survey of the broadcasting board of governors’ middle east ... · oig report no. ibo-a-02-02,...

Survey of theBroadcasting Board of Governors’

Middle East BroadcastingActivities and Initiatives

Report Number IBO-A-02-02, March 2002

United States Department of Stateand the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General

This report has been decontrolled for release under the Freedom of Information Act.

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OIG Report No. IBO-A-02-02, Survey of the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ Middle East Broadcasting Activities and Initiatives - March 200224 .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

RESULTS IN BRIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

PURPOSE AND SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Objective 1.Evaluation of the Proposed Structure of MERN and Its Place,Organizationally . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Objective 2.How Has BBG—As Currently Constituted—Responded to andSupported U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities in the Middle East? . . . . . . . . . . 16

CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

APPENDICES

A. Letter from Senator Helms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1B. Officials and Key Staff Interviewed for this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1C. Demographics of the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1D. Planned MERN Transmission Sites and Delivery Systems . . . . . . . . . D-1E. Project Schedule from FY 2003 MERN Performance Plan . . . . . . . . E-1F. Surge Response to Terrorist Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1G. Regular Listening to VOA, BBC, RMC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1H. Agency Comments by the Broadcasting Board of Governors . . . . . . H-1I. Agency Comments by the Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-1

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OIG Report No. IBO-A-02-02, Survey of the Broadcasting Board of Governors’ Middle East Broadcasting Activities and Initiatives - March 2002 1 .

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

By letter dated January 16, 2002, Senator Jesse Helms, the ranking member of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee, asked the Office of Inspector General (OIG)of the Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Gover-nors (BBG) to review the BBG’s broadcast activities in the Middle East to date. Healso asked OIG to evaluate the BBG’s plans for a new initiative to broadcast to theMiddle East by radio, the Middle East Radio Network (MERN). (See Appendix A.)

MERN is designed to provide an alternative to the media in the region, which isgenerally reflective of local government policy and hostile to the policies, viewpoints,and interests of the United States. MERN is intended to be a credible source ofnews and information about both the countries in the region and the United States.

Specifically, OIG was asked to determine whether:

“(1) U.S. positions will be best presented through strong existing foreign commercialradio and television outlets in the Middle East media ‘marketplace;’

“(2) BBG is capable of managing a project related to such sensitive U.S. policyinterests without a far more careful review by the State Department and/or WhiteHouse supervisory role;

“(3) the VOA [Voice of America] can effectively serve as the institutional home for anetwork melding both surrogate broadcasting and broadcasting about America;

“(4) . . . a network [can] remain consistent with U.S. interests if its personnel areresident nationals in Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries; and

“(5) . . . editorial control [can] be realistically implemented from Washington”

Additionally, OIG was asked to review how “the BBG—as currently consti-tuted—has responded to, and supported, U.S. foreign policy priorities in the MiddleEast.”

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RESULTS IN BRIEF

Generally, OIG’s conclusions (presented below in the order of the questions recitedabove) are as follows:

1. U.S. positions cannot be presented better through existing media outlets inthe Middle East. As noted above, most of these outlets are reflective of theofficial policies and positions of their respective governments. And, those mediagenerally present a negative view of the United States and its policies and posi-tions. Furthermore, even if Middle East media were receptive to providing aforum for America to make its case to the people in the region, too few Ameri-can broadcasters and diplomats have the language proficiency credibly to makethat case. While efforts are underway to increase the ranks of officers who canspeak the requisite languages, these efforts are unlikely to bear fruit any timesoon.

2. BBG is capable of making the vision of MERN a reality; provided, ways arefound to reconcile the tension inherent in the applicable statutes between theBBG’s “professional independence and integrity” 1 and its obligation to broad-cast in a manner “consistent with the broad foreign policy objectives of theUnited States.” 2 The Department must avail itself fully of the opportunityafforded by its seat on the board of the BBG to advise BBG regularly of itspolicies, positions, and viewpoints with regard to issues related to the MiddleEast. Additionally, the idea of the Department’s providing full-time publicdiplomacy advisers to BBG, similar to political advisers provided by the Depart-ment to unified theater military commanders, should be considered, to provide adaily point of contact as to such policies, positions, and viewpoints.

3. As both a surrogate broadcaster (i.e., one that broadcasts about the coun-tries in the region) and one that broadcasts about America, MERN can functionwithin VOA’s organizational framework. Such programming is not prohibited bylaw. Moreover, VOA, which primarily broadcasts about America, already doessome surrogate broadcasting of its own in Africa. And, to the extent thatMERN ultimately expands to television, VOA, which does it own televisionbroadcasting, can serve as a model.

1 22 U.S.C. 6204 (d).2 22 U.S.C. 6202 (a)(1).

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4. MERN can remain consistent with U.S. interests if its personnel are residentnationals of Middle East and other Muslim countries; provided, the requisiteeditorial controls are in place. Those controls include editing of news stories bya bilingual American broadcaster, so that items likely to spark controversy arecaught before transmission. Furthermore, given the dearth of American broad-casters who are fluent in the languages of the region, at least for the foreseeablefuture, there is no alternative to relying on resident national broadcasters.

5. Appropriate editorial control can be implemented from Washington, as longas there is a pre-broadcast review by an American.

6. BBG has responded to and supported U.S. foreign policy interests in theMiddle East. Its language reviews and audience surveys have identified the regionas priority. It surged broadcasts to the region following the September 11, 2001,terrorist attacks. But, there have been some controversial broadcasts that havebeen deemed by critics to be inconsistent with American foreign policy interests.And, even BBG concedes that its efforts to reach Middle East audiences havebeen largely unsuccessful. Indeed, it is this recognition that led BBG to conceiveof MERN.

We make recommendations to BBG and the Department, as applicable, to (1)develop the internal language proficiency needed credibly to articulate Americanpolicies and viewpoints in Middle Eastern media outlets; (2) consider placing publicdiplomacy advisers with MERN; and (3) introduce as much news programming inMERN broadcasts as possible as quickly as possible. BBG and the Departmentagree with the recommendations, with the exception of the recommendation forpublic diplomacy advisers, which the Department supports but BBG finds unaccept-able and unnecessary. Agency comments are included in Appendices H and I.

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PURPOSE AND SCOPE

So as to assist in the consideration of priorities in the FY 2003 budget cycle, OIGwas asked to submit its report by March 15, 2002. (OIG subsequently sought andobtained an extension until April 1, 2002). Accordingly, this report was producedunder a tight deadline. It is not the exhaustive examination that OIG would haveconducted under normal circumstances. Because of the importance of the issuesdiscussed herein and widespread interest in them, OIG intends to undertake a moredetailed examination of MERN as soon after its first anniversary as possible.

In conducting this survey, OIG held discussions with key officials, editors,researchers, program and technical directors, and staff members of MERN, VOA,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, the InternationalBroadcasting Bureau (IBB), and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB). Thesediscussions were conducted in Washington, Miami, and Prague. Additionally, OIGinterviewed senior Department officials, including experts from the Office of theUnder Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Bureau of NearEastern Affairs (NEA), the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, as well as officialsfrom the National Security Council (NSC) and the Office of Management andBudget. Furthermore, key personnel of the Arabic service of the British Broadcast-ing Corporation (BBC) were interviewed in London. A wide variety of documenta-tion was examined as well. (See Appendix B.)

OIG’s office of International Broadcasting Oversight (IBO) conducted thissurvey in accordance with the standards of the President’s Council on Integrity andEfficiency. Major contributors to this report were Louis A. McCall, IBO director;Lenora Fuller, auditor-in-charge; and Matthew E. Glockner, management analyst.

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BACKGROUND

BBG’s broadcast principles and standards state that U.S. international broadcastingshould have “maximum impact” to support strategic interests and to reach a signifi-cant audience. Assessed by those standards, VOA’s Middle East broadcasts werefound by BBG to be wanting in three respects: (1) signal quality; 3 (2) relevance ofprogramming; and (3) lack of programming in different Arabic dialects. Further-more, a BBG survey found that only 1-2% of people in the Middle East acknowl-edged listening to its broadcasts.

These findings led the BBG to conclude, even before September 11, 2001, thatefforts to reach the Middle East more broadly and effectively had to be intensified.The idea of MERN was conceived during a February 2001 visit to the region by twoBBG board members. The visit was prompted in part by ongoing regional instabili-ties, including the Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Because about 60 percent of the population of Middle East countries is 25 yearsold or younger, MERN’s target audience is young people. (See Appendix C.) Toensure that MERN reaches its target audience, the IBB Research Office contractedwith a major U.S. research company with extensive experience in radio, both domes-tically and overseas. In coordination with local subcontractors in the Middle East,the research company conducted target audience focus groups and surveys duringthe months of September through November, 2001. The research companyconcluded that the target audience’s interest in news is very low, and that MERNwill face “a challenge to get the listeners through the news as they no doubt wait forthe music programming to come back on.”

Accordingly, MERN plans to begin by broadcasting for a period of time onlymusic of a kind popular with Arab and Muslim young people in the region. Thereaf-ter, MERN would introduce short newscasts at regular intervals during the course ofthe hour. After that, news coverage would gradually expand to encompass an evenlarger portion of programming.

3 Signal quality is a register on a scale of 1 to 5 of whether the programs are capable of beingheard by the target audiences. On the scale, 1 is nil, 2 is poor, 3 is fair, 4 is good, and 5 is excel-lent.

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FINDINGS

OBJECTIVE 1. EVALUATION OF THE PROPOSED STRUCTUREOF MERN AND ITS PLACE, ORGANIZATIONALLY

Q1. Would U.S. positions best be presented through strong existingforeign commercial radio and television outlets in the Middle East media“marketplace”?

From interviews and research, OIG determined that there are only a smallnumber of commercial radio and television outlets in the Middle East. The twoprincipal players are the Qatari-based Al-Jazeera and the Saudi-owned Middle EastBroadcasting Centre (MBC). While Al-Jazeera is more widely known in this country,MBC, actually, has the larger audience. On the whole, Middle East broadcasts reflectthe official policies of their governments, and broadcasts regarding America and itspolicies, viewpoints, and culture are either limited or hostile.

Furthermore, even if existing media in the region were receptive to providing aforum for America to present its own policies, viewpoints, and culture directly toMiddle East audiences, there are only a small number of Foreign Service officerswith a level of proficiency in Arabic and the other regional languages credibly tomake America’s case. According to those we interviewed and our own research,there are no more than ten, and perhaps as few as one person who can speak Arabicwell enough to do a live broadcast.

A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) study noted that the Departmentdoes not have a plan to address this shortcoming and recommended that one be putin place.4 In any event, realistically, it will be many years, if then, before Departmentdiplomats can take advantage of any opportunities to use existing Middle East mediato promulgate pro-American views.

4 Foreign Languages: Workforce Planning Could Help Address Staffing and Proficiency Short-falls (GAO-02-514T, March 12, 2002).

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Recommendation 1: The Director General of the Foreign Service and Direc-tor of Human Resources of the Department of State should design and imple-ment a plan to develop the internal language proficiency needed credibly toarticulate American policies and viewpoints in Middle Eastern media outlets.

The Department strongly supports this recommendation and believes it now hasprograms underway to address this deficiency. BBG also agrees with this recommen-dation and believes it will greatly enhance the effectiveness of Department represen-tatives’ participation in news interviews and other programs employed by MERN.

Q2. Is BBG capable of managing a project related to such sensitive U.S.policy interests without a far more careful review by the State Departmentand/or White House supervisory role?

The concern about whether BBG alone can make MERN the vehicle for advanc-ing American interests in the Middle East that its supporters hope it will be arisesprincipally from two VOA broadcasts following the terrorist attacks of last Septem-ber. The first broadcast featured a member of one of Egypt’s most violent terroristgroups now living in exile in London under the threat of a death sentence by Egypt’scourts. In that broadcast, his terrorist history was not identified. That broadcastdrew criticism and complaints as being antithetical to American interests. Then onSeptember 25, 2001, VOA broadcasted an interview with the now deposed leader ofthe Taliban, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Detractors decried the broadcast as provid-ing a platform to a discredited and deposed leader hostile to the United States.

After those broadcasts, the BBG Chairman was called by the House Interna-tional Relations Committee to testify about them. In that testimony, the Chairmanacknowledged that the VOA editorial review process was not without its flaws.Accordingly, VOA later established guidelines, in consultation with the Departmentand the NSC, designed to ensure that future broadcasts are, indeed, consistent withU.S. foreign policy objectives. (See Objective 2)

While the guidelines are certainly a step in the right direction, concerns remain asto whether additional input is required from the Department and/or the NSC toensure that the views of the United States are being effectively presented. That said,there is a tension in the applicable statutes between BBG’s “professional indepen-dence and integrity” and its obligation to broadcast in a manner “consistent with thebroad foreign policy objectives of the United States.”

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There is broad agreement now, since a June 18, 1992, inter-agency decision ofthe Deputies Committee (a committee of cabinet level agency Deputy Secretaries),that editorials that purport to convey U.S. government policy require Departmentapproval. Disagreement arises over where the line should be drawn between theaforementioned imperatives as regards news gathering and reporting. As long asboth provisions remain in the law, these tensions will remain.

It is for Congress alone to decide whether this tension should be ever resolved infavor of one imperative or another. Failing that, MERN, as a part of VOA, canaccomplish its mission; provided, the Department fully avails itself of the opportu-nity afforded by its seat on the BBG board to advise BBG regularly of Americanpolicies, positions, and viewpoints with regard to issues related to the Middle East.It is statutorily required that the Secretary of State, or his designee (the UnderSecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs), “provide information andguidance on foreign policy issues to the Board, as the Secretary may deemappropriate.” 5

Prior to the consolidation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) intothe Department, U.S. international broadcasters had foreign policy guidance directlyavailable to them on an ad hoc basis in the person of USIA Foreign Service officerswho were occasionally assigned as language service branch chiefs. In that capacity,they provided area expertise and guidance on U.S. policy with respect to the coun-tries covered by the service they managed.

While the Secretary’s designated seat on the BBG board provides for foreignpolicy input, the Board is a part-time one and it meets only once a month. Theforeign policy guidance given is to the Board, with no mechanism for ensuring thatthis guidance is communicated to the broadcasters.

Public diplomacy advisers need to be detailed from the Department to providedaily guidance to MERN. These public diplomacy advisers would provide dailyguidance to MERN as to official U.S. government policy with respect to the MiddleEast. To similar effect are so-called “POLADS,” political advisers serving U.S.unified theater military commanders. The advisers at MERN would have no edito-rial control there or at VOA; but, they would provide working level input that,coupled with the Department’s vigorous use of its seat on the BBG, could provideadditional assurance that official views are being heard and communicated.

5 22 U.S.C. 6205.

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MERN POLAD equivalents could be selected on the basis of requirementsdeveloped by BBG. BBG could select candidates based on their skills, their knowl-edge of the region, its culture, language(s), and their expertise in and sensitivity tojournalistic issues. While assigned to MERN, public diplomacy advisers wouldfunction as members of the MERN staff, reporting directly to and receiving annualperformance ratings from either the MERN director or the director of the MiddleEast Programming Centre (MEPC) in Dubai. Public diplomacy advisers could be anasset in contacts with Middle East government officials in helping to negotiatefrequencies, locations, and the like.

As stated earlier, Section 303(a)(1) of the U.S. International Broadcasting Act of1994 requires that broadcasts be “consistent with the broad foreign policy objectivesof the United States.” As recent events have demonstrated, there needs to be amechanism in place to help ensure that result. Our recommendation proposes sucha mechanism. While the legislative history of the act indicates that the Secretary ofState should not be involved in the “management or day-to-day decision making ofthe agency or any of its operations or programs such as international broadcasting orotherwise,” 6 it does not prohibit the provision of advice or assistance by the Secre-tary or his designees in connection with international broadcasting. Furthermore,the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act makes clear that the Secretary ofState’s authority to provide foreign policy guidance to the Board may be exercised athis discretion.7 We believe, then, that our recommendation stays within the boundsof the law.

Recommendation 2: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should designand implement a program, in coordination with the Department of State, toplace public diplomacy advisers with the Middle East Radio Network at thedisposition of the program director in Washington, D.C., and/or the directorof the Middle East Programming Centre in Dubai.

BBG does not agree with this recommendation, finding it to be both unaccept-able and unnecessary. BBG strongly believes that the placement of political adviserswithin MERN would breach the “firewall” between broadcasters and policymakers.In addition, BBG believes that it already has routine yet robust contacts with theDepartment. Although the Department fully concurs with this recommendation, itnotes the need to discuss implementation with the Board, given the Board’s concernabout “firewall issues.”

6 S. REP. NO. 103-107, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 356 (1993).7 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-825, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess. 129 (1998).

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OIG disagrees with the BBG position. While OIG recognizes BBG’s properconcern about firewall issues, OIG does not believe that the advisers called for in therecommendation would breach the firewall. Their principal activity would be toprovide MERN management with advice. They would not be involved in editing thecontent of individual news stories. They would be advisers and not decision makers.The extent of this advisory role would be carefully worked out, in consultation withthe Department, with due sensitivity for firewall considerations. Given time zonedifferences between Washington, D.C. and the Middle East, OIG believes that it isespecially important that an adviser be located at the MEPC in Dubai. Assuming theDepartment’s Legal Adviser agrees with the OIG position, and BBG continues todisagree, this dispute should be referred to the Department of Justice’s Office ofLegal Counsel for an authoritative legal opinion.

Q3. Can the VOA effectively serve as the institutional home for a networkmelding both surrogate broadcasting and broadcasting about America?

Surrogate programming is broadcasting that focuses on local/host country newsbecause domestic stations are not objective or balanced. OIG believes that VOAcan, indeed, house an entity, MERN, designed to be both a surrogate broadcasterand one that focuses on the United States. First, while the VOA charter does notexplicitly authorize surrogate programming, there is no legislative or regulatoryproscription against VOA’s doing surrogate programming.

Second, VOA, which, of course, is designed primarily to broadcast aboutAmerica, already engages in surrogate programming in Angola, Nigeria, and otherparts of Africa. From what OIG understands, VOA does so effectively.

Third, VOA is an appropriate home for MERN to the extent that it already hasexperience with television broadcasting. Within the IBB, of which VOA is a part,there is television experience also at OCB and WorldNet.8 This is important becauseMERN plans to start limited television broadcasts in late FY 2003, so as to becompetitive with the satellite TV networks that are popular in the region.

The structure and format of MERN will be different from that of previousVOA programming. MERN programs will have an interactive component, usingsuch familiar commercial formats as questions of the day, listener email, person onthe street interviews, and the like. MERN programming will feature a mix of musicby both Middle East and Western artists and will also present official U.S. policyeditorials. As such, MERN represents a new model for international broadcasting – ahybrid of traditional VOA programming about America and local broadcast streams.

8 OCB is the home of TV Marti. WorldNet Television is in the process of becoming VOA-TV.

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While MERN could have been established under the auspices of RFE/RL, likeRadio Free Iraq, or as a separate grantee,9 OIG’s understanding is that MERN is tobe a part of VOA. Moreover, establishing MERN as a grantee would not expeditethe process of building transmission facilities. With the exception of OCB mediumwave and television transmissions, the IBB Office of Engineering and TechnicalServices provides transmission capabilities and services to all BBG broadcast entities,including grantees.

In addition, MERN, as part of IBB, will have security advantages over grantees,an important consideration given the threat that goes with being located in theregion. As a broadcast entity under IBB, the U.S. direct-hire staff at MEPC in Dubaiwill be under chief of mission authority with regard to their physical security. Highsecurity standards set by the Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security must bemet. American employees of grantees are not under chief of mission authority; theyare employees of a private company. Especially in this post-September 11 environ-ment, if security concerns are an issue with MERN, making MERN a part of VOAwill subject it to more stringent requirements, making it safer presumably.

Moreover, it is BBG’s view—but OIG was unable to verify this owing to timeconstraints—that host country governments were more receptive to MERN’s beingpart of VOA than its being a grantee. Accordingly, it would have been difficult andtime-consuming to have MERN operate in the region as a grantee. If doing sowould be more difficult and time-consuming, this would undercut the principaladvantage of the grantee structure, which is being free from Civil Service regulationsand union rules.

The MERN director briefs the VOA director daily. He also reports to the BBGat its monthly meetings. There is a model within the IBB framework that wouldprovide for greater MERN autonomy without its becoming a grantee.

OCB was likewise established as part of VOA; but, the director of OCB reportsto the director of the IBB, not the director of VOA. Likewise here, the MERNdirector could report to the IBB director, as well as monthly to the BBG board. Thisdegree of autonomy from the VOA would be consonant with MERN’s uniquenature, while being faithful to the Congress’ organizational mandate.

OIG encourages BBG to consider having the VOA adopt the OCB organiza-tional model for daily MERN operations and supervision, enabling the new radionetwork to take advantage of the VOA’s broadcasting assets while maintaining adegree of autonomy without the necessity of becoming a grantee.

9 Grantees, by charter, are required to function as surrogate or alternative home service broad-casters in countries where an independent press is nonexistent or struggling to survive.

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Q4. Can a network remain consistent with U.S. interests if its personnelare resident nationals in Middle Eastern and other Muslim countries?

As noted earlier, there are few Americans with the requisite language skills tobroadcast credibly to Middle East countries. Accordingly, as a practical matter,MERN has no choice but to rely on resident Middle East nationals, at least for theforeseeable future. Over time, as and when the Department develops more crediblespeakers of Arabic and other regional languages, those personnel can supplement thelocal broadcasters upon whom MERN must initially rely.

Although MERN has no choice in this matter in the near term, using localbroadcasters is not without advantages. If properly selected, MERN broadcasterswill be well known in the applicable country or countries. They will be not just fluentin the requisite languages, dialects, and accents; they will also be familiar with localcolloquialisms, culture, idiosyncrasies, and trends. As such, they are likely to havecredibility with and to appeal to the local audience. It should be noted, too, thatthere is no legislative requirement that broadcasters be United States citizens.

The foregoing having been said, there is no question but that there are vulner-abilities in relying upon resident nationals to serve as MERN broadcasters. Thesevulnerabilities can be mitigated by ensuring that effective editorial controls are inplace, which is the subject of the next question.

Q5. Can editorial control be realistically implemented from Washington?

MERN plans to station a bilingual American in Dubai who would edit all pro-gramming there and then send it to Washington for further editing. The onlyexception to additional Washington editing would be for “local” surrogate program-ming. There will be five different streams of broadcasting to the Middle East, whichwill include one stream of modern, classical Arabic and four streams of colloquial,sub-regional Arabic dialects. (See Appendices D and E.) This sub-regional program-ming would be edited in Dubai by the resident bilingual American; but, because oftime constraints, it might not be sent to Washington for further editing. All broad-casts, then, will have at least one review by an American, and most will be reviewedby two Americans before transmission.

Although BBG advised OIG during the survey that broadcasts were to bedelayed to permit any necessary editing, BBG subsequently saw no reason to addtape delays nor to refrain from transmitting in real time. OIG prefers that thisadditional control be retained.

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By ensuring at least one pre-broadcast review by an American, OIG believes thatMERN can be adequately overseen and monitored by the United States government,though again, OIG would prefer that BBG not transmit in real time as an additionalcontrol.

OBJECTIVE 2. HOW HAS BBG—AS CURRENTLYCONSTITUTED—RESPONDED TO AND SUPPORTED U.S.FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST?BBG has certainly attempted to respond to and support U.S. foreign policy prioritiesin the Middle East, even before the creation of MERN and even before the terroristattacks of last September 11.

For example, the Language Service Review identified the Middle East as a regionwhere VOA could improve its broadcasting effectiveness. In August 1999, the IBBissued a report titled Broadcasting into the Millennium that addressed immediate andlong-range requirements worldwide by region for radio, television, and Internettransmissions. The Middle East was identified as a “global priority.” 10 A follow-upreview in February, 2001, reconfirmed that conclusion.

MERN was conceived in late 2000, around the time of and in response to thebeginning of the present Palestinian uprising or “intifada” in the West Bank and theGaza Strip. Of course, MERN’s very purpose is to respond to and support U.S.foreign policy priorities in the Middle East.

Planning and funding for MERN intensified after the September 11 terroristattacks. And, shortly after the attacks, the BBG “surged” or increased its short waveand medium wave radio broadcasts as well as live streamed (“real time”) program-ming via the Internet to 21 countries in the Middle East, and South and Central Asia(including Afghanistan). (See Appendix F.) And, BBG sought additional funds inthe President’s supplemental budget request to increase its broadcast hours in Arabic,Farsi, Dari, Pashto, Urdu, and Uzbek.

Although BBG has responded to and supported U.S. foreign policy priorities inthe Middle East to date, no one, including BBG, would argue that BBG’s efforts havebeen effective. MERN’s conception and implementation is a realization of theinadequacy of previous efforts.

10 Broadcasting into the Millennium: Transmission Strategies and Outlook for the International BroadcastingBureau (IBB), August 1999, see pages 9-16.

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BBG has acknowledged that its Arabic broadcasts “have been at the bottom tierof effectiveness.” 11 By its own admission, BBG has been unable to meet its legisla-tive mandate to reach effectively a substantial audience.12 Only 1-2% of the targetaudience in the region acknowledges listening to BBG broadcasts. (See Appendix G.)

Furthermore, as noted above, on occasion BBG broadcasts have, at least in theopinion of some, not supported U.S. foreign policy priorities in the Middle East.The broadcast of former Taliban leader Omar, and that of the Egyptian terroristcited above, are said by BBG’s critics to have undercut American policy by providinga forum to our enemies.

In testimony before the House International Relations Committee in October2001, the BBG Chairman acknowledged that mistakes were made as VOA quickly“ramped up coverage” after September 11. Noting that the controversial items ranfor only minutes compared to the thousands of hours of annual VOA broadcasts, hereported that corrective actions had been taken. The journalists involved werereassigned. Also, new journalist reporting guidelines were developed. A QualityControl Group consisting of senior managers will now review “sensitive material.”VOA, on a temporary basis, will also:

• increase “editorial control over stringer and correspondent reports;”

• double the airing of U.S. policy editorials;

• create an all news format for all services;

• increase analytical and background reports on terrorism and U.S. policyrelated topics;

• direct branch heads to exercise direct oversight of all programming, includ-ing correspondent reports and sensitive interviews; and

• seek to develop more consistency in VOA Dari, Pashto, Urdu, Uzbek, andFarsi language services.13

BBG further reports that it is now relying upon outside experts to help monitorradio broadcasts to eliminate any bias in reporting and better align itself with U.S.foreign policy goals.

11 Middle East Radio Network Performance Plan – FY 2003, p.212 Middle East Radio Network Performance Plan, as cited.13 The intent of “consistency” is that the meaning and interpretation of editorials be as close tothe original English as possible, regardless of the variations possible in some languages.

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CONCLUSIONS

Our overall evaluation of MERN is that it is a worthwhile and timely initiative thatcan advance U.S. foreign policy interests in the Middle East. Present efforts arehaving, at best, a limited impact on improving the Middle East’s view of the UnitedStates and its foreign policy. 14

Although MERN began broadcasting March 23, 2002, from its FM station inAmman, Jordan, for some period of time, it will continue to be a work in progress.It needs, then, to be considered a pilot project that can and will evolve over time.Because MERN is to be in a nascent stage for the foreseeable future, and becausethe reporting deadline imposed was tight, OIG intends to conduct a full-scale evalua-tion of MERN one year after its launch.

It is critical that the BBG meet its commitment to track the listening rate for itstarget audience and assess overall programming quality. OIG understands that theBBG will also evaluate the effectiveness of MERN broadcast transmissions bytracking signal strength as well as the number and type of FM affiliates. Verificationand validation of performance measures will be provided by entities outside of BBG,to ensure objectivity. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993(GPRA) requires this kind of effort to assess the efficacy of government programs,and OIG applauds BBG for its agreement to apply GPRA principles to MERN.OIG’s review next year will consider, among other things, the degree to whichperformance measures are met and validated.

OIG intends also to determine whether the BBG follows through on its commit-ment to introduce as much news and information, both about the United States andthe targeted countries themselves, as quickly as possible after launch. The BBG’splan to start only with popular music programming, as a means to attract the pre-dominantly young Arab and Muslim audience, makes sense to us, and credibleresearch supports such an approach. But, a promising and unique opportunity toadvance U.S. foreign policy interests in this volatile and vitally important region will

14 Gallup Poll conducted December 2001-January 2002 in Muslim countries, as reported in theBaltimore Sun, March 21, 2002.

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have been lost if MERN becomes only or even primarily a rock music station.Accordingly, BBG needs to adopt a written plan committing MERN to introducingas much news programming as possible as quickly as possible. OIG will assess theplan and MERN’s compliance when a more thorough review is conducted next year.

Recommendation 3: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should designand implement a plan to introduce as much news programming in Middle EastRadio Network broadcasts as possible as quickly as possible.

BBG agrees with this recommendation and advises OIG that it intends toexpand steadily the time devoted to news on MERN broadcasts.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: The Director General of the Foreign Service and Director ofHuman Resources of the Department of State should design and implement aplan to develop the internal language proficiency needed credibly to articulateAmerican policies and viewpoints in Middle Eastern media outlets.

Recommendation 2: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should design andimplement a program, in coordination with the Department of State, to placepublic diplomacy advisers with the Middle East Radio Network at the dispositionof the program director in Washington, D.C., and/or the director of the MiddleEast Programming Centre in Dubai.

Recommendation 3: The Broadcasting Board of Governors should design andimplement a plan to introduce as much news programming in Middle East RadioNetwork broadcasts as possible as quickly as possible.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation

BBG Broadcasting Board of Governors

FSO Foreign Service Officer

GAO General Accounting Office

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act

IBB International Broadcasting Bureau

MBC Middle East Broadcasting Centre

MEPC Middle East Programming Center

MERN Middle East Radio Network

NEA Near Eastern Affairs

NSC National Security Council

OCB Office of Cuba Broadcasting

OIG Office of Inspector General

OMB Office of Management and Budget

POLAD Political Adviser

RFE/RL Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

VOA Voice of America

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survey of the broadcasting board of governors’ middle east ... · oig report no. ibo-a-02-02,...

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