGovernmentPolicy ...........................................................................................176NGOs,AccountabilityandtheLong‐Term ............................................................................................177References ..........................................................................................................................................................179

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Preface

In2002,attheageoftwenty‐four,ImovedtoNairobi,KenyatoworkforasmalllocalNGO.Africawasnotcompletelynewtome:asanundergraduate,IspentayearstudyingabroadinDakar,Senegal,whereIlivedwithalocalfamily,tookclassesattheuniversity,internedwiththeU.S.PeaceCorps,andtraveledinnearbycountries.Afterwards,IgraduatedwithadegreefocusedonAfricanStudies,thenworkedforaninternationaldevelopment‐focusedNGOinWashingtonD.C.IfeltitwastimetotryworkinginAfrica.AnopportunityaroseinNairobiandoffIwent.

TheNGOwhereIworkedwaslocatedinoneofthecity’sIndustrialAreaslums–“informalsettlements”astheyareknowninthedevelopmentindustryor“villages”aslocalresidentscallthem.Intheseareas,largefactoriesstandinterspersedwithunauthorizedneighborhoodswhereresidentsliveinmakeshifthousesofcorrugatedironsheets,wood,plasticandsometimescardboard;opensewageandmuddylanewayscreateahopscotchpatternofsolidlandtonegotiateduringtherains;andmicroentrepreneurssellshoes,clothes,householdgoodsandfoodstuffsalongeachpath.

Inthemidstoftheseconditions,theNGOwasstartedintheearly1990stohelpeasethelackofschoolsinthearea,whereonlyninegovernmentschoolsservedapproximate140,000children.ItalsoaimedtoassistmembersofthecommunityindealingwiththeHIV/AIDSepidemic.Todoso,itoperatedanon‐formalprimaryschool,eventuallyservingover950children,40staffandtheirfamilies.Attheschool,pupilsweretaughtthegovernmentcurriculum,participatedinextra‐curricularactivities,andateanutritiousmealeachday.Alongsidetheschool,theNGOalsoprovidedfinancialsupport,counselingbyatrainedsocialworker,nutritiontraining,andenterprisedevelopmentforawomen’sgroupwhosememberswereHIV‐positive. TheNGOwasfoundedbyBettyNyagoha,avillageresidentwhowasdisheartenedbythenumberoflocalchildrennotattendingschool.Armedwithonlyaprimaryschoolteachingcertificateandahealthysupplyofgumption,shehiredthreeotherteachersatawageofabout$10/month,andapproachedalocalchurchtousetheirhallforclassrooms.Notlongafter,aEuropeanNGOlookingforprojectstofundintheslumsnoticedtheinformalschoolandofferedaid.Theyhelpedtheschoolsettleontounclaimedland,buildcorrugatedironandwoodstructurestoserveasclassrooms,andtoregisterwiththegovernment–asa“testingcenter”fortheKenyaCertificateofPrimaryEducation,theexamrequiredforstudentstoentersecondaryschool.1Theyalsopaidteachersalaries,administrativecosts,andmanagedtheNGO’saccountsandhiring. Afterafewyears,theEuropeanNGOwasunabletocontinuesupport.TheyhelpedBettyfindasecondinternationalNGO,thistimeanAmericanone,who

1Theschoolregisteredasatestingcenter,andnotaprimaryschool,becauseofitsinformalnatureandlackofformaltrainingbymuchofthestaff.Atthesametime,theHeadTeacherisinvitedtoHeadTeachers’meetingsatthelocalDivisionandDistrictEducationOffice,andthepupilsareinvitedtoparticipateinextra‐curriculareventsattheDivision,District,ProvincialandNationallevelwithgovernmentandformalprivateschools.

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fundednearlytheentireannualbudgetof$80,000forthenextfiveyears.Atthatpoint,however,theAmericanNGOs’headquartersannouncedglobalprioritychanges,anditstoppedsupportingtheKenyanNGOafteronlythreemonths.BettysentoutanS.O.S.toeveryforeignerwithwhomtheNGOhadhadcontact,askingforassistance.TwocolleaguesofmineandIobtainedfinancialsupporttocoverourexpenses,andheadedtoKenya.

Overthenexteightmonths,wesuccessfullyimplementedafinancialmanagementplan,accountingsystem,humanresourcesmanualandpractices,andworkedtofindcost‐cuttingmeasuresandnewdonors.Today,theNGOisfundedinpartbytwodifferentEuropeanNGOs,severalindividualsfromaroundtheworld,andschoolfeesfromthestudents.Eachsummer,ithosts10‐12Irishvolunteerswhoactasteachingassistantsandruntrainingsforthestaffandstudents.Oddly,ithasalsobecomesomethingofa“showcase”non‐formalschoolforthegovernment,visitedanddisplayedbyMinistersofEducationasasuccessstoryintheslum.YetitstillreceiveslittleornofundingfromtheKenyanGovernment–thoughtheyhavebeeninveryslow‐movingtalksforseveralyearsregardingpartialgovernmentfundingforteachersalaries. ThestoryofthisNGOisnotunique.WhereverItraveledinKenyaduring2002,InoticedsignsforthisNGOandthatone,metpeopleworkingforbiginternationalNGOsandsmalllocalones,andwitnessedvehiclesemblazonedwithNGOlogosdrivingupanddownthecountry.ProsperoussuburbsofNairobiwerefullofforeignandlocalNGOworkersandoffices,andhavebecomeknownas“NGOcenters.”Travelingbackandforthtotheslumbylocalminibusmatatutransport,poporhip‐hopmusicblaringanddieselfumesfillingmyhead,Ireflectedonthestateofaffairs.Wherewasthegovernmentinthissituation?WhathadbroughtalloftheseorganizationstoKenya?Whatweretheyachieving?Wasn’talotofwhattheydidsupposedtobedonebythegovernment,particularlythecoreserviceofeducation–whichevenAdamSmith,granddaddyofthefreemarket,believedthe“watchmanstate”shouldprovide?WereNGOslettingthegovernmentoffthehookintheirdutytoprovide?Andweretheymakingserviceprovisiondecisionsthatmightnormallybethoughttoresideintherealmofthestate?Didanyofthismattertoregularpeople–diditchangehowtheyviewedtheirstate? During2002,andmanytimesintheyearssince,regularKenyanpeople,wananchi,2havetoldmethatNGOshavebeenablessingtothecountry,providingthingsthattheycouldnotrelyuponthegovernmenttoprovide,helpingoutwhentheydidnottrustthatthegovernmentwoulddoso.In2002,peopleseemedtoseeNGOswithhope;thegovernment,withdisillusionment.Butwhatdoesitmeanwhenpeoplelosethesenseofexpectationfromtheirgovernment?Doesitlowergovernmentlegitimacyintheireyestoseetheseothernon‐stateactors–oftenforeigners–provideservices?Andhowhadthesituationchangedsince2002? Thesearethesettings,experiencesandthoughtprocessesthatformedtheimpetusforthisdissertation.TheideaforthisresearchcameoutofanenrichingpersonalexperienceinKenya,yetonethatleftmefrustratedanddisappointedwiththeKenyangovernment,andbyextension,Africangovernmentsingeneral.Yetover2Wananchiliterallytranslatesto“theyofthecountry”inSwahili.

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thecourseofthisresearch,I’vediscoveredthat–asisoftenthecase–therearetwosidestoastory.Inmanyways,NGOshavehadapositiveimpactongovernment,andtheirexistencehashelpedtomaketheKenyanstatestronger.UnlikemanyrecentbooksonAfricanpoliticsproclaimingtheweakeningofthestateinAfrica,IbelievethatNGOshavehelpedsupport,encourageandbolsteramoreablestateinKenya.

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AcknowledgementsAsanyonewhohaswrittenoneknows,adissertationcannotbefinished

withouttheadvice,encouragementandempathyofateamofcolleaguesandfriends.Iwishtoacknowledgeanumberofpeoplefortheirinvaluableguidanceandsupport.First,mydissertationChair,DavidK.Leonard,whoprovidedmanyyearsofpatientsupervision,excitedfeedbackoncemyprojectbegantotakeshape,welcomefatherlyadvice,andatleastonewell‐timed,“Gettowork,Jen!”Evenafterhemovedover5,000milesaway,Davidremaineddedicatedtoadvisingmywork,closelyreviewingchapterdraftsandrespondingtoemailsinthewinkofaneye.Davidalsostillfoundmeseveraltimesayeartotreatmetoahotmealandafewhoursofconversation–meetingmeinBerkeley,Philadelphia,Princeton,andeveninNairobi,twice.Icanonlyhopetobecomesuchadedicatedmentoroneday.

WhereDavidgavemetheblueprintforalongcareerinacademia,LeoArriolahasbecomemyrolemodelforthenewestgenerationofAfricanpoliticsscholars.Withhisextremelykeenmind,clearloveoflearningandofAfrica,Leo’sexcitementhasbeeninfectious,inspiringenthusiasmforresearchinme.LeoalsobecameagoodfriendafterwespentasummerinKenyaashouse‐mates–we’dstayupchattinguntiltheweehoursaboutourresearch“find”oftheday(usuallytobeshushed!byourthirdhousemate,whoneededhersleep).

ChrisAnsell,alongwithToddLaPorte,deservesaheartfeltthankyouaswell,forteachingmeasmuchasIcouldabsorbaboutalesser‐studiedaspectofpoliticalscience:publicadministration.ItookeverycourseChrisandToddoffered–fromclassicorganizationtheorytogovernancetosocialnetworkanalysis–makingupafull50%ofmyBerkeleygraduatecoursework.Withouttheirteachingandguidance,Iwouldneverhavebeenofferedmyfirstpost‐doctoralfacultypositionataschoolofpublicaffairs.Iamtrulygrateful.SeveralotherfacultyatUCBerkeleyhavebeenkeensupportersofmyprogress.MichaelWattsgavemeafreshperspectiveonthestudyofAfricanpolitics,lookingatitfromthegeographer’seye;mychapteronterritorialityreflectsthisinfluence.ItwasalsoinMichael’scourse(Fall2004)thatIfoundmyacademicconfidence,realizingthatI,too,hadsomethingtocontribute.AnnSwidlerwasequallyimportant,remindingmewithherovation‐worthylectureshowrewardingteachingcanbe.HerresearchonHIV/AIDSinMalawiisclosetomyown,andIhavethoroughlyenjoyeddebatingNGOs’influencewithher–Iwasdelightedtodiscoversuchapositivefemaleacademicrolemodel.TedMiguelinEconomicsalsogetsashout‐outforinvitingmetojointheWGAPEcommunity,andforencouragementduringBARTridesbacktoourcommonneighborhoodinSanFrancisco.Finally,MarthaSavaadraandAmmaOduroattheCenterforAfricanStudieshavemygratitudefortheirtirelessworktokeepAfricanStudiesaliveatBerkeley.WithinthePoliticalSciencedepartment,therearemanysupporters.ProfessorsKirenChaudhry,SteveVogel,BobPrice,PaulPierson,LauraStoker,JasonWittenberg,AndrewJanos,SteveFishandMarkBevirallactively(ifperhapsunwittingly)contributedtomyacademicidentity.Mygraduatestudentcohortwerelikewiseanexcellentextendedfamily,butspecialthanksareduetomydissertation‐writingpartners:JenniferDixon,SamHandlin,JonHassid,DannNaseemullah,

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RachelSternandSusanneWengle.GoTeamGo!Andontheadministrativeside,Ellen,Andrea,Kathleen,Gwen,Gilbert,Janet,SandyandSuzandidsomuchbehindthescenes.Onapersonalnote,Iowemylargestthankstomyfamily–Becky,AlanandRachelBrass.Byexample,Ilearnedfrommymomtotakerisksanddreambig,evenwhenthelikelihoodoffailureishigh.Mydad,ontheotherhand,taughtmetheimportanceofhardworkandattentiontodetail–andtheirproperroleinalifethatisalsofullofplay.Anditisbigsisterwhoalwayspullsmebackhome,remindingmewhatmatterstomemost.Friendshaveactedsimilarly;happily,therearetoomanytoname.Twostandout,however,forsupportingmebothpersonallyandacademically.KristinReedandScottNicolson.Ican’tthankyouenough.Lastly,withouttheearlyinfluenceoftheConcordiaLanguageVillages–DahveedandZuwennainparticular–ImightneverhavegonetoAfrica.

Ofcourse,thisdissertationcouldnothavebeencompletedwithoutconsiderableandgeneroustime,thoughtandenergyputinbyhundredsofKenyans,mostofwhomremainnamelessforconfidentialityreasons.AtIDSattheUniversityofNairobi,scholarsKarutiKanyingaandWinnieMitullahhelpedmenavigatetheKenyanpoliticallandscape,aswellasitsbureaucracy.MaggieIreri,attheSteadmanGroup,notonlymanagedtomakemylegitimacysurveyareality,shealsobecameafriend.Likewise,TomWolfhelpedmebothatSteadman,andwithinthegreaterKenyancommunity–oftenmakingthenetworkofKenyascholarsstrongeroverdeliciousOpenHouseIndiandishes.InMbeereDistrict,averyspecialthankyouisowedtoMwaniki,whovolunteeredmanydaysofhistimetobringmeintotheback‐roadsandsmallvillagesofthedistricttospeakwithNGOsIwouldnothavefoundmyself.AndinNairobi,IcannotthankBettyNyagohaandJosephNgigienough.Betty,alongwithJosephOlooandtheentireGatotofamily,inspiredthisdissertation.JosephNgigimadetheresearchalogisticreality,notonlyfindingmeplacestolivewheninNairobi,butalsoprovidingGoldMinetransportationwhereverIneededtogo.Bothhavebecometrue,lifelongfriends.Finally,IwishtoacknowledgethegenerousfundingprovidedtomebytheNationalScienceFoundation,theRoccaMemorialFellowship,theBerkeleyCenterforAfricanStudies,theTraversDepartmentofPoliticalScience,andtheGraduateDivisionoftheUniversityofCaliforniaatBerkeley.

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ChapterOne:Territoriality,Legitimacy,Capacity,Governance:NGOsandtheStateinAfrica

“Averitable‘associationalrevolution’nowseemsunderwayatthegloballevelthatmayconstituteassignificantasocialandpoliticaldevelopmentofthelattertwentiethcenturyastheriseofthenationstatewasofthelatternineteenthcentury.”(Salamon1993:1)

Introduction Inthepasttwodecades,governmentsthroughoutthedevelopingworldhaveseenanexplosioninthenumberofbothforeignandlocalnon‐governmentalactors(NGOs)providingsocialservicesintheirterritory.Accordingtooneestimate,thenumberofdevelopmentNGOsbasedinrichcountriesgrewfrom6000to26,000between1990and1999alone.3InKenya,NGOgrowthhasbeentrulystaggering:in1974,therewereonly125NGOsinKenya.By1990,therewereover400registeredwiththegovernment,soaringtonearly3000in2004,andwellover4200by2007(Bratton1989citingUSAID,NationalCouncilofNGOs2005,NGOCoordinationBureau2006).Whilemostofthesenon‐governmentalactorsarenotdirectlyhostiletothestate,theyareprovidingwelfareandotherservicesthataretraditionallyassociatedwithandoftenexplicitlypromisedbygovernmentsinAfrica(Campbell1996:9,Cannon1996,Whaites1998),suchaseducation,healthcare,childandwomen’sassistance,agriculturalextensionservices,employment,andeveninsomecases,roads,wellsandotherinfrastructure.

Thisdissertationprobeswhathappenswhenanewsetofactors–inthiscaseNGOs–stepsbetweenstateandsocietytobringpeoplegoodsandservices.Howdoesitimpactastatethatgainscomplianceandlegitimacybypromisingtheseverythings?Dothesenewactorsfundamentallyalterthesocialcontractbetweenstateandsociety?WhileconsiderableresearchhasestablishedthatthegrowthofNGOsstemsfromeconomicandpatrimonialgovernmentcrisis(Bratton1989,Sandberg1994,Tripp1994,Kameri‐Mbote2000,Kiokoetal.2002,Owiti2004,Young2004,Roitman2005),verylittleresearchhasbeenconductedonthefeedbackeffectsofNGOprovisionofservicesonthestate.Thisdissertationattemptstofillthisgap.Itexaminesfouressential“elementsofstateness:”territoriality,capacity,governance,andlegitimacy.ThroughcomparativequantitativeandqualitativeanalysisacrossKenya,itasks,HaveNGOsimpactedtheterritorialityofthestate?HaveNGOsbroughtaboutanexpansionofstateserviceprovisioncapacity?HaveNGOschangedpatternsofdecision‐makingandgovernancewithinthestate?AnddoNGOscompetewiththegovernmentforlegitimacy,ordotheycomplementit,therebyincreasingpopularsupportforthestate?

3WorldBankwebsite,“DefiningCivilSociety,”athttp://go.worldbank.org/4CE7W046K0,accessed11April2006and10August2009.

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Byanalyzingthefourelementsofstateness,thisdissertationshowshowNGOpresencechangesthenatureofthestateinthetwenty‐firstcentury.ItexamineswhetherNGOsundermineorbolsterthestate,takingseriouslyFernando&Heston’sclaimthat,“NGOactivitypresentsthemostseriouschallengestotheimperativesofstatehoodintherealmsofterritorialintegrity,security,autonomyandrevenue”(1997:8).Inanagewherescholarshavebeenassertingthe“erosionofstateness”inAfrica(Young2004)andhavefamouslydeclaredtraditionalformsofdevelopmentaidtobenoxiousand“dead”(Moyo2009),thisstudyprovidesanimportantempiricalassessmentofbothaidviaNGOsandthestateinAfrica.

Mostcasestudiesincomparativepoliticsexplorethe“causesofeffects”–takingapuzzlingoutcomeandexplainingit.Thisresearchtakestheoppositeapproach:itexaminesanimportant,interestingandnewphenomenonandseekstodetermineitsimpact–the“effectofcauses”method.Consequently,thefocusisononeindependentvariable,theproliferationofNGOs,examiningitsimpactonthestatethroughmultipledependentvariables,myfour“elementsofstateness.”TheliteratureonNGOsisbrimmingwithoften‐unsubstantiatedclaimsboththatNGOsunderminethestate,andthattheystrengthenit.Ultimately,Iwanttoknowwhichistrue.

Thefindingsinthisstudyemployamixed‐methodcomparativeapproach,throughquantitativeanalysisof4200organizationsacross72administrativedistrictswithvaryinglevelsofNGOpenetration,twolarge‐Nsurveysfromseveraldistricts,andover100semi‐structuredqualitativeinterviewswithNGOleaders,governmentrepresentatives,politiciansandregularKenyans.

Thisintroductorychapterproceedsasfollows:First,itprovidesasummaryoftheargumentinthisbook.ThenitgivesanoverviewofthehistoryofserviceprovisionandtheriseofNGOsinAfrica,followedbyamorespecificlookattheconceptandroleofnon‐governmentalserviceprovisioninKenya.Next,thekeytermsandconceptsofthedissertationarepresented:state,territoriality,capacity,governance,andlegitimacy,aswellashowtheymightchangeinresponsetoNGOproliferation.Otherscholars’interpretationsofNGOs’growthfollow.Thechapterconcludeswithadescriptionofdataandresearchmethodologyandaroadmapofthechaptersthatfollow.

ASummaryoftheArgumentThroughoutthisdissertation,animageofstatechangeinKenyaemerges.

ContrarytoNGOskeptics,thisresearchfindsthatthroughinvolvementinserviceprovision,NGOstendtohavesupportive,bolsteringinfluenceonthestate’sterritoriality,capacity,governanceandlegitimacy.

NGOsareincreasinglyactivepartnersingovernance.Contrarytobothnormativeargumentsthatgovernmentshould“steer”theshipofstate(makepolicy)whileprivateactors“row”(implementpolicy),andthebeliefthatgovernmentiserodingorbecomingirrelevanttothegovernanceprocess,thisdissertationshowsthatNGOsarenowjoiningpublicactorsandagenciesatmanylevelsindecisionandpolicymakingregardingserviceprovision.NGOsregularlysitongovernment

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planningboards;governmentintegratesNGOprogramsandbudgetsintolocalandnationalplans;andNGOshelptowritestatelegislation.Governanceisnottheremovalofgovernment,buttheadditionandacceptanceofotheractors,includingNGOs,inthesteeringprocess.

Moreover,NGOshaveinfluencedgovernancestrategieswithinpublicadministration.IndividualsanddepartmentsingovernmenthavelearnedfromNGOs,andhavebeguntomimicthetoolstheyhaveseenNGOsusesuccessfullyforyears,callingforparticipatorydevelopmentandciviceducationsothattheiragenciescanbetterservethecommunity.Thisfacilitatesaccountability,andreflectsaveryslowprocessofchangetowardmoredemocraticgovernancepracticesamongcivilservants.

SuchimprovementsingovernancearerelatedtoNGOs’positiveimpactonstatecapacitytoprovideservices.NGOsextendtheservicearmofthestatetoplacesandlocationsforwhichgovernmentcounterpartslacksufficientfunds;theyalsoprovideindirectservicesthatthegovernmentisnotabletoprovide,particularlyinrelationtoHIV/AIDSprograms,butalsoinmanyotherservicesectors.Often,NGOsworkcollaborativelywithgovernmentonprogramsneithercoulddoalone,andtheygenerallyusetheirfundsexpedientlyandcost‐effectively(withthepossiblelargeexceptionoftrainingexpenditures).Furthermore,bywayofpositiveexample,NGOsinfluencegovernmentofficesandemployeestoimprovethequalityofservicestheyprovide. Insodoing,NGOsandgovernmentbothseetheroleofNGOsas“gap‐filling,”complementingthestate.Thegovernment,forthemostpart,providesprimaryeducationandsecurity,allowingoraskingNGOstosupplementtheseservicesandexpandtheirreachinotherareas.Contrarytosomeclaims,NGOsarenotreplacingthegovernmentinserviceprovision.ThisparallelssimilarfindingsinNigeria:“AnyexpectationthattheNGOswillsupplantthestateinserviceprovisionislikelytobeutopian”(Obiyan2004:302).

Insteadofsupplanting,NGOssupplement.NGOshaveimpactedtheterritorialityofthestatebyprovidingservicesinplacesthatthegovernmenthasbeenunabletoreach,particularlyinarid,sparselypopulatedareas,wheretheNGOspercapitaratioishighest.Yettherearelimitationstothis,asNGOsalsotendtoclusterincitiesandtowns–sometimes–butnotusually–atthephysicaledgesoftheterritory.NGOlocationcorrespondswithobjectivelevelsofneedinanarea,butalsototherelativeeaseofreachingtheseneedypeople.

Still,insmallmarkettownsandvillagesthroughoutthecountry,peopleexpecteithergovernmentorNGOstobethereprovidingservices,seeingthemassubstitutesforoneanother.Asacivilservantexplainedit,“Thewananchidon’tcarethatgovernmentisnottherewhenNGOsarethere.Aslongasoneisthere,allisokay.Butifnone,thentheygetangryatgovernment”(2008‐39).4NGOsenhancetheimageofastatetoregularpeopleinthisway.

Finally,NGOshavelargelyincreasedthelegitimacyofthestate.FormanyKenyans,particularlytheruralpoor,themereprovisionofserviceslowerspopular4Wananchi,Swahilifor“regularpeople”or“peopleofthecountry,”isusedveryfrequentlyinKenyaevenwhenwritingorspeakinginEnglish.

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frustrationbelowthetippingpointwherechangewouldbedemanded.Peoplearethankfulthatserviceshavebeenbrought,andtheirthanksarediffuse.ManyregularpeopleassociateNGOs'gooddeedswiththeirlocaladministratorsorpoliticians,whoareoftencreditedwithhavingbroughttheNGOstothecommunity.NGOpresencesuggeststoruralwananchi,whohavegreatdesiresbutlittlerealexpectationsfromgovernment,thatsomeoneintheworldoutsidetheirvillagecaresaboutthem–andthisimprovestheiroptimismforthefuture,andbyassociation,theirsupportforgovernment.Urbanitesaremorecynical,butNGOsstillappearnottohaveasystematicnegativeimpactontheirviewofgovernment.

Drawingonthesefindings,IarguethatNGOsnowcompriseanintegralcomponentoftheorganizationalformofthestateinAfrica.NGOsinKenyaexpandthenatureofstateserviceprovisioninsuchawaythatwestarttoincludenon‐governmentalaswellasgovernmentalactorsundertheaegisof“thestate.”AsNGOsandgovernmentworkhand‐in‐handonprogramsandprojects,thelinebetweenpublicagencyandprivateNGOblurs.FollowingRoitman(2005),IarguethatNGOshelptoreconstitutethestatethroughthecreationofnetworksofactorsredeployingstatetechnologies.Symbolicallyaswell,NGOssuggesttowananchi,theregularpeopleofKenya,thatorganizationsarelookingoutforthem.Withtheadditionoftheseprivateactors,governmentperformanceimproves.

Whileitmaybeoddtothinkofnominallynon‐governmentalorganizationsaspartofthestate,thisideaisnotasrevolutionaryasitmightfirstappear.Longago,TocquevillenotedthatAmericawasfilledwithnon‐governmentalactorsprovidingsocialservicestostrengthena“weak”state.Morerecently,Putnametal.(1993)madeasimilarobservationaboutcivicassociationsimprovinggovernmentperformanceinnorthernItaly.Today,itisclearthatsucharoleforcivilsocietyisnotparticulartotheWest:NGOsachievethesamevarietyofimpactinAfrica.ThestateinKenyaisstrongerbecauseofNGOs–itismorecapableofexpressingterritoriality,abletoprovidemoreservices,ismoredemocraticinthegovernanceofserviceprovision,andmaintainssomedegreeoflegitimacy.Migdal’s(2001:22)writingsonthestatereinforcethepossibilityofthistypeofarrangement,stressingthatthepracticesandactorsofthestateare“thepracticesofaheapoflooselyconnectedpartsorfragments,frequentlywithill‐definedboundariesbetweenthemandothergroupingsinsideandoutsidetheofficialstatebordersandoftenpromotingconflictingsetsofruleswithoneanotherandwith‘official’Law.”

Atalargerlevel,theimplicationisthatthestateisandremainsanimportantactor–onlyitscompositionhaschangedslightly.AsMigdal(2001:23)continues,“Likeanyothergroupororganization,thestateisconstructedandreconstructed,inventedandreinvented,throughitsinteractionasawholeandofitspartswithothers.Itisnotafixedentity;itsorganization,goals,means,partners,andoperativeruleschangeasitallieswithandopposesothersinsideandoutsideitsterritory.Thestatecontinuallymorphs.”

Muchofthewritingonglobalizationhasadvancedthenotionthatchangesintheglobalpoliticaleconomyareoverwhelmingthe“retreatingstate”ina“racetothebottom,”inwhichsocialwelfareissacrificedtothewhimsofglobaleconomiccompetition(Rodrick1997,Strange1996).WorkspecifictoAfricainthisbroaderliteraturemakesdramaticclaims:ithasbeenarguedthatAfricangovernmentshave

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entereda“permanentcrisis”ofthestateandeconomy(VandeWalle,2001),areincreasinglyruledby“informal”behind‐the‐scenesactorsandinstitutions(Chabal&Daloz1999)orengagedincriminalactivitiestomaintainresourcelevels(Bayartetal1999,Reno1997,Shaw2002,Balogun1997,Mbembe2001).Becauseofallofthis,scholarsdebateabouthowbestto“reconstruct”theAfricanstate(ASAAnnualMeeting2005,2panels).

Ifind,however,thattheintroductionofnewactorsandinterdependenciescreatesnewpossibilitiesinstateserviceprovision.AsWeiss(1998)argues,globalizationrequiresstatestobecomemoreefficientandcapable,enhancingtheirabilitiesinternallyaswellasexternally.Throughinterpenetrationofitsactivitieswiththoseofgovernment,NGOshavefacilitatedthisprocessinKenya.

Infact,theverynatureoftheAfricanstatemaybechangingwithNGOpenetration.SincetheperiodofAfricaindependencesinthe1960s,themodalformoftheAfricanstatehasbeenneo‐patrimonialism(Bratton&VandeWalle1997)or“personalrule”(Jackson&Rosberg1984,Leonard&Strauss2002).Thesestatesarecharacterizedbyhighlyconcentratedpowerandextremelyhighlevelsofpatronage,largelyarisingasalegacyofcolonialism(Ekeh1975).However,asNGOsgainsalience,themannerofgoverninginAfricaappearsalsotobechanging,albeitverygradually.ThegrowthofNGOsandthemindsettheyputforthencouragemoreequitable,participatoryandnon‐politicallymotivateddistributionofresourcesandservices,sinceprivateactors,andinternationalnon‐profitsinparticular,maybelesssubjecttoclientelisticdemands.Governments,seeingthepositiveresponseNGOsgetfromthepeople,maycontinuetomimicthesestrategies.

Beyondscholarlydebates,thisresearchthereforehasconsiderablepracticalimportanceforallcountriesexperiencingtheproliferationofNGOsintheirterritory.UsingKenyaasacasestudy,weseehowtheGovernmentofKenyaatvariousstagesinthepasthasappearedquitethreatenedbytheNGOandbroadercivilsocietycommunity.FormerpresidentMoicalledNGOsa“securitythreat”(Kameri‐Mbote2000),introducedrestrictivemonitoring,regulationsandtaxesforNGOs,andevenderegisteredsomeNGOs.Wasthisnecessary?Myresearchsuggestsnot.IfNGOsbolsterpopularsupportforgovernment,increasecapacityandassistinthegoverningprocess,thenthegovernmentshouldworktoencouragenon‐governmentalassistanceintheprovisionofservices.ThisisnottoimplythatNGOsareanunmitigatedgood;certainlynotallNGOshavepositiveimpactsallofthetime.Butonthewhole,theybuttressthestateinKenya.

History:ServiceProvisionandtheRiseofNGOsinAfricaSinceindependence,Africangovernmentshavepredicatedtheirlegitimacy

onthepromiseofdistributingdevelopmentalservicesandemploymenttothepopulace(Young1988,Bratton1989,Fowler1991,Kanyinga1996,Schatzberg2001,Owitietal.2004).Thiswasamajorchangefromthecolonialera,whengovernmentsrefusedtoprovideservicestomostofthenativeAfricanpopulations.AsJuliusNyerere,thefirstpresidentofTanzaniaandapan‐Africanleader,oncesaid,

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“Freedomtomanymeansimmediatebetterment,asifbymagic.UnlessIcanmeetatleastsomeoftheseaspirations,mysupportwillwaneandmyheadwillroll.”

FortunatelyforNyerereandothers,newAfricanstateswereabletomakegoodonpromisesofserviceprovision,rapidlyexpandingthegovernmentatatimewhenKeynesianstate‐leddevelopmentwasderigueur,worldmarketcommoditypriceswerebooming,andloanswereeasytoobtain.Thus,young“developmentalstate”governmentsbecamepervasive,involvedinallelementsoftheeconomy,serviceprovisionandwelfare(Mkandawire2001).Theyquicklybecamethelargestemployerinmostcountries,creatingthousandsofnewjobsinthecivilservice,state‐ownedenterprises(SOEs),schools,clinicsandinfrastructureprojects.5Growingnumbersofuniversity‐educatedstudents6automaticallysawthecivilserviceastheirfutureemployer(Prewittetal.1971,Barkan1975)andinmanystateswereactuallyguaranteedemployment(VandeWalle2001).Governmentwasseenasalegitimatepaternalfigure;itstood“inthesamerelationshiptoitscitizensthatafatherdoestohischildren”(Schatzberg2001:1).Assuch,patron‐clientrelationshipsbecamethenorm.

Thisperiodofeasyexpansiondidnotlastlong.Thepatronageonwhichlegitimacywasbased(ibid)resultedinconsumptiveratherthantrulyinvestiveeconomicpolicies,whichovertimemeantlowornegativeprofits,perverseincentiveswithinorganizations(Ekeh1975),andthewithdrawaloffarmersfromcommercialmarkets,reducingtaxrevenues(Bates1981).Addedtothiswereaseriesofeconomicallydeleteriousfactorsinthe1970sandearly1980s:oilshocks,plungingworldmarketcommodityprices,truncatedindustrialcapabilityduetoincreasingrelativecostsofimports,andastringofdebilitatingdroughts.Duringthisperiod,statesbecameincreasinglyreliantonforeignaidandloans,thelatterofwhichwereeasilyobtained(andarguably,foolishlygranted)fromoil‐producingstates.

Bythelate1980s,theEastAsian“Miracle”cametolight,emergingtosupportanideologyofliberalizationthathadgainedstrengthintheWest,astherapidgrowthstemmedfromanexport‐basedorientation.Initially,somearguedthatEastAsiancountriesachievedgrowthwithverylowgovernmentalinvolvementintheeconomy,althoughthiswasclearlynotthecase.7Still,internationalpolicymakersquicklybegantoinsistoneconomicliberalizationasapre‐conditiontoloansandgrantsforotherdevelopingcountries,requiringexchangerateandfinancialmarketliberalization,reducedexpansionarybudgeting,andthemaintenanceofsustainablemonetarypolicies,privatization,tradeliberalization,outsourcing,andderegulation.

5Thus,forexample,by1979,fifteenyearsafterindependence,42percentofformalemploymentinKenyawasinthegovernment(Hazlewood1979).SimilarlyinNigeria,thenumberofSOEsgrewfrom250toover800inthe1970s(Lewis1994,443),andtheNigeriangovernmentgrew50percentinthefirstfiveyearsafterindependence(VandeWalle2001).6Stateinvestmentineducationwasparticularlyhigh–literacyratesinTanzaniaincreasedbetween1975and1986from61to91.4percent(Mushi&Bwatwa1998),andthenumberofuniversity‐educatedAfricansgrewfromaslittleas6inCongoor76inZambiaatindependenceto100,000sthroughoutthecontinentbythe1990s(VandeWalle,2001).7Asearlyas1982,scholarspointedoutthatEastAsianstatesactuallyplayedanextremelystrongroleinfosteringeconomicdevelopment(Johnson1982,Woo‐Cummings1999,Wade1992).

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Theeraofimport‐substitutingindustrialization,inwhichstatesdominatedAfricannationaleconomies,drewtoaratherabruptclose.InordertogetInternationalFinancialInstitution(IFI)funds,stateshadtoadoptatleastasemblanceofthesepolicies.8

Theroleofthegovernmentinserviceprovisionchangeddramatically;theycouldnolongerbethedevelopmentalstatestheyaspiredtobe(Mkandawire2001).Governmentsstoppedexpanding,andretreatedfromfreepublicandwelfaregoodprovision,bothoutofaneedtodrasticallyreducepublicexpenditure,andundertheguiseofcomplyingwithIFIbeliefsthatmoreefficientprivateorganizations,includingNGOs,shouldtakeoverserviceprovision.InTanzania,socialservicesasapercentageofgovernmentexpenditurehalvedbetween1981and1986,decreasingtothelowestpointin20years,whilefeesforpublicservicesincreased,withschoolfeesupby25to45percentin1989alone(Tripp1994).InKenya,spendingoneducationdroppedfrom18percentofthebudgetinthe1980sto7.1percentin1996,andinthehealthsector,governmentspendingdecreasedfrom$9.82millionin1980‐1981to$6.2millionin1993and$3.61millionin1996(Katumanga2004,48).“EspeciallyintheremotestregionsoftheAfricancountryside,governmentsoftenhavehadlittlechoicebuttocederesponsibilityfortheprovisionofbasicservices…”(Bratton1989:569).

Unfortunately,whiletheseadjustmentpoliciesweremeanttoincreaseinternationalinvestmentinAfrica,itsoonbecameclearthatforeigninterestwasnotforthcoming,andAfricaneconomicsactuallyshrankthroughoutthe1980satanannualrateof2.8percent(WorldBank1989,221).Allinall,livingstandardsinmostofAfricaarenowshockinglylowerthantheywereatindependenceoverfortyyearsago(Wrong2006).

Attemptingtoturnthistrendaround,NGOshavesoughttofillthelacunaandprovidemanyoftheservicesAfricangovernmentspreviouslysupplied.Overtheyears,theyhavemovedfromprovidingsupplementalcharityandreliefworktobeingincreasinglyinvolvedinbasicdevelopmentandserviceprovisionwithaparticipatoryapproach(Brodhead1987).Forexample,inthehealthservicessectorinKenyaalone,NGOsnowrunasmanyhospitalsinthecountryasthegovernment(EcoNewsAfrica2006).Moreover,otherhealthfacilitiesandservices,includingdispensaries,HIV/AIDSassistanceandmostclinicsinremoteruralareasareprimarilyrunbyNGOs(Bratton1989).Inmanyinstances,“the’roll‐backofthestate’hasbeenaccompaniedbyagrowthinNGOservice‐provisionandthereplacementofgovernmentstructuresbyinformal,non‐governmentalarrangements”(Campbell1996:2‐3citingFarrington1993:189andBennet1995:xii).

NotonlyinAfrica,butthroughoutthedevelopingworld,NGOsareoftenfavoredasprovidersofservicesbydevelopmentagenciesandbilateraldonors,whotouttheirservicesasmoreefficient,effective,flexible,participatory,democratic,

8Moststatesdidnotactuallyimplementallpolicies;ingeneral,theyimplementedstabilizationmeasures,butnottruestructuralchange(vandeWalle2001).Consequently,theIFIswithheldfundsfornon‐compliance,asinKenyaformuchofthe1990s.

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accountableandtransparentthantheirgovernmentbureaucracycounterparts.9Yetwhatimpactdoesthistrendhave?AsObiyan(2004)asks,“WillthestatedieastheNGOsthrive?”Ormightitbetruethatimprovedserviceprovisionbynon‐governmentalactorsrendersagreater“philanthropicstate”–inwhichwell‐intentionedoutsidersprovidetheinstitutionalformofserviceprovisionimplementation‐morelegitimateandable?10

NGOsinKenya:AnOverviewInabroadsense,NGOs,thoughrelativelyrecentlyidentifiedwithan

acronymiclabelandasa“thirdsector”(Salamon&Anheier1992),arenotnewinKenya.Bothlocalandinternationalorganizationshavealonghistoryintheterritory.Since1963,thebeginningofKenya'shistoryasanindependentcountry,thegovernmentofKenyahasencouragedthedevelopmentofindigenousnot‐for‐profitorganizations,locallycalledharambeegroups–self‐helpsocietiesorcommunity‐basedorganizations(CBOs).Harambee,whichliterallymeans,“let’spulltogether”inSwahili,wastherallycryofKenya'sfirstPresident,JomoKenyatta,anditbecamethecountry'smotto.

KenyattarecognizedthattheKenyanpeoplewouldhavetosignificantlycontributetothecountry'sdevelopmenteffortsforittoadvance.Hecalledonlocalgroupstopulltogethertoachievewhattheycouldontheirown,promisingthatthegovernmentwouldsupplementlocalefforts.Themostcommonmanifestationsofthisprogramwereharambeeschoolsandclinics;alocalcommunitywouldgathertheresourcestobuildaschoolhouseorclinicbuilding,andthegovernmentwouldstepinandprovideteachers,administrators,nursesandclinicians. Whilethistypeofparticipatorydevelopmentmightsoundideal,muchoftherelationshipbetweenharambeegroupsandthegovernmenthasbeenfraughtwithcontentioninKenya.Fromearlyon,theharambeemovementwaslargelyco‐optedbypoliticalmotivationsandcorruption,weakeningitseffectiveness.Harambeewasmeanttolegitimatetheregimebyredistributingwealthfromtherichtothepoor(Osodo&Matsvai1997:2);itinsteadbecameatoolofcontrolthatstrengthenedthecountry’sdependenceonpatronagepolitics.MPsbegantovocallybroadcasttheircontributiontolocalself‐helpprogramsintheirconstituenciesforpoliticalfavorhigherintheregimeandelectoraladvantage,andlocaladministratorswouldcoercetheircommunityintodonatinginordertogaintheeyeoftheirsuperiors(Adili2003).

“Themoretheamountraisedinacertainjurisdiction,themorethejuniorstaffcaughttheattentionofthepowersthatbe.YoucouldbepromotedfromDistrictOfficerIallthewaytoadistrictcommissioner(DC)veryquickly.…Atthehigherlevelsandpoliticalcircles,thiswasapublicitystrategy.Politiciansknewthefunctionmaybebroadcast,sotheyhadtobeseentoraisebigmoney.…Therewasanotherlevelofcoercionwherethehigheryouwerethe

9TheWorldBankincreasinglyasksmembercountriestoinvolveNGOsinBank‐financedactivities,andhasincreasedthepercentageofprojectsinvolvingNGOsfrom21percentin1990to72percentin2003(www.worldbank.org/civilsociety2005)10ThankstoToddLaPortefortheideaofthe“philanthropicstate.”

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moreyouhadtocontribute”(ibid.2). Alongwiththedevelopmentofindigenousnon‐governmentalorganization,thecountryalsohasalongtraditionoflargelywell‐intentionedoutsiders–beginningwithMuslimandChristianmissionaries–providingsocialservicesatrelativelylowcost.Duringcolonialism,Europeanmissionariesprovidedmostofthemodernhealthcareinthecountrythroughbothlargehospitalsandsmallclinics.MissionariesalsobroughtformalWesternschoolingtoKenyabeginninginthelate1800s,andremainedthemainproviderofWesterneducationbeforeindependence.AfricansalsobegantoopentheirownschoolsaspartoftheKikuyuIndependentSchoolsmovementinthelate1920sand1930s.Theseschoolswereaprecursortoharambeeschools,astheywereestablishedatthecommunitylevelandlaterprovidedteachersbythegovernment(Rosberg&Nottingham1966,Natsoulas1998).Manyofthemissionary‐foundedinstitutionsstillexist,thoughmostoftheschoolsweretakenoverbythegovernmentduringtheearlyindependenceperiod.Clinicsandhospitals,however,usuallyremainedinthehandsofthechurchesfollowingindependence. TodayinKenya,bothlocal,community‐basedself‐helpgroupsandforeign‐basedother‐orientedNGOsstillexist.Bothareregisteredwiththegovernment.Theformer,nownumberingmorethan220,000(Kanyinga2004:9)areregisteredwiththeMinistryofCultureandSocialServicesundertheSocietiesAct,andareoftencalledCBOs.11Thelater,forthemostpart,havemorphedintoNGOs,andalongwithsimilarKenyan‐basedorganizations,areregisteredwiththeNGOCoordinationBoard.TheseNGOsarelargelysecularorganizations,thoughtheyaresometimesregisteredinassociationwithachurchorotherreligiousorganization,makingthestrictcharacterizationofNGOsas“secularorganizations”inaccurate.12WhilebothCBOsandNGOsareinterestingandimportant,thisdissertationfocusesonNGOs. AnNGO,accordingtotheGovernmentofKenya,is:

“Aprivatevoluntarygroupingofindividualsorassociationsnotoperatedforprofitorforothercommercialpurposesbutwhichhaveorganizedthemselvesnationallyorinternationallyforthebenefitofthepublicatlargeandforthepromotionofsocialwelfare,development,charityorresearchintheareasinclusivebutnotrestrictedtohealth,relief,agricultural,education,industryandsupplyofamenitiesandservices”(RepublicofKenya1992).

NGOsbegantoberegisteredquaNGOsintheearly1990s,aftertheirnumbersbegangrowingnoticeably.13Thesectornowemploysmorethan300,000peoplefull‐time,whichisabout2.1percentoftheeconomicallyactivepopulation,andasizeable16.3percentofnon‐agriculturalemployment(Kanyinga2004:17).11Notethatthisministryhashadseveralnamesovertime,asthenumberofministrieshasgrownrepeatedlysinceindependence.12 Indeed, over the course of research for this project, the use of the term FBO, or “faith-based organization,” also grew, partially in response to the US funding of FBOs during the George W. Bush administrations. The line between church-based development activities (not registered as NGOs) and NGO activities, like the line between CBOs and NGOs, is incredibly blurred. Often, individual churches or national-level church organizations run development programs, clinics, etc. Often, these are not registered as NGOs, but sometimes they are. Clearly, the somewhat messy reality of registration choice makes perfect interpretation of the impact of NGOs difficult. 13SeeChapterFourformoredetails.

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DualacronymsandregistrationprocessesforCBOsandNGOsdisguisethefactthatthedistinctionbetweenthetwotypesoforganizationsonthegroundismurky,makingitnearlyimpossibletodiscussNGOswithouttalkingimplicitlyaboutCBOsatsomelevelaswell.Foronething,many–ifnotmost–NGOsinKenyanowimplementtheirworkthroughCBOs,makingthelinebetweenthemfuzzy.Forexample,onetypicalNGOhasalivelihoodprogram,trainingadultsinagriculture,livestockrearingandincomegeneration.ItorganizesthetrainingsthroughCBOs:ithassixprogramsinsixzones,withsixCBOsof25membersineachzone(2008‐18).14NGO‐CBOrelationsoftenappearinthisnestedform:alargeforeign‐basedNGOwillfundtheprogramsofaKenyan‐basedNGO,whichwillthendistributeitsfundsviaregisteredcommunitygroups(2008‐44;2008‐52). Governmentofficesnowalsodistributeservicesthroughgroups.Forexample,theNjaaMarufuku(KickingawayHunger)programoftheMinistryofAgriculturefundsupto120,000KSH/‐(about$1,645)perprojecttoself‐helpgroupsforfoodsecurityprograms(2008‐38,2008‐50),andtheMinistryofLivestockhasasimilarprogram(2008‐39).EvenattheDivisionlevelofgovernment,WelfareOfficersworkviaCBOs–onementionedworkingwithover560CBOsinherdivision(2008‐40).Tohelpthemaccesstheseresources,localadministrationDistrictDevelopmentOfficers,ChiefsandSub‐Chiefsurgemembersoftheircommunitiestoformself‐helpgroupsregisteredasCBOs(2008‐31). Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatthegrowthtrajectoryofNGOsandCBOsoverthepasttwodecadeshasbeensimilar–between1995and2002,thenumberofCBOsgrewfrom90,000to220,000(Kanyinga2004:9).Arguably,thegrowthinregisteredCBOsisareactiontothegrowthofNGOs;whileCBOscanbeseenasanexpressionofgrowingcivicengagement,theyarealsooftenanexpressionofpopulardesiretoaccesstheresourcesbroughtbyNGOs.CBOscannotthereforebeentirelydelinkedfromNGOs. AnotherfactorconfoundingtheappealingNGO/CBOdistinctionisthefactthatmanyorganizationsregisteredasonetypeoforganizationactuallyhavecharacteristicsmoretypicaloftheothertype.Usually,NGOsarebetterequippedwithformaltraining,staffandmaterialresources,andhavealargerbaseofsupport.Thissaid,manysmalllocalNGOsregisterwithoutfunding,trainingorconcreteplansinthehopethatregisteringwillattracttheseresources(2008‐16).TheselatterorganizationsmorecloselyresembleCBOs. Moreover,somepeoplecritiquethedescriptionofNGOsas“civilsociety”sincemanyarebasedinforeigncountries–unlikeCBOs,whichareclearlyhomegrowncivicorganizations.ThetruthisthattheoverwhelmingmajorityofNGOemployees,leadersandadvocatesinKenyaareKenyans,advancingKenya‐specificsocialagendas–evenwhentheirfundingisforeign.Giventhisreality,wecantalkofNGOsascivilsocietyorganizations.Indeed,NGOsinKenya–aselsewhere–playedasignificantcivilsocietyroleinthedemocratizationofthe1990s,oftenprovidinga“counterweighttostatepower”duringthistime(Edwards&Hulme1996:962).

14Referencesintheformat(XXXX‐XX)indicatethataquoteorideastemsfromaninterview.TheyaredeliberatelycodedtohonortheconfidentialityrequirementsofUCBerkeley’sCommitteefortheProtectionofHumanSubjects.

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Practicallyspeaking,NGOsareconsideredpartofcivilsocietybyinternationaldevelopmentagenciessuchastheWorldBank,USAIDandtheUnitedNations,andbythewideliteratureonNGOsindevelopingcountries.15 Becauseofthesefactors,itisdifficulttowriteonlyaboutNGOswithoutreferencingtheirself‐help,harambeeandCBOcousins.Whiletheywillnotbediscussedexplicitly,theirinclusioninthediscussionisimpliedbyextension,duetotheinter‐relationsbetweenthetwotypesoforganizations. Itisperhapshumannaturetocategorize,lumpingorganizations,peoples,thingsandevenideasintoneatandtidymounds.Ideally,thecategorizationsalignwithactualandclearlydefineddifferences.AswehavejustseenwithCBOsandNGOs,thisisnotalwaysthecase.ItissimilarlycommontocategorizeNGOsas“national/local”or“international.”Manyscholarsareinterestedindifferentialimpactscausedbythesedifferentlybasedorganizations–infact,thishasbeenthemostcommonquestionotheracademicsaskmeaboutmywork.16Yet,liketheblacklineartificiallydrawnbetweenNGOandCBO,thisisalargelyfalse–albeithandy–dichotomy.ItreflectslittleonthegroundinrealplacesinKenya.

Indeed,mostNGOsinKenya–whetherestablishedwithinthecountrybyKenyancitizensorabroad–arefundedviainternationalsourcesorlocalprivatesources.17Ofthe4211organizationslistedintheKenyanGovernment’sNGOBoarddatabaseinDecember2006,only663(about16%)submittedareturnwithfundingsourceinformationinthemostrecentreturnyear,2005.18Inthesereturnfigures,91%offundsarelistedascomingfrominternationalsources.Oftheother9%offunds,8%comefromlocalprivatesources,withonly1%ofNGOfundsderivedfromtheGovernmentofKenyaatthenationalorlocallevel.Over35%oforganizationsreceivedfundingentirelyfromabroad,withorganizationsreceivingfundsfromamixoflocalandinternationalsources(anadditional25%oforganizations)getting71%oftheirfundsfromabroadonaverage.Toputthesefiguresintorealterms,oftheapproximately213milliondollarsreportedin2005,$195millionoriginatedintheinternationaleconomyversus$17millionfromKenyansources,ofwhichonly$1.5millioncamefromtheKenyangovernment.1915Forexample,theWorldBank’s“overview”webpageoncivilsocietyexplicitlysays,“TodaytheWorldBankconsultsandcollaborateswiththousandsofmembersofCivilSocietyOrganizations(CSOs)throughouttheworld,suchascommunity‐basedorganizations,NGOs,socialmovements,laborunions,faith‐basedgroups,andfoundations.”(http://go.worldbank.org/PWRRFJ2QH0,accessed11April2006,emphasisadded)16SomescholarshavealsosaidtomethattheamorphousnatureofNGOsandtheirrelationtocivilsocietymakestheminappropriateforstudy.Idisagree,however,withthenotionthatwecanorshouldonlystudythosephenomenathatcanbeperfectlycategorized.17ThisisinstarkcontrasttomostNGOsinLatinAmerica,whicharefundedthroughnationalgovernments.18BecausethemajorityofNGOsdidnotsubmitfinancialreturninformation,wemustusethesefigureswithadegreeofcaution.Atthesametime,organizationssubmittingfinancialreturnsannuallyarelikelytobethemostrobustorganizationsinthecountry,withthegreatestfundingsources.Mostoftheremainingorganizationsarelikelysmall,localorganizationswithcontributionsderivedprimarilyfromthelocalcommunityintheformofdirectors’andmembers’contributions.19FigureswerelistedinKenyanShillings.Astheexchangeratebetweenshillingsanddollarshasfluctuatedbetweenabout62KSH/Dollarand78KSH/dollar,dollarfiguresgivenrepresenttheaverageexchangerateof70KSH/dollar.

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Yetwhilemostorganizationsreceivemostoftheirfundingfromabroad,thevastmajorityofthetime,theymaketheirowndecisionsontheirprogramsandprojectsatthelocallevel.Forexample,itisnotuncommontofindanNGObasedinNairobi,staffedentirelybyKenyans,withofficesthroughoutthecountry,thatreceives80percentofitsfundingfromabroad,butspreadacrossmanydifferentdonorsindifferentcountries.IsthisaninternationalNGOoralocalone?WhatabouttheindependentlymanagedandfundedKenyachapterof,say,aGerman‐headquarteredorganization? ItmaybehelpfultothinkofforeignfundingforthemajorityofNGOsasreleasingaresourceconstraintthatallowspredominantlyKenyanorganizationstoachievetheirgoals,mostofwhichseembasedongenuinedesiretoimprovethequalityoflifeintheircountry.ActivitiesofNGOs MostNGOsinKenyaareinvolvedinoneormoreofthefollowingeighttypesofactivities:agriculture,education,environment,generaldevelopment,peaceandgovernance,health,emergencyorrefugeerelief,andprogramsdirectedatdisadvantagedcommunities(specificallywomen,children,youth,thedisabledandtheelderly).TableOnebelowprovidesanideaofthetypeofNGOprojectsdoneineachactivityarea.20TableOne:NGOActivityAreasandTypesofProgramsInvolvedActivity TypesofProjectAgriculture - Introductionofnutritionalordroughtresistantcrops

- Trainingonlivestockrearingtechnologies- Pastoralistsupportprograms- Agro‐businessdevelopment

Education - Maintenanceorconstructionofschoolinfrastructure- Sponsorshipprogramsforeducationfees- Technology‐in‐schoolsprograms- Adulteducationprograms- Generalskillstrainingforenterprisedevelopment(e.g.anNGOthattrainsincarpentry,dress‐making,masonry,catering,weldingandhairdressing)

Environment - Waterprogramsnotspecificallytiedtoagriculture- Forest,water,land,habitat,wildlifeprotection- Promotionofenergy‐savingdevices(e.g.solarcookers,lighting)

GeneralDevelopment

- Programsthataimforgeneralsocialandeconomicbettermentand/orpovertyreductioninthecommunitiesinwhichtheywork

- NGOswithprojectsintwoormoreoftheactivities(e.g.anNGOthathaseducation,health,environmentandyouthprograms)

20Thiscategorizationisbasedonmyownreadingandclassificationofall4200+missionstatementsandorganizationnamesintheNGOBoard’sdatabase,whichIobtaineddirectlyfromtheNGOboardattheendof2006.

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- Businessordevelopmentnotspecificallyrelatedtoanotheractivityarea,suchasbusinessskillstrainingprogramsormicro‐financeprograms.

Health - Supportformaintenanceorconstructionofhealthfacilities

- HIV‐relatedprograms,whethereducational,counselingorpurelymedical

- Malaria,TB,orotherspecificillnessprograms- Trainingfordoctors,nursesorcommunityhealthworkers

MarginalizedPopulations(Women,Children,Youth,Disabled&Elderly(WCYDE)

- Supportforwomen’sgroups- Non‐education‐specificchildren’sprograms(e.g.streetchildren’sprograms)

- Programstargetingtheyouth(youngadultsbetweentheageof15and35)

- Supportforthedisabled- Supportfortheelderly

PeaceandGovernance

- Anti‐corruption,transparencyandaccountabilitypromotion- Supportforcivileducation,voterregistration,voterrights,democracy- Peace‐buildingorconflict‐reductionefforts- Programspromotingsocialjusticeandequity

Relief - Refugeeandinternallydisplacedpersons‐relatedprograms- Emergencyassistance,includingthatcausedbyconflictinneighboringcountries,naturaldisastersandroadaccidents

Other - Religiousproselytizing

- Artorculturalexchangeorpreservationprograms- UmbrellaNGOsnotconnectedtoaspecificactivity(e.g.linkingNGOstodonors,linkingNGOstoeachotherinadistrictorprovince)

- Housingactivities- Transportation‐relatedprograms- Promotionofsports- Ex‐conrehabilitationprograms

Atthenationallevel,thedistributionofNGOsacrosstheseactivitycategoriesisshowninthepiechartbelow.First,weseethedistributionforall4200+NGOs.Approximatelyhalf(47percent)oftheorganizationsareinvolvedin“generaldevelopment.”Becausethistermisbroad,itdeservesclarification:itsignifieseitherthattheorganizationsdonotspecifyaninterestarea,buthavemissionstatementslike,“topromote,encourageandfacilitateholisticdevelopmentthatenhanceseffectiveandmeaningfullivelihoodchangesinthelifeofthepooranddisadvantagedcommunities”orthattheylisttwoormoreactivityareasintheirmission,suchas,“toenhanceecology,foodsecurity,health,andnutritioninKenya'saridandsemi‐aridlands”(NGOBoard2006).Thenextmostcommontypeoforganizationfocusesonmarginalizedgroups–women,children,youth,disabledand

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elderly(WCYDE)–butdoesnotspecifyonlyoneparticularsectorinwhichtowork.Health‐relatedactivities,theneducation,environment,agriculture,governanceandrelieffollowthisclosely,respectively.

Ibelievethatthisdistributionisslightlyskewed,withthetruepercentofthegeneraldevelopmentorganizationssomewhatlower.Thisbiascomesfromthefactthatmanyoftheorganizations’entrieslistedinthedatabasedidnotincludemissionstatements,leavingonlythenameoftheorganizationtoguidemycategorization.Whentheseorganizationnameswereambiguous,Iincludedtheminthe“generaldevelopment”category.Iftheseorganizationsareremovedfromthelist,wegetthedistributionbelow,basedontheremaining2250+organizations.AswewillseeinChapterThree,thisnationaldistributionisremarkablysimilartothoseofthecasestudydistrictsandofinterviews.Here,generaldevelopmentNGOsstillcomprisethepluralityoforganizations,40percent,butalmostalltheothercategoriesare1‐2percentagepointshigher.

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UnderstandingtheState21Researchfocusingonthestatehaslongbeenacorecomponentofthestudy

ofpolitics,whichwecantracebacktothewritingsoftheearliestphilosophers.FromHobbestoWeber,SmithtoMarx,DurkheimtoGramsci,muchofthecanoninthefieldexaminesthestate.Thoughsomeperiodsofresearchhavedismissedtheimportanceoffocusingonthestate,eventuallythestateis“broughtbackin”tothediscussion(Evans,RueschemeyerandSkocpol1985),becauseananalysisofpoliticallifewithoutitwouldbeimpossible.

Researchonthestatehasvaried,however.Sometimes,ourfocushasbeenonconsideringthestateasanautonomousactororsetofplayers,actingonitsownaccord(Allison1971,Skocpol1979,Johnson1983,Haggard1990);othertimes,researchhasfocusedonthe“embedded”natureofthe“stateinsociety”(Migdal1988,2001)orthesocietalactorsinthestate(Evans1995).Wehavealsolookedatthestatethroughthelensesofitsformalrules,itsfunction,behavior,anditsinstitutions.Thosefocusedontheinternationalarenahavehistoricallyexaminedstates’actionsvis‐à‐visotherstates.Othersareinterestedinrelationsbetweenstatesandmarkets.Whenwestudydemocracy,law,economicregulation,ethnicminorities,humanrightsorcivilsociety,weinspectsomeelementsofthestate.

Morerecently,manypoliticalscientistshavedebatedwhetherornotthestatestillmatters,whetheritisweakeninginrelationtoprivateenterprises,internationalorganizationsorcertainstrongphilanthropicorganizations,andhowitfitsintoanetworkedpoliticaleconomycharacterizedbyglobalinteractionsandexchanges(Keohane1984,Ohmae1990,Strange1996).22LookingatAfricainparticular,scholarsquestionthevery“stateness”ofAfricanstates(Callaghy1987,Migdal1988,Jackson1990,Doornbos1990,Sandberg1994:7,Widner1995,Herbst1996,2000,Development&Change2002,Young1994,2004).Myresearch,however,demonstratesthatthestateisimportantandquestionsthispessimisticbent,optingtoviewstatesnotasstatic,ideal‐typeWeberianinstitutions,butasmutable,diverseandeverchanging.Itelucidatesthewaysinwhichthestatehaschangedandischanginginresponsetoanimportantnewsetofactorsgainingstrengthinmanyareasoftheworld. “Thestate”isnonethelessadifficultconcept–understandableincommonparlance,butslipperyandabstractwhenoneattemptstograspitfirmlyanddisplayittotheworldfordissection.Partofthereasonforthisisthatthestateisnotone‐dimensional,butcomplexandmulti‐faceted,makingpithy,parsimoniousdefinitionsinadequate(Young&Turner1985:12,Kjaeretal2002:7).IbeginmyexaminationofthestatebyrecallingclassicscholarshipstemmingfromMaxWeber.InPoliticsasaVocation(1919),Weberfamouslyarguedthatthestateis“ahumancommunitythat(successfully)claimsthemonopolyofthelegitimateuseofphysicalforcewithin21ProfoundthanksareowedtoDavidK.Leonardforhishelpwiththissection.22TheliteratureonAfricadiffersonseverallevelsfromwhathasbeenwrittenaboutglobalization’simpactonthestateingeneral:first,theAfricanistperspectivefocusesonthedetrimentalroleofpersonalrulethathascharacterizedmostAfricanstatessinceindependence;second,ittendstoplacelessemphasisoneconomicglobalization,sinceAfricatendstobelessintertwinedwiththerestoftheworld;andthird,itsuggeststhattheimpactsinAfricaaremuchmoresevere,sinceAfricanstateshavetendedtobemuchlessinstitutionalizedthanelsewhereintheworld.

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agiventerritory.”InworkpublishedlaterbyTalcottParsons(1947),Weberelaboratesontheformalcharacteristicsofthemodernstate:

“Itpossessesanadministrativeandlegalordersubjecttochangebylegislation,towhichtheorganizedcorporateactivityoftheadministrativestaff,whichisalsoregulatedbylegislation,isoriented.Thissystemoforderclaimsbindingauthority,notonlyoverthemembersofthestate,thecitizens,mostofwhomhaveobtainedmembershipbybirth,butalsotoaverylargeextent,overallactiontakingplaceintheareaofitsjurisdiction.Itisthusacompulsoryassociationwithaterritorialbasis.Furthermore,to‐day,theuseofforceisregardedaslegitimateonlysofarasitispermittedbythestateorprescribedbyit.”(156)

YetWeber’sdefinitionsareincompleteformypurposes,inwaysthatwillbecomeclearintheparagraphsthatfollow.Toexpandonthem,IdrawstronglyfromJoelMigdal(2001),CrawfordYoung(bothinhisownwork(1988,1994)andthatwhichhewrotewithThomasTurner(1985)),andfromPierreEnglebert(2000).23DavidEaston’s(1965)workon“politicalcommunity”isalsouseful,asIportrayanexpansiveviewofthestateasthesupremecommunityoforganizations,rules,normsandinstitutionsthatordersocietywithinaparticularterritorialentity.

WhatWeber’sdefinitionlacksisrecognitionoftheextenttowhichthestateisnotentirelyconcrete.Inadditiontothephysicalbuildings,writtenlawsandadministrativeofficesofthestate,thereisalsotheabstractideaofthestate–aconstructthatwedrawtomindwhenthinkingaboutthestate,aswellasthepracticesofthestate–ortheprocessesbywhichthestateacts(ibid,Young1994,Migdal2001).Englebertagrees:“Stateisabroaderconceptthangovernmentorregimeandalsoincludestheterritory,laws,thebureaucraticandmilitaryapparatus,andsomeideologicaljustificationforthestate’sexistence”(2000:4).

InStateinSociety(2001,p.15‐22),Migdalconceptualizesthestateas:“afieldofpowermarkedbytheuseandthreatofviolenceandshapedby1)theimageofacoherent,controllingorganizationinaterritory,whichisarepresentationofthepeopleboundedbythatterritory,and2)theactualpracticesofitsmultipleparts”(ibid:15‐16).Whilehismeaningsofthephrases“fieldofpower”and“representation”arehazy,MigdalimportantlyexpandsonWeber’sdefinitionbyallowingustoadmitasstatesthoseentitieswhoseideaandpracticesofstatemaynotperfectlyalign.Ononeside,thestateisan“image,”mostoftenconceivedofandprojectedastheideal‐typestateelucidatedbyWeberabove,abureaucratic‐rationalsysteminwhichasetofgoverningorganizationsholdsamonopolyoverthelegitimateuseofviolenceinadefinedterritory.AsMigdalpointsout,veryfewstateshaveeverachievedaperfectresemblancetothisbureaucratic‐rationalWeberianideal,yetscholars,policymakersandstatesmenallcontinuetopointtoit. Onthesecondside,however,existtheactualday‐to‐daypractices,or“routinizedperformativeacts”ofthestate(ibid:19).“Whiletheimageofthestateimpliesasingularmorality,onestandardway,indeedrightwayofdoingthings,practicesdenotemultipletypesofperformanceand,possibly,somecontentionoverwhatistherightwaytoact”(ibid.).Forthisreason,thepracticesofthestatecan23ThissectionalsoparallelsinsomewaysFowler(1991),whoemploysasimilarpassagefromYoung(1988)todiscussNGOsandthestate.

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eitherundermineorbolstertheimageofthestateasunified,purposive,centralactor.‘ElementsofStateness’andNGOs

Thestateisthusadministration,idea,andpractice.DrawingonWeber,TurnerandYoung(1985)alsofocusonthepracticesofstate,whichtheyrefertoas“regularitiesinbehavior”thatmakestatesidentifiablequastates(14)oras“imperatives”thatallstatesface(Young1994).Myresearchfocusesprimarilyonfourofthebehavioralregularities(andcorrespondingcharacteristics)theyidentify:hegemonyoveraterritorialarea,autonomyingovernance,legitimacy,andcapacity.24Inthissection,IdescribetheseelementsofstatenessandquestionhowtheymaybeimpactedbyNGOs.

“Thestate,tobeginwith,isaterritoriallydemarcatedentity,”writeTurnerandYoung(1985:12).Behaviorally,“Thestateseekstoupholditshegemonyovertheterritoryitrules”(ibid:15).Territorialitycombinescharacteristicwithpractice,asthedemarcation,occupationanddefenseofageographicalterritorybygoverninginstitutions.Itconcernsthe“broadcastingofpower”(Herbst2000)throughoutageographicalspace,orwhatwasreferredtointhe1960sasthepenetrationofgeographicalterritorybygoverningauthorities.Territorialboundariesdemarcatethelinesofhegemony,alongwhichpublicauthoritiesandpeoplescanmakedemandsoneachother,suchastaxation,defense,securityoraccountability. Inthisdissertation,IaminterestedintherelationshipbetweenNGOsandterritoriality.DoNGOshelporhinderthestateinbroadcastingpowerovertheterritoryitclaims?DoNGOsassistthestateincreatingorganizationalpresenceinremoteareas,byputtingonthegroundactivitiesthatlocalsconsiderasunderstatejurisdiction?Ordotheyclusterincentralorreadilyaccessibleareas,enhancingatendencyofthestatetofadeawayasonemovesoutwardfromthecapital,leavingitsterritorialitypoorlyarticulated?

“Sovereigntyisaseconddefiningcharacteristic…Thepowerandauthorityofthestateoveritsterritorialdomainaretheoreticallyabsolute,indivisible,andunlimited”(Turner&Young1985:13).Behaviorally,theimperativeforthestateistobeautonomous,“independentofthedictationofanyotherauthority”(ibid:15).Thisattributeleadsustoquestionsofgovernance,thepatternsormethodsbywhichgoverningoccurswithinastate.Whomakesthedecisions?Howaretheymade?Whatactorsregulatethemonceinplace?

Forastatetotrulyhavecompletesovereignty,inprinciple,itsrepresentativesalonemustmakedecisionsaboutthepresence,distributionandoperationofserviceprovisioninthesociety.Whilenostateactuallymakesallof24Besidesthefourdiscussedhereinthetext,YoungandTurneralsoidentify“theconceptionofthestateasalegalsystem”(14)aspartoftheadministrativebehavior,aswellasbehaviorthat“seekstoupholdandadvance[thestate’s]security”(15)andits“revenueimperative”(16).Formypurposes,theseareonlytangentiallyrelevant,sinceNGOsdonotgenerallyimpingeonsecurityorlegalsystemsatall.NGOsdoarguablyaddtotheresourcesavailabletosocietyasawhole(andthereforestaterevenue),andmightthereforehavebeenappropriatelyincludedinthisanalysis.Itwasnot,however,asrevenuegarneredbythestatefromNGOsisoftenindirectandthereforeextremelydifficulttocalculate.

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thesedecisionsdirectly,theydosotoagreaterorlesserdegree.Turningtothesubjectofthisdissertation,NGOs,IexploretowhatextentNGOshavebeguntomakesuchdecisions,orareconstrainedbythegovernmentindoingso.

Thirdly,TurnerandYoungidentify,“theemotionallypowerfulconceptofthenation…[which]‘centersthesupremeloyaltyoftheoverwhelmingmajorityofthepeople…’”(Ibid:13,quotingKohn).Suchemotionaltiesofloyaltyinducecitizensto“defertothestate’spowerandconsenttoitsauthority…”(Ibid:14).Behaviorally,“Statespursueanimperativeoflegitimation….Astateseeksrulebyconsent,andtosecurehabitualacquiescencetoitsauthority”(ibid:16).

InAfrica,legitimacyhasoftenbeenpredicatedonthedistributionofresourcesthroughserviceprovision.Historically,thishasoccurredaslocal“BigMen”gainedaccesstotheresourcesofthestate(ascivilservantsorpoliticians)anddistributedthemamongtheirclientsinexchangefordecision‐makingauthorityamongthegroup.IntheculturalcontextofAfrica,thiswasnotonlystrategicallyimportantforgettingreelected;itwasmorallyrequired,asmutualexchangerelationsofpatron‐clientelismprovidedakindofsocialinsurancewherenoformalpoliciesexisted.Today,areNGOsbecomingthenew“BigMen”?DoesthefactthatNGOsaredeliveringservicesthatcitizensseeasapartoftheirsocialcontractwiththestateenhanceorlessenthestatelegitimacyintheeyesofitssubjects–ontheonehandbecausetheservicesarebeingdeliveredandontheotherbecauseitisnotthestateitselfthatisdoingso?

“Fourthly,thestateis…asetofinstitutionsofrule,anorganizationalexpressionofhegemony.”(Ibid:13)Behaviorally,thischaracteristicexpressesitselfasadministrativecapacity,thestate’sabilitytoimplementstatedobjectives.AccordingtoMigdal(1988),itistheabilitytoappropriateoruseresourcesindeterminedways,ofteninoppositiontopowerfulsocietalactors.

Inthiswork,thequestioniswhetherNGOsenhanceorunderminethecapacityofthestatetoprovideservices.DoNGOsenhanceserviceprovisionqualityandquantity?OrdoNGOslowerstatecapacity,notonlybyleachingresourcesandpersonnelfromthestate,butalsobyallowingittoshirkresponsibilitytoitscitizens?TableTwo:ElementsofStatenessElement Definition KeyQuestions Literature Chapter

Territoriality Thedemarcation,occupationanddefenseofasetgeographicalterritorybygoverninginstitutions.

DoNGOshelporhinderthestateinbroadcastingpowerovertheterritoryitclaims?DoNGOsassistthestateincreatingorganizationalpresenceinremoteareas,byputtingonthegroundactivitiesthatlocalsconsiderunderstatejurisdiction?Ordotheyclusterincentralorreadilyaccessibleareas,enhancingatendencyofthestatetofadeawayasonemovesoutwardfromthecapital,leavingitsterritorialitypoorlyarticulated?HowdoNGOsdecidewheretolocatephysically?

PoliticalPenetration,State‐building

Two

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Wherestatesact.

Capacity Theabilitytoimplementstatedobjectives.

HaveNGOsinfluencedchangeinthestate'scapacitytoprovidesocialservices?DoNGOsenhanceserviceprovisionqualityandquantity?Ordotheyleachresourcesandpersonnelfromthestate,whileallowingittoshirkresponsibilitytoitscitizens?Whatstatesdo.

PoliticalEconomy,Privatization,CivilSociety

Three

Governance Thepatternsormethodsbywhichgoverningoccurswithinastate.

WhatimpacthastheproliferationofNGOsinKenyahadonhowandbywhomallocationdecisionsaremade?TowhatextenthaveNGOsbeguntomakesuchdecisions?Aretheyconstrainedbythegovernmentindoingso?HowdoNGOsandgovernmentinteractregardingdecision‐making?Howstatesgovern.

NewGovernance,GoodGovernance,GlobalGovernance,AdministrationTheory

Four

Legitimacy Ageneralizedperceptionthatthestatehasarighttogovernanditsactionsaredesirable,properorappropriateinitsculturalcontext.

DoesasituationwhereNGOsprovidebetter,cheaperservicesthanthegovernmentlowerpopularperceptionsofgovernment?OrdoesNGOspresencebolsterthewaypeopleviewtheirstate,withextra‐governmentalserviceprovisioneitherpacifyingthepeopleagainstdemandingmorefromthegovernmentand/orbeingviewedasapositiveextensionofstatecapacity?Howstatesareseen.

CivilSociety,theState

FiveSix

UndermineorSupporttheState?SomescholarsseeNGOsgainingpowerasthestaterecedes,whileothers

questionthehypeoverNGOs(Edwardsetal.1993:3)orseeNGOsreinforcingweakstates.Whataretheprincipleargumentsinthisdebate?Whoaretheactorsoneitherside?Inthissection,Ioutlinethetheories.NGOsBolstertheState ManypeoplewhobelieveNGOprovisionofservicesmakesthestatestrongerturntoclassictheoriesofcivilsocietytomaketheirclaims.Twoworksinparticular,Tocqueville’sDemocracyinAmericaandPutnametal.MakingDemocracyWork:CivilTraditionsinModernItaly,arefrequentlycited.

ForPutnam,themore“civicness”inasociety,thehigherstateperformancewillbe.Horizontalrelationshipsoftrustandinterdependencebuiltthroughmembershipinalltypesofassociationsmakeforactivedemocraticcitizens,whoinsistoneffectiveandresponsiveservicedelivery.Thus,civilsociety“reinforcesastrongstate”(Putnametal.1993:182),byincreasingdemocratizationandinstitutionalaccountability,andthereforeadministrativecapacity.These,inturn,generatepopularsupportforlegitimategovernment.

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ForTocqueville,civilsocietywasnecessarybecause,asistrueinAfricancountries,19thcenturyAmericangovernmentadministrationwasextremelyweak,even“absent”(1863:72).Tocquevillesawthatwhilethegovernmentacknowledgeditsobligationstosocietyandhadlawsdetailingserviceprovision(ibid:44‐45),civicassociationsactuallycarriedoutthetasks:

“Americansofallages,allstationsinlife,andalltypesofdispositionsareforeverformingassociations.…Hospitals,prisons,andschoolstakeshapeinthatway.…Ineverycase,attheheadofanynewundertaking,whereinFranceyouwouldfindthegovernmentorinEnglandsometerritorialmagnate,intheUnitedStatesyouaresuretofindanassociation.”(Ibid:513)

Thus,TocquevillesawNGOsasextendingorevencomposingthesocialservicewingofthestatesincenon‐governmentalprovisionofservicesallowed,forexample,patriotismtospreadthroughthenewstatesoftheWestinchurches,schoolsandpolicing(ibid:293).Hesawablurringofstateandcivilsocietynotalwaysrecognizedintheliterature.

Theseargumentshavebeenlargelytakenupbytheinternationaldevelopmentcommunity,whichhasoftenaddedanideologicallyneo‐liberalbent.TheoristswritingfromNewPublicManagementinpublicadministration,internationalfinancialinstitutionsonstructuraladjustment,bi‐andmulti‐lateraldonorrepresentativesandfrombothgroupson“new”or“good”governance(WorldBank1989,Hyden1983,Diamond1989)supportNGOsascivilsocietyorganizations,butalsobecausetheyareprivateorganizations,whichtheyconsidersuperiortopubliconesingeneral.Attheextreme,scholarsinthisveinbelievethatunfetteredmarkets,howevertheyarefreedfromtheoppressivehandofstateintervention,supplygoodsandservicesfaster,betterandcheaperthandogovernments.NGOsareseenbytheseorganizationsasmoreefficient,effective,flexibleandinnovativethangovernment;tobeother‐orientedandideologicallycommittedtodemocracyandparticipatorypro‐poordevelopment;andtobemoreaccountableandtransparentthanthegovernment(Bratton1989,Fowler1991,Owitietal2004,WorldBank1989).

ReflectingthisfaithinNGOs,theWorldBankincreasedthepercentageofitsprojectsinvolvingcivilsocietyorganizations(CSOs),includingNGOs,from21to72percentbetween1990and2006.25TheBank’swebsiteassertsthat,“TheWorldBankhaslearnedthroughtwodecadesofinteractionthatCSOs…improvedevelopmenteffectivenessandsustainability,andholdgovernmentsandpolicymakerspubliclyaccountable.TheparticipationofCSOsinWorldBank‐financedprojectscanenhanceoperationalperformanceandsustainabilitybycontributinglocalknowledge,technicalexpertise,andsociallegitimacy.”Theyhighlighttherolethatnon‐governmentalactors,includingcitizens,interestsgroups,experts,andotherstakeholdersshouldplayinthedecision‐makingofpublicservicesinordertomakethemmoredemocratic,accountableandtransparent. AthirdsectionoftheliteratureonNGOsagreesthatNGOsbolsterthestate,butfollowsadifferentlogictoarriveatthisconclusion.InsteadoffocusingonNGOs

25TheWorldBank’swebsiteoncivilsocietysaysexplicitlythatNGOsareconsideredpartofcivilsocietyorganizations(http://go.worldbank.org/PWRRFJ2QH0‐accessed11April2006).

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ascivilsocietyorasprivateorganizations,theybelieveNGOsincreasesupportforexistingpoliticalauthoritybecausethey–ofteninadvertently–obfuscategovernment’sinadequaciesbycompensatingfortheirineffectivenessinservicedelivery(Martin2004:10).Insomecases,politiciansrecognizeanopportunityinthissituation;notonlydotheygainlegitimacyindirectlyfromNGOsprovidingservicesintheirconstituencies,butundercertainconditionstheycanactuallysuccessfullyclaimcreditforbringingNGOstotheareaandfortheworkthattheydo(Cannon1996:263,Boulding&Gibson2009).26Thislegitimatespoliticalauthority,especiallywhenNGOsfacilitateorallowthistypeofcredittakingtooccur(Sandberg1994). Afourthlogicholdsthat,onapurelypracticallevel,NGOscansupportstatecapacitysimplybyrelievingsomeofthemanagerialandfinancialburdenplacedonit(Bratton1989),allowingforadivisionoflaborbetweenthetwotypesoforganizations.FrankHolmquist’s(1984)workonharambeegroupsinKenyasupportsthisidea,showinghowtheself‐helpgroupsenhancedstateeffectiveness.ThisargumentreliesonanassumptionthatNGOsandgovernmentsarenotultimatelycompetingforthesameresources. Finally,lookingspecificallyatterritoriality,Jacobson(2002)arguesthatrefugeeresourcesinparticular,andtheinternationalorganizationsandNGOsthatbringthem,“representanimportantstatebuildingcontributiontothehoststate”(577).Becauserefugeesusuallycomefromneighboringstates,theyencouragehoststatestostrengthentheirpresenceatborderregions,extendingtheirbureaucraticreachtotheseareas.

NearlyallscholarswhobelieveNGOsaresupportingthestateemphasizethatthereremainsanimportantroleforbothgovernmentalandnon‐governmentalorganizations,andunderscoretheimportanceofpartnershipbetweenthem(Obiyan2004,Camposetal.2004,Clark1995).Forexample,KenyanscholarB.M.Makau(1996:87)arguesthatexpansionofeducationinKenyahasbeenpossibleonlybecauseofpartnershipsbetweengovernment,communities,NGOsandprivateenterprises.NormanUphoffagrees,sayingthattotalemphasisonstate,marketorNGOswillnotworktodeveloppoorcountries,sincetheweaknessesinanyonesectorarecompensatedforbythestrengthsofothers(1993:607).ManyintheWorldBankandotherdonororganizations,haveprescriptivelyarguedthatthegovernmentshouldmakedecisionswhileoutsourcingimplementationtoNGOsandotherprivateactors(Cannon1996citingWorldBank1993:87).

AnextensionofthisargumentholdsthatbothNGOsandgovernmentarenecessarycomponents,andaddsthattheyarebeginningtoblendtogether,thoughNGOsremainamicro‐actorwhencomparedtothegovernment(Oyugi2004).Inseveralarticles,ClaireMercer,forexample,noteswaysinwhichgovernmentofficialsactlikeNGOsandviceversa,blurringtheboundariesbetweenthem(1999:26Boulding&Gibson(2009)callthisthe“statusquoargument”intheiranalysisofthepoliticalimplicationsofNGOs.Inthisexplanation,NGOs–whetherexplicitlyorinadvertently–supportexistingpoliticalauthority(measuredinelectoralsupportforincumbentpoliticians)bycreatingopportunitiesforpoliticianstoclaimcreditfortheirwork.Sometimesthishappensthroughstatecapture,aswhenNGOsdependonstatecontractsorfunding.Ittendstohappenmoreinlargepoliticalunitswhereinformationsharingacrosstheentirepopulationisdifficult.

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253‐254).VanKlinken(1998:349)agrees,“…thisdebateispremisedonaneatdivisionbetweengovernmentandNGOs;adistinctionthatishardertosustainontheground.GovernmentisofteninvolvedinNGOactivities,andviceversa.Yet,mythicalindependenceiscreatedtoreplaceinterdependenceinreality.”WhileNGOsare“constitutedoutsidethestate,[they]actinthepublicsphere.”(Osodo&Matsvai1997:5)NGOsUnderminetheState

Manyoftheargumentsjustpresentedseemplausible,yetotherscholarsandpolicymakershavedrawnouttheprocessesbywhichNGOscanundermineorweakenthestate.Interestingly,thesamecivilsocietyargumentsusedtoarguethatNGOscanstrengthenthestatehavebeenusedtoshowhowtheycanweakenit.27TocquevillefoundthatcivilsocietyinAmericastrengthenedthestate,yethealsowarnedthatnon‐governmentalprovisionofservicescouldthreatengovernmentauthority.Othershaveagreed:evenwhenunintended,NGOs’participatoryapproachmobilizespeople,encouragesincreasedinformationsharing,fostersalternativepoliticalideas,andempowersthedisadvantaged,allofwhichcanthreatenextantpoliticalauthority,powerandorder(Bratton1989,Fowler1991,Boulding&Gibson2009citingPutnam1993andPutnam2000,Martin2004).AsnotedKenyanpoliticalscientistStephenNdegwa(1994)remindsus,thenormalrelationshipbetweenstateandcivilsocietyisopposition.

Indeed,organizationsthatbecomeveryindependentfromgovernmentcancompetewithitforloyaltywhentheyperformmanyotherwisepublicfunctions(Whittington1998).Tocquevilleworriedthattheycan“formsomethinglikeaseparatenationwithinanationandagovernmentwithinthegovernment”(1863:190).Thiscreatesthepossibilityofcompetinglegitimateauthorities:“If,besidestherulingpower,anotherpowerisestablishedwithalmostequalmoralauthority,canonesupposethatinthelongrunitwilljusttalkandnotact?”(Ibid:191)Thisisespeciallytruewheregovernmentsareweak,lackconfidenceoftheircontrolinthecountry,andwheretheyarenon‐democraticornotaccountable(Bratton1989:576).AnditisexacerbatedbythefactthatNGOworkersformalargepartoftheircountry’seducatedmiddleclass,meaningtheyhaveaccesstotheresourceswithwhichtochallengestateauthority(Obiyan2004:81).

DevelopingcountrygovernmentsoftenfeeltheirauthoritythreatenedbyNGOs:giventheirrelativenewnessasstates,theartificialityofmanyoftheirborders,andtheirhistoryoffightingcolonialpowersthroughcivilsocietyorganizations,thisshouldnotbesurprising(Fowler1991:58).EvenwhereNGOs

27ItispossiblethatthedemocratizingeffectsofNGOsmayweakensupportforexistingpoliticalauthorityintheshortrun,whileimprovinggovernanceinthelongrun.Innon‐democracies,theflipsideofweakeningstatepowerorcontrolcanbeaboonfordemocratization.Forexample,aKenyanjournalisthaswrittenabouthowNGOsthreatenstatepowerbyemancipatingKenyansthroughempowermentandcivicconsciousness‐raisingefforts(TheSundayNation.1998.“Kenya:WhyWeCan'tDowithoutNGOsJustYet”AccessedonlineattheGlobalPolicyForumwebsite,www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/state/1998/kenya.htm,onMay21,2009).Yetothersinterprettheseexactchangeswithapositiveslant–democratizationisinherentlystrengtheningforastate(evenifaparticularregimemightsuffer).

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canperformbetterthanthestate,suggestinganetbenefitvis‐à‐visserviceprovision,Africanpoliticiansalsotendtoviewdistributionofservicesinpoliticalterms(Bratton1989:573),seeingNGOs’greatercapacityas“embarrassing”forthestate(Guber2002:141)orasavisiblecriticismofstateshortcomings(Farringtonetal.1993:50).WhereNGOsareovertlypresentedasasubstituteforgovernment,politicalresentmentishigh(Obiyan2004).ThesamecanbesaidforplaceswhereNGOstakeaway“whatthestatedoesbest”–Whaites(1998:346)describesthisasoccurringwithregardtoserviceprovisioninSriLanka.

TheliteratureonNGO‐staterelationsisrifewithassertionsthatNGOsundermineorthreatentounderminegovernmentlegitimacy.“OfthefiveimperativesthatareaconstantsourceofpoliticalconcerntoAfricangovernments,legitimacyispotentiallytheonemostsusceptibletoNGOexpansion”(Fowler1991:78).MichaelBrattonexplainsthatNGOsthreatenlegitimacyspecificallybecauseAfricangovernmentsrelyonpromisesofserviceprovisionandeconomicdevelopmentastheirmoralbasisforholdingpower(1989).NGOsprovidingtheseservicessuggest,then,thathostgovernmentshavefailedintheirsideofthesocialcontract,andthereforehavelesslegitimateclaimtopower.

ThismeansNGOscaninadvertentlythreatenlegitimacyiftheyofferservicesthatthegovernmentcannotmatch(Martin2004).Accordingtosome,however,NGOsalsosometimesusedonorresourcesdeliberatelytocompetewithgovernmentforlegitimacy(Obiyan2004:82).Theyintentionallyswaylegitimacybypublicallyopposingpoliticiansandtheircredentials,ordrawingattentiontotheirmistakes(Sandberg1994:11).

ManyoftheseargumentsrelyonanassumptionthatcitizensindevelopingcountriesmakecomparisonsbetweenNGOsandthegovernment,suchthatNGOsdoingsomethingwellreflectspoorlyonthegovernment.WorldBankandUNdevelopmentexpertJohnClarksuggestsNGOsthemselvesmakethisassumption;hewritesthatNGOsmightnotwanttoimproveservicedeliveryifitbringspositivereturnstothegovernmentanditspopularity(1995:596).Yetwedonotknowwhetherthisassumptionholds.

Asidefromgoverningauthorityandlegitimacy,NGOsmayalsoweakengovernmentcapacity.IfNGOsdrawdonorresourcesawayfromthegovernment28,capacitymayfallforanumberofreasons:First,NGOsmaybelessabletodeliverthanisoftenasserted,sodivertingresourcestothemmaynotimprovematters.Second,serviceprovisionmaynotbewellcoordinated,leadingtoaduplicationofeffortsandthereforewastedresources.Third,becauseNGOsareabletopayhighersalaries,theycandrawthemostcompetentemployeesoutofthepublicsector(Chege1999).29Fourth,NGOsmayprovideanexcusetothegovernmentto28Competitionfortheseresourcesincreaseddramaticallyinthe1990sandearly2000sasdonorsredirectedfundstoNGOSinsteadofgovernments(Bratton1989,Fowler1991,Chege1999,Edwards&Hulme1996,Martin2002,Owitietal2004).29Liberalizationofexchangerateshasmeantlowerrealwagesforcivilserviceemployees,whothencompeteforhigher‐payingNGOjobs.Withexchangerateliberalizationanddevaluation,realwagesforcivilservantshavefallenasmuchas80percent(vandeWalle2001),coveringfamilyfoodexpensesforaslittleas3dayspermonth(Tripp1994).Atthestartofthe21stcentury,NGOsalariesaveragedfivetimesashighastheirgovernmentcounterpartsinKenya(Chege1999).

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withdrawfromserviceprovision(Campbell1006).GovernmentsmaybelievethatNGOsalleviatesomeoftheirresponsibilitytotheirownpoorpeople(Martin2004:30). Fifth,bypassingalready‐weakgovernmentsdoesnothingtoincreasetheircapacity–instead,evermoreemasculatedgovernmentsexist,withlittlelong‐termsolution(Whaites1998).WritingonTajikistan,Martinsays,“…donoragencieshaveatendencytolooktoNGOsasthepreferredpartnersindevelopmentinitiatives,specificallybecausehostgovernmentsareineffective.Yetindoingso,noincentiveiseverprovidedtothemtopromotethekindofchangeswhichwouldultimatelyreducetheirdependencyonforeigndonors.”(2004:12,seealsoCampbell1996andCannon1996).Asaresult,developingcountrygovernmentinefficiencybecomes“aself‐perpetuatingreality”(Edwards&Hulme1996citingFarrington&Lewis1993,333),sincegovernmentsnevergetthefundstoimproveorchange.NGOexpertsEdwards&HulmegosofarastoarguethatNGOserviceprovisionmayactasapalliative,preventingstructuralchangesthatareneededtoimprovestatecapacity(1996:964).Indeed,NGOsdooftensetupnewoperationalnetworks,sidesteppingexistinggovernmentstructures,whichfurtherunderminesstateinstitutions(Campbell1996).Thus,whileNGOsmaybecurrentlyassistingwithshort‐termdevelopmentandmaintenanceefforts,theseandotherscholarsarguethatNGOsshouldnotbeseenasanalternativetofunctioningstateinstitutionsinthelongrun(Brautigam1994,Chege1999).30 Moreover,withoutaminimumlevelofpre‐existinggovernancecapacity,themanyactorsnowprovidingservicescanoverwhelmaweakstate’sabilitytosetstandards,coordinate,monitorandregulateallorganizationsinvolved.BecauseprivatizationofserviceprovisiontoNGOsisoftennotdeliberate,butspontaneous“gap‐filling,”governmentsendupinthedarkaboutwhichorganizationsareinvolvedinserviceprovision,whereandinwhatcapacity.Tocquevillerecognizedthispossibilityandarguedthatthestateneededwell‐designedgovernmentinstitutionsandlawsmeanttoshapethepolityandimpartvalues.HefeltthatthesituationinAmericaworkedbecauseitslaws“descendintominutedetails…inthiswaythesecondaryauthoritiesaretieddownbyamultitudeofdetailedobligationsstrictlydefined”(ibid:74).

Lastly,NGOshavebeenarguedtounderminegovernmentalautonomy.Theirsovereigntyisweakenedasexternallybased–orexternallyfinanced–NGOsmakedecisionsnormallyconsideredthepurviewofgovernment.Decidingtowhom,whereandwhenservicesareprovidedisnowsometimestheroleofNGOsorthedonorsthatfundthem(Kameri‐Mbote2002),butistraditionallythatofgovernment–ideallyademocraticandaccountablegovernment.StateswithoutsufficientresourcesorcapacitytoprovidetheseservicesthemselvesmayfeeltheyhavelittlechoicebuttocedesomedegreeofautonomyinexchangefortheresourcesNGOsbring(Martin2004;Osodo&Matsvai1997).

30TherealsoexistrumorsthatNGOsarelargelyaruseforthecontinuedenrichmentofthepowerful,beingcreatedandmaintainedbypoliticians,businesspeopleandcivilservicesinordertoredirectdonorfundsforprivateuse.Iftrue,thenthediversionoffundstoNGOswillcertainlynothelpcapacitynorlegitimacyeither,ifitisknownwidelyinsociety.

25

Attheendoftheday,however,muchaswequestionthesovereigntyofdevelopingcountrygovernments,manyofthemexertstrategiesofcontroloverNGOsworkingintheirterritory.GovernmentsactasgatekeepersbetweenlocalNGOsandforeigndonors(Bratton1989),andnearlyalwayshavethepowertoexpeloffendingforeignorganizations,orscarethemthroughraidsandinvestigations(Katumanga2004).TheyenactregulationandlawsconcerningtheoperationofNGOsintheirborders,andvisiblyenforcethemwhennecessary(EdwardsandHulme1996,Ndegwa1994).

Methodology&DataBecause“thestate”isalargeandabstractconceptthatisdifficultto

operationalize,Icometomyfindingsonthestatebyexaminingitscomponentbuildingblocks,eachofwhichspeakstoanessentialelementofstateness.Ithencompilemyfindingsontheindividualcomponentstodrawconclusionsthatapplytothestateasawhole.Inthisway,Iemployaformofsocialsciencetriangulation–ratherthanusingoneelementofthestatetoactasaproxyforthestateasawhole,Ilookatavarietytoseeifmyfindingsareconsistentacrossdifferentaspectsofthestate.Foreachelement,Iaskaninterestinglower‐orderquestionaboutNGOs’impacts,which,takentogether,provideinsightaboutahigher‐order“bigquestion”:thechangingnatureofthestate.Thus,IlookattheimpactofNGOsfromfourvantagepointspertainingtothestate:capacity,governance,legitimacyandterritoriality.BecauseIdrawsimilarconclusionsregardingeachlower‐orderquestion,Iamconfidentinmyultimateconclusionsonthestateasawhole.

Inadditiontoanalyzingmultipleelementsofstateness,Ihavealsousedamixed‐methodsapproach,weavingtogetherquantitativestatisticalanalysisoforiginalsurveyworkwithin‐depthinterviews,casestudiesandinformationgatheredduringthetwenty‐onemonthsIspentinKenyabetween2002and2008.31This,too,allowsmetoconfirmfindingsusingoneanalyticmethodwithothertypesofresearchthroughtriangulation.

Forthequantitativeanalyses,Icollectedbothcross‐temporalandcross‐locationdata.IgatheredinformationonNGOs,changesindevelopmentindicators,serviceprovisioncapacityandperceptionsofthestate,bothovertimeandacrossKenya’s72administrativedistricts.ThesedatalargelycoverthetimeperiodsinceNGOsstartedtoberegisteredbythegovernment(in1991);onlegitimacy,however,Icomparetheearlypost‐independenceperiodofthelate1960stotoday.

Ialsoadministeredtwosurveys.Thefirstsurveyof500secondaryschoolstudentsduplicatesa1966‐1967surveybyKennethPrewitt,askingquestionsaboutcitizenship,nationbuildingandthestateinKenya.Thissurveyhelpsmetomeasurechangeinperceptionsofstatelegitimacyovertime.Thesecondisanoriginalsurveyof500adults,anddeterminescurrentperceptionsofthestate,linkingstatelegitimacytogovernmentalandnon‐governmentserviceprovisionmoreconcretely.

31IlivedinKenyaforeightmonthsin2002.IconductedfieldresearchinKenyaspecificallyforthisprojectfromMaytoAugust2005,SeptembertoNovember2006,JanuarytoJune2007andJulytoNovember2008.

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IcomplementthesestatisticalanalyseswithaqualitativeassessmentofNGOs’impactinKenya.Throughoutthedissertation,Idrawonoveronehundredsemi‐structuredinterviewswithgovernmentalandnon‐governmentalservicesproviders,governmentofficialsandregularpeople,wananchi.MyinterviewscoveredsuchtopicsastheprogramsofferedbyNGOsandgovernmentrespectively,organizations’goalsandmotivations,fundingsources,andrelationshipswithlocalandnationalgovernmentofficesandofficers.IalsoprobedtherelationshipbetweenNGOs,wananchiandthestate.Theseinterviewsprovidedmuchoftheunderstandingthatallowsmetointerpretmystatisticalresultsinmeaningfulways.

Mostoftheinterviewsforthisworkweredoneintwocase‐studydistrictsofKenya,MachakosandMbeere,andinthecapital,Nairobi,wherethehighestnumberofNGOofficesandheadquartersarelocated.Topickthecase‐studydistricts,IfirstdeterminedwhichfactorsinfluenceNGOplacementacrossKenya’s72districts(discussedindetailinChapterTwo).Controllingforthesefactors,IthenselectedasingledistrictwithrelativelyhighandlowNGOnumbers–MachakosandMbeererespectively.ThedistrictwithahighlevelofNGOs,Machakos,isanalogoustoa“treatment”caseinwhichNGOsarethetreatment,whereasthedistrictwithfewNGOsisanalogoustoacontrolcase.ExceptforvariationinthenumberofNGOs,thedistrictsareotherwisesimilarinmanyways.

Qualitativeworkisparticularlyimportantforthestudyofless‐developedcountrieslikeKenya,sincestatisticaldatacanbeunreliable–governmentstatisticsofficesareoftensorelyunder‐funded.Moreover,comprehensiveandreliabledataonnon‐governmentalserviceprovisionisinseverelyshortsupply,notonlyfrompastdecades,butalsoforthepresenttimeperiod.Inaddition,researchtouchingeventangentiallyonissuesofgovernmentlegitimacywasstymiedinKenyabythegovernmentduringmuch,ifnotalloftheMoiadministration,whichstretchedtwenty‐fouryearsfrom1978to2002,makingforalargegapincross‐temporalanalysis.Moreover,supplementingquantitativedatawithqualitativeresearchprovidesweighttoandflexibilityintheuseofthefindings,sincequalitativeunderstandingsthatsupportnumbers‐drivenfindingsincreaseourconfidenceintheirvalidity.

Finally,asmentionedintheintroductiontothischapter,thisresearchtakesthe“effectsofcauses”approachtoresearch:Iexamineanewphenomenonandseektodetermineitsimpact.Consequently,myfocusisononeindependentvariable,theproliferationofNGOs,examiningitsimpactonfour“elementsofstateness.”Whilethisapproachislesscommonthanoneinwhichapuzzlingoutcomeisexplained,itisimportantbecauseoftheextremelyrapidgrowthofNGOsinAfricaandtheirunknownimpacts.ThisisimportantbecauseoftheextremelyrapidgrowthofNGOsinAfrica.NGOsareclearlyhavingfar‐reachingimpacts,andareinmanywaysthebiggestchangetotheAfricanpoliticallandscapeinthepasttwodecades.

WhyWorkonKenya?Kenyaisaprimelocationinwhichtoconductresearchofthistypefor

severalreasons.First,thenumberofNGOsinthecountryhasskyrocketedrecently:

27

whereasin1974therewereonly125NGOs,thisincreasedtoover400by1989,soaredtoover3000by2005(Bratton1989citingUSAID,NationalCouncilofNGOs‐Kenyawebsite2005),andarrivedatover4000bytheendof2006(NGOCoordinationBoarddatabase,December2006).WhenIfinishedfieldresearchinNovemberof2008,Iwastoldthereweremorethan6000(2008‐10).Asearlyas1999,NGOsreceiveover18percentofofficialaid(Chege1999).

Second,thehistoryofserviceprovisioninthecountrymakesKenyaaninterestingcase.Theearly‐independenceKenyangovernmentstrovetotakenon‐governmentalserviceproviders–mostlymissionaries–underthegovernmentwing.WhereasTanzania’sNyerereinvitedNGOsandevenbilateraldonorstotakechargeofserviceprovisioninspecific,assignedareasofthecountry,Kenyanleaderspreferredaidfortheseservicestogothroughtheirgovernment.Yetatthesametime,Kenyanleadershavepromotedanethosofself‐helpsinceindependence.Inthisvein,citizengroups,women’sgroupsandyouthcivilsocietyanddevelopmentgroupshavebeenextremelycommon,withover220,000registered“societygroups”by2002(Kanyinga2004).ThesefactorshavemadeKenyansreceptivetoNGOs’presenceandparticipatoryapproachtodevelopment. Finally,KenyaisakeystateinwhichtoundertakethisresearchbecauseofthewaythattheKenyangovernmenthasrespondedtothegrowthofNGOs.Earlyon,theMoiAdministrationoftenappearedthreatenedbyNGOs.In1990,itinstitutedthethen‐controversialNGOActwiththejustificationofprotectingthepublicinterest.TheActrequiresallNGOstoregisterandpayfeestothegovernment,tobeanswerabletotheNGOCoordinationBureauoftheOfficeofthePresident,andtoacceptgovernmentsupervisionandmonitoring.ThegovernmentusedpowersgainedundertheActtoharassandderegisterNGOsitfeltthreatenedby,includingseveralhumanrightsNGOsin1995,theGreenBeltMovementin1999,theCentreforLawandResearchInternational(CLARION)(Kameri‐Mbote2000),andthe304and340NGOs(in2002and2003respectively)whichwerestruckfromtheregisterforfailingtoadequatelyfilerequiredpaperwork32(NationalCouncilofNGOswebsite).Interestingly,afterachangeofgovernmentalpowerin2002,thenewKibakiAdministrationattemptedtoreclaimsomeofthegovernmentlegitimacythathadarguablybeenlosttoNGOsbyhiringmanypopularNGOleadersintothecivilserviceandpublicizingtheircooptationwidely.TheKibakigovernmenthasmadenumerousattemptstoworkmorecloselywithNGOsinacomplementarymanner.

ARoadmapoftheChaptersAheadThisdissertationisaboutNGOs’impactonfourelementsofstateness:

territoriality,capacity,governanceandlegitimacy.Forsimplicity’ssake,eachelementwillbeaddressedindividually,inturn.ChapterTwoexaminestheinterplaybetweenNGOsandterritory,probingthefactorsthatdeterminehowNGOschoosethelocationsinwhichtheywork.Dotheyworkinplaceswhereneedforassistanceisgreat?Placesthatareconvenientfortheirworkers?Placessuggestedby32Only20ofthese644organizationssuccessfullyappealedtheirderegistration.

28

prominentpoliticiansorotherpoliticalinfluences?Whatdoesthistellusabouttheirimpactonterritoriality?

ChapterThree’sfocusisoncapacity.ItexaminestheimpactofNGOsonserviceprovisioncapacity,lookingattwodistricts’experience.Itshowswhere,inwhatwaysandinwhicharenasstateserviceprovisioncapacityhasexpandedorcontracted.InChapterFour,governanceistheelementofstatenessputunderthemicroscope.Thechapterprobeschangingpatternsofdecision‐makingandNGO‐governmentrelations.

ChaptersFiveandSixinvestigateNGOs’impactsonstatelegitimacy.Theyusetwodifferentoriginalsurveyinstrumentsaswellasin‐depthinterviewstounderstandwhetherpopularsupportforgovernmentchangesinthepresenceofNGOactivity.Finally,ChapterSevenconcludesthework,tyingthefourindependentthreadsbacktogetherinananalysisofhowourunderstandofthestatehaschangedasnon‐stateactorslikeNGOsgainsalienceinmanyoftheworld’sleastdevelopedcountries.

29

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ChapterTwo:WhyDoNGOsGoWhereTheyGo?TerritorialEvidenceattheNationalLevel

“NGOshaveatremendousabilitytoexpandthescopeofthestate’sreach.”(Sandberg1994:13)

IntroductionThischapterasksabouttheplacementofNGOswithinKenya.Itexaminesin

detailhowNGOlocationsaredetermined,andthenprovidesanalysisonhowNGOs’geographicdistributionaffectstheterritorialityofthestate.KnowingthefactorscorrelatingwithNGOplacementwithinacountryallowsustounderstandwhatiscapturedwhenNGOsareusedasanexplanatoryvariable.WhatfactorscorrelatewithNGOimplementationofprogramsontheground?DoNGOs’locationscorrelatewithobjectiveneed‐basedgrounds,likepoverty,illness,lackofeducation,orothersuchmeasuresofrelativedeprivation?Ordoother,less‐altruisticfactorsassociatemorehighlywithNGOplacement,liketheeaseofworkinginaparticularlocationorthenational‐politicalimplicationsofthechoice?AreNGOsthedo‐goodersofpopularimagination,orareNGOcynicscorrect?

OnecanimagineseveralpossiblereasonsforhowNGOsmightselectparticularplacesinwhichtoimplementtheirprograms.Forexample,projectlocationscouldbechosenmoreorlessatrandom–NGOsmightthrowadartatamaptofindavillageortowninwhichtowork.Assumingthisisnotthecase,severalotherplausibleexplanationsexist.Selectionmaybebasedonneed,meaningthatNGOschoosetoworkwherethereisthemostpoverty,illness,lackofeducationornosafedrinkingwater.OrNGOsmightgowherethereareagreatnumberofpeopleinrelativeneed.PerhapstheyusuallyworkwhereanindividualNGOworkerorleaderhasconnections,orwheretheirworkwon’tbeinterferedwithforpoliticalreasons.Alongsimilarlines,it’splausiblethatNGOsareswayedbypowerfulnationalpoliticians,whoinfluencetheNGOstoworkintheirhomeareaeitherbydirectinstruction,orbecausetheycanofferresourcestotheNGOsiftheyarewillingtodoso.Finally,ithasbeensuggestedthatNGOschosetheirlocationbasedontheconditionsorcomfortlevelinthatplacefortheNGOworkersthemselves.

ThegeographicdistributionofNGOswithinacountryalsoallowsustothinkabouttherolenon‐governmentalactorscanplayinstateterritoriality.DoNGOshelporhinderthestateinbroadcastingpowerovertheterritoryitclaims?DoNGOsassistthestateincreatingorganizationalpresenceinremoteareas,byputtingonthegroundactivitiesthatlocalsconsiderasunderstatejurisdiction?Ordotheyclusterincentralorreadilyaccessibleareas,enhancingatendencyofthestatetofadeawayasonemovesoutwardfromthecapital,leavingitsterritorialitypoorlyarticulated?

Casestudiesonthesequestionsarerare,asfewresearchershavehadaccesstocomprehensivecountrywidedataindicatingwhereNGOsimplementtheirprojects.Iwasable,however,togathersufficientinformationbyobtaininga

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completedatabasefromtheGovernmentofKenya’sNGOCoordinationBoard(NGOBoard),theagencyresponsibleforregistering,monitoringandassessingNGOs’workinthecountry.Thisdatabasenotonlylistseachoftheover4200NGOsoperatinginKenyaatthetimeofresearch,butprovidesinformationonwhichareasofthecountrytheywork.Specifically,itlistseachadministrationdistrictinwhicheachNGOsaysthatitworks.Iusethisdata,combinedwithinformationfromothergovernment,internationalandNGOsourcesonKenya,tocorrelatepullfactorswithNGOplacement.Ithenreflectontheirimplications.

ThischapterbeginswithanoverviewofexistingtheoriesofhowNGOschosethelocationsinwhichtheywork.Thisisfollowedbyadiscussionofthedataandmethodsusedintheanalysisofgeographicspreadoforganizations,aswellasdescriptionsforeachexplanatoryvariable.Nextcomedataanalysis,includingsubstantiveinterpretationsofthefindingsandchecksforrobustness.ThechapterprovidesimplicationsforNGOsandpolicymakers,aswellasanalysisofgeographicspreadoforganizationsontheterritorialityofthestate.Finally,itgivessuggestionsforadditionalresearchinthisarea.

ExistingExplanationsofNGOPlacement:SaintlyorSelfCenteredNGOs?Twodifferenthypothesesexistregardingthetypesoffactorsthatcorrelate

withNGOplacement.Thefirst,whichIcallthe“saintlyviewofNGOs,”iswhatmostpeopleprobablyassumethatNGOsfollowindecision‐making–NGOslocatetheirprojectswhererecipientneedisverygreatandalternativemeansofserviceprovisiondonotexistorareinsufficient.ThisviewcorrespondstothemissionstatementsofmostdevelopmentNGOsinKenya,whichpromisesuchthingsas:“toensurethateveryAfricancanenjoytherighttogoodhealthbyhelpingtocreatevibrantnetworksofinformedcommunitiesthatworkwithempoweredhealthcareprovidersinstronghealthsystems”(AMREF2008);or“toprovideequipmentforthedrillingofwaterwellsthatwillprovidecleandrinkingwatertothepeopleofWesternKenyainandneartheCityofKakamega”(WaterforKakamega2008).WhenaskedtheirmotivationsforstartingorworkinginNGOs,individualshavetoldmeexplicitlyandwithoutpromptingthattheirorganizationschooselocationsbasedonneed(2008‐13,2008‐16,2008‐25,2008‐26,2008‐30,2008‐31,2008‐32).33

Needalsocorrespondstothereasonthatmanyhighlyeducatedpeople–bothforeignandKenyan–givefortheirdecisiontoworkforanNGO.NGOworkersingeneralhavetheskillsandabilitiestoearnconsiderablyhigherincomesthroughemploymentintheprivatesector,butchosetoworkinNGOsforhumanitarianoraltruisticreasons.Forexample,oneinternationalNGOworkerinterviewedsaidthatshechosetotakea40%paycuttoworkforanon‐profit,“becauseIreallywantedtogivebackinsomeway…so[my]mainreasonisserviceandmissiondriven”(2008‐3).Anothermid‐levelNGOworkertoldof,“apersonalinteresttoworkonissuesthatIhadanopinionaboutandcaredfor”(2008‐7).Manyotherstoldmetheir

33Areminder:referencesintheformat(XXXX‐XX)representtheauthor’sinterviewsduringfieldresearch.BecauseofconfidentialityrequirementsoftheCommitteefortheProtectionofHumanSubjectsattheUniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley,personalidentifiersarenotused.

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organizationshopedtoreduce“duplicationofefforts”inserviceprovisioninordertoreachagreaternumberofpeople.Anothersaid,“Wedon'tjusttalkaboutthebottomline.Wegetachancetotalkaboutwhywearedoingwhatwearedoing,anddebatewhatistherightthingtodo”(2008‐8).Similarly,aKenyanleadertoldmethatbeforeshestartedherNGO,sheearnedmoremoneysellingmaizeandbeansmealsinashantytown,butshecouldn’tstandbyandwatchsomanychildrenremainuneducated(2007‐26).Likewise,ayoungKenyanleftapayingjobtostartanNGOdesignedtokeepboysinschoolandoutoftroubleinahighlyturbulentNairobislum.Hereliedondonationstomaintaintheorganization(2007‐36).Theseworkersbelievetheorganizationsworkwheretheydoinordertoimprovethelivesofthosewhotrulyneedassistance.

Somerecentresearchconfirmsthesesentiments.Intheinternationalrelationsliteratureonnorms,forexample,TimBütheandhiscolleaguesasked,“Whatexplainstheallocationofprivate‐sourcedevelopmentaidacrossrecipientcountries?”andfoundthatAmericanprivatedevelopmentassistanceisdispensedalongneed‐basedlines,followingidealistic,altruisticandprinciplednormsofservingunderdevelopedandneglectedpopulations(Bütheetal.2008,2).ItisnotallocatedprimarilytoprolongthesurvivalofNGOsortheemploymentofpersonnel.Bütheetal.pointout:

“Difficultworkunderoftenunpleasantconditionsforquitelowsalariesleadstoself‐selectionamongtheoftenhighlyeducatedNGOstaff,sothatthosewhomakeacareerindevelopmentNGOstendtobestronglymotivatedbyacommitmenttoindeedfeedthehungry,treatthoseinpoorhealth,educatetheilliterate,andtodosoinwaysthatcreateconditionsforlong‐termimprovementsinaidrecipients'qualityoflife”(ibid.4).Shouldthis“saintly”viewofNGOsbetrue,weshouldexpecttoseeanumber

ofspecificfactorsstronglycorrelatedwithhighlevelsofNGOactivity.DistrictswithhighpovertyandlowhumandevelopmentshouldtendtohavemoreNGOs,allelsebeingequal.Similarly,poorhealth,education,sanitationandeconomicindicatorsshouldcorrespondtohigherNGOpenetration.HighpopulationorpopulationdensitiesmightalsobeassociatedwithNGOs,sincethiswouldallowNGOstodogoodforthegreatestnumberofpeople.

Thesecondcategory,the“cynicalviewofNGOs,”ismoreoftenheldbypolicy‐makers,embitteredNGOworkers,donorcountryrepresentatives,politicians,andcriticalacademics.Cynicalviewscanfallintotwosub‐categories:politicaltheoriesandconveniencetheories.ThesebothsuggestthatNGOsprovideservicesnotwheretheyarenecessarilyneededthemost,butwherethereareinstrumentalreasonstoprovidethem.

Inthecaseofpoliticaltheories,cynicstellseveralrelatedstories.First,somesuggestthatNGOsaremostplentifulinareaswherepowerfulnationalpoliticianshailfrom,sinceAfricanpoliticiansareknowntousetheiraccesstothenationalcaketofeedtheirhomeareas(Ekeh1975,Jackson&Rosberg1984,Joseph1987,Bayart1993,vandeWalle2001).NGOshaveplayedaroleinthisdistributionofbenefitseversincedonorsbegantofocusoncorruption:nationalresourcescanbefunneledthroughpolitician‐initiatedNGOstosanitizethem(Bratton1989,Fowler1991).

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AvariantofthisholdsthatNGOsaremoreprevalentindistrictswhereelectedpoliticiansaremostpopular–oratleastrepeatedlyreelected–sinceinapatronage‐basedpoliticalsystem,apoliticianwillbepopularonlyifs/hedelivers,andNGOsassistwithdelivery.Areasdisplayingloyaltytothenationalgovernmentarethereforerewardedbyit(Barkanetal.2003)viathesteeringofNGOstothoseareas.InKenya,thiswassaidtobetruethroughouttheMoiadministration,duringwhichtimethesaying“siasambaya,maishambaya”(badpolitics,badlife)waspopular,meaningthatareaswith“bad”politicalaffiliationswouldnotreceivestate‐basedfunds(2008‐58).

AsimilaraccountholdsthatNGOsoftendonotchoosetheirownlocations,butaretoldwheretolocateprojectseitherexplicitlyorbyimplicationbypowerfulpoliticiansandadministratorsatthenationalgovernmentlevel–peopleattheMinistriesofHealth,Education,Planning,etc.Thesepoliticaltheoriesleadtoasetoftestablehypotheses.Iftrue,weshouldseethatdistrictsfromwhichverypowerfulpoliticianshailhavemoreNGOsthantheirlessfortunatecounterparts.WeshouldalsoexpectthatdistrictswithlowelectoralturnoverhavehighernumbersofNGOsthanthosedistrictswithhighturnover,allelseequal.Sincepoliticiansareoftenreelectedwhentheybringgoodsandservicestotheirconstituency,andNGOsareequatedwiththesegoods,politicianswhocansuccessfullyclaimcreditforbringingNGOstotheirdistrictaremorelikelytobereelected.Finally,districtsthatshowstrongallegiancetothenationalgovernmentshouldhavemoreNGOsthanthosethatdonot.

LikepoliticaltheoriesofNGOplacement,conveniencetheoriesholdthatNGOschoosetheirlocationfortheinstrumentalbenefitoftheNGOworkersortheNGOasanorganization.Forexample,proponentsofthistheorybelievethatNGOprevalenceiscorrelatedwitheaseofaccesstoalocation.Sincetherearesomanypeopleinneedindevelopingcountries,choosingtohelptheonesthatarerelativelyeasytoreachmightseemreasonabletoNGOdecision‐makers.Whypicksomeoneinneedwhoisverydifficulttogettowhenthereisanotherpersoninneedrightalonganicelypavedroad?Thesetheoristsalsobelievethatjustasdevelopingcountrygovernmentofficialsoftenconsiderit“punishment”tobesenttoremotelocationswithpoorlivingqualityandlimitedaccesstoelitegoods(McSherry&Brass2007),itisdifficulttofindhighqualityNGOworkers–particularlywell‐educatedlocalelites–eagertoliveinsuchareas.Indeed,inmyownexperience,Ihaveknownvastlyunder‐qualifiedindividuals(bytheirownadmissions)tobeconsideredforhigh‐levelpositionsinsuchlocationsforlackofalternativecandidates(2006‐9).Onarelatednote,somearguethatNGOschooselocationstoworkbasedonwhereindividualmembersoftheorganizationhaveconnections–bothprofessionallyandpersonally,includingfamilyconnections.InAfrica,thisnotonlyhelpstheseworkersdeveloptheircommunitystatusas“patrons”(Kaler&Watkins2001),italsoallowsthemtospendtimewithpeopletheycareabout.

Aswithindividualworkers,NGOsasorganizationsmayalsochoosetoworkwheremembersoftheirorganizationalnetworkorfieldworksalready,suchasinaplacewhereanorganizationwithwhichtheyhavesuccessfullycollaboratedinthepastalreadyhasaproject.Thuswemightexpecttoseeasnowballingoflike‐missionedorganizationsinonegeneralarea.

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Ontheorganizationallevel,manypeoplehavearguedorimpliedthatNGOschooseprojectsbasedprimarilyonthesurvivalimperativeoftheorganizationitself–andlessontheneedsofthepeopletheyclaimtohelp(Hancock1989,deWaal1997,Butheetal.2008).Intheorganizationtheoryliterature,thisisaddressedbytheoristswhoclaimthatmanyorganizationslosesightoftheirinitialgoalsinordertosurvive.“Natural”systemstheoriesofresourcedependence,forexample,wouldpointoutthatNGOsaredependentontheirexternaldonorsfortheirsurvival.Forthisreason,anorganizationmaychoosetolocateaprojectinanareathatisimportanttothedonor;thatishighlyvisibleinthenewsandthereforelikelytoreceivefundingfromthepopulacegenerally;orthatis“hot”inthedevelopmentfield.Eachofthesecouldhelptoensuretheorganization’ssurvivalthroughsuccessinaccumulatingresourcesneededforcontinuation.

IfitistruethatNGOschoosetheirlocationbasedontheseconvenienceandlivabilityfactors,thencertaincorrelationsshouldhold.First,NGOsshouldbemoreprevalentinplacesthatareeasytogettoandwheretheycanaccessahighdensityofpeople.Allelsebeingequal,thismeansthatonecouldexpecttofindNGOsalongmajorhighways,nearwell‐traffickedairports,inareaswithwell‐pavedroadsandinlargercities.Second,NGOsshouldbemorecommoninareaswherethereisincreasedaccessto“elitegoods,”suchasrestaurants,entertainment,importedorprocessedfoodstuffs,resortsandhighqualityhealthcareandeducationforworkers’families.Third,weshouldseeacorrelationbetweenanystatedinterestsofmajordonorcountriesandNGOlocation–althoughthismightbemoreobviousbetweencountriesthanwithinthem.Finally,overtime,wewouldexpecttoseeasnowballingofNGOsinotherwiseinexplicablelocations.Forexample,inthetownofBusiainWesternKenyathereisasizablecommunityofacademicworkersthathaslargelyformedviathesnowballmethod.NGOsmightprovetodothesamething.

Data&MethodsIestimatealinearregressiontoassessthecompetingclaimsmadeabout

whereNGOschoosetolocate.ThedependentvariableinthisanalysisisthenumberofNGOsineachadministrativedistrictofKenya.ToclarifyforthereaderunfamiliarwithKenya,adistrictisthethird‐leveladministrativeunit:itisbelowthenationalandprovinciallevels,andabovethedivision,locationandsub‐locationlevel(seemaplaterinthischapter).Thedistrictisanadministrative,notapoliticalunit,thoughitusuallyoverlapswithseveralsub‐nationalpoliticalunitscalledconstituencies,andlocalpoliticalunits,counties.EachconstituencyvotesforitsownMemberofParliament(MP),meaningthatmostdistrictsareservedbyseveralMPs,whogenerallyarethehighestpoliticalofficialsinthedistrict,unlessthedistrictisfortunateenoughtoclaimaMinisterorAssistantMinister.ThenumberofdistrictsinKenyahasgrownsinceindependence,whentherewere40districts;atthetimeresearchtherewere72,althoughcomprehensivedatawasonlyavailablefor70.34

34Therearenowanadditional72districts,createdinlate2007foratotalof144districts.Asofmid‐2009,theyhadyettobecomefullyindependentfromtheirparentdistricts.Incomparison,thereare

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IusedatacollectedbytheGovernmentofKenya’sNGOCoordinationBoard(NGOBoard),thegovernmentagencyresponsibleforregisteringandmonitoringNGOs’workinthecountry.Thisdatabaselistsover4200NGOsactiveinthecountryatthetimeofresearch,including:alltheNGOsregisteredinKenyabetween1991,whentheNGOBoardwascreated,andDecember2006,duringinitialfieldwork;plusabout50NGOsregisteredbetween1953and1991thatwereenteredinthedatabaseuponitscreation;minusallNGOsstrickenfromtherecordovertheyearsforvariousreasons.Forexample,304and340NGOsin2002and2003respectivelywerestruckfromtheregisterforfailingtoadequatelyfilerequiredpaperwork,only20ofwhichweresuccessfullyabletoappeal(NationalCouncilofNGOswebsite,accessed2006).BasedonthenumberingsystemoftheNGOBoard,itappearsthat2164NGOshavebeenstruckfromtheregistersinceitscreation–thereareorganizationsnumberedto6375,butonly4211records.

TheNGOBoarddatabasecontainsaplethoraofinformation.BasicdatasuchastheNGO’sname,postalandphysicaladdress,contactinformation,andregistrationdateexistalongsidemoreinterestinginformationliketheorganizationalobjectives,dateoflastreturn,missionstatement,origins,amounts,andspendingpatternsoforganizationalresources,and–mostcrucialforthispaper–thegeographicallocationsinwhicheachNGOworks.

Acaveat:whilethisdatabaseisremarkablycomplete,thereareseveralfactorssuggestingthatthedataisnotflawless.Forexample,financialinformationisremarkablyincomplete.Moreover,someNGOshavenotsubmittedrequiredannualreportsconsistently,makingitunclearwhethertheorganizationstilloperatesgenerally,andinthelocationlistedspecifically.SincetheNGOCoordinationBoarddoesnothaveadequatestafftofollowupwitheachoftheseorganizations,manyofthemareleftinthedatabaseinyearsthatreportsarenotsubmitted,givingtheorganizationthebenefitofthedoubt–it,too,islikelylackinginadministrativeresources.Yetasalreadymentioned,theNGOBoardhasstruckmanyorganizationsfromtheregisterovertheyears,suggestingthatthereisastrongattemptatmaintenanceofthedatabase.

Anequallyproblematicelementinthedatabaseisthatitreliesonself‐reportedlocationinformationfromtheNGOs.ThismeansthatthedatabaseliststhedistrictswhereeachNGOsaysitworks–notwheretheorganizationcanactuallybeshowntoworknoworinthepast.BecauseagoodnumberofNGOsnevergetofftheground,ortheirstrategychangesbetweenregistrationandimplementation,itisnotalwaysclearthattheyhaveoreverhadapresenceintheplaceslistedinthedatabase.Itisalsounclearwhetherthelocationinformationisupdatedeachtimeanannualreportissubmitted,orwhetheritisenteredonlyatthetimeofinitialregistration,andneverupdated.

Nevertheless,Iusethedata.Thisdatacanbeuseddespitethesepotentialerrorssince:itisfarandawaythemostcomprehensivedatasetavailableforthecountry;itisthedatathattheKenyangovernmentusestodetermineitsNGO‐

210politicalconstituenciesandMPs.Until2007,therewerebetween2and8constituenciesineachdistrict.

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relatedpolicies;itisupdatedaswellaspossiblegiventheBoard’scapacity,35withinactiveNGOsremovedeachyear;anditholdsuptotestsofrobustnesswhencomparedwithalternatedatasets.Specifically,resultsarerobustagainstthoseoftheDirectoryofNGOsinKenya(2005),fromthenon‐profitorganizationresponsibleforcoordinatingallNGOsinKenya,theNGOCouncil.WhiletheabsolutenumberofNGOsisnotconsistentbetweenthetwoorganizations,thegeographicdistributionofNGOsishighlycorrelated,at.9478.Moreover,thereisnoreasontobelievethaterrorswereplacedthereintentionallyorsystematically.Thus,whiletherearemostcertainlyerrors–asthereareforallstatistics,especiallythosefromdevelopingcountries–thereisnoreasonthattheerrorsarebiasedinasystematicway.

TableOne:DescriptiveStatistics

Variable Obs Mean StdDev Min Max

NumberofNGOs 70 250 42.5 204 534

HIVRate 70 5.7 4.6 0 24.4

AdultIlliteracy 70 33.9 15.1 11.1 82.6

LackWater 70 48.1 17.9 6.1 96

LackHealthcare 70 65.6 13.8 31 94

PopulationDensity 70 280.3 492.8 0 2994

PavedRoadDensity 70 127.4 389.2 0 2867

DistancefromNairobi 70 343.7 190.2 0 1039

%Urban 65 13.6 17.6 1.2 100

Ave#ofMPs 70 2.1 0.41 1 3

1997MoiVote 70 50.0 31.2 3.3 99.2

InadditiontotheNGOBoarddatabase,Icollectedawidevarietyof

informationduringfieldresearchbetween2005and2008thatservesasproxiesformyexplanatoryvariables(seetableone).TheseproxiescomefromGovernmentofKenyacensesfrom1989and1999,UNDPHumanDevelopmentReportsforKenya,andsevendifferentKenyangovernmentagenciesorministries.Idividetheseindependentvariablesintothreecategories,relatingtothetheoriesdetailedabove:needfactors,politicalfactors,andconveniencefactors.

Needfactorproxiesincludemeasureslike:thepercentageofthepopulationwithoutaccesstodrinkingwaterorhealthcare,HIVlevels,oradultilliteracyrates.36If35NGOBoardworkers,relativetootherKenyangovernmentagencies,wereprofessional,interestedintheirwork,andwillingtoassistme.Employeesrecognizedtheirresourcescarcityanddidnotattempttohidelimitationsintheirwork.36Idonotuseaproxyfor“poverty,”asmanypovertyindicators,suchasthatusedintheUNHumanDevelopmentReports,arecompositeindices.Ichoosetoteaseoutindividualfactorsforgreaterprecision.IdonotincludeGDPpercapita,asGDPisbothhighlycorrelatedwithseveralother

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relativeneedforassistancecorrelateswithNGOplacement,weshouldseeasignificantpositivecoefficientforlackofaccesstodrinkingwaterandhealthcare,highHIVprevalenceandilliteracy.Theserepresenttheneedforinfrastructure,healthcare,assistancefightingHIVandeducation.37

AsproxiesforpoliticalfactorsinNGOs’decisions,Ifirstcompileddataondistrict‐levelallegiancetothenationalgovernmentusingelectoraldatafromthepresidentialelectionsof1997,inwhichahighlyunpopularDanielarapMoisqueakedthroughthevote,retainingthepresidencyafternineteenyearsinoffice.Aggregatingconstituency‐levelvotingdataintodistrict‐wideaverageelectoralsupportforMoideterminesaparticulardistricts’allegiancetothenationalgovernmentinthelate1990s.Accordingtothedominantneo‐patrimonialismtheoriesofAfricanpolitics,onewouldexpectthatthemoreadistrictsupportsMoi,themoreitisrewardedwithNGOsbythismost‐powerfulpatron.Shouldpoliticsbeamajorfactorintheirlocationdecisions,supportforMoiinthe1997electionsshouldhaveasignificantpositivecoefficient.38

Asanalternatepoliticalvariable,Icalculatedtheaverageamountofelectoralturnoverinadistrict.Thismeasuresthepowerofpatronageatthelocalratherthannationallevel;MPswhodonotbringgoodsandservicesarenotreelected.SincepoliticsinKenyaishighlypersonalizedwithelectoralcompetitionbasedonthecandidate’sindividualcharacteristicsandnotpartyplatforms(Oyugietal.2003),thisisameasurenotofpartyturnover,butofchangesintheindividualservingasMPinaconstituency.ThisvariableisderivedbydeterminingthenumberofelectoralMPturnoversineachconstituencyineachdistrict,andthenaveragingthenumberforallconstituenciesinthatdistrict.Sincetherewerethreeelectionsinthisperiod,thisvariablerangesfrom1,whichmeansasinglepersonservedasMPineachconstituencyinthedistrict(i.e.therewasnoturnoverinanyconstituency),to3,meaningthat3differentindividualsservedasMPineachconstituency(i.e.turnoverineveryconstituencyineveryelection).ThisvariableiscalledElectoralTurnoverofMPs,andIexpecttoseeasignificantandnegativecoefficientonthisvariable,allelseheldconstant.39

Finally,tomeasureNGOconveniencefactors,40Icollectedinformationonthepopulationdensityofthedistrict,undertheassumptionthatNGOswillgowhere

measuresincludedinthemodels(suchasurbanization,populationdensityandroaddensity)andcanbemisleadinginplaceswithhighincomedisparity.37ThemeasuresofneedlargelycorrespondwiththeprimaryareaofinvolvementfortheoverwhelmingmajorityofNGOsinKenya.Infourrepresentativesampledistricts(Machakos,Mbeere,TaitaTavetaandSiaya)forwhichIanalyzedtheNGOfocusarea,thedistributionofNGOswasvirtuallyidentical.SeeAppendixEforpiecharts.38Asanalternatemeasure,Icalculateddistrict‐levelsupportforKibakiinthe2002elections.VoteshareforMoiin1997andKibakiin2002werehighlycorrelatedwithoneanother,soIrelyonlyon1997voteshareforMoi.39Giventhelackofstatisticallysignificantcorrelationforthetwopoliticalvariables,I’mnotconvincedit’sworthdevisingameasureofpowerfulpoliticianscomingfromparticulardistricts.40Ithasbeensuggestedthattheproportionofstudentsattendingsecondaryschoolinadistrictwouldalsobeagoodmeasureforconvenience,asitindicateswhetherthereisapoolofeducatedpeoplefromwhichtodrawNGOpersonnel.Becauseofthenationalcentralizednatureoftheschool

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theycanaccesslargenumbersofpeoplefromasingleoffice.Ialsocomputedthedistanceofeachdistrict’sadministrativeheadquarterfromthecapitalcity,Nairobi,aswellasthedensityofthedistrict’sroadnetwork.Dataforthesecomputationscamefromthegovernment’sKenyaRoadsBoard.SincemanyofthelargestdistrictsinKenyahavetheleastinfrastructure,measuringroaddensityprovidesamagnifiedresultforeaseofaccess.IfNGOschoselocationbasedoneaseofaccess,weshouldseeapositiveandsignificantcoefficientonthepavedroadsvariables,andanegativecoefficientonthedistrict’sdistancefromNairobi.

AsameasureofphysicalcomfortandqualityoflifeforNGOworkers,Iexaminetheurbanizationlevelofthedistrict,sinceurbanareashavesignificantlyhigherlevelsofelitegoodsthantheirruralcounterparts.Theurbanizationvariableistheratiooftheurbanpopulationofthedistricttotheentirepopulation,basedonthe1999census.IfNGOschosetheiroperatinglocationsbasedonemployees’convenience,weshouldseeapositiveandsignificantcoefficientonthisvariable.41

AnalysisofNGOPlacementWiththisdata,Iamabletodeterminewhichfactorscorrelatewiththe

distributionofNGOsinKenyaatthedistrictlevel,allelsebeingequal.Ibeginwithabasicmodel(Model1inTableTwo),inwhichIincludeseveralfactorsthatrepresenteachhypothesis,andconcludebyshowingthatseveralneedandconveniencevariables–lackofaccesstohealthcare,highHIVrates,highpopulationdensityandcloseproximitytothecapital,Nairobi–areconsistentlysignificantcorrelateswithNGOplacementinKenya(Model5),whilepoliticalfactorshavenoclearrelationshiptoNGOplacement.

MostNGOsclaimtolocatebasedonobjectiveneed.Tocoveravarietyoftypesofneed,Iincludemeasuresforeducation,infrastructureandhealthcaregenerally,representedbyadultilliteracy,lackofaccesstocleandrinkingwaterandlackofaccesstohealthcare.Interestingly,twooftheseindependentmeasuresofneedhaveverylittleimpactonthemodel.Thefirst,adultilliteracyisneverstatisticallysignificant(p‐valuesof.279,.313,.897and.799inModel1,2,3and4).Moreover,thecoefficientsonthestatisticallysignificantvariablesbarelychangewhenitisdiscardinModel5.WhileIdonotincludeallmodelsattemptedhere,Ineverfoundadultilliteracytobestatisticallysignificant–itssignificanceonlydecreasedasIaddedothermeasures.Asanalternatemeasure,Iusedprimaryschoolenrollmentratesinthemodelintheplaceofadultilliteracy.IusetheUNDP’sHumanDevelopmentReportforKenya(2006),whichestimatestheschool‐agepopulationfromthe1999censusrelativetotheenrollmentfigures.42Thismeasurewasalwaysinsignificant.systeminKenya,however,studentsoftenattendsecondaryschooloutsideoftheirhomedistrict.Moreover,NGOsareoftenabletohireuniversitygraduates.41QualitativeevidencegainedthroughinterviewssuggeststhatNGOleadersandworkersavoidduplicationofeffortsinaparticularvillage,Sub‐LocationorLocation(2008‐14,2008‐18,2008‐37).42Enrollmentratesover100%arenotanerror:theintroductionofuniversalfreeprimaryeducationinKenyain2002broughtalargenumberofadultsbacktoschool,andchildrenolderthanthecohortageoftenattendschoolinKenya.

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TableTwo:NumberofNGOsaccordingtoNGOBoard Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5NeedFactors AdultIlliteracyRate 0.404 0.365 0.036 0.083 [0.370] [0.358] [0.275] [0.325] Percentw/oaccesstocleanwater ‐0.256 ‐0.318 0.006 ‐0.118 [0.293] [0.284] [0.195] [0.226] Percentw/oaccesstohealthcare 0.24 0.041 0.479* 0.697** 0.743** [0.369] [0.368] [0.276] [0.337] [0.310]HIVPrevalence 2.299** 1.849** 1.906* 1.675** [1.040] [0.822] [0.971] [0.803] ConvenienceFactors HQDistancefromNairobi ‐0.052** ‐0.063** ‐0.034 ‐0.057** ‐0.054** [0.026] [0.026] [0.021] [0.024] [0.021]Urbanizationpercentage 1.552*** 1.405*** [0.271] [0.271] Kmofpavedroadsper 0.082*** 1000km2ofarea [0.009] PopulationDensity 0.056*** 0.058*** [0.009] [0.008] PoliticalFactors Ave#ofMPsperconstituency 4.848 2.891 ‐3.252 ‐3.185 in92‐02elections [10.423] [10.124] [7.808] [9.151] PercentagevoteforMoi–1997 ‐28.184 ‐6.664 ‐0.071 1.633 [18.174] [20.100] [15.888] [18.582] Constant 235.194*** 237.885*** 214.641*** 205.905*** 194.017*** [37.014] [35.834] [27.514] [33.794] [19.383]Observations 65 65 70 70 70R‐squared 0.49 0.53 0.67 0.55 0.55Standarderrorsinbrackets Note:AlltablesdepictOLSestimateswithHuber‐Whiterobuststandarderrorsinbracketswhere*p<0.1;**p<0.05and***p<0.01,two‐tailedtests.IusedStata10.0toderiveallestimates.

Likeadultilliteracy,thesecondadditionalmeasureofneed,thepercentofpeopleinadistrictwithoutaccesstocleandrinkingwater,whichmeasuresbothabsolutepovertyandneedforinfrastructure,isnotsignificantlycorrelatedwithNGOpresence.Additionally,ithadacoefficientwiththe“wrong”sign:thetheoryimpliesthatthepercentageofpeoplewithoutsafewaterandthenumberNGOsinadistrictshouldmoveintandem,yettheresultsinTableTwoindicatethatasthelackofcleanwatergoesup,thenumberofNGOsinthatarea,allelseheldconstant,goesdown.Thisvariabledoesnothavealargeimpactonthecoefficientsofothersignificantvariablesortheoverallfitlevelofthemodel.

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Thelastmeasureofneedinthesemodelsisthepercentofpeoplewithoutaccesstohealthcareinadistrict.Whilethisdoesnotinitiallyappeartobesignificant,whenthemodelisrefined,itbecomessignificant(p‐valueof.088,.043and.019inmodels3,4and5),withapositivecoefficient,allelseheldconstant.

IaddHIVratestomyindicatorsofneedsinceIwastoldfrequentlyduringfieldresearchthatahighproportionofNGOsworktofightKenya’sAIDSepidemic.HIVratesinthecountrywerethoughttobearound14%intheearly2000s,although,asinmanycountriesoftheworld,estimateshavebeenloweredtoaround6%,largelyduetoimprovedmeasurementtools(WorldBank2008).WhileHIVratemayseemtomeasurethesamethingaslackofaccesstohealthcare(sincetheybothpertaintoillness),infactthetwoarecorrelatedatanextremelylowlevel(.01).Thus,Iincludethembothinthemodel.AsseeninTable2,theestimatedcoefficientforHIVprevalenceispositiveandsignificant,ashypothesized.Needfactors–particularlythosepertainingtoavailabilityofsocialservicesandtheHIVepidemic–mightthereforebeexplanatoryfactorsindeterminingNGOplacement.

Likesomeoftheneedfactors,conveniencefactorshaveahighlysignificantcorrelationwithNGOplacementinKenya.Totestthem,ImeasurethedistrictheadquarterdistancefromNairobi.Onaverage,thefartheronegetsfromthecapital,thelesswellmaintainedtheroadsare–makingtraveltoremotelocationsmorephysicallyuncomfortableandthelikelihoodoffindingelitegoodsonarrivallower.Forthemostpart,throughoutthemodels,thisvariableisstronglysignificantwithconsistentsubstantivemeaning.

Becausemanyofmyconveniencemeasuresarefairlyhighlycorrelatedwithoneanother(exceptdistrictheadquarters’distancefromNairobi)andallrepresentaccesstoahighnumberofpeople,IalternatethesemeasuresthroughoutthemodelstoconfirmthatconveniencefactorsdohighlycorrelatewithNGOplacement.43Thus,inModels1and2,Iincludeanurbanizationmeasure,whichishighlysignificant(p‐valueof.000inbothmodels).InModel3,Iexchangeurbanizationforthedensityofpavedroadsinthearea.Mycoefficientontheroaddensityvariableishighlystatisticallysignificant(p‐valueof.000)andhasthesignpredictedbytheconveniencetheory.Itsuggeststhatastheroaddensityinadistrictincreases,thenumberofNGOsinthedistrictincreases,allelsebeingequal.BecauseIbelievepopulationlevelsanddensitiestobetheclearestpull‐factorforeaseofaccessbyNGOs,Iincludeameasureofpopulationdensityinthefinalmodels.Liketheotherconveniencemeasures,populationdensityisstronglysignificantandpositive(p‐valueremaining.000inbothmodels).Idiscussthesubstantivemeaningofthisfindingbelow.

Finally,Iincludemeasurestotestthepolitics‐basedexplanationsofNGOpresenceinKenyandistricts.Thesearenotstatisticallysignificantinanymodel.Iuse1997voteshareforMoiasaproxyforpoliticalinfluenceonlocationchoiceof

43Sincetheabsolutelevelanddensityofpeopleandroadstendtobestronglycorrelated,roadnetworkdensityalsoservesasaconveniencemeasure.Populationlevelsandthekmofpavedroadsinadistrictarecorrelatedat.8447;Populationandroaddensityat.6923,Populationdensityandroaddensityat.9193.

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NGOs.AhighlevelofsupportforMoiinthe1997electionssuggestsloyaltytoMoiasapatronabletobringdevelopmentsupporttothedistrict.

BecausepoliticsinKenyaislargelybasedonpatron‐clientties,however,itislikelythatsupportformorelocalpoliticianshasagreaterimpactonNGOplacementinadistrictthansupportforthepresident.Forexample,thepatronagerelationshipbetweenanMPandhis/herconstituencyismoredirectthanthatbetweenadistrictandtheleaderoftheentirenation.ForthisreasonIincludeameasureofMPturnover,whichfindsthemeannumberofMPsinthedistrictinfrom1992‐2002.Remarkably,neithervariablehasasignificantimpactontheregressioncoefficients;whenremovedfromtheequationinModel5,theychangeneithercoefficients,norsignificancelevels,northefitofthemodelinameaningfulway.Extrapolating,politicalpressuresdonotappeartobehowNGOschosetheirprojectlocationsinKenya.

InTableThree,IsummarizethesubstantivemeaningofeachcoefficientinModel4inordertoshowthepredictedeffectofeachvariable.Thefirstcolumnremindsusofthevariable’scoefficientinthemodel;thesecondshowstherealmeaningofonestandarddeviationchange.ThelastcolumnontherightshowstheimpactofthisonestandarddeviationincreaseonthenumberofNGOsinadistrict,allelsebeingequal.TableThree:SubstantiveMeaningofModel4

VariableModel4Coefficient

OneStandardDeviation

intheVariable

ImpactontheNumberofNGOsinadistrict

(roundedtothenearestwholenumber)

AdultIlliteracyRate 0.083 15.1% +1HIVPrevalence 1.906* 4.6% +9***Percentw/oaccesstocleanwater ‐0.118 17.9% ‐2Percentw/oaccesstohealthcare 0.697** 13.8% +10**HQDistancefromNairobi ‐0.057** 190.2km ‐11**PopulationDensity 0.056*** 493people/km +28***Ave#ofMPsperconstituency ‐3.185 0.41MPs +1

Inmeaningfulterms,thedatasuggeststhatbothneedandconvenienceplayaroleindeterminingNGOlocation.Forexample,foreachstandarddeviation(13.8%)increaseinthepercentageofpeoplewithoutaccesstohealthcare,wefindapproximately10moreNGOsinadistrict.Likewise,theestimatedcoefficientsfortheHIVvariablesuggeststhatforeachstandarddeviationincreaseinHIVprevalenceinadistrict–orabout4.6%increaseinprevalence–wefindanincreaseofapproximately9NGOsinadistrict.Statedanotherway,aswemovefromadistrictwiththemedianHIVprevalenceinthecountry(4.05%HIVprevalence)tooneatthe75thpercentileHIVrate(6.7%),wefindanincreaseofapproximately5NGOs,allelsebeingequal.Inrealterms,thisisequaltoaboutaquarterofonestandarddeviationinNGOnumber.

Similarly,whilelesssignificantthanHIVprevalence,theestimatedcoefficientformyconveniencemeasure,HQdistancefromNairobi,impliesthatforeach

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standarddeviationincreaseinthedistanceofadistrict’sheadquartersfromNairobi,wefindapproximately11fewerNGOs,allelsebeingequal.Thismeansthatbeinglocatedonly190km(114miles)awayfromNairobiresultsinadistricthavingalmostadozenfewerNGOsthanaverage.Ifindthatholdingallelseconstant,aonestandarddeviationincreaseinthepopulationdensityofadistrict(493peoplepersquarekm)leadstoanincreaseinthenumberofNGOsforthatdistrictof28.Statedanotherway,aswemovedfromadistrictwiththemedianlevelofpopulationdensity(164people/km2)toadistrictatthe75thpercentile(323people/km2),wefindanincreaseof9NGOsinthedistrict.

TestsofRobustnessUsinganalternatemeasureofNGOs,datafromtheNationalCouncilofNGOs,

itselfanumbrellaNGOresponsibleforcoordinatingNGOactivities,Ifindthatthemajorresultshold,asshowninTableFour.WhileHIVprevalenceisnolongersignificant,theotherkeyindicatorofneedthatwassignificantusingthefirstdatabase,lackofaccesstohealthcare,remainsstronglysignificant.Likewise,bothofthemeasuresofconveniencethatweresignificantusingthefirstdatabaseremainso.Mostimportantly,thereisnoindicationthatthepoliticalhypothesisneedstobereconsideredwhenthisnewdataisemployed.TableFour:RobustnessTestUsingNationalCouncilofNGOsData Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5NeedFactors AdultIlliteracyRate 1.139* 1.103* 0.367 0.41 [0.634] [0.634] [0.457] [0.619] Percentw/oaccesstocleanwater ‐0.428 ‐0.477 0.071 ‐0.265 [0.502] [0.504] [0.323] [0.432] Percentw/oaccesstohealthcare 0.349 0.186 1.058** 1.403** 1.496** [0.631] [0.650] [0.458] [0.641] [0.594]HIVPrevalence 1.906 1 1.377 0.781 [1.839] [1.363] [1.850] [1.540] ConvenienceFactors HQDistancefromNairobi ‐0.152*** ‐0.161*** ‐0.097*** ‐0.146*** ‐0.137*** [0.044] [0.045] [0.034] [0.046] [0.041]Urbanizationpercentage 3.268*** 3.149*** [0.465] [0.478] Kmofpavedroadsper 0.172*** 1000km2ofarea [0.016] PopulationDensity 0.109*** 0.112*** [0.017] [0.015] PoliticalFactors Ave#ofMPsperconstituency 2.191 0.603 ‐10.726 ‐11.589 in92‐02elections [17.817] [17.871] [12.928] [17.412] PercentagevoteforMoi‐1997 ‐37.981 ‐19.989 ‐5.834 ‐1.437 [31.157] [35.652] [26.426] [35.513]

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Constant 47.979 49.766 10.754 8.16 ‐22.517 [63.650] [63.632] [45.811] [64.686] [37.467]Observations 64 64 69 69 69R‐squared 0.59 0.6 0.75 0.55 0.54Standarderrorsinbrackets Note:AlltablesdepictOLSestimateswithHuber‐Whiterobuststandarderrorsinbracketswhere*p<0.1;**p<0.05and***p<0.01,two‐tailedtests.IusedStata10.0toderiveallestimates.

ConclusionsPragmaticSaintsinKenya

Inthispaper,IhaveprovidedpreliminaryevidenceofthefactorsinfluencingNGOstochoosetheirlocationwithinacountrybycorrelatingNGOlocationacrossthedistrictsofKenyawithneed,convenienceandpoliticalvariables.Extrapolatingfromthefindingsofarangeofmodels,NGOsinKenyaappeartopickdistrictsinwhichtoworkfortworeasons:first,theygowheretheyareneeded,largelytofighthealth‐relatedissues,andwhereserviceprovisioninfrastructureislacking.Thisisnotentirelysurprising,consideringthattheMinistryofHealthhasshownitselftobewillingtocollaboratewithNGOs,andisrequiredtobylarge‐scaledonorssuchastheGlobalFundtoFightAIDSTuberculosisandMalaria.Second,theylocatetheirprojectswhereit’sconvenient–wheretheroadnetworkisgoodandwherethereisaccesstoahighdensityofpeopleandtoelitegoods. Thissecondconclusiondeservespause.WemightchideNGOsforlocatingtheirprojectsinplaceswhereelitegoodsareavailableandthejourneytoarriveonsiteisnotbackbreaking(asitcanbeinKenya,whereevenmajorhighwayscanhave“potholes”impassibletoallbutfour‐wheel‐drivevehicles,progressinggingerlythroughthepock‐marked“pavement”atspeedsunder10km/hoursoasnottoloseanaxleortire).Yet,anequallyplausibleexplanationshouldbeconsidered:NGOsmaystrategicallyplacetheirprojectsinareaswithhighpopulationdensity,highroadnetworkdensity,andaccesstogoodsandresourcessothattheycanpositivelyaffectthegreatestnumberofpeoplewiththeirorganization.

TheplacementofNGOsnearelitegoodsmayalsoindicatethatNGOworkersarenotallasceticaltruists;atthesametime,itislikelythathavingevenminimalconveniencegoodsdrawsahigherqualityofworkertotheNGOfieldlocation.JustastheWorldBankandother“elite”developmentorganizationsarguethattheyneedtopaytop‐dollarsalariesinordertoattractthemostpromisingcandidatesfromfirst‐rankuniversities(butstillpaylessthancomparablejobsintheprivatesector),NGOsmayneedtoprovidesomelevelofphysicalcomforttotheirworkersinordertoenticethemintothefield.Forthisreason,itisplausiblethatneedfactorsaretheprimarymotivationforNGOplacement,butthatrealisticconsiderationsofhowtoachievethegreatestimpactwiththehighestqualityworkersalsoplayalargerole.AsoneNGOleaderinMachakos(70kmfromNairobi)reported,theorganization,whichregisteredin1996,choseMachakosduringanexpansionbothbecausepovertylevels,HIV/AIDSalongtheMombasaRoad(theroadfromNairobitotheportatMombasa),andunemployedyouthrateswerehigh,butalsobecause

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“Machakosisnottoofar…itseasytocoordinatewith[ourofficesin]Nairobi”(2008‐32). Thisconclusionisconsistentwithorganizationtheoryliteratureongoaldisplacement,inwhichthemeansusedtoachieveagoalinadvertentlybecomemoreimportantthanthegoalitself,oradditionalgoalsareadopted.Inthiscase,theinitialgoal(drawnfromneedfactors)appearstoberetained,buttheseother,practicalgoalsarealsoincluded.InthecaseofNGOplacement,Iarguethatconveniencemattersprimarilyasameanofbetterachievingthestatedneed‐orientedgoalsoftheNGOs.Thus,itmightappearasthoughNGOsareconsideredwithpersonalcomfort,butonlyasameansofbetterachievingtheirinitialneed‐fulfillinggoal.ThisisconfirmedbyinterviewswithNGOworkers,whoreportedsuchthingsas:“Moneywasnotatallaconsiderationformewanting…toworkintheNGOdomain,butIdovaluebeingcompensatedaccordinglyformyexperience”(2008‐5)and“moneywasn'tcritical,butIfeelthatISTAYEDwith[theorganization]becausedespitebeinganon‐profit,itwasaplacewhereIcouldgrowprofessionally,andfeelstable.[It]provideshealthinsurance,401K,competitivesalaries,andmanyextraperks”(2008‐2).WhilethesequotescomefromAmericansworkingindevelopment,clearlyNGOworkersarerealisticregardingcompensationandconveniencegoods. AnotherconclusionwecanbegintodrawfromthisdataisthatpatronagepoliticsmaynotholdasmuchswayasisoftencynicallysaidinKenya.InnomodelwerepoliticalfactorsshowntohaveastatisticallyandsubstantivelysignificantimpactonNGOplacementinthecountry.NeitherallegiancetothenationalgovernmentviaelectoralsupportforeitherMoiorKibaki,norfidelitytoMPsinthedistrictappearedtohaveanyimpactonNGOplacementinthatlocation.Whileitispossible–indeedprobable–thatMPsinfluencesomeproportionofNGOstoworkintheirdistrict,there’snoevidenceofaprimarilypatronage‐basedstoryline,inwhichprolongedfidelitytoasinglepersonresultsingreaterNGOassistance.Inacountrywherepatronageandcorruptionareconsideredthenameofthegame,thisisasubstantialfinding.Implicationsforterritoriality

Fromtheforegoinganalysis,wecandrawconclusionsregardingNGOs’roleinstateterritorialityinKenya.Territorialitycanbethoughtofasthedemarcation,occupationanddefenseofasetgeographicalterritorybygoverninginstitutions.Itconcernsthe“broadcastingofpower”(Herbst2000)throughoutageographicalspace,orwhatwasreferredtointhe1960sasthepenetrationofgeographicalterritorybygoverningauthorities.Territorialboundariesdemarcatethelinesofhegemony,alongwhichpublicauthoritiesandpeoplescanmakedemandsoneachother,suchastaxation,security,socialservicesoraccountability.

NGOsimpactsonterritorialitycanbeseenfromseveralvantagepoints.Whencontrollingforallofthecharacteristicslistedinthemodelsabove,NGOsdonotappeartosystematicallylocatethemselvesinareaswherethereislimitedgovernmentpresence.Instead,theirprevalencetendstobecorrelatedwithareaswherethestateisstrongest–nearertothecapitalcity,inhigh‐densityareas,incitiesratherthanruralareas,etc.

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Yetatthesametime,qualitativeevidencesuggestsNGOsmaintainsignificantpresenceinareasofthecountrywherethegovernmentisweakest–particularlyinthearidandsemi‐aridlands(ASALs)inthenorthofthecountry(SeealsoOyugi2004:48).Intheseareas,NGOshaveoftenbeensaidcolloquiallyto“bethegovernment,”sincetheymorevisiblyprovidegoodsandservicestothepopulace.SomehavesuggestedthatthisreflectsbadlyontheKenyangovernment.SinceNGOsandgovernmentareworkingcollaborativelyinmostareas,however,wecaninferinthefar‐flungplaceswhereNGOsarerelativelystrongvis‐à‐visgovernment,theystillworktoreinforcethestate.Evencivilservantsseeitthisway;asonesaid,“TheproblemactuallyiswhenNGOsarenotthere.Thewananchidon’tcarethatgovernmentisnottherewhenNGOsarethere.Aslongasoneisthere[i.e.eitheranNGOorthegovernment],allisokay.Butifnone,thentheygetangryatgovernment.YourarelyfindaplacewhereneitherNGOsorgovernmentisthere.”ThissuggestsadegreeofinterchangeabilitybetweenNGOsandgovernmentoffices–ifgovernmentisnotstronglybroadcastingthesignalofthestate,NGOscandoso.AsBratton(1989)suggestsispossible,NGOssupportthestatebyrelievingsomeoftheadministrativeburdenplacedonit.

Thus,intheASALsofnorthernKenya,NGOsprovideasemblanceofgoverningauthority,whichservestheKenyangovernmentwell.ThegovernmentisabletoprojectabroaderfaceintheseareasviaNGOs,therebyincreasingitsterritorialscope.Likewise,inareasneartheEthiopianandSudaneseborders,KenyahostsNGO‐managedrefugeecampsthathelptoreinforcepublicadministrationinthosefar‐flungareas.NGOsworkinginandaroundrefugeecampsbringsocialservicesandemploymentnotonlytoforeignrefugees,butalsotothecommunitiesnearthem.WhilehostcommunitiesturntoNGOsforservices,theirnormativeassociationsarewiththeKenyanstate(seeLandau2002,regardingthissituationinTanzania).

LookingatthenumberofNGOsperpersonatthedistrictlevel,thedatadoesconfirmthesefindings.Onapercapitabasis,NGOsareactuallymoreprevalentontheoutskirtsofthestatethantheyarewherethestateisstrongest.FigureOneaboveillustratesthispoint.AreasshowninlightcolorhavelowerNGOpercapitaratiosthandarkareas–asthecolordeepens,thenumberofNGOspercapitaincreases.Aclearlineofthelightest‐possibleshadingcanbeseenstretchingfromthesoutheastofthecountrytowardthenorthwest.Remarkably,thislightlyshadedstripcorrespondstothelocationofthecentralhighwaythroughthecountryfromtheportofMombasatotheUgandanborder.Alongthisstretch,populationandroaddensityishighest–asisgovernmentalpresence.YetNGOpercapitaratiosarelowest.EachpersonhasaccesstoagreaternumberofNGOsoutsidetheseareas.

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FigureOne:NGOsperCapitaineachdistrict

Asshadingdarkens,theNGOpercapitarateincreases.Thus,combininginterviewdatawithquantitativeanalysis,wefindthatNGOs

arecomplementingthestate,contrarytopopularandoftcitedclaimsthatNGOsare“replacingthestate.”Theseclaimswillbeexaminedingreatdetailinthechapterstofollow,whichsuggestthatNGOsareaugmentingtheorganizationalform,orimplementingarmofthestate.Ratherthancompetingwiththegovernmentforlegitimacy,authority,andabilitytogovern,NGOsworktostrengthenthestate.

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AppendixA:AreasofFurtherInquiryThischapterrepresentsafirstattempttoaddressNGOlocationinanAfrica

developingcountry.Already,spaceforadditionalresearchpresentsitself.Forexample,Iamcurrentlyworkingtoidentifywhetheranorganization’sprimaryareaofinvolvementmakesadifferenceforthisfindings.DowefindthatNGOsfocusingoncorruptionarecorrelatedwithareaswithpeculiarcharacteristics,whileenvironmentalNGOscorrelatewithdifferenttraits?DohealthNGOsassociatewithmalariaandHIVzones,whileeducationNGOslinktolowadultliteracy?

Preliminaryfindingssuggestthatthesectoroffocusisnottremendouslysignificant.ThismaybeduetothefactthatapluralityofNGOs(about40percent)workonmultipleissueareas.Forexample,anNGOmighthaveaneducationprogram,ahealthprogramandanagriculturalprogram.Moreover,thedistributionofNGOsbysectoracrossdistrictsandnationallyisquiteconsistent,ascanbeseeninAppendixE.Thefourdistrictsshownrepresenthighandlow‐NGOpenetration,andarerepresentativeofthreeKenyanprovincesandwidephysicalgeographicspread.

Iamalsocurrentlyworkingonalternatemeasuresofpoliticalinfluenceorinterferenceinordertoconfirmtheresults.Onesuchmeasureexploresthedistrict‐leveldistributionofcabinetmembersfrom1991‐presenttoseewhetherrepresentationinthenationalleadershipcorrelateswithhigherNGOpresence.Othermeasuresarealsopossible:perhapsthePresidentialAdministrationduringwhichanNGOregisteredmightbecorrelatedwiththedistrictsthatareloyaltothatadministration,andthisdeservesfurtherconsideration.AKenyancolleaguepointedtothefactthathigh‐leveladministrators’homedistrictsmightbeunusuallyfavored,butnotalwaysfordeliberatelypoliticalreasons.Hecitedanexampleinwhichathen‐unknownUK‐basedNGOapproachedthePermanentSecretaryoftheMinistryofSocialServicestoaskwheretheywereneeded.BecausetheNGOpositioneditselfasachild‐welfareorganizationandnotadevelopmentorganizationatatimewhendevelopmentprojectswereindemand,thePShadtroublegarneringexcitementforitswork.HeinstructedtheNGOtoworkinhishomedistrict,sincehehadleveragewiththeDistrictDevelopmentCommitteethere(2008‐58).Theauthoriscurrentlydevelopingameasureoftheroleofthistypeofnon‐elected“influentialelites”toshedmorelightonthepoliticsofNGOplacement.

Similarly,whethertheorganizationisan“international”or“local”NGOmightinfluenceresults.WhileIfeelthatthisdistinctionmakeslittleempiricalsenseintheKenyancontext,wherenearlyallregisteredNGOsreceivethevastmajorityoftheirfundsfromnon‐Kenyan/internationalsourcesandanalternateregistrationcategoryexistsfortruly“local”organizationsorcommunitygroups,itispossiblethatinothercontexts,thisdistinctionwillproveanalyticallyuseful.44Alternatively,

44IfindthisdistinctionanalyticallyinvalidintheKenyancontext–nearlyeveryNGOworkerinterviewedreportedreceivingthebulkoftheirfundsfromabroad.Thismeansthatforeigndonorshavetheopportunitytoinfluencenearlyallorganizations,notonlythosethatareheadquarteredinanothercountry.Moreover,nearlyall“international”NGOshaveastaffthatis95%ormoreKenyan,makingthemquite“local.”Finally,adifferentformalregistrationprocessexistsforlocalorganizationsthatdofundraisinginternallyandaimforself‐helpanddevelopmentgoals(they

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futurepapersmightexaminespecificsourcesoffundsbycountryoforiginandbywhetherfundscomefromprivateorpublicsources.

Finally,whilethispapergivesusavaluablesnapshotofwhereNGOsreporttobeworking,futureresearchshouldexaminechangesinNGOlocationsovertime.Thiswouldprovidegreaterinsightintosuchthingsaswhetherorganizationsare,infact,snowballing–choosingtolocatewheretheirNGOcompatriotsareworkingalready–andwhethertheyfollow“hotspots”inneed,asmighthappenafteranaturaldisasterorpoliticalinstabilityresultinginrefugees.ItmightalsosettlethequestionoftheroleofinfluentialactorsinNGOplacement,aswecoulddeterminesuchthingsaswhetherthepromotionofsuchindividualstohighpositioncorrelateswithincreasedNGOnumbersinthatorfollowingyearsintheirhomedistricts.

registerasmembershipsocietiesthroughtheMinistryofGender,CultureandSocialServicesundertheSocietiesAct).

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AppendixB:ExplanationsandSourcesofInformationVariable DefinitionandSourceofDataNumberofNGOs(usedinprinciplemodels)

NumberofNGOsperdistrict.Source:GovernmentofKenyaNGOCoordinationBoardDatabase,December2007.

NumberofNGOs(usedintestofrobustness)

NumberofNGOsperdistrict.Source:NationalCouncilofNGOs,DirectoryofNGOsinKenya2005.

HIVPrevalence HIVPrevalencerateperdistrict.Source:UNDPKenyaHumanDevelopmentReport2006.

AdultIlliteracy PercentageofIlliterateadultsperdistrict(agedover15).Source:GovernmentofKenyaCentralBureauofStatistics,Kenyapopulationcensus,1999.

Percentw/oaccesstocleanwater

Percentageofresidentsinadistrictlackingaccesstocleandrinkingwater.Source:GovernmentofKenyaCentralBureauofStatistics,Kenyapopulationcensus,1999.

Percentw/oaccesstohealthcare

Percentageofresidentsinadistrictlackingaccesstohealthcareservices.Source:GovernmentofKenyaCentralBureauofStatistics,Kenyapopulationcensus,1999.

HQDistancefromNairobi

Distanceinkilometersofdistrict’sheadquarters,whichisthecityortownadministrativecenterforthedistrict.Source:GovernmentofKenya,KenyaRoadsBoard,2007.

Urbanizationpercentage

Percentageofdistrictpopulationthatresidesinanurbanarea.Source:GovernmentofKenyaCentralBureauofStatistics,Kenyapopulationcensus,1999.

PopulationDensity Ratioofpopulationlevelstolandareainsquarekilometers.Source:GovernmentofKenyaCentralBureauofStatistics,Kenyapopulationcensus,1999.

Kmofpavedroadsper1000km2ofarea

Measureofroadnetworkdensityinadistrict,computedbydividingthetotalkilometersofpavedroadsinadistrictbythetotalareainthedistrict.Source:GovernmentofKenya,KenyaRoadsBoard,2007,andCentralBureauofStatistics.

Ave#ofMPsperconstituencyin9202elections

AveragenumberofdifferentindividualsservingasMPforallconstituenciesinadistrictoverthe1992,1997and2002parliamentaryelections.Rangesfrom1to3.Source:ElectoralCommissionofKenya.

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AppendixC:FrequencyDistributionofNGOsacrossDistrictsofKenya

Note:“Frequency”denotesthenumberofdistrictshavingthisnumberofNGOs.Thisdistributionincludesallbutonedistrictdatapoint,Nairobi,asthenumberofNGOsinthatdistrictisover550,clearlyinthetailofthedistribution.

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AppendixD:ScatterplotsofKeyVariablesGraphsshowthataspopulationdensityincreases,sotoodoesthenumberofNGOs.Inthesecondgraph,outliershavebeenremoved.Thesameistrueforthesecondsetoftwographs,showingHIVratesandNGOnumbers.Thelabelsindicatethedistrictinquestion.

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AppendixE:DistributionofNGOsinaSelectionofDistricts

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ChapterThree:MakingaDifference?NGOsandServiceProvisionCapacity“WithnoNGOs,there’smoreofgovernmenthangingaroundtheoffice.Whenthere’sstrongNGOs,morecanbedone,moreimpact.Thengovernmentgetsoutthere,tothefield.”(MinistryofAgricultureemployee,MachakosDistrict,October2008)“Onourside…wecannotfeelwe’recompeting[withNGOs].Actually,they’rehelpingusalotalotalotalot.Imaginetherearefourofus[workingintheChildren’sOffice]!Wecannotbeeverywhere.Thereare6291sqkminthisDistrict,and142peoplepersquarekm.WeverymuchrelyontheseNGOs!Wedon’tevenhaveavehiclehere!”(GovernmentChildren’sOffice,MachakosDistrict,October2008)

IntroductionNowthatwehaveasenseofthefactorsthatdrawNGOstoworkinparticular

areas,wecanaskwhatKenya’s4200+registeredNGOsdooncetheysetupshop.InwhatwaysdoNGOsaddvalue?Whatservicesdotheyprovide?Ingeneral,howdotheyimpactserviceprovisioncapacity:dotheysupplementthesamepublicservicesprovidedbythegovernment?Competewithpublicagenciestoprovidebetterservices?Providedifferentservicesthatthegovernmentcan’torwon’tprovide?HastheabsolutelevelorqualityofserviceprovisionincreasedwhereNGOpenetrationishigh?HavetheactivitiesofNGOschangedthewaythatthegovernmentprovidesservices,orletthegovernmentoffthehookwithregardtoserviceprovision?

Inaddressingthesequestions,thechaptercontributestodebatesonneo‐liberalismandprivatization.45Thechapteralsoteststhetheorythatcivilsocietypresenceincreasesgovernmentperformance.Takentogether,thefindingsonthesedebateshaveimplicationsforKenya’sstateness.

TheanalysisinthischaptershowsthatNGOsarepositivelyinfluencingserviceprovisioncapacityinKenya.NGOshaveraisedthecapacityofthestatetoprovideservicesbyextendingthearmofgovernmentsomedegreefartherthanitwouldhavereachedinNGOs’absence.Sometimesquiteliterally,NGOsprovidethevehicletoextendgovernmentservicestooneadditionalvillageortown.Likewise,NGOshavehadasymbolicimpactonthewaymanygovernmentofficesattempttoprovideservices.

Toexaminetheseissues,thechapterfirstoutlinesclaimsthathavebeenmaderegardingtheimpactofNGOsonstatecapacitytoprovideservices.ThestudythenemployskeyinformantanalysistodetermineinwhatwaysandunderwhichconditionsNGOsextendservices.Inthissection,evidencefromNGOsintwocasestudydistrictsishighlighted,asarechangestothewayinwhichthegovernmentitselfprovidesservices.Thepenultimatesectionexaminestheissueofprivatization,lookingatwhetherNGOsasprivateorganizationshaveimprovedservices,and45Inthisway,thechapteraddressesthequestionofwhereNGOsfitinthestatevs.marketdichotomy,orwhethertheycomprisewhatUphoff(1993)callsa“thirdsector.”

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wheretheirweaknessesstilllie.Thechapterconcludesbysummarizingwhattheseimpacts,takentogether,meanfortheKenyanstateasawhole.

OnCapacityIexplorethesequestionsthroughthelensofstatecapacity,looking

specificallyatthecapacitytoprovideservices.Capacityisdefinedhereastheabilitytoimplementstatedobjectivesandtorealizegoals(Evansetal.1985:194;Finegold&Skocpol1995).Itistheabilitytoappropriateoruseresourcesindeterminedways,ofteninoppositiontopowerfulsocietalactors(Migdal1988).Capacityactsinmanywaysastheinterfacebetweenstatesandtheirpeoples;peoplecontinuallymakedemandsonthestateforgreaterstandardsoflife,andstates,iftheyhavetheabilitytodoso,respondtothesedemands,makingforgoodstate‐societyrelations(Kjaeretal.2002).

Anyonewhohastriedtoquicklytraveloverland,processadministrativerequirementslikegettingaworkpermit,orwitnessedthe“administrationofjustice”throughbriberyinthecourtsofmanydevelopingcountrieshasexperiencedtheeffectsoflowstatecapacityfirst‐hand.Capacityisaslipperyterm,andissometimesdismissedastautological.Itistruethatitis“notobservableinitself,butitsconsequencesandpreconditionscanbeobserved,suchaseconomicgrowth,thecharacterofpolicyoutcomes,orthesystemofrevenueextraction”(Kjaeretal.2002).Itistheabilitytomovefromawrittengoalonpapertoavaccineprovided,aroadbuiltoraschoolopened.AsHuntingtonputit,capacitymightbethoughtofasacountry’s“degreeofgovernment”–moregovernmentpresenceandoutputequalsmorecapacity(1978:1).

Manystudiesofcapacitytypologizetheconcept,andmosttypologiesincludesomeelementofadministrative,extractive,coercive,andregulatoryabilities.46Theexpressionofcapacityintheseelementscorrespondstothe“functions”ofthestateidentifiedbyMaxWeber:“theenactmentoflaw(legislativefunction);theprotectionofpersonalsafetyandpublicorder(police);theprotectionofvestedrights(administrationofjustice);thecultivationofhygienic,educational,social‐welfareandotherculturalinterests(thevariousbranchesoftheadministration);andlastbutnotleast,organizedprotectionagainstoutsideattack(militaryadministration)”(1978:905).

Inthisresearch,capacityisoperationalizedthroughthelensofserviceprovision.Successfullydistributingpublicservices(orfacilitatingtheirdistribution)

46Forexample,Migdal(1988)identifiesfourcategories:thecapacitytopenetratesociety,toregulatesocialrelations,toextractresourcesandtouseresourcesindeterminedways;Brautigam(1996)givesusregulatory,administrative,technical,andextractivecapacity;Grindle(1996)offersinstitutional,technical,administrativeandpoliticalcapacities.Skocpol(1985)providescharacteristicsneededforcapacity:maintenanceofsovereignty,administrative‐militarycontrol,loyalandskilledofficials,financialresources,andauthorityandorganizationalmeanstousetheseresources.AndtheWorldBankfocusesoncapacitiesrelatingtodevelopment,“capacitytoformulatepolicies;capacitytobuildconsensus;capacitytoimplementreform;andcapacitytomonitorresults,learnlessons,andadaptaccordingly.Buildingtherequisitecapacitiesturnsouttobeaformidablechallenge”(Levy&Kpundeh2004:v).

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indicatesanabilitytoimplementastatedgoal,andisacommonlycitedindicatorofcapacity(Brautigam1996:84;Englebert200047;Putnametal.1993),sincenearlyallgovernmentspromiseservices.48Inourtypology,serviceprovisionfallswithintherealmofadministrativecapacity,andissomethingnearlyallstatesaspireto,nomatterhowmarket‐orientedthestate.49

AmongscholarsofAfricanpoliticaleconomy,statecapacityhasbeenahottopicsinceatleastthebeginningofStructuralAdjustmentPrograms(SAPs)intheearly1980s.SAPsrequiredgovernmentstodownsizethepublicsectorandcuttheirbudgets.Inprinciple,thiswasmeanttostreamlinethepublicsector,butitoftenresultedinreducedadministrativecapacity(whichhadnotalwaysbeenlowinallstates).Persistentpatronage‐basedhiringandpromotiondecisions,relativelysmallstatebudgets,below‐marketpublicsectorsalaries,andthedearthofworld‐classeducationinmostcountrieshavealsoerodedcapacity.Today,

“AlthoughtheaverageAfricanstateisnotcollapsed,itscapacitytoprovideorderandsecurity,todeviseandimplementpoliciesforgrowth,toadoptandenforcelaws,toregulatemarkets,tocontrolitsbordersanditscivilservants,tocrediblyengageincommercialtransactions,toadjudicatedisputes,andtoallocateresourcesisgenerallyandcomparativelyweak.Inotherwords,theaveragedevelopmentcapacityofAfricanstatesislow.”(Englebert2000:41‐42)

AfteritbecameclearthatSAPswerenotproducingthedesiredresults,developmentexpertsbegantocallforexplicit“capacitybuilding”efforts.Theyrealizedthatmanagingaliberalizedeconomyrequiresafairlycapablestate,abletobothenactregulationandadministerpolicy(Chaudhry1993,Grindle1996,Levy&Kpundeh2004).TheWorldBankgreatlyexpandeditstrainingarm,theEconomicDevelopmentInstitute(EDI),atthistime.50Italsoprovidednearly$9billioninloansand$900millioningrantstosupportpublicsectorcapacitybuildingbetween1995and2004(WorldBank2005:vii).

Atthesametime,NGOshavebegunprogramstoaddressstatecapacityinAfrica.ThisoccursintrainingprogramsheldbyNGOsaroundtheworld,manyofwhoseprimaryactivityistoeducatecivilservants.Indeed,mostNGOsinterviewedseecapacitybuildingasoneoftheirgoalsorprogrammaticareas(seeAppendixB).NGOsalsoaddressstatecapacitybyfillinggapsand/orjoiningforceswithgovernmentwhereitisweak.Thisisparticularlytruewithsocialserviceprovision,thefocusofthischapter.KenyanpoliticalscientistWalterOyugidescribestheNGO‐governmentrelationshipascomplementary:“Ingeneral[NGOs’]complementaryrolehasincreasinglybeenfeltinmanyservicesectorsasstatecapacitytodeliverhasdwindledovertheyearsagainstabackgroundofrisingdemandandshrinking47Itisworthnoting,however,thatEnglebert’sdiscussionofcapacityisthatof“developmentcapacity,”bywhichheseeminglymeansabilitytoproduceeconomicgrowth.Englebertidentifiestwobroadareasofcapacity,“developmentalpolicies”and“goodgovernance.”Theformeraremeasuredthroughsuchthingsaspublicinvestmentineducationandinfrastructure,governmentexpenditureasashareofGDP,anddistortionsinforeignexchangemarkets;thelatter,throughenforceabilityofcontracts,extentofcivilliberties,andprevalenceofcorruption.48Clearly,somestatesmerelypaylipservicetothesepromises.49EvenAdamSmith,thefatherofsmall‐statepromoters,calledforthestatetoprovidesomeservices,includingeducationandsecurityinTheWealthofNations.50TheEDIwasrenamedtheWorldBankInstitute,in2000.

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resources”(2004:49).ServiceprovisionlevelsinKenyaarelow,andhavefallenintheperiodunderconsideration.Thisislargelyduetolong‐timemismanagementofpublicfundsanddecisionstolowerservicebudgetsduringthe1990s.WhatroledoNGOsplayinserviceprovisiontrends?

NGOsandtheCapacityLiterature:Tocqueville,PutnamandPrivatizationTheimpactofNGOsonstateserviceprovisioncapacityrecallsthreetheories

ofpoliticalscience.AlexisdeTocqueville’sDemocracyinAmericadetailsthewayinwhichprivateactorscanprovidesocialservicestostrengthenaweakstate.Likewise,RobertPutnam’sinfluentialMakingDemocracyWorkexaminesthecorrelationbetweencivilsocietyandhigh‐performinggovernment.Finally,scholarlyworksinceAdamSmithaswellasrecentinternationaldevelopmentparadigmspushesfortheuseofprivateactorsforimprovedserviceprovision.CivilSociety

NGOs’workinKenyaincitesmanytodrawparallelstoacademicworkontheroleofcivilsocietyanditsrelationtothestate.Turningtotwoclassicworks,Tocqueville(1863)andPutnametal.(1993),wefindargumentsthatstrongcivilsociety,ofwhichNGOsareusuallyconsideredapart,strengthensthestate–alinethathasbeentakenupbydonorsandIFIsinthepromotionofNGOsasagentsofchangeinthedevelopingworld(WorldBank1989,Hyden1983).DoesthisrelationshipbetweenNGOsandcapacityholdtrueinKenya?

ForTocqueville,civilsocietywasnecessarybecause,asistrueinAfricancountries,19thC.Americangovernmentadministrationwasextremelyweak,even“absent”(1983:72).Tocquevillesawthatwhilethegovernmentacknowledgeditsobligationstosocietyandhadlawsdetailingserviceprovision(Ibid:44‐45),civicassociationsactuallycarriedoutthetasks:

“Americansofallages,allstationsinlife,andalltypesofdispositionsareforeverformingassociations.…Hospitals,prisons,andschoolstakeshapeinthatway.…Ineverycase,attheheadofanynewundertaking,whereinFranceyouwouldfindthegovernmentorinEnglandsometerritorialmagnate,intheUnitedStatesyouaresuretofindanassociation.”(Ibid:513)

Thus,TocquevillesawNGOsasextendingorevencomposingthesocialservicewingofthestate.Hearguedthatnon‐governmentalprovisionofservicesallowed,forexample,patriotismtospreadthroughthenewstatesoftheWestinchurches,schoolsandpolicing(Ibid:293).Hesawablurringofstateandcivilsocietynotalwaysrecognizedintheliterature.

Putnametal.followedinTocqueville’sfootsteps,arguingthemore“civicness”inasociety,thehigherstateperformancewillbe(1993:98).AlthoughPutnamhasbeencritiquedforhislackofcausalmechanism,onemightarguethatitisashorizontalrelationshipsoftrustandinterdependencedevelopthroughmembershipinalltypesofassociations,citizensbecomegenerallymoreinvolvedintheirlargersociety.Theseactivedemocraticcitizensinsistoneffectiveand

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responsiveservicedelivery,andpresstheirpoliticianstoachieveit.51Thus,civilsociety“reinforcesastrongstate”(Ibid:182),byincreasingdemocratizationandinstitutionalaccountability.Thisviewhasbeenechoedinlaterstudiesaswell(Evans1997).

It’sworthnotingthatthecivilsocietyactorsidentifiedbybothPutnamandTocquevillearehomegrown,notforeign‐originating–astheylargelyareinAfrica.Doesthismatter?AccordingtoEsman&Uphoff(1984),itdoes,asorganizations“implanted”fromtheoutsidehaveahighfailurerate.Yetatthesametime,NGOsinKenyadisplaymanycivilsocietycharacteristics.ManyoftheorganizationsregisteredasNGOsinKenyacouldjustaseasilyhaveregisteredwiththegovernmentascommunitybasedorganizations(CBOs).Theyarefunctionalequivalents,differentinnameonly–organizationsinitiatedbyKenyans,staffedentirelybyKenyansandworkexclusivelywithandthroughCBOs.Moreover,althoughmostNGOsinKenyareceivetheirfundingfromabroad(discussedindetailinChapterOne),theseinternationaldonorssimplyremovearesourceconstraint,allowingKenyansinKenyanorganizationstodowhattheywouldhavedoneontheirownintheabsenceofsuchaconstraint.NearlyallpersonnelworkinginNGOsareKenyan,makingdecisionsonbehalfofKenya.Finally,NGOsinKenyamaintainautonomyfromthegovernment.Infact,NGOs,alongwithchurches,havebeenthebiggestpromotersofcivilrightsanddemocracyinKenyasincethepre‐multi‐partyelectionperiod.Unlikeinone‐partystateslikeChinawherecivilsociety,totheextentthatithasblossomed,hasthenbeenco‐optedbythestate,NGOsinKenyaretaintheirautonomy,evenwhileworkingdirectlywithgovernmentactors.Privatization

Second,provisionofservicesbyNGOsrecallspoliticaleconomydebatesoneconomicliberalismandprivatizationofserviceprovision.BeginningwiththeThatcheradministrationintheUK,policymakersaroundtheworldbeganpromotingneo‐liberalstrategiesforeconomicdevelopment,publicservicedeliveryandgrowth.Attheextreme,scholarswritingsfromtheNewPublicManagementinpublicadministration,IFIsonstructuraladjustment,andbothgroupson“new”or“good”governancecalledforthestreamliningofpublicsectorprovision,favoringthird‐partycontractingandoutsourcingtoostensiblymoreefficientandeffectiveprivateorganizations.

Underpinningthesecallswasthenotionthatmarkets,freedfromtheoppressivehandofstateintervention,wouldbeabletosupplygoodsandservicesfaster,betterandcheaperthancangovernments:“marketsandprivatesectorinitiativesareseenasthemostefficientmechanismsforachievingeconomicgrowth,producinggoodsandprovidingservices.…Theargumentisthat‘imperfectmarketsarebetterthanimperfectstates’”(Edwards&Hulme1996:961).Whilemostwritersinthisveindonotcallforthecompleteremovalofthegovernmentfromalleconomiclife,theydocallforitsroletobereducedtocreatingan“enablingenvironment”inwhichprivateorganizationsexecuteservicedelivery(WorldBank51Boix&Posner(1993)explicatethiscausalpath,alongwithfourotherpossiblepathsproducingthecorrelationPutnamdescribes.

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1989).Althoughtheyarenotcompetitiveprivatefor‐profitorganizations,NGOsare

oftenincludedinthelistofprivateorganizationsthatshouldbegivenagreaterhandinservicedelivery(Besley&Ghatak2001,WorldBank1989,Pfeiffer2003,Umali‐Deininger&Schwart1994).ThesescholarsseeNGOsasmoreefficient,effective,flexibleandinnovativethangovernment,tobeother‐orientedandideologicallycommittedtodemocracyandparticipatorypro‐poordevelopment,andtobemoreaccountableandtransparentthanthegovernment(Bratton1989,Fowler1991,Owitietal2004).Forexample,accordingtoaseniorUSGovernmentdevelopmentagencyofficialthatworkedforover20yearsintheNGOsector,NGOsprovide,“relative(togovernment),cost‐effectivenessindeliveryofservices.VirtuallyanythingIaminvolvedindoingingovernmentcouldhavebeendoneforaquartertohalfthecostby[anNGO]”(2008‐4).

Assuch,NGOshavereceivedconsiderablesupportfrominternationalandmulti‐nationaldonors,includingtheWorldBank,theUNagencies,andmanyrichcountrydevelopmentagencies.Asearlyas1983,NGOswereclaimingagrowingshareofofficialbilateralaid–upto$1.5bfrom$332madecadeearlier,withabout$600m/annumfromtheEECand12%ofCanadianaid(Bratton1989).By1994,12%ofallforeignaidwenttoNGOs,totaling$7bby1996(Chege1999).By1999,mostofUSAID’s$711minaidtoAfricawenttoNGOs(ibid).TheDutchdidthesamewiththe$835m/annumtheygivetoAfrica(ibid).PrivatefundsalsoflowtoNGOs–asmuchas$3.5bnannuallyinthe1980s(BrattoncitesOECD,1989).

EvidencefromMachakosandMbeereDistrictsCasestudiesoftwodistrictsinKenyaprovidetheevidentiarybackboneto

thischapter.TheyrevealthatNGOspositivelyimpactstateserviceprovisioncapacity.ThecasestudiesareaccompaniedbyinformationgarneredfromNGOsinthecapital,Nairobi,andfromthesurveyonserviceprovision,NGOsandpublicopiniondiscussedintheintroduction. MachakosandMbeereDistricts,locatedinKenya’sEasternProvince,52aresimilardistricts.Asshowninthetablebelow,thetwodistricts’votingrecordinpresidentialelections,infantmortality,literacyandmalariarates,andlifeexpectancywereallnearlythesameatthetimewhentheKenyangovernmentfirstregisteredNGOs.53

52SeemapinChapterOne.53ItisworthnotingthatthepopulationlevelisMachakosishigherthaninMbeere–possiblyexplainingthedifferenceinrawNGOnumbers.GDPpercapitainMbeere,however,issignificantlyhigherthaninMachakos.ThismaybeduetoincreasingkhatgrowthinMbeere(GovernmentofKenya2008b).KhatisamildstimulantchewedthroughoutthecountriesoftheRedSea.CultivationandtradehasgrowninrecentyearsinKenya,asthedemandandpricesforitaremorereliablethantheothercommonlygrowncoffeeandtea.StandardsoflivinginMbeere,however,donotseemtobepositivelyimpactedbythishigherGDP.

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MachakosandMbeereDistricts(1990)Indicator Machakos MbeereDistanceofDistrictHQtoNairobi(km)54 63 163PopulationDensity 143 81Percentageof1997PresidentialVoteforMoi 33% 35%InfantMortality(1989) 43.9 42.0AdultLiteracyRate(1989) 80% 77%MalariaRate(1994) 11% 13%LifeExpectancy(1989) 68 70#ofNGOs(NCNGOs) 120 31#ofNGOs(NGOBoard)55 292 213

WhilethenumberofNGOsdiffers,thesectoraldistributionofNGOsbetween

thetwodistrictsisremarkablesimilar,differingatmostbytwopercentagepointsforanyparticularcategory,asseeninthepiechartsbelow.ThistypologylargelycorrespondstotheprogramsthattheNGOswithwhomIspokereportedundertaking.Thesimilarityofactivitiesinthedistrictsmakesitdifficulttomeasuretheirrelativeimpactsoncapacityinthedistrict,andthegeneraltrendsinbothdistrictsweresimilar.Forthisreason,mostoftheanalysisinthischapterlooksatthetwodistrictstogether.Yetatthesametime,somecleardistinctionsbetweenthetypeofNGOsandtheirworkwereevidentinthetwodistricts.

First,collaborationonserviceprovisionbetweengovernmentandNGOsappearedstrongerandmorefrequentinMachakosthaninMbeere.WhilesomeofthebiggerNGOsworkinginMbeerenotedtheirjointprojects,thesenseofworkingtogetherwaslower.Second,MbeereNGOsfocusedslightlymoreonagriculturalprogramsthantheirMachakoscounterparts,andslightlylessonchildren‐specificandHIV‐relatedprograms.Theyfocusedconsiderablylessongovernanceandcivileducationprograms,whichwerequiteprominentinMachakos.

Thesedifferencesarelikelyduetoseveralfactors:first,themaintrucking

54WhilethedistanceofMachakos’DistrictHeadquartersissignificantlycloserthanthatofMbeere,thisdifferenceismitigatedbythefactthattheroadtoMachakosisinfarworseconditionthanthattoMbeere,makingthetimeittakestotraveltoeachquitesimilar.Moreover,manyoftheNGOsthatworkinMbeeredistricthaveofficesinEmbutownratherthaninMbeere’sheadquarters,Siakago.EmbutownisthirtykilometersclosertoNairobi,andinmanywaysthemaintownforresidentsofMbeere,asMbeerewaspartofEmbudistrictuntilthemid‐1990s.EmbutownsitsontheborderbetweenMbeereandEmbudistricts.55 This is the figured used in the primary analysis in Chapter Two.

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route,alongwhichHIValsotendstopass,runningthroughMachakos–makingHIVandorphan‐focusedprogramsmoreprominent.Second,thedistrictheadquartersofMachakosisboththeseatoftheCountyCouncilandthetownwiththegreatestconcentrationofNGOoffices,facilitatingNGO‐governmentinteractions–whereasthedistrictheadquartersofMbeere,Siakago,hasneverhadthesignificanceofnearbyEmbuTown(headquartersofEmbuDistrict,ofwhichMbeereusedtobeapart),wheremanyMbeere‐operatingNGOsarelocated.SiakagoismoredifficulttoreachthaneitherEmbuorMachakos,lackingapavedaccessroute.Thismakescostsoftraveltotheirdistrictheadquartershigher,makingNGOslesslikelytovisitdistrictrepresentativesinMbeerethantheymightinMachakos.Asaresult,relationshipsbetweenindividualsinNGOsandgovernmentseemnottodevelopaswell,leavinggovernmentofficialsinMbeeremoreapprehensiveofNGOsthantheirMachakos.

AsidefromaccessibilityofNGO‐governmentphysicalcontact,thesizeandrelativestrengthofindividualNGOsinMbeereseemedlowerthaninMachakos,afactorthatmayaccountfordifferentoutcomesinthetwodistricts.Whiletherewereahandfuloforganizationswithsignificantresourcesandprograms,agreaterpercentageofNGOsinMbeereweresmallerandmorelocal,withfewerpaidstaffandsmallerbudgets.InterviewswithleadersofMbeereNGOstendedtoofferlesssophisticatedexplanationsthaninMachakos,andrespondentcomprehensionofthequestionsappearedlower.Asarepresentativeexample,oneNGOleaderinaremotevillageoffofasecondarymurram(dirt)road,explainedhowtheirorganizationintendstohelporphans,encourageemploymentandfoodsecurity,buthasactuallyachievedverylittle.Shenotedthat,“Peoplewanttodosomething,buttheydon’tknowhow”(2008‐49).SheregisteredhergroupasanNGOonlybecauseoftheencouragementoftwoPeaceCorpsvolunteerswhousedtoliveinthevillage.

TheoveralltrendofgreaterNGOstrengthinMachakoswasalsoreflectedinsurveyresponses.501respondentswereasked,“Inthepastyear,howmanytimeshaveyougonetoanNGOseekingtraining,information,aserviceorforphysicalgood?”InMachakos,nearly30%ofrespondentshaddonesoatleastonceinthepreviousyear,whereasthefigurewascloserto20%inMbeere.56

56ThepercentageswerenearlyidenticalfortheurbanMachakossampleandforthedistrictasawhole.Theyarecombinedinthefigure.Nairobiisincludedforcomparison’ssake.

0%

10%

20%

30%

Machakos Mbeere Nairobi

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TheWorkNGOsDo:AnOverviewWhatsortsofworkdoNGOsdo,andhowtheydoit?Surveyresultshelpus

begintoanswerthesequestions,lookingatthecoreservicesofeducation,healthandsecurity.RespondentsrandomlyselectedacrossMachakosandMbeere,aswellasaseparaterandomsamplefromurbanMachakosandlong‐standingneighborhoodsinNairobi,revealthatNGOsdocontributetotheprovisionofthesecoreservices.Respondentswereaskedwhethertheirhouseholdhadchildrenenrolledinprimaryschooland,ifso,thetypeofschool(government,private,non‐governmental(includingreligiousschools),oramix),foruptotwodifferentschools.Theywerethenaskedsimilarquestionsregardingwheremembersofthehouseholdwouldgoforhealthcare(providinguptothreeresponses)andwhoistheprimaryproviderofsecurityservicesintheplacewheretheylive.Thetablesbelowprovidepercentageresponsesforeachservicesector,basedonthetypeofserviceprovider.

Thisdatashowsthatthedistributionofserviceprovidersissimilarbetweenthetwofulldistricts,andbetweenthetwourbanareas.57Acrossthefulldistricts,thegovernmentprovidesthemajorityofservices,roughly80%ofprimaryschoolingandhealthcare,and50%ofsecurityservices.Intheurbanareas,thepercentagesarecloserto50%forallservices,withtheexceptionofeducationinMachakos,whichisapproximately75%government.Thus,thegovernmentprovidesthemajorityoftheservicesthataremostoftenassociatedwiththestate.Severalorganizationsexplicitlymentionedthatgovernmentdoesmakeaconcertedefforttoprovidebasichealth,educationandsecurityservices:“Governmentprovidesthebasicsoflifeordeath,butnothingmore”(2008‐18).NGOsseetheirroleaspickingupwherethisserviceprovisionletsoff,fillingthegapsleftbyarelativelyincapaciousstate.

PrimarySchoolProvider58 Machakos Mbeere NairobiUrbanMachakos

Government 81% 84%59 56% 74%Government&NGO 6% ‐‐ ‐‐ 18%NGO 2% 4% 11% 3%Private 12% 12% 31% 3%

57Thecity‐towndifferencesintheNairobi‐Machakoscomparisonmakesensewhenoneconsiderstheroleofprivatefor‐profitactors.ThesearemuchmorecommoninNairobithanelsewhereinthecountry,sincesurplusincomeismoreprevalent.Accountingforthis,thenumberslookremarkablysimilar.58Notincludedinthetablearedon’tknow/non‐answers.Intheeducationsector,NGOschoolsarefaith‐basedmissionschools,asaretheirjoint‐NGO&governmentcounterparts.Atotalof456schoolswerementioned.59 Note that the percentage levels in Machakos and Mbeere are similar, even though there are more NGOs in absolute numbers terms in Machakos than in Mbeere. This can be explained by the higher population levels in Machakos, as well as the fact that different NGOs have different access to resources – so, for example, a large NGO in Mbeere might provide the same impact as several small ones in Mbeere. The similar number might also be explained by the fact that NGO impacts tend to be indirect, as is discussed more in the rest of this chapter.

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HealthcareProvider60 Machakos Mbeere NairobiUrbanMachakos

Government 75% 93% 50% 57%Government&NGO <1% ‐‐ ‐‐ ‐‐NGO 7% 5% 20% 21%Private 18% 1% 30% 22%

SecurityProvider61 Machakos Mbeere NairobiUrbanMachakos

Government(police,localadministrators) 50% 52% 48% 47%PrivateGuards 10% 0% 23% 16%CommunityPolicing(programswithgovernmentorcommunityalone) 40% 41% 26% 36%Other(dogs,family,god) 0% 7% 2% 0%

ThepresenceofjointNGO‐governmentserviceswashighestinMachakos,

againsupportingthefindingthatNGOsarestrongerandmorecollaborativewiththeirgovernmentcounterpartsinthatdistrict.Inparticular,educationinMachakosTownreflectsjointeffortsbetweengovernmentalandnon‐governmentalactors.

Inmostcases,thenon‐governmentalactorsprovidingeducationandhealthserviceswerefaith‐basedorganizationsconnectedtolocaland/orinternationalchurches.Manyofthesemissionaryfacilitiesarelikelynotnew,andmaynotreflecttheNGOphenomenonofthepasttwentyyears.Still,itissignificantthatthesefaith‐basedNGOsprovidetheservices,particularlyinthehealthsector.

Onthesecurityside,theroleofnon‐governmentalorganizationsisplayedprimarilybycommunityinitiatives,notformalizedNGOs–althoughseveralformalNGOsdosupportthedevelopmentoftheseprograms.“Communitypolicing”inthetable,however,includesCBO‐typecommunity‐initiatedandorganizedsecurityservices,suchasneighborhoodwatchgroups,vigilantegroups,aswellasformallyorganizedinitiativesthathavebeenundertakeninconjunctionwiththeKenyanPolicesinceMay2005.62

60Don’tknowandNAanswersarenotreported.Respondentsnameduptothreehealthcareproviders,foratotalof760responses.61Respondentswereaskedfortwoanswersandgaveatotalof896responses.62ThisinformationrevealssomeofthedifficultiesofconductingsurveyresearchacrossawideswathoflandinKenya.Workersconductingthissurvey,althoughprofessionallytrainedbyaninternationalsurveyfirm,didnotrevealthattheresponses“vigilantegroup”and“communitypolicinginitiative”hadmorethanonemeaningandaresometimesusedinterchangablyuntilafterthesurveyconcluded.Vigilantegroupsareconsideredbenigncommunity‐sponsoredyouthgroupsbysome;hostileandviolentextortionistsbyothers.Manyofthesegroupshavebeguntoclaimlegitimacythroughformalcommunitypolicingprojectsaswell.Withinthe“communitypolicing”responsesgroupedabove,thebreakdownisasfollows:

Machakos Mbeere NairobiUrbanMachakos

Vigilantegroups 63% 2% 55% 51%CommunityPolicing 38% 98% 45% 49%

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Thefigureofapproximately50percentofsecurityservicesprovidedsolelybythegovernmentshouldgiveuspause.Securityisunquestionablyastateresponsibility.Yet,thisstateserviceisfrequentlyprovidednotbythegovernment,butbylocalcommunities–recallingTocqueville’sexperienceinAmerica.AccordingtotheKenyanPolicewebsite,

“CommunityPolicingisanapproachtopolicingthatrecognizestheindependenceandsharedresponsibilityofthePoliceandtheCommunityinensuringasafeandsecureenvironmentforallcitizens.ItaimsatestablishinganactiveandequalpartnershipbetweenthePoliceandthepublic.…TheKenyapoliceattachgreatimportancetograssrootscommunityinvolvementinseekingsolutionstocrimeproblemsatlocalandnationallevelthroughapeopledrivenpolicing.”63

Thesejointgovernment‐communityeffortsareanalternativetovigilantegroups,usuallyself‐organizedgroupsofyoungmenchargedwithkeepingcrimelowinaspecificneighborhoodorvillage.Accordingtorespondents,vigilantesarequitecommon,andarenotnecessarilymalignant.Ahigh‐rankingpoliceadministratorinterviewedinMachakosdistrictdeniedtheirpresenceinthedistrict,however–likelyduetoanation‐widetrendofyouthsecuritygroupsemployingextortionistandviolentpractices,ashasbeenfrequentlydocumentedinlocalandinternationalnews.64

WhileNGOs,broadlyconceived,playaclearroleintheprovisionofcoreservices,datafromtheGovernmentofKenyaNGOCoordinationBoard’sdatabasesuggeststhatmostNGOsdonotdirectlyimpacttheseservices.Instead,NGOstendtohaveanindirectimpact,makingthemdifficulttomeasureusingcommondevelopmentindicators.In‐depth,semi‐structuredinterviewswithorganizationsworkinginthetwofulldistrictsandNairobisupportthisnotion.65Forexample,NGOs’educationprogramsareusuallynotdirectlyteachingchildrenorbuildingschools.Instead,education‐focusedNGOstendtodothingslike:rehabilitationofschoolfacilities;paymentofschoolfees,uniformsandbooksforrelativelypoorstudents;HIV/AIDSawarenessprogramsatschools;orlibraryorcomputerlabconstruction.Likewise,whilehealthprograms,toagreaterextentthaneducationones,dooftenentailthebuildingandstaffingofahealthclinic,providingcleandrinkingwaterorfightingaparticulardisease,theyequallyofteninvolvetrainingcommunity‐basedhealthworkersandhome‐basedcaregivers,orholdingralliesoreducationcampaignsaimedatcombatingthespreadofHIV/AIDS.6663http://www.kenyapolice.go.ke/community%20policing.asp,accessedMarch25,2010.

‐ 64See,forexample,“VigilanteskillKenyan'mafia'membersinmacheteattacks”GuardianUK,21April2009(http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/21/kenya‐vigilante‐kill‐mungiki);“Kenyamilitiasturnintocriminalgangs,posethreat”DailyNation,27February2010(http://www.nation.co.ke/News/‐/1056/870310/‐/vr4bqi/‐/index.html)and“TheriseofKenya'svigilantes”BBCNews,9October2007(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6995577.stm).

65Mostoftheseinterviewslastedaroundonehour,withtheshortestabouttenminutes(whentheonlypersonintheofficewasareceptionistwithpoorEnglishability),andthelongestoverthreehours.66AppendixAprovidesacompletelistoftheprogramsinMachakos(textinblack)andMbeere(textinblue)districtsthatwereunderwayatthetimeofinterviewsin2008.Althoughitisquitelengthy,

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AverylargeproportionofNGOsreportengagingin“capacity‐building”–afewclaimitisalltheirorganizationdoes(2008‐17,2008‐29).Usually,thistakestheformofgrouptrainingclasses,heldatalocalschool,communitycenterorhotel.Intheagriculturalsector,NGOsinterviewedinMachakosandMbeereconducttrainingon:foodsecurity,agriculturalproductivity,micro‐franchisedevelopment,livestockrearing,horticulture,poultryraising,goatbreeding,fruitgrowing,honeybusinesses,bee‐keeping,dairyandconfectionaryfoodprocessing,marketing,drought‐resistantcropsandfundraising.Likewise,programsspecificallytargetingtheyouthinclude:HIV/AIDSprevention,drugabuse,behavioralchange,self‐relianceandcommunications,aswellasvocationaltrainingontailoring,film,documentaryandcommercialcreationandvideoediting,conductingresearch,agricultureandsmall‐scalebusinessskills.Thistypeoftraining,whilearguablyimportantifdonewell,doesnotdirectlyresultinanimprovementindevelopmentindicators.67

IncomegenerationandlivelihoodsupportareanothersetofkeyactivitiesundertakenbyNGOs.Twocurrentlyin‐vogueincomegenerationprogramsinthesedistrictsaremicrofinanceandagriculturalenterprisedevelopment(beekeeping,fruitprocessingandgoatrearingwereeachmentionedanumberoftimes).Microfinanceprogramsrangefromthelendingofsmallandmediumsumsofmoneyatlowinteresttothecreationofrotatingsavingandcreditassociations(ROSCAs)commoninmuchofthedevelopingworld.68Forexample,ayoungNGOinMbeerehasaprogramprovidingemergencyone‐monthloansofupto2000KSH/‐(about$30)attenpercentinterestandeight‐monthloansofupto20,000/‐(about$300)atthreepercentinterest(2008‐45).Afterayearofoperation,theorganizationhadmade37emergencyloanstotaling92,000/‐(about$1,375)and47normalloansfor557,000/‐(about$8,325).AnotherNGOgivesrotatingloanstogroupsthathaveself‐formedintoROSCAs(2008‐33).

Inmanyways,whiletheseactivitiesareimportant–evenlifesaving–forthepeopletheyaffectdirectly,thescaleofthefinancialactivitiesofferedbyNGOsrelativetothelevelofneedacrossthedistrictisnotveryhigh.Moreover,itisnotobviousthattheenterpriseskillstaughtareonesforwhoseoutcomesthereisdemand.WhilealargenumberofNGOsspokeofbeekeepingactivitiesasasourceofincomegeneration,itisnotclearthatthereisanuntappeddemandforhoneyinthearea,orthatthereisadequateinfrastructuretogethoneytomarketelsewhere.

Programsfocusingonpeacebuilding,civileducationandgovernance,ontheotherhand,mayhavemoreofanimpact,thoughstillnotonethattranslatesdirectlyintoimprovedstatisticalindicatorsofdevelopment.ParticularlyinMachakosdistrict,alargeproportionofNGOsworkongovernanceissues.Notonlydotheymonitorgovernmentspending,programimplementationanduseoftaxes,theyencourageregularKenyanstobecomeengagedinthisprocessaswell.NGOsinMachakos:actasawatchdogofgovernmentuseoffunds,provideinformationthisdatagivesthereaderastrongimpressionofwhatNGOsdo.67Itisworryingtorealizethatinthesetwodistrictsalone,tensofthousandsofindividualshavetakenpartincapacity‐buildingprogramswithnodiscernableeffectoneconomicdevelopmentlevelsatthedistrict‐widelevel.68ROSCAshaveexistedinthedevelopingworldsincebeforetheexplosivegrowthofNGOs–NGOsoftenfacilitatetheintroductionoffundsoriginatingfromoutsidethegroups,however.

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to/fromgovernmentandwananchi,69assistwananchiinprotestinggovernmentmismanagementandholdinggovernmentaccountable,helporganizeresidents’associations,coordinatedistrict‐levelparticipationinnationalhumanrightsprograms,conductciviceducationonanumberoftopics,representminoritygroupstogovernment,andteachpeopleabouttheKenyantaxsystemandtheirrightsastaxpayers.Theseactivities,supportedbythegovernmentforthemostpart,currentlyencouragecivicparticipationinawaythathasseldombeenseeninKenya.InMbeereaswell,oneNGOworksontheseissues,empoweringpeopletounderstandthattheyhaverightsandcanmakedemandsofgovernment(2008‐54).Ifcontinued,theseactivitiesshouldhaveastrongandpositiveimpactondemocraticgovernanceinKenyainthefuture,atopicthatwillbeaddressinconsiderabledetailinChapterFour.70

Finally,andperhapsmorethananything,NGOsprovidewananchiasymbolicgood:thesensethatchangeispossible.DuringaperiodinwhichmanyserviceprovisionlevelsfellinKenya,NGOsbecameavisibleemblemtothepeopleofKenyaofsomeonetryingtolookaftertheirneeds,providinghopeforabetterlifeinthefuture.Thisisreflectedinsurveyresponses.WhenaskedwhethertheyfeelmoreorlessconfidentaboutthefutureofKenyawhentheythinkaboutNGOs,50%ofthepeoplefeltmoreconfident,whereasonly30%feltlessconfident(20%didn’tknowordidn’trespond).Nearly70%ofNairobiansfeltmoreconfident,withageneraltrendofmoreurbanareasrespondingpositively–likelyreflectinggreateraccesstoandinformationaboutNGOs.

NGOsalsoservedasareminderthattheworldoutsideKenyahadnotforgottenaboutthem.71ThisisreflectedinstatementsmadebybothNGOandgovernmentrepresentatives,aswellasinwananchi’sownsentiments.OneNGOleadertoldmethathestartedhisNGOinMbeereafterdiscoveringhowhopelessanddejectedtheruralpeoplearoundhimappeared,asituationhefeelshehaschangedinsmallwaysthroughlivelihoodprograms(2008‐43).Othersfeltthat,“Weprovidelife,education,food…soitgivesthepeoplesecurity.Theyareveryappreciative”(2008‐13).

ThehopebroughtbyNGOsisalsoreflectedintheviewthatNGOshavethepeople’sinterestinmind.Inasurveyof500individualsacrossthetwodistrictsandNairobi,70percentofrespondentsgavepositiveanswers(i.e.“sometimes”or“usually”)tothequestion;“TowhatextentdoyouthinkthatNGOshavetheinterestsofthepeopleinmind?”30percentanswered“usually,”themostpositivepossibleresponse.72Incomparison,only53and34percentrespondedgenerallypositiveonthesamequestionregardingcivilservantsandpoliticiansrespectively,

69EvenwhenspeakingorwritinginEnglish,thisword,meaning“regularpeople”or“peopleofthecountry,”isusedveryfrequentlyinKenya.70Again,theseactivitiessupportthePutnametal.(1993)theorythatcivilsocietygenerateshighergovernmentperformance.Here,themechanismisthroughthegrowthofcivic‐mindednessandrightsunderstandings.71RachelStern(2009)findssimilarimpactsofNGOsamongChineseenvironmentallawyercommunities.72Respondentsweregiventheoptions“never,”“rarely,”“sometimes,”and“usually”havetheinterestsofthepeopleinmind.

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withonly20and6percentresponding“usually.”PeopletendtobelievethatNGOsarelookingaftertheirinterests,givingthemasenseofhopeinthefuture.

NGOsandGovernmentCollaboration:ExtendingtheArmofServiceProvisionInadditiontotheactivitiesalreadymentioned,NGOsinthetwodistrictsboth

workwithgovernmentcounterpartstoextendthereachofstateservicesprovision.Indoingso,theyheighteningstateserviceprovisioncapacity.AsoneNGOleadersaid,“weworkwithalmosteveryministrybecauseourprogramsarecloseto[thoseof]government”(2008‐53).CollaborativeeffortsinvolvemerginggovernmentandNGOresourcestogetherinasingleproject,orNGOspayingforactivitiesallowingthegovernmenttofulfillitsmandate.CollaborationcanalsobeseenwhengovernmentofficialsembedthemselvesinNGOprogramsorvice‐versa.AnditcanbeseenwhenNGOsbringservicesthatarepromisedbygovernmenttocommunitiesforwhichgovernmentlackssufficientresources.OnemighthypothesizethatthisNGOinvolvementinserviceprovisionallowsthegovernmenttoshirkitsresponsibilities.EvidencefromKenyainsteadconfirmsthecivilsocietytheorythatNGOsimprovegovernmentperformancethroughtheextensionofthestate.ScholarsdescribingthesituationelsewhereinAfricaagree:“EvidenceseemstosuggestthatapropersynergybetweenNGOsandgovernmentcanfacilitatetheprocessofserviceprovisionandtherelationsneednotbecharacterizedbydestructiveconflict.”(Obiyan2005:319)Instead,“NGOshaveatremendousabilitytoexpandthescopeofthestate’sreach”(Sandberg1994:13).

NGOsandgovernmentlineministriesfrequentlymergeresourcestoprovideservices.Often,thisentailscivilservantsprovidingtechnicalexpertisetoNGO‐fundedprograms.Forexample,forablooddonorprograminMachakos,thegovernmentprovidessocialmobilization,sendsnursesandtechnicianstophysicallycollecttheblood,andcontributes25‐40%offunding.ItspartnerNGOgiveslogisticalsupport,providestheremainingfunding,andcoordinatestheprogramfromcollectiontostorage.OneNGOemployeeisbasedinthegovernmenthospitaltomanagetheprogram(2008‐14).Similarly,anotherNGOworkshand‐in‐handwiththeMinistryofAgriculture,MinistryofWaterandIrrigation,MinistryofEnvironmentandMineralResources,MinistryofHealthandMinistryofEducationonan“orphansandvulnerablechildren”(OVC)community‐basedcareprogram(2008‐29).Tocompleteoneelementofthisprogram,training50community‐basedhealthworkers,theMinistryofHealthprovidedthecurriculumandeducators,whiletheNGOprovidedthefunding.

ThisNGOalsoworkedwiththeMinistryofHealthonacondomdistributionprogram.Theministryprovidedcondomsandhospitalstafftoholddemonstrations,andtheNGOgavelogisticalsupportandtransportation.InMbeere,asimilarmergersawanNGOfacilitatethegovernment’sde‐wormingprograminschools:thegovernmentsentanofficeranddrugs,whiletheNGOprovidedtransportationandanallowancefortheofficer.AccordingtotheNGO,“Thegovernmenthasthedrugs,buttheyjustexpireiftheydon’tgetfacilitation.Soweaddthat”(2008‐52).NGOsandgovernmentsometimesalsoco‐financefundingtoCBOs(2008‐54).On

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occasions,manyorganizationscollaborate:forawaterprogram,oneNGOmightconducttrainingwhileanotherpaysforadamtobebuilt,andthegovernmentprovidesadamspecialist(2008‐17). TheWaterDepartmentoftheMinistryofWaterandIrrigationoftenembedsitsstaffinNGOprojects.Inparticular,waterengineersandothertechnicalstaffaresecondedtoNGOstoprovidetheexpertiseneededtolocatethewatertableanddrillboreholes(2008‐14,2008‐30,2008‐46).Sometimestheseengineersworkonasinglewell,whileothersembedinanNGOforaperiodofyears(2008‐14).Likewise,NGOsworkingwithotherministries,suchashealth,agricultureandlivestock,occasionallybasetheirofficeswithinlineministryoffices(2008‐11).Thishasmutualbenefits:itallowstheNGOandgovernmenttoworkveryclosely,andprovideslow‐costrentfortheNGOandasmallamountofrevenuetotheministry.Ontheseprograms,NGOsandgovernmentoftensignformalmemorandumofunderstandingtoensurethattherolesandresponsibilityofeachorganizationisclear(2008‐14,2008‐18).

SomeNGOsalsodesigntheirprogramswiththegoalofenablingministriestoenacttheirownmandates.Forexample,theMinistryofEducationlackssufficientfundingtotrainpublicschoolmanagementcommitteesandholdin‐servicetrainings.Knowingthis,anNGOinMachakosfacilitatesthesetrainings,providingtransportation,fuel,meals,suppliesandanhonorariumfortrainers(2008‐32).ThisNGOhassimilarprogramswiththreeotherministriesandtheHorticulturalCropsDevelopmentAuthority.NGOandgovernmentemployeesbothconfirmedthatNGOsalsosponsorgovernmentalspecialeventslikeministrystakeholders’meetingsorthe“DayoftheAfricanChild”celebration(2008‐11,2008‐39).IntheHIV/AIDShealthsubsector,thegovernmentoftenlacksthecapacitytoimplementprogramsonitsown(2008‐19).WorkingwithNGOs,governmentofficersidentifyproblems,butassertthatitiseasierforNGOstohelpthepeoplethrough(2008‐37).

SeveralotherNGOsstressedtheimportanceofinformationsharingwiththegovernment.OneNGOsupportstheMinistryofAgriculturemandatebysharingfamineandreliefdistributiondatawiththeministry,andhelpingitwithlogisticalsupportinthesesectors(2008‐25).ProgramofficersinanotherNGOwererequiredtocontinuouslyupdatetheirgovernmentcounterpartsintheministriesofhealth,education,waterandagriculture,aswellasintheChildren’sDepartmentandtheProvincialAdministration.Inresponse,thesecivilservantsattendtheNGOscommunityplanningmeetings(2008‐18).AndtheMinistryofLivestockofficesinMachakosareprovidedInternetaccessfromoneoftheNGOsworkinginthearea(2008‐38).

Sometimes,NGOsliterallyextendtheservicesofgovernment,facilitatingexistinggovernmentservicestoagreaternumberofvillagesorlocations.SeveralNGOleadersspokeofgovernment’sweaknessinaddressingneedsatthelocalorvillagelevel,whichKenyansoftenreferredtocolloquiallyas“downthere.”OneNGOworkingcollaborativelywithgovernmentlineministriessaid,“Youknowgovernment…theyhavestructuresandguidelines[togetthingsdone],buttheydon’tactuallygodownthere.Theycan’tdoeverything”(2008‐18).Instead,governmentprojectstendtobeconcentratedinparticulartownsorlocations,anddon’treachallofadistrictorconstituency(2008‐32).Asaresult,thisNGOfocused

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itsprogramsonplacesoverlookedbygovernment.Governmentofficersexplainthattheirannualbudgetusuallyprovidesadequatefundsforactivitiesinasub‐setofthelocationsofthedistrict(2008‐38,2008‐40).73TheyappreciatewhenNGOsfacilitatetheextensionoftheseactivitiestoadditionallocations.NGOsprovidetransportationandlunchtothecivilservants,whoarethenabletoreachmorepeople(2008‐38).Forexample,onedivision‐levelcivilservantreportedthatshewasonlyfundedtoworkinthreeoftheninelocationsinherdivisioneachyear,leavingsixwithouttheservicesofherofficeinanygivenyear.Withhergovernmentbudget,shevisitedatleastonesub‐locationeachweek.AlocalNGO,however,helpedhertoreachmoresub‐locations.(2008‐40).Likewise,forprogramslikecomputers‐in‐schools,itisoftenthecasethatgovernmentgivessomefundsforthese,but“thentheNGOsbringagainmore”(2008‐51).

BothNGOrepresentativesandcivilservantsemphasizedthatgovernmentstaffareextremelypleasedwiththeseserviceextensions.Withoutthem,theyoftenrestidleintheirofficesforlackofresourcestobringthem“downthere.”(2008‐30).Frustratedwhentheyendup“justwritingreportsintheoffice,”mostgovernmentintervieweesliketospendtimeinthefield(2008‐39).AcivilservantintheMinistryofAgriculturesaid,“WithnoNGOs,there’smoreofgovernmenthangingaroundtheoffice.Whenthere’sstrongNGOs,morecanbedone,moreimpact.Thengovernmentgetsoutthere,tothefield”(2008‐38).Likewise,amemberoftheChildren’sOfficefeltthat,“They’rehelpingusalotalotalotalot.Imaginetherearefourofus[workingintheChildren’sOffice]!Wecannotbeeverywhere.Thereare6291sqkminthisDistrict,and142peoplepersquarekm.WeverymuchrelyontheseNGOs!Wedon’tevenhaveavehiclehere!”(2008‐37). Therearelimitationstothistypeofprogram,however.WhilecivilservantsaregenuinelypleasedtohavetheirworkfacilitatedbytheNGOs,theyalsousuallybenefitfinancially.ManyNGOsreportedpayingadaily“allowance”togovernmentemployees.AlthoughsomeNGOsrefusetopaythesehonorariums,mostdo,andthefees(around5000Kenyashillings($70)perday)addup.Atthesametime,NGOsreportthatthesefeesarelowerthanwouldbechargedbytheprivatesector,sotheyarewillingtopaythem(2008‐30).Ortheyseeitasoneofthecostsofdoingtheirwork:“Theyareparasitic,butoftenhelp[ourorganization]inthelongrun”(2008‐17). AnothercommonlymentionedjointprograminvolvedtheNGOs’useoftheProvincialAdministrationatthelocallevel.NGOsoftenworkverycloselywithChiefsandSub‐Chiefs,thecentralgovernmentadministratorforlocationsandsub‐locationsrespectively.TheseindividualshelpNGOsmobilizeparticipationandsupportfortheirworkatthecommunitylevel(2008‐17,2008‐35).RelationshipsbetweenNGOsandSub‐Chiefsseemgenerallyverycollaborative:“Evenparticulararms[Sub‐Chiefs]knowwhereIwillbetoday[becauseweworksoclosely]”(2008‐17).Atthedistrictlevel,someNGOsalsofoundverystrongsupportfromtheProvincialAdministration.NGOsworkingonMbeere’scotton‐growinginitiative

73Alocationisaformaladministrativeunitofgovernment;itissmallerthanaprovince,districtanddivision,andlargerthanasub‐location.

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mentionedthattheDistrictCommissionerintervenedonthecotton‐growers’behalfwhencottonginnersseemedtobetakingadvantageofthefarmers(2008‐54).

BothNGOandgovernmentrepresentativesemphasizedtheneedtoreduceduplicationofeffortstoincreaseefficiencyinmeetingneeds–theytrytoworkindifferentlocations,orwheninthesameplace,makesuretheireffortsarecomplementary,notthesame(2008‐23,2008‐11,2008‐18).SomeNGOsalsoavoidparallelprogramssothatthegovernmentcan’ttakecreditforthetheirwork.“Whentherecanbearepetitionofdutiesandactions,thengovernmentwilltakeadvantage!”(2008‐14)

NGOsseethemselvesascomplementinggovernment(2008‐32,2008‐44,2008‐50).However,theyalsorecognizethatsometimes,theyarethesoleproviderofgoods.“Ideally,we’dbegap‐fillingbutsometimeswe’retheonlyonethere!”(2008‐30)Forexample,oneNGO,recognizinganunfilledgovernmentresponsibility,begana“disasterriskreductionprogram”forroadsafety.74“Someonehastocoordinateeveryone,sowedecidedtodoit”(2008‐14).AnotherNGOnotedthefailureofthesemi‐statalKenyaFarmer’sAssociation,andclaimedtohavereplaceditwiththeirownprograms,whichbringsmoreaffordablefarminputstothelocallevel(2008‐11).Athirdmentionedthattheyrevivedacattledipthatthegovernmentwasmeanttomaintain,butwhichhadfallenintodisrepair.TheNGOboughtthedipchemicals,repairedthephysicalinfrastructure,andaddednewpipes,whilethegovernmentprovidedadviceviatheVetOfficer(2008‐53).OneNGOworkerexpresseditthus:“Intheory,wesupplement,butinpracticewe’retheretodowhatthegovernmentfailstodo”(2008‐17).“OVCs,forexample.Governmentshoulddoit,butaretheyable?Theyneedotherstodoitforthem!…PeoplehavegivenupongovernmenttoprovideA,B,C,D.SoNGOscometocomplimentgovernment,butsometimesendupthemainsupplier.Wheregovernmentisnotthere,NGOsare.NGOsdosomuch”(2008‐44).Indeed,insomecases,“NGOsdomorethangovernment”(2008‐13).

Asinthegeneralpopulace(seeChapterFive),therearemixedfeelingsamongNGOworkersaboutthis.Onthesurface,manyreportthingstobegoodandNGO‐governmentrelationstobepositive.“NGOsaremeanttosupportgovernment…atleastwecandosowithsupplies”(2008‐44).Yetanundercurrentoffrustrationwasalsoevident.“Nooneisinahurrytodoanything…Likeinprocurement.Thegovernmenttakesforeverbecauseoftheirprocurementprocess.Soweactuallyprovidethemabufferstockofmedicines.Theyhavesuchdelays!It’stheorderoftheday!Often,wearenoteventhebufferstock;wearethemainprovider”(2008‐44).Ofteninthesamebreath,respondentswouldreportbeingpleasedtosupplementgovernmentactivities,yetinsistthatgovernmentoughttoprovidetheservicesusingtaxpayermonies(2008‐30).“Governmentshoulddoit,butifgovernmentisnotdoingit,thenanNGOjusthastodoit,sincetheyarecapableofhelping[thegovernment]”(2008‐53).

Whilegovernmentpatternsarechanging,manylongtimecomplaintscontinued.Theslowpaceofgovernmentimplementationwasafrequentcomplaint74Africanroadsarenotoriouslydangerousduetopoorroadconditions,under‐maintainedvehiclesanduntrained,aggressivedrivers.

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(2008‐31,2008‐44,2008‐50,2008‐52).NGOsworkingwithgovernmentcangetfrustrated,“Ah!Wearetired”[ofwaitingforgovernment]!(2008‐31).Fromthis,it’sclearthatmostNGOshavenowishtosupplantthegovernment.Instead,“MostNGOsarecopingstrategies:”wefillgaps,butthey“don’tletgovernmentoffthehook”(2008‐14).

GovernmentResponsestoNGOsWhatdoestheKenyangovernmentsayaboutalloftheseNGOsworkingin

theircountryordistrict?ManygovernmentofficialsthinkofNGOsastheir“collaboratorsinextension”(2008‐39),andapplaudtheirincreasinglyintegratedmethodsofserviceprovision(2008‐38).75Indeed,mostdistrictsandministriesnowexplicitlyrelyonNGOstoachievesomeoftheirgoals.Forexample,acivilservantintheChildren’sOfficeoftheMinistryofGenderandChildren’sServices76reportsthattheirofficeincorporatesNGOactivitiesintotheirannualbudget.BecausetheNGOsprovidethegovernmentwithanannualreturn,theChildren’sOfficehasstartedfactoringNGObudgetsintotheirownfinancialplanning(2008‐37).

MostdistrictsnowalsointegratetheworkofNGOsintotheirDistrictDevelopmentPlans(DDPs).TheDDP,akintoSovietfive‐yearplans,hasbeenusedinKenyasincethe1970s.Usuallywrittenforaperiodof4‐5years,DDPsareagoodmeasureofthepulseofthecountryandeachdistrict.Astrikingintroductiontothe2002‐2008DDPsistheacross‐the‐boardinclusionandelaborationoftherolethatNGOswillplayduringtheplanperiod.77Whilesomedistricts'plansincludereferencestoNGOsmorethanothers,thesenseofrelianceonNGOsforserviceprovisionispresentthroughout.

InformalcontentanalysisontheDDPsturnsuprepeatedstatementslike:“TheNGOsanddonorswillbeexpectedtoinjectnewresourcesintocooperativesintheformofcredit,grantsandmaterialsupport,whilethecivilsocietywillsupportthesub‐sectorinthemanagementandpromotionofgoodgovernance”(Butere/Mumias:29);“TheDevelopmentFinancialInstitutions(DFIs)andtheMicroFinanceInstitutionsincludingNGOswillberequiredtoprovidethenecessarysupportinfinancialandcapacitybuilding”(Nyando:43);“TheNGOsandCommunityBasedOrganizationswillprovidecreditfacilities,physicalinfrastructure,educationalandhealthservicesandnetworkwithotherdevelopmentpartners”(Kakamega:50);or“NGOsoperatinginthedistrictinthewatersub‐sector...willbeexpectedtocontinuecomplementingtheWaterDepartment'sefforts”(Rachuonyo34‐5).

Moreover,atthebackofeach2002‐2008DDPisanextendedtabledetailing

75Thisisarelativelynewphenomenon.Thechangefromoftenconflictingtousuallycollaborativegovernment‐NGOrelationsisaddressedindetailinChapterFour.76ThenamesandnumbersofKenyanMinistrieschangefrequently.Thiswasthenameoftheministryatthetimeofwriting.77SomeDDPsfromthepre‐2002periodalsomentionNGOs,butthecountrywideemphasisbeganinthe2002‐2008DDPs.

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allprojectsproposedfortheplanperiod,andhoweachwillbecarriedout.Veryfrequently,thisroundofplansstatesthatNGOswilldosuchthingsas“Supplementextensionservices;Carryouttrainingandawarenesscampaigns”(Kisii:36),or“provisionoftextbooks,bursariesandphysicalfacilities”(Kuria:48).Inits2002‐2008DDP,MakueniDistrictproposes149projectstobeundertaken;ofthese,44(justunder30%)explicitlymentioninvolvementofimplementationand/orfundingbyNGOs(Makueni:71‐86).ThespecificNGOresponsibleforsuchprogramsinthesedistrictsisonlysometimesmentioned.

GovernmentrelianceonNGOsisevidentnotonlyintheirplans,butalsoinsomeactivities.Forexample,duringthepost‐electionviolenceofearly2009,thegovernmentofKenyareliedheavilyonNGOs.OneNGO,reported,forexample,thatthegovernmentreliedonitsstatisticsoninternallydisplacedpeopleintheprovince.ThegovernmentnotonlytrustedtheNGOtobebetterabletodeterminethisdatathanitwas,italsowantedtoavoidduplicationofefforts(2008‐14).Insituationslikethis,NGOprogramsbecomegovernmentprograms–thegovernmentachievesitspublicadministrationgoalsthroughtheNGO.

GovernmentrepresentativesclearlyrecognizetheimportanceofNGOs–ortheirimplementationstrategies–foreffectiveservicedelivery.TheWestPokotDDPstatesexplicitly,“LessonsLearnt:ProjectsthatwereimplementedwithassistancefromNGOsandotherdevelopmentagenciesperformedbetterthanthosethatwereimplementedbythegovernmentalone.Thereisthusneedtocollaboratewithallstakeholdersduringthepreparationofthecurrentplans”(2002:17).Governmentactorsdesiretoimprovethequalityofservicestheyprovide,andtheyrecognizethattherearethingstheycouldlearnfromNGOsinthisregard.Workingtogetherisonesolution;“Extension[servicesinagriculture]willbeundertakenjointlybetweenthegovernment,theNGO,andthefarmersthemselvesthroughFarmersFieldSchools,agriculturaldemonstrationsandexchangevisits”(Butere/Mumias:27).

ThisisnottosaythatallgovernmentactorsfeelpositivelyaboutNGOs.Admittedly,somegovernmentofficialsseemedmuchmoretuned‐intowhatNGOsdoandhowtheycanbeusedthanothers.InMachakosandMbeere,DistrictDevelopmentOfficerswereamongthemostknowledgeableaboutNGOsworkinginthedistricts,astheyshouldbe.Butothers,suchasthoseworkingintheChildren’sOfficeinMachakos,seemedremarkablyin‐touchwithNGOsprovidingsimilarservices,rattlingoffthenamesof20‐plusorganizationswithwhomtheywork.We“workhandinhandtoadvocatetherightsofchildren.Theysponsorustogodowntothecommunitytoadvocate”(2008‐37).

Othergovernmentofficials,however,seemedunclearaboutNGOs.Itwasnotuncommonforthemtomentionthingslike“itwasanEUNGO,”toconfusebilateralgovernmentassistancewiththatofNGOs,oreventoconsiderprivate,for‐profitcompanies,includingbanks,tobeNGOs(2008‐35,2008‐38,2008‐40).78

Nevertheless,theoverarchingtrendssuggestthatmanygovernmentofficialsconsidertheworkofNGOstobepartoftheworkoftheKenyanstate.ThegovernmentnowcountsonNGOstohelpprovidebasicservices.Ifthiswerenotthe78Onoccasion,governmentinformantsseemedsomisinformedoruninformedaboutNGOsthattheauthorfeltcompelledtocutshortaninterviewinorderforthecivilservantorpoliticiantosaveface.

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case,theDDPsectionconcerning“publicadministration,safety,lawandorder”fromNyandaruaDistrictwouldnotstatethat“developmentpartners,NGOsandthegovernmentworkhandinhandprovidingfinances,technicalandlogisticalsupportandtrainingservicesincarryingoutvariousresearchanddevelopmentactivities”(Nyandarua:54).EvenwhentheydonotyetseeNGOsasfullyintegratedwithgovernment,somecivilservantshopethatthiswillonedaybethecase:“NGOsandtheMinistrywillbestreamlined,sotheyareworkinginthesamesame79direction”(2008‐38).Intheirplans,theyaimto“seekcloserworkingrelationshipwiththecommunity,CBOs,NGOs,religiousorganizationsandotherprivateproviderstoincreasetherangeandqualityofprovision”(Kakamega:49).

NGOInfluencedChangesontheGovernmentSideofServiceProvision

Atthesametime,duringtheperiodofNGOexpansion,governmentactorshavealsobeguntochangethewaytheyprovideservices.ParticularlysincethestartoftheKibakiAdministrationin2002,governmentministrieshavemovedtowardademand‐drivenapproach,decentralizeddevelopmentfunds,begunoutsourcing,andenactednewmeasuresofaccountabilityingovernmentoffices,guaranteedthroughservicechartersandcontracts.ThesechangesreflecttheinfluenceofNGOs,whichhavebeenamajorforcepushingfordemocratizationandaccountablegovernanceinKenyasinceatleasttheearly1990s.AccountabilitymeasuresandperformancerequirementsareaninherentfeatureofNGOs,iftheywanttosecuredonorfunding;asoneobserverreported,“servicecontractsarenewingovernment,butareoldatNGOs”(2008‐52).Inaddition,whenKibakicametopower,manyNGOleadersoremployeeswerebroughtintogovernment,includingatseniorpositions.“Civilsocietywasallswallowedbygovernment,sogovernmentisthinkinglikeNGOs”(2008‐33).Throughoutthepublicadministration,governmentofficeshavemimickedNGOs’focusonparticipatorydevelopment,transparencyandaccountability.80Asaresult,asoneseniorcivilservantreports,“GovernmentismoreofanNGOthanNGOsare!”(2008‐33).

SomeofthenewestprogramsofferedbygovernmentministriesarepurecopiesofNGOprograms.Forexample,thegovernmentwaspilotinganOrphansandVulnerableChildren(OVC)CashTransferprograminMachakosatthetimeofresearch.Intheprogram,thegovernmentgives1500Kenyashillings(about$25)permonth,plusregularmedicalcheckupsandmedicine,tohouseholdsfosteringOVCs(2008‐37).AnotherNGObeganaresearchprogramgiving“reportcards”tovariousgovernmentagenciesprovidingservices.TheheadofthisNGOnotedthatthegovernmentitselfnowproducesnearly‐identicalscorecardsaspartoftheir“CitizenServiceDeliveryCharters,”whichexplainwhatthepublicshouldexpectfromserviceprovidersaswellashowandtowhomtheycanmakecomplaintsabout

79Kenyansoftenrepeatwordsintentionallyforemphasis.Thus,“samesame”isusedtheway“verysame”or“exactsame”wouldbeusedintheUS.80Idon’twanttooverstatetheroleofNGOsinthesechanges.Mostoftheinternationaldevelopmentenvironmenthasbeenpushingtheseapproachesforsometime,aswell.YetthevisibleexamplesetbyNGOsandthepopulargratitudeexpressedinreactiontothemissignificant.

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theservices(2008‐10).81Governmentemployees,includingsomepoliticians,nowhaveperformancecontracts,usedtojudgehowtheirofficesareworking(2008‐35).“Inthe1990s,governmentministrieshadnomoney,andemployeesofgovernmentcoulddowhattheywantedwiththemoneythatwasthere.Butnow…thingsarechanging.Noyouhavetowork.Youhavetogodownthere,totheDivisions”(2008‐39). Anotherelementofthechangesingovernmentserviceprovisionhasbeenapushtowardsparticipatory“demand‐drivendevelopment,”whichencourageswananchitobeproactiveinmakingtheirvoicesheard,astheydemandservicesfromgovernment.Forexample,theMinistriesofAgricultureandofLivestockhaverecentlyemphasizeddemand‐drivenextensionservices,teachingpeoplethatiftheywantservices,theyneedtoapproachtheministryforthem.Oneagriculturalofficerreportedsuccessinthisprogram,“It’stakingroot!60%ofpeoplecomeanddemand”(2008‐41).Crucially,theseapproachesarenowalsomoreparticipatory:MinistryofLivestockandAgriculturecivilservantsexplainedthatinsteadofhandingoutministry‐chosenagriculturalinputs,theynowdevelopcommunityactionplansatthecommunitylevel.First,theylookattheconditionsinthearea,thentheyfloatseveralpossiblestrategiestothefarmers,andtheyallowthecommunitytodecideontheircourseofaction.Theministriesthenprovidetrainingontheseagriculturaltechniques(2008‐38,2008‐39).82 Since2007,thegovernmenthasalsohelda“KenyaPublicServiceWeek(KPSW)”setofeventsattheconferencecenterinNairobiandineveryprovincialanddistrictheadquarters.Thisprogram,begunbytheUNin2006asaPublicServiceDay,wasnationalizedthefollowingyear.AccordingtotheKPSWbrochure,“…domesticationintotheKPSWin2007isasignificantdevelopment.Itrepresentsashifttowards‘openness’inservicedeliverytothepublicbesidesencouragingcitizenstodemandbetterservicesfromtheGovernment.…Itisalsotobuildrecognitionoftherolepublicofficersplaytowardsachievementofefficientandeffectiveservicedeliverytocitizens”(GovernmentofKenya2008).Asonepoliticiansaid,theKPSWallowsthecommunitytoseethethingstheyspendmoneyon;itisanaccountabilitymeasuredesignedtoletcitizens“knowthattheirtaxesaregettingplowedback”(2008‐35). Anotherelementofthedemand‐drivenapproachistheintroductionandexpansionofdevolvedfunds.Theseprograms,includingsevennewfundsforlocalauthoritiesandconstituencies,bursariesforsecondaryanduniversityschool

81AccordingtoabrochurefortheKenyaPublicServiceWeek(2008),thefollowingministriesanddepartmentsareinvolved:Officeofthepresident(ProvincialAdmin,Internalsecurity,Defense,SpecialPrograms);OfficeoftheVP(HomeAffairs,HeritageandCulture,ImmigrationandRegistrationofPersons);OfficeofthePrimeMinister(PublicServiceMinister,planning/nationaldevelopment,ASALs,Trade,Agriculture,LocalGovernment,CooperativeDevelopmentandMarketing,EAC,Education,Energy,EnvironmentandMineralResources,Finances,Fisheries,ForeignAffairs,ForestryandWildlife,Gender/Children,HigherEducation/Science/Tech,Housing,Industrialization,Info/Communications,Justice/NationalCohesion/ConstitutionalAffairsandLabour.)82Theideaofdemand‐drivenservicesisnotnecessarilynewintheseministries(Leonard1977).Theparticipatoryelementonthepartofgovernment,however,is.

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students,roadmaintenance,AIDSefforts,andyouthenterprisedevelopment,aremeanttoincreaseaccountabilitybybringingthedistributionoffundstoalower,morelocallevel.Inmanycases,committeescontainingbothgovernmentandNGOrepresentativesdeterminethedistributionofthesefunds.Individualministriesalsohavethissortofprogram,givingfundstoCBOsaspartofcommunityinitiativeprograms.Forexample,theMinistriesofAgricultureandLivestockfundbothsmallself‐helpgroupsandlargerprivatebusinessesforfoodsecurity,agro‐forestry,waterdevelopmentandlivestockimprovementprograms(2008‐38,2008‐39).83Theseprojectsarediscussedpublicallyinaparticipatoryapproach.Thefundsare“soappreciatedbythecommunity”andmeanthatgovernmentis“nowbeingheldaccountable”(2008‐41). FrommostNGOs’reports,however,adegreeofpoliticalgoodwillisnecessarytogetmoneyfromthesegovernment‐fundedprograms.NGOsreporttheoccasionalone‐offfromgovernment(2007‐26,2008‐12,2008‐25,2008‐27,2008‐31,2008‐18),butthatalotofpressuremustbeappliedtogetfunds(2008‐12).OneNGOinMbeere–whichifnotregisteredasanNGOmightbeconsideredaCBO,duetoitssmall‐town,local,group‐basedapproach–wasunusuallysuccessfulinthisregard.Theyreceivedanimalstockfromoneministry,feedfromanotheroffice,adrought‐resistantcropprogramfromathird,andafruitprogramfromafourth(2008‐50).Accordingtooneoftheirleaders,theywere“co‐optedintotheMinistryandtheiractivities”(2008‐50).Asarepresentativesample,otherNGOshavereceivedgovernmentfundsfrom:theMinistryofHealthforanHIV/AIDScampaign;theConstitutionalReviewCommissionforcivileducationinoneDivision;trainingandfoodsuppliesfromtheNationalAIDSControlCouncil;andtrainingfromKARI,theKenyaAgriculturalResearchInstitute.

ThegovernmentunderKibakihasalsobecomelesscentralized,withpublicadministratorsgivenafreerhandindecidinghowtouseministryfunds.Atthesametime,donors,pleasedwiththetransferofpowerinthe2002presidentialelections,begantofundthegovernmenttoagreaterextent,includingamajorshifttogeneralbudgetarysupportinsteadofsupportforspecificlineitems.“Governmenthasmorefundingnow,anditsmanagedbetter.Withthechangeofgovernment,thereisnowmorecontroloffunds”(2008‐39).

Onoccasion,thegovernmentevensub‐contractstoNGOs,afairlynewactivityforgovernment.84Forexample,in2008,theMinistryofPlanning,DevelopmentandVision2030contractedouttheactivitiesofapilotsensitizationprogramcalled“LocalizingMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs),”partofthe“NGO‐GovernmentPartnershipProgram,”toanNGOinMachakos,andNGOsinatleasttwenty‐oneotherdistricts(2008‐29,2008‐41).Aftergettingthecontractbyrespondingtoanadinthenewspaper,theNGOworkedwiththeDistrictDevelopmentOfficetoteachwananchiabouttheMDGsandthegovernment’sgoalto

83ScholarsfamiliarwithpublicadministrationinKenyainthefirstdecadesofindependencehavesaidthatthistypeofCBOfundingisnotnew,butthatitisinterestingthatyoungcivilservantsandNGOworkersbelieveittobenew.ItmaybethecasethattheseprogramsdeclinedsignificantlyduringtheMoiadministrationandhavebeenreinvigoratedinthe2000s.84ThepoliticalandgovernanceimplicationsofthisspecificactivitywillbediscussedinChapterFour.

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implementthemby2030.TheNGOorganizedworkshopsatthedistrict,divisionandlocationlevels,andhadalocalkikamba‐languageradiostationplayMDG‐relatedpublicserviceprogrammingfor15‐20minuteseachdayfortwomonths.Theyalsoworkedwithseverallineministriestoconducttrainingsaboutsector‐specificMGDs.TheMinistrydidmonitoringandevaluationfortheprogram.TheheadofthisNGOsaidthattheyreachedmanymorepeopleworkingtogetherthaneithertheyorthegovernmentcouldhavedonealone(2008‐29).

RoomforImprovementRemains Insomecases,NGOssubstituteforthestate,makingupforgovernmentinadequaciesthatstemmorefrommismanagementthanfromasimplelackoffunds.Corruptioningovernmentisanoft‐citedproblemwithpublicserviceprovision.Whilethisisnotsurprising,giventhatKenyaconsistentlyranksamongthepoorestperformersonglobalcorruptionandtransparencyrankings,itisstillworthyofdiscussion.85Sometimesinformedobservers’critiquesweremildcomplaintsof“poormanagement”(2008‐13,2008‐14),butoftentheyweremoredirectassertionsthat“governmentputsinalotoffunds,butatleasthalfendsupintheirpockets”(2008‐44)or,“Theysaytheyprovideserviceswiththattax.Iamnotsurewhichones…theychargedoubleandpockettherest”(2008‐31).OneNGOofficerwhoworkedformanyyearsasacivilservantfeltthat,“Governmenthasalotofmoney…Heh!Idon’tknowwhythey’renotproviding!CDFhas50m[Ksh]whenwehave5m[Ksh],butwedomore…Somethingiswronginthesystem”(2008‐32).

Evengovernmentofficialsadmittheysometimesshirk,knowingtheycanrelyonNGOs.Onecivilservantsaid,“Whenthegovernmentgetsalot[ofmoney],theymightnotdothework.SowereallyrequireNGOservicesverymuch”(2008‐35).Therewasgeneralconsensusthat,“Somehow…ontheway…thingshappen…”suchthatgovernmentmoneydoesnotmakeittothepeople(2008‐23).Asaresultpeoplefeelthat,“WhenNGOsgotothegrassroots,themoneygetsthere.Whengovernmentgetsmoney,itdisappears.Onchildren,oldage,drugrehab,alcohol,NGOsdomorethangovernment.Governmentdoesroadsandbighospitalsonly”(2008‐19).

RelativetoNGOs,governmenttransparencyisalsolow:“And[governmentoffices]areneveraudited–theyarefourorfiveyearsbehind,whereasweareauditedeveryquarter”(2008‐44,also2008‐14).Becauseofthis,NGOscollaboratingonprojectswithgovernmentsometimesbecomedisappointed,claimingthattheyholduptheirendoftheagreement–say,buildingadispensary–butthenthegovernmentrenegesonitspart–neversendinghealthworkerstothedispensary(2008‐14).Caseslikethisgiveprivatizationproponentsalegitimatereasontocallforloweringgovernmentcontroloverserviceprovision.

Attheendoftheday,however,twothingsmustberemembered.First,governmentserviceprovisionisimproving,partiallyduetoNGOsinfluenceonthewayservicesareprovided(and,asweshallseeinthenextchapter,decisionsaremade).AsoneNGOleaderexplained,NGOsweredoingtheirworkinitiallybecausethegovernmentwasnotdoingit,buttheynowcomplementeachother.“Fundsof85Forexample,TransparencyInternational(www.transparency.org)hasconsistentlyrankedKenyaamongthe10‐20mostcorruptcountries.

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governmentareup–andifitcontinues,NGOswon’tneedtobethereanymore”(2008‐33).

Second,governmentresources,despitewhatmanyNGOsupporterssuggest,arefarhigherthanthoseofNGOs–asituationthatisunlikelytochangeinthefuture.“We’dratherworkwithoutgovernment,butyoucan’t.Itwon’tmakeanimpactwithoutgovernment,becausetheyactuallydomostoftheserviceprovision.…Itcreatesmoreopportunities,though,workingwiththem”(2008‐44).Infact,NGOsrelyonmanyofthesegovernmentagencies,“NGOsalsoneedgovernment.Theyhavecertaininstitutionsenablingthemtodotheirjobs”(2008‐52).WhileNGOnumbermaydeclineagaininthefuture,thegovernmentislikelytheretostay.

Asaresultofgovernment‐NGOcollaborationonserviceprovision,thetotalamountofservicesishigherthanitwouldbeinNGOs’absence(2008‐38).NGOsprovidetheirownservices,supplementtheservicesofgovernment,and,byexample,influencethegovernmenttoprovideservicesinamoreparticipatoryandcivic‐mindedmanner.Thecivilsocietytheoryidentifiedearlierinthischapterfitsthispatternofcivilsocietyinfluenceonstatecapacitylikeaglove.WhileotherfactorsinKenya’spoliticaleconomymaybeloweringoverallratesofserviceprovision,NGOsareimprovinggovernmentservicedeliveryperformance.Andwhiletheremaystillbecorruptioningovernmentprograms,thefundsaredevolvedtoalowerlevel,wherethegroupstheyaregiventoarguablyhaveagreaterstakeintheoutcomesofthefundsgivenandcandirectlybenefitifthefundsareusedproductively.

SummaryandImplications ThischapteranalyzestheimpactofNGOsonstatecapacitytoprovidesocialservices.ItarguesthatNGOshaveadistinctpositiveimpactonserviceprovisioncapacity.NGOsa)contributeasubstantialamounttothecoreservicesofeducation,healthandsecurity;b)provideindirectservicesthatthegovernmentisnotabletoprovide;c)extendthearmofthestatetoadditionalplacesandlocationsforwhichgovernmentcounterpartslacksufficientfunds;d)workcollaborativelywithgovernmentonprogramsneithercoulddoalone;ande)bywayofpositiveexample,influencegovernmentofficesandemployeestoimprovethequalityofservicestheyprovide. Inprovidingsuchservices,NGOsandgovernmentbothseetheroleoftheorganizationsas“gap‐filling,”complementing,orsupplementingthestate.Thegovernment,forthemostpart,providesprimaryeducationandsecurity,allowingoraskingNGOstosupplementtheseservicesandexpandtheirreachinotherareas.Contrarytosomeclaims,NGOsarenotreplacingthegovernmentinserviceprovision.AsaNigerianscholarconfirmselsewhereinthecontinent,“AnyexpectationthattheNGOswillsupplantthestateinserviceprovisionislikelytobeutopian”(Obiyan2004:302). Instead,NGOsinKenyaessentiallyexpandthenatureofstateserviceprovisionsuchthatwestarttoincludenon‐governmentalaswellasgovernmentalactorsundertheaegisof“thestate.”Workinghand‐in‐handonprogramsand

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projects,thelinebetweenpublicagencyandprivateNGOblurs.GovernmentcivilservantsspendmonthspaidbyandworkingforNGOprograms.NGOssetuptheirdistrictorregionalofficesingovernmentministrybuildings–publicandNGOemployeesliterallyworkingsidebyside. Thus,NGOsessentiallyjointheadministrativewingofthestate,expandingstatecapacity,andstatestrength.FollowingRoitman(2005),NGOshelptoreconstitutethestatethroughthecreationofnetworksofactorsredeployingstatetechnologies.Withtheadditionoftheseprivateactors,governmentperformanceimproves. Atalargerlevel,theimplicationisthatthestateisandremainsanimportantactor–onlyitscompositionhaschangedslightly.Contrarytoclaimsthatglobalizationisoverwhelmingthestatewith“racestothebottom,”inwhichsocialwelfareissacrificedtothewhimsofglobaleconomiccompetition(Strange1996)wefindthattheintroductionofnewactorsandinterdependenciescreatesnewpossibilitiesinserviceprovisionandcapacity.AsWeiss(1998)argues,globalizationrequiresstatestobecomemoreefficientandcapable,enhancingtheirabilitiesinternallyaswellasexternally.Throughinterpenetrationofitsactivitieswiththoseofgovernment,NGOshavefacilitatedthisprocessinKenya.

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AppendixA:SpecificProgramsorProjectsUnderwaybyNGOsInterviewedActivity ProgramsorProjectsAgriculture - Lobbycentralgovernmenttostopprovidingfarm‐relatedhandouts,sothatagro‐

dealerenterprisescangrow.Createdavoucherprogramwiththegovernmentasanalternative.

- Fundagriculturalstakeholderforumsheldbygovernmentsatthedistrictlevel.- Trainingforenterprisedevelopmentintheagriculturalsector,withthegoaloffoodsecurity,increasedagriculturalproductivity

- Domicro‐credit,ROSCAdevelopmentforfarmgroups.TheNGOguaranteesthesegroups’loanswithoneofthenation‐widebanks.

- Micro‐franchiseprogram:horticulture,poultry,dairyandconfectionaryfoodprocessing.

- Incomegenerationdevelopmentthroughtrainingon:crops,animals,chicken,fruit,honeyandhowtomarketitbetter.

- Livelihoodprogram:traininginagriculture,livestock,andincomegeneration.- Privatesectordevelopment:agriculturalbusinessdevelopment.- Worktogetfarminputssoldinsmallerpackages,sotheyareaffordabletothelittleguy.

- Foodsecurityprogram:trainingandgoat‐rearingprogram.- Foodsecurity:trainingandhelpgrowingdrought‐tolerantcrops.- Foodsecurityprogramviafarming,animalhusbandrytraining,agriculturalexpositions.

- Providerestockinganimals(goats,chickens)forfoodsecurity.- Traininginagricultureandfoodsecurity.- Introductionandpromotionofdrought‐resistantcrops,specificallycassava.- Supplynon‐GMOseedlingstofarmers.- ProtestandlobbyagainsttheallowanceofGMOseedsandproduceinKenya.- Agro‐forestryprogram.- Revitalizationofcottonfarmingprogram.- Linkingcottongrowerstoginnerforbetterpricing.- Promotionofdrought‐resistantcrop,amaranthus,ahigh‐proteingraincrop.- Promotionofbeekeepingforincomegeneration.- Promotionofmodernmethodsofbeekeeping.- Trainingfarmerson:fruitfarming,beekeeping,andvalue‐additionforcrops.- Developmentoffisheries,dairygoatsandpigeonpeasforincomegeneration.- Capacitybuildingonagriculturalproduction,businessdevelopment,fundraising.- Provisionoffarmingtools,foodstorage,agriculturalmarketingprograms,livestockandvetservices,goat‐keeping,andlivestockupgrading.

- Goatbreedingprogramforagri‐business,foodsecurity.- Livelihoodsupportandrighttofoodprogram.

Education - Educationqualityimprovementprograminpublicprimaryschools:infrastructureimprovement,provisionofinstructionalmaterials,managementcommitteetraining,in‐servicetrainingforteachers.

- Openedasmalllibrarywithacomputer‐trainingcenter.- HIV/AIDSprograminschoolsforgrades1‐4,includingclubs.- HIV/AIDStrainingprograminprimaryandsecondaryschools.- Childsponsorshipprogram:education,schoolfees,uniforms,andfood.- Childsponsorshipprogram:supporttoorphans’fosterfamiliestoencouragekidstostayinahomeandnotanorphanage:schoolfees,food,shelter,medicalservices.

- Childsponsorshipprogram:education,schoolfees,uniforms,bursaries,etc.- OrphanandVulnerableChildren(OVC)careprogram:money,medicalsupport,schoolfees,uniforms,counselingandfood.

- OVCsupportprogram:providesbursaries,uniforms,bookstopublic‐school

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children.- YouthtrainingonHIV/AIDS.- Trainingtowomentobecometailors–theywillmakeuniformsusedinchildsponsorshipprogram.

- Youthtrainingonself‐reliance,small‐scalebusinessdevelopment.- Holdworkshops,seminars,trainingsandresearchforyouth:goalsaretogetyouthemploymentandinvolvementindevelopment.

- Computers‐for‐schoolsprogram,bringingcomputers,generatorsandtrainingtosecondaryschools.

- Creationofacomputercollege,withlow‐costcomputertraining.- Childsponsorshipprogram:bursariesforsecondaryschool,clothing,etc.- Sponsorshipsforprimaryandsecondaryschoolstudents.- Earlychilddevelopmentprograms:fundingofteachers.- Schoolinfrastructurerehabilitation,especiallyinprimaryschoolsandearlychildhooddevelopmentcenters.

- Schoolconstructionandmaintenance:putupasecondaryschoolsciencelab,equippedclassrooms,staffroomfurniture,etc.

- Educationschoolsandfacilitiesprogram.- Adultliteracyprogram.

Environment - Capacitybuildinginnaturalresourcemanagementindrought‐proneareas.- Waterprovision.- Waterdevelopment:servicedams,tanksanddeep‐wellsurveysandboreholes.- Trainingonwatermanagement.- Drillboreholes.- Agro‐forestryprogram.- Buildsanddamsforbusinessdevelopment.- Planttreesatthevillagelevel,promotingafforestation.- Seedlingsandtreefarmprogram.- Tree‐planting,soilconservation,treenurseriesprograms.- Extensionofgovernmentpipelinetoprovidewater.- Provisionofcleanwater,distributionofwaterpipestogroups.

GeneralDevelopment

- Builtmulti‐purposecommunityhallandtwolargehostelsforpeoplestayingfortheirprograms.

- Integrateddevelopmentprograms:trainingonwater/sanitation,diseaseprevention,foodsecurity,povertyeradication,healthcenters.

- Trainingingeneralcapacitybuilding:workinginanysector,dependingonwhatthecommunityasksfor.

- TrainingonMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsaspartofagovernmentawarenessprogram:includedradioprogramminginlocallanguages.

- Capacitybuildingonmanagementskills,organizationaldevelopment.- Privatesectordevelopment:encouragingsavings,helpopeningbankaccounts,group‐basedaccounts.

- Traininginincomegenerationandmicro‐credit.- Ruralfinanceprogram.- Micro‐lendingprogrambasedonGrameenmodel.- Createdmicro‐financegroups,givenlow‐interestloans.- Providerevolvingsmallloansandgrants.- Makesoap,bleachandjuiceforincomegeneration,andtrainothersonit.- Financialassistancevialoans,check‐cashingandsavingsprograms.- Revolvingloanprogram.- Businessmanagementtraining.- Trainingonfinancialserviceprovision,creationoffinancialservicescenter.- Capacitybuildingonsavings,micro‐finance,businessskills,etc.

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PeaceandGovernance

- Actasawatchdogofgovernment;providinginfoto/fromgovernment.- Monitorgovernmentspending,implementation,anduseoftaxes.- Assistregularpeopleinprotestinggovernmentmismanagement,misuseoffundsandparticipatinginholdinggovernmentaccountable.

- Initiate/inspireresidentsassociationsacrossthecountry,tobeusedasatoolofgovernance:ultimategoalis“sustainedaccesstopublicservices.”

- Helpgovernmentmakepolicywithregardtoserviceprovision,currentwastageingovernmentprovision.

- Write“servicereportcards”onserviceprovisionandcitizens’feelingsaboutthem:havebeenimitatedbygovernment.

- Organizationofdistrict‐levelparticipationinnationalhumanrightsprogram,NationalActionPlan(NAP)onhumanrights.

- Conductciviceducationtrainingonconstitutionandconstitutionalism,nationhoodandnation‐building,democracy,governance,peace‐buildingandhumanrights.

- Conductlegalandlaw‐basedciviceducation,teachingpeopleaboutlaws,theirrights,andrightsvis‐à‐vistaxestheypay,aswellasfactthattheydopaytax(VAT).

- Representminorityissuesatthenationallevel:goalofinfluencingpolicyonpastoralists,livestock,minorities,humanrights,landreform,constitutionalreform.

- Runannual“pastoralistsweek”–bringingissuesparticulartopastoraliststolightatthenationallevel.

- Advocacyprograms.- Empowerment,governance,humanrightstrainingprogram.

Health - Childsponsorshipprogram:supporttoHIV/AIDSorphans’fosterfamiliestoencouragekidstostayinahomeandnotanorphanage:schoolfees,food,shelter,medicalservices.

- Providecounselingtoorphans,manyofwhomtookcareoftheirdyingparents.- Builttwomaternities/dispensaries,tobeturnedovertogovernmentwhenfinished.

- Builtmedicalclinicinaperi‐ruralcommunity:staffedbyoneregisterednurseandadministrativestaff.

- Healthservicesviaclinics.- Trainingcommunity‐basedhealthworkers.- Waterprovisionforbetterhealth.- Bringsafedrinkingwatertocommunity.- Providehygieneanddiseasepreventiontraining.- Undertakemassvaccinationscampaign,mobilizingpeopletogetvaccinated.- Logisticsandadministrationofblooddonorprogram.- RalliesandawarenesscampaignstoteachpeopleaboutHIV/AIDS.- TrainlocalandreligiousleadersonHIV/AIDS.- HIVandgeneralhealthcarethroughclinics.- Trainingonhealthissues,suchasHIVandOVCs.- Condomdistributionandtrainingprogramalongmajorhighways.- CommunityassistancewithHIV/AIDS‐affectedpeople.- ProvisionofPMTCT(preventionofmother‐to‐childtransmission)training,drugsinclinics.

- HIV/AIDSprograminschoolsforgrades1‐4,includingclubs.- Trainingonprovidinghome‐basedcareforHIV/AIDSpatients.- TrainedVCTworkers(voluntarycounselingandtestingforHIV);openedVCTs.- HIV/AIDStrainingprograminprimaryandsecondaryschools.- SupporttoHIV/AIDSaffectedfamilies.- Lobbiedsuccessfullyforpipedwatertobebroughttoagreaterportionofthedistrict.

- Mosquitonetprogramforpreventionofmalaria.

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- Healthcare:treatment,labwork,childrenunderfive,familyplanning,VCT,anti‐natal,STDs,HIVmanagement.

- Medicineandmedicalpackagestodispensariesandlocalhospitals:givencomputers,chairs,medicalsupplies,medicines,paymentofstaff,provisionofdonkeyforfetchingwater.

- Trainingonpropernutrition.- Dewormingprogram.- SupportforpeoplelivingwithHIV.- Trainingofhome‐basedcaregiversforHIV/AIDS.- FooddonationsandsupporttoyouthlivingwithHIV.

Other - HoldBiblestudy/funcampsforsponsoredchildren.- Roadsafetyprogram,designedtoreduceaccidentnumbers.

Relief - Emergencyresponseprograms.

WCYDO - Rehabilitatestreetchildren- Trainingtowomentobecometailors–theywillmakeuniformsusedinchildsponsorshipprogram.

- Monitorchild‐rightsandwomen’srightsabuses,reporttoauthoritiesandrefertohelpingorganizations.

- Savingsassociations,loansforparentsofat‐riskchildren.- Childsponsorshipprogram:education,schoolfees,uniforms,food.- Childsponsorshipprogram:supporttoorphans’fosterfamiliestoencouragekidstostayinahomeandnotanorphanage:schoolfees,food,shelter,medicalservices.

- Childsponsorshipprogram:education,schoolfees,uniforms,bursaries,etc.- OVCcareprogram:money,medicalsupport,schoolfees,uniforms,counselingandfood.

- OVCcommunity‐basedcareandchildsponsorship.- OVCsupportprogram:providesbursaries,uniforms,bookstopublic‐schoolchildren.

- YouthtrainingonHIV/AIDS.- Youthtraining:education,vocationaltraining,drugabuseandbehavioralchangeandcommunications.

- Youthresourcecentertogiveconstructivepastimestotheyouth:goalistotrainyouthtodotailoring,videoanddocumentarycreation.

- Youthtrainingonself‐reliance,small‐scalebusinessdevelopment.- Holdworkshops,seminars,trainingsandresearchforyouth:goalsaretogetyouthemploymentandinvolvementindevelopment.

- Bringyouthvoicestogovernmentandinternationalagencypolicymakers:e.g.NationalYouthPolicy,MGDsteeringcommittee,etc.

- Monitor/Evaluateuseofgovernmentyouthfunds.- Enterprisedevelopmentforyouth:beekeeping,value‐additionforfruits,horticulture,vegetables,etc.

- Feedingprograms,Christmaspartyfororphans.- Childsponsorshipprogram:bursariesforsecondaryschool,clothing,etc.- Relieftotheelderlyandmarginalized:blankets,clothes,food,etc.- Programonwomen’srightsandempowerment.

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AppendixB:NumberofStructuresProducedandPeopleAssistedbyNGOsInterviewed86

ActivityInfrastructure(thingsproduced)

NonTangible(peopleimpacted)

Agriculture - Twofoodsecuritytrainingcenters/demonstrationfarms.

- Threelargefishponds.

- Livelihoodprogram:5400people.- 312peopleinmicro‐franchiseprogram.- 1800cottonfarmers.

Education - Onesmalllibrary,withcomputers

- Rehabilitationof,instructionalmaterialsfor8schools

- 10computers,onegeneratorbroughttotwoschools(5moreschoolsinprogress).

- Rehabilitationof7schools,furnitureonlyinadditional2schools.

- HIV/AIDStrainingandawarenessprogramsin32schools.

- 52adultsinliteracyprogram.

Environment - Twosanddams- 4kmofwaterpipeline.

GeneralDevelopment

- Onemulti‐purposehall- Twolargehostels- Financialservicescenterbuilt.

-

- 21peoplegivenmicro‐loans.- 40,000beneficiariesofintegrateddevelopmentprogram.

- 2000peopleinfinanceprogram.- 3000membersofprivatesectordevelopmentprogram

- 312peopleformicro‐creditprogram.- 37peoplegivensmall,emergencyloans.- 47peoplegivenlarger,long‐termloans.- 38trainingfocusgroups.

Health - Twomaternities/dispensaries.

- 10healthclinics(4moreunderconstruction)

- 2VCTcenters.- 8boreholesdrilled.- 9damsbuilt.- 15servicedams.- 25watertanks.

- 50community‐basedhealthcareworkerstrained

- 4millioncondomsdistributed- Supportto70HIV/AIDSaffectedfamilies- 22home‐basedHIVcaregiverstrained.- Serve20‐40peopleperdayathealthclinic.- 20groupstrainedonpropernutrition.

Other - ThreeBiblestudyfuncampsforsponsoredchildrenperyear

WCYDO - Youthresourcecenterwithvideoequipment,tailoringschool.

- 9831sponsoredOVCs(orphansandvulnerablechildren)

- 6youthgroupsforenterprisetraining86NotethatthislistisnotcomprehensiveofallactivitiesdonebyallNGOsinterviewed.SomeNGOsdidnotgivespecificnumbers.Nevertheless,thischartgivesthereadanimpressionofthescaleofworkbeingundertakenbyindividualorganizations.

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- Children’shome,twodaycarelocations.

- 5womentrainedastailors- 5savingsassociationsorganized- 50childrenhelped.- 942childrensponsored.- 14childrensponsored.

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AppendixC:NotesonNGOEffectivenessand“CapacityBuilding”Training ThefocusofthischapteristheimpactofNGOsonserviceprovision.YetmanyinformedobserversalsocommentedontheabsoluteeffectivenessandefficiencyofNGOs.Inparticular,thosewishingtohighlightthebenefitsofgovernmenttendtopointtoNGOs’excessesorflaws–ofteninsteadofhighlightingactualgovernmentachievements.WastefulnessbyNGOsisacommoncomplaint:“NGOsusealotoffunds.Theypourthemout,butwhenyouquantifytheamountofbenefit,itseemsnottobeequivalentwiththeamountpoured.Theyemployalotofstaff,buttheremunerationofstaff!Itissoenormous!Ittakesalmosthalfofwhathasbeenallocated!”(2008‐37,also2008‐31).

Inparticular,wastingcopiousamountsofmoneyon“capacitybuilding”trainings,whichoftentakeplaceatlocalhotelsandincludelargemealsandteabreaks,wasafrequentcritiqueofNGOs–frombothwithinNGOsandfromgovernment.Onelocalpoliticiansaid,“MostoftheNGOsaregood.Buttheircapacitybuilding[expenditure]istoohigh–theycomehere,spendalot,wastemoney.Theyshouldspendmoreinthecommunity,lessintown”(2008‐35).SomegosofarastosuggestthattrainingisallNGOsdo:“I’venotseenit[NGOs’impact].ButI’mnotsurewhattheydo.Theydosomanyseminars,buttheoutputisn’tvisible.Ican’tsaythisNGOdidX,Y,Z.Mostlytheyhaveseminarsinthebighotels”(2008‐36).87SomeNGOleadersagreewiththis,sayingthatthecommunityhasbeen“sotrained”thattheyare“becomingfatigued”(2008‐33;SeealsoSwidler&Watkins2009).Ironically,othersfeltthatgovernmentofficialstookadvantageofthis,“Collaborationwithgovernmentjustmakesitmoreexpensive.Theydemandlunch.Ortheydon’tsupportthework.GovernmentseesNGOsasaplacetoeat”(2008‐44).

Theauthorherselfnoticedtheabundanceofsometimes‐wastefulNGOtrainingsatfourdifferenthotelsinMachakosandtwoinEmbutown,nearMbeere.InMachakosthelargest(andmostexpensive)hotelintownpostedasignboardinthelobbyannouncingthetrainingsessionsoccurringthatday,andthesignboardneverhadfewerthantwoNGOtrainingseachtimetheauthorvisited–sometimesjusttolookattheboard.Mealsatthishotelranabout$10forabuffetlunch,and$15fordinner–anexorbitantpriceinadistrictwhereGDPpercapitaislessthan$300peryear.88

YetNGOsprovide“capacitybuilding”oftenbecauseofdonorprioritiesregardingfunding.Donors,bothgovernmentalandnon‐governmental,oftenrefusetopayrecurrentcostsofprograms,withtheassumptionsthattheirworkshouldbecomeself‐sustaining,andrepeatedlypayingforthingsencouragesdependency.Asaresult,donor‐raisedfundsmustbeusedforonce‐offexpenses,makingtrainingprogramsanaturaloutlet.“Capacitybuilding,”isnotwithoutnobleinspirations–

87Notallgovernmentofficialsfeltthisway.OnecivilservantappreciatedthetrainingsshehadreceivedfromoneofthelargerNGOsinMachakos–infact,shehadattendedsixsuchtrainingsbetweenJanuaryandOctober2008(2008‐37).88Otherhotelsweremorereasonable.TheauthorusuallystayedinatidylittlehotelthatalsoheldfrequentNGOseminarswheretheroomswereabout$15pernightandmeals$1to$5.

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manyNGOworkersandwananchiparticipantstrulybelievethewaytodevelopmentisto“teachamantofish…”–andoft‐citedphraseamongdevelopmentpractitioners.

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ChapterFour:NGOsandChangingPatternsofGovernance:ClearRolesorGrowingComplexity?

“It’sNGOsthatmadegovernmentopenoureyes.Wehavemadealotofchanges.”(CivilServant,MachakosDistrict,September2008)“That’sthenewglobalapproach–youmustinvolveeveryonenow.”(NGOworker,MachakosDistrict,October2008)

IntroductionNGOsclearlyimpactthestate.ChapterTwodemonstratednotonlythe

factorsthatexplainwhyNGOsgowheretheygo,butalsothewayinwhichNGOsextendtheterritorialreachofthestate.ChapterThreethenshowedthatNGOsoftenraisethecapacityofthestatetoprovideservicesbyextendingthearmofgovernmentsomedegreefartherthanitwouldhavereachedinNGOs’absence.Sometimesquiteliterally,NGOsprovidethevehicletoextendgovernmentservicestooneadditionalvillageortown.Likewise,NGOs'symbolicimpactischangingthewaymanygovernmentofficesattempttoprovideservices.

Whatofotherrealmsofthestate?Thischapterexaminesanothercoreelementofstateness:governance.Overthepasttwentyyears,theworldhasseenamassivechangeinpatternsofgovernancewithincountries.Largelyinresponsetoanagendaofneo‐liberalismandpro‐privatizationbyrichanddonorcountriesandinstitutions,governmentshavewitnessedariseinnon‐stateactorsincludingNGOsinvolvedinthegoverningprocessitself.Insomeplaces,thishasinvolvedapositiverelationshipbetweenNGOsandgovernmentactors,whileelsewheretherelationshiphasbeenfraughtwithcontentionandconflict.WhatofKenya?

Asexploredintheintroduction,non‐governmentalassociationsworkingtodevelopthecountryarebynomeansnewinKenya.Sincebeforeindependence,aspiritof“harambee,”meaning,“let’spulltogether”inSwahili,motivatednationaldevelopment.Harambeegroups,usuallyvillage‐levelassociations,havefordecadescreatedinstitutionslikeschoolsandclinics;localsgatherresourcestobuildinfrastructure,andthegovernmentprovidesstaffingandothersupport(Chieni1997).Asareminder,nearlyallharambeegroupsareestablishedatthecommunitylevel,ofteninruralareasbyless‐educatedKenyans–theyarewhatdevelopmentscholarsnowcallcommunity‐basedorganizations(CBOs).NGOs,however,areusuallyformalorganizations,oftenledandstaffedbyhighlyeducated,cosmopolitanpeoplewithresourcesandauthority.ThepositionfromwhichNGOsstandinrelationtogovernmentisthereforeuniqueinthehistoryofthecountry,andassuch,deservesattention.

ThischapterseekstounderstandtheimpactofNGOproliferationongovernanceinKenya,addressingpatternsofgovernancefromtwoangles.Toprovidecontext,itfirstasks:whatareNGO‐governmentrelationsinKenyanow,andhowhavetheychangedovertime?Then,torepeataquestionposedbyRobertDahl

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nearlyhalfacenturyago(1961),itexamineswhogoverns?Dahlwasinterestedinthepowerrelationsdelineatinginfluenceamongsupposedequalsinademocracy.Here,thefocusisonrolesplayedbypublicandprivateorganizationsintheprovisionofservicesinless‐developedcountries.Whatimpacthasthegrowthofforeign‐fundedNGOsinKenyahadonhowandbywhomserviceprovisiondecisionsaremade?HowhaveNGOsbecomeinvolvedinthegoverningprocesses?

Accordingtosome,theopeningofpublicspacetoprivateactorslikeNGOsallowsthegovernmenttofocusoncorecompetenciesofsettinglawsandregulations,and“steering”theshipofstate.Inthisview,non‐stateactorsimplementgovernmentpoliciesand“row”throughmoreefficientserviceprovision.OtherssuggestthattheriseofNGOsandotherprivateactorsinpubliclifesignalsthedeclineofgovernmentandretreatofpublicactorsgenerally.Yetdoeseitherofthesevisionsofchangecorrectlydescribenewpatternsofgovernanceinpoorandweaklyinstitutionalizedcountries,whereNGOsareoftentheprimarynon‐stateactor?

Thischapteraddressesthesequestions,providinganhistoricalanalysisofKenya’sgovernancetrajectory.Itassertsthatinsteadofacleardivisionbetweenpolicy‐makinggovernmentandpolicy‐implementingprivateactors,decision‐makinginKenyahasbecomeacomplexandintertwinedprocess.89NGOslobbyforincreasedparticipation,transparencyandaccountability;theysitonnationalpolicymakingcommittees;governmentintegratesNGOplansandbudgetsintonationalplans;andgovernmentactorsmimicNGOs’participatory,accountableapproach.Throughsimilarchangeselsewhere,developingcountriesarewitnessingablurringofthelinesbetweenpublicandprivate.Indeed,NGOsextendtheorganizationalformofthestatebeyondthecivilservice.Assuch,governanceofpublicserviceshasstartedtobecomebothstrongerandmoredemocraticinKenya.90

Thechapterbeginswithadefinitionofgovernanceaswellascommonlycitedcharacteristicsof“newgovernance.”Next,itprovidesahistoryofNGO‐governmentrelationsinKenya,highlightingthemovefromauthoritarian,hierarchicalgovernancetowardmoreopen,collaborativegovernancepatterns.ItthendetailsgovernanceofserviceprovisioninKenyatoday,drawingattentiontothegrowingroleplayedbyNGOs,theirdemocratizinginfluence,andtheirintertwinedrelationswiththestate.ThepaperconcludesbyoutliningimplicationsoftheKenyanexperience.

OnGovernanceRelativelyrecently,academicsaswellaspublicservantsandinternational

developmentadministratorshavebeguntorelyontheword“governance.”Fromeconomicstobusinessstudiestopublicadministrationandanthropology,wehearof“corporategovernance,”“goodgovernance,”“networkgovernance”andmore.WhilemuchoftheliteratureonthesetopicshasfocusedontheWest,andgrowsout

89 The focus here is on NGOs’ role in decision-making, not in implementation. 90 Note that more democratic does not mean wholly democratic.

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oftheBritishexperienceinparticular,ithasimportantimplicationsfordevelopingcountries,includingthoseofAfrica. Inthischapter,governanceisdefinedconcretelyastheprocessoractsofmakingbindingdecisionsthatordercollectiveactioninapolity.Thisdefinitionderiveslargelyfromdiscussionsinthesemester‐longGovernanceseminaratUCBerkeleyleadbypoliticalscientistsChrisAnsellandToddLaPorteinthespringof2006.Decision‐makingactivitiesincludepolicymaking,lawmaking,choosingservicestoprovideandtheadministrativelevelsandlocationsatwhichtheyareprovided.

Governance,therefore,concernsgoverning(Peters&Pierre1998)orpublicmanagement–certainlynotanewphenomenon.Intherecentpast,however,scholarsexcitedaboutchangingpatternsofgoverninghavecometorefertothesenewtrendsas“governance”todistinguishthemfromtheirpublicmanagementpredecessors.Tosimplifymatters,thischapterfollowsotherswhodefinegovernanceasgoverning,andrefertocontemporarypatternsofgoverningthathavearisenintherecentpastas“newgovernance.”Trendsidentifiedin“newgovernance”stemfromstudiesofpublicadministrationchangeintheUK,EuropeandAustralia,andinclude:non‐stateactorsincreasinglytakepartinthepolicydecision‐makingprocess;theroleofpublicactorshaschangedordiminished;networksofpublic,privateandnot‐for‐profitorganizationshaveproliferated,replacingmarketsandhierarchies,arguablyasgoverningproblemsbecomemorecomplex;therehasbeeneitherablurringoftheboundariesbetweenpublicandprivateactorsortheadventofmulti‐centric,decentralizeddecision‐makingandauthority;andthegoverningprocesshasbecomemoreparticipatory.Foranoverviewofthegovernanceliteratureandattemptstointegrateit,seeStoker(1998),Peters&Pierre(1998),Rhodes(2000),Rosenau(2000)andBevir(2006).

Insimpleterms,thechangeswearewitnessinghavelargelyentailedmovingfromasituationinwhichgovernmentwastheprinciplegoverningactortooneinwhichgovernmentisbutoneofanumberofactorsinvolvedinthegoverningprocess.ChangeslikethesearenotparticulartowealthyWesterncountries,butcanalsobeseenintheworld’spoornations.Theparticularcontoursofchange,however,areimpactedbythedevelopingcountrycontext.Thispaperfollowsaninterpretivistsegmentoftheliteratureongovernance,whichurgesscholarstoexaminetraditionsofgovernancewithincountries,analyzingthechangesthereinthroughanhistoricallens,payingcloserattentiontocontextandparticularitiesthantostylized“universal”theoriesofchange(Bevir&Rhodes2003,Beviretal.2003).Sodoing,weexaminehowandwhytraditionschangeinparticularplaces.

Kenya'sgovernancetrajectoryhasdifferedfromthoseoftherichcountrieswheretheextensiveliteratureongovernancefirstdevelopedpartiallybecauseitisarelativelypoor,late‐developingcountry.Assuch,theKenyangovernmentismuchweakerthanthoseoftheWest.Somestrandsofthegovernanceliteraturecalledforgovernmentto“steer”theshipofstate,enablingprivateactorsto“row”,implementingstatepolicy(Osborne&Gaebler1992,seealsodiscussioninStoker1998andPeters&Pierre1998:231).Yetforagovernmenttobeabletoeffectivelysteer,itmustbequitestrong(Chaudhry1993).Onthewhole,theKenyangovernmenthasnothadthecapabilitieswhenrequired,particularlyasthelaw‐

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makingbody,Parliament,wascapturedbytheexecutivepresidencyuntilquiterecently(McSherry&Brass2007). Moreover,the“hollowing”ofthestateintheWesterncontexthasinvolvedintentionalthirdpartycontractingtofor‐profitactors,whilethegovernmentretainsultimatecontrolandprovidessomeleveloffunding.InAfrica,however,thestatehasnottendedtodeliberatelycontract,atleastnottonot‐for‐profitsfundedfrominternationalsources.Insteadof“plannedprivatization,”theexplicitsaleofgovernmententerprises,outsourcingorpublic‐privatepartnerships,withNGOs,Kenyahaswitnessed“spontaneousprivatization,”inwhichnon‐governmentalactorstrytofillthegapsleftbythestatewithoutbeingexplicitlypromptedtodoso(UNHabitat1998).Naturally,therearesomeexceptionstotherule.Still,whiletheKenyangovernmenthascometorelyonNGOsforsomeserviceprovision,weshouldbehesitanttoviewNGOsinKenyainthesamewayasweviewprivateactorsintheWest.

Fromintimidationtointegration:NGOgovernmentrelationsunderMoiandKibaki

NGO‐governmentrelationschangedsharplyoverthefirstdecadeofthe2000s.AttheendoftheadministrationofDanielarapMoiin2002,tensionsbetweenNGOsandgovernmentwerehigh.Onlyseveralyearslater,however,relationshavewarmeddramatically,asPresidentMwaiKibakitookadvantageofKenya’spoliticalopeningtoworkwithcivilsociety.Conflict,ControlandBureaucraticGovernanceduringtheMoiAdministration

Duringthe1980s,severalelementscoalescedtoprovoketheMoiAdministrationtoincreasecontroloverNGOs.MoididnotwanttodeterNGOsfromworkingtoprovideeconomicdevelopmentassistance,healthcare,andpovertyreliefinKenya–thesethingsallhelpedhimsinceNGOsincreasedgrossdistributionlevels.YetMoialsowantedtoretainpower,andheappearstohavebeenconcernedthatNGOscouldinfringeonhisauthority.Heturnedtoregulationforseveralreasons.

Moibegantoappearuneasyasthenumberofnon‐governmentalcharitableorganizationsinthecountrygrewrapidly.WheninternationalNGOssteppedintohelpprovideasocialsafetynetinresponsetoeconomiccrisisinthe1980s,thegovernmenthadnosystematicwaytoknowwhattheseorganizationsweredoing.Asamatterofsovereignty,thegovernmentarguablyhadarighttomonitorandregulatetheactivitiesofforeignactorswithinitsterritory. TheabsolutelevelofdonorfundingtoNGOswasasecondmotivatorfortheMoiAdministrationtointroduceregulation.ThegovernmentbecameconcernedthatdonorsfavoredNGOsoverit(Chege1999,Owitietal.2004),asmanybi‐andmulti‐lateralorganizationsexplicitlyshiftedfundsawayfromgovernmentstoNGOsduringthistime.91Atthesametime,donorspressuredgovernmentsthroughout91 The overwhelming majority of foreign donor funding, however, has always gone to governments, not NGOs. At the high end, bilateral aid through agencies like USAID reached 13% of American aid overseas.

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Africatoallownon‐governmentalactorstoparticipateinstatedecision‐making(Brautigam1994:59).TheMoigovernmentworriedthatthistrendcouldincrease,threateningbothitscrucialdonorfundinganditspower.

TheadministrationwasalsonervousthatshiftingresourcestowardNGOsreflectedpoorlyongovernmentintheeyesofwananchi,theregularpeopleofKenya.KenyanscholarswritingatthetimewerenotsurprisedthatthestatecrackeddownonNGOssince“NGOswereusingdonorfundstoconteststatelegitimacythroughdeliveryofservices”(Kanyinga1996:82).ThegovernmentlikelybecameconcernedthatNGOsthreatenedtobecomeastrongand“separatepoliticalforce,”influencingpartisanpolitics,asFernando&Heston(1997:13)andSandberg(1994)identifyelsewhere.InLatinAmericaandEasternEurope,politicalpartiesandtheirleadershavebeenoffshootsofNGOs.Regulationallowedthegovernmentto“guardagainsttheweakeningofstatelegitimacyandtheundesirabletendencyofimpingingonnationalsovereigntybyNGOs”(Kameri‐Mbote2000:7). Finally,Moibegantoexperienceconsiderablepressureforpoliticalliberalizationfromboththeinternationalcommunityandlocalcivilsociety.Alongwithreligiousandprofessionalassociations,NGOswereakeyelementinthelocalsourceofdemocratizationdemands.OrganizationsliketheNationalCouncilofChurchesofKenya,theInternationalCommissionofJurists,theGreenbeltMovement,CLARION,andtheKenyaHumanRightsCommissionallpressedthegovernment.EnactinglegislationauthorizingthegovernmenttomonitoranddisbandNGOsatwillwasawaytoresistdemocratization. Thesefactorsledthroughthe1980stoNGOregulations.In1986,NGOswerefirstrequiredtosubmittheirplansandbudgetstothegovernment.Theywerealsoobligatedtochannelfundsthroughgovernment,thoughitisunclearthatthishappenedregularly.In1989,newlegislationallowedthegovernmenttoderegisterNGOsandtosetupagovernmentagency,theNGOCoordinationBoard,andasanon‐profitorganization,theNGOCouncil,tocoordinateNGOsinthecountry.AfullNGOActpassedin1992,securingthegovernment’sregulatorycontroloverNGOs.

Increatingthislegislation,thegovernmentreinforcedtheclearchainofcommandinthecountry’sgovernance,whichplacedPresidentMoiatthepinnacleofasteeppyramidofpower.Someauthors(Rhodes2000,Bevir2006)havereferredtothissortofgovernmentalcommand‐and‐control,hierarchicalgovernanceas“bureaucraticgovernance”(asopposedtonetworkorcollaborativegovernance).Governmentallowedlittleautonomytocivilsocietyorganizations,includingNGOs.

OverthedecadeuntilMoileftoffice,relationsbetweenNGOsandthegovernmentremainedtense.AccordingtoKenyanlegalscholarPatriciaKameri‐Mbote(2000),thegovernmentemployedtheNGOActasjustificationforharassingNGOs,particularlythosethatpressedforcivilliberties,humanrightsandenvironmentalprotection.Forexample,NobelPeacePrizewinnerWangariMaathai’sGreenBeltMovementwasthreatenedforitsroleinpro‐democracyactivities,andwasderegisteredforatimein1999.Likewise,CLARIONwas

In the past five years, the trend has been to revert to direct, non-earmarked budgetary funding to governments as well.

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deregisteredin1995forseeminglypoliticalreasons.Throughalengthyappealsprocess,theorganizationwasreinstatedayearlater.In2002alone,304NGOswerederegistered,withfewerthan20successfullyappealing(NationalCouncilofNGOswebsite2006).Whilemostoftheseorganizationswereremovedfromtheregistryforlegitimatereasons(notfilingtherequiredreturnsorfees,orhavingdisbanded),itislikelythatsomeremovalswereaimedatgettingridofpoliticallypeskyorganizations.Governmentdidn’ttargetonlyNGOsworkingonhumanrightsanddemocratization:poverty‐relieforganizationswerealsoatrisk.AsanNGOleaderinMbeeresaid,“Foralongtime,liftingpeopleoutofpovertywasseenasthreatening”(2008‐54).

OtherNGOsfacedlessdirectdifficulties.Forexample,thegovernmenttookoverayeartoprocesstheregistrationofaNairobi‐basedorganizationpromotingpublicsafetythroughcollectiveaction(2008‐10).92ItsleaderfeltthatthedelaywasduetogovernmentsuspicionofNGOsascivilsociety.Thissentimentwaslikelywarranted,giventhatMoidescribedNGOsconductingciviceducationas“athreattothesecurityofthestate”in1997(USStateDepartment1998).

Asinotherauthoritarianstates,thethreatofpunishmentwassufficienttoinduceself‐regulationinmostNGOs.OneNGOleaderreportedthatduringtheMoiyearsshedarednotstrayfromthegovernmentcurriculumatherorganization’sprimaryschool–theideaofintroducing“civics”classeswasparticularlyanathematoher.Shebelievedthegovernmentrapidlyshutdownorganizationswhoseprogramstaughtstudentscriticalthinkingskills(2007‐26).NGOregulationactedasadeterrentinthisandothercases.TheTransitionandBeyond:Relationssince2002

NGO‐governmentrelationschangedquicklyfollowingthe2002presidentialelections,inwhichanoppositioncoalitiongainedthepresidencyforthefirsttimesinceKenya’sindependencein1963.Inmanycases,relationsmovedfromhierarchicalgovernancetowardsnetworkorcollaborativegovernance,inwhichmanyactorsareinvolvedindecision‐making.TheattitudebetweengovernmentandNGOshasbecomemoreopen,withindividualsonbothsidesmorewillingtoworktogether.Thisisnot,however,toimplythatthesituationhasbecomeoneofpowerequality.

NGOrepresentativesnowfeelabletospeakopenly,saying,“It’snotlikewhenitwasadictatorship!”(2008‐19).Somefelt,“It’saplus,workingwithgovernment”(2008‐29).Manyorganizationsreportpositiveworkingrelationshipswithgovernmentoffices,andmostspokeofanimprovementsincetheMoiAdministration.

WhatCausedtheChange?WhydoesitseemthattheKibakiAdministrationisnotthreatenedpolitically

likeMoiwas?AnanswercommonlyheardinKenya,particularlyamongKibaki

92 As a reminder, references in the format (XXXX-XX) indicate that a quote or idea stems from an interview. They are deliberately coded to honor the confidentiality requirements of UC Berkeley’s Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects.

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supporters–evenafterthecontroversial2007electionsandpost‐electionviolence–isthat,“Kibakiisatechnocratwhobelievescivilservantscandotheirjobsifyouletthem,andhewelcomesanyassistancewecanget.He’sahands‐off,learnedpresident.NotlikeMoi–aprimaryschooldropout!”

Accordingtothislineofthought,thenewadministrationdeliberatelychangedNGO‐governmentrelations,sensingthebenefitsofpositiveinteractionswouldvastlyoutweighthepoliticalthreats.Decadesofhierarchicalcontrolledtoadeclineinpublicserviceprovision,acrumblingeconomyandmassivecorruptionunderMoi.TakingadvantageoftheopeningofKenya’spoliticalsystemandthegeneralizedfeelingofgoodwill,theKibakiAdministrationworkedtogetnewvoicesintogovernmentandtolearnfromnon‐governmentalactors.

Forexample,theKibakiAdministrationinvitedanumberofprominentcivilsocietyleaderstodirectgovernmentdepartments.Integratingcapable,demandingleadersintopublicadministrationmeantthatthedo‐goodermentalities,participatorydecision‐makingmechanisms,transparentspendingpractices(garneredthroughsuccessfullynavigatingdonoraccountabilityrequirements),andpushfordemocratizationcommontoNGOswerebroughtintogovernmentoffices,sometimesforthefirsttime.AsoneNGOleadersaid,“Civilsocietywasallswallowedbygovernment,sogovernmentisthinkinglikeNGOs.Governmentemployeesareallfrom[NGOs]”(2008‐33).Formerthornsinthesideofgovernmentwereincluded,shakingupthegovernmentstatus‐quo:JohnGithongo,founderofTransparencyInternational’sKenyaoffice,becamethegovernment’s“anti‐corruptiontsar,”andMainaKiai,formerdirectorofthenon‐governmentalKenyaHumanRightsCommission,becameheadofitsgovernmentcounterpart.

FactorsbeyondKibaki’slaissez‐faireattitudealsocoalescedtobringabouttheturntowardnewgovernance.Agenerationalchangeingovernmentbegan,bringingyoungpeopleandnewideastothecivilservice(2008‐14).AndmembersofthepoliticaloppositiontoMoiwhohadtakenrefugeandpromisingplatformsinNGOsnaturallyalignedwiththenewgovernment.WhileKibakiopenedaonce‐lockeddoortocivilsociety,NGOsandcivilsocietyhadconsistentlygrownthroughoutthelatterhalfoftheMoiAdministration,pushingforbettergovernanceviapoliticalliberalization,economicdevelopment,improvedserviceprovision,andlowercorruption.EvenardentKibakisupportersagreed,sayingthat,“educationlevelsarealsohighernow;civilsocietyhasbecomestrongerovertime–growingoutofthedemonstrationsduringtheMoitime.…Butit’struethatKibakigivesabitmorespace”(2008‐54).

Moreover,NGOinvolvementingovernancewasencouragedbydonors,soKibakimayhavesimplyactedstrategicallytoreceiveabetterdonorpackagethandidhispredecessor.Leadingmulti‐nationalinstitutionsliketheGlobalFundtoFightAIDS,TuberculosisandMalariaandthePresident’sEmergencyPlanforAIDSReliefrequirethegovernmenttoworkwithNGOsinordertoreceivefunding.Peoplethroughoutthegovernmentwerethuslikelyinfluencedbyaglobalpatternofchangetowardcollaborativegovernance:asoneseniorNGOemployeetoldme,“That’sthenewglobalapproach–youmustinvolveeveryonenow”(2008‐26).GovernanceToday:CollaborationandBlurredBoundaries

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IthasbecomebothnecessaryandrationalforthegovernmentandNGOstoworktogether.“Forweakerstates(orcities),joiningforceswithprivate‐sectoractorshasbeenanestablishedstrategytoincreasetheirgoverningcapacity”(Peters&Pierre1998:233).NGOsnowhelptheKenyangovernmentsteertheshipofstatewhenitcomestoserviceprovision.Theysitongovernmentpolicymakingboards,developmentcommitteesandstakeholderforums;theirstrategiesandpoliciesareintegratedintolargernationalandsub‐nationalplanningdocuments;andtheirmethodsofdecision‐makinghave,overtime,becomeembeddedingovernment’sown.NGOshavebecomeinstitutionalizedinthegoverningprocessesofpublicserviceprovisionineachdistrict.Asaresultofinteractionwiththeinternationalcommunity’sliberalnarrativeviaNGOs,governanceofserviceprovisioninKenyahasmadeagraduationchangetowardsbecomingmoredemocratic. NGOsdirectlyhelpgovernmenttosteer

NGOsnowdirectlyparticipateingovernmentplanningandlaw‐makingatthenationalandlocallevelforservicedelivery.Asrepresentativeexamples:theNGO,CNFA,lobbiedtheMinistryofAgriculturetochangetheministry’spolicyonfarminputshandouts.ThroughlengthycollaborationwithCNFA,theministryadoptedanewpolicy–insteadofgivingfreeseedsandfertilizertofarmers,thegovernmentnowsubsidizestheseitemsthroughavouchersystem,soastonurturethedevelopmentofagro‐markets(2008‐9,2008‐11).Likewise,theInternationalLivestockResearchInstitute(ILRI)NGOworkedwithtwogovernmentagenciesonaSmallholderDairyProjectmeanttobenefitpoordairyproducersanddistributers,makingaccesstothelucrativemarketmoredemocratic.Thiscollaborationledin2005totheintroductionoftheDairyDevelopmentPolicy,inwhichthegovernmentagreedtolicenseheretofore‐informalmilkproducersandlegalizesmall‐scalemarketing,whichaccountsfor85%ofmilksoldinthecountry(McSherry&Brass2007).

AnotherNGOthatworksonyouth93issueshasbeeninvolvednotonlyinthedevelopmentofaNationalYouthPolicywiththeMinistryofYouthAffairs,ithasalsorepresentedyouthinterestsfortheMinistryofHousing’sannualreport,workedonreformingwaterpolicyaspartofthenationalKenyaWaterPartnership,contributedtothedraftNationalLandsPolicy,andsitsonthenationalsteeringcommitteeonimplementationoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(2008‐24).94YetanotherNGOworkswiththegovernmentonserviceprovisionpoliciesandlandreforms,andisamemberoftheReviewCommitteeoftheLocalGovernmentAct(2008‐10);itreportedalsoworkingcloselyonpolicyandprogrammaticdecisionswiththeEnergyRegulatoryCommission,KenyaPower&LightingCorporation,KenGen,KenyaWaterServicesBoard,WaterServiceRegulatoryBoard,KenyaRoadsBoard,andthePoliceService.TheheadofoneofKenya’slargestNGOssitsonapproximatelythirtygovernmentpolicy‐makingbodiesintheMinistryofHealth,

93 In the African development context, “youth” is a broad term, denoting people aged between fifteen and thirty-five – a large proportion of whom are unemployed urbanites. 94 I do not mention specific organization’s names due to my university’s protection of human subjects requirements.

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whereherorganizationhelpedtocreateaCodeofEthicsfortheKenyanhealthsector(2006‐3).OthernationalbodiesthatNGOsinterviewedforthisresearchworkonincludetheNationalEnvironmentalManagementAuthority,NationalKenyaFoodSecuritySteeringCommittee,andConstitutionalReviewboard.

Allofthismightsoundfamiliartostudentsofinterestgrouppoliticsofthe1950sintheUS.WhatisdifferentinKenyaisthatmanyoftheorganizationsareforeignorforeign‐funded,raisingthequestionofwhoseinterestsarebeingrepresented–Kenyanordonorinterests?ScholarsoftheearlyyearsofindependenceinAfricamightalsonotethatthegovernmentisintegratingcivilsocietyinawaythatearlypost‐independencegovernmentsdidnot–achangemakinginterestrepresentationlookremarkablysimilartopatternsinindustrialdemocracies. Apartfrompolicyatthenationallevel,mostNGOsareinvolvedatthesub‐national(localordistrict)level.Nearly20%ofNGOrepresentativesinterviewedforthisworkmentionedwithoutpromptingthattheyaremembersoftheirDistrictDevelopmentCommittee(DDC),agoverningbodyoverseeingtheadministrativedistrict’seconomicandsocialdevelopment.AnNGOrepresentativeontheMbeereDDCsaidabouthisroleontheDDC,“Wearepartandparcelofgovernmentprocedures”(2008‐52).NGOsalsositontheirCountyCouncilBoard,WaterBoard,ConstituencyDevelopmentFundCommittee,DistrictPeaceCommittee,DistrictSteeringGroup,DistrictEnvironmentalCommittee,DistrictStakeholder’sForum,andLocationalDevelopmentCommittees.

SmallNGOsoftencontributetogovernmentpolicyanddecision‐makingthroughstakeholderforums.Attheseforums,representativesfromdifferentgovernmentministriesandpoliticiansgatherwithNGOsandothercommunityrepresentativestogetinputonprogramsorpolicy.AccordingtoamemberofonesuchNGO,“Whenthey[thegovernment]plan,theydonotleaveusbehind”(2008‐50).Anothertoldmethatwhileherorganizationwasnotinvolvedinpowerfulmeetings,thegovernmentwantstheirinput,andorganizeslocalmeetingsto“shareideas,brainstorm,discusssharedproblems…andbarrierstowork”(2008‐12).NGOsreportedactiveparticipationatMinistriesofHealth,Agriculture,Livestock,LocalGovernment,andChildren’sDepartmentstakeholdermeetings,aswellasplanningeventsfortheDayoftheAfricanChild,PovertyReductionStrategyPaper,Vision2030,NationalPolicyandActionPlanonhumanrights,andgeneraldistrict‐levelstakeholders’gatherings.Moreover,therelativelynewConstituencyDevelopmentFunds(CDF)giventoeachMP–constituting2.5percentofgovernmentrevenuenationally–aredistributedviaacommittee,whichusuallyhasNGOmembers.

AccordingtomostNGOsinvolvedinthesegoverningactivities,“It’ssincerelyaverycohesiverelationship”(2008‐11).UnlikeduringtheMoiAdministration,NGOsopinionsandideasarewelcome:“We’refreetovoiceissues,saywhat[we]want”(2008‐12). NGOplansbecomeintegratedintothoseofgovernment

ThegovernmentofKenyaincreasinglyacceptsarealroleforNGOstoplayinthegovernanceofserviceprovision.Besidestheirinvolvementinplanning

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committeesandpolicymaking,NGOshavealsobeenrecognizedascrucialpartnersindecision‐makinginDistrictDevelopmentPlans(DDPs),thedistrict‐levelplanningdocument.ThegovernmentexpressesexplicitrelianceonNGOsforserviceprovisionatthedistrictlevelinmostofitsDDPs(Brassforthcoming:Chapter3).Forexample,the2002MakueniDDPproposes149projectstobeundertaken;ofthese,44(justunder30%)explicitlymentionimplementationorfundingbyNGOs.

Thisappearsinboththe2002‐2008andforthcomingDDPs.Sincethecreationofthe2002plan–andevenmoresowhilecreatingthenewestroundofDDPs–governmentofficialshavewrittenDDPsincollaborationwithNGOsandothersocietalgroups.NGOs’ownannualplans–andevenbudgets–arerequestedbythegovernmentandthenintegratedintotheoverallplanforthedistrict.Thismeansthatwhendistrict‐levelgovernmentslisttheirrevenueandexpenditures,theynowincludefundsraisedbyNGOs,notgovernment.Beforethistime,DDPswerewrittenbyandforgovernmentonly.Onecivilservantexpressestheideabehindthechange:“Youcan’timplementaplanyoudidn’thelptomake!”(2008‐41).AstheexpectationthatNGOswillundertaketheadministrationandfundingofmanypublicservicessolidifies,theboundarybetweentheendofgovernmentandthebeginningofcivilsocietyblurs.

GovernmentalsoinfluencesNGOdecisions:NotaRetreatingStateAtthesametimeasNGOsaremeldingintothegoverningprocess,the

GovernmentofKenyamaintainsalevelofauthorityovertheNGOs,influencingtheirpoliciesandprocedures.ThisoccursmostobviouslythroughtheregulationssetintheNGOActandotherformallaws.YetgovernmentalsoinfluencesNGOsinformally.NGOsreferencegovernmentplanningdocuments,suchastheVision2030plans,EconomicRecoveryStrategy,orrelevantresearchreports.“Someobjectivesaresharedbyeveryone,andareborrowedfromgovernmentdocs,”saidoneNGOworker(2008‐17).

NGOsalsomeetregularlywiththeProvincialAdministrationofficialsintheirlocation,divisionordistrict.Mostfrequently,theyworkwiththeChieforsub‐Chiefintheirlocationorsub‐location–thesearethecivilserviceareamanagersclosesttothegroundwhoknowthepeopleandtheirneeds(2008‐12,2008‐25,2008‐37,2008‐40).ButmanyalsoworkwithDistrictOfficers,DistrictCommissioners,andMembersofParliament.AsoneNGOworkerexplained,“Anytimeyoustartworkinginanarea,youhavetotalktothelocalauthoritiesthere.Then,youinvitethemtoyourmeetings.Notsothattheyarestudentsofyourtrainings,butsoyoushowsolidarityandconcern”(2008‐12).OnepowerfulNGOleaderagreed,“Ifyoucan’thavegoodrelationships,youcan’tbeaneffectiveorganization.We’realltargetingthesamecommunity,soweworktogether”(2008‐29).JustasNGOsnowsitongovernmentplanningbodies,governmentofficialsoftensitonNGOcommittees(2008‐30).

TherelationsbetweenNGOsandthegovernmenttodaysuggestthatcountertosomeclaimsinthegovernanceliterature,thestatehasnotretreatedfromthegoverningscenetobereplacedbynon‐stateactors.Instead,ithasbeenjoinedbynon‐stateactorsinthegoverningprocess,andhasbeenbolsteredbythecombinedefforts.NGOsunderstandthatitisintheirinteresttoshowdeferencetothelocal

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authorities,whohavethepowertohelporhindertheirwork.“Letthem[thegovernment]beinformedofwhatwe’redoing,sotheywilladdsupport”(2008‐30).95

StudentsoforganizationtheorymightnotethattheserelationshipsconjurePhilipSelznick’s(1949)discussionofcooptationinTVAandtheGrassRoots.Here,though,whoisco‐optingwhom?Selznickdefinedformalcooptationastheestablishmentofformalrelationshipsbetweennewelements,signifyingthattheyhavearoleindecision‐making,whichallowedtheoriginalorganizationtoavertthreatstoitsstability(ibid:13).Thisoccurredwhenthelegitimacyoftheorganizationwascalledintoquestion,suchthatthenewelements’legitimacycouldbeabsorbedbytheoriginalorganization,orwhentheorganizationneededanorderlyandreliablemechanismforreachingitspublic.Selznick’sanalysisclearlyappliesoutsideoftheUS.

MovementtowarddemocraticvaluesthroughNGOintegrationIndevelopingthisnewgovernanceofserviceprovision,governmentagencies

andactorshaveslowlybeguntoadoptmoredemocraticgoverningstylesthanareusuallyassociatedwithAfricanpublicadministration.Accordingtooneauthorityoninternationaldevelopment,thisisoneofNGOs’greatestabilities–tochangeattitudesandpracticesoflocalofficials(Clark1995).Thus,insteadof“hollowingout”thestate,theinvolvementofNGOshasbeguntoincreasedtransparency,accountability,responsiveness,andparticipationwithinthepublicadministration,openingthedoortothedevelopmentofavibrantinterestgroupdemocracy.

ThisisnottosaythatNGOshavebeena“magicbullet”miraculouslyinstillingcivilsocietyandconsolidateddemocraticgovernanceinallwalksofKenyanpublicmanagement(Edwards&Hulme1996).Indeed,NGOscanthemselvesbeshortoninternaldemocracyprocesses(Ibid,Bebbington1997,Edwards2000),particularlyaccountabilitytotheimpoverishedpeopletheyclaimtoserve(Mercer1999).Thiscanbeattributedlargelytoperverseincentivescreatedinthecompetitionforforeigndonorfunding(Fowler1991,Cooley&Ron2002,Martin2004).96

RegardlessofwhetherNGOsarealwayssuccessfulat“practicingwhattheypreach,”theydousuallychampiondemocraticvaluespublicly,encouraging

95Indescribingthisgeneraltrend,theauthorrecognizesthatrealityisoftenmorecomplex.TheNGOworkerjustcitedaddedafteralongpause,“Though…theydon’toftenaddsupport.”Likewise,someNGOsonlypaylipservicetogovernmentregulations.AsoneNGOsaid,“Butreally,[we]followourownmission,[our]strategicplan.[Our]projectsthenfallfrom[our]ownplanningsessions–notthegovernment”(2008‐17).96 Many scholars raising concerns about NGOs being accountable to donors rather than constituents draw from experiences in Latin America. The African context is different, however, as many NGOs in Latin America are indeed funded by national governments there – as Bebbington (1997) argues, funding of this nature can make NGOs into “consultants” for the government. Bebbington (1997) and Mercer (2002) also see it as problematic that the leaders and workers in NGOs usually come from wealthier or elite classes, which have historically dominated the poor. There is, however, a long history of liberal elites taking up causes of empowerment and civil rights among disenfranchised communities in the US and abroad, making this argument quite weak.

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participatoryapproaches,transparencyandaccountabilityinothers.97NGOshavebeenlaudedforteachingpopulationsabouttheirrightsascitizens,lobbyinggovernmentstoadministertransparently,actingasinformationconduitsbetweenlocalcommunitiesandpublicofficials,providingavoiceforthedisempowered,andexplicitlypressingfordemocratization(Clark1991;SeealsoHyden1983,WorldDevelopment(Supplement)1987,Bratton1990,Sanyal1994,Ndegwa1994,INCL1995,Meyer1997,Salamonetal1999,Besley&Ghatak1999,Garrison2000,Cannon2000,Mercer2002:8‐10,Martin2004:25).Theyhavebeencitedforreducingcorruption(Deininger&Mpuga2005:183),spreadingpowertomorepeopleandgroups(Matthews1997),diffusingliberalidealsaroundtheworld(Keck&Sikkink1998),andencouragingactivisminauthoritarianregimes(Stern2009).

WhileabuseofgoodwillbyNGOssometimeshappens–particularlywhengovernmentalorpeer‐levelmonitoringisinsufficient–onthewhole,NGOsseektoservethepublicgoodandtouseparticipatorymethods(Barretal.2005).Indeed,inasurveyofNGOsinUganda,90%oforganizationsreportedinvolvinghostcommunitiesinthedeliveryofservices,andnearly60%ofbeneficiariesoftheseNGOsagreedthattheNGOsseekcommunityparticipation(ibid).WhileNGOsclaimedmoreparticipatoryinvolvementthantherespectivecommunitiessaw,60%participationratesaresignificant.RelativetotheKenyangovernmentanditspublicadministrationoverthepastfortyyears,NGOsunquestionablytrytobemoreparticipatoryandaccountable.

Kenyancitizensagree,viewingNGOsaslookingaftertheinterestsofthecommonman.Whenasked,“TowhatextentdoyouthinkNGOshavetheinterestsofthepeopleinmind?”inasurveytheauthorconductedonserviceprovisionandserviceproviderswith501Kenyans,70%ofrespondentsansweredpositively,andonly20%respondednegatively.98InasimilarstudyinUganda,Barretal.(2005)reportthatNGOsaregenerallywellregardedinthecountry,particularlywhentheyareaccessibletotheirbeneficiaries(676).

OfcoursethereissignificantvariationingovernmentresponsestoNGOs.Itispossible–evenprobable–thatsomeintheKibakiAdministrationappearopentoworkingwithNGOsforinstrumentalreasons:itisrequiredbylargeandpowerfuldonors.Chabal&Daloz(1999)refertosuchpracticesasthe“politicsofthemirror,”inwhichgovernmentsreflectbacktodonorswhattheywanttoseeorhear,whilefollowingtheirownpreferencesbehindthelookingglass.99SincedonorswantNGO97ThereisconsiderabledebateaboutwhetherNGOscanbeassociatedwiththesedemocraticvalues.Muchofthisappearstostemfromtheworldviewsofthescholarsinvolved–optimisticscholarsseethebenefitsthatNGOsbring(whileoftennotingtheirshortcomings),whileothersfocusontheshortcomingsalone.YetcritiquesoftheviewofNGOsasagentsofdemocratizationdonotrelyonanyless‐anecdotaldatathantheiroptimisticcounterpoints(Fafchamps&Owens2008).Indeed,eventhemostoutspokencriticsofNGOshavealsosaid,“generallyspeaking[NGOs]areonthesideoftheangels,andtheworldisabetterplaceforthem”(Edwards2000:36)Incomingtothisconclusion,Ireviewedapproximately100articlesonNGOs,civilsociety,democratization,developmentandaccountabilityaroundtheworld.Alistofthesearticlesisavailable.98 The remaining 10% had no answer or didn’t know. 99 Ebrahim (2003) agrees. While he discusses five methods of NGO accountability, he also cites Najam’s (1996) description of NGOs’ claims of participation as “sham rituals,” in which “the sham of participation translates into the sham of accountability” (Ebrahim 2003: 818).

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involvementingovernance,itisintheinterestoftheKenyangovernmentopendecision‐makingtoincludeNGOs.

Onthewhole,however,evidencecollectedbetween2005and2008inKenyasuggeststhatNGOsareleadingtoagreaterdegreeofthesevaluespushedwithinthepublicadministrationofservices.Many,ifnotmost,normalpeople–includingcivilservants–indevelopingcountriesactivelywanttomaketheircountryabetterplaceanddonotorienttheiractiontowarddupingdonors.

Atthelevelofserviceprovision,theKibakiAdministrationhasunquestionablyadoptedthelanguageofopen,collaborativegovernance.ItsambitiousplantoimplementtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsbytheyear2030,forexample:

“Advocatedaconsultativeapproach…involvingasmanyordinaryKenyansandstakeholdersaspossible.Consequently,thiswasdonethroughworkshopswithstakeholdersfromalllevelsofthepublicservice,theprivatesector,civilsociety,themediaandnon‐governmentalorganizations(NGOs)”(GovernmentofKenya2007:3).Mostkeyinformantsinterviewedforthispaper–evenaftertheviolent

electionperiodinearly2008–wereconvinced,however,thatthechangesaremorethanwindow‐dressingandfancylanguage.Instead,NGO‐governmentcollaborationispartofaslow‐movinglong‐termturntowardincreasingaccountabilityandparticipationinthegovernanceofserviceprovision.ADistrictOfficertoldmethatgovernmentworkersappreciatethetransformations;despitetheaberrantpost‐electoralviolence,“2002catalyzedpeople–theywanttomoveforward.Oncechangecomes,it’shardtostop”(2008‐36).AnNGOworkeragreed,sayingthatcivilservants“arenowmoreproactive.Theyreallytrytodotheirjobssince2002”(2008‐14).

Anotherseniordistrictadministratortalkedanimatedlyofthings“changingdramatically:everyoneisbeingbroughtonboard!”(2008‐41).WorkingwithNGOsispartofanoverallnewstrategyofgovernment,expressedintheGovernment’s“Vision2030”plan,whichexplainsthata“participatoryapproachisoneofournew‘corevalues’”(ibid.).TheseareinnovativewaysofthinkingforKenya’sgovernment:“Focusandworkasateam…we’retalkingabouta24‐houreconomy,notbusiness‐as‐usual.Weneedtoworktogethernow”(ibid.).Othercivilservantsagreed.WhenaskedwhetherherofficehadeverprovidedinformationforNGOstodisseminate,askedanNGOtoorganizeapublicconsultation,orinvitedNGOrepresentativestoserveonagovernmentcommittee,adivision‐levelworkeraccustomedtoworkingwithNGOsinotherwayssaid,“No.Butwewouldlikeit…”(2008‐35).

EvenleadersofNGOsthathadbeenkeyplayersinthestrugglefordemocracyduringthe1990sspokeofanopeningingovernancenow.Forexample,arepresentativeofanationwideKenyan‐basedNGOthatbattledtheMoiAdministrationasthe“voiceofthevoiceless,”describedhowherorganizationsuccessfullyengagedwiththeKibakiAdministrationwhenitbegantobringNGOsintothegoverningprocess:“Governmenthasnotaskedustocompromiseourselves”(2008‐26).ThisorganizationisnotpoliticallyaffiliatedwithKibakiorhisKikuyuethnicgroup–itistrulyanationalorganization.Thiswomansaidthatinthepast,ProvincialAdministratorssentheron“wildgoosechases,”andforcedherto

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conductserviceprovisionsecretlytoavoidharassment.Thishasended,shesays.“Now…I’mabletowork”(ibid.).

Demonstratingthischangetowardparticipatorygovernance,theGovernmenthascontractedherorganizationtoimplementdistrict‐wideprogramsonhumanrights,civiceducation,HIVandtheenvironment.TheorganizationwasalsoaskedtocoordinatetheNationalPolicyandActionPlan(NAP),aprogramtoreformhumanrightspolicyinKenya.Itisagovernmentprogram,implementedthroughNGOs,withahighlyparticipatoryelementdowntothelocallevel.Accordingtothegovernment’sKenyanNationalHumanRightsCommissionwebsite,thegovernment’sapproachtocreatingthispolicyistoconduct“regionalhearings…inallprovinces,wherebytheywillreceivesubmissionsanddiscusswiththeresidentstheirhumanrightsconcerns,challengesandprioritiestowardsinformingthehumanrightspolicyandactionplan”(KNCHR2009).OrganizersofthisprocessinEasternProvincerevealedthathundredsofNGOsandcommunitygroupspresentedplanningdocuments,groupopinionsandmemorandaatastakeholderforumheldforthepurposeofpublicinvolvement.Thesedocumentswerecollectedbythegovernmentagencywiththegoalofintegratingthemintothenationalplan.

AnotherorganizationrepresentativeinvolvedintheNAPprogramtoldasimilarstory.EventhoughhisNGOisactsasacritical,outspokenwatchdogofgovernment,itwascontractedtoconductNAPactivitiesinEasternProvince.Hespokeofsuccessfullydemandingthegovernmenttoholdrequiredopen‐to‐the‐publicmeetings,“gatecrashing”onlynominallyopenmeetingsandreportingonthemtowananchi,andprovidingdetailedinformationtowananchionhowthegovernment’snewdevolvedfundsaremeanttowork(2008‐27).ThisNGO’sgoalwastomobilizepeopleto,“Raiseconcerns!Belively!Demandtoknow!”atlocalanddistrict‐widegovernmentmeetings(Ibid.).Suchrabble‐rouserswouldneverhavebeenwelcomedaspartnerswiththegovernmentduringtheMoiAdministration.Workingwithcriticalorganizationsratherthanstiflingthemrepresentsasignificantopeningingovernancepatterns.

Thegovernment’snewtrendofcontractingitsprogramstoNGOsforimplementationlikewiserepresentsamovetowardnewgovernance.AsidefromtheNAP,thegovernmenthasinvitedNGOstodisseminateinformationonitsbehalfduringthecountry’sannual“publicserviceweek”(PSW).ThegoalofthePSW,inauguratedin2006,istoimproveserviceprovisionbyinformingcitizensofwhattheirrightsandgovernmentobligationsareregardingservices(2008‐26).Withbetterknowledgeoftheirrights,citizenswillbemoreabletoholdthegovernmentaccountable.ThegovernmenthasalsoinvitedNGOstodomonitoringandevaluationforsomeofitsdistributiveprograms,includingdecentralizedfunds(2008‐24).This,too,ismeanstoincreasegovernmentaccountability.

Movementtowardmoreopengovernancepatternsisrevealedaswellinnewmechanismsintendedtoincreaseaccountabilityinthecivilservice.Forexample,“Servicecharters”havebeenintroduced,andareprominentlydisplayedaspostersinline‐ministryoffices.TheMinistryofLivestockservicecharter,forexample,callsitself,“atooltoenhanceawarenessontherangeofservicesofferedbytheMinistry…andtoexpressourcommitmentstooffersatisfactoryservicestoallour

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clients.[It]representsaparadigmshiftinthemannerinwhichpublicserviceswillbedelivered,nowandinfuture”(RepublicofKenya2008).

Thecivilservicehasalsointroducedannualperformanceassessmentsforthefirsttime.Onecivilservantwasexcitedtopointoutthat“youhavetoreporttodutynow”–suggestingthatmerelygettingstafftoappearintheofficeswheretheyworkisamovementforward(2008‐41).Governmentserviceprovisionofficesnowhavesuggestionboxesandevenstaffedcustomercaredesksatgovernmentoffices.100ManyoftheseaccountabilitymeasuresmimicthoseusedinNGOs–stemmingfromformerNGOleadersenteringtheKibakiadministration,fromclosercontactbetweenNGOsandcivilservants,andfromgovernmentofficialsnotingthepositiveresponsethatpeopleonthegroundhaveforNGOprogramsandprojects.101GovernmentofficialcreditNGOsforthisexplicitly:“It’sNGOsthatmadegovernmentopenoureyes.Wehavemadealotofchanges”(2008‐37).

ThereaderneednotseeNGO‐governmentrelationshipsthroughrose‐coloredglasses–theadministrationofmostpublicserviceshasnotbecomeefficient,accountableandparticipatory–butitismovinginthisdirection.Thedegreetowhichtheyarechangingisyettobedetermined,andwillbealong‐termprocess.

ADegreeofConflictualRelationsStillExistsDespitetheseconsiderableimprovements,somehardfeelingsstillexist

betweenNGOandgovernmentrepresentatives.Generallyspeaking,NGOworkershadverypositiveattitudestowardNGO‐governmentrelations,butwouldslipintoexpressionsofmildpiquesuchas,“they[thegovernment]takeyourideasdown,buttheydon’tusethem.…Theyworkwithyou,butreally,notingoodfaith”(2008‐24),or“Governmentcanmakepolicy.Butimplementationiswherethe[NGOs]comein.Governmentisatoothlessdogwithoutthem.Theyhavesomanypoliciesonpaper,buttheydon’tdoanything!”(2008‐14).Wecouldinterprettheselatterstatementsasthe“truerelationship”betweenNGOsandgovernment–infact,thiswasmyhypothesisbeforebeginningfieldresearchinKenya.Yetthesentimentsexpressedininterviewsbeliedthisinterpretation–acrimoniousrelationshipsseemedatrueafterthoughtformostNGOs.Goodwillwastherule.

Nevertheless,frictionbetweenNGOsandgovernmentremaininseveralarenas.Factorscontributingtothisacrimonyinclude:a)mutualsuspicion,lackoftrustandinsider‐outsiderresentment,b)lackofcommunication,c)promisesmade,butnotkept,d)bitternessstemmingfromresourceconstraints,ande)organizationstakingcreditforothers’work.

100 One customer care desk in Machakos district entailed a table placed under an awning outside of a central administrative office. Two women staffed the desk, although “customers” were infrequent. This suggests good intentions on the part of the government, but perhaps not well-thought-out implementation. 101 In the survey of 501 adults in Kenya, about 60% felt that NGOs “shared their values”; 70% thought that NGOs have the interests of the people in mind (vs. 34% for politicians and 53% for civil servants), and nearly 20% would choose NGO leaders to run the country (vs. 15% for the civil service).

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MutualSuspicion,lackoftrustandinsideroutsiderresentmentOneofthemainsourcesofanimusbetweenNGOsandgovernmentwasa

generalizedsenseofsuspicionbetweentheorganizations–likelystemmingfromyearsofrancorduringtheMoiAdministration.Becomingpartofthein‐groupfavoredbythedistrictadministrationisimportanttoNGOs,butisdifficult.“Theyaretoosuspicious!Youhavetoconvincethemthatyouareserious,”oneNGOleadertoldme,usingthebroadKenyan‐Englishmeaningof“serious”:well‐intentioned,upstanding,judiciousandresponsible.Hesaidittookseveralyearsandcarefulgroomingtogetontothedistrictgovernment’sgoodside(2008‐43).Sometimes,though,distrustledtohighleveldistrictworkers“pullingrank”andexplicitlyexertingtheirpoweroverNGOs–particularlysmall,localones,whospokeofofficialsgettingupsetandstallingtheirwork(2008‐16). LackofCommunication

Muchofthismistruststemsfromalackofinformationflowonbothsidesoftheaisle.Sometimesitisunintentional–peopleworkontheirownthing,usingthecontactstheyalreadyknow(2008‐24).Othertimes,NGOssaytheydonotknowwhatinformationtheyshouldprovidetothegovernment.Ifemployeesareforeign,theyfrequentlydonotunderstandtheinformalprotocolofworkinginKenya.AndgovernmentofficerssimilarlydonotrealizeNGOsliketoknowwhatcivilservantsareworkingonandhowitaffectsthem.OneNGOleadersaidthathissuccessfulsolutiontothiswas“knockondoors;demandinformation;demandtoknow,”whichledhimtocohesiverelationshipswithgovernment(ibid.).

YetsomeNGOsdeliberatelywithholdinformationfromthegovernment(2008‐60)–becausetheydon’twanttopaygovernmentfees,becausetheydon’twantgovernmenttointerferewithorskimfromtheirprograms,orbecausetheyarethemselvesshady,corrupt“briefcase”NGOs.GovernmentemployeesbecomefrustratedwithalloftheseNGOsbothbecausetheyfeeltheyhavearighttoknowwhatNGOsintheirareaaredoing,andbecausetheNGOssometimescauseavoidableproblems.Forexample,anagriculturalofficercomplainedaboutNGOsencouragingcropsthatrequireaccesstomarketsforprofitability,butthendisappearingaftertheplantshadbeengrown,butbeforeamarketcouldbefound(2008‐38).ShesaidthattheirofficetriestopartnerwithNGOssothatthefarmersarenothurtintheprocess. PromisesandPoliciesMade,butnotImplemented NGOsinparticularexpressedmildfrustrationthatthegovernmentcannotalwaysbereliedontoholdupitsendofbargains.Sometimesrenegingisexplicit,aswhenagovernmentpromisestobringstafftoanNGO‐builtdispensaryorschool,butdoesn’t(2008‐14,2008‐30,2008‐47).Othertimes,itisinferred;anNGOmightregularlyassistthegovernment,butwhenthegovernmentimplementsitsownprograms,itdoesn’tsupporttheNGOinreturn(2008‐54).OneNGOleadercomplainedaboutgovernmentcontracts,“There’snopointtosignapaperifyouaren’tgoingtoactually[dothe]work”(2008‐27). Thisfeelingreflectedthedisparitiesbetweengovernment’sstrongplanningandweakimplementation.AsoneNGOleadersaid,“Kenyaonpaperisgood!The

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policydocumentsareperfect!Buttheyareverypooronimplementation!…Therulesarethere.Buttheyarenotfollowed”(2008‐14).AnotherNGOemployeehadpreviouslyworkedinSudan,andfeltthatcollaborationtherewasmoresuccessfulthaninKenya,largelybecausebothNGOsandgovernmentfollowedthroughafterworkingtogether.“TheKenyancontext,though,isaboutmeetings,butneverwhatcomesout.…Noonetalksaboutbudget.Noevaluationiseverdoneofwhethertheplansworked”(2008‐17).Still,manyNGOsthatmentionedthisalsorecognizedthelimitedresourcesofgovernment.AsoneNGOleaderdiplomaticallyphrasedit,“Governmentactsonthese[ideas,suggestionsandopinions]attimes,but…let’stalkoflimitedresources…”(2008‐25).MutualResentmentoverResourceIssues Nevertheless,althoughmanyNGOsrecognizedthegovernment’sresourceconstraints,issuesofmoneywereafrequentsourceofslightconflict.NGOworkersresentthe“allowances”andperdiemthattheirorganizationshadtopaytotheirgovernmentcollaborators(2008‐18,2008‐47,2008‐54).Othersexpressedconcernsthatparticularcivilservantswouldnothelpthemwithoutbribesorotherinducements(2008‐16).NGOsfeltthatgovernmentwasjealousofthemoneythatNGOsreceive(2006‐3). Ontheotherside,civilservantsexpressedconcernthatprofligateNGOscausedproblemsfortheirministries.Forexample,theMinistriesofAgricultureandLivestockimplementedapolicyendinghandouts.YettheyseeNGOsgivematerialincentivestothepeople,whothenfavorNGOprogramsovergovernmentones.Asacivilservantworried,“Theytakethecommunityawayfromgovernment.Wecan’tgetquorumsforourmeetings,etc.”(2008‐38).TheseworkersfeltthatNGOswerestymieingtheireffortstodevelopingworkingagro‐markets.TakingCreditforOthers’Work

OnewaythatgovernmentappearstohandletheseissuesistoclaimcreditforNGOs’work,inordertomakeitselflookbetter.ThisconformstoBratton’s(1989:572)analysisofcredittaking:“Governmentsareloathtoadmitthattheyhaveperformedpoorlybecauseoftheimplicationsthishasfortheirrighttoholdpower.Theymaybeunwillingtoallowcredittoaccruetoanyorganizationotherthanthestate.”Thisstrategy,however,cancausefrustrationamongNGOs(2008‐19,2008‐31).“Don’ttakethegloryifyou’renotactuallymypartners!”exclaimedoneNGOleader,whenaskedabouttheissue(2008‐47).

AcommonNGOsolutionistoimplementcomplementaryprojectsinsteadofidenticalones(2008‐17,2008‐18).Anothermethodistoinsistonpublic,writtenacknowledgementfortheNGOscontribution(2008‐24).NGOsalsomakeapointofinformingcommunitiesofthesourceoftheprogram–byincludingcommunitymembersintheprojectasithappensand/orleavingtheirlogooninfrastructureorsignboardsbuilt.Thispreventspoliticianstakingovertheentireplaque(2008‐18).Forexample,NGOsplacedthesignsbelowatplacesinwhichtheyworked:

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NGOsignboardoutsideanoffice NGOlogopaintedonthesideofabuildingata

sponsoredproject

Yetmanyorganizationsarequitehappyforthegovernmenttotakecreditfortheirwork–someevenencourageit(2008‐11).Theyseetheirroleassupplementinggovernmentintheserviceofthestateanditsdevelopment.“Ithappens[thatMPstakecredit],”saysoneNGOleader,“ButIlikeit.Itmeanstheytakeownershipandcare”(2008‐33).ProblemswithPoliticiansorPublicAdministration? ManyinformedobserversmadeapointtostressthatmuchoftheconflictualrelationshipbetweenNGOsandthegovernmentisrelatedtopoliticiansratherthantopublicadministrators.TheytalkedofMPswritingNGOs’programsintotheirConstituencyDevelopmentFund(CDF)reports,evenwhentheNGOreceivednoCDFmoneyorsupport(2008‐10).OrofanMPannouncingtohisconstituentsataprojectlaunch,“Youtoldmetobringsomeone[tohelpyou],andIhavebrought[thisNGO],andthey’vedoneit!”–eventhoughtheMPhadnothingtodowiththeNGOworkinginthatplace(2008‐54).Suchpolitickinghasbeencommonsincetimeimmemorial,yet,“Ministriesdon’tdothis[credit‐taking],”accordingtolocalinformants(ibid.).

PoliticianscansabotageNGOswhentheyfocusonlyontheirpoliticalagenda.OneNGOworkerspokeofanMPdrillingaboreholeforpoliticalreasons400metersfromthespotwheretheNGOhadjustdrilledone–evenaftertheorganizationimploredhimtoputitfartheraway(2008‐14).Anotherfeltthat,“WhenNGOsdowell,politicianscometoidentifywiththem.Theyarenottherewhenyoustart…buttheycomein…[andendup]destroyingthework!”(2008‐19).Asanothersaid,“Whenwe’reopeningaproject,we’llcallthem,okay.Butgenerallywedon’tworkwiththem.Someonereallyconcernedwithhelpingworkswithouta[political]agenda”(2008‐30).Andafourth:“Politicianswantpeopletoknowthathebroughtthesethings.But…ifitdoesn’tgowell,theyturnaroundandblameyouforit!”(2008‐17).Afifthaddedthatrelationsare“verycordialexceptwhenpoliticscomesin.Politiciansdon’tlikeitwhenyoueducatepeople”(2008‐54).Thelistcouldgoon…

Atthesametime,somepoliticiansworriedaboutinadvertentcredittaking,andchosetosteerclearoftheirNGOcounterparts.“NGOsdon’tworkwiththe

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CountyCouncil;theyworkwithcommunities.…WecannotjointogetherwithNGOs.Otherwise,whoownstheproject?”(2008‐35).

Unlikepoliticians,NGOsgenerallyhadpositivethingstosayaboutworkingwithcivilservants.Asdescribedearlierinthispaper,manyNGOsworkwithtechnicalstafffromgovernmentlineministries.Inparticular,thereisfrequentcollaborationwiththeministriesanddepartmentsofhealth,water,agriculture,youth,childrenandgender.Likewise,theprovincialadministration–particularlyatthelowestlevels–isverywellregarded.

ConclusionLet’sreturntoDahl's(1961)question,“Whogoverns?”InKenyanservice

provision,itisincreasinglyajointprocess.Governanceisnolongerthepurviewofonlypublicgovernmentactors;itisincreasinglyseenasasharedornetworkedprocessamongseveraltypesoforganizations.Governancehereisnottheremovalofgovernment(Rosenau&Czempiel1992,Jordanetal.2005),buttheadditionandacceptanceofotheractorstothesteeringprocess. GovernmentandNGOslearnfromeachothertoimprovewhattheydo.Inparticular,manygovernmentagenciesnoticethesuccessesachievedbyNGOsandmimictheiractions,whetherintentionallyornot.Thisismostobviousintheirattemptsatparticipatoryapproaches,inwhichopinionsfromthevillagetothecityaresolicited(ifnotalwaysactuallylistenedto).Asaresult,governanceinKenyahasslowlybeguntomoredemocratic,movingawayfromitshierarchical,authoritarianpast. Governanceofthisnatureiscontingentonseveralfactors,whichrequireconstantvigilanceandefforttomaintain.Notsurprisingly,itworksbestwhenrelationsbetweenpublicandprivateactorsarecollaborativeandcollegial.GoodrelationslargelydependongovernmentrepresentativesbeingopentohelpfromNGOs,toworkinghand‐in‐hand,andonNGOstakingtimetoworkwithgovernmentaswell.Governancealsoworksbestwhenelectoralpoliticalconsiderationsdonotbecomeforefrontinthepicture.NGOspreferworkingwithlineministriesandtheprovincialadministration,notMPsorCountyCouncilmembers,soastoavoidtheabjectpoliticizationoftheirwork.Likewise,withsomeexceptions,governmentgenerallypreferstoworkwithNGOswithnon‐politicalobjectives.WheretherearemoreNGOsinanarea,relationsseemslightlybetter–perhapsbecausegovernmentworkersaremoreaccustomedtoworkingtogether. Theimplicationsofthesefindingsarethreefold.First,whatarethelong‐termconsequencesofrelyingonthisparticulartypeofprivateactors–largelyforeign‐fundedNGOs–askeyparticipantsinthegoverningprocessindevelopingcountries?IsitrealistictoassumethatNGOsareinKenyatostay?Orthatglobaleconomicconditionswillcontinuetofacilitatetheirfunding?OnehopestoavoidamassexodusofinternationalfundsuntilthecapacityoflocalNGOs,governmentandcivilsocietyhasgrowntofillthespaceoccupiedbythem.ItisimperativethatKenyanactors,whetherinsidethegovernmentoroutside,alsogrowtheircapabilities.

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Second,thehistoryofKenyanNGO‐governmentrelationsintheMoiandKibakiAdministrationssuggestsadelicatebalanceexistsbetweencollaborativeandbureaucraticgovernancepatterns.MaintainingpositiverelationshipsandNGOintegrationintopolicymakingandgoverninggenerallydependstosomeextentonpoliticalgoodwill.RecentupheavalinKenyafollowingthe2007presidentialelectionsremindsusthatdemocracyinKenyaisyoungandunconsolidated.WhileNGOsarehelpingtomovepublicserviceadministrationanddecision‐makinginamoredemocraticdirection,theseeffortsexistinabroaderandfragilepoliticalcontext.Successinpublicmanagementimprovementswilldependlargelyonthetrajectoryofthepoliticalsystemasawhole. Finally,foracademics,theKenyancaseallowsustoexaminehowcategoriesandconceptstravelglobally.Elementsofthegovernanceliteraturesuchas“steeringandrowing”maybepossibleandlaudableindevelopedcountrieswheremuchofthegovernanceliteratureblooms.Yetinweaklyinstitutionalizedstateswithlimitedpublicadministrationcapacity,thissortoforganization‐levelcomparativeadvantagedevelopmentisnotfeasible.Insteadofaclearseparationofdutieswheregovernmentmakespolicywhileprivateorganizationsimplementthem,wefindtheblurringoflinesofauthority,decision‐makingandgoverningbetweenNGOsandgovernment.

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ChapterFive:DoNGOsAccountforDecreasingLegitimacyinKenya?

“Sincetheleadersofthepostcolonialstateclaimedtheirrighttoruleonthebasisofpromisesofimprovedmaterialwelfare,alossofdistributivecapacityispredictablymetwithareductioninpopularlegitimacy.InmanyAfricancountries,ordinarypeopleareceasingtoregardthestateastheirownandarerefusingtocomplywithofficialinjunctions.”(MichaelBratton1989b:410)

“OfthefiveimperativesthatareaconstantsourceofpoliticalconcerntoAfricangovernments,legitimacyispotentiallytheonemostsusceptibletoNGOexpansion.ThecriticalshortcomingofthegoverningsystemchosenbytheleadersofmostAfricanstatesisitsnonfulfillmentoftheoriginalcontractbetweengovernmentandgoverned.Inabilitytoprovideforthesustainablewellbeingofcitizensandfailuretoensuresocialjusticeandpublicaccountabilitycanonlyunderminethegovernment’spositionvisàvisavoluntarysectorwhichcouldofferanalternativeonallthesefronts.”(AlanFowler1991:78)

IntroductionBeneatheachoftheprecedingchaptersisanunderlyingquestionofwhether

NGOsareasupportorathreattothestate.Eachbuildstothissetoftwochaptersonstatelegitimacy.Whetherornotastatebroadcastsphysicalpresenceoveritsterritory,exertscapacitytoprovideservices,orgovernswithfinesse–allhaveimplicationsonhowcitizensperceivetheirstate.Themorestatepresence,capacityandfairgovernanceanindividualobserves,themoreconfidencethatpersonwillhaveinthestate’smoralandappropriaterighttorule.AndsincewehavealreadyseenthatNGOsimpactstateserviceprovisioncapacity,governanceandterritoriality,theycertainlyimpactlegitimacyaswell. Whatislegitimacy?Legitimacy,followingWeber,isageneralizedacceptanceoftheauthorityofthestatetorule.Statedanotherway,itistheperceptionthatthestatehasarighttogovernandthatitsactionsareproperorappropriateinitsculturalcontext(Suchman1995).Itisanexpressionofconsentbythepeopletobegovernedwithoutrelianceoncoercionorbribes,andisthereforethelowest‐costmethodofgainingcompliance(Etzioni1966).Itisalsoameanstoevaluateauthority,aspeoplejudgehowfairlyandmorallyauthorityisexercised(Sunshine&Taylor2003).Whilesomebelievethatlegitimacyisbasedoncharacteristicsofanorganization,institutionaltheorycorrectlyassertsthatlegitimacyderivesfromacceptancebythoseintheorganization’senvironment,whoareinformedbytherules,beliefsystems,valuesandrelationalnetworksofthebroadersocialcontext(Selznick1949,Lister2003). TherootsofNGOs’impactsonstatelegitimacylieinthehistoricalfoundationsofthestateinKenya,astheydointheAfricanstategenerally.As

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discussedinChapterOneofthisdissertation,Africanstateshavepredicatedtheirlegitimacyonthedistributionofservicesandpromisesofeconomicdevelopment(Young1988:59‐62,Bratton1989and1989b,Fowler1991,Kanyinga1996:71,Owitietal.2004,Osodo&Matsvai1997).Arisingoutofcolonialism,duringwhichAfricanswereoftendeniedservicesandopportunitiesforadvancement,thenewlyindependentstatesofAfricasettheirregimesinoppositiontothepreviousera,basingtheirpartofthesocialcontractwithsocietyonprovidingtheseverythingstothepeople(Jackson&Rosberg1984).GovernmentsinAfricahavedevelopedapaternalrole,actingascaregiver,providerandsourceofsecuritytothecitizen‐childrenofthenation;thepresidentserves–oftenexplicitly–asthe“father”ofthecountry(Schatzberg2001).

Thissetofchaptersexplorestheimpactonthisparentalrelationshipofare‐routingofserviceprovision.Itexamineswhathappenswhenathird,non‐“familial”setofactors–NGOs–stepsbetweenstateandsocietytoprovideservices.DoNGOsactassurrogatemotherforthestate?Ordoestheintroductionofthisthirdactorinterrupttheflowoflegitimacyfromcitizentostate?

Asestablishedintheintroductorychaptertothisdissertation,theliteraturesonNGOsandserviceprovisioninAfricaarefilledwithexplicitclaimsthatNGOsthreaten–orhavethepotentialtothreaten–statelegitimacy(Fowler1991:62,Rothschild&Chazan1988,Schatzberg2001,Young1988,Martin2002,Sandberg1994).102Manyofthesearesummedwellbystatementspresentedattheopeningofthischapter.

WhenIfirstbeganstudyingNGOsinKenyain2002,itwasinacontextofweakeningsemi‐authoritarianismatthecrepusculeofDanielarapMoi’stwenty‐fouryearpresidency.TheNGOwithwhichIworkedhadhadseveralnegativeexperienceswiththegovernmentinNairobiandlivedinfearofbeingshutdown.Donors,otherNGOworkersandthenewspaperswereproclaimingthepositiverolethatcivilsocietyandNGOshadplayedinendingthe“OldMan’s”near‐dictatorship.OneimaginedatthattimethatNGOswereaconstantthorninthesideoftheKenyangovernment,intentionally–orinadvertently–underminingstatelegitimacybyurgingondemocracy,accountabilityandruleoflaw.

Duringfieldresearchseveralyearslater,someintervieweesexpressedthesameideas.TheytoldmethatNGOsare“seenasinciting–peopleseeNGOsprovidingallthis,andtheyfeelalienatedfromgovernment.Apathy,too.…Butthegovernmentdoesn’twanttotakeabackseat”(2008‐10).Theyalsosuggestedthatwananchi,regularKenyans,makecomparisonsbetweenthetwogroupsthatreflectunfavorablyongovernment.NGOsareknownforstartingprojects,monitoringthemtoasuccessfulend,andallowingconcernstobevoicedthroughout;“Butwithgovernment,youhitbureaucracy.Gotooneoffice,theytellyoutobouncetoanother.Theytellyounothing…SopeopletrustNGOsmorethangovernment”(2008‐27).

Thisworkaimstodiscoverwhethertheseclaimsholdwater.Doesthegovernmentitselfhavetoprovideservicesforlegitimacytoaccruetoit?When102ForareviewoftheargumentsonwhyNGOseitherbolsterorunderminelegitimacy,seeChapterOne.

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NGOsprovidebetter,cheaperservicesthanthegovernment,distributedonorresourcesgenerously,andfosterademocraticspiritofparticipation,istheresultlowerpopularperceptionsofgovernment?

Toanswerthisquestion,thechapterbeginsbysimplytestingwhetherthelegitimacyoftheKenyanstatehasdecreasedovertime,comparingdatafrom1966toreplicatedresultsin2008.Inasense,wearecomparingcitizens’viewsofthegovernmentovertime,usingaperiodbeforetheproliferationofNGOsasourbaseline,NGOsasthe“treatment,”andthecurrentperiodasthetreatmentoutcome.IfNGOsarethreateninglegitimacy,weexpecttoseemeasuresofstatelegitimacygoingdownovertime,allotherfactorsbeingequal.Eyeballanalysisofthedatadoessuggestadecreaseinlegitimacyovertime,whichaccordswithbothpopularandscholarlyopinion.

TableOne:Descriptivestatisticsshowapparentdeclineinlegitimacy

Question:AgreeorDisagree

PositiveResponseRate1966

PositiveResponseRate2008

ChangeinLegitimacy19662008

Peoplehavetherighttodisobeylawstheythinkarewrongorimmoral? 42% 48% ‐6%Thegovernmentusuallyknowswhatisbestforpeople? 53% 46% ‐7%

Oncechangesindemographicsareincludedintheanalysis,however,aswillbeshownbelow,wefindthat,first,legitimacyhasnotdecreasedverymuchovertime.

Buteveniflegitimacyhasdecreased,NGOsarenotthemajorfactorloweringitinKenya–endemiccorruptionandheightenedinsecurity,amongotherthings,haveastrongernegativeimpactonlegitimacy.103ThusthesecondsectionofthischapterexaminesNGOs’impactsonthesamemeasuresoflegitimacyusedinthefirstsection.Insteadoffocusingonchangesovertime,wefocusonNGOimpactsinthesecondperiodalone.104ThissectionshowsthatitisnotNGOs,butlargelymistrustinpoliticiansalongwithotherdemographictrendsthatexplainalesseningoflegitimacyinKenyabetween1966and2008.

Thus,usingtoolsofstatisticalandregressionanalysis,Ishowthatcontrollingforthesefactors,legitimacylevelsin2008arenearlyidenticaltothoseintheimmediatepost‐independenceera,ifnothigher.NGOsdonotappeartobedrivingareductioninstatelegitimacy,whereoneisseenatall.

103Iflegitimacylevelshadgoneupinthe1966to2008timeperiod,wecouldthereforeconcludethatNGOsarelikelyincreasinglegitimacy,sincetheseotherfactorsareclearlyloweringit.104ThiscanbeanalyzedonlyinthesecondperiodsincequestionsaboutNGOswerenotincludedin1966.

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Replicationofa1960sSurveyToobtainthedataneededtorunthesetests,Iconductedasurveyof500

FormThree105secondaryschoolstudentsinEasternProvince(whereMachakosandMbeerearebothlocated)inOctoberandNovember2008.ThissurveyreplicatedworkdoneinKenyain1966‐1967,atimeofgreatoptimismjustafewyearsafterthecountry’sindependencein1963.TheoriginalsurveywasconductedbypoliticalscientistGeorgevonderMuhllaspartofalargerprojectdirectedbypoliticalscientistandformerUSCensusDirectorKennethPrewitt(Prewitt1976).Prewitt’soriginalsurveyqueriedstudentsthroughoutEastAfricaonissuesofnationalism,statebuildingandsocializationviaschools.Ireplicatedportionsofthesurveymostcloselyrelatedtoissuesofstatelegitimacy.ComparingPrewitt’sresultsfromthemid1960stoanswersstudentsgivefortyyearslatergivesasenseofchangeovertimeinKenya.106Inaddition,Iinsertedquestions(oranswerchoicesonselectedquestions)toprovideanothermeanstounderstandtherelationshipbetweenNGOsandpopularviewsofgovernmentlegitimacyin2008.Approximatelyhalfofthe2008respondentsreceivedPrewitt’sexactquestions,whiletheotherhalfhadthequestionsmodifiedtoincludeNGOsinthequestionsoranswers.ThisallowsforacomparisonovertimethatincludesinformationaboutNGOsinthepresenttimeperiod.

SamplingforthereplicationwasdoneinamannerattemptingtocloselymatchthatofPrewittinthe1960s.Becauseofsignificantlyaltereddemographicconditionsinthepasthalf‐century,andbecauseVonderMuhllandPrewittremovedschoolnamesforconfidentialityreasons,theschoolsvisitedinthelate1960scouldnotbereplicatedexactly.Instead,afterconsultationwithPrewitt,nowaColumbiaUniversityprofessor,abouthismethods,Iselectedschoolsthatmatchedthetypeofschoolselectedinthe1960s.Theseschoolswerelong‐standing,well‐establishedschoolsofgoodreputation–importantbecauseallsecondaryschoolsinKenyaintheearlypost‐independenceerawouldhavehadthesecharacteristics.WhilePrewitt’sfullsamplecamefrommultiplegradelevelsacrossallofKenya’sprovinces,IcompareonlyhisresultsfromEasternProvincethatcorrespondtotoday’sFormThreestudentsthere.Asaresult,thissub‐sampleofhisworkcontained144respondentsfromfourschools.Mysurveyisof500respondentsfromsixschools.BecauseofchangesinKenyandemographicsduringthistimeperiod,the2008studentstendtobeyounger,morelikelytobefemaleandtohavebetter‐educatedparentsthantheir1966counterparts.Icontrolforthesefactorsinallregressionanalyses.

105FormThreeisthepenultimateyearofsecondaryschoolinKenyatoday,inwhichsecondaryschooltakesfouryears.ToconformwiththeProtectionofHumanSubjectsCommitteeatUCBerkeleyrequirements,allrespondentsinmysurveywereaged16orolder.106Ideally,Iwouldhavecomparedmyresultstosomeintermediatetimeintheforty‐yeargapaswellastotheimmediatepost‐independenceera.Opinionandpoliticalsurveys,however,werenotallowedinKenyaduringmostofthetwenty‐fouryearsthatMoiwaspresident.TryasImight,Iwasnotabletodiscoverapolitically‐relevantopinionpollconductedinthecountrybetweenPrewitt’stimeand2002,whensurveysbegantobeallowed.Idid,ontheplusside,havesomeenlighteningemailexchangeswithmanyscholarswhodidresearchinKenyaduringtheMoiyears.

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Toarriveattheconclusionsofthefirstsectionofthechapter,Ibeginwithasimplemodeltestingwhetherlegitimacyhasdecreasedduringtheperiod1966to2008,controllingforthedemographicfactorsjustmentioned.ThusPr(legit=1)=ƒ(α+ßYear+ßGender+ßAge+ßUrban+ßFatherEd+ε),wherethevariablesaredescribedasinthetablebelow.

TableTwo:Dependent,independentandcontrolvariablesused107

Variable

(stataname) Description SurveyQuestion

Includedin

Survey

DependentVariableMoralLegitimacy(govt_knws_bst)

0=disagreeorstronglydisagree;1=agreeorstronglyagree

Thegovernmentusuallyknowswhatisbestformostpeople.

1966,2008,2008‐N

ProceduralLegitimacy(laws)

0=agreeorstronglyagree.1=disagreeorstronglydisagree.

Ifsomeonebelievesalawiswrongorimmoral,hehasarighttodisobeyit

1966,2008,2008‐N

IndependentVariables

YearMeasureschangeovertime.0=1966;1=2008.

Yearinwhichsurveywasconducted. NA

Corruption(govt_leaders)

Measureoffaithingovernmentleadersandpoliticians.1=never;2=notalways;3=sometimes;4=usually.

Howmuchwouldyousayyoutrustgovernmentleaders?

1966,2008,2008‐N

Insecurity(police)

Measureoffaithinthepolice.1=never;2=notalways;3=sometimes;4=usually.

Howmuchwouldyousayyoutrustthepolice?

1966,2008,2008‐N

Democracy(voting)

Measureoffaithindemocraticprocesses.0=Votinghasverylittleeffectonwhatgovernmentdoes;1=Votingisagoodwaytocontrolgovernment.

Whichsentenceismoretrueaboutvoting?

1966,2008,2008‐N

imprv_k_ngos

MeasureoffaithinNGOs.1=stronglydisagree;2=disagree;3=agree;4=stronglyagree.

ThepeopleofKenyacannotimprovetheircountryunlessNGOsleadthemandhelpthem. 2008‐N

ngo_knw_bst

MeasureoffaithinNGOs.1=stronglydisagree;2=disagree;3=agree;4=stronglyagree.

NGOsusuallyknowwhatisbestformostpeople. 2008‐N

ngo_help_fam

MeasureofcontactwithNGOs.1=NGOsdonotdomuchformyfamily;2=NGOsdosomethingsformyfamily;3=NGOsdo

WhichstatementbestdescribeshowmuchNGOsdoforyouandyourfamily? 2008‐N

107Thistableincludesthevariablesusedinbothsectionsofthepaper.

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manythingsformyfamily.

ngo_trust

MeasureoffaithinNGOs.1=never;2=notalways;3=sometimes;4=usually.

HowmuchwouldyousayyoutrustNGOs? 2008‐N

ControlVariables

Gender(gender) 0=Male1=Female Areyoumaleorfemale?

1966,2008,2008‐N

Age(age)

Rangesfrom"16"to"20orolder" Whatisyourage?

1966,2008,2008‐N

Urban/Rural(rents_live)

Measureofurbanvs.ruralrespondent;In2008data,itcanalsobeameasureofinsecurity,whichisconsiderablyhigherinurbanareas.0=rural;1=urban.

Wheredoyourparentslivenow?(Inalocation;Inatownorcity)

1966,2008,2008‐N

Father’sEducation(dum_sch)

Measureoffamilyclass,usingfather'seducationlevel.Rangesfrom0=primaryeducationorless;1=secondaryeducationandmore.

Didyourfatherattendschool?Ifso,whatisthehigheststandardheattended?

1966,2008,2008‐N

Istartusingameasureofmorallegitimacy,askingwhethertherespondent

believesthattheGovernmentofKenyausuallyknowswhatisbestformostKenyans.Iflegitimacyhasdecreased,assuggestedintheliterature,thecoefficientonßYearwillbestatisticallysignificantandnegative(year=0for1966;year=1for2008).

Totesttherobustnessofmymodel,Irepeatthestepsaboveusingadifferentmeasureoflegitimacy.Thesecondmeasureaddressesprocedurallegitimacy,askingwhetherapersonhastherighttodisobeylawstheybelieveareimmoralorwrong.108Thishasbecomeacommonmeasureoflegitimacyinsurveyresearch(WorldValuesSurvey,Afrobarometer,Gilley2006and2006b).

Inthesecondsectionofdataanalysis,Iusethe2008samplethatincludesquestionsandanswerchoicesaboutNGOstotesttheimpactofNGOsonlegitimacyoutcomes.Again,Ibeginbyexaminingmorallegitimacy,andusethequestiononprocedurallegitimacyasatestofrobustness.Inthismodel,Iamalsointerestedintheimpactsofcorruptionandhighinsecurityonlegitimacy,againcontrollingforgender,educationlevelandage.IthereforesetPr(Leg08=1)=ƒ(α+ßNGO+ßcorr+ßpolice+ßcontrols+ε)Finally,Ihypothesizethatthemaindriversofdecreasedlegitimacyarecorruptionandinsecurity,notNGOs.

108Inthiscase,theagree/disagreeresponsestothisquestionarereversedfromthepreviousone,suchthatapositiveresponsecontinuestoindicateapositiveviewoflegitimacy.

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Legitimacy,ChangeoverTimeandNGOsLegitimacyandChangeoverTime IfirstlookattheimpactoftimeongovernmentlegitimacyinKenya.AsshowninTableThreebelow,Ifindthatcontrollingforanumberofdemographicfactors,thepassingoftime(year)isnotsignificantlycorrelatedwithlegitimacy.Thismeansthatcountertothegeneralperception,onceavarietyoffactorsaretakenintoaccount,legitimacyinKenyadoesnotappeartohavefallenbetween1966and2010.

Iarriveatthisconclusionusingthetwoseparatemeasuresoflegitimacymentionedabove.Thefirstmeasuresmorallegitimacy,legitimacybasedonjudgmentsthatanorganizationorinstitution“doestherightthing”(Suchman1995:579),meaningtheorganizationreflectsthevalues,moralandethicsofthepopulace.Here,respondentswereaskedwhethertheyagreedordisagreedwiththefollowingstatement:“Thegovernmentusuallyknowswhatisbestformostpeople.”Theresultsofthiswereregressedusinglogisticregressionagainstthechangeintime(year)controllingforanumberofdemographicfactorsincludingtherespondent’sgender,age,father’seducationlevel(dum_sch),andurbanorruralbackground(rents_live).Insomemodels,Ialsoincludedthevariablevoting,whichmeasureswhethertherespondentbelievesinproceduraldemocracyasawaytocontrolgovernment.Whiletheoutputisnotshownintheregressiontables,Ialsotestedforchangestothedemographicsbyinteractingthesevariableswithmyvariableofinterest,changeintime.Thiswasmeanttocontrolforthechangesindemographicsovertime.Theseinteractioneffectsdidnotrevealsignificantinformation.

TableThree:ImpactoftimeonlegitimacyinKenya

ModelOneModelTwo

ModelThree ModelFour

VARIABLEMoral

LegitimacyMoral

LegitimacyProceduralLegitimacy

ProceduralLegitimacy

year 0.0732 0.0468 ‐0.294 ‐0.252 (0.281) (0.279) (0.288) (0.281)gender ‐0.0968 ‐0.0753 ‐0.446*** ‐0.502*** (0.166) (0.164) (0.167) (0.165)age 0.0965 0.0953 ‐0.0709 ‐0.0709 (0.0944) (0.0931) (0.0964) (0.0952)rents_live ‐0.304* ‐0.381** ‐0.00740 0.0111 (0.183) (0.180) (0.183) (0.181)dum_sch ‐0.0352 ‐0.0107 ‐0.0939 ‐0.0993 (0.243) (0.240) (0.242) (0.236)voting 0.660*** ‐0.339 (0.219) (0.220) Constant ‐2.149 ‐1.574 2.129 1.865 (1.782) (1.761) (1.839) (1.808) Observations 621 633 616 628Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

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Tablethreeshowsthatthereisnotaclearandsignificantdecreaseingovernmentlegitimacybetween1966and2008.Ignoringstatisticalsignificanceforamoment,itappearsthatmorallegitimacyhasincreasedovertime,whileprocedurallegitimacyhasdecreased.

Becausethelog‐oddsreportedabovearenoteasytointerpret,Iprovideasubstantiveinterpretationonmykeyvariableofinterest,year,lookingfirstatModelOne,whichexaminesmorallegitimacy.Whenageissetatthemean,yearissetat1966andeachotherindependentvariableissetat1,orpositive,thenthepredictedprobabilitythatapersonthinksthegovernmentislegitimateis0.44.Whentheyearexaminedischangedto2008,butallelseisunchanged,thepredictedprobabilityofapositivelegitimacyresponserisesveryslightlyto0.46.Thismeansthatin1966,anaverageagedfemaleurbanrespondentwhosefatherhasattendedatleastsomesecondaryschool,andwhobelievesinelectoraldemocracyhasaslightlylowerthan1in2chanceoffeelingthatthegovernmentislegitimate.In2008,thesametypeofpersonwouldhaveanearlyidenticalprobability.Consideringtheelectoralviolencethatoccurredapproximatelytenmonthsbeforethissurveywasconductedin2008,theresultsinmorenormaltimesmighthavebeenmorepositive.

Brieflydiscussingothervariablesofinterest,weseethatwhenallvariablesareheldconstantasabovein2008,changingfromaruraltoanurbanlocationlowersthepredictedprobabilityofapositiveviewofgovernmentby0.08.Havingapositiveviewofdemocraticprocedure,however,increasesthelikelihoodofapositiveviewofgovernmentby0.15.Thesechangesinpredictedprobabilityareverysimilarlookingatthe1966data,wheretherespectivechangesinlocationandinelectoraldemocracyare‐0.07and0.15.Theseresultssupportthecommonlyheldnotionthaturbanresidentsaremoreskepticalofgovernmentthanaretheirruralcounterparts.

Asatestofrobustness,themodelswererepeatedusinganalternatemeasureoflegitimacy.Thistime,procedurallegitimacyismeasured,meaningthatrespondentsupholdthelegitimacyoftheproceduresofgovernment.ThisisofparticularinterestinlightofMichaelBratton’sstatementthatregularAfricansare“ceasingtoregardthestateastheirownandarerefusingtocomplywithofficialinjunctions”mentionedearlierinthechapter(1989b:410).Inthiscase,thequestionaskedofrespondentswaswhethertheyagreedordisagreedwiththestatement,“Ifsomeonebelievesalawiswrongorimmoral,hehasarighttodisobeyit.”Apositiveresponsetothisquestionimpliesthantherespondentacceptsthegreaterauthorityofthestateassetbygovernmentprocedures,thelaws.Iflegitimacyisdecliningovertime,thecoefficientonyearshouldbesignificantandnegative.

Thelogisticregressionoutput,expressedagaininlog‐odds,isincludedinTableThreeabove.Again,theresultsdonotprovidestatisticallysignificantindicatorsshowinganimpactofthevariableyear.Thismeansthechangeintimecannotbeproventocorrelatewithachangeinlegitimacylevels.Theonlysignificantindependentvariableinthesemodelsisgender.Itappears,interestingly,thatwomenaremorelikelytofollowtheirownmoralcompass,ratherthanthatsetoutbythelawsofthegovernment.

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NGOsandLegitimacyThemodelsanddataabovesuggestthatlegitimacyinKenyahasnot

decreasedduringtheperiod1966‐2008.YetadditionalinformationisneededtounderstandtherolethatNGOsplayspecifically.Thereforeinthissection,IexaminethecorrelationbetweenseveralNGO‐relatedvariablesandlegitimacy,bothmoralandprocedural,usingthesamemeasuresoflegitimacyasabove.Iuselogisticregressionwithrobuststandarderrors,andemploythesameindependentvariablesasinthepreviousregressions,allowingmetocontrolforthesamefactorsusedwhenexaminingchangeovertime.

ToexaminetheroleofNGOs,Iprovideavarietyofmeasures,aslistedinTableTwoearlierinthechapter.InTableFourandTableSevenbelow,imprv_k_ngosbecomesincreasinglypositiveasrespondentsmovefroma“stronglydisagree”toa“stronglyagree”responsetothestatement,“ThepeopleofKenyacannotimprovetheircountryunlessNGOsleadthemandhelpthem.”Likewise,ngo_knw_bstbecomesmorepositivewhenrespondentsagreedorstronglyagreedwiththestatement,“NGOsusuallyknowwhatisbestformostpeople.”Apriori,Iconsiderthisthebestmeasureofarespondent’sviewofNGOs,sinceitisidenticaltothequestionaskedofgovernmentandusedasanindicatorofmorallegitimacyofgovernment.Inmodelsthreeandseven,ngo_help_famisincreasinglypositivewhentherespondentanswered“some”or“manythings”tothequestion,“WhichstatementbestdescribeshowmuchNGOsdoforyouandyourfamily?”Finally,ngo_trustincreasesasrespondentsindicatethattheytrustNGOs“sometimes”and“usually,”over“notoften”or“never.”

Theresultsoftheseregressionsareslightlyinconclusive,buttendtosupportthefindingthatNGOshaveapositiveorneutralimpactonviewsofgovernmentlegitimacyinKenya.Whilethereisonemodel(ModelFour)oftheeightwherethereisanegativecorrelationbetweenpositiveviewsofNGOsandgovernmentlegitimacy,itisstillnotthestrongestindicatoroflegitimacy–viewsongovernmentleadershaveagreaterimpactonarespondent’ssenseofgovernmentlegitimacythandotheirviewsofNGOs.

TableFour:RelationshipbetweenNGOsandmorallegitimacyinKenya ModelOne ModelTwo ModelThree ModelFour

VARIABLESMoral

LegitimacyMoral

LegitimacyMoral

LegitimacyMoral

Legitimacy govt_leaders 0.735*** 0.838*** 0.767*** 0.824*** (0.244) (0.278) (0.248) (0.249)police 0.192 0.102 0.163 0.348 (0.232) (0.242) (0.236) (0.245)gender ‐0.161 ‐0.0867 ‐0.141 ‐0.303 (0.269) (0.273) (0.270) (0.276)age 0.00717 ‐0.0166 0.0238 ‐0.0564 (0.160) (0.165) (0.160) (0.161)rents_live ‐0.476* ‐0.441 ‐0.457 ‐0.446 (0.279) (0.287) (0.281) (0.281)dum_sch 0.280 0.275 0.241 0.168 (0.412) (0.435) (0.408) (0.392)

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voting 0.0368 ‐0.192 ‐0.0579 0.00284 (0.351) (0.369) (0.348) (0.342)imprv_k_ngos ‐0.0351 (0.119) ngo_knw_bst 0.528*** (0.136) ngo_help_fam 0.170 (0.208) ngo_trust ‐0.547*** (0.197)Constant ‐1.751 ‐2.718 ‐2.344 0.246 (2.875) (3.027) (2.889) (2.931) Observations 255 256 253 256Robuststandarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

UsingpredictedprobabilitiestohelpusinterpretthecoefficientsonModel

Twoabove,wefindthatifage,viewsonNGOs,viewsongovernmentleadersandonthepolicearesetattheirmean,andeachotherindependentvariableissetat1,meaningapositiveresponse,thenthepredictedprobabilitythatapersonthinksthegovernmentislegitimateis0.42,orabouta2in5probability.Ifwethenholdallelseconstant,butsetngo_knw_bstatthemostpositiveresponse(“always”thinkNGOsknowwhatisbestforKenya),thepredictedprobabilityforapositiveresponseregardinggovernmentlegitimacyis0.59,asubstantialincreaseinprobability.Thismeansthatanaverageagedfemaleurbanrespondentwhosefatherhasattendedatleastsomesecondaryschool,whohasaverageviewsongovernmentleadersandthepolice,andwhobelievesinelectoraldemocracyhasabouta3in5chanceoffeelingthatthegovernmentislegitimate–ifshedoesbelievesthatNGOsusuallyknowwhatisbestformostpeople.Ifsheneverbelievesthat“NGOsknowbest,”thesametypeofpersonwouldhaveonlya1in4likelihoodofapositiveresponsetogovernment.

Thevariablegovt_leaders,whichmeasurestrustingovernmentleaders,isalsoconsistentlysignificantinthemodelspertainingtomorallegitimacy,and–importantly–hasagreaterimpactonlegitimacy.AgainlookingatModelTwo,holdingngo_knw_bestatthemeanandallelseasabove,wefindthatchangingfromastrongdistrustingtostronglytrustingviewofgovernmentleadersresultsinanincreaseinthepredictedprobabilityofapositiveviewofgovernmentlegitimacyof0.53.Whenrespondents“always”trusttheirgovernmentleaders,theyhavea4in5likelihoodoffindingthegovernmentlegitimate.Whenrespondents“never”trustgovernmentleaders,likelyduetoperceptionsofcorruption,theyhavelessthana1in3probabilityoffindingthegovernmentlegitimateingeneral.Thisisnotsurprising,asonewouldexpectapriorithattrustingovernmentleadersreflectsarespondent’sbeliefingovernmentlegitimacygenerally.Andbeliefingovernmentcorruptionstronglydrivesnegativeviewsofgovernmentlegitimacygenerally.

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TableFive:ChangesinPredictedProbabilitiesforVariablesinModelTwo

VariableRangeofChange

PredictedProbabilityofFindingtheGovernmentLegitimateatBottomofRange109

PredictedProbabilityofFindingtheGovernment

LegitimateatTopofRange

ChangeinthePredicted

ProbabilityofFindingtheGovernmentLegitimate

TrustinGovernmentLeaders

FullRange(from1to4) 0.27 0.80 0.53***

Beliefthat“NGOs

knowbest”forKenya


LookingthenatModelFour,itisimportanttonotethatwhilearespondent

trustingNGOsdoescorrelatewithadecreasedsenseoflegitimacy,theimpactofviewsofNGOsissmallerthanistheirviewofgovernmentleaders.Thissuggeststhatdistrustinggovernmentleaders–likelyduetohighcorruptionlevelsinKenya–isthemaindriverloweringlegitimacyinKenya,amongthosewhodonotfindthegovernmentlegitimate.

Usingpredictedprobabilities,holdingthevariablesaswedidinModelTwo,wefindthatchangingfromastronglydistrustingtostronglytrustingviewofgovernmentleadersresultsinanincreaseinthepredictedprobabilityofapositiveviewofgovernmentlegitimacyof0.53.ThesamechangeintheNGOvariable,fromstronglydistrustingtostronglytrustingaffectsthepredictedprobabilityless–decreasingit0.28.FeelingsaboutgovernmentofficialsandcorruptionhavetwiceasmuchimpactacrosstherangeofresponsesthandofeelingsaboutNGOs.Thosewhonevertrustgovernmentofficialshaveonlya1in4likelihoodoffindinggovernmentlegitimate,risingtoanearly9in10probabilityiftheyalwaystrustgovernmentleaders.TherangeissmallerforNGOs:thosewhoalwaystrustNGOsstillhavea3in5probabilityoffindinggovernmentlegitimate.ThissuggeststhatevenwhereNGOsdodecreaserespondents’viewsoflegitimacy,itisviewsongovernmentleadersandtheirlevelsofcorruptionthatarethemaindriversoflegitimacyinKenya.

109Inthistable,asinthedescriptionsinthechapter,thesearethepredictedprobabilitieswhenage,viewsonNGOsorviewsongovernmentleadersandonthepolicearesetattheirmean,andeachotherindependentvariableissetat1,meaningapositiveresponse.

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TableSix:ChangesinPredictedProbabilitiesforVariablesinModelFour


PredictedProbabilityofFindingtheGovernmentLegitimateatBottomofRange110





TrustinGovernmentLeaders


TrustinNGOs

FullRange(from1to4) 0.87 0.59 ‐0.28***

TurningthentothemodelsonprocedurallegitimacyshowninTableSeven

below,wefindthatNGOsdonotappeartohaveastatisticallymeaningfulimpactonwhetherornotarespondentbelievesinthelegitimacyoftheproceduresofgovernment.Otherfactorshaveamoreconsistentlysignificantrelationshipwitharespondent’sbeliefinabidingbythelaw.Ingeneral,allelseheldconstant,femalerespondentsweremorelikelytofollowtheirownmoralguidelines(anddisobeygovernmentlaws),aswerethosewhosefatherscompletedatleastsomesecondaryschool,andthosewhobelievethatvotingisagoodwaytocontrolgovernment.

Interpretingthelog‐oddsofModelSixusingpredictedprobabilities,wefindthatagainsettingage,viewsonNGOs,governmentleadersandthepoliceattheirmean,witheachotherindependentvariablesetat1,meaningapositiveresponse,thenthepredictedprobabilitythatapersonthinksthegovernmentislegitimateis0.44,oragainabouta1in2likelihood.Beingfemaleinthisinstancelowersthepredictedprobabilityofapositiveviewofprocedurallegitimacyby0.12;havinghighereducatedparentsby0.17;andbelievinginelectoraldemocracyby0.19.Thesevariablesnotonlyhaveagreaterimpactonviewsofprocedurallegitimacy,theyarealsoconsistentlysignificantstatistically.TableSeven:RelationshipbetweenNGOsandprocedurallegitimacyinKenya

ModelFive ModelSix ModelSeven ModelEight

VARIABLESProceduralLegitimacy




govt_leaders ‐0.0692 ‐0.0546 ‐0.0357 ‐0.0486 (0.214) (0.210) (0.211) (0.211)police 0.114 0.120 0.0768 0.109 (0.224) (0.224) (0.224) (0.227)gender ‐0.451* ‐0.486* ‐0.458* ‐0.480* (0.270) (0.270) (0.270) (0.274)age ‐0.240 ‐0.246 ‐0.227 ‐0.251 (0.167) (0.165) (0.164) (0.165)rents_live 0.293 0.272 0.309 0.288

110Inthistable,asinthedescriptionsinthechapter,thesearethepredictedprobabilitieswhenage,viewsonNGOsorviewsongovernmentleadersandonthepolicearesetattheirmean,andeachotherindependentvariableissetat1,meaningapositiveresponse.

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(0.265) (0.265) (0.266) (0.265)dum_sch ‐0.676* ‐0.706* ‐0.683* ‐0.699* (0.392) (0.392) (0.391) (0.390)voting ‐0.807** ‐0.812** ‐0.864** ‐0.838** (0.374) (0.369) (0.364) (0.364)imprv_k_ngos ‐0.190 (0.121) ngo_knw_bst ‐0.0921 (0.125) ngo_help_fam 0.0981 (0.196) ngo_trust ‐0.0251 (0.185)Constant 5.914* 5.849** 5.122* 5.759* (3.021) (2.984) (2.971) (3.008) Observations 254 255 252 255

Conclusions Thischapterprovidestwokeyadditionstotheliteratureonstatelegitimacyinsub‐SaharanAfrica.First,comparingdatafromtheimmediatepost‐independenceperiodandthepresent,weseethatonceavarietyofdemographicfactorsarecontrolledfor,legitimacyhasnotactuallydecreasedovertimeinKenya.Ifanything,youngpeopleremainasoptimisticaboutthegovernment,ifnotmoreso,thantheydidinthelate1960s.Second,whenwelookattherelationshipbetweenrespondents’viewsonNGOsandthoseongovernmentlegitimacy,itislikelynotNGOs,butavarietyofotherfactorsthatdrivecurrentlevelsofrespectforgovernmentauthority.Contrarytothestatementscitedintheopeningofthischapter,ordinarypeoplearenot“ceasingtoregardthestateastheirown…andrefusingtocomplywithofficialinjunctions”undertheinfluenceofNGOs(Bratton1989b).

Instead,thedatainthischapterclearlysuggestthatthemaindriversoflowlegitimacyperceptions,wheretheyexist,arecorruption,socio‐economicbackground(asexpressedinhigherparentaleducationlevels,urbanupbringingandgender).Itshouldnotcomeasasurprisethatpeoplewhodistrusttheirleadersarenotlikelytofindthegovernmentanditsprocedurestobelegitimate.Andwheretheyaremoreurban,thesameholdstrue,astheinsecurityKenyansfeelinurbansettingsreflectspoorlyonthegovernment.Inthisway,thedatafromKenyatellsomethingofamodernizationstory–peoplewhoaremoreurbanandbettereducated,tendtobemorecriticalofgovernment.Thiscritiquecouldbeindicativeofgreaterawarenessofandresponsivenesstowardthegovernmentanditsactions.111

Theseresults,however,arenotconclusive.WhileitappearsthatNGOsarehavingapositiveimpactonlegitimacy,theresultsarenotconsistentlysignificantacrosstheregressionanalysismodels,usingthedataavailablefromthiscross‐

111Thesetrendswillbeaddressedingreaterdetailinthefollowingchapter.

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temporalsurvey.Thus,thischaptershouldbereadinconjunctionwiththefollowingone,whichprovidesmorerobustevidenceoftheneutralorpositiveimpactofNGOsongovernmentlegitimacyinKenya.

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AppendixA:CorrelationMatrixforIndependentVariablesUsedinTimeAnalysis

year gender age rents_live dum_sch voting year 1 gender 0.08 1.00 age ‐0.58 ‐0.19 1.00 rents_live 0.36 0.01 ‐0.27 1.00 dum_sch 0.63 0.01 ‐0.45 0.36 1.00 voting ‐0.08 0.01 0.09 ‐0.06 ‐0.07 1.00

AppendixB:CorrelationMatrixforIndependentVariablesUsedin2008onlyAnalysis ngo_trust imprv_k_ngos ngo_knw_bst ngo_help_fam govt_leaders police gender age rents_live dum_sch voting

ngo_trust 1.00

imprv_k_ngos 0.26 1.00

ngo_knw_bst 0.29 0.29 1.00

ngo_help_fam 0.15 0.03 0.22 1.00

govt_leaders 0.18 ‐0.01 0.04 0.08 1.00

police 0.30 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.46 1.00

gender ‐0.16 0.06 ‐0.08 0.02 0.08 ‐0.04 1.00

age ‐0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.05 ‐0.13 1.00

rents_live 0.10 0.00 ‐0.07 ‐0.03 0.01 0.12 0.00 ‐0.07 1.00

dum_sch 0.01 ‐0.03 ‐0.03 ‐0.08 0.09 0.01 ‐0.10 ‐0.17 0.18 1.00

voting 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.21 ‐0.03 0.00 ‐0.02 0.04 1.00

AppendixC:DescriptiveStatistics

Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max govt_knws_bst 643 0.48 0.50 0 1laws 638 0.53 0.50 0 1police 642 2.02 0.77 1 4govt_leaders 636 2.03 0.75 1 4ngo_leader 266 0.12 0.32 0 1 imprv_k_ngos 265 2.39 1.09 1 4ngo_knw_bst 266 2.67 1.08 1 4ngo_help_fam 263 1.81 0.67 1 3ngo_trust 264 2.29 0.76 1 4gender 644 0.47 0.50 0 1 age 641 17.45 1.08 16 20rents_live 637 0.39 0.49 0 1dad_sch 595 4.22 1.65 1 6

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voting 632 0.82 0.38 0 1

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ChapterSix:IncreaseStateLegitimacyorUnderminePopularSupport?

“TheproblemactuallyiswhenNGOsarenotthere.Thewananchidon’tcarethatgovernmentisnottherewhenNGOsarethere.Aslongasoneisthere,allisokay.Butifnonearethere,thentheygetangryatgovernment.”(CivilServant,Machakos,2008)“IfIdon’tgiveservices,Iwon’tbeelected.”(CountyCouncilMember,MasakuCounty,2008)

IntroductionThischapteractsasacompaniontotheprecedingchapter.InChapterFive,

wesawthatthelegitimacyofthestatehasactuallynotdecreasedinastatisticallymeaningfulwayinthepost‐independencetimeperiod,oncedemographicandpoliticalfactorsaretakenintoconsideration.Moreover,NGOs’relationshipwithlegitimacyisusuallypositive;whereitisnegative,theimpactofNGOsislessstrongthanareotherfactors.ThissecondchapteronlegitimacylinksNGOsandquestionsoflegitimacyevenmoreexplicitly.ThedatafromChapterFivedrewonsurveyresearchamongsecondaryschoolstudents,replicatingworkdoneinthelate1960s.Thedatainthischapter,however,drawsonanoriginalsurveyof501adultKenyansinthreedistrictsofthecountry.ItasksquestionsdirectlyaboutcontactwithandaccesstoNGOs,aswellasquestionsdirectlyqueryingthelegitimacyofgovernment.Usingregressionanalysis,thetwoarelinked.

Therearefourprinciplefindingsinthischapter.First,mostindividualshavelimiteddirectcontactwithNGOs.Second,atthesametime,NGOsaregenerallyregardedfavorably–oftenbettersothantheirgovernmentcounterparts.Third,contactwithandappreciationforNGOsdoesnottranslateintodistasteforgovernment.ThosesoundingthealarmthatNGOsareoverwhelmingweakstatelegitimacyarecryingwolf–ifperhapsunintentionally.InKenya,thereislittleevidenceofNGOsreplacingthegovernmentasthenewlegitimateauthority.Indeed,inmyfindings,NGOpresenceeitherbolstersthewaypeopleviewtheirstate,orseeminglyhaslittleeffect.112Finally,whileNGOsappearnottohaveamajorimpactonlegitimacyingeneral,thereissomeevidenceofasignificantdifferenceinresponsesfromurbanversusruraldwellers,andonmoreversusless‐educatedindividuals.

Thischapterisorganizedasfollows:thefirstsectiondescribesthedatacollectedandusedinthischapter.Next,thechapterexaminesdescriptivestatisticalfindingsfromthedata,followedbymodelsthatcontrolforavarietyoffactorsandprovidechecksofrobustness.Drawingoninterviewsconductedwhilethesurveywastakingplace,thefollowingsectionprovidesseveralexplanationsforthe

112Ina2009APSRarticle,ChrisBlattmanalsofindsthatNGOsdonotaffectpoliticalparticipationlevelsamongex‐combatantsinnorthernUganda.

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statisticalresults,highlightingthemostconvincingexplanations.Thechapterconcludeswithabriefoutlineoffactorsthatdoaffectlegitimacy.

TheDataSurveyInstrumentandInterviews

Thischapterdrawsondatafromanoriginalsurveyof501individualstakenatthehouseholdlevelinthreedistricts(thecapital,Nairobi,MbeereandMachakos),inAugustandSeptember2008.113Randomsamplesof150respondentsweretakeninthetwofulldistricts,MbeereandMachakos.Samplingwasdoneinclustersinurban,ruralandperi‐ruralareas(so‐calledmarkettowns),inproportiontothepopulationofeachlocationorsub‐locationaccordingtothemostrecentgovernmentcensus.Notmorethantenrespondentscamefromanyonecluster.114Bothdistrict‐widesampleswerethereforemeanttoberepresentativeofthedistrictasawhole.

TocompareresponsesoftheaverageKenyan(fromMachakosandMbeere)tourbanKenyans,arandomsampleof101respondentsinNairobi“middleclass”neighborhoodswasalsoconducted.115Theseneighborhoodswerecarefullyselectedforbeinglong‐standingcommunitiesinhabitedlargelybyeducatedandformal‐sectoremployed–butnotwealthyor“elite”–Kenyans.Forthemostpart,theywereneighborhoodswhereonemightexpectcivilservantsandtheirfamiliestolive.Arandomsampleof100respondentsinMachakosTown,thedistrictheadquartersofMachakos(population150,000),wasalsotakeninordertocompareurbanvs.ruralviewpointsoutsideofthecapitalcity.116

Tosupplementtheresponsesfrommysurveyinstruments,Iconductedin‐depthone‐on‐oneinterviewswithregularKenyans,NGOworkers,civilservantsandpoliticians.Theseinterviewshelpinterpretthestatisticalfindings.RespondentsoftenprovidestoriesofmechanismsbywhichNGOsandlegitimacyarerelated.Variables

ContactwithNGOsismeasuredthroughtwosetsofquestionsintheoriginalsurvey.First,respondentsareaskedwheretheygotoreceivebasicservices–education,healthcare,HIV‐specifichealthcare,drinkingwaterandsecurity.Second,113WhileIdesignedthesurveyandoversawitsimplementation,IhiredtheNairobi‐basedinternationalfirmSteadmanGrouptotranslatethesurveytothreelocallanguages(Swahili,KambaandKimbeere),administeritandinputthedatatodigitalformatusinghigh‐speedscanners(15%ofwhichwererescannedand10%ofwhichwerecheckedmanuallyforqualitycontrolpurposes).Steadman,whichwasintheprocessofbeingacquiredbytheBritishcompanySynovate,isthelargestsurveyfirminEastAfricaanddoesconsiderableworkforclientslikeUNDP,Afrobarometer,andotherAmericanscholars.Inadditiontoscholarlyresearch,theyhaveanextensivecommercialmarketingand24‐hourmediamonitoringbusiness.114InMbeere,samplingtookplacesintwenty‐threelocationsrepresentingtheentiredistrict.InMachakos,samplingwasdonein25locations.115TheseneighborhoodsincludedUmojaI,Mbotela,BuruBuru,Bahati,Maringo,OfafaJericho,Uhuru,Kayole,Makadara,andDonholm.116InMachakosTown,samplingwasdoneinBondeni,Katoloni,Kariobangi,KenyaIsrael,College,Mjini,Miwani,Muthini,EastleighandMajengoII.

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otherquestionsdirectlyaddressperceptionsofthenumberofNGOsintheirareaaswellastheirindividualcontactwiththem.AsidefromcontactwithNGOs,somequestionsaimtoassesswhetherregularKenyansmakecomparisonsbetweenNGOsanddifferentaspectsofgovernmenttodeterminewhichtheyviewmorefavorably.

Inthischapter,legitimacyisoperationalizedinseveraldifferentways.ItfollowstheWorldValuesSurveyandAfrobarometermodels,askingquestionsconcerningperceptionsoftherighttogoverninproceduralterms.Theseaskrespondentssuchthingsaswhethertheybelievestatecourtsshouldalwaysbeobeyed;whetherpolicehavetherighttoenforcelaws;whetherthestatehastherighttocollecttaxes;andwhetherthelawsrepresentthewaytheyshouldberuled.Questionsalsoaskaboutvotingandothermeasuresofcivicparticipation.Thesehaveallbecomecommonmeasuresoflegitimacyinsurveyresearch(WorldValuesSurvey,Afrobarometer,Gilley2006and2006b),andremainvalidregardlessofslightvariationsinthedefinitionoflegitimacyemployed.

Otherquestionsaskmoredirectlyaboutpopularsupportforandtrustingovernment.Whileperhapsnotidenticaltolegitimacy,popularsupportismorecomprehensibletotheaveragepersonthantheabstractconceptlegitimacy.ThisisparticularlytrueintheruralAfricancontext,where“legitimacy”mustoftenbetranslatedintolocallanguagesanddiscussedwithpeoplewhohavehadlimitedaccesstopost‐primaryeducationopportunities.Popularsupportthereforeservesasagoodproxyforlegitimacyinthiscontext,especiallywhencombinedwiththemorecommonsurveymeasures.

Awidevarietyofcontrolvariableswereincludedinbothsurveys.Issuesofeducationlevel,socio‐economicclass,viewsontheeconomy,accesstomedia,firstlanguage,gender,ageandurbanizationlevelareallconsidered.

FindingsMostKenyanshavelittledirectcontactwithNGOs Simpledescriptivestatisticsprovidethefirstfindinginthischapter:countertosuggestionsthatNGOsareoverwhelmingthestate,mostKenyansactuallyhavelittledirectcontactwiththem.ThisshouldnotbesurprisinggiventhefindingsofChapterThree,whichshowedthatalthoughanot‐insignificantproportionofservicesareprovidedbynon‐governmentalorganizations,manyoftheseserviceswereprovidedinjointNGO‐governmentarrangements.Thegovernmentprovidesthemajorityofservices,asseeninthetablebelow.117

ChapterThreealsoshowedthatthetypesofservicesofferedbyNGOsareusuallyindirectassistanceintheformoftraining,bursaryprovision,HIVawarenessandpreventionactivities,etc.118Outsideofremotepartsofthecountry,whereintervieweesavowthatNGOsdoprovidecoreservices(asdiscussedinChapterTwo),thesesurveyresultsareprobablygeneralizabletotherestofKenya.

117Totalresponsesreachover501becauserespondentswereaskedtonamemorethanoneschool,medicalfacilityorsecurityprovider,ifapplicable.118SeeChapterTwo.

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TableOne:PrimarySocialServiceProvisionbyTypeofOrganization

PrimarySchoolType ResponseFrequencyPercentofSub

TotalGovernment 342 75.0%Private 66 14.5%JointGovernment&Missionary 24 5.3%Missionary/FBO 21 4.6%Don'tKnow 3 0.7%Sub‐Total 456

HealthcareProviderType ResponseFrequencyPercentofSub

TotalGovernment 538 70.8%Private 127 16.7%Missionary/FBO 89 11.7%NGO 2 0.3%JointGovernment&Missionary 1 0.1%Don'tKnow 3 0.4%Sub‐Total 760

SecurityServiceProvider ResponseFrequencyPercentofSub

TotalGovernment:Police 425 47.4%Government:AreaChief 19 2.1%CommunityPolicingInitiative 200 22.3%Vigilantes119 129 14.4%PrivateGuards 100 11.2%Other(myself,dogs,family,God) 21 2.3%NoAnswer 2 0.2%Sub‐Total 896

Clearly,NGOsarenotoverwhelmingthestateinprovidingbasicservices,

thoughtheyarecontributingtoserviceprovision.Indeed,mostKenyansinthesurveyhadhadlittleornocontactwithNGOs,(excludingchurches).120WhileNGOsarequitevisibleontheinternationalsceneandamongtheeliteinmostcities,mostwananchisurveyedarenotawareofbeingindirectcontactwiththem.WhenaskedwhethertheythinktherearemanyorfewNGOsintheirarea,only33.4percentgaveresponsesof“many”“some”or“few”NGOsinthearea,while53.3percentsaid“none.”121Similarly,25.5percenthavebeenapproachedbyanNGOprovidinggoods119VigilantesintheKenyancontextdonothavequitethesameconnotationasintheWest.Usuallytheyaregroupsofyoungmenwhohavetakenprovisionofsecurityoftheirneighborhoodorvillageuponthemselvesforasmallfee.120ThequestionsdidnotspecifywhatwasmeantbyNGO,leavinginterpretationopentotherespondent–althoughitimmediatelyfollowedaquestionaskingrespondentsto“defineNGO.”Clearly,giventhehighrateofchurchattendanceinKenya,thesefiguresdonotreflectcontactwithchurches.121Respondentschosefrom“Verymany,Some,VeryFew,NoneorDon’tknow.”12.4percentofrespondentssaidtheydidn’tknow.

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orservicesintheirareaatleastonce,with24.2percentofrespondentshavingdeliberatelygonetoanNGOforassistance.122

Thelevelofcontactisdependenttosomeextentonwhereapersonlives.Thereisavastdifferenceinthepercentagegivinganon‐zeroresponseinMachakosTown–ahighof57percent–versusmiddleclassNairobiorMbeeredistrict(seetablebelow).ThiscorrespondstoandconfirmstheconclusionpresentedinChapterTwo,thatNGOslocatewheretheyareneeded,butalsowhereitisconvenienttoreachagreatnumberofpeople.MiddleclassNairobiresidentsdonotparticularlyneedNGOs,andwhileruralMachakosandMbeereresidentsdoneedthem,theyarelessconvenientthanMachakosTown.(Inparticular,thereisnolargetowninMbeere;it’sdistrictheadquartersisnotonapavedroad,buttwelvekilometersdownabumpymurramroad.)ThesefindingsregardingNGOpenetrationalsoconfirmdatacollectedbythegovernmentNGOboard(2006)andusedinChapterTwo,whichsaysthatMachakoshadahigherconcentrationofNGOsthanMbeere.Inthisgroupofpeople,then,aboutone‐quartertoone‐halfofthepeoplefeltexposuretoNGOs.

InyouropinionaretheremanyNGOsworkinginyourareaorfew?

TotalPositiveResponse VeryMany Some VeryFew None

Don'tKnow

UrbanMachakos 57.0% 1.0% 18.0% 38.0% 39.0% 4.0%MachakosDistrict 30.7% 1.3% 10.0% 19.3% 64.7% 4.7%UrbanNairobi 28.7% 1.0% 5.9% 21.8% 43.6% 27.7%MbeereDistrict 26.7% 2.7% 6.0% 18.0% 58.0% 15.3%

Inaddition,aboutone‐third(33.5percent)ofallrespondentssaid,“Idon’t

know”whenaskedtodefineNGO.Whileit’spossiblethishadsomethingtodowiththewayenumeratorsaskedthequestion,it’sequallylikelythatmostKenyansarenotasfamiliarwiththe“NGORevolution”asweareintheWest,especiallyamongthoseininternationaldevelopmentandpublicadministrationcircles.Thisstatisticalsosuggeststhat,unlikeintheWest,regularKenyansdonotassociatemostmissionorchurch‐basedeffortsasbelongingtotheNGO.Onlyatinyfractionofwell‐educatedKenyans,however,didn’tknowwhatanNGOis.Indeed,ofthosewhocouldnotdefine“NGO,”147ofthe168respondents(87.5percent)wereclassifiedinthelowestofsevensocio‐economicbracketsinKenya,withanother14(8.3percent)locatedinthesecond‐lowestbracket.Whilethemajority(72%)ofthetotalrespondentsfellintothesetwoextreme‐povertybrackets,thisdatacouldbeinterpretedtomeanthatNGOsarenotreachingthepoorestofthepoor.Itcould,however,alsomeanthatNGOs,particularlydevelopmentandrelieforganizationsassociatedwithchurchesorreligiousinstitutions,arenotidentifiedquaNGOsbythepoor.Clearly,thereisasignificantlevelofcontactwithNGOs,butitisnottheoverwhelmingpresencesometimesportrayed.NGOvs.GovernmentLegitimacy KenyanswhodohaveopinionsaboutNGOs,however,tendtothinkvery122Thesegroupsarenotmutuallyexclusive.

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highlyofthem–oftenmorepositivelythantheythinkofthegovernment.NGOsinKenyaareconsideredlegitimateorganizations,givenrespectandappreciationbymostrespondents:“peoplearejusthappywithNGOs”(2008‐32).Forexample,whenrespondentswereaskedtworelatedquestionsregardingthemorallegitimacyofNGOs,roughly58percentand56percentrespondedaffirmatively,whileonlyabout13percentand16percentrespondednegatively(therestwereneutralordidn’tknow).Specifically,respondentswereaskedtowhatextenttheyagreedordisagreedwiththestatements,“NGOsingeneralsharemyvaluesanddotherightthing”and“WhatNGOsbelieveisgoodforKenyaisthesameaswhatIthinkisgoodforKenya.”123

ThoughtsonNGOscomparefavorablyorwereaboutequaltothoseonthegovernment.Whenaskedthefirsttwoquestionsaboutgovernment,favorableresponseswereverysimilartothoseforNGOs.65percentofrespondentsagreethatthegovernmentofKenyasharestheirvalues,while56percentfeltthatwhatthegovernmentofKenyabelievesisgoodforKenyaisthesameaswhattheybelieveisgoodforKenya.MorepeoplehadnegativeviewsofgovernmentthantheydidofNGOs,however;21and27percentofrespondentsdisagreedorstronglydisagreedwiththestatementsrespectively.

Organization“sharesmyvaluesanddoestherightthing”

GovernmentofKenya NGOsStronglyAgree 7.4% 5.2%Agree 57.3% 52.7%Neitheragreenordisagree 13.8% 17.6%Disagree 18.4% 10.4%Stronglydisagree 2.8% 2.2%DK 0.4% 12.0% Whatorganization“believesisgoodforKenyaiswhatIthinkisgoodforKenya”

GovernmentofKenya NGOsStronglyAgree 8.0% 5.6%Agree 47.9% 50.3%Neitheragreenordisagree 16.4% 14.8%Disagree 22.6% 11.8%Stronglydisagree 4.6% 4.2%DK 0.6% 13.4%Respondentswerealsoasked,“TowhatextentdoyouthinkthatKenya‐

basedorinternationally‐basedNGOshavetheinterestsofthepeopleinmind?”Justlessthan63percentoftotalrespondentsthoughtthatKenya‐basedNGOs“sometimesorusually”havetheinterestsofthepeopleinmind,whileafull75percentofpeoplefeltthiswayaboutinternationalNGOs.124Asoneinformed123Respondentswereaskedtochoosefromtheoptions“stronglyagree,”“agree,”“neitheragreenordisagree,”“disagree,”and“stronglydisagree.”Theycouldalsoanswer“don’tknow,”and13and12percentdidsorespectively.124Respondentsweregiventheoptions,“never,”“rarely,”“sometimes,”and“usually”havetheinterestsofthepeopleinmind.

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observersaid,“ThecommonmanlikesNGOstentimesgovernment!Goaskanyoneonthestreet”(2006‐6).WhenaskedwhetherKenyanpoliticiansorcivilservantshavetheinterestsofthepeopleinmindonly33percentand53percentofKenyansrespectivelyresponded“sometimes”or“usually”–considerablyfewerpeoplethinkgovernmentofficialshavetheirinterestsinmindthandoNGOs.

Towhatextentdotheseorganizationshavetheinterestsofthepeopleinmind?

KenyanPoliticians

KenyanCivilServants

KenyanNGOs

InternationalNGOs

Neverhaveinterestsinmind 35.9% 14.6% 6.6% 2.4%Rarelyhavetheinterestsinmind 27.9% 27.4% 19.2% 13.6%Sometimeshavetheinterestsinmind 27.5% 33.1% 42.5% 36.9%Usuallyhavetheinterestsinmind 5.6% 19.8% 20.4% 38.3%NoAnswer 3.0% 5.2% 11.4% 8.8% Putinbargraphform,weseetheproportionofrespondentsthinkingfavorablyaboutpoliticiansistheinverseofthatforinternationalorganizations.Ifweweretodrawlinesfollowingtheblue(politicians)andpurple(internationalNGOs)barsbelow,theywouldformanX.Civilservants(inred)andKenyan‐basedNGOshaveasimilartrendasinternationalNGOs,iflesspositive,particularlyatthehighest“usually”frequency.

Towhatextentdotheseorganizationshavetheinterestsofthepeopleinmind?

Finally,whenrespondentswereaskedhowmuchconfidencetheyhadin

variousgovernmentalandnon‐governmentalorganizationsandinstitutions,rangingfromindividualslikethepresidenttoorganizationslikethepolicetoKenyan‐basedNGOs.“GovernmentofKenya”ratedveryhighlyasanaggregatedcategorywithnearly74percentofrespondentsgivingapositiveassessment.NGOsdidaswell–particularlyinternationally‐basedones,inwhichalmost69percentfeltconfident.Arguably,theaggregategovernmentcategoryratedsohighlybecauseKenya–andAfricagenerally–hashighlypersonalisticpoliticalsystems,leadingtoatendencyamongcitizenstoassociatethestatewiththepersonofthepresident.

0.00%5.00%10.00%15.00%20.00%25.00%30.00%35.00%40.00%45.00%

KenyanPoliticians

KenyanCivilServants

KenyanNGOs

InternationalNGOs

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Nearly81%ofrespondentssaidtheyhadagreatdealorquitealotofconfidenceinpresidentKibaki.125ConfidencelevelsinorganizationslikeParliament,thecivilserviceandthepolicewereagoodbitlower,at61,58and54percentconfidencelevelsrespectively.

Howmuchconfidencedoyouhaveinthefollowingorganizationsorinstitutions?

GenerallyPositive

Agreatdeal

Quitealot

Notverymuch

Noneatall NA

President 80.8% 37.1% 43.7% 16.8% 2.2% 0.2%GovernmentofKenya 73.7% 30.1% 43.5% 22.0% 4.0% 0.4%InternationalNGOs 68.5% 25.0% 43.5% 19.4% 6.2% 6.0%PrimeMinister 62.1% 23.6% 38.5% 27.2% 10.6% 0.2%Parliament 61.3% 19.4% 41.9% 31.4% 5.8% 1.6%KenyanNGOs 58.7% 21.4% 37.3% 26.4% 8.4% 6.6%CivilService 58.1% 16.4% 41.7% 37.1% 4.2% 0.6%Police 53.7% 13.4% 40.3% 33.5% 12.0% 0.8%

ItmaybeworthnotingthatnearlyalloftheresponsesinthissectionofquestionsaremuchhigherthanonewouldhaveexpectedaprioriforasurveyofKenyans.126Wolf,etal.(2004)foundaverysimilarsituationinthedatatheycollectedforthefirstwaveoftheAfrobarometerresearchdoneinKenya,in2003.Theyrefertotheoverwhelminglypositiveresponsesas“euphoria,”stemmingfromthepresidentialdemocraticturnoverofpowerinlate2002aftertwenty‐fouryearsofsemi‐authoritarianrule.Thistendencytoward“euphoric”answersonthepartofKenyansdoesnotinvalidatetheresponses.Infact,itaccordswiththepositivefindingsongovernmentlegitimacyfromadifferentsetofdatausedinthepreviouschapter.

NGOImpactonLegitimacy? MoralLegitimacyClearly,peopledothinkhighlyofNGOs.ButhowdoestheirexposuretoNGOsimpactthewaythattheyperceivegovernmentandthestatebroadlyspeaking?DoesexposuretoNGOscorrelatewithhigherorlowerlevelsoflegitimacyofgovernment?ItestthisquestionusingseveralmeasuresoflegitimacyandNGOcontactorinfluence,comparingbetweenwholedistrict(rural)andurban125Thisisaremarkablyhighpercentage,giventhatKibakiiswidelythoughttohavestolenthepresidentialelectionthattookplacelessthanayearbeforethesurveywasconducted.Someofthiscanbeexplainedbythefactthattherewaslittleelectoralviolenceintheareaswherethesurveywasconducted,andmostKambasandMbeeres,thelargestethnicgrouplivinginMachakosandMbeererespectively,tendtosupportKikuyupoliticianslikeKibaki.Moreover,Kibaki’svicepresidentcomesfromtheKambagroup.126WhiletherespondentsweretoldthatthesurveywasconductedforaresearcherattheUniversityofCalifornia,theenumeratorswereadultKenyans.Theyweretrainedenumeratorsinstructedtodressandspeakappropriatelyfortheregiontheywerein,andtospeakinlocallanguageswhenpreferredbytherespondent.Forthesereasons,Idonotbelieverespondentswereansweringthewayan“outsider”wouldwantthemto,buthowtheythoughtthey“should”moregenerally.

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samples.127Theanalyseshereprovideanothercheckontheresultsofthepreviouschapter.Fortheseanalyses,however,contactwithNGOswasquerieddirectly,makingthelinkagesbetweenNGOsandlegitimacymoretransparent.

Holdingallelseconstant,thereisnotasignificantimpactonperceptionsofgovernmentfromcontactwithNGOs.PeoplewhohavesoughtoutNGOsforagoodorservicewithintheyearpriortothesurveydonothavestatisticallysignificantlydifferentviewsofgovernmentthanthosewhohaven’t.Andtheredoesnotappeartobea“transfer”oflegitimacyaffectfromgovernmentagenciestoNGOs–meaningthatpeoplewhoviewNGOsveryhighlydonotviewgovernmentlessfavorably.WhileIcouldshowtheseoutcomesinmyriadpermutations,Idisplayonlyafewbelow.Theseshouldnotbeconsideredexhaustive,butrepresentative. Iuseanumberofvariableslargelyascontrolvariables.Ibeganbyimaginingwhatmightcorrelatewithhigherorlowerlevelsoflegitimacybesidesmyprincipleindependentvariableofinterest,NGOs.Iincludedquestionsmeasuringthesecontrolsinmysurveyinstrument(seetablebelow).Controlsincludecontinuousvariablesmeasuringage,educationlevel,socio‐economicclass,128andviewsonthepresentstateofthenationaleconomy(usingaLikertscale),129aswellasdummyvariablesforsexandsetting(inthefulldistrictsampleonly).Ialsoincludeameasuretogaugetherespondents’politicalactivitylevel,usingtheirhistoryofattendanceatprotestsordemonstrationsandwhethertheyaregenerallythetypeofindividualwhoraisesissueswithgovernmentadministratorsorpoliticians(seeAppendicesfortables).130AlthoughNGOlevelsarenotsignificantcorrelateswithhigherorlowerperceptionsofthegovernment,severaloftheotherfactorsare.

Asmykeyindependentvariableofinterest,IrelyonasurveyquestionregardingwhetherapersonhasactivelysoughtoutorvisitedanNGOwithinthepastyearfortraining,information,goodsorservices.131IusethisparticularmeasureofNGOcontactinpartbecausethisquestionasksrespondentsabout

127Thewhole‐districtsampleincludesarepresentativesampleofallofMachakosandMbeeredistricts.Theurbansampleincludes101respondentsfromworkingclassNairobiand100respondentsfromurbanMachakosTown.128Ireportonlytheregressionsusingacompositemeasureofclassrangingfrom1(extremepoverty)to17(extremelywealthy),basedontheLivingStandardsMeasurementSurvey(LSMS)developedintheearly1980sintheWorldBank,whichhasbeenusedinmorethan70countries(http://go.worldbank.org/WKOXNZV3X0).Ialsotestedtheresultsusingdifferentmeasuresofeconomicstatus,suchasthetypeofhousingandtherespondents’accesstotelevision.Thesegeneratedsimilarresults,soarenotincludedinthetablesshown.129WhilenotallsocialscientistsagreethatLikertscalesshouldbeusedwithintervalprocedures,manyagreethatanitemwithatleastfivecategoriescanbeusedinthismanner.Forexample,JaccardandWan(1996:4)summarize,"formanystatisticaltests,ratherseveredepartures(fromintervalness)donotseemtoaffectTypeIandTypeIIerrorsdramatically.”130Whilenotreportedinthetablesbelow,Iusedseveraldifferentmeasuresofpoliticalparticipationinclinations,includingbeingregisteredtovote,theirlevelofdisappointmentwiththe2007elections,andhavingvotedinthe2002and2007elections.Allturnedbacksimilarresults.131Thequestionwas:“Inthepastyear,howmanytimeshaveyougonetoanNGOseekingtraining,information,aserviceorforaphysicalgood?”Inthesurvey,respondentschosebetween“Once,twotofourtimes,morethanfourtimesorNever.”Becauseoftherelativelysmallsamplesizesinmydata,Ihaverecodedthevariableasabinaryvariable,where1=hasgonetoanNGOforgoodsorservicesinthepastyear,and0=hasnotgonetoanNGO.

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havingtakeninitiativetowardNGOs,andwemightexpectthatproactiveNGOseekersmightbebothmorelikelythanotherstotransferlegitimacy,andtoalreadybeirritatedbythegovernmentthanthosewhohavenotactivelysoughtgoodsorservicesfromanNGO.Ialsousethisvariableforpracticalreasons–thereareasignificantnumberofindividualswhohavesoughtoutanNGOatleastonceinthepastyear(aboutone‐thirdofthetotalsample),andthereareremarkablyfew“don’tknow”or“NA”responses–only3respondentsoutof501.132

TableofVariables

DependentVariables(stataname)

Description

Govtsharesmyvalues

Measuresmorallegitimacy,askingwhethertherespondentagrees(3),disagrees(1)orisneutral(2)withthestatement,“TheGovernmentofKenyaingeneral,"sharesmyvalues"and"doestherightthing”

AgreementwithGovernment

Measuresmorallegitimacy,askingwhethertherespondentagrees(3),disagrees(1)orisneutral(2)withthestatement,“WhattheGovernmentbelievesisgoodforKenyaisthesameaswhatIthinkisgoodforKenya.”

Laws

Measuresprocedurallegitimacy,askingwhethertherespondentagrees(3),disagrees(1)orisneutral(2)withthestatement,“ThelawsofKenyaexpressthevaluesandmoralsofpeopleinthiscountry.”

Police

Measuresprocedurallegitimacy,askingwhethertherespondentagrees(3),disagrees(1)orisneutral(2)withthestatement,“Thepolicealwayshavetherighttomakepeopleobeythelaw.”

IndependentVariable

GonetoanNGO(Dum_GoneNGO)

SignifieswhetherarespondenthasgonetoanNGOseekingtraining,information,aserviceorforaphysicalgood,inthepastoneyear.1=Yes;0=No.

ControlVariables Age(Age) Ageinyears,rangesfrom18to85Gender(Gender) Male(0)orfemale(1)Education(highest_ed)

Highestlevelofeducationobtained.Scalefrom1=Noformaleducationto7=Finisheduniversity.

Class(sclass1_17)

Variablemeasuringwealthbasedonaquestionnaireaskingwhichof22itemstherespondent’shouseholdcontains.Rangesfrom1(extremepoverty)to17(verywealthy).ThistoolisbasedontheLivingStandardsMeasurementSurvey(LSMS)developedintheearly1980sintheWorldBank,whichhasbeenusedinmorethan70countries(http://go.worldbank.org/WKOXNZV3X0).

EconomicViews(econ_condtns)

Responsetothequestion,“Ingeneral,howwouldyoudescribethepresenteconomicconditionsofthiscountry?”Scalefrom1=VeryBadto5=VeryGood,with3beingneutral.

Protest(dum1protest)

Respondentswereaskedwhether,ascitizens,theyhadeverattendedaprotestmarchordemonstration.Dummyvariableforhavingattended

132OtherpossiblesurveyquestionsaskedrespondentswhethertheythoughtthereweremanyorfewNGOsworkingintheirarea,andwhetheranindividualhasbeenapproachedbyanNGOforservicesorgoodsinthepastyear.Sincethenon‐responseratesonthesequestionsweremuchhigher(12percentand6percentrespectively),makingforasignificantlossinobservationsorpower,IusethequestionaboutvisitinganNGO.

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(1)orhavingneverdoneso(0).RaisedIssuewithgovernment(raised_issue)

Respondentswereaskedwhether,ascitizens,theyhadevergottentogetherwithotherstoraiseanissuewithalocalpoliticianoradministrator.1=Yes;0=No.

Inthetwotablespresentedbelow,Ipresentthelog‐oddsfromordered

logisticregressionsinwhichthedependentvariablemeasuresrespondents’agreementwiththestatements:“TheGovernmentofKenyaingeneral,‘sharesmyvalues’and‘doestherightthing’”and,“WhattheGovernmentbelievesisgoodforKenyaisthesameaswhatIthinkisgoodforKenya”respectively.133Thesequestionsmeasurethegovernment’smoralrighttogovern,akeycomponentinstatelegitimacy.

RuralDistricts UrbanAreas

ModelOneModelTwo

ModelThree

ModelFour ModelFive ModelSix

VARIABLES

Govtsharesmyvaluesanddoestherightthing






dum_goneNGO 0.08 0.08 0.03 ‐0.05 0.09 0.13 (0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37)highest_ed ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.05 0.25* 0.38*** 0.38*** (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14)sclass1_17 ‐0.18** ‐0.18** ‐0.17** 0.01 ‐0.04 ‐0.03 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)gender 0.26 0.26 0.38 0.38 0.58* 0.54* (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33)age 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)setting3 2.23** 2.23** 2.08* (1.10) (1.10) (1.11) dum1protest 0.77* 0.76 0.74 ‐0.33 ‐0.95 ‐0.97* (0.42) (0.47) (0.47) (0.52) (0.58) (0.59)raised_issue 0.02 0.02 1.96*** 1.84*** (0.31) (0.32) (0.61) (0.61)econ_condtns 0.24** 0.19 (0.12) (0.15) CutPoint1 ‐1.41** ‐1.41** ‐0.74 0.16 0.85 1.27 (0.59) (0.59) (0.66) (0.79) (0.82) (0.92)CutPoint2 ‐0.66 ‐0.66 0.01 0.86 1.59* 2.00** (0.59) (0.59) (0.66) (0.79) (0.83) (0.93)

133Thedependentvariableisanordinalvariable,inwhich1=doesnotagree,2=neutral,and3=agree.

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Observations 297134 297 294 196 196 188Coefficientsarelog‐odds;Standarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

Examiningthetableabove,wefindthatevenforthesetofindividualswhohavesoughtoutanNGOatleastonceinthepastyear,thereappearstobenosignificantcorrelationbetweenNGOuseandviewsongovernmentlegitimacy.Ifanything,havingvisitedanNGOinthepastyearraisesarespondent’sviewofthegovernmentveryslightly.Usingpredictedprobabilities,wecanmaketheregressioncoefficientsmoresubstantiallymeaningful.Forexample,lookingatModelThreeofthefullruraldistrictssubsampleabove,ifwesetthevaluesoftheindependentvariablesforage,educationlevel,socialclassandviewsontheeconomyattheirmean,andlookatamale,rural,politicallyinvolvedandactiverespondent,wefindthattheprobabilityoffeelingthatthegovernmentsharestherespondent’svaluesremainsflat,increasingbyanearzero0.005,ifthatpersonhasvisitedanNGO,from0.729to0.734.Thisresultisnotstatisticallysignificant,norisitsubstantivelymeaningful.ThischangelevelforhavingvisitedanNGOissimilarinruralandurbanareas.

Othervariables,however,havebothstatisticallyandsubstantivelysignificantimpactsongovernmentlegitimacy,ascanbeseeninthetablebelow.Again,theseresultsareforaruralmanofaverageage,educationlevel,class*andviewsontheeconomy*,whoispoliticallyactiverural*(*exceptwherespecifiedinthetable).TheseresultssuggestthattheaverageKenyanfindsthegovernmenttobelegitimate,afindingthatcorrespondstothefindingsofChapterFive.Respondentshaveabouta3in4likelihoodthattheywillbelievethatthegovernment“sharestheirvalues”and“doestherightthing.”However,accordingtotheseresults,anurbaniteisconsiderablymorelikelytofindthegovernmentlegitimatethanisaruraldweller,allelseheldasstatedabove.135ThesameholdstrueofapersonwhohasverypositiveviewsonthecurrentstateoftheKenyaneconomy,allelseunchanged.


PredictedProbabilityofFindingtheGovernmentLegitimateat

BottomofRange





SocialClass

FullRange(from0to17) 0.76 0.22 ‐0.54**

Setting

FromRuraltoUrban(0to1) 0.73 0.93 0.20*

134Onthedependentvariable,sixresponsesweredroppedfor“don’tknow”answers.Observationnumbersarelowerinthistableandthosethatfollowbecauseof“don’tknow”andnon‐responsesinboththisdependentvariableandanumberofcategoricalindependentvariables.135Note,however,thatinthissampleof300,only10respondents,or3.3%arecodedaslivinginurbanareas.

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EconConditions

FromNegativetoPositiveViewoftheEconomy

(1to5) 0.69 0.84 0.15**Thewealthieraruralindividualis,however,themorelikelyheistoviewthe

governmentnegatively.MovingfromapersoninextremepovertytooneoftherichestpeopleinKenya,theprobabilityoftheirfindingthegovernmentlegitimatedecreasesdramatically–froma3in4likelihoodtoa1in5likelihood.Thevariationonthisvariablecanbeseenmoreclearlyinthegraphbelow,inwhichthedarkgrayarearepresentsthepredictedprobabilityoffindingthegovernmentlegitimateovertherangeofeconomicclasses.

Theresultsofthesameregressionslookingattheurbansamplearesomewhatdifferent,butourvariableofinterest,NGOs,isstillnotsignificant,eithersubstantivelyorstatistically.Lookingatfactorsthatdohavearelationshipwithlegitimacy,weseethatwhereaseconomicclasshasasignificantrelationshipwithlegitimacyinruralareas,inurbanNairobiandMachakos,itdoesnotplayasignificantrole(althoughinmodelsfiveandsix,thesignisinthesamedirection).136

Ifwelookatthesametypeofpersonintheurbansampleaswedidintheruralones–thatis,ifwelookatamalerespondentofaverageage,education,classandviewsontheeconomy,whohasprotested,raisedissueswithhisadministrators,andvisitedanNGO–wefindthatthepredictedprobabilityofhisrespondingaffirmativelyaboutgovernmentlegitimacyis0.75(modelsixabove).Ifhehasnot

13688%ofthepopulationintheruraldistrictssampleareclassifiedinthepoorestthreeoftheseventeencategories,whereasinoururbansample,only35%ofrespondentsfallintotheseextremepovertycategories.Thismightexplainthediscrepancybetweentheurbanandruralsamplesonthewealthandeducationvariables.

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visitedanNGO,itis0.74,althoughthisisnotstatisticallyorsubstantivelysignificantthisisaboutthesamelikelihoodasitwasinruralareas.

Inurbanareas,education,gender,andpriorpoliticalinvolvementhaveasignificantrelationshipwithgovernmentlegitimacy.Holdingallthesameexcepteducationlevel,andsettingittothehighestpossibleeducationlevel,thepredictedprobabilityoffindingthegovernmentlegitimateincreasesto0.83,asizable,butnotamajorincreaseoverthepersonofaverageeducation.Inthetownorcity,however,apersonwiththelowestpossiblelevelofeducationisfarlesslikelytofindthegovernmentlegitimate,withapredictedprobabilityofdoingsoofonly0.38.Thismakessenseifweconsiderthaturbandwellerswiththeleasteducationarelikelytohavelowemploymentopportunitiesandbewithoutthelandandcommunityavailabletotheirruralcounterparts.Theymayblamethegovernmentfortheirsituation,whilethemosteducatedinurbanareasaremuchmorelikelytohaveemploymentandsteadyincome–particularlyinthemiddleclassneighborhoodsofNairobithatwerevisited.


PredictedProbabilityofFindingtheGovernmentLegitimateat

BottomofRange





EducationFullRange(from1to7) 0.38 0.83 0.45**

Gender

FromMaletoFemale(0to1) 0.81 0.89 0.08*

RaisinganIssuewithPoliticianorAdministrator

FromNotoYes(0to1) 0.48 0.88 0.40***

Protesting

FromHaveNeverProtestedto

HaveProtested(0to1) 0.93 0.79 ‐0.14*

Inurbanareas,havingapropensitytowardpoliticalactivityisalso

significantlycorrelatedwithviewsongovernmentlegitimacy.Ifapersonhasevertakeninitiativetoraiseanissuewithalocaladministratororpolitician,theyaremuchmorelikelytofeelpositiveaboutthegovernmentthaniftheyhavenot–goingfromabouta1in2chanceofapositiveviewofgovernmenttoa9in10chance.Ifthey’veprotestedordemonstrated,however,theyarelesslikelytofindthegovernmentlegitimate.Thiscanbeunderstoodtomeanthatpeoplewhoraiseanissuewithanindividualgenerallyhavehadgoodexperiencesindoingso,whilethosewhohaveprotestedremainslightlymoredisenchantedwithgovernmentthantheymightotherwise,allelseheldasstatedabove.

TestsofRobustnessAsmeasuresoftherobustness,themodelsusedabovewereusedwithother

measuresofgovernmentlegitimacy.Thesecondmeasuredrawsonaquestionthat

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askswhetherrespondentsfeeltheirgovernmentholdsthesamevaluesandbeliefsastheydo.Theresultsofanorderedlogisticregressionarepresentedbelow.Thesamevariablesaresignificantusingthisalternatemeasureofgovernmentlegitimacy,withthesignspointingthesamedirection,inbothurbanandruralareas.NotethathavinggonetoanNGOinthepastyearisagaininsignificant(andpositive)inallmodels.

RuralDistricts UrbanAreas

ModelOneModelTwo

ModelThree

ModelFour ModelFive ModelSix

VARIABLES

WhatgovtbelievesisgoodforKenyaiswhatIthinkisgood






dum_goneNGO 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.29 0.40 0.44 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.34) (0.35) (0.35)highest_ed ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 0.21* 0.30** 0.29** (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)sclass1_17 ‐0.18** ‐0.18** ‐0.18** ‐0.04 ‐0.07* ‐0.07 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)gender ‐0.14 ‐0.14 ‐0.04 ‐0.10 ‐0.02 0.02 (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.30) (0.31)age 0.00 0.00 0.01 ‐0.00 ‐0.00 ‐0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)setting3 2.51** 2.51** 2.38** (1.09) (1.10) (1.10) dum1protest 0.52 0.53 0.50 ‐0.94* ‐1.27** ‐1.25** (0.37) (0.42) (0.42) (0.51) (0.54) (0.55)raised_issue ‐0.01 ‐0.01 1.14** 1.02** (0.29) (0.29) (0.50) (0.50)econ_condtns 0.20* 0.17 (0.11) (0.14) CutPoint1 ‐1.16** ‐1.16** ‐0.61 ‐0.23 0.20 0.58 (0.56) (0.56) (0.62) (0.75) (0.78) (0.87)CutPoint2 ‐0.24 ‐0.25 0.33 0.32 0.76 1.11 (0.55) (0.56) (0.62) (0.75) (0.78) (0.88) Observations 296 296 293 196 196 188Coefficientsarelog‐odds;Standarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

Next,Iturntoadifferentsortofmeasureoflegitimacy,procedurallegitimacy,whichisthedegreetowhichcitizensbelievethegovernmenthasthe

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righttogovernasmeasuredthroughperceptionsofitsprocedures–itsrighttocollecttaxes,toenforcelaws,andsoon.Respondentswereaskedquestionspertainingtoprocedurallegitimacy,astheyareontheWorldValuesSurveys(www.worldvaluessurvey.org),Afrobarometer(www.afrobarometer.org)andotherregionalperceptionsurveys.Respondentswereaskedhowmuchtheyagreeordisagreewiththefollowingstatements:a)ThelawsofKenyaexpressthevaluesandmoralsofpeopleinthiscountry;andb)Thepolicealwayshavetherighttomakepeopleobeythelaw.Thesequestionsprobeverydifferentelementsofgovernmentprocedure,theabstractlawsofthecountryandtheday‐to‐dayimplementationandenforcementofthoselaws.Orderedlogisticregressionoutputisshownbelowforbothquestions,andisquiteconsistentwithintheruralandurbansamples.

RuralDistricts UrbanAreasVARIABLES laws police_right laws police_right dum_goneNGO 0.357 ‐0.328 0.353 0.431 (0.342) (0.398) (0.390) (0.459)highest_ed 0.0460 ‐0.0995 0.156 0.201 (0.106) (0.133) (0.145) (0.163)sclass1_17 ‐0.306*** ‐0.211** ‐0.0212 ‐0.0496 (0.0779) (0.0897) (0.0463) (0.0498)gender 0.240 0.161 0.325 ‐0.0613 (0.313) (0.399) (0.340) (0.370)age ‐0.00881 ‐0.0197 0.0173 0.0100 (0.0103) (0.0128) (0.0154) (0.0161)dum1protest 0.695 0.0913 ‐1.461** ‐1.541*** (0.501) (0.629) (0.580) (0.541)raised_issue ‐0.113 0.573 0.651 0.115 (0.338) (0.468) (0.517) (0.524)econ_condtns 0.143 0.0380 0.506*** ‐0.0245 (0.135) (0.164) (0.173) (0.162) CutPoint1 ‐1.889** ‐3.712*** 0.873 ‐0.974 (0.740) (0.954) (0.969) (1.069)CutPoint2 ‐1.137 ‐3.040*** 1.549 ‐0.341 (0.733) (0.941) (0.973) (1.062) Observations 283 282 185 185Standarderrorsinparentheses***p<0.01,**p<0.05,*p<0.1

RegressionresultsagainsupportthefindingthathavinggonetoanNGOforinformation,servicesorgoodsdoesnotsignificantlycorrelatewithhigherorlowerlevelsoflegitimacy,allelseheldconstant.Asformorallegitimacy,economicvariablesamongruralrespondentsandpoliticalparticipationinurbanareasappeartobemosthighlycorrelatedwithviewsonthestate’srighttogovernment.

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MakingSenseoftheData ThestatisticsabovesuggestthatNGOsdonotunderminestatelegitimacy.Ifanything,theoppositeappearstobetrue:NGOcontactseemstoimproveoverallsupportforthestate.WhilescholarshiphassuggestedthatAfricanstatesmakeasocialcontractwiththeircitizensinwhichthestategivesservicesandpeoplegivethestateloyalty,itseemsthatinfactthepeoplegiveloyaltyregardlessofwhogivesservices.Why?

Interviewdatafrommyfieldresearchhelpstomakesenseoftheseregressions.Inthissection,IproposeseveralpossiblemechanismsbywhichNGOshavetheirimpact.Thesearedividedintothreetypesofmechanisms:onefocusingondeliberatepoliticalobfuscation,anotheroncognitivelimitationsamongAfricansorresearchers,andthethirdonthetypesofexpectationscommonamongthepoor,particularlytheruralpoor.SomeofthesemechanismswerebroughttomyattentionduringqualitativefieldworkinterviewswithNGOleadersandworkers,politiciansandcivilservants–meaningthattheyreflectthebiasesofmyrespondents,mostofwhomwererelativelywell‐educatedmiddleandupperclassKenyans.

UnderstandingNGOs’ImpactonGovernmentLegitimacyCause Explanation AssessmentPolitical GovernmentsuccessfullytakescreditforNGOs’work.

Peopleexpectservicesofgovernment,andtheyviewthegovernmenttohavedeliveredifitcreatesanenvironmentinwhichanyserviceproviderdelivers,includingNGOs.

Sometimes.Occasionally.

Cognitive AfricansdonotunderstandthedifferencebetweenNGOsandthegovernment–theyareallgovernmentintheeyesofwananchi.

ScholarlyerrorinassumptionsonthesourcesofAfricanstatelegitimacy.

Rarely.Sometimes.

Poverty Africancitizenexpectationsoftheirgovernmentareextremelylow,particularlyamongtheruralpoor.

Frequently.

Thefirstexplanationregardingtheneutralorpositivecorrelationbetween

NGOsandgovernmentlegitimacylargelyinvolvespoliticalsleight‐of‐hand:theargumentisthatpoliticians,fromlocalcountycouncilorstoMembersofParliament,claimcreditfortheservicesthatNGOsprovide,therebyclaimingthepositivepopularsentiment.AsmentionedinChapterFour,governmentsdonotwantcreditforsocio‐economicprogresstogotonon‐governmentalorganizations(Bratton1989:572)–sogovernmentofficialsandevenadministratorsoftenclaimresponsibilityfortheworkthatothershavedone.Asaresult,thelegitimacyderivedfromprovidingservicesaccruestothegovernment,aswellasNGOs.

Credittakingassumesmanyforms,rangingfromtherelativelysubtledroppingofNGOs’namesintheauthorshipofjointlycreateddocuments(2008‐24)topoliticiansandadministratorspubliclyandunambiguouslydeclaringtheypersonallyarrangedfor–orevenfunded–anNGOtoworkinthearea.ThesehappeninConstituencyDevelopmentreports(2008‐10),projectopeningsorlaunches(2008‐17),dedicationplaquesoninfrastructure(2008‐18,2008‐14),andotherevents.Onoccasion,politiciansalsoattempttogarnerpoliticallegitimacybyactingthehero,publicallydenouncingNGOsforunrestorproblemsinthearea

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(2008‐54).AlocalpoliticianinMachakosDistrictexplainedtherationale:“Thecommunitymightnotliketoknowwheretheirservicescomefrom,butforpoliticians,whenitcomestoelectiontime,itreallymatters!Sotheyreallymakesuretospecifytothepeople”(2008‐35).

ToreiterateapointmadeinChapterFour,someNGOsencouragethegovernmenttogainlegitimacyfromtheorganization’swork–theyseetheirroleasimprovingthestateasawhole,notunderminingit.Assuch,theyarehappytoshareaccruedserviceprovision‐basedlegitimacywithlocalcivilservantsandpoliticians.Onthewhole,however,NGOrepresentativesintervieweddidnotwantcredittogotogovernmentunlessgovernmentactorsactuallycontributedinsomeway.WhileNGOsdon’tworktounderminethestate,137manywouldliketoseegovernmentbeingmoreresponsivetoitscitizenry.

Relatedtothis,somesuggestthattheGovernmentgainslegitimacybycreatinganenvironmentinwhichNGOschoosetobepresentandconducttheirwork–workwhichoftencouldjustaseasilybeundertakenelsewhere,suchasinothercountrieswithneedypopulations.IndeedmanyoftheNGOsinsomepartsofKenyaserveneighboringcountries,especiallySudanandSomalia,fromwithinKenya,sincetheatmosphereforworkinginthecountryissomuchlesshostileinKenya.OnesmallNGOleader,whenaskedhowNGOsaffectlegitimacysaid,“thecommonpeopleendupthankfultogovernmentforallowingtheNGOstooperatethere”(2008‐13).

Asecondexplanationreliesonaratherpessimisticviewofthecognitiveabilitiesofwananchi.ThislineofreasoningholdsthatregularKenyansarenotsmartenough(ornotwelleducatedenough)tounderstandthedifferencebetweenNGOsandgovernment.Thus,whenwananchiseeservicescomingfromanorganizationexternaltothevillageortown,theyassumethattheservicescomefromsomebranchofgovernment.Interviewdata,however,suggeststhatthisisnotthecase–thoughconfusiondoeshappensometimes.

Foronething,particularlyinpoororremoteareas,thestartofanewserviceprovisionprogramisoftenbignews–everyoneinthevillageknowsaboutit,howitcameabout,andbywhom.Projectsarediscussedseriouslythroughoutthevillage.Communitieshavemanagementcommitteesaswell,whoworkwithNGOstocompleteprojects–so“theyknowwhobroughtwhat!”(2008‐33).Peoplealsoknowthatit’suncommonforgovernmenttofundverylocalizedprograms:“Soifsomethingcomes,theyknowit’snotfromgovernment”(2008‐18).EvenifindividualsdonotknowparticularsabouttheNGObringinggoods,informedobserversinsistthattheyknowthatit’snotthegovernment(2008‐34,2008‐50,2008‐52).

Inaddition,NGOsmakeapointofinformingthecommunityinwhichtheydoaprojectofthesourceoftheprogram–byincludingthemintheprojectasithappens,holdingmeetingsinthevillage,and/orleavingtheirlogooninfrastructureorsignboardsbuilt(2008‐18,2008‐25,2008‐30,2008‐32).Assuch,it’snoteasyforapoliticiantosuccessfullyclaimcreditforsomethings/hedidnotdo:forexample,137Cannon(1996:263)similarlyfoundthatNGOsinUgandaaretheretomeetneeds,notworryaboutwhetherornottheyareundermininggovernmentbyprovidingservices.

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whenaDistrictOfficerinoneareatriedtotakeoveracommunityboreholeprovidedbyalargeNGO,hecouldnotconvincethecommunitythathedrilledit–theyhadbeenactivelyinvolvedwiththeNGOintheprojectandknewthetruth(2008‐14).Inmanycases,“wananchiaremobilizedbeforetheprojectandthroughout,sotheyknowthatwhenapoliticiantakescredit,it’susuallynottrue”(2008‐54).

Still,confusionofthistypedoeshappensometimes,allowingNGOactivitiestoreflectpositivelyonstatelegitimacy.Mostinformedobserversthoughtthatsuchmisunderstandingswereverycontextspecific–theyaremorelikelyinextremelypoororremoteareas(2008‐31),orinsituationswheremuchisuncertain,asinrefugeeorinternallydisplacedpersonscamps(2008‐14).Confusionhasstartedtoarisearoundrelativelynewgovernmentdecentralizationoffundinginitiativesaswell–thingsliketheLocalAreaTransferFund,governmentbursaryfunds,andlocalHIV/AIDSfundsincreasinglylooklikeNGOprograms,butarerunbythegovernment.Alocalresearchcompany,ResearchInternational,hasfoundagooddealofconfusionbetweentheseprogramsandthoseofNGOswhenithasconducteditsownresearchonnon‐stateprovisionofservices(2008‐59).AsNGOsandgovernmentworktogethermoreandmore,theeasilydrawnlinebetweenthemhasblurredforwananchiaswell:“Peopledon’tknowwhat’sgovernmentfunded,what’sNGO,especiallynowthattheyareworkingsomuchtogether,”accordingtoamid‐levelcivilservant(2008‐37).

Mostcommonly,however,theattitudeofpeopledependsontheirlocal‐levelpublicadministrator–theChieforSub‐ChiefoftheLocationorSub‐Location.“Forlocalpeople,thegovernmentistheAssistantChief,”afterall(2008‐30).And“ThecommonpeopleendupthankfultogovernmentforallowingtheNGOstooperatethere,”since,“MostpeopleknowthatgovernmenthastoallowtheNGOtoparticipatebeforetheystartinanarea…”(2008‐13).

Insteadofcitingmisunderstandingonthepartofwananchi,wecanalsomakesenseofthisdatainathirdway,byreassessingourownassumptionsasscholars.AreourpriorsabouttherelationshipbetweenAfricanstates,serviceprovisionandlegitimacywrong?Perhapswhereprevioustheoriesweremistakenisatthelevelofunderstandingexpectations.PoliticalscientistanddevelopmentexpertNormanUphoffoncewrotethatlegitimacyderivesfrom“havingsatisfiedpeople’sneedsandforhavingmettheirnormativeexpectationsovertime”(1993:614,emphasisadded).DatafrominterviewsheldconcomitanttothesurveysuggestthatNGOsdonotlowerlegitimacy–particularlyinruralareas–becauseKenyans’expectationsofthegovernmentintheseareasarealreadyextremelylow(2008‐32).Mostinformedobserversfeltthatwananchidon’tmakethelinkbetweenNGOprovisionandgovernmentnotfulfillingitsendofthesocialcontract(2008‐30,2008‐34,2008‐51)because,“Peopletendtounderstandthatgovernmentcan’tdoitall.Theyseethegovernmentrepresentativelivingintheirsameconditions,etc.”(Ibid.)Theyalsomightnotunderstandthattheypayvalue‐addedtax(VAT)ongoodstheypurchaseinformalstores:“Alotofpeopledon’tthinkthattheypaytax,sotheydon’tthinkgovernmentneedstogiveanything”(2008‐27).Theydon’tbecomefrustratedbecausetoalargeextent,theyarenotholdingexpectationsthat

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aren’tbeingmet.Inhisseminalworkonrebellion,Gurr(1970)identifiesthisrelativedeprivationasthekeysourceofhumanviolenceandrebellion.

RegularKenyansseemtounderstandandacceptthelimitationsoftheirownandgovernment’ssituation(2008‐18).Thereisasenseofunderstanding–evenempathy–onthepartofwananchi:“Peopleunderstandgovernmenthasanobligation,butnocapacitytoreachdownsofar.Theyknow.”(2008‐25)Evenwhentheythinkit’sthegovernment’sresponsibilitytotakecareofthem,theyunderstandthatNGOssimplytrytofillinwheregovernmentcan’tprovide(2008‐23,2008‐24).Thisunderstandingmayberealistic–Kenya’spost‐independencedevelopmenthistorysuggestsitsreasonableforpeopletomakedowithwhatisavailable.

Yetonsomelevel,wananchibothunderstandthatthegovernmentisunlikelytoprovideforthem,andexpectonanabstractlevelthatthegovernmentwillstilldoso.AnNGOtalkingaboutbringingfinancialservicestoamarkettowninMbeere,forexample,said,“Peopleexpectgovernmenttodothings,likebringabankhere.Butpeoplealsounderstandthegovernmentisslow,sotheyarehappythatthe[organization]isherefornow,evenifitsnotafullbank…Inthelong‐term,though,theyexpectalotmorefromgovernment,becauseNGOswillleaveoneday.”(2008‐45).

IntervieweesunwittinglyrecalledSchatzberg’s(2001)extendedanalogyinPoliticalLegitimacyinMiddleAfrica:Father,Family,FoodoftheAfricanstateasfamily.ComparingthestatetoamotherandNGOstoacaringneighborhoodlady,oneseniorKenyanNGOworkersaid,

“Imaginethatyouhaveamother,whoissupposedtoprovideyouwithcare.Butwhatifsomeladyfromtheneighborhoodistheonewhoalwaystakescareofyou.Howdoyoufeel?Youdon’tknowherinterests!You’dratherstillhaveyourmother’slove.So…Youunderstandthatyouarebeingtakencareof,butyoureallywantyourmothertocomeanddoit.Thereisjustsomethingspecialaboutamother’scare,andthatotherwoman,youdon’tknowwhyshe’sdoingit,whatothermotivationsshehas…”(2008‐10)Eventhoughpeoplemightwanttheirowngovernmenttolookafterthem,

severalNGOmanagersindependentlyworriedthatNGOsinadvertentlylowerpeople’sexpectationsofpublicofficialsandagencies(2008‐18).OnenotedthatwananchipesterthegovernmentforserviceslessfrequentlywhenNGOsareinthearea,becausepeopleknowtheycangettheservicesfromtheNGO(2008‐44).Whilethismeanstohimthatgovernmentcanbelessaccountable,italsosuggeststhatNGOslullKenyansawayfrommakingdemandsontheirpublicadministratorsandofficials.EvenagovernmentofficialsaidthatpeopleexpectsomethingfromNGOsonly,takingpressureoffgovernment,“PeoplehavecometoassociateNGOswithgettingstuff.Theydon’texpectasmuchfromgovernment”(2008‐39).Ageneralizedsentimentof,“Peopleknowgovernmentshouldprovide,butisnotableto,sotheycountonNGOs,”prevailedinmanyinterviews(2008‐54).

Anothergovernmentofficialclarifiedthat,“TheproblemactuallyiswhenNGOsarenotthere.Thewananchidon’tcarethatgovernmentisnottherewhenNGOsarethere.Aslongasoneisthere,allisokay.Butifnone,thentheygetangryatgovernment.”Hepointedout,“YourarelyfindaplacewhereneitherNGOsor

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governmentisthere.”(2008‐39)ThissuggeststhatNGOsmaydecreasetheextenttowhichpeoplemakedemandsongovernment.

Finally,manyinformedobserversthoughtthatNGOsprovidingservicesbenefitsstatelegitimacybecauseinsituationsofextremepoverty,peopleliveintoodiresituationstocarewhereservicesandgoodscomefrom–theyarejusthappytohavesomeoftheirneedsmet(2008‐12,2008‐26,2008‐33,2008‐34,2008‐45,2008‐47,2008‐49,2008‐50,2008‐51,2008‐53).Thishappinessresultsindiffusesupport–wananchitendtobegenerallymoreoptimisticwhenservicescome.AsawomanworkinginruralMachakosexplainedit,“Desperatepeopledon’tthinkaboutwherethingscomefrom–becauseoftheirpoverty.Theyjustwantmore,soastogetoutoftheplacethey’rein.Sotheygenerallyfeelbetteraboutthegovernment,becausesomeoneishelpingthematleast!”(2008‐12).Mixingsarcasmandcoldreality,anothersaid,fortheuneducated“…solongasthereisfoodonthetable…Actually,ifthereevenisatable…well,theydon’tcarewhere[help]comesfrom”(2008‐26).Anothersaid,“Peoplearejustveryhappy.It’swonderful,theWorldConcern[NGO],forbringingthesethings”(2008‐45).Assuch,“Youdon’tseeNGOsreflectingpoorlyongovernment.YouseegovernmentbeinghelpedbyNGOs”increasingoverallsatisfactionlevels(2008‐50).

Inconditionsofextremepoverty,thefactofanoutsidercomingforpovertyreliefsuggeststopeoplethattheirlivescouldbecomelessprecariousovertime.Theygainthesensethatpeople“outthere”or–“upthere”astheysayinKenya–caresabouttheirsmallvillageanditsproblems.Whetherintentionallyornot(andIbelieveitsnot),wananchitransferthispositivefellow‐feelingtothestate,excusingitslimitedperformance.

TheRealDriversofLegitimacy Contrarytowhatsomescholarshaveasserted,NGOsdonotthreatengovernmentlegitimacyintheplaceswherethissurveywasconducted.Whatdoes?Accordingtothesesurveydata,correlateswithlegitimacydifferbetweenurbanandruralareas.Inruralareas,householdwealthstronglycorrelatewithchangesinviewofstatelegitimacy.Asruralpeoplebecomewealthier,theybecomemorelikelytobeskepticalofgovernment.Andiftheybelievetheeconomyisdoingverypoorly,theytendtofeellesspositiveaboutgovernment.Fortownandcityrespondents,politicalandcivicparticipationappearstomattermost.Urbaniteswhoengagewithgovernmentinapositive,individualmannerbyraisinganissuewiththeirlocaladministratororpoliticiantendtofeelthegovernmentismorelegitimate,whilethosewhoprotestinurbanareasfinditlessso.138

Again,interviewdatahelpsmakesenseofthis.Inparticular,manyinformedobserversfeltthataspeoplebecomebettereducated,wealthierandmoreurban,theybegantoexpectmorefromgovernment,citingtheir“rights”ascitizens.Assuch,theirexpectationsofgovernmentaswellastheirskepticismofittendtobehigher.Aschangescometocommunities,theirdemandsgoup.Theyrealizethey138Ofcoursethedirectionofcausationhereisunclear;indeeditispossiblethatlowlegitimacyleadstoprotest.

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shouldhavepossibilitiesthatthegovernmentisnotproviding(2008‐25). Interestingly,whenaskedhowtheythoughtwananchiwouldrespondtothequestion:“Whichstatementdoyouagreewithmore:A)ItistheresponsibilityoftheGovernmentofKenyatoprovidemyfamilywithservices,andIexpectthattheGovernmentitselfwillprovidethem,orB)Itdoesn'tmatterwhoprovidesmyfamilyservicesaslongastheyareprovided,”

manyNGOandgovernmentofficialsinterviewedfeltthateducatedpeoplewhoknowtheirrightswouldanswer“A”(2008‐10,2008‐14,2008‐26,2008‐27,2008‐33,2008‐36,2008‐37,2008‐47).Often,intervieweesmadethedistinctionbetweenthosewhounderstandtheypaytaxesandthosewhodon’t,believingpeoplewhoknowtheypaytaxeswillexpectmorefromthegovernment.OneseniorNGOleadersaid,“Butwepaytaxes!Sothegovernmenthastoprovidefromthosetaxes.It’sunfairotherwise,andit’sunsustainable.ShouldwepaytaxestoNGOs?”(2008‐10).Governmentofficialsfeltthesameway:

“(Laughs)Let’ssaybotharetrue.Theycarrythesameweight,butstatementBisslightlyheavierthanA.Peoplehavebeenenlightened,likeabouttaxes.Before,theyjustthoughtgovernmentistheretomisusefunds.Now,theyevenquerytheirMPinParliament:Whyaretherenolights?Whytheroadisn’ttarmacked?Butitdependsonliteracylevels.Inplaceswithoutliteracy,theywillsayA.Theydon’tcarewhogiveswhat.”(2008‐37)

Inthesurvey,however,urbanitesactuallytendedtorespond“B”considerablymorethantheirruralcounterparts.Movingfromthemostruralsample(Mbeere)tothemosturban(Nairobi),wefindanear‐doublingof“B”answers:36%inMbeere,49%inMachakosDistrict,60%inMachakosTown,and70%ofrespondentsinNairobisaidthatitdoesn’tmatterwhoprovidesservicesaslongastheyareprovided.AsoneNairobiresidentsays:“NairobiansarenowrealizingthattheGovernmentisincapableofsolvingallofthecity'sproblems.TheirsolutionliesinthewillofNairobiansthemselves”(Onyango,1998).

Whichstatementdoyouagreewithmore:ItistheresponsibilityofthegovtofKenyatoprovideservicesandIexpectthegovernmenttoprovidethem;orItdoesn'tmatterwhoprovidesservicesaslongastheyareprovided.

Rural

DistrictsUrbanAreas Total

Doesn'tmatter 128 131 259ResponsibilityofGovernment 172 70 242 Total 300 201 501

Summary&ConclusionsAlthoughscholarsandpoliticianshaveclaimedthatNGOsthreatento

underminestatelegitimacy,inKenyathereislittleevidenceofthispattern.Indeed,whileNGOsareregardedquitefavorably–andoftenevenmorefavorablythantheirgovernmentcounterparts–theydonottakeawaylegitimacyfromthegovernment.

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Ratherthanazero‐sumgamewhereapositiveviewofNGOsbringsaboutanegativeviewofthecivilserviceorpoliticians,NGOsappeartoeitherhavenoimpactonpopularperceptionsofthestate,ortoimprovethem.

InplaceslikeKenya,thisfindingmattersforquitepracticalreasons.Inthepast,NGOshavebeendecriedbypoliticiansasunderminingtheirlegitimateauthority.Yetwhenputtothetest,suchallegationsappearnottohavemerit–theymaybeausefulscapegoatforpoliticiansfacingunhappypopulations,butdonotreflectempiricalevidence.Thischapter,whencombinedwiththeresultsofthepreviousone,demonstratesusingdatanotonlyfromtwodifferenttypesofKenyans(secondaryschoolstudentsandadults),butalsoacrossruralandurbanareasthatNGOsarenotdecreasinggovernmentlegitimacyinKenya.

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AppendixA:CorrelatesofIndependentVariablesRuralDistricts

goneNGO

setting3 age

highes~d

gender

sclas~17

dum1pr~t

raised~e

econ_c~s

goneNGO 1.00 setting3 ‐0.06 1.00

age 0.05 ‐0.031.00

highest_ed 0.25 0.11

‐0.19 1.00

gender ‐0.11 ‐0.16

‐0.13 ‐0.27 1.00

sclass1_17 0.24 0.20

‐0.06 0.52 ‐0.12 1.00

dum1protest 0.08 ‐0.070.10 ‐0.02 ‐0.26 0.05 1.00

raised_issue 0.12 ‐0.120.14 ‐0.05 ‐0.15 0.04 0.51 1.00

econ_condtns 0.09 0.17

‐0.10 0.11 ‐0.19 0.07 0.02 ‐0.02 1.00

UrbanAreas goneNGO age highes~d gender sclas~17 dum1pr~t raised~e econ_condtns goneNGO 1.00 age ‐0.01 1.00 highest_ed 0.24 ‐0.10 1.00 gender ‐0.08 ‐0.01 ‐0.18 1.00 sclass1_17 0.10 ‐0.06 0.47 ‐0.14 1.00 dum1protest ‐0.06 0.10 ‐0.11 ‐0.02 0.08 1.00 raised_issue ‐0.09 0.01 ‐0.13 ‐0.13 0.23 0.32 1.00 econ_condtns ‐0.03 ‐0.12 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.10 1.00AppendixB:DescriptiveStatistics

RuralDistricts Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max GoK_share_~s 299 2.44 0.82 1 3q302 298 2.28 0.85 1 3laws 298 2.56 0.75 1 3police_right 297 2.77 0.58 1 3dum_goneNG~y 298 0.24 0.43 0 1 age 300 35.28 13.79 18 85

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highest_ed 300 3.81 1.60 1 8gender 300 0.62 0.49 0 1sclass1_17 300 1.88 1.97 1 12dum1protest 300 0.14 0.34 0 1 raised_issue 300 0.30 0.46 0 1econ_condtns 297 1.88 1.09 1 4

UrbanAreasVariable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max GoK_share_~s 200 2.44 0.82 1 3q302 200 2.30 0.89 1 3laws 196 2.51 0.80 1 3police_right 197 2.64 0.70 1 3dum_goneNG~y 200 0.25 0.43 0 1 age 200 31.46 11.67 18 78highest_ed 198 5.27 1.41 2 8gender 201 0.45 0.50 0 1sclass1_17 201 6.18 4.34 1 16dum1protest 199 0.09 0.29 0 1 raised_issue 199 0.16 0.36 0 1econ_condtns 193 1.98 1.13 1 5

AppendixC:FrequencyTables

InthepastyearhowmanytimeshaveyougonetoanNGOseekingtraining,information,aserviceorforphysicalgood?

RuralDistricts UrbanAreas Total

Never 226 151 377 Once 47 28 75 2‐4Times 13 18 31 Morethan4Times 12 3 15 DK 2 1 3 Total 300 201 501 Towhatextentdoyouagreewiththisstatement:ThegovtofKenyasharesmyvaluesanddoestherightthing.


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StronglyAgree 28 9 37 Agree 166 121 287 Neitheragreenordis 42 27 69 Disagree 54 38 92 Stronglydisagree 9 5 14 DK 1 1 2 Total 300 201 501

Towhatextentdoyouagreewiththisstatement:WhattheGoKbelievesisgoodforKenyaisthesameaswhatIthinkisgoodforKenya.


StronglyAgree 30 10 40 Agree 132 108 240 Neitheragreenordis 58 24 82 Disagree 66 47 113 Stronglydisagree 12 11 23 DK 2 1 3 Total 300 201 501 Laws


0 2 5 7

StronglyAgree 58 26 84 Agree 158 111 269 Neitheragreenordis 34 21 55 Disagree 38 33 71 Stronglydisagree 10 5 15 Total 300 201 501 Police


0 3 4 7

StronglyAgree 83 32 115 Agree 171 121 292 Neitheragreenordis 19 18 37 Disagree 18 23 41

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Stronglydisagree 6 3 9 Total 300 201 501 Ingeneralhowwouldyoudescribethepresenteconomicconditionsofthiscountry?


VeryGood 0 3 3 Good 40 25 65 NeitherGoodnorBad 41 29 70 Bad 58 45 103 VeryBad 158 91 249 Total 297 193 490 Whatisthehighestlevelofformaleducationthatyouhavefinished?


Noformaleducation 11 0 11 Someprimary 56 6 62 Finishedprimary 87 16 103 Somesecondary 30 18 48 Finishedsecondary 85 97 182 Somepost‐secondary 8 15 23 Finishedpost‐seconda 17 32 49 FinishedUniversity 6 14 20 Total 300 198 498 Gender


Male 113 110 223 Female 187 91 278 Total 300 201 501 Class‐basedonLSMS(LevelofSocialandMaterialStatus)


1 221 35 256

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2 26 18 44 3 18 18 36 4 5 19 24 5 5 8 13 6 5 9 14 7 8 20 28 8 6 21 27 9 4 8 12 10 1 12 13 11 0 5 5 12 1 6 7 13 0 5 5 14 0 5 5 15 0 6 6 16 0 6 6

300 201 501 Haveyou,asacitizen,everattendedaprotestordemonstration?


Wouldneverprotest 219 140 359 Haven'tprotested,butwouldunderrightcircumstances 40 41 81 Haveprotested 41 18 59 Total 300 199 499 Haveyoueverraisedanissuewithpoliticiansoradministrators?


No 209 168 377 Yes 91 31 122 Total 300 199 499

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Uganda,”AmericanPoliticalScienceReview.Bratton,Michael.1989.“ThePoliticsofGovernment‐NGOrelationsinAfrica”World

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Africa.”WorldPolitics,41:3,407‐30.Etzioni,1965."OrganizationalControlStructure",inJ.G.March,ed.,Handbookof

Organizations,p.650‐677.Fowler,Alan.1991.“TheroleofNGOsinchangingstate‐societyrelations:

perspectivesfromEasternandSouthernAfrica”DevelopmentPolicyReview9,53‐84.

Gilley,Bruce.2006.“Themeaningandmeasureofstatelegitimacy:Resultsfor72countries.”EuropeanJournalofPoliticalResearch45:499–525.

Gilley,Bruce.2006b.“TheDeterminantsofStateLegitimacy:Resultsfor72Countries”InternationalPoliticalScienceReview.27,1:47–71.

Gurr,Ted.1970.WhyMenRebel.Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.Jaccard,JamesandChoiK.Wan(1996).LISRELapproachestointeractioneffectsin

multipleregression.ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublications.Jackson,RobertandCarlRosberg.1984.PopularLegitimacyinAfricanMulti‐Ethnic

State.JournalofModernAfricanStudies.22(2):177‐198Kanyinga,Karuti.1996.“ThePoliticsofDevelopmentSpaceinKenya”inSemboja,

JosephandOleTherkildsen(eds.)ServiceProvisionUnderStressinEastAfrica:State,NGOs&People'sOrganizationsinKenya,TanzaniaandUganda.Copenhagen:CentreforDevelopmentResearch.




Prewitt,Kenneth.EDUCATIONANDCITIZENSHIPINEASTAFRICA,1966‐1967:KENYASAMPLE[Computerfile].Chicago,IL:KennethPrewitt,UniversityofChicago,Dept.ofPoliticalScience[producer],196?.AnnArbor,MI:Inter‐universityConsortiumforPoliticalandSocialResearch[distributor],1976.doi:10.3886/ICPSR07301



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Suchman,MarkC.1995.“ManagingLegitimacy.”AcademyofManagementReview20(3).

Sunshine,J.&T.Taylor2003.“MoralSolidarity,IdentificationwiththeCommunity,andtheImportanceofProceduralJustice:ThePoliceasPrototypicalRepresentativesofaGroup’sMoralValues,”SocialPsychologyQuarterly.66:2,153‐165.

Uphoff,Norman.1993.GrassrootsorganizationsandNGOsinruraldevelopment:opportunitieswithdiminishingstatesandexpandingmarkets.WorldDevelopment.21:4.

Wolf,ThomasP.,CarolynLogan,andJeremiahOwiti.2004.“ANewDawn?PopularOptimisminKenyaaftertheTransition.”AfrobarometerWorkingPaper33.

Young,Crawford.1988.“TheColonialStateanditsPoliticalLegacy”inRothschildandChazan(eds)ThePrecariousBalance:StateandSocietyinAfrica,59‐62,

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ChapterSeven:BlurringtheBoundaries:NGOsandtheStateinAfrica“Peopleconsiderusgovernment.Theyareconfusedaboutwheregovernmentstartsand[ourNGO]stops.”(NGOWorker,MachakosDistrict,September2008)“ThegovernmentisnowmoreNGOthantheNGOsare!”(NGOleader,October2008) Throughoutthisdissertation,theargumenthasbeenmadethatNGOsstrengthenthestateinKenya.Takenindividually,eachchapterdemonstratesthepositiveimpactofNGOsononeoffour“elementsofstateness,”providingnewinsightsonthewaythatservicesareprovidedandontheirimpacts.ExaminingNGOs’roleinonecorestateactivity,publicserviceprovision,thisstudyshowsthatNGOshavesupplementedasenseofgoverningpresencewithintheterritory;theyhaveexpandedthestate’scapacitytoprovideservices;theyhaveinfluencedaslowturntowardparticipatorygovernancepractices;andtheyhaveboostedthelegitimacyofthestate.Takentogether,thechapterstellarichstoryabouthowthestateitselfischanginginresponsetothisnewphenomenon.

NGOs,however,donotsimplystimulatechangewithinpublicoffices,governmentagencies,andamonggovernmentofficials.Instead,inmanycases,theythemselvestakeonrolesandresponsibilitiestraditionallyassociatedwithpublicadministrationofservicesbypublic,governmentactors.KenyanpoliticalscientistWalterOyugiarguesthatgovernmentandNGOshavebecomepartnersinthedevelopmentprocessinKenya;NGOs’“activitiesessentiallyparallelandcomplementthoseofthestate”(2004:48).Iargue,however,thatNGOsrunmorethananalogousprogramstotheirgovernmentcounterparts.NGOshavemovedawayfrombeingthird‐partyplayers,andtowardintegrationandinterweavingintothedefactoorganizationalfabricofthestateinKenya.Thelinebetweennon‐governmentalandgovernmentalorganizationblurs,asserviceprovisiondecisionsaremade,programsareoffered,anddistrict‐wideplanningisdonejointly.Andwiththeblurring,governmentperformanceimproves. Shouldwebesurprisedtoseesuchaphenomena:nominallynon‐governmentalactorsassuminggovernmentresponsibilitiesinAfrica?Isitasignthatthesestatesaregettingweakerinthefaceofpowerfulinternationalactors?Notatall.PoliticaltheoristssinceTocquevillehavedescribedsituationsinwhichformallynon‐stateactorsundergirdedweakstates.Muchasthechurches,communityorganizations,women’sgroupsandvillagecouncilsofearlyAmericatookontheresponsibilityfortheeducationofchildren,thepavingofroads,andthediggingofwells,NGOsactinKenyatoday.Thisoccursnotonlyinthephysicalprovisionofservices,butalsoinpatternsofgovernanceanddecision‐making.InKenya,asintheUS,“thetraditionofastrongcivilsocietybearssomeofthebruntofgoverning.Evenbeforeitbecamefashionable,governmentintheUnitedStates

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utilizedtheprivatesector...tohelpmakeandimplementpolicy”(Peters&Pierre1998:238,citingSalamon1981andKettl1987). ThepointhereisnotthatAfricatodayshouldbeseenasreplicatingtheUnitedStatestwocenturiesago.Instead,thisresearchremindsusthattheorganizationalcompositionofstatesshouldnotbeunderstoodinstarklybifurcatedterms,inwhich“government=state”and“non‐governmental=outsidethestate.”Instead,weshouldfollowMigdal’s(2001:16)understandingofthestateasmorecomplexthan“asingleentitythatisfairlyautonomous,unifiedandcentralized.”Ashesays,“thestate,nomoreprobablytodaythanatanyothertimeinitshistory,doesnothavethisunity,thisindividuality,thisrigorousfunctionality”(ibid.18).

Atthesametime,themannerandreasonsforNGOintegrationintoserviceprovisioninKenyadifferfrommanyplacesintheworld.Forexample,alargeliteratureexistsonNGO‐staterelationsincorporatist(sometimescalledstate‐corporatistorneo‐corporatist)systemsinEastAsia,EasternEuropeandLatinAmerica.Inthesecountries,thestatebargainswithorprovideslicensingandregulationtoNGOs,unions,andothersortsofcivilsocietyorganizationsostensiblytoorganizethem,butoftenalsoinordertorestrictorlimitthem(seeSchmitter1974,Unger&Chan1995,Saich2000).Usually,thestatedesignatesparticularorganizationsasinterestgroupintermediaries,givingthempowerrelativetootherorganizationsinthesystembutusuallyweakeningthemrelativetogovernment.Theorganizationshelpimplementpoliciesofgovernmentandtoorganizeothersinthesector.

InChina,forexample,NGOsarefrequently“welcomed”intostateactivities–orarecreatedexplicitlybythestate–soastoremovethemasacivilsocietythreatbyorganizingandcontrollingthem.Whetherwelcomedorcreated,allsocietalorganizationsneedastatesponsorinordertooperate,leadingsometocallChina’sarrangement“state‐ledcivilsociety”(Brook&Frolic1997).Theboundarybetweenstateandsocietyisthereforeincrediblyporous,ifnotcompletelyintertwined.Conflict,whenitoccurs,istoalargeextent,containedwithinthestate(Gallagher2004)sinceNGOsandothercivilsocietyorganizationsaresoembeddedinit.Onemightconsiderthemappendagesoftheparty‐state(Foster2002).

InKenya,however,NGOshavenotbeensilencedbytheirinvolvementingovernment.Inthisway,NGOsinKenyaoftenactlikea“Trojanhorse,”enteringgovernmentcommitteesopenly–evenbyinvitation–onlytochangethegovernmentfromtheinside.Ratherthangovernmentco‐optingcivilsociety,itisinfactslowlyadoptingthestrategiesandmechanismspromotedbycivilsocietyinitsgoverningprocesses.Countertotheclearandlargesetbackincurredfollowingthepresidentialelectionsof2007,thissuggestsamovementtowardsdemocratizationandcivicempowermentinKenya,howeversmall–athemethatwasaddressedinmoredetailinChapterFour.

Interestingly,however,thereremainsomesimilaritieswithstate‐corporatistsystems:inbothKenyaandChina,forexample,NGOshavebecomeinterwovenwiththegovernmentenoughthattheycanbestudiedas“newelementsofthestate’sadministrativesystem,”usedbythegovernmenttocarryoutitsmandatedtasks

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(Foster2002:42).139However,whereintegrationinChinareflectsstatecontrolandcooptation,inKenya,ininvolvesmutualadjustmentandcooperation.Asintheimplementationofpolicy,thebordersbetweenpublicadministrationandNGOsinKenyaareincreasinglyblurredandhazy.

*****

Moreimportantthantherecognitionofamultiplicityofpossibleorganizationalconfigurationsofthestate,thisworkdemonstratesthattheAfricanstatehasnotbeenunderminedbyNGOs;rather,ithasbeenreinforcedbythem.Whilesomescholars,thenewsmediaandpoliticianshaveportrayedNGOsasthreateningthestate,infacttheiractionsservetobolsterit.InthelanguageofCameroonscholarJanetRoitman(2005),NGOsreconstitutethestate,creatingnewnetworksofactorsdeployingstatetechnologies.140OrasCallaghy,Kassimir&Latham(2001:7)putit;trans‐boundaryorganizationslikeNGOshavebecomeinvolvedinshapingandconstitutingorderandauthorityinvarioussocialandpoliticalcontextsinAfrica. Atthesametime,theKenyangovernmentclearlyunderstandstheprioritiesofastate,andmakeseffortstofulfillthemostfundamentalstatesservicesofeducation,healthcareandsecuritythroughpublicagencies.Recognizingthatlegitimacyderivesfromprovidingtheseservices,thegovernmenthasnotleftthemtoNGOs.Providinguniversalfreeprimaryeducation,inparticular,hasbeenoneofthemostvisibleprogramsoftheKibakiAdministration.141Likewise,incitiesandtowns–particularlyinNairobi–improvingphysicalsecurityhasbeenaclearpriority.142NGOrepresentativesmentionedfeelingthatthesethreeserviceswereprimarilytheresponsibilityofgovernment,andthattheirrolewastocomplementgovernmentonlesserpriorities.Asonesaid,“Commonpeopleunderstandthatgovernment…givesschools,hospitals,security.Nothingelse.Sowetrytodowhatisoverlookedbythem”(2008‐18).WhileNGOsoftengrumbleaboutthewaygovernmentworks,theydonotseetheirroleascompetingwithit,butasfillinggapswherepublicagenciesdonotreach. Notonlythat,butNGOshavealsobecomeameansbywhichthestatecanconductserviceprovision“experiments”atlittlecosttopubliccoffers.Becauseofthestructureoftheirfundingsourcesandaccountabilitymechanisms,NGOs–oftenrelativelywell‐fundedvis‐à‐vistheirgovernmentcounterparts–havetheflexibility139FosterrefersspecificallytobusinessassociationsinanarticleontheembeddednatureofcivilsocietyinthestateinChina.140RoitmandoesnotwriteaboutNGOs,butaboutothertypesofnon‐stateactorsdeployingstatefunctions.Shearguesthatregulationoftradeandlegitimateauthorityovertherulesofitarenolongersolelyingovernmentalhands,butthatamultiplicityoflegitimateauthoritieshastakenshape.141 The program is not without its faults. Because students no longer have to pay prohibitive school fees, the cost of providing universal education in some areas of the country has been vastly over-crowded classrooms, since additional classrooms and teachers have not been provided at the same rate as new students enroll. Single classrooms have as many as 120+ children (2007-29; 2007-30). 142WhilesecurityseemstobeimprovinginNairobi,itisstillacitywherecar‐jacking,armedrobberyandmuggingsaredailyoccurrences,andwherenewsheadlineslike“Crimewaveblamedonpoliceofficers”remaincommon(DailyNation,26May2005:18).

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andresourcestoattemptavarietyoftypesofprograms,projectsandserviceprovisionmethods,evenwhentheirfailureratesmaybehigh.GovernmentagenciesinAfrica,especiallyatthelocallevel,donothavethistypeofleewayintheirbudgetsorintheirprogrammaticdecision‐making.ButAfricanstatescanmakeuseofthisfeatureofNGOs,allowingthemtobearthecostsofprogrammaticexperimentationandthenadoptingonlytheirsuccessfulprogramsatthedistrict,provinceornationallevel.143Already,theyshowsignsofadoptingNGOs’participatorymethods,aswellassomeoftheirinternalqualitycontrolmechanismslikeservicechartersandemployeeperformanceappraisals. Thusserviceprovision–frompolicymaking,toexperimentalattemptsatimplementation,tonationwideeffortstoprovide–hasincreasinglybecomeajointprojectofNGOsandgovernment.UnliketheMoiAdministration,whichlargelyviewedNGOswithsuspicionandhostility,theKibakiAdministrationappearstorecognizethebenefitsofworkingmorecloselywiththem.Incolloquialterms,theAdministrationseemstohavebeenfeedthe“collaborativegovernance”linebyinternationaldonorsanddevelopmentagencies,andhasdecidedtoeatitup.ThisadministrationinvitesNGOstoparticipateinmostline‐ministryplanningsessions,tocontributetothedraftingofnationalpolicyandlegislation,tosetupofficeswithinministrybuildings,andtoconductjointserviceprovisionactivitiesthroughoutthecountry.PartlybecausetheKibakiAdministrationbroughtmanyNGOleadersintogovernmentduringitsfirstterm,manyoftheparticipatorypatternsofworkingthatarecommonlyassociatedwithNGOshavebecomegovernmentpractice.Assuch,atleastoneNGOemployeeproclaimed,“ThegovernmentisnowmoreNGOthantheNGOsare!”(2008‐33).

NGOs,LegitimacyandGovernmentPolicy Onapracticalandpolicymakinglevel,thefindingsinthisdissertationpertainingtolegitimacymaybethemostusefultotheKibakiAdministrationandotherdevelopingcountrygovernments.Usingtwooriginalsurveyinstruments,thisresearchprovesthatNGOsarenotaseriousthreattogovernmentlegitimacy.Ifanything,NGOpenetration,contactandaccessarecorrelatedwithhigherviewsofgovernmentlegitimacyinthesurveydistricts.ThustheKibakiAdministrationlikelymadeacorrectdecisionwhenitchosetocollaborateconsiderablymorewithNGOsthandiditspredecessor–itappearsitcanonlygainpopularsupportforsuchaction. Atthesametime,thechaptersonstatelegitimacysuggestthatwhetherregularpeopletrusttheirgovernmentofficialsandpoliticiansornothasthegreatestimpactonlegitimacy.Thissuggests,perhapsunsurprisingly,thatwhilesomeAfricanpoliticianschoosetoblameinternationalactors,civilsocietyorNGOsfortheirlackofpopularity,theirownactionshavethegreatestimpact.Themoretransparentlytheygovern,themorelegitimacytheywillgarner. Finally,boththerelativelyhighlegitimacyratesinthesurveyresults,aswellasdataobtainedinone‐on‐oneinterviewssuggestthattheKenyanpeopleare143 Clark (1995: 596) makes a similar point.

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relativelyforgivingorunderstandingofthefinancialanddevelopmentaldifficultiesoftheirgovernment.Ininterviewafterinterview,respondentstalkedabouthowwananchibelievethatthegovernmenthasaresponsibilitytoprovideforthem,butessentiallyacceptatthesametimethatitisnotgoingtodoso–eitherbecauseitisunwillingorunable.WhenNGOscometoprovideingovernment’sstead,theydonotthenblamegovernmentforslackingonitsduties.Instead,theytendtobesimplygratefulthatsomestate‐likeorganizationistryingtolookoutforthem.Particularlyinruralareasamongtheextremelypooranduneducated,theprovisionofanyserviceisappreciatedandbringshopeforthefuturetolocalresidents.

NGOs,AccountabilityandtheLongTerm Acommonconcernamongdevelopmentworkersandscholarsisthelong‐termfeasibilityofgrowingNGOinvolvementintheprovisionofservices,notonlyinKenyaorAfrica,butthroughoutthedevelopingworld.Theseconcernsariseoutofanumberoffears:thatNGOfundingisnotsustainable(Edwards&Hulme1996:964)andcanendorfallarbitrarilyatanytime;thatNGOscreategreaterdependencyamongpoorcountries;andthatNGOsallowgovernmentinefficiencytoself‐perpetuating(Farrington&Lewis1993:333).Thisdissertationdoesnotaddressthequestionoflong‐termconsequencesingreatdetail,choosingtofocusonwhatishappeningthanpredictwhatmighthappeninthefuture.Yetafewthoughtsareinorder. ItisafactthattheKenyan–andmanyotherpoorcountry–governmentscurrentlycannotsupplytotheircitizenstheextentofservicestheymightideallyprovide.Atpresent,NGOsarehelpingtodoso,bothbyofferingsignificantfinancialandphysicallyresourcesandbypositivelyencouragingparticipatoryandtransparentgovernanceprocesseswithinthegovernment.Thissaid,theactuallevelofNGOinvolvementinnowaymatchesthatofgovernment,eitherinthelevelofphysicalorfinancialresourcesfromdonors.Indeed,inrecentyears,donoragencieshavereturnedtodirectbudgetarysupportfordevelopingcountrygovernments,makingNGOsworrymoreabouttheirfinancesthantheydidinthe1990sorearly2000s.Asoneinformantsaid,“Fundsofgovernmentareup–andifitcontinues,NGOswon’tneedtobethereanymore”(2008‐33).Thus,whileworriesthatNGOsare“takingover”arecommon,therealityisthatNGOshaveonlyasmallportionoftheresourcesofgovernments.Moreover,theyrarelydesiregovernmental‐stylecontrolatanylevel.

Indeed,nearlyallagreethattheproblemsofdevelopmentandofserviceprovisioninKenyaareultimatelytheresponsibilityoftheKenyangovernment.144NGOsmaybecurrentlyassistingwithshort‐termdevelopmentandmaintenanceefforts;theyshouldnotbeseenanalternativetofunctioningpublicadministrationinthelongrun(Brautigam1994,Chege1999).Moreeffortbyinternationalfinancialinstitutions,developmentagenciesanddonorsshouldclearlybepaidtotheverydifficulttaskofincreasingadministrativecapacitywithinthestate.Inthemedium

144 See Martin 2005 for a similar sentiment regarding NGOs’ role in Tajikistan.

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term,however,NGOsarepositivelyinfluencingthisgrowthincapacitywithinthepublicservice. Justasconcernsaboundaboutthelong‐termsustainabilityoftheNGOsolutiontotheproblemofserviceprovision,manycriticalscholarsworryaboutthelackofaccountabilitytothepeoplethatNGOshave.TheargumentisthatNGOsareaccountablenottotheimpoverishedpeoplethattheyclaimtoserve,buttotheirinternationaldonors,whoareusuallybothphysicallyandcognitivelydistantfromthesituationontheground.Thisisindeedanissue.Ideally,publicadministration,connectedtodemocraticallyelectedgovernments,wouldprovideservicestothepeopleastheydoinmostwealthycountries,allowingforaccountabilitythroughthevotingprocess.

Intheabsenceofsuchidealsituations,however,thequestionbecomeswhetheritisbetterfornon‐democratic,butgenerallyidealisticorganizationstocontributeornot.Seeinga)thatthealternativewouldbealessertotalsupplyofservicesinastillonlysemi‐democraticstate,andb)thatNGOsappeartobehavingapositiveinfluenceontheuseofparticipatoryanddemocraticmethodswithinthepublicservice,thisissuebecomessomewhatmoot.ItisofcourseimportanttoacknowledgethefairlyhypocriticalgapintransparencyandaccountabilityofNGOs.Yetitmightbeequallyfoolishtotooharshlyjudgetheminthisregard.

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ReferencesBrook,TimothyB.andMichaelFrolic.1997.CivilsocietyinChina.Armonk,NY:M.E.

Sharpe.Callaghy,Kassimir&Latham.InterventionandTransnationalisminAfrica.“Chapter

1:Introduction:Transboundaryformations,intervention,orderandauthority.2001.

Clark,John.1995.“TheState,PopularParticipationandtheVoluntarySector”WorldDevelopment,23:4,593‐601.

Edwards,MichaelandDavidHulme.1996.“TooCloseforComfort?TheImpactofOfficialAidonNongovernmentalOrganizations.”WorldDevelopment6:961‐973.

Farrington,J.,andD.Lewis(Eds.),withS.Satish,andA.Miclat‐Teves.1993.NGOsandtheStateinAsia:RethinkingRolesinSustainableAgriculturalDevelopment.London:Routledge.

Foster,KennethW.“EmbeddedwithinStateAgencies:BusinessAssociationsinYantai.”TheChinaJournal.47:41‐65.

Gallagher,MaryE.2004.“China:TheLimitsofCivilSocietyinaLateLeninistState,”inCivilSocietyandPoliticalChangeinAsia:ExpandingandContractingDemocraticSpace.M.Alagappa(ed.)Stanford,Calif.:StanfordUniversityPress,419‐52.

Martin,Jay.2005.“CanMagicBulletsHurtYou?NGOsandgovernanceinaglobalisedsocialwelfareworld.ACaseStudyofTajikistan.”DiscussionPaperNo.92,AustralianNationalUniversity.

Migdal,Joel.2001.StateinSociety:StudyinghowStatesandSocietiesTransformandConstituteOneAnother.CambridgeUniversityPress.

Oyugi,WalterO.2004.“TheRoleofNGOsinFosteringDevelopmentandGoodGovernanceattheLocalLevelinAfricawithaFocusonKenya”AfricaDevelopment.29:4,19‐55.

Peters,B.GuyandJonPierre.1998.“GovernanceWithoutGovernment?RethinkingPublicAdministration.”JournalofPublicAdministrationResearchandTheory,8:227‐243.

Roitman,Janet.2005.“TheGarrison‐Entrepot:AmodeofgoverningintheChadBasin”inGlobalAssemblages:Technology,PoliticsandEthicsasAnthropologicalProblems.Oxford:BlackwellPublishing,417‐436.

Saich,Tony.2000.“NegotiatingtheState:TheDevelopmentofSocialOrganizationsinChina.”ChinaQuarterly.161:124‐141.

Schmitter,PhilippeC.1974.“StilltheCenturyofCorporatism?”TheReviewofPolitics.36:1,85‐131.

Unger,JonathanandAnitaChan.1995.“China,CorporatismandtheEastAsianModel.”AustralianJournalofChineseAffairs.33,29‐53.

surrogates for government? ngos and the state in kenya by

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