sustaining motivation in sub-conventional warfare

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IDSA Occasional Paper No. 14 K.C. Dixit SUSTAINING MOTIVATION SUSTAINING MOTIVATION in Sub-Conventional Warfare SUSTAINING MOTIVATION 9 798186 019763 ISBN 81-86019-76-6 The Indian Army is primarily structured, equipped and trained to conduct high intensity conventional operations. Strategic policy formulation, planning, force structure, equipment acquisition and training are geared primarily for safeguarding the territorial integrity of the nation against external threats. However, owing to the rapidly changing security environment, the role assignment of Indian troops has undergone substantial changes. The ever increasing requirement of troops in low intensity conflict operations has become a regular feature, resulting in constant and prolonged deployments. Low intensity conflict operations and proxy wars have put tremendous professional and psychological pressures on military leaders and troops. Therefore, the importance of sustaining the motivation level and morale of troops in these circumstances, assumes added significance, which if not addressed in right earnest, can well manifest in the form of stress, tension, frustration, anger, and cumulatively result in below par performance as a combat outfit. A Research Fellow at IDSA, Col. K. C. Dixit is an alumni of National Defence Academy. He was commissioned into the Army in 1983. He has commanded a Corps Operating Signal Regiment in Counter Insurgency Operations (OP RHINO) in the Eastern Theatre. He is an experienced communication planner and executor and was awarded the COAS Commendation Card for displaying exceptional devotion to duty and tact in handling men and resources and dealing with local population and civil administration in CI environment. During a tenure with Rashtriya Rifles at Doda (J&K) for OP RAKSHAK and OP VIJAY, he was instrumental in acquiring land for Rashtriya Rifles and arranging release of awards to affected civilians in record time through effective liaison and coordination with state government functionaries and local population in terrorist infested area apart from ensuring sound logistics support for the force including air maintenance of posts located at higher reaches. He has planned and handled mobilization and subsequent administration of a division size force on western borders during OP PARAKRAM. A keen trekker, he has travelled extensively in northern glaciated terrain. He, as Director ISTT at Integrated HQ of MOD (Army) before joining IDSA, was responsible for training and HRD of more than 90,000 personnel of Corps of Signals.

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Page 1: Sustaining Motivation in Sub-Conventional Warfare

IDSA Occasional Paper No. 14

K.C. Dixit

SUSTAININGMOTIVATIONSUSTAININGMOTIVATION

inSub-Conventional Warfare

SUSTAININGMOTIVATION

9 798186 019763

ISBN 81-86019-76-6

The Indian Army is primarily structured, equipped and trained to conduct high intensity conventional operations. Strategic policy formulation, planning, force structure, equipment acquisition and training are geared primarily for safeguarding the territorial integrity of the nation against external threats. However, owing to the rapidly changing security environment, the role assignment of Indian troops has undergone substantial changes.

The ever increasing requirement of troops in low intensity conflict operations has become a regular feature, resulting in constant and prolonged deployments.

Low intensity conflict operations and proxy wars have put tremendous professional and psychological pressures on military leaders and troops. Therefore, the importance of sustaining the motivation level and morale of troops in these circumstances, assumes added significance, which if not addressed in right earnest, can well manifest in the form of stress, tension, frustration, anger, and cumulatively result in below par performance as a combat outfit.

A Research Fellow at IDSA, Col. K. C. Dixit is an alumni of National Defence Academy. He was commissioned into the Army in 1983. He has commanded a Corps Operating Signal Regiment in Counter Insurgency Operations (OP RHINO) in the Eastern Theatre. He is an experienced communication planner and executor and was awarded the COAS Commendation Card for displaying exceptional devotion to duty and tact in handling men and resources and dealing with local population and civil administration in CI environment.

During a tenure with Rashtriya Rifles at Doda (J&K) for OP RAKSHAK and OP VIJAY, he was instrumental in acquiring land for Rashtriya Rifles and arranging release of awards to affected civilians in record time through effective liaison and coordination with state government functionaries and local population in terrorist infested area apart from ensuring sound logistics support for the force including air maintenance of posts located at higher reaches. He has planned and handled mobilization and subsequent administration of a division size force on western borders during OP PARAKRAM.

A keen trekker, he has travelled extensively in northern glaciated terrain. He, as Director ISTT at Integrated HQ of MOD (Army) before joining IDSA, was responsible for training and HRD of more than 90,000 personnel of Corps of Signals.

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