report13DestroyingSmall Arms andLight WeaponsSurvey of Methodsand Practical Guide

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Today, the destabilizing accu-mulation of small arms and theirviolent use in many countries

around the world are high on theinternational agenda. One ap-proach to the resolution of theseproblems is micro-disarmament,that is, taking small arms and lightweapons—the tools of civil war—out of conflict areas. As part ofa comprehensive peace processthat includes, among other things,the demobilization, reintegrationand reconciliation of combatants,micro-disarmament is an indis-pensable element.

BICC Report 13 examines theissues and methodologies regard-ing the destruction of light weap-ons, small arms and ammunition,primarily within the context ofpeace-building operations in apost-conflict society. Several situa-tions in which collection and de-struction of weapons were carriedout are analyzed for lessonslearned. Current destruction me-thodologies and available technol-ogies are reviewed with the aimof introducing appropriate destruc-tion methods for each individualsituation.

Editing:Moira Davidson-SegerHeike Webb

Cover photo:“The Flame of Peace”Bonfire of small arms in MaliRobin Poulton

Photos:Many Photos shown in thisreport were taken and collectedby the author during the fieldstudies and have a more docu-mentary character.

Zusammenfassung 4Summary in German

Introduction 6Aim and methodology

1 Intra-state Conflict—Two Case Studies 8Sahara-SahelCentral America

2 The Domestic Destruction of Surplus and/or Illegal Small Arms 12AustraliaCanadaSouth AfricaUnited StatesEl SalvadorMozambiqueHaitiNicaraguaSlavonia

3 Analysis of Small Arms and Light Weapons Destruction Methods 20BurningCutting: oxy-acetylene torch

and plasma cutterCutting/crushing:

hydraulic shearsShreddingCrushing/bending with vehiclesDumping at seaOther methods

4 Ammunition and Explosives Destruction (Demilitarization) 26

5 Scrap Recycling 28

Recommendations and Conclusions 29

List of Selected Acronyms 31

References 32

Annex 36

report 13Destroying Small Arms andLight WeaponsSurvey of Methods and Practical Guide

by David DeClerq

april 99

BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION . INTERNATIONALES KONVERSIONSZENTRUM BONN

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B I C C

K leinwaffen stellen sowohl ausder Sicht der Rüstungskontrolle

und der internationalen Sicherheitwie unter dem Blickwinkel vonKriminalität und innerer Sicherheiteinen komplexen Problemkreis dar,der in den 90er Jahren enorm anBedeutung gewonnen hat. Die Kon-trolle der Kleinwaffen erfordert einumfassendes Konzept mit politischen,geographischen, ökonomischenund sicherheitsbezogenen Elemen-ten. In der Vielfalt der Ansätze zurBekämpfung der explosionsartigenVerbreitung und des unrechtmäßigenGebrauchs von Kleinwaffen, insbe-sondere nach dem Ende von Bürger-kriegen, kommt der Vermeidung derdestabilisierenden Wirkung unkon-trolliert verfügbarer Überschußbe-stände große Bedeutung zu (sieheDi Chiaro, 1998). Neben anderenAspekten umfaßt dieses Problemauch die wirksame und wirtschaft-liche Entsorgung überschüssigerKleinwaffen, vorzugsweise durchumweltschonende Vernichtung.

Der vorliegende BICC Report unter-sucht die Probleme und Methodender Vernichtung und Entsorgungvon Kleinwaffen, stellt diese in denKontext von friedensschaffendenMaßnahmen nach größeren Konflik-ten und bettet die jeweiligen Erfah-rungen in den gesellschaftlichenZusammenhang ein.

Eine Vielzahl von UN-Initiativenund Operationen haben sowohl dieMöglichkeiten als auch die Problemeder praktischen Umsetzung vonKleinwaffenabrüstung aufgezeigt.Die meisten dieser Operationensind unter politischen und norma-tiven Vorzeichen analysiert worden.In der vorliegenden Studie wirdanhand von Fallbeispielen der Graddes praktischen Erfolgs der Waffen-vernichtung beschrieben.

Exemplarisch seien zwei Beispieleerwähnt:

n In Mali wurden in der Mitte derneunziger Jahre nach dem fried-lichen Ende eines innerstaatlichenKonfliktes einige TausendFeuerwaffen eingesammelt undöffentlich in einer sogenannten‘Friedensflamme’ verbrannt(siehe Titelbild). Die Bedeutungdieser Operation lag mehr inihrem Symbolwert und ihremBeitrag zur nationalen Versöhnungals in der konkreten Entsorgungvon Kleinwaffen.

n In Nicaragua und El Salvadorfanden zwischen 1989 und 1997verschiedene UN-Friedens-missionen statt, die direkt oderindirekt zur Einsammlung undVernichtung von Kleinwaffenführten. Auch in der serbisch-kroatischen Enklave Ostslavonienwurden unter der Obhut einerUN-Friedensmission Waffen ein-gesammelt und entsorgt.

Mit dem Vertrag über konventionelleStreitmächte in Europa (KSE-Vertrag),der 1992 in Kraft trat, wurde zumersten Mal die Vernichtung von kon-ventioneller Rüstung, einschließlichvon Vorschriften über erlaubteMethoden, vereinbart. Diese Vor-

schriften, die genau beschreiben,welche Waffenkategorien wie zuzerstören sind, sind auch für dieEntsorgung von Kleinwaffen relevant.Der Hauptteil der vorliegendenStudie analysiert die vielfältigenMethoden zur Zerstörung von Klein-waffen. Welcher Methode unter spe-zifischen Verhältnissen der Vorzugzu geben ist, hängt von der Mengeund dem Typ der zu entsorgendenWaffen ab, von der verfügbarenZeit, der vorhandenen Infrastruktur,den verfügbaren finanziellen Mittelnund von politischen und psycholo-gischen Faktoren, wie zum Beispielder Beteiligung von ehemaligenKämpfern an der Mikroabrüstung.Genaue Kostenschätzungen sindschwierig. In der Praxis ist die theoretisch optimale (das heißtzuverlässigste oder kostengünstigste)Methode nicht unbedingt die unterden gegebenen Verhältnissen beste:Zeit, Geld, Durchsetzbarkeit undandere Kriterien erfordern häufigKompromißlösungen.

Das Verbrennen von Kleinwaffen, inMali und Nicaragua durchgeführt,ist billig aber nicht umweltschonend.Außerdem ist der übrigbleibendeAbfall weniger wertvoll als beianderen Zerstörungsmethoden. Eineandere einfache und billige – unddabei gleichzeitig effektive – Methodeist das Zerdrücken der Waffen durchein schweres Fahrzeug, zum Beispieleinen Kampfpanzer, der sie über-fährt. Primitiv und billig und für dieUmwelt nicht belastender als dasVerbrennen ist das Versenken derKleinwaffen auf dem Meeresgrund.Kleine Mengen an Feuerwaffenkönnen auch mit Handwerkzeugenwie Hammer und Amboß oder einerKreissäge kostengünstig zerstörtwerden. Wirksam ist auch das Ein-schmelzen von Kleinwaffen in Hoch-öfen der metallverarbeitendenIndustrie.

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ZusammenfassungSummaryin German

Gasflammen, mit denen Waffenunbrauchbar gemacht werden, sindein bewährtes Mittel, wobei einPlasmaschneider schneller arbeitetals Schneidbrenner. Die Methode istwirksam und hinterläßt wertvollenSchrott. Sie ist allerdings relativlangsam und teuer. Außerdem stelltsie technische Anforderungen, dienicht immer erfüllt werden können.

Umweltschonend und schnell ist die Benutzung von hydraulischenPressen und Scheren. Bei größerenMengen lohnt sich die Beschaffungder teueren Maschinen. Schreddernist die effizienteste Methode für dieZerstörung von Kleinwaffen. GroßeMaschinen arbeiten sehr schnell undumweltfreundlich und garantiereneine totale Zerstörung. Sie produ-zieren außerdem wertvollen Schrott,wenn die Waffen vorher zerlegt undnach Material sortiert wurden. DiesesVerfahren erfordert allerdings sehrhohe Investitionen.

Die Zerstörung von Munition undanderen explosiven Stoffen ist ge-fährliche Spezialistenarbeit. Demon-tage, Delaborierung und umwelt-schonende Entsorgung sind zuempfehlen. Gezielte Detonation inabgelegenen Gegenden ist die billigeund schmutzige Alternative.

Schlußfolgerungen und Empfehlun-gen des Autors:

n Die direkten Kosten der Vernich-tung von Kleinwaffen sind seltenein Problem.

n Die Kosten des Einsammelns unddes Verzichts auf Verkauf könnenerheblich sein.

n Für alle Verhältnisse gibt es eineprobate Methode, Kleinwaffenzu zerstören.

n Perfektionismus bei der Vernich-tung von Kleinwaffen zahlt sichoft nicht aus.

n Es empfiehlt sich, nach demModell des Vertrags für konven-tionelle Streitmächte in Europa,eine Verifikationsstelle für dieZerstörung von Kleinwaffen insLeben zu rufen.

n Privatwirtschaftliche Firmen mitKompetenzen auf dem Gebietder Entsorgung von Waffen undExplosivstoffen können ebenfallsdiese Rolle übernehmen.

n Eine dritte Möglichkeit wäre dasErstellen eines Standardverfahrensoder eines Leitfadens durch einekompetente Organisation wie dasPearson Peacekeeping Centre inKanada.

n Die UNO sollte die Beschaffungvon Geräten zur Vernichtung vonKleinwaffen für ihre Friedens-truppen erwägen.

n Große Mengen von Munition sindnur auf teuerem Wege zu entsor-gen. Die Kosten sollten die Ver-antwortlichen aber nicht voneiner notwendigen Abrüstungabhalten.

n Wo die Verhältnisse es zulassen,kann ein Recycling des Materialszerstörter Waffen einen Teil derVernichtungskosten ausgleichen.

n Es kann dem Frieden nützen,wenn Rüstungsproduzentendazu veranlaßt werden, bei derEntsorgung von überschüssigenWaffen behilflich zu sein.

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T he issue of small arms and lightweapons, from both an arms

control and international securityperspective, and from a criminaland public safety domestic securityperspective, catapulted into promi-nence in the 1990s. This attentionwas brought about by several factorsincluding the demise of the ColdWar and an increasing awareness ofthe casualties that were produced asa result of intra-state conflict includ-ing, in many cases, post-conflictviolence aided and abetted in itsseverity by the holdovers of thetools of hostile conflict—small armsand light weapons. Academics, non-governmental organizations(NGOs), governments and variousinternational regimes have examinedthe concerns surrounding smallarms and light weapons and havemade numerous recommendationsaccordingly (see DFAIT, 1996 and1997a; Prep Com website; BICCwebsite; BASIC website1). The issueis complex and multifaceted andrequires a holistic approach across a broad spectrum of legal, geo-graphical, political, economic, commercial and security concerns,both international and domestic.

Of the many aspects which warrantstudy regarding light weapons andsmall arms, the important matter ofcollection and destruction—alsocalled micro-disarmament—(DFAIT,1997a, p. 1) is an important one, inparticular as it applies to the poten-tially destabilizing surpluses of mili-tary-class light weapons and smallarms within the context of a countryemerging from intra-state conflict.

1 For detailed information on internet services, see references.

It is debatable whether the term‘micro-disarmament’ would apply tocollection and destruction done with-in the context of a state destroyingsurplus war stocks or destroyingfirearms collected as seized contra-band or as part of a domestic fire-arms regulation initiative. Thecollection and destruction of surplusand/or illegal weapons as a meansto reducing further firearms casual-ties through post-conflict criminalaction or renewed hostilities hasbeen suggested in a number of studies. A UN Panel of Governmen-tal Experts on Small Arms recom-mended among other things that:

“The United Nations should support,with the assistance of the donorcommunity, all appropriate post-conflict initiatives related to disar-mament and demobilization, suchas the disposal and destructionof weapons ... ;

... two sets of guidelines should bedeveloped: to assist negotiators ofpeace settlements in developingplans to disarm combatants, partic-ularly as it concerns light weapons,small arms and munitions, and toinclude therein plans for weaponscollection and disposal preferablyby destruction;

... all such weapons which are notunder legal civilian possession, andnot required for the purposes ofnational defense and internal secu-rity, should be collected and de-stroyed by states as expeditiouslyas possible; and

All States should exercise restraintwith respect to the transfer of sur-plus small arms ... . All States arerecommended to also consider thepossibility to destroy all the surplusof such weapons” (United Nations,1997, pp. 29–30).

Micro-disarmament has already metwith some success within the con-text of post-conflict situations, bothas an initial disarmament measureinvolving former combatants and asa method of mitigating casualtiesthrough criminal activities. Somemicro-disarmament measures havebeen implemented well after hostili-ties have ceased. It is within this framework that the UN recommen-dations were made and under whichother authorities on the subject haveput forth observations and sugges-tions. Edward Laurance, from theMonterey Institute of InternationalStudies Program for Arms Control,Disarmament and Conversion—theconsultant to the UN Panel of Ex-perts on Small Arms—has proposeda treaty on small arms and lightweapons in which he states thatcollection and destruction shouldhave a prominent place, given theirpractical and symbolic importance(Laurance, 1997, p. 19). The BritishAmerican Security InformationCouncil (BASIC) has conductedseveral studies on small arms andlight weapons where either thefocus of the study was on collectionand destruction and/or where therecommendations strongly encour-aged collection and destruction(BASIC, 1997a; 1997b; Vines, 1998).Within their studies, the BASICpapers reiterated and elaborated on the UN Panel recommendations.A meeting sponsored by theInternational Committee of the RedCross (ICRC) and the NorwegianRed Cross in Oslo, where participantsfrom fourteen countries attended,recommended that “the immediatedestruction of surplus arms andammunition to prevent them spread-ing further should be an integral partof peace agreements and demobili-zation processes” and that “interna-tional assistance be made availableto States for the disposal of surplussmall arms and light weapons”(Prep Com, 1998).

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Introduction

There are several examples of post-conflict micro-disarmament initiatives—most with mixed results. The UNwas involved in most of them, eitherdirectly as part of a peacekeepingmandate or indirectly in an advisoryor other sponsorship role. Micro-disarmament attempts, which demon-strate various degrees of less thancomplete success, have occurred inNicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala,Namibia, Mozambique, Angola,Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti and Mali.Many of these missions have beensubsequently evaluated in terms ofthe micro-disarmament componentof the mandate. The findings providea plethora of information on whatto avoid and how to successfullyplan such programs from a policyperspective. The most significantstudies have been carried out by theUnited Nations Institute for Disarma-ment Research (UNIDIR), BASIC inthe papers mentioned above, by theMonterey Institute of InternationalStudies, and by the Lessons LearnedUnit of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) UN,Headquarters New York. A synopsisof several studies and interviewsincluding the UNIDIR studies wascompleted by David DeClerq in his study for DFAIT on micro-disarmament (DFAIT, 1997a, pp. 44–47).

Micro-disarmament should not be a‘stand alone’ process, particularly inthe context of post-conflict rapproche-ment; it must be part of what can becalled a peace process continuumof disarmament, demobilization andreintegration. (For details, seeDFAIT, 1997b.) In fact, without thiscontinuum, voluntary disarmamentmay be very difficult to implementand, without collection, there canbe no destruction. The DevelopmentAssistance Committee of the Organi-sation for Economic Cooperationand Development views disarmamentas part of the whole demobilization/reintegration scheme (OECD, 1997,p. 64).

There has thus been a significantamount of research devoted to policyanalysis and the implementationshortfalls of micro-disarmament.However the analysis provides manyhelpful recommendations most ofwhich focus by-and-large on whatshould be done—policy direction—leaving the operational aspect ofhow to do it—operational imple-mentation—largely untouched. Todate, micro-disarmament destructiontechniques have at best been verysuperficially addressed—particularlyfrom a cost-analysis perspective.Failure to do this may leave policy-makers susceptible to argumentswhich could undermine attempts atmicro-disarmament such as sugges-tions that it is too expensive or toodifficult to organize and implement.Such reasoning may reflect a lack ofpolitical will, and/or an unprovedassumption regarding cost, technical,geographical or infrastructure con-straints. This applies whether one islooking at collection and destructionwithin the definition of micro-disarmament or at the destruction ofsurplus weapons in a more benignsetting such as surplus war stocks.

Aim and methodology

This study will examine the issuesand methodologies regarding thedestruction of light weapons, smallarms and ammunition, primarilywithin the context of peace-buildingoperations in a post-conflict society.Firearms collection and destructionconducted within the scope ofdomestic firearms regulations insome selected countries will also beaddressed with a view to providinguseful considerations and guidancefor similar actions, not only in post-conflict situations but in a domesticeffort to destroy surplus militaryweapons and seized illegal weaponswithin or outside an internationalagreement or understanding. Severalpost-conflict situations where collec-tion and destruction of weaponswere carried out either by the state,NGOs and citizens groups or an out-side third party will also be analyzedfor lessons learned. A review of current destruction methodologiesand available technologies will beundertaken with a view to suggest-ing appropriate destruction consid-erations including possible roles forcommercial participation. Potentialorganizational considerations formicro-disarmament will also beexamined.

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About the author:

David DeClerq, a retired infantryofficer of the Canadian Army, hasmore than 15 years of experience instrategic security analysis. He workedas a consultant to the foreign ministryin Ottawa and represented his coun-try on the UN Panel of GovernmentalExperts on Small Arms. Mr DeClerqis a member of the Canadian Councilfor International Peace and Securityand holds an MA in InternationalAffairs from Carleton University.

“Micro-disarma-ment should not

be a ‘stand alone’ pro-cess, it must be part ofwhat can be called apeace process continu-um of disarmament,demobilization andreintegration.

”

A number of UN initiatives andoperations have demonstrated

the problems and potentials ofmicro-disarmament with regards topractical implementation. Most ofthese missions have been the subjectof substantial policy-prescriptiveanalysis. For purposes of this study,only two micro-disarmament initia-tives will be discussed as these illus-trate a degree of success in destroy-ing a number of weapons throughrelatively cost-effective procedures.In almost all the cases of micro-disarmament within the context ofimplementing peace agreements,physical destruction was generallynot a significant problem insofar asmethodology and costs were con-cerned: it was collection and, insome cases, the lack of disposalwhich created difficulties.

Sahara-Sahel1

The Secretary-Generals AdvisoryMission to the Sahara-Sahel in 1994was not a UN peace operation; itwas however the first UN advisoryventure addressing the issue of lightweapons proliferation includingcollection and destruction andhence it is useful to examine.

In October 1993, a request by thePresident of Mali to the UN Secre-tary-General to assist in the collec-tion of an increasing excess of lightweapons within his country metwith agreement and a UN AdvisoryMission was formed, visiting Mali in

August 1994. The mission outcomeresulted in the Secretary-Generalstating in his report to the GeneralAssembly on the Advisory Board onDisarmament Matters that the missionhad heightened the need for practi-cal answers to questions such asincentive programs, the level of stability required before programscould be implemented, and codesof conduct for supplier states. Hestressed the requirement for an ad-equate level of personal security incountries plagued with a prolifera-tion of light weapons if micro-disarmament was to work (Boutros-Ghali, 1995).

The micro-disarmament componentof the mission focused on Mali andinvolved the destruction of 2,642 rifles, machine-guns, grenade laun-chers and pistols, all in good work-ing order which were collected anddestroyed by burning in March 1996.These weapons were turned in as aresult of negotiations implementinga cease-fire agreement between theGovernment of Mali and the TuaregRebellion leadership. The collectionprogram was voluntary and the de-struction method was inexpensiveto implement: a public bonfire (Disarmament Times, May 1996;Discussion with a Canadian memberof the original Advisory Mission).

The methodology for collection anddestruction was quite simple; fourcantonments were selected whereweapons from the clans of that partic-ular area were collected. Incentiveswere offered in the form of a modestpayment for weapons including freefood and an initial retraining allow-ance. Lesser financial support wasprovided to combatants who surren-dered without weapons. The armswere transferred to a central locationin Timbuktu where a concrete plat-form had been constructed. A pyrewas constructed in alternating layers

of wood and weapons and the re-sulting pile was soaked in gasoline.There was no preliminary disablingof the firearms through bending,crushing or cutting. All weaponswere proofed to ensure that theycontained no live ammunition. Whilethe ex-combatants did not take partin the actual destruction, the clanchiefs did witness the burning.According to Henny J. van der Graaf,(Brigadier General Retired)—thechief UN representative who certifiedthe destruction on behalf of the UN—the weapons were completelydisabled and unusable after theburning (Van der Graaf, personalcommunication, July 1998).

So what was the cost? The militaryin Mali were initially unpersuadedabout the benefits of such destruc-tion (Poulton and Youssouf, 1998,p. 120). In short, they saw fewbenefits but many costs on the basisthat the weapons could have beenused by the security forces—and infact many had been stolen from thesecurity forces. This would havebeen a cheap source of replenish-ment which, in their view, wouldhave to be provided for elsewherefrom a scant national treasury.According to the same source, Mali’sPresident saw it not as a militarymatter but a political matter: it couldnot be judged in terms of costs somuch as in terms of benefits; nationalreconciliation and peace were farmore valuable than the cost of theweapons—its symbolic value wasbeyond cost-analysis. More cynicalanalysis suggested that it was apublic relations effort of little valueas replacement weapons were rela-tively easy to obtain (Poulton andYoussouf, 1998, p. 121). Whateverthe case, the direct cost of destruc-tion was in reality the price of thefirewood and the gasoline. A cost-analysis could be applied to ‘lostopportunity sales or recovery’ andthe actual cost of paying soldiers to

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Figure 1: Members of the UN Observer Group cutting

an assault rifle with an oxy-acetylene torch

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1 This outline draws primarily from the following sources: United Nations, 1995;Van der Graaf, 1996; Poulton and Ibrahim,1998.

Intra-stateConflict—Two Case Studies

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collect, secure and burn the weaponsincluding transportation costs, andso on, not to mention the paymentshanded out for the weapons. How-ever, to do this without factoring inthe intangible and/or unquantifiableaspects of moving toward a moresecure environment and ‘peace andnational reconciliation’ would leavean incomplete picture. In simpleterms, cost-benefit analysis is ex-tremely difficult to apply in such circumstances.

Central America2

UN peacekeeping operations inCentral America involved severalseparate missions and mandates.The UN Observer Group in CentralAmerica (ONUCA) operated from1989 to 1992 and was responsibleamong other things for the super-vision and disarmament of theNicaraguan Resistance. The UNObserver Mission in El Salvador(ONUSAL) functioned from July1991 to 30 April 1995. Among itstasks were the supervision and disar-mament of a coalition of five armedopposition groups collectivelyknown as the FMLN. The UNObserver Mission in Guatemala(MINGUA) ran from January to May1997. As weapons destruction wasnot a responsibility of the mission, it will not be discussed here. Thereare many good studies which discussand analyze the effectiveness ofthese missions, including the disar-mament component (Wrobel, 1997;BASIC, 1997b). The only aspectwhich will be addressed here is thedisarmament process with specialemphasis on small arms and lightweapons destruction methodologies.

The destruction of weapons collectedfrom the Nicaraguan resistance wasa known part of the mandate and,as a result, planning for such activities was conducted prior to themounting of the mission. The missionChief of Staff, Canadian Brig. Gen.Ian Douglas, consulted with severalexperts on small arms destruction inCanada (Douglas, personal commu-nication, June 1998). These includedthe Royal Canadian Mounted Police(RCMP), military armorers and privateconsultants. It was concluded thatan oxy-acetylene cutting torch wasthe best process to use under thecircumstances. Consideration wasgiven to such basic procedures asusing a bulldozer or other suitablevehicle to crush the weapons. It isinteresting to note that one methodconsidered was a weapon destruc-tion point consisting of two NCOsfrom the Venezuelan Battalion withsledge hammers and two cementblocks (Murphy, 1991, p. 51). How-ever, the isolation of some of thecollection sites and the potentialnumber of sites suggested that oxy-acetylene was more appropriate;oxy-acetylene equipment is relative-ly cheap to buy or lease and is avail-able almost everywhere. The equip-ment is easily portable as it can bemoved by helicopter and lightvehicle; moreover personnel can beeasily trained to use it (see Figure 1).At the time it was the preferredmethod of destroying illegal andcontraband weapons seized byCanadian authorities.

A Standing Operating Procedure(SOP) for weapons destruction wasdeveloped as a handbook detailingthe description and number of cutsto be made for each type of weapon.In general, for assault weapons andhandguns, the weapons were cutcompletely through at the receiver.3

Not only did the cut ensure that theweapon was unusable in its presentstate; because of the oxy-acetyleneheat, the surrounding metal was

melted so the congealed slag madeit impossible for even a skilledarmorer/gunsmith to repair it. Whilethe one-cut approach could makesome spare parts available to beretrieved, their value was minimaland the likelihood that even onereasonably functioning firearm couldbe reassembled out of several hun-dred destroyed ones was extremelyslight. According to ONUCA’s officialreport, a total of 14,920 small armswere destroyed along with 4 heavymachine-guns, 134 mortars and1,265 grenade launchers (Wrobel,1997, p. 31). Thus, small arms madeup over 90 percent of all weaponsdestroyed.

The sites were all established on aparticular pattern and the numberof oxy-acetylene torches at each sitewas set according to the number ofweapons likely to be decommis-sioned there. The actual cutting wasdone by members of the ONUCAVenezuelan Infantry Battalion in thepresence of the former combatantwho gave up the weapon. This wasa confidence-building measureensuring that the weapon wouldnot merely be handed over to thegovernment or military against whichthe resistance had been fighting. Itwas also a psychological reminderthat hostilities were indeed over andwas a sign of commitment to a ‘neworder’. In addition, it was one of thefirst steps in the peace process contin-uum of disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration. If the continuumdid not exist, it would probably havemeant no collection of weapons. Ateach site, collected munitions wereburned, in the case of ball ammuni-tion, or destroyed using plastic ex-plosives (C4) in the case of grenades,mortar rounds and other explosivemunitions.

The equipment used to destroyweapons and munitions waspurchased or leased by the UNChief Administrative Staff (civilian).Expenditures regarding the destruc-tion costs in Central America were

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2 For more basic details on all UN CentralAmerican missions, see internet website of the UN Peacekeeping Operations.

3 The receiver is that portion of the firearmwhich seats the bolt or breech block and is the chassis for the firearm; it is the frameto which all other components (barrel,trigger mechanism, breech bolt, etc.) arefastened.

“Cost-benefit anal-ysis is extremely

difficult to apply.

”

unavailable. The fact that therewere a sufficient number of trainedofficers to carry out the weaponsdestruction program—particularlythe destruction of ammunition andexplosives—was more good luckthan good planning. The UN didnot request experts in these areasfrom the contributing countries.Proper SOPs and safety training,together with the requisite numberof experts is an important considera-tion for any mandate which involvesweapons and munitions destruction.In addition, it was the opinion ofBrig. Gen. Douglas that two of themost important considerations insuch a weapons destruction pro-cedure were (a) that it be done immediately and (b) that it be imple-mented within the context of a well-planned and -funded reintegrationprogram. The importance of imme-diate destruction was based on hisexperience in Liberia: if the weaponswere guarded for long periods of

time pending disposal decisions, itwas too easy for them to ‘leak’ intothe area again. Moreover guardingthe weapons ties up security forcesand, over time, the weapons wereless likely to be destroyed and morelikely to be disposed of in a waywhich destabilized the area onceagain.

The destruction program which tookplace in El Salvador under ONUSALwas similar in many ways to theone in Nicaragua. Two minor differ-ences were that the ex-combatantstook part in actually destroying theirown weapons and that hacksaws(see Figure 2) were also used todestroy weapons. The number ofarms destroyed in El Salvador waslisted as 9,851 small arms (over 96percent of all weapons handed in)and 379 support weapons (Wrobel,1997, p. 138). As in Nicaragua therewere problems in finding the requi-site number of qualified personnelwithin ONUSAL to properly super-vise the destruction procedures.

There were several minor incidentsregarding the inability to properlyproof weapons, one resulting ininjury. There was also an instanceof improperly setting an explosivecharge but, other than scatteringmunition components around alarge area, there were no injuries.

The disposition of the scrap metalresulting from the destruction is notentirely clear. In the case of Nicaraguasome of it was delivered to anAmerican company which convertedthe scrap into prostheses. This effortwas symbolic. Its political value can-not be quantified in monetary terms.In all likelihood this procedure wasnot cost-effective in real terms. In-formation on whether or not scrapmetal was eventually sent to localscrap recyclers could not be obtained.

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Figure 2: Ex-combatants cutting their assault rifles with a hacksaw in El Salvador

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O utside the sphere of conventionaldisarmament and the context of

intra-state peace agreements, weaponsdestruction is routinely carried outunder a number of scenarios. (SeeBICC website for an internationalsurvey.) These range from destroy-ing many thousands of surplus mili-tary small arms and light weapon—which are no longer required and,in some instances, have no militaryre-sale value and/or cannot legallybe sold to distributors for the civilianmarket—through post-conflict buy-back programs supported by nationalgovernments, to the more mundaneaspect of destroying illegal weaponsseized as part of criminal investiga-tions.

A review of the destruction proce-dures used by some states indicateshow many methods exist for dispos-ing of firearms in various ranges ofcost-effectiveness. They provideuseful guidelines for any organizationor state seeking to implement asimilar program.

Australia

Australia has just completed a mas-sive destruction of previously legal-ly held civilian firearms which weresubsequently declared illegal. Theprogram was initiated in reaction toa single civilian shooting rampagein Tasmania which left dozens ofpeople killed and wounded. Whilenot welcomed by some firearms

owners for various reasons, one ofthe keys to its success was a gener-ous compensation package for resti-tution which was funded by a one-time additional medicare tax. TheFederal Government then financedthe State buy-back programs. Thefirearms buyback was administeredby six states and two territories.Each state had its own procedurefor disposing of firearms but mostwere similar. A description of theprocedure of the largest state, NewSouth Wales, is outlined below(Mackenzie; Roelandts, personalcommunication, June 1998).

In New South Wales (NSW) a totalof 182,000 firearms were collectedat various sites which included 400police stations, a large metropolitansite in Sydney (relocated to four different areas in the city) and twomobile collection stations. The NSWpolice were responsible for receivingthe firearms. When their ownershanded in the firearms, they wereissued checks on the spot in accor-dance with the value of the firearmsas published in the Australian Fire-arms Compensation Hand Book.Where there was a claim that thefirearm in question had greater valuedue to unique circumstances or,from a collectors perspective, rarity,a special evaluation was made. Ofinterest is the fact that 25,000 legalfirearms for which there was nocompensation were also submitted.A comprehensive firearms account-ing procedure using computers, ledgers and security checks was followed at all stages of collectionand disposal.

The firearms collected at police sta-tions were transported under con-tract to a private security firm inlocked high top ‘wheelie bins’ andtransported to the Weapons DisposalSection. They were then dismantledto separate metal and non-metalparts. The non-metal componentswere shredded whilst the metal wasconveyed to a smelter for recycling.There was no partial cost recoveryas there was no payment for thescrap metal. Some ammunition andexplosives were also handed in andtransported to destruction sites inaccordance with explosives regula-tions (DFAIT, 1998; CanadianGovernment, 1998).

The two mobile collection stationsand the Sydney static center usedportable 10 ton hydraulic presses tobend barrels and smash receiverswhich rendered the firearms totallyinoperable. These firearms werethen loaded into a dumpster refusebin and taken to a giant shredderwhere they were shredded and pro-cessed through a separator whichsorted the non-metallic parts out.The scrap was then sent to steelmills. According to Australian sources,the cost of running the two mobilecollection sites was 1.2 millionAustralian dollars.

The 10 ton hydraulic presses wereportable (requiring two people tomove them), electrically powered,and could be operated by one per-son. The presses for the mobilesites were bolted to the floor of atruck. The hydraulic ram press pro-cessed one firearm at a time in lessthan 30 seconds. The presses weremanufactured specifically for thisoperation by Tieman Industrial PtyLtd, 145 Lavarack Avenue, EagleFarm, Queensland 4009 at a cost of1,500 Australian dollars.

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The DomesticDestruction ofSurplus and/orIllegal Small Arms

Figure 3: Firearm being destroyed with a plasma cutter at RCMP Forensic

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Consultation with the recycling in-dustry in New South Wales revealedno interest in purchasing the materialdue to the alleged poor quality ofthe metal components of firearmsand the environmental problemassociated with the disposal of thenon-metallic parts. Some recyclingplants wanted to charge 100,00Australian dollars a short ton to pro-cess and dispose of the collectedfirearms. Agreements reached in-volved non-payment for scrap withthe police responsible for transport-ing the metal to the smelter or therecycling yards.

In a post-operation report, the NSWpolice made several recommenda-tions which included:

n more use of mobile collectionsites

n payment for firearms on thespot, except where evaluationswere needed

n the establishment of an expertSpecial Evaluations Committeefor rare or otherwise valuable orunique firearms

n a comprehensive and up-to-dateevaluations list for firearms

n crushing as the preferredmethod of disabling a firearm(rather than simply cutting thebarrel); a 10 ton hydraulic pressfor example would easily do thejob and is relatively inexpensive

n safety instructions and proceduresfor those collecting and disposingof firearms were vital becausethere had been instances ofloaded firearms being handed inand a few rare cases of deliber-ately sabotaged firearms whichcould have exploded during thedisabling process.

Canada4

Discussion of the Canadian experi-ence regarding the disposal of fire-arms will center on the more commonand on-going aspect of disposing offirearms seized by customs andpolice authorities in the line of duty.Such destruction is practiced in manystates where contraband and/or illegalweapons are confiscated. In theCanadian case, because relativelysmall quantities of firearms areinvolved, the weapons are shippedto the RCMP forensic laboratories

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Figure 4: Crane placing oldvehicle containing firearmsinto giant shredder

4 The information in this section was obtained from the RCMP Central ForensicLaboratory, Chief Scientist-Firearms, andthe Armourer who readily answered allquestions and permitted the author to tourand photograph destruction activities(Smith and Bryant, personal communica-tion, June/July 1998).

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Figure 5: Shredder endproduct—baseball sizecompressed and mangledsteel parts

in Ottawa where they are kept untila sufficient quantity makes it feasibleor necessary to commence destruc-tion.

The firearms are cut in half at thereceiver using a plasma cutter (seeFigure 3). The plasma cutter costsabout 3,000 Canadian dollars andreplaced a previously used oxy-acetylene torch. The plasma cutteris portable, can be run off any elec-trical source including a generator,and is much quicker than an oxy-acetylene torch—taking about 20 to30 seconds to cut an assault rifle intwo. The armorer technician respon-sible for firearms established thatapproximately 1,200 handguns weredestroyed in this manner in a periodof 8 hours using the plasma cutter(Bryant, personal communication,June 1998). In Canada, once a fire-arm has been cut through the re-ceiver it is legally no longer a fire-arm. The scrap is divided into twoon-site dump buckets—one for barrel ends and one for butt ends.This is to prevent anyone from pos-sibly attempting to repair the fire-

arm—which in any case would bedifficult, if not impossible. The twodump buckets are then taken atseparate times to a scrap recyclerdealer rather than a foundry as thescrap dealer is in a position to sellthe scrap on the open market to asuitable steel-recycling company.The firearms parts are usually loadedinto an old car at the recycling siteand, in front of witnesses, hoistedby a large crane and deposited intoa multi-million dollar giant steelscrap shredder where it is shreddedinto large pellet-size pieces. It iscertainly the opinion of the RCMPstaff in charge of destruction thatthe shredder alone is sufficient todestroy any and all light weaponsand small arms without preliminarypreparation (see Figures 4 and 5).The preliminary destruction proce-dure using the plasma cutter ismerely an additional security mea-sure. It was confirmed that severaldecades ago the Canadian Army,through a government agency, dis-posed of firearms (Sten guns, thatis, short-barreled personal automaticfirearms and Bren guns, that is, light

machine-guns) directly to a scrapdealer without prior destruction orsupervision at the site. Some of theseweapons and/or parts found theirway intact onto the illegal civilianmarket. The scrap dealer shreddingis done at no cost but the scrap dealer gets the metal free. The rea-son given for no payment is that thequantities are small and must bewitnessed, therefore the normal re-cycle yard routine must be adjustedto accept the firearms. While theshredder is capable of taking thefirearm complete with non-metallicparts, the RCMP strip the weaponsto metal parts only as part of thedeal to shred the weapons for nocost.

In another small arms destructionprocedure, the RCMP were respon-sible for overseeing the destructionof some 22,000 RCMP .38 caliberrevolvers which had recently beenreplaced by more modern 9 mmpistols. The destruction involvesplacing the handguns in a steel 45gallon drum with holes drilled in itto prevent heat build-up. The sealed

drums, which weigh about 800 lbeach when filled, were loaded byfork lifts into trucks and transportedto a local foundry where they weremelted down. The foundry did notcharge for the procedure, nor didthe RCMP receive any payment forthe scrap metal. All of this was doneunder supervision and witnessed bycompetent authorities. The Ottawapolice force used the hydraulicshears of a local scrap recycler toquickly and completely sever fire-arms obtained in a local gun amnes-ty program.

South Africa5

South Africa is faced with a particu-larly daunting influx of military-typeassault weapons from neighboringcountries which are emerging fromintra-state conflict and from internalfirearms sources both legal and illegal. As is often the case in stateswhere security forces cannot providea satisfactory level of protection tothe population, legal firearms haveproliferated, keeping pace with therise in criminal violence and illegalfirearms. The number of police seizures of firearms has increasedaccordingly. At the end of 1997,4,504 confiscated firearms—many ofthem ‘homemade’—were destroyedat the Transworks in Koedoespoort,Pretoria. The estimated commercialvalue was 2 million South Africanrand. After being stored for sometime, each weapon was catalogedby the police for destruction.Initially the weapons were brokenusing a hydraulic press located atthe police’s logistics head office inSilverton, Pretoria. The 20 tons ofscrap metal were then loaded inspecial ‘trunks’ which were sealedand taken under police escort to theTransworks steel mill. When thesealed trunks arrived at the millthey were inspected again by thepolice against an original inventorylist. The trunks were then hoistedwith an electro-magnet and droppedinto the furnace, beginning the tran-sition from guns to new cars (Star(South Africa), 7 October 1997).

Within a different context, anotherSouth African weapons destructioneffort was undertaken in 1994 knownas the Gun-Free South AfricaCampaign. Its goal was to focusattention on firearms as the tools ofthe escalating crime and violence.The voluntary collection programwas modest in its achievements.Places of worship were the preferredcollection sites because it was feltthat people were more likely to goto such sites rather than to a policestation. However police stationswere used in some areas. At thecollection sites, each weapon wasreceived by a member of the clergywho handed it to a South AfricanPolice officer who then proofed theweapon and destroyed it using aoxy-acetylene torch or an anglegrinder. All weapons collected werethen transferred by the police to apolice storage facility (Meek, 1998).

United States

In the United States, municipal, stateand federal law enforcement author-ities all undertake the destruction ofillegal firearms using a variety ofmethods. The Department ofDefense (DOD) may have one ofthe more established large-scalemethodologies for destroying surplusweapons in the world. Several at-tempts were made to obtain officialdetails on the procedures throughUS Government and Military sourcesbut responses were not forthcoming.There are several military installationsin the US which have their ownlarge-capacity shredders (Pielet,personal communication, June 1998).These installations oversee theshredding or compaction of the lightweapons under secure conditions.The scrap metal is then sold throughtender for recycling. National RifleAssociation (NRA) bulletins of March1994 and December 1995 state thatthe DOD confirmed that a weaponsdestruction program lasting abouttwo years destroyed over 3 millionfirearms including colt .45 pistols,M1 carbines and an assortment of

other rifles (NRA 1994; 1995). TheNRA lobby was apparently success-ful in stopping further destructionactivities. According to NRA sources,most of the destruction took placeat two facilities in Anniston6 andBirmingham, Alabama using ashredder and a compactor which de-stroyed the entire firearm includingshipping box, sling and cleaning kit.The gist of the NRA complaint wasthe destruction of many valuablecollectors items; the destruction ofvast numbers of military heritagefirearms and the allegation that theactual cost of destruction was US$3.50 a firearm while the resale valueof each firearm averaged about US $250.00. In other words the lostopportunity cost (resale value indollars) plus the actual cost of de-struction suggested a destructioncost of perhaps several million dollarsto the tax payer. There is no indica-tion of how the US $3.50 cost perweapon for destruction was derived,however the cost estimate is feasiblebased on the going price for ashredder plus attendant labor.

Once guns are turned into scrap,there is no guarantee that some partswill not resurface to be reassembledinto working firearms. ArmscorpsUSA, based in Baltimore, uses USmilitary parts to rebuild firearmssuch as the M-1 and M-14. Accordingto Melvin Glaxton and William Gainesof the Chicago Tribune7 based onan interview with Mr Friese fromArmscorps, the firearms are recon-structed using imported parts (85percent) from places such as South

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5 For details on the situation in South Africa,see also: Smith, 1996; Cock, 1995; Meek,1998.

6 According to information received fromSSI Shredding Systems Inc., Wilsonville,Oregon, the Anniston Army Depot boughttwo of their shredding systems for destroy-ing weapons. They were advised by anauthority at the Anniston Army Depot thata unit can process small arms such as anAK-47 in a little less than a minute. Largerlight weapons such as Browning .50 cali-ber machine-guns and 81 mm mortarsmust first be cut to reduce the size. Theportable shredder can destroy the receiverof a .50 caliber machine-gun but not thebarrel.

7 For full details see http://www.kentuckyconnect.com/heraldleader/news/011298/n1guns.html.

Korea, while 15 percent of the partscome from domestic US army scrapfrom demilitarized small arms. Thecompany gets regular notices fromthe military announcing sales andinviting scrap inspection and bidoffers. Defense Department recordsshow that in May 1995, Mr Friese,through an intermediary, was thehighest bidder on 100,000 poundsof scrap sold by the military at itsdepot in Crane, Indiana. The invita-tion to bid stated that the scrap con-sisted of “demilitarized small armsparts” and other steel of similar quality. By the time Mr Friese andhis workers sorted through the3-foot-high, 20-foot-long pile ofsupposedly inoperable guns, hehad more than 250,000 usable parts.Friese states that Armscorp has morethan 500 million weapons parts,including the parts recovered frommilitary scrap—enough completekits to build a million M-14s.

El Salvador

El Salvador is somewhat unique inits domestic approach to addressinga crime wave exacerbated by a sur-plus of small arms and light weaponsleft over from the internal conflictsof the 1980s. In a program called‘Goods For Guns’, over 3,100 smallarms and light weapons and almost50,000 rounds of ammunition includ-ing grenades, detonators, and mineswere collected and destroyed in thefall of 1996.

At the request of the author, Mr William Godnick, director of PrepCom, made some queries regardingthe destruction methodology on arecent visit to El Salvador in July1998. He stated that there was noconsistent method of destruction—some weapons were cut and otherhad their barrels filled. They werenot completely destroyed but weremade unusable and stored by thearmy for eventual use in a monumentmade from the weapons. Explosiveordnance was detonated as soon aspossible due to storage concerns.The general procedure has been todig several holes one meter deep

and 50 cm wide and—after obtainingpermission from state and local authorities including an environ-mental approval—to explode theordnance. The explosives were some-times destroyed in an area wherethe detonation could double for useas a construction project. Thus if aroad had to be built or widened, itwas done in conjunction with thedestruction of explosive ordnancethereby assisting in maximizing theuse of expensive detonation require-ments (Godnick, 1998).

Mozambique

A modest weapons collection pro-gram was conducted in Mozambiquein 1996/97. The destruction techniqueused there was a bench saw in theback of a truck to provide a mobile‘collection and destruction site’.However, this allegedly proved tooexpensive and too unreliable, soweapons are now bought to churchesfor destruction. Generally the weap-ons are destroyed at the collectionsite, but explosives and ammunitionare given to the police for destruc-tion (Meek, 1998). There is no indi-cation as to how the weapons wereeventually destroyed. While themicro-disarmament failure of theMozambique UN peacekeepingmission ONUMOZ has been welldocumented, it is interesting to notethat when “the United Nationsassessed various options to destroyadditional weapons in metal foun-dries, the idea was rejected as tooexpensive” (Vines, 1998, p. 6). No explanation was provided as tohow this decision was reached andwhy other methods were not con-sidered.

Haiti

Weapons collected by the US-ledMulti-National Force mission weredestroyed or disabled by the 8thOrdnance Company, US Army, inHaiti. Some modern weapons ingood condition were passed to theUS Department of Justice to be re-issued as necessary to the newHaitian Police Force. Weapons ofhistorical value were set aside as

museum pieces; and the remainderwere sent to the Letterkenny ArmyDepot in Pennsylvania to be melteddown at a destruction facility (BASIC,1997b, p. 8; Laurance, 1996). This isprobably part of the US Army weap-ons destruction capability previouslydescribed.

Nicaragua

A separate effort at weapons collec-tion was initiated in Nicaragua in aneffort to reduce weapons in circula-tion which had not been destroyedunder the ONUCA mandate (BASIC,1997b, p. 8; Laurance, 1996). Thiswas a combination gun-buy-backprogram and confiscation effortwhich resulted in some 142,000weapons—some 30 percent ofwhich were non-functioning—beingdestroyed. These weapons were destroyed in public bonfires as botha cheap method of disposal and as apolitical and sociological statementregarding the commitment to reduc-ing violence and increasing publicsecurity. The attempts to obtain anyinformation from the NicaraguanArmy on the details of how theweapons were burned, costs in-volved, and effectiveness of thetechnique were unsuccessful.

Slavonia

In 1996/97, the UN in collaborationwith Croatia supervised a weaponsbuy-back program in EasternSlavonia, Baranja and West Sirmium(Croatia). Weapons which were oldor in poor condition were kept bythe United Nations TransitionalAdministration for Eastern Slavonia,Baranja and Western Sirmium(UNTAES) for destruction. Smallarms were crushed and heavierweapons were disabled by pouringconcrete into their barrels. Ammuni-tion and explosives were destroyedunder controlled conditions byUNTAES demolition teams organizedby the Force Engineer at specialsites well away from public areas(Boothby, 1998).

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Box1:The Treaty onConventional ArmedForces In Europe (CFE Treaty)8

The CFE Treaty was the first inter-national agreement which formallyinitiated a regime which oversawthe destruction of conventionalarmaments—main battle tanks, ar-tillery and mortars above 100 mm,armored combat vehicles and com-bat aircraft and helicopters (CFE,1990). The agreement was signedby the former member states of theWarsaw Pact including successorstates and NATO member states. It entered into force in July 1992and, over the next four years, wasresponsible for the formalized andverified destruction of some 50,000pieces of treaty-limited equipment.The relevance to the issue of thedestruction of small arms and lightweapons is manifested in severalways.

In two protocols, the CFE Treatylays out very precise details onexactly what equipment is subjectto the Treaty provisions and how todestroy such equipment. The pro-tocol on Existing Types clearly estab-lishes what weapons systems, plat-forms or vehicles must be limited,

leaving no doubt as to what systemsare subject to the destruction pro-tocol. This provides a model for anymandate or effort to destroy smallarms, be it a UN mandate or a nation-al program to destroy weapons. Thedestruction protocol clearly estab-lishes what constitutes destructionand how it is to be done—severalmethods are deemed permissible.The closest example applicable tosmall arms and light weapons de-struction is the protocol for the de-struction of artillery (see Annex).Some states were quite creative inemploying various destruction tech-niques for reducing costs throughefficiencies and recycling. Germanydesigned and used a massive shred-der to reduce armored combatvehicles to scrap. Poland used agiant ball weight and electro-magnetto smash tank hulls (see Figure 6).

Most signatory states to the Treatyformed arms control verificationorganizations which—dependingon the circumstances of individualcountries—were responsible forconducting verification inspectionsof other signatory states to ensurethat the treaty-limited equipmentnotifications were accurate in termsof location and numbers and thatdestruction was carried out in ac-cordance with the destruction pro-tocols. Where a state received in-spections, these same organizationswere responsible for escorting thevisiting verification teams and inmany cases were responsible forhelping ensure that the destructionprotocols were properly carried out.These organizations spent consider-able time and effort in developingoperating procedures and trainingmostly military officers and seniornon-commissioned officers forvarious responsibilities to ensurethat the Treaty was properly imple-mented. The national verificationorganizations conducted verificationinspections as part of their ownnational teams and frequently aspart of a multi-national team.

Many of these verification organiza-tions have an indefinite existence.Their experience and knowledge isa valuable resource which hasapplicability beyond the CFE Treatyand should be offered and exploitedwherever and whenever possible.They also plan and conduct inspec-tion and observation activities underthe CSCE (OSCE) Vienna Document1994 and assist in other arms controlactivities, such as inspections underthe Dayton Accords. There are fewreasons why these verification orga-nizations could not develop therequisite expertise to oversee thecollection and destruction of smallarms and light weapons within thecontext of an international regime,or to assist the UN, regional organi-zations or individual states in thatregard. The requirement for assis-tance (financial or technical) wasnoted in the summary report ema-nating from the meeting held underthe auspices of the ICRC and theNorwegian Red Cross in May 1998(Prep Com, 1998). At the very leasttheir organizational structure, know-ledge and skill levels and modusoperandi provide a model for weap-ons destruction monitoring and/orimplementation regimes, whethersmall scale in support of UN peacemissions or part of an internationalagreement to destroy surpluses.

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8 The information is drawn from Treaty onConventional Armed Forces in Europe,Paris, 19 November 1990, and the author’sown experience in the Canadian ArmedForces as a policy analyst, arms controlinspector and information support analystpertaining to Canadian involvement in theCFE Treaty, the Document of theStockholm Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures andDisarmament in Europe (OSCE, 1986), theVienna Document (OSCE, 1994) and otherarms control activities from 1988 to 1996.

Figure 6: Tank hull destruction by smashing in Poland

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I t is clear from the survey of smallarms destruction to date that

there is a profusion of methodolo-gies for destroying small arms andlight weapons, ranging from thecheap and simple but perhaps lessreliable and less environmentallyfriendly methods of burning to theadvanced and very reliable butmore costly methods of shredding.A choice of system for destroyingsmall arms and light weapons ismade according to several factorsincluding: quantity; time constraints;security requirements; political, psychological and publicity factors (the value of participation by ex-combatants for example); nationalinfrastructure (road networks anddomestic destruction and recyclingcapabilities); labor costs, and avail-able implementation funds. Usingordinary cost analysis and cost-benefit analysis to determine thebest destruction procedure is diffi-cult and sometimes unreliable, evenif one can account for all the varia-bles. Intangibles cannot be quanti-fied, and assumptions often cannotbe proven. This present analysiswill try to incorporate reasonabledirect costs and considerations only.More detailed cost-benefit-analysisis a matter which perhaps requiresaddressing, not only for the moreconcrete issue of destruction but for the entire aspect of micro-disarmament.9 Also, in terms of thereliability of various techniques regarding the certainty of destruction,

“better is sometimes the enemy ofgood enough”! If one techniqueguarantees a destruction probabilityof 99 percent while another guaran-tees a destruction probability of 95percent, costs might sometimes meanthat the 95 percent solution shouldbe given preference.

Burning

This is an established procedurewhich has been used in both Maliand Nicaragua. It has the advantageof being simple to execute and isvery inexpensive in terms of incre-mental costs. Its essential ingredientsare fuel (wood or coal), a flammablesubstance to enhance rapid heatgeneration (gasoline or diesel oil),some care, and a modicum of skillin stacking the firearms to maximizedestruction. No doubt the procedurescan be improved upon through trialburns and the use of crude furnaces.Burning provides a visible and tan-gible statement in symbolic and realterms which has a political and psychological impact difficult toquantify. It may be appropriate forless developed states and for statesemerging from severe intra-stateconflict where a new direction andnew hope must be symbolically andconcretely demonstrated. The pro-cedure is more labor-intensive whichis generally not a significant problemfor less developed states.

On the other hand, however, burningruns the risk of being less effectivein terms of total destruction, and theresulting scrap is less desirable forrecycling. Some experts have ques-tioned the ability of open fires toproduce enough heat to adequatelydestroy all firearms. Informationwas provided by the Chief Scientist-

Firearms for the RCMP that firearmsburned in this manner would prob-ably be unusable even if there wasno visible damage, as the metalwould have been sufficiently affect-ed to make firing dangerous if notimpossible. However, burning is nota 100 percent-guaranteed disablingprocedure unless the barrels andreceivers are visibly bent, twisted orotherwise deformed (Smith, personalcommunication, June/July 1998).This can be overcome through spotchecks and re-burning if necessaryor, if it is a case of only a few weap-ons, destruction by other meanssuch as sledge hammers. As forrecycling, unless a state has an in-digenous capability to recyclethrough its own steel mills it is high-ly unlikely that the transportationcosts alone would be off-set by anypotential gain through scrap steelrecycle payments. In situations likethis, it might be better to bury thescrap firearms in situ or, if appro-priate, construct a peace memorialor monument. Another disadvantagemight be the environmental concernsof smoke pollution and scrap metalpollution. However it is highly prob-able that in the situation where thismethod is likely to be used, such‘pollution’ would be an infinitesimalproportion of what the state and itscitizens already generate and wouldbe incomparable to the potential forcasualties and social suffering whichmight take place if the procedurewere not carried out.

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Analysis of Small Arms andLight WeaponsDestruction Methods

9 For an interesting conceptual approach to cost-benefit analysis, particularly withinthe field of social issues, see Kopp,Krupnick and Thomas, 1997.

“Burning may beappropriate for

less developed statesand for states emerg-ing from severe intra-state conflict where anew direction and newhope must be symbol-ically and concretelydemonstrated.

”

Cutting: oxy-acetylenetorch and plasma cutter

Oxy-acetylene cutting is a well-established and proven method fordestroying weapons of all types andsizes. It can be used for destroyingthe smallest handgun up to large-caliber systems requiring reductionunder the CFE Treaty. It has theadvantage of being relatively simpleto use. Personnel can be trained ina day to use the cutting torch, includ-ing safety lessons. Local contractorscan be employed under supervision,or the equipment can be purchasedor leased for use by the security forces or supervising agency person-nel. The equipment is available on a worldwide basis and is portableenough to be flown to isolated spotsby helicopter or light aircraft ormoved by light truck. It is relativelymaintenance free and spare partsare normally plentiful. If procedures

for cuts are followed—at least onecut through the receiver—the cutplus the resulting slag from the congealing of the metal renders theweapon useless. If nothing more isdone and the pieces are made avail-able, it is conceivable that a gun-smith might be able to produce oneworking model out of several hun-dred scrap weapons, but the workinvolved and the potential dangerto the subsequent user would makesthis an unprofitable undertaking. Tobe absolutely certain, a second cutcould be made through the barrel ator near the chamber—two cuts wouldindeed ensure that the weapon isuseless.

Disadvantages to this method centerprimarily on the number of weaponsthat can be cut in a given time frame.While some may take less than aminute, others may take more time.Operator skill also has some bearingon the matter. Nevertheless it maybe unrealistic to expect to cut morethan 40 to 50 in an hour or 400 to500 in a 10-hour day, even withchanges in operators. Arguably, thescrap metal should be disposed ofto prevent parts being used for spares but again it is questionablewhether this makes sense if spareparts are easily available.

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Figure 7: Shredding Systems Inc. 2400-HM mobile shredder

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“Oxy-acetylene cutting is a well-

established and provenmethod for destroyingweapons of all typesand sizes.

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The expense of purchase, lease or acommercial contract with a cuttingoperator obviously varies from areato area and region to region. Onewould expect that leasing and commercial contracting would becheaper in less developed countries.In Canada, a new system (valves,connectors and hoses) costs 250Canadian dollars (CDN $); the leaseof the two medium tanks is aboutCDN $65 a year. An oxygen refill isapproximately CDN $25 and anacetylene refill is about CDN $65.One would expect to get 15 to 20hours of cutting from medium tanksbefore requiring a refill. The cuttingratio use of oxygen and acetylene isabout two oxygen to one acetylenewhich requires changing an oxygentank every 10 hours and an acetylenetank every 20 hours (Candasamy,personal communication, June 1998).As tanks must be leased, it does notpay to buy the ancillary equipment.If one assumes a weapon can be cutonce at the rate of one per minutethen it would be fair to suggest that,not counting labor, the costs in gasesalone are about twelve to fifteencents a weapon. As the lease andancillary equipment are essentiallyone-time purchases, the cost on alarge number of weapons, for ex-ample 10,000, might be an extrathree cents for a total equipmentmaterial cost of about fifteen toeighteen cents a weapon. The costof transportation, collection, labor,and supervision are all variables de-pendent on a number of factors andcost-analysis accounting assumptions.If labor were added at ten dollarsan hour, it would raise the cost ofdestruction (two men per site) toabout sixty cents a weapon.

A plasma cutter is more expensive(in terms of equipment) but a fasterway to do the same thing as oxy-acetylene. It can cut weapons twiceas fast as oxy-acetylene and providesa much cleaner cut. The cleaner cut,because it does not produce a largeslag component, may make theweapon more susceptible to repairbut again this is a relatively smallconcern in most countries. By thesame token, double cuts are morepractical. A plasma cutter suitablefor this type of work costs about3,000 Canadian dollars. It requiresan electrical 220 volt current andcan be run off a portable generator.A 5 kWh generator costs in the rangeof CDN $1,200. In addition, it re-quires the use of compressed air orcompressed nitrogen. Compressedair is a cheaper commodity but againa compressor and tank would berequired with each cutter. Accordingto the chief firearms technician re-sponsible for destruction of weaponswith the RCMP, the plasma cutter ismuch easier to use than the oxy-acetylene one. It is, however, sus-ceptible to moisture problems whichcan effect maintenance and repaircosts (Bryant, personal communica-tion, June 1998).

Cutting/crushing:hydraulic shears

Mechanical methods of cutting orbending have been used as adestruction method for disablingweapons by numerous police forcesincluding some in Australia, SouthAfrica and Canada. It is a relativelysimple procedure which is environ-mentally friendly. Shears run in costfrom a few thousand dollars to tensof thousands of dollars. The pricereflects both their capability in termsof the size of steel they can cut orbend and the speed with whichthey can do it. The machinery canbe bought new or used and can becustom designed. Several manufac-turers who were contacted said theycould meet the specifications ofportability and capability insofar asdestroying small arms were con-cerned and would be prepared toconstruct shears to whatever speci-

fications were required. Crew-servedweapons, particularly items such as.50 caliber machine-gun barrelswould require a more expensiveshear capability. According to corres-pondence with the director of AlanRoss Machinery Corporation,Northbrook, Illinois, in June 1998,the best equipment would be ahydraulic alligator shear.10 Suchmachines can be made self-powered(diesel generator), be sent into thefield, and are available in a varietyof blade sizes (8 inch [20 cm] to 24 inch [61 cm]) which generateanywhere from a 30-ton to 90-toncutting force. They are easy to useand would be able to take advantageof low-cost labor under the super-vision of security personnel. Thecompany claimed it could producea ‘field rugged’ equipped model,conforming to most military require-ments and custom manufactured forprices from US $10,000 upwards.Depending on size, these machinescan make anywhere from 8 to 50 cutsper minute. Thus, a few persons ata well organized site could easilydestroy a stockpile of 5,000 smallarms in a day. Similarly, Ramjet FluidPower Ltd, New Zealand stated thatthey supplied hydraulic alligatorshears to some Australian policeforces for the purpose of small armsdestruction. They recommended anRJ 14/50 Alligator Shear with 14 inchblades and a 50-ton shearing force.Such a machine can cut weapons atthe rate of eight per minute but,with a skilled operator, this couldbe increased to 10 or 12 per minute.It weighs 800 kg and can be fittedwith its own power source and madetruck/trailer portable (Turnock, per-sonal communication, July 1998).

report 13

22 B.I.C.C

cutt

ing

10 For details on hydraulic alligator shears(new and used) and other equipment seeinternet websites of Alan Ross MachineryCorporation and Recycler’s World.

“Cutting/crushingis a relatively

simple procedure whichis environmentally friendly.

”

Shredding

There seems to be little doubt thatshredding is perhaps the quickestand most effective way to destroysmall arms and light weapons. Indeveloped countries it is often thepreferred final step in destruction.This procedure has several advan-tages over other methods. First iscapacity: a giant shredder can liter-ally destroy thousands of firearms a day. Second is finality: a weaponwhich goes through a shredder isrendered completely useless, notonly with regard to operation but as a source of spare parts. Anotherconsideration is that shredder scrapmetal product is normally destinedfor recycling by the nature of wherethe bulk of shredding is done,namely, scrap metal recycle depots.Under some circumstances it mightbe feasible to commercially contracta mobile shredder on lease to destroyweapons in situ while in other in-stances it might be more effective to transport the weapons, either dis-abled or intact, to a giant shredderlocation. Shredded scrap whichconsists of non-metallic refuse doesnot have as high a scrap metal valueas scrap which is 99 percent pure.On the plus side, the lower value isoffset by the high speed and highcapacity of destruction.

Disadvantages of this method of de-struction center primarily on expenseand availability. Even in developedcountries with extensive recyclingcapabilities, large capacity fixed lo-cation shredders are located in onlya few places. These machines costseveral million dollars. Smaller, moremobile shredders are also availablebut these are not cheap and theirpurchase for destruction of weaponsonly would not be cost-effective un-less one was in the business of doingmany thousands of light weaponsper year. (See Figures 4 and 5 for anexample of a giant fixed locationshredder and Figure 7 for an exam-ple of a mobile shredder.) As notedin the destruction procedures forCanada and Australia, the use of the

shredder was merely the final stepin a destruction procedure whichentailed initial disabling, securetransport and supervised destruction.While legal considerations and fail-safe security requirements mayrecommend this procedure, there islittle doubt that it is not required tosatisfy final destruction requirements.There is no reason why operatingweapons could not be transferred

intact in locked trucks accessiblethrough removable tops to a shred-ding site and be destroyed in theshredder immediately under super-vision. In most countries, securityneed not be any more than wouldbe involved in transporting largesums of money—perhaps a driver,two security guards and a supervisorwith the requisite accounting logs. Inless stable countries, more securitywould be necessary. An alternativesolution is to bring mobile shreddersto weapons depots for destructionwithin a secure environment. Thereis little doubt that, where the eco-nomic and industrial infrastructure ofa country permits, this type of de-struction procedure may be the mostefficient and cost-effective particu-larly for large quantities of weapons.As will be discussed under recycling,some cost recovery is probablyachievable particularly for largenumbers of weapons.

Crushing/bending with vehicles

During a discussion with Mr JohnHardy, Lieut. Col. retired CanadianArmy, he stated that in the mid-1950s—when the Canadian Armywas replacing its light machine-gunof the day (Bren guns)—orders werereceived to destroy those currentlybeing held by laying them flat on ahard stand (asphalt or preferablyconcrete) and running over themlengthwise with a Centurion tank.Mr Hardy, who was involved in thedestruction, vouched that the weap-ons were totally mangled as thetank had no track pads and hencethe weapons were repeatedly hitabout 36 times with tank cleats froma 50 ton tank (Hardy, personal com-munication, June 1998). Anecdotalinformation suggests that weaponsseized from one of the factions inthe Yugoslavian conflict were atleast partially disabled by runningthem over with a Canadian trackedarmored personnel carrier (M113A). Heavy tracked military vehicles and/or bulldozers of various sizes arenot uncommon in most countriesincluding less developed states.There is no reason to suggest thatcrushing in this manner is not a viable technique. It can be done bylaying the weapons down lengthwiseand running them over; or layingthem down crosswise on a log,cement blocks or a curb and runningthem over. Even heavy wheeledvehicles such as loaded tandemdump trucks could perform the sametask if the small arms were laid outacross beams, logs or blocks. Bull-dozers or even front-end loaderscould also use their blades in thesame manner as shears to bendweapons. A visual inspection by acompetent authority would be ableto identify whether or not the firearmwas destroyed and whether the pro-cess needed repeating. (See Box 2for the results of tests carried out bythe author using a front end loader.)

destruction methods

23B.I.C.C

shre

dd

ing

“Shredding is per-haps the quickest

and most effective wayto destroy small armsand light weapons.

”

24 B.I.C.C

The author obtained two .303 caliber Enfield rifles courtesy ofMr Murray Smith, Firearms Scientistfor the RCMP forensics laboratory,to conduct field expedient destruc-tion testing. The .303 Enfield is per-haps one of the most difficult riflesto destroy as its receiver and barreltend to be thicker and stronger thanthose of modern assault rifles. Alocal contractor, Mr Lawrence Wyatt,agreed to the use of his constructionequipment. Rather than use anavailable large bulldozer or anotherheavy piece of equipment, it wasdecided to use a smaller tractorwith a front dump blade—one thatwould be in common use by smallcontractors throughout the world.

The firearms were held tight in thejaws of the blade and the hydraulicpressure on the downstroke wasused to bend the gun metal againstthe hard gravel surface In other

words, the barrel (rather than thestock, as in the photograph) waspointing downward. This is thepreferred method because if thestock is pointing downward, thereceiver is not adequately disabled.The experiment using the preferredmethod was successful in bendingthe barrels and the receiver to theextent that the weapons were com-pletely disabled. It is the opinion ofthe author that such a procedurecould destroy two to six firearms ata time, taking about one minute.The procedure would probably bequicker once the operator and thosefeeding the blade became morefamiliar with the operation. Whilethe hard gravel surface was ade-quate, a concrete or similar hardsurface would enhance the opera-tion. This is just one example ofhow adequate destruction can becarried out at little cost.

Figure 8: Firearms in the jaws of a front dump blade

Figure 9: Firearms afterbeing placed in bladewith barrels downwards

s

s

Phot

o: D

e Cl

erq

Phot

o: D

e Cl

erq

Box 2: Destruction testingusing a loader blade

Dumping at sea

Article 210 of the Law of the SeaConvention declares that “statesthrough laws, regulations and mea-sures shall ensure that dumping isnot carried out without the permis-sion of the competent authorities ofStates.” It goes on to say that “dump-ing within the territorial sea and theexclusive economic zone or ontothe continental shelf shall not becarried out without the express priorapproval of the coastal State, whichhas the right to permit, regulate andcontrol such dumping after due con-sideration of the matter with otherStates which by reason of their geo-graphical situation may be adverselyaffected thereby.” The OceanDumping Act London Conventionon the Prevention of Pollution fromthe Disposal of Wastes and otherMatter, passed in 1972, provides aframework for managing oceandumping activities and for conduct-ing basic oceanic research. The lawbans ocean dumping of radiological,chemical, and biological warfareagents and high-level radioactivewaste. Amendments in 1988 and1993 extended this ban to sewagesludge, industrial waste, and medicalwastes.

Industrial wastes are defined as anywastes and similar matter other than:dredged material, fish wastes, shipsand platforms, organic waste of na-tural origin, inert inorganic geologicmaterial and bulky items such assteel and concrete. The issue of fire-arms and ammunition disposal atsea was debated at the conventionbecause one of the parties to theconvention was at that time dispos-ing of such wastes at sea on a reg-ular basis. The decision of theConvention was that firearms andammunition were considered indus-trial waste and thus included in theprohibition. The Convention wasamended again in 1996. The newProtocol used a reverse listingapproach enumerating those items

which may be considered for dis-posal at sea. The reverse list is thesame as the list of what is not indus-trial waste. The Protocol also includesa process of assessing the suitabilityof the wastes on the reverse list fordisposal at sea. The process involvesan examination of alternatives: permits for disposal of wastes at seawould only be issued where it is theenvironmentally preferred and prac-tical option. Obviously this wouldnot be the case for most industria-lized states (Osborne; Tay, personalcommunications, July 1998).

It would appear from the above con-ventions that dumping small armsand light weapons at sea may onlybe a viable destruction method forsome less developed countries andonly if other alternatives were noteconomically available. Used smallarms and light weapons are unlikelyto have significant amounts of lubri-cants, perhaps 2–3 ml of light oileach—many would have less. Thedumping of 100,000 light weapons,even without decontamination oflubricants would probably meanthat about 250 liters of diffused lightoil would be dumped along withthe firearms. If one were to comparethe ecological pollution possibilitiesto, for example, air pollution throughburning the equivalent number ofweapons or even cutting them usingoxy-acetylene torches, then the pro-cedure appears practical. The use ofa dump barge and/or containerswould seem to offer the best proce-dure for dumping. Semi-trailer truckcontainers could pick weapons upat various points where they couldbe taken to a port facility for loadingonto ships and sea disposal. Thecontainers would be locked andguarded. Dumping at sea would

have to be done in deep waterwhere economical retrieval wouldnot be possible. This would un-doubtedly be a relatively inexpensivemethod of destroying large quantitiesof small arms and light weapons. It might be worthwhile to seek ex-emptions for such dumping (ammu-nition excluded), given the assumedbenefits of destruction.

Other methods

The destruction methods listed aboveare those most applicable to largerquantities of small arms. There is nodoubt that simple methods such asa sledgehammer and anvil (particu-larly useful for handguns); hacksaw,grinder, bandsaw and bench sawswith special carbide blades; directdisposal into blast furnaces or foundryfurnaces; and plugging barrels with metal welds are all feasiblemethods. It was noted that cementwas used to plug barrels in Slavoniaand El Salvador. In the opinion ofseveral expert armorers this lattermethod is highly suspect as a meansof permanently disabling weapons(see also Smith, personal communi-cation, June/July 1998). In general,the primary drawbacks of all theseother methods are that they are eitherlabor-intensive, time-consuming,dependent on special resources, per-haps not 100 percent effective or—in the case of special cutting blades—perhaps somewhat expensive.Nevertheless they all have their special niche and should be con-sidered as an option where appro-priate.

destruction methods

25B.I.C.C

du

mpi

ng

at

sea

“Dumping at seawould undoubtedly

be a relatively inexpen-sive method of destroy-ing large quantities ofsmall arms and lightweapons.

”

T he destruction of ball ammunitionand explosive ammunition does

not lend itself to as many choices asthe destruction of small arms andlight weapons. In the case of ballammunition it essentially requiresdestruction through burning and forexplosive ordnance, destructionthrough open detonation. Whendealing with small amounts of ballammunition, this is not particularlyexpensive nor complicated. In factball ammunition could be merelyexpended in the normal way byfiring on a range or into a butt/back-stop. See Box 3 for a basic procedurefor destroying ball ammunition whichis both simple and inexpensive.

As ammunition is an expendableproduct, the military forces of moststates maintain large quantities forboth training purposes and as warreserves. While destruction of smallquantities of ball ammunition arerelatively easy to achieve, largequantities—such as those held bythe US military—present difficulties.The destruction of munitionsthrough burning and detonation maycause the emission of particulates,suspected carcinogens and nitrousoxides which presents concerns re-garding the environment. A numberof trials are underway to overcomesome of these problems (for details,see United States Army, 1995). Inmany cases, particularly in stateswith strict regulations and hugequantities of ammunition, destruc-tion can become very expensive.

For example, in the United States200,000 short tons of ammunitionrequired demilitarization in 1990(United States Army, 1995). Accord-ing to ABC News, the US Armydestroys 67,600 tons of munitionsannually at a cost of US $100 milliona year (Petri, 1997).

The US Under-Secretary of Defensefor Acquisition and Technology statedthe US has an existing stockpile ofthree million tons of ammunition ofwhich 400 thousand tons require de-militarization now and that the latteramount will double in the next fewyears (Kaminski, 1996). When onelooks at these problems in com-parison with the relatively paltryamount of ammunition handed inon UN peace missions, disposal ofthe latter is relatively easy.

The destruction of explosive—par-ticularly high explosive—ordnancesuch as grenades, mines, mortarbombs, artillery shells and so on issomewhat more complex, time-consuming and costly than thedestruction of ball ammunition andsome pyrotechnics within the con-text of peace-operations. As statedpreviously, the normal procedure isto use explosive detonation in situ.There are several reasons for doingthis, not the least of which is theunreliability of some of the ammu-nition which creates safety problemsif stored and moved to a central lo-cation. Procedures for such disposalare taught to specialists in all profes-sional militaries (combat engineersand selected ordnance personnel)and are annotated in various explo-sive ordnance disposal manuals.Disposal procedures using plasticexplosives such as C4 are generallyacceptable for the small quantities

of explosive ordnance handed overon peacekeeping missions. Largerquantities, such as ammunitiondumps left over from the Gulf Warand obsolete war reserve munitions,may require a different approach.

The requirement to rid a state or anarea of unwanted munitions, be theyunexploded ordnance on old weap-ons ranges, unwanted national re-serves, or former combat zones suchas found in the states of the formerYugoslavia and in the Middle East,has spawned a commercial industryready to take on the challenge at aprice. Such organizations can befound throughout the world. Someof these businesses are organizedand contracted through munitions-producing companies such as SNCIndustrial Technologies Inc. inCanada. (For a listing of many ofthese companies, see United StatesSpecial Operations, 1998.) Of inter-est is the fact that some major pro-ducers of ammunition in the UnitedStates have criticized the giving ofsurplus ammunition stock to othercountries as it poses unfair competi-tion. Aliant Tech Systems, a majorUS manufacturer of military ammu-nition, criticized a gift to Greece of58,000 rounds of tank ammunitionas it then enabled Greece to cancela US $30 million order. Aliant is onrecord as stating that the US govern-ment should adopt demilitarization,that is, destruction, as the preferredstrategy for disposing of surplusammunition (Lumpe, 1996). Thissuggests that it might be possible toco-opt ammunition producers intohelping to destroy ammunitioncollected as surpluses!

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26 B.I.C.C

Ammunition and ExplosivesDestruction(Demilitarization)

“The destructionof explosive

ordnance is somewhatmore complex, time-consuming and costlythan the destruction ofball ammunition andsome pyrotechnics.

”

27B.I.C.C

dem

ilit

ari

zati

on This is an abbreviated description

regarding the destruction of ammu-nition under field conditions. It is the procedure authorized forammunition destruction by theCanadian Armed Forces (Anglin,personal communication, 1998). Allmilitary forces have similar proce-dures as do commercial explosivesordnance destruction firms. Thereis probably more state-of-the-artequipment available that can dolarger quantities more quickly.

1. The field furnace consists of anall-steel cabinet weighingapproximately 157.5 kg and isdesigned with a removablecover, a side door for removalof burned by-products and aremovable tray which serves asthe fire box. See Figure 10 for aschematic drawing. The furnaceis designed to burn condemnedor surplus small arms ammuni-tion, pyrotechnics but not blackpowder and high explosives dueto the risk of violent explosion.

2. The field furnace should be seton a hard platform—concrete orrocks—and all flammable mate-rial should be cleared within aradius of 7.5 meters. When aburn is taking place, personnelshould retire to a distance of 45 meters.

3. Items to be burned must beremoved from packaging asburning even under slight con-finement may result in an ex-plosion. All ball ammunition(except 20 mm MP, HE, HEI andDU) and ammunition containingEC smokeless powder, may be

burned.1 Only small quantitiesof bulk primers may be burned at one time. As well as ballammunition, small quantities ofdetonators, blasting caps, explo-sive bolts and relays and somepyrotechnics may also be burned.

4. Fuel oil or motor oil or othersuitable combustion materialmay be used to aid burning.Ignition may be electric or non-electric. The furnace shall beobserved but not approachedwhile burning is in progress. Awaiting period of 30 minutes isrecommended before approach-ing the furnace. The furnaceshall be allowed to cool beforeopening and removing refuse.The refuse shall be inspected andif necessary unburnt or function-ing ammunition will be re-burned. The remainder shall be certified ‘Free From Explosives’prior to declaration as scrap forsalvage.

1 Author’s note: This means virtually allsmall arms ammunition of the type collec-ted on most UN missions may be burnedusing this method.

5. A sample of recommended burnquantities for this type of furnaceis as follows: All .22 caliber—2,500 per burn. All 5.56 mm to 9mm—500 per burn. .50 caliber—100 per burn. The author isaware that the recommendednumber of cartridges per burnhas been exceeded with no problems. Presumably a larger,stronger furnace could safelyburn more ammunition.

Tray

Grate

Door

CoverRod

FrameAssemblyStructure

Cover Grate

Box 3: Field destruction of ammunition

Figure 10: Schematic diagram of field burn stove for ammunition

R ecycling the scrap from weaponsdestruction programs has had

indifferent results as regards assistingin cost recovery. All of the destruc-tion programs examined in this studyfailed, or apparently failed, to obtainany cost recovery from recycling.The exception appears to be USArmy weapons destruction in thecontinental United States; the relevantinformation on defense recyclingprocedures are described in a recentUS Army document (Mather, 1996).It specifically refers to selling non-ferrous metals, which are truly scrapand do not require demilitarization,and ferrous metals. The describedprocedure is designed to solicit better prices. According to a scraprecycler broker from Chicago, theUS military puts out tenders forscrap bids on destroyed weapons(Pielet, personal communication,June 1998). Current prices forshredded steel with a 25 percentcontamination level (plastic andwood) are between US $40 to $60 aton. Scrap steel which is 99 percentpure may fetch a price of US $100.A German source suggested that, asmuch of the steel is chromium,molybdenum and nickel alloy, itshould command a premium priceif uncontaminated—in the neighbor-hood of US $105 (Hempel, personalcommunication, July 1998). It shouldbe noted that Australian mills claimedthe metal was inferior and thuswanted to charge rather than pay!

Both sources indicated that brassshell cases, clean, fired and withoutprimers would fetch US $1,300 to$1,400 a ton. Small arms casingswould fetch much less. Apparentlyshell casings from former WarsawPact countries are in demand be-cause of their high silicon content.An official from the Canadian Com-pany Bakermet which shreds weap-ons for the RCMP speculated that ifthe quantity was large enough, per-haps 100 tons or more, they wouldprobably pay CDN $40 to $60 a tondelivered. Normally one tandemtruck load is approximately 20 tons.

Over the last few years, new smallarms have been developed thatcontain substantially less steel andmore plastics and polymers thantheir predecessors. This develop-ment means that these small armswill not be attractive for recyclingpurposes and will have little costrecovery potential when destroyed.

It was clear from the sources con-sulted that price was a variabledepending on market requirementsand location. If the cost of transportis equal to or more than the priceoffered for the scrap metal then it isobviously not a worthwhile propo-sition to attempt recycling for cost-recovery purposes. This may be aparticular problem in developingcountries which lack scrap-recyclingfacilities, a good transportation net-work and steel mills. Notwithstanding,in countries which have a steel-recycling capability, it appears likelythat an aggressive marketing campaignby the authorities disposing of weap-ons might meet with some success.This can be approached on twolevels—one is the actual value of theproduct and the second is the com-munity service/public relationsaspect of contributing to improvingthe security situation in a given state.

At the very least, where the situationpermits, destruction through shred-ders, should be at no cost. Callingfor tenders is a worthwhile consid-eration where the numbers of fire-arms being destroyed warrant it. Thetenders should include a requirementto actually destroy the firearms undera witness accounting program, whichcould completely eliminate all directcosts of destruction and even makea small profit.

report 13

28 B.I.C.C

Scrap Recycling

“All of the destruc-tion programs

examined in this studyfailed, or apparentlyfailed, to obtain anycost recovery from re-cycling.

”

conclusions

29B.I.C.C

T here are many lessons, observa-tions and recommendations to

be drawn from the analysis of theavailable information on weaponsdestruction to date.

1. The direct cost of destructionwas not an apparent problemin any of the destruction opera-tions, be they micro-disarmamentdestruction within a UN peace-keeping mandate or the morebenign requirements of disposingof illegal or surplus small armsand light weapons in both devel-oped and less developed coun-tries. Where direct cost concernsmight have been a factor(Mozambique), it appears thatcreativity and will may have beenlacking.

2. The indirect cost of destruc-tion can be significant. Thatis, the cost of buy-back incentivesand reimbursement for property,and the cost of lost sales or useopportunity by governments andtheir security forces. It is difficultto quantify this in relation to thepolitical and psychological bene-fits which may accrue fromdestruction.

3. There are numerous ways todestroy small arms and lightweapons. These range from thevery inexpensive such as burningor crushing/bending with vehiclesto mass destruction throughshredding. There is a techniquesuitable to every environmentwhether one is considering costs,political and psychological factors,numbers, or infrastructure. Leas-ing equipment from commercialfirms or hiring commercial firmsto assist in destroying weaponsunder supervision are realisticoptions in some areas.

4. On a cost-analysis basis, it is not always necessary tochoose the most effectiveprocedure. Sometimes ‘better isthe enemy of good enough’. Inmany instances (Canada andAustralia) redundancy, fail-safesecurity procedures, and perhapslegal concerns added to the costof destruction. If a shredder willcompletely destroy a weapon,why cut it up first?

5. It might be worthwhile estab-lishing a ‘small arms/lightweapons destruction verifica-tion capability’ similar to thatwhich exists for the CFE Treaty.Such a capability would assist indeveloping the expertise tomaximize effectiveness throughvarious destruction techniquesand ensure cost-recovery is dili-gently pursued. It should alsodevelop suitable expertise inammunition and explosivesdestruction and develop therequisite safety and identificationknowledge to either implement,or supervise the implementationof, micro-disarmament projects.Such a capability could be devel-oped on a national basis either asan adjunct to CFE Treaty verifica-tion organizations, where theynow exist, or as a designated UNcomponent with various coun-tries on standby to provide therequisite personnel and equip-ment.

6. Where costs permit and the com-plexity of the destruction require-ments dictate such a measure,commercial explosives ord-nance disposal firms shouldbe considered in lieu of theabove verification organization.

7. Instead of implementing the rec-ommendations made in 5. and 6.above—or as a parallel action—a standing operating procedureor guide to collection and de-struction could be preparedby a competent organizationsuch as the Lester B. PearsonCanadian International Peace-keeping Training Centre, NovaScotia. Such a guide shouldinclude weapon identification,destruction methodologies,collection point organization,and safety considerations, toname but a few.

8. The UN should considerpurchasing and maintainingequipment for a light weap-ons destruction capability intheir holding depots. Thisequipment could include suchitems as oxy-acetylene cuttingtorches, plasma cutters andhydraulic alligator shears fordeployment with UN peace-keeping forces or for use by aUN light weapons destructionunit as applicable.

9. Large quantities of ammuni-tion—particularly explosiveordnance—are more costlyto destroy. There are few alter-native methods when it comes todestroying ammunition. Environ-mental concerns reduce flexibilityand add to costs. Notwithstand-ing, the costs cannot be deemedas overriding considerations fornot destroying the ordnance.

Recommendations and Conclusions

10. Recycling should be used as a way to reduce the cost ofdestruction wherever possible.Scrap recycling is a tenablemethod of disposal although ithas often not been effectivelyused because infrastructure andquantities hindered cost recovery.Nevertheless, cost recovery shouldbe more vigorously pursued inregions and states where it isfeasible.

11. The co-opting of large muni-tion and even weaponsmanufacturers into assistingstates and regions in ridding themselves of unwantedammunition and weaponsshould be pursued. It is in themanufacturers self-interest to doso, partially because destructionof weapons diminishes supplyand thus provides a possiblemarket and partially because itmight enhance their public image.Such an approach is not altruistic,thus cynics and purists may notapprove, but the fact remainsthat cheaper used weapons wouldbe taken out of the system; new,more advanced weapons shouldbe subject to tighter controls andmight in any case be beyond thefinancial means of some undesir-able, ‘would-be’ users.

30 B.I.C.C

con

clu

sion

31B.I.C.C

BASICBritish American Security Information Council

CFEConventional Armed Forces in Europe

CSCEConference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (now OSCE)

DODUnited States Department of Defense

DPKOUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

FMLNFrente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (El Salvador)

ICRCInternational Committee of the Red Cross

MINGUAUN Human Rights Verification Mission Guatemala

MPCDPatriotic Movement Against Crime (El Salvador)

NCONon-commissioned officer

NGONon-governmental organization

NRANational Rifle Association (United States)

NSWNew South Wales (Australia)

OECDOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

ONUCAUN Observer Group in Central America

ONUMOZUN Operation in Mozambique

ONUSALUN Observer Mission in El Salvador

OSCEOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (formely CSCE)

RCMPRoyal Canadian Mounted Police

SOPStanding Operating Procedure

UNIDIRUnited Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

UNTAESUnited Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

List of Selected Acronyms

References

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Boothby, Derek. 1998. The UNTAESExperience. Brief 12. Bonn: BICC,October.

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. 1995. TheSecretary-General’s Report to theGeneral Assembly on the AdvisoryBoard on Disarmament Matters.UN General Assembly DocumentA/50/391.

British American Security InformationCouncil. 1997a. Africa: The Challengeof Light Weapons DestructionDuring Peacekeeping Operations.BASIC Paper No. 23, December.

________.1997b Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Light WeaponsDestruction in Central America.BASIC Paper No. 24, December.

Canadian Department of ForeignAffairs and International Trade. 1996.Small Arms and Light Weapons: An Annotated Bibliography.Ottawa, November.

________with the assistance ofDavid DeClerq. 1997a. Light Weaponsand Micro-Disarmament. Ottawa,January.

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________ with the assistance ofDavid DeClerq. 1998. The Role ofAmmunition Controls in AddressingExcessive and Destabilizing Accumulations of Small Arms, April.

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CFE. See: Treaty on ConventionalArmed Forces in Europe.

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CSCE. See: Organization for Securityand Co-operation in Europe.

Di Chiaro, Joseph. 1988. ReasonableMeasures: Addressing the ExcessiveAccumulation and Unlawful Use ofSmall Arms. Brief 11. Bonn: Bicc,August.

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Godnick, William H. 1998. “ThePatriotic Movement Against Crimeof El Salvador (MPCD). Update on the Seventeenth Round of theVoluntary Weapons Collection Pro-gram ‘Goods for Guns’.” San Salvador,El Salvador, July, available at http://www.prepcom.org/text/pc2/pc2b13.htm.

Institute for Defence Policy. 1996.“Towards Collaborative Peace (TCP)Project News 1”, September.

Kaminski, Dr. Paul G. 1996.“Globalization: Munitions in the 21stCentury.” Address by The UnderSecretary of Defense for Acquisitionand Technology to the ADPAMunitions Executive Summit, Ritz-Carlton Hotel, Tysons Corner,VA, 17 September, available athttp://www.acq.osd.mil/ousda/speech/adpa_munitions_summit.html.

Kopp, Raymond J., J. Krupnick, andMichael Thomas. 1997. Cost-BenefitAnalysis and Regulatory Reform:An Assessment of the Science andthe Art. Discussion Paper 97–19.Resource for the Future, 1616PStreet, Washington, DC, June.

Laurance, Edward J. 1996. The NewField of Micro-Disarmament:Addressing the Proliferation andBuildup of Small Arms and LightWeapons. Research Report Preparedfor the Disarmament Section of theForeign Ministry of the FederalRepublic of Germany. Californiaand Bonn: Monterey Institute ofInternational Studies and BonnInternational Center for Conversion,June.

________. 1997. The Light WeaponsProblem: The Way Ahead. Paperprepared for the Canadian Councilfor International Peace & Security,presented in Ottawa, Canada, 24 October.

Lumpe, Lora, 1996. “Costly Giva-ways.” Educational Foundation forNuclear Science. Washington, DC,available at http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1996/so96/so96lumpe1.html.

Mather, Kim, 1996. “Direct Sales ofRecyclable Materials.” FORSCOMEnvironmental Grapevine, Vol. 2,No. 1, Summer. FORSCOMEnvironmental Operations Center.October. US Army, available at http://www-tradoc.army.mil/dcsbos/recycle2.htm.

report 13

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ces

Meek, Sarah. 1998. “The History andProspects of Voluntary CollectionProgrammes.” Monograph 22,Institute for Security Studies,Halfway House, South Africa, March.

Musah, Abdul Fatah and RobertCastle. 1998. “Eastern Europe’sArsenal on the Loose: ManagingLight Weapons Flows to ConflictZones.” BASIC Paper No 26, May.

Murphy, J.H. Lt Col (ed). 1991.ONUCA Observer Impreso enLithopress.

NRA. See: National RifleAssociation.

National Rifle Association. 1994.Bulletin, March.

________. 1995. Bulletin, December.

OECD. See: Organisation forEconomic Co-operation andDevelopment.

OSCE. See: Organization for Securityand Co-operation in Europe.

Organisation for Economic Co-ope-ration and Development, Devel-opment Assistance Committee.1997. DAC Task Force on Conflict,Peace and Development Co-operation.DCD/DAC (96)31/Rev3, 17 April.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 1986.Concluding document of theStockholm Conference onConfidence- and Security-BuildingMeasures and Disarmament inEurope. Stockholm, 19 September,available at http://www.osceprag.cz/docs/chronos.htm.

________. 1994. Vienna Document1994 of the Negotiations on Con-fidence-and Security-BuildingMeasures. Budapest, 28 November,available at http://www.osceprag.cz/docs/chronos.htm.

Petri, 1997. “Ammo wins Porker forPentagon.” Press release, 30 May,available at http://www.house.gov/petri/porker/may30prk.htm.

Poulton, Robin-Edward and Ibrahimag Youssouf. 1998. A Peace ofTimbuktu: Democratic Governance,Development and African Peace-keeping. UNIDIR 98/2, New York:United Nations.

Prep Com. See: PreparatoryCommittee for A Global Campaignon Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Preparatory Committee for A GlobalCampaign on Small Arms and LightWeapons. 1998. “Meeting of expertson arms availability, violations ofinternational humanitarian law andthe deteriorating situation of civili-ans in armed conflict.” Summaryreport, 22 June, available at http://www.prepcom.org/text/pc4/pc4a10.htm.

Smith, Christopher. 1996. “A GlobalSurvey of Stocks and Flows of LightWeapons in the International Systemand a Case Study of Light WeaponsProliferation in Southern Africa.”Paper delivered to the UN Panel ofGovernment Experts on Small Arms.New York: United Nations, 26 June.

Treaty on Conventional ArmedForces in Europe. 1990. Paris,November, available at http://www.OSCE.org/docs/chronos.htm.

United Nations. 1995. “Sahara-SahelAdvisory Mission Report.” (Excerpts).Unpublished paper. UN Departmentof Foreign Affairs.

United Nations. 1997. Report of UN Panel of Experts on Small ArmsA/52/298, 27 August, pp. 29–30.

US Army. 1995. “Evaluation of theUse of Waste Energetics asSupplemental Fuels.” available athttp://clean.rti.org/serdp/comp2k.htm.

Van der Graaf, Henry J. 1996. Pro-liferation of Light Weapons in theSahel. Presentation to Experts Panelon Small Arms and Light Weapons,Regional Workshop in Pretoria,South Africa, 23–25 September.

Vines, Alex. 1998. “The StruggleContinues: Light Weapons Destruc-tion in Mozambique.” BASIC PaperNo. 25, April.

Wrobel, Paulo S. 1997. ManagingArms in Peace Processes: Nicaraguaand El Salvador. United NationsInstitute for Disarmament Research(UNIDIR/97/1) Geneva: UnitedNations.

references

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Personal communications

Alan Ross Machinery Corporation.Concerning machinery for small armsdestruction (hydraulic alligatorshears). Telephone and e-mail, June1998.

Anglin, C.R. Directorate of Ammuni-tion Program Management, NationalDefence Headquarters, Ottawa.Concerning ammunition destruction.Telephone, fax and e-mail, July 1998.

Beasley, Joyce. Technical Sales SSIShredding Systems Inc., Wilsonville,Oregon. Concerning shredder capa-bilities and costs. Telephone, faxand mail, July 1998.

Bryant, Nick. RCMP Armourer, (ChiefWarrant Officer retired CanadianArmed Forces). Concerning smallarms destruction. Interview, June1998.

Candasamy, Soonderan. Sales Re-presentative for Messers MG Canada.Concerning oxy-acetylene and plasmacutters. Interview, June 1998.

Douglas, Ian (Brigadier Generalretired). Former Chief of StaffONUCA. Concerning small armsdestruction plans and methods.Interview, June 1998.

Godnick, William. Prep ComDirector. Concerning small armsdestruction efforts in El Salvador. E-mail, July 1998.

Griesseir, Walter. Cohen & Cohen,Ottawa. Concerning hydraulic shearsand destruction of firearms byOttawa police. Interview, July 1998.

Hardy, John. (Lieutenant Colonelretired Canadian Army). Concerningsmall arms destruction by trackedvehicles. Interview, June 1998.

Hempel, Robert. Hanseatische Waren,Bremen, Germany. Concerningscrap recycling. E-mail, July 1998.

Levitan, Joe. VP Bakermet Inc.Ottawa. Concerning metal shreddingand scrap recycle prices. Interview,June 1998.

Mackenzie, Gary. Firearms Unit ofPolicy Coordination and CrimePrevention Division of the FederalAttorney-General’s Office, Australia.Concerning firearms destruction inAustralia. E-mail, June 1998.

Osborne, Jim. Head Ocean Disposaland Shellfish, Marine EnvironmentDivision, Environment Canada,Ottawa. Concerning dumping smallarms at sea. E-mail, June 1998.

Pielet, Robert L. ManufacturersSolutions, Chicago. Concerning scraprecycle prices. Telephone, June 1998.

Roelandts, Mick. Project Managerfor the Gun Buy-Back Scheme inNew South Wales. E-mail, June 1998.

Smith, Murray. Chief Scientist - Fire-arms, RCMP. Concerning technicaladvice and small arms destructionprocedures carried out by RCMP inCanada. Telephone, interview,June/ July 1998.

Tay, Dr. K. Atlantic DivisionEnvironment Canada. Concerningdumping small arms at sea.Correspondence, June 1998.

Turnock, Trevor. Representative forRamjet Fluid Power Ltd, New Zea-land. Concerning hydraulic alligatorshears. E-mail, July 1998.

Van der Graaf, Henny J. (BrigadierGeneral retired) concerning burningmethodologies for small arms inMali. E-mail, July 1998.

Wyatt, Lawrence. Construction con-tractor. Concerning the testing of thefield expedient destruction of smallarms. Interview, summer 1998.

report 13

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Internet websites

Bonn International Center forConversion: http://bicc.uni-bonn.de

British American SecurityInformation Council:http://www.basicint.org

National Rifle Association: http://www.nra.org

Preparatory Committee for A Global Campaign on Small Arms and Light Weapons:http://www.prepcom.org

Recycler’s World:http://www.recycle.net

Ross Machinery Corporation,Northbrook, Illinois:http://www. rossmach.com

UN Peacekeeping Operations:http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko

US Special Operations: http://specialoperations.com/eod.html

references

35B.I.C.C

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ces

Treaty on Conventional ArmedForces in Europe, Protocol on

Procedures Governing theReduction of Conventional

Armaments and EquipmentLimited by the Treaty on

Conventional Armed Forces inEurope, Section V: Procedures

for the Reduction of Artillery by Destruction

1. Each State Party shall have theright to choose any one of the

following sets of procedures eachtime it carries out the destruction ofguns, howitzers, artillery piecescombining the characteristics ofguns and howitzers, multiple launchrocket systems or mortars at reduc-tion sites.

2. Procedure for destruction bysevering of guns, howitzers,

artillery pieces combining the charac-teristics of guns and howitzers, ormortars, that are not self-propelled: (A) removal of special equipment,

including detachable equipment,that ensures the operation of thegun, howitzer, artillery piececombining the characteristics ofguns and howitzers or mortar,

(B) for the breech system, if any, ofthe gun, howitzer, artillery piececombining the characteristics ofguns and howitzers or mortar,either:(1) welding the breech block to

the breech ring in at leasttwo places; or

(2) cutting of at least one side ofthe breech ring along thelong axis of the cavity thatreceives the breech block;

(C) severing of the tube into twoparts at a distance of no morethan 100 millimeters from thebreech ring;

(D)severing of the left trunnion ofthe cradle and the mounting areaof that trunnion in the upper carriage; and

(E) severing of the trails, or the baseplate of the mortar, into twoapproximately equal parts.

3. Procedure for destruction byexplosive demolition of guns,

howitzers, or artillery pieces combin-ing the characteristics of guns andhowitzers that are not self-propelled:(A)explosive charges shall be placed

in the tube, on one cradle mountin the upper carriage and on thetrails, and detonated so that:(1) the tube is split or longitudi-

nally torn within 1.5 metersof the breech;

(2) the breech block is torn off,deformed or partially melted;

(3) the attachments between thetube and the breech ring andbetween one of the trunnionsof the cradle and the uppercarriage are destroyed or sufficiently damaged to makethem further inoperative; and

(4) the trails are separated intotwo approximately equal partsor sufficiently damaged tomake them further inoperative.

4. Procedure for destruction byexplosive demolition of mortars

that are not self-propelled: explosivecharges shall be placed in the mortartube and on the base plate so that,when the charges are detonated,the mortar tube is ruptured in itslower half and the base plate issevered into two approximatelyequal parts.

5. Procedure for destruction bydeformation of mortars that are

not self-propelled:(A) the mortar tube shall be visibly

bent approximately at its mid-point; and

(B) the base plate shall be bentapproximately on the centerlineat an angle of at least 45 degrees.

report 13

36 B.I.C.C

Annex

6. Procedure for destruction bysevering of self-propelled guns,

howitzers, artillery pieces combiningthe characteristics of guns andhowitzers or mortars:(A) removal of special equipment,

including detachable equipment,that ensures the operation of thegun, howitzer, artillery piececombining the characteristics ofguns and howitzers or mortar;

(B) for the breech system, if any, ofthe gun, howitzer, artillery piececombining the characteristics ofguns and howitzers or mortar,either:(1) welding the breech block to

the breech ring in at least twoplaces; or

(2) cutting of at least one side ofthe breech ring along thelong axis of the cavity thatreceives the breech block;

(C) severing of the tube into twoparts at a distance of no morethan 100 millimeters from thebreech ring;

(D)severing of the left trunnion andtrunnion mount; and

(E) severing of sections of bothsides from the hull which includethe final drive apertures, by vertical and horizontal cuts inthe side plates and diagonal cutsin the deck or belly plates andfront or rear plates, so that thefinal drive apertures are containedin the severed portions.

Procedure for destruction byexplosive demolition of self-

propelled guns, howitzers, artillerypieces combining the characteristicsof guns and howitzers or mortars:(A) for self-propelled guns, howitzers,

artillery pieces combining thecharacteristics of guns andhowitzers or mortars with a turret:the method specified for battletanks in Section III, paragraph 3of this Protocol shall be appliedin order to achieve results equiv-alent to those specified in thatprovision; and

(B) for self-propelled guns, howitzers,artillery pieces combining thecharacteristics of guns andhowitzers or mortars without aturret: an explosive charge shallbe placed in the hull under theforward edge of the traversingdeck that supports the tube, anddetonated so as to separate thedeck plate from the hull. For thedestruction of the weapon system,the method specified for guns,howitzers, or artillery piecescombining the characteristics ofguns and howitzers in paragraph 3of this Section shall be appliedin order to achieve results equiv-alent to those specified in thatprovision.

8. Procedure for destruction bysmashing of self-propelled

guns, howitzers, artillery piecescombining the characteristics ofguns and howitzers or mortars:(A)a heavy steel wrecking ball, or

the equivalent, shall be droppedrepeatedly onto the hull and turret, if any, until the hull iscracked in at least three separateplaces and the turret in at leastone place;

(B) the hits of the ball on the turretshall render either of the trun-nions and its trunnion mount in-operative, and deform visibly thebreech ring; and

(C) the tube shall be visibly crackedor bent at approximately its mid-point.

9. Procedure for destruction by severing of multiple launch

rocket systems:(A) removal of special equipment

from the multiple launch rocketsystem, including detachableequipment, that ensures theoperation of its combat systems;and

(B) removal of tubes or launch rails,screws (gears) of elevationmechanism sectors, tube basesor launch rail bases and theirrotatable parts and severingthem into two approximatelyequal parts in areas that are notassembly joints.

10. Procedure for destruction byexplosive demolition of mul-

tiple launch rocket systems: a linearshaped charge shall be placedacross the tubes or launcher rails,and tube or launcher rail bases.When detonated, the charge shallsever the tubes or launcher rails,tube or launcher rail bases and theirrotatable parts, into two approxi-mately equal parts in areas that arenot assembly joints.

11. Procedure for destruction by deformation of multiple

launch rocket systems: all tubes orlauncher rails, tube or launcher railbases and the sighting system shallbe visibly bent at approximately themid-point.

Source: http://www.tufts.edu/fletcher/multi/texts/bh980.txt

annex

37B.I.C.C

CFE

-Tre

aty

7.

BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION

B I C C

Bonn

International Center

for Conversion

conversion

survey 1998

Global Disarmament,

Defense Industry

Consolidation

and Conversion

O X F O R D

report 13

report 1:Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf, withthe assistance of Joseph Di Chiaro III,Conversion and the Integration of Economicand Security Dimensions, January 1995

report 2:Nicola Mögel, Thomas Sachse und Hans-Henning Schröder, Chancen und Problemeder Rüstungskonversion in der GemeinschaftUnabhängiger Staaten: Konversionsprofileausgewählter Regionen – Nizhnij Novgorod,Republik Udmurtien, Ekaterinenburg, RepublikBelarus [Problems and Prospects of DefenseConversion in the Commonwealth of Inde-pendent States: Conversion Profiles of SelectedRegions—Nizhnii Novgorod, Udmurtiya,Yekaterinburg, and Belarus], March 1995

report 3:Joseph Di Chiaro III (ed.), Conversion of the Defense Industry in Russia and EasternEurope, Proceedings of the BICC/CISACWorkshop on Conversion, 10–13 August 1994,April 1995

report 4: Keith Cunningham and Andreas Klemmer,Restructuring the US Military Bases inGermany: Scope, Impacts and Opportunities,June 1995

report 5:Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and Herbert Wulf (eds.), Military Conversion forSocial Development, July 1995

report 6:Petra Opitz, Krisenmanagement in der russi-schen Rüstungsindustrie – Regionale undunternehmensbezogene Konversionsstrategien[Crisis Management in the Russian DefenseIndustry], October 1995

report 7:Corinna Hauswedell, Paul Klemmer andHerbert Wulf (Hg.), Konversion – Herausfor-derung für Wissenschaft und Forschung(Konferenzdokumentation) [Conference proceedings], December 1995

report 8:Ulrike Lindemann and Jørgen Klußmann,Konversion militärischer Liegenschaften – Eineweltweite Herausforderung,Konferenzreportage [Base Closures—A GlobalChallenge, Conference proceedings], October1996

report 9:Jörn Brömmelhörster, KONVER II:Konversionsförderung durch die EuropäischeUnion/Fostering of Conversion by theEuropean Union, March 1997

report 10:Ksenia Gonchar, Research and Development(R&D) Conversion in Russia, May 1997

report 11:Keith Cunningham, Base Closure andRedevelopment in Central and EasternEurope, July 1997

report 12:Kiflemariam Gebrewold (ed.), ConvertingDefense Resources to Human Development,Conference Proceedings, October 1998

38 B.I.C.C

T he end of the Cold War hasbeen accompanied by a drastic

reduction in demand for weapons.Defense industries in East and Westhave had to downsize, restructure,consolidate and convert capacitiesto civilian use.

Last year’s edition of the conversionsurvey gives an overview of theindustry’s adaptation to lowerdemand for weapons, governmentpolicies to support diversificationand regional initiatives to counter thenegative effects of arms-industrial

downsizing. The major countriesare treated in some detail, withnumerous examples of individualcompanies undergoing restructuring.

In addition to this, the book providesan update on other conversion-relevant issues dealt with in previousyearbooks, such as military expendi-tures, demobilization of armed forcesand base closures.

A country and company index facilitates the user’s orientation inthe Conversion Survey 1998.

BICC yearbook 1998

report 13:David DeClerq, Destroying Small Arms and Light Weapons. Survey of Methods andPractical Guide, April 1999

brief 1:Ksenia Gonchar, Yevgeny Kuznetsov andAlexander Ozhegov, Conversion of the Post-Soviet Defense Industry: Implications forRussian Economic Development, February1995

brief 2:Anke Habich, Werner Voß und Peter Wilke,Abhängigkeit der Werften im Ostseeraumvon der Rüstungsproduktion [Dependence ofShipyards in the Baltic Sea Region on DefenseProduction], March 1995

brief 3: Edward J. Laurance and Herbert Wulf (eds.),Coping with Surplus Weapons: A Priority forConversion Research and Policy, June 1995

brief 4:Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers,Demobilization in the Horn of Africa, Pro-ceedings of the IRG Workshop, Addis Ababa,4 –7 December 1994, June 1995

brief 5:Werner Voß and Michael Brzoska, Eurofighter2000: Consequences and Alternatives,February 1996

brief 6:Michael Renner, Cost of Disarmament: AnOverview of the Economic Costs of theDismantlement of Weapons and the Disposalof Military Surplus, March 1996

brief 7:Edward J. Laurance, The New Field of Micro-Disarmament: Addressing the Proliferationand Buildup of Small Arms and LightWeapons, August 1996

brief 8:Pawel Wieczorek and Katarzyna Zukrowska,Conversion in Poland: The Defense Industryand Base Redevelopment, November 1996

brief 9:Greg Bischak, US Conversion after the ColdWar, 1990 –1997, Lessons for Forging a NewConversion Policy, July 1997

brief 10: Yitzhak Shichor, Peaceful Fallout: China’sMilitary Nuclear Complex to Civilian Use,October 1997

brief 11: Joseph Di Chiaro III, Reasonable Measures:Addressing the Exessive Accumulation andUnlawful Use of Small Arms, August 1998

brief 12:Derek Boothby, The UNTAES Experience:Weapons Buy-Back in Eastern Slavonia,Baranja and West Sirmium, October 1998

brief 13:Ingo Cremer, Harmut Küchle and Steven E. Sokol, Integrierte Arbeitsmarktprojekteauf Konversionsflächen: Auswertung aus-gewählter Beispiele verschiedenerBundesländer, January 1999

paper 1: Michael Brzoska, Kees Kingma and HerbertWulf, Demilitarization and Conversion, WorldSocial Summit, Copenhagen, March 1995

paper 2:Andreas Klemmer, United Nations PublicationsRelated to the Subject of Conversion: An Annotated Bibliography, April 1995

paper 3:Yevgeny Kuznetsov (ed.), Learning toRestructure: Studies of Transformation inthe Russian Defense Sector, June 1996

paper 4:Mersie Ejigu and Tekalign Gedamu,Conversion in Africa: Past Experience andFuture Outlook, June 1996

paper 5:Pieter D. Wezeman and Siemon T. Wezeman,Dutch Surplus Weapons, July 1996

paper 6:Joseph Di Chiaro III, Conference onDismantlement and Destruction of Nuclear,Chemical and Conventional Weapons, 19–21 May 1996, Conference Summary,December 1996

paper 7:Irmgard Nübler, Human Resources Develop-ment and Utilization in Demobilization andReintegration Programs, January 1997

paper 8:Denise Spencer, Demobilization and Reinte-gration in Central America, March 1997

paper 9:Stacy Larsen, An Overview of DefenseConversion in the Ukraine, June 1997

paper 10:Moses Kiggundu, Retrenchment Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications forDemobilization, July 1997

paper 11:Ian Davis and Steve Schofield, Upgrades and Surplus Weapons: Lessons from the UKDisposal Agency, August 1997

paper 12: Susanne Kopte, Nuclear SubmarineDecommissioning and Related Problems,August 1997

paper 13:Peter O’Meara Evans, Destruction ofAbandoned Chemical Weapons in China,September 1997

paper 14: Ksenia Gonchar; Conversion within theContext of Economic Reform: The Case ofNizhniy Novgorod Oblast, May 1998

books:BICC, Conversion Survey 1998, GlobalDisarmament, Defense IndustryConsolidation and Conversion, OxfordUniversity Press, UK, 1998

BICC, Conversion Survey 1997, Global Disarmament and Disposal ofSurplus Weapons, Oxford University Press,UK, 1997

BICC, Conversion Survey 1996, Global Disarmament, Demilitarization andDemobilization, Oxford University Press, UK, 1996

John Hart and Cynthia D. Miller, ChemicalWeapon Destruction in Russia: Political,Legal and Technical Aspects, OxfordUniversity Press, 1998

Jörn Brömmelhörster and John Frankenstein(eds.), Mixed Motives, UncertainOutcomes—Defense Conversion in China,Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 1997

Michael Brzoska and Werner Voss (eds.), Aus-wirkungen und Alternativen des Eurofighter2000 [Consequences and Alternatives of the Eurofighter 2000], Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 1996

Ulrike Lindemann and Ulrich Schirowski,Truppenabbau und Konversion in NRW,Handbuch für Kommunen [Handbook for Communities in NRW], January 1996

forthcoming:

brief 14:Yudit Kiss, The Transformation of theDefense Industry in Hungary, Spring 1999

books:BICC, Conversion Survey 1999, GlobalDisarmament, Demilitarization andDemobilization, NOMOS Verlagsgesellschaft,June 1999

39B.I.C.C

BIC

C p

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Cen

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BICC is an international thinktank, which conducts research, makespolicy suggestions and facilitatesand mediates the conversion processat all levels—local, national, and global. The Center provides consult-ing services to a range of public andprivate organizations. In order tofunction as an international clearing-house, BICC actively collects dataand information on a range of con-version issues, and produces a varietyof publications analyzing the inter-national conversion process, such asits annual Conversion Survey, itsseries of reports, briefs, and papers,as well as its internet serviceConverNet.

BICC was established in 1994with generous support from theGerman State Government of NorthRhine-Westphalia (NRW). The Center’sshareholders include the states ofNorth Rhine-Westphalia andBrandenburg as well as the West-deutsche Landesbank Girozentrale(WestLB), Düsseldorf/Münster andthe LandesentwicklungsgesellschaftNRW. BICC cooperates with multi-lateral institutions, German andinternational organizations andfoundations.

The Bonn International Centerfor Conversion (BICC) is an indepen-dent non-profit organization dedicat-ed to promoting and facilitating theprocesses whereby people, skills,technology, equipment, and financialand economic resources can be shifted away from the defense sectorand applied to alternative civilianuses. Through research and analysis,technical assistance and advice, re-training programs, publications, andconferences, BICC supports govern-mental and non-governmental ini-tiatives as well as public and privatesector organizations by finding waysto reduce costs and enhance effect-iveness in the draw-down of military-related activities. As a result, BICCcontributes to disarmament, demili-tarization, peace-building, post-conflict rehabilitation and humandevelopment.

BICC’s six program areas are:

n Defense expenditures and budget reallocation

n Civilian applications for military R&D

n Restructuring and conversion of the defense industry

n Demobilization and reintegration

n Base closure and redevelopment

n Dismantling and disposal of surplus weapons

Published by

©BICC, Bonn 1999Bonn International Center for ConversionDirector: Dr. Herbert WulfPublishing management: Michael DedekAn der Elisabethkirche 2553113 BonnGermanyPhone + 49-228-911960Fax + 49-228-241215E-mail: bicc@bicc.uni-bonn.deInternet: http//bicc.uni-bonn.de

ISSN 0947-7330

Design: Hansen Kommunikation, ColognePrinted in GermanyAll rights reservedPrinted on chlorine-free bleached 100% recycled paper.