swaziland election update 1 2003

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SWAZILAND

ELECTION

DOSSIER

2003

No. 1, October 2003

CONTENTS

Historical Background 2Socio-Economic Profile 6Constitutional Development 10Struggle for Political Power 18Swazilands Electoral Process 23Review of Previous Elections 29

About the Research Team 35About EISA 35


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2

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Jackie Kalley

An investigation into Swazilandspolitical development reveals the tension

produced by the adoption of a bi-cameralWestminster-style constitution on anAfrican nation ruled by a traditionalmonarch. The origin of the Swazi peoplecan probably be traced to the second part

of the 18 th century when King NgwaneIII led a Nguni sub-group across the

Lebombo Mountains into the area nowknown as Swaziland. They coalescedinto a homogenous nation by the

beginning of the 19 th century under KingSobhuza I, who subdued andincorporated into his people largenumbers of non-Nguni people. Theybecame known as the amaSwati orSwazis under the rule of his successor,Mswati II, and became a powerfulmilitary force due to the introduction ofconscription. This factor, together withdiplomatic skills, enabled the Swazi tolong retain their independence in an eraof colonial domination.

A century later, however, most of theland had been taken over by whitemigrant settlers, mainly from the CapeColony. They were granted land rightsand mining concessions by the king,

Mbandenzi. Although Swazi sovereigntywas formally recognised by Great

Britain and the South African Republic,it was under constant threat. This finallyculminated in the declaration of a

political dependency status and,despite protest by the Swazi royal family

it was administered initially by GreatBritain and later, in 1885, by theTransvaal Republic. On cessation of the

Anglo- Boer War, Swaziland wasadministered through the British High

Commissioner in South Africa and in1907 it was declared a High Commissionterritory and a resident High

Commissioner was stationed inMbabane. Where it was feasible,administration was operated through asystem of traditional authority structures,albeit with reduced powers given theirsubordination to the British government.The King and Chiefs retained theirpositions but the King was known as theParamount Chief and the Chiefs wereregarded as salaried officials of the state.

In 1921, the European Advisory Councilwas established to represent whitecommercial interests but became a

political tool. Both South Africa andGreat Britain envisaged the ultimateincorporation of Swaziland into SouthAfrica. Local interests, however,stressed the unique nature of the Swazi

people and by the 1940s, the Britishadministration developed a system of

indirect rule through native authorities

in which the Royal Family was given aseminal role. They emerged as a

dominant political force due to theircontrol of access to the land and its

concomitant legal and tax powers.Political parties were slow to develop;the Swazi Progressive Association wasformed in 1929 but only establisheditself as Swazilands first political party

in 1960 when it became known as theSwaziland Progressive Party and was led

by Dr Ambrose P. Zwane. A split in theparty led him to form the NgwaneNational Liberatory Congress (NNLC),with its manifesto pledging to establishuniversal suffrage and to supportSwazilands independence under aconstitutional monarch. The SwazilandDemocratic Party (SDP), led by SimonNxumalo and later by Allen Nxumalo,was also established; this political


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activity led the King and his supportersto form their own party, the ImbokodvoNational Movement (INM). Given their

connections and resources, they soonbecame a formidable force, winning allthe seats in the Legislative Council inthe 1964 and 1967 elections. As powerbecame more centralised in the hands ofthe King, so the role of political partiesdiminished.

The call for the restoration of Swaziindependence began in 1960. It wasinitiated by the European Advisory

Council in an attempt to establish aLegislative Council. This move wassupported by the King, and, in 1963, a

Constitutional Conference was held inLondon which led to the promulgation ofa Constitution in the same year. Itprovided for racially basedrepresentation in the Legislative Council

and the rural constituencies fell underthe control of the traditional chiefs.

Political parties were weakened, the

position of the royalists and the Kingwere strengthened while the small white

community was given disproportionateinfluence. In the 1964 elections the INM

won an overwhelming 85 % victory andwooed several opposition members to itsranks. This victory emboldened them towrest more concessions from the Britishgovernment. A further round of

constitutional negotiations culminated ina Constitution that served as a basis for

independence. By the time that formalindependence from Great Britain wasgranted on 6 September 1968,approximately 56% of the land had beenrepurchased by the state.

Although constitutional issues, electoralprocesses and a discussion of politicalparties form the basis of latercontributions, a basic outline is

presented here in order to place all futuredevelopments in historical context.

The Independence Constitution allowedfor a Prime Minister responsible to thebicameral parliament and the King (thenSobhuza II) as the Head of State. Thepre-independence election had resultedin the unopposed victory of the Kingsparty the INM - but in the firstelections, held from 16 to 17 May 1972,the ruling party won only twenty one(21) of the twenty four (24) seats in theHouse of Assembly. The remaining three

(3) seats were won by the radical NNLC,and given their backing by the labourunions were considered a serious threat

to the supremacy of the Dlamini clan.At the end of May 1972, the King, inaddressing a meeting commented thatthe advent of an official opposition wasa new development and a legacy from

the British colonial administration. ByJuly, a new bill was introduced

providing for amendments to the

Constitution, including inter alia, anincrease in the Members of Parliament

from six to ten, and an increase in thenumber of Senators, also from six to ten.

On the 12 April 1973, King Sobhuzarepealed Swazilands IndependenceConstitution and assumed full judicial,legislative and executive power

(Proclamation No. 7 of 12 April 1973).The existence of political parties was

cited as the reason for this developmentas they were not deemed part ofSwazilands social fabric and had thuscreated a constitutional crisis. Basiccivil rights were denied and all partyactivity was banned. This was followedby an announcement that the RoyalProclamation of the previous week wasonly an interim measure and that aConstitutional Commission would


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choose a constitution pertinent to Swazitraditions and international trends. TheRoyal Commission was appointed on the

countrys sixth independenceanniversary on 6 September 1975 andpresented its findings on 24 January1975. It was only in March 1977 that theKing announced the replacement of theparliamentary system with one based ontraditional elements and in October 1978that the Tinkhundla- system wasestablished (The Swazi AdministrationOrder, 1998 (Order No. 6 of 1998). Itconfirmed the powers of the King and

according to this system; the countrywas divided into 40 electoral districts,each of which elects two representatives

to form an electoral college, which thenelects the Members of the House ofAssembly. All candidates have to beindependent of any political party andstand as individuals. The bicameral

parliament (Libandla) consisting of aHouse of Assembly and a Senate was

confined to debating government

proposals and served in an advisorycapacity to the King. Political parties

and campaigning were prohibited. TheKing, in effect, ruled with absolute

power for the ten years before his deathin 1982. The new Constitution was neverformally presented to the people asrequired by Swazi custom and thegoverning constitutional elements

comprised the 1973 Proclamation,several subsisting provisions of the 1968

Constitution which had been expresslyretained by the Proclamation, andvarious royal decrees.

Sobhuzas death witnessed a powerstruggle between the traditionalists andmodernists. The Prime Minister, PrinceDlamini was dismissed but refused toaccept his dismissal, and in the interimthe Kingdom was ruled by the Queen

Regent. On the 26 August 1983, fifteenyear-old, Prince Makhosetive then at apublic school in the United Kingdom,

was named as the heir. The princeassumed the title of King Mswati III on25 April 1986, two years earlier thanoriginally planned and in a move tostrengthen his personal authority, hedissolved Parliament one year beforeschedule and called for new elections.These were held in November 1987. In1989 he assumed full executive poweron the occasion of his 21st birthday.

Pressure built up over several years tomodernize the political system, and inparticular to draft a constitution

containing a Bill of Rights. Severalpolitical groupings emerged, despite theban on political parties, and have servedas a form of opposition to agitate forreform and democratization. These

include PUDEMO, the SwazilandFederation of Trade Unions, the

Swaziland Youth Congress and the

Human Rights Association ofSwaziland. An alliance of pro-

democracy groups, the SwazilandDemocratic Alliance has also been

established. Since 1990 anti-governmentdemonstrations and strikes haveescalated and in 1996, the Kingappointed a 30-member ConstitutionalReview Commission to examine the

constitutional system, determine thewishes of the Swazi population

regarding a new system of governmentand to make recommendations on a newConstitution. Its terms of reference(Decree, No 2 of 1996), initiallyprovided that it would draft a newConstitution but these were subsequentlyamended to the drafting of a reportwhich was completed in August 2001.The Report concluded that anoverwhelming majority recommended


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that the system of government based onthe Tinkhundla must continue, the banon political parties maintained, the

executive powers of the King retained,the position of the traditional advisers tothe King strengthened, and that Swazicustoms would take supremacy over anycontrary human rights obligations.

This was the background against whichthe Constitutional Drafting Committee,chaired by the Kings brother, PrinceDavid, was established in 2002. Itsmandate stated that the process should

be as inclusive as possible, astransparent as possible, as participatoryas possible and accountable to the

people. These criteria were not met asthe proceedings were not made availableto anyone other that the members of theCommittee, the Attorney-General,several constitutional experts and

members of the Secretariat. There wasno consultation with the Swazi judiciary.

A conference was organised in July

2002, by the Swaziland Council ofChurches to debate issues around the

process and a fourteen membercommittee was appointed to inform the

King of their criticisms of theConstitutional Review CommissionReport. They were not allowed access tothe King.

A draft document was completed byOctober 2002 but the King and Prince

David apparently disagreed on its

contents. It was finally presented to theSwazi nation on 31 May 2003.

References

Africa South of the Sahara 2002.London: Europa Publications, 2002.

Economist Intelligence Unit.Namibia:Swaziland; Country Profile 2001.

London: EIU, 2001.

International Bar Commission. Strivingfor Democratic Governance: AnAnalysis of theSwaziland Constitution;

A Report. London: The Association,August 2003.

Kalley, J.A., Schoeman, E., Andor, E.Southern African Political History: A

Chronology of Key Political Events fromIndependence to mid-1997. Westport,

Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1999.

Lodge, Tom, Kadima, Denis, Pottie,

David, eds., Compendium of Elections inSouthern Africa. Johannesburg: Electoral

Institute of Southern Africa, 2002.

Nohlen, D. Krennerich, M., Thiaut,B.,eds,Elections in Africa: A Data

Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1999.


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SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE

Wole Olaleye

Geography and Population

Swaziland is a small landlocked countryin Southern Africa, surrounded by South

Africa on three sides, with Mozambiqueto the northeast. With an area of 17,364

km2, it is one of the smallest Africanstates. The country is divided intomountainous Highveld in the West,

grassy Middle area in the centre and

bush and Lowveld in the East. TheClimate varies from tropical to neartemperate. The Highveld is humid andtemperate, with warm wet summers andcold dry winters (down to 5 degrees atnight). The Middle area is subtropical,

again with wet summers and dry winters.The lower region is dry and hot insummer and with warm winter days andcold nights. Rainfall is sparse in thelower areas. The hottest months are

January and February: 15-25 C; coldestmonth, June, 5-19C; driest month, June,18 mm average rainfall; wettest month,January, 252 mm average rainfall.

Swazis are a homogeneous group ofpeople with one common history,tradition and customs. The officiallanguages are English and siSwati.Swazis are very religious people. Morethan half (55%) of the population

belongs to protestant group; Muslim(10%); Roman Catholic (5%); and thosethat subscribe to the indigenous beliefrepresent 30% of the population. Adultliteracy rate the proportion ofpopulation age 15 and over that can readand write is as high as 78.9%1. Human

Development Index (HDI) ranking

1Source: CIA World Factbook , 2002

(2000), ranked Swaziland at 122 out of173 countries (1=most developed,173=least developed). The HDI

measures a countrys achievements inthree aspects of human development:longevity, knowledge and a decentstandard of living. Longevity ismeasured by life expectancy at birth;knowledge is measured by acombination of the adult literacy rate andthe combined gross primary, secondary,and tertiary enrolment ratio; andstandard of living, is measured by GDPper capita2.

The population is estimated to around1.1 million. The country is said to have

experienced a steady increase inpopulation growth from 374 571 in 1996to 994 000 in 19973. According toUnited Nations Population andDevelopment Programme (2002), the

population growth rate for 2001 wasestimated at 1.83%4. The life expectancy

at birth for the population stands at 37;

86 years for males and 39.4 years forfemales5. Alarming statistics have

recently emerged about the extent towhich Swaziland has been affected by

the HIV/AIDS epidemic. According torecent UNAIDS statistics, the country isamong the hardest hit in SouthernAfrica, ranking alongside Botswana,Namibia and Zimbabwe. Swaziland has

now been added to the list of countrieswhere 20-26% of the population

between the ages of 15 and 49 arecarrying the virus. In a 1998 survey, theHealth Ministry found that almost 50%of hospital in-patients were HIV-

2

Source: Ibid.3

Masuku, M. Swaziland. In: Lodge, T. Kadima,

D., Pottie, D., eds. Compendium of Elections in

Southern Africa, 20024CIA World Factbook, 2002 5Ibid.


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positive. Among tuberculosis patients,the rate is as high as 58% (TB is one ofthe most common opportunistic

infections associated with HIV/AIDS)6.The government has now identifiedHIV/AIDS as an emergency, requiringpriority attention. A National Aidsprogramme was established tocoordinate all aspects of the fight againstthe disease. The government is alsoworking closely with NGOs, recognizingthat the scale of the problem obliges allsectors to pull together. In addition,emphasis is put on education and

prevention campaigns, designed toincrease awareness of HIV/AIDS amongyouth.

Mbabane and Manzini, which are 40kmapart, are the two main commercialcentres with estimated populations of 60000 and 74 000 respectively. These two

cities and the area between them formthe countrys commercial, financial,

tourism and manufacturing hub. The

Matsapha Industrial Area is the largestindustrial park in the country. In addition

to this, the cities of Mbabane, Manziniand the town of Nhlangano have

industrial parks, all of which areserviced with water, electricity andtelecommunications connections.Matsapha is doubling in size through anexpansion programme and three regional

sites are being developed. One of these,in Mpaka, will become a dry port similar

to the one that services the MatsaphaIndustrial Estate. The other main townsare Big Bend, Mhlambanyatsi, Simunye,Mhlume and Piggs Peak.

Economic Structure and Outlook

The economy is largely dependently onagriculture (mainly sugar) as the

6Source: CIA Factbook, 2002

mainstay of economic productivity.Agriculture (8.7% of GDP) whichprovides inputs for the manufacturing

sector has been negatively affected byadverse weather conditions. Sugarcaneand maize are two important agriculturalcrops. Sugarcane is largely grown inirrigated land and has been partiallyprotected from the effects of the regionaldrought. The manufacturing sector(35.6% of GDP) is expected to havesuffered as a result of lower agriculturaloutput. It is the second largestcontributor to output after the services

sector, which accounts for 43.4% ofGDP. Sugar refining and soft drinkprocessing in the manufacturing sector

have strong linkages with theagricultural sector. The banking sector isrelatively well developed. There are fourcommercial banks, three of which areforeign owned. The Swaziland Stock

Exchange (as a full exchange) opened itsdoors in 2000. The small exchange has

five listed shares. The market

capitalization was about US$145 millionin January 2003.

The economic growth stagnated since1997 due to adverse weather conditionsand disruptions in manufacturing and

mining sectors. Economic growth fell to2.5% in 2000 mainly due to pooragricultural production attributed to the

floods in February 2000. The regionaldrought has adversely affected the

country and the food crisis is affectingabout a quarter of the population. Thesugar industry remains the backbone ofthe economy. According to SwazilandSugar Association data, output

represents a quarter of GDP; an eighth ofexports; and three-fifths of agriculturalproduction. The long term outlook forthe sugar industry is uncertain. Theexisting European Union and African,


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Caribbean and Pacific (EU-ACP) SugarProtocol and the Agreement on SpecialPreferential Sugar (SPS) will be

renegotiated when they expire in 2008.Also, the EUs new Everything ButArms (EBA) initiative will phase outpreferential access between 2006 and2009. Growth for 2001 is expected toimprove slightly (figures not yetavailable). Inflation was 7.5% in 2001,and for 2002 it is estimated to be 10%.During the financial year ending March2001 public debt stood at E2.12 billion,an increase of 22% from March 2000.

Amongst its budget plans for 2001/02,government allocated E151 million tothe Millennium Projects, which include

plans for a new international airport,convention centre, hotel and theme park.The money is intended for feasibilitystudies, consultancy and land purchase,as the projects themselves are expected

to be commercially viable. Mostgovernment expenditure continues to be

on personnel costs which represent 54.4

percent of the budget, an all time high.Attempts by government to restructure

the public sector and privatise are slowand have yet to bring any significant

changes. Legislation is promised whichwill govern the operations of theSwaziland Electricity Board and theSwaziland Posts andTelecommunications Corporation, which

is due to be split in two.

The economy of Swaziland is closelyintegrated with South Africa, through theSouthern African Customs Union(SACU), and the Common MonetaryArea (CMA). SACU, a customs union

linking the country with Botswana,Lesotho, Namibia and South Africa, isone of the most important regionalorganizations for Swaziland. Revenue-sharing formula provides about 50% of

the government's receipts. It is widelyexpected that income from this sourcewill decline in the medium to long term.

SACU revenue is almost certain todecline between 2005/6 when the EU-South Africa free-trade agreementbegins to affect the common revenuepool7. Swaziland partially lost itscompetitive edge as an investmentdestination when South Africa became ademocratic state in 1994.

Swaziland is a member of the SouthernAfrican Customs Union (SACU) with

South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho andNamibia. This agreement allows a freeand, subject to South Africas importcontrol requirements, virtuallyunimpeded interchange of goodsbetween contracting countries. Customsand excise duties are paid into a pool,managed by South Africa, from whichSwaziland receives a share. It is also asignatory to the treaty establishing the

Preferential Trading Area for eastern and

Southern African states. Swaziland is amember of SADC (Southern AfricaDevelopment Community). Swaziland isnot a signatory to GATT but applies

GATT rules on a de facto basis throughthe Generalized System of Preferences

(GSP). Swaziland also has preferentialtrade access to North America, Japanand Australia. South Africa is its main

trading partner; other export markets areJapan, the UK and other EC countries.

Its main imports are generalmanufactured goods, fuels, lubricants,transport machinery and equipment. Allgoods entering Swaziland require importlicenses.

The tourism industry could become an

important growth area, if the

7 The Economic Intelligence Unit. Country

Report, Namibia and Swaziland, November 2001


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development initiative LubomboSpatial Development Initiative (SDI),launched in 1997 between South Africa,

Swaziland and Mozambique and otherinitiatives well supported. Highunemployment and poverty levelsremain a critical challenge for Swazilandeconomy. The incidence of HIV/AIDSalso continues to cloud the economicoutlook of the country with the highestprevalence rate in the region. Althoughthe economic impact of HIV/AIDS onsuch a small country is difficult toquantify, evidently, the pandemic is both

severe and devastating indeed. Theeconomic outlook is highly unfavorablein the face of the recent purchase of

presidential luxury jet for King MswatiIII in the context of regional drought andfood shortage. Anecdotal evidenceabounds suggesting that the price andoperational and maintenance costs of the

jet amounts to a quarter of the countrysgovernment budget.

References

Central Intelligence Agency. WorldFactbook,

www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

Economist Intelligence Unit. CountryReport: Namibia and Swaziland.

London: EIU, November 2001

Masuku, M., Swaziland In:Compendium of Elections in SouthernAfrica, Lodge, T., Kadima, D., Pottie,D., eds. Johannesburg: Electoral Instituteof Southern Africa, 2002

Standard Bank of Southern Africa,Economic Division. Africa Research,www.ed.standardbank.co.za


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CONSTITUTIONAL

DEVELOPMENT

Khabele Matlosa

Defining the Constitutional Crisis

As Swaziland prepares for a generalelection on the 18th October 2003, it is inorder for us to reflect on the countrysrecord of constitutional development todate since its political independence.Much of the informed opinion onSwaziland has now established by any

shadow of doubt that this sma llestcountry in country in the SouthernAfrica region severely lags behind in

terms of constitutional engineeringtowards a multi-party democraticdispensation. To be sure, only threeSouthern African DevelopmentCommunity (SADC) member-states

have not yet upheld multipartydemocratic governance and these areAngola, the Democratic Republic of

Congo and Swaziland. In all fairness,almost all the SADC member states have

embraced multi-partyism and haveundergone a transition from authoritarian

rule of the yesteryear with the exceptionof those three countries that are stillstruggling to institutionalise democratic

governance. Whereas many of thevexatious problems bedeviling

democratic transitions in Angola and theDRC has much to do with protracted

violent conflict in these countries, inSwaziland democratic transition iscompounded by a different set of

problems.

At the very heart of Swazilandsdaunting challenges for establishing ademocratic transition in Swaziland isthe enormous tension and, at times,violent encounter between the traditional

and modern institutions of governance.Put somewhat differently, Swazilandsconstitutional dispensation is caught

between the rock and the hard place; anexecutive monarchy dominatesoverwhelmingly the entire spectrum ofthe governance arena and has effectivelyasphyxiated modern forms andinstitutions of multiparty democracy.This is the essence of the constitutionalcrisis in the Kingdom of Swaziland. Asone informed local authority inSwaziland poignantly stated the biggestchallenge that faces the Swazi political

community is how to strike a balancebetween the forces of democracy and thedemands of monarchism. There cannot

be a monolithic view on these matters.Yet, if proper balance can be attained,the question of power distribution in theSwazi political economy would havebeen answered.1

Thus, Swazilands constitutional crisis

can be summed up in three

interconnected, albeit distinct, ways.First it underlines a fierce struggle over

limited resources in a small enclaveeconomy between the royalist elite on

one hand and the modern institutions ofdemocracy and this becomes even morepronounced when the palace feelspressure for democratisation both fromendogenous and exogenous forces. The

monarchy controls almost all the keysectors of the Swazi economy, through

the all-powerful royal corporation styledTibiyo Taka Ngwane thereby enjoyingmuch leverage over the entiregovernance project in the country muchto the chagrin of the democratic forces.Second, this crisis also brings into sharprelief the power struggle between the

1Mzizi, J. Leadership, Civil Society and

Democratisation in Swaziland, 2002


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two forces for the control of the statemachinery especially the executive, thelegislature, the judiciary, the

bureaucracy and the securityestablishment. It should be noted that, infact, hegemonic control of the statemachine by the monarchy has ensuredand perpetuated its unfettered dominanceof the governance arena to date. Third,this crisis also exposes the ideologicaldivergence between the monarchy andits allied chieftainship who espousesteadfastly the ideology of tradition anduncontaminated Swazi culture which

often times is perceived as a perfectanchor to a unique Swazi democracy incontradiction to a western-type liberal

democracy. In contrast, variousdemocratic forces in Swaziland haveargued over the years, and to this day,that Swaziland can (and in fact should)uphold its distinctive culture, but

embrace, at the same time, a democraticmultiparty governance more along the

lines of a constitutional monarchy as the

case is in, say, Lesotho, for instance.

Therefore the constitutional crisis in thistiny Kingdom can best be explained with

reference to a triangle of conflictbetween the monarchy and moderninstitutions of governance elaboratedabove comprising struggles over (a)resources, (b) state power, and (c)

ideological world- view. There is nogainsaying that in terms of resources,

power and ideological orientation of thegovernance project, the monarchyexercises unfettered political hegemonyand has thus entrenched a dynasticauthoritarian regime which to dateremains unmoved by democratic wavesaround the country. Thus, Swazilandremains an island of autocracy in a seaof democratic transitions in Africa as awhole and Southern Africa in particular.

Lodge et al sum up the political dilemmaof Swaziland in the following words:

The king enjoys unfettered executive andlegislative powers. As a consequence,

the cabinet and parliament play only asubordinate role in the countrys

political life. The King appoints a

cabinet headed by a prime minister for

the day-to-day running of the country.

The cabinet is fully accountable to theKing who can dismiss it at will. A

parliament consisting of elected and

appointed members plays a minimal

legislative role. Parliament issubordinated to the monarch, who canoverturn its decisions. Its main function

is not so much to legislate, but rather toinitiate and debate policy issues, subject

to the Kings approval2.

We should hasten to add that over and

above the executive and legislativepowers, the King also enjoys judicial

powers and has full control over the

bureaucracy and the securityestablishment in the country. This, thus,

completes the extent of the enormouspowers of Swazilands executive

monarchy since its entrenchmentthrough the Royal Proclamation of 1973.This brief expose, in a nutshell,represents a sketchy definition of theconstitutional crisis in Swaziland and as

we write this Election Dossier, prospectsfor democratic transition in this country

remain a distant mirage.

Constitutional Engineering: A Bumpy

Road to Democracy

As mentioned previously, atindependence, Swaziland achieved itspolitical freedom from British colonial

2 Mzizi, J. Leadership, Civil Society and

Democratisation in Swaziland, 2002


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administration, like other Africancountries like Lesotho and Botswana. Asthe case was in these two countries,

Swaziland was expected to embrace aWestminster constitutional arrangementdesigned to institutionalise aconstitutional monarchy along the linesof Lesotho, although the King wasaccorded much more extensive power incomparison to Lesotho, a situation thatdid not at all prevail in Botswana. Theresult was, thus, a Westminster-styleconstitution providing for a 24-memberHouse of Assembly and a 12-member

Senate, composed of chiefs. Investingthe King with extraordinary powers, thiswas no ordinary Westminster-style

constitution, for it empowered the Kingto nominate one-fifth of the House ofAssembly and half of the Senate as wellas the Chief Justice and the PrimeMinister3.

However, the initial attempts to

institutionalise a constitutional

monarchy, the hegemonic hold of themonarch notwithstanding, were dashed

when King abolished the independenceconstitution in 1973. This was done by

King Sobhuza II through a RoyalProclamation dated the 12th April 1973in which the King proclaimed:

That the constitution has failed toprovide the machinery for goodgovernment and for maintenance of

peace and order; That the constitution is indeed the

cause of growing unrest, insecurity,

dissatisfaction with the state ofaffairs in our country and an

impediment to free and progressive

3Lodge, T., Kadima, D. and Pottie, D. eds.

Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa,

2002

development in all spheres of life;and

That the constitution has permittedthe importation into our country ofhighly undesirable political practicesalien to, and incompatible with, the

way of life in our society anddesigned to disrupt and destroy ourown peaceful and constructive andessentially democratic methods ofpolitical activity. Increasingly thiselement engenders hostility,bitterness and unrest in our peacefulsociety4.

According to Mzizi, the Swazi monarchthen assumed all executive powerspreviously granted by the constitution tothe Prime Minister and the Cabinet.From that day onwards, the King hasbeen able to act wholly at his owndiscretion, consulting whomever hewishes, not bound by law Thisproclamation also banned political

parties including any political activities

in Swaziland a situation that stillprevails and has greatly helped toentrench the unfettered politicalhegemony of the monarchy and the royal

elite at large as the King essentially rulesin his own accord with advice from such

advisory agencies as the Libandla andtheLiqoqo.5

In effect, therefore, the immediateaftermath of independence witnessed a

steady erosion of democratic culture andpractice in Swaziland as the monarchydeliberately sought to amass all thepowers and in the process throwingconstitutional rule in disarray. This

4Mzizi, J. Constitutional Developments in the

Kingdom of Swaziland, 20025

International Bar Association. Striving for Democratic Governance: An Analysis of the

Draft Swaziland Constitution :Report, 2003


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status quo of dynastic authoritarianismremains a norm under the reign of KingMswati III in present-day Swaziland.

Current Efforts Towards

Constitutional Reforms

Let it be emphasised that even asSwaziland has been holding elections,fairly regularly and in the light of theforthcoming election in October 2003,Swaziland still has no workingconstitution. It was only in 1996 thatKing Mswati III made an attempt to put

in place several mechanisms forconstitutional review and reformprocesses. These initiatives by King

Mswati III were due mainly to pressurethat had been building steadily since thedemocratisation wave in Africa in theearly 1990s exerted by various localnon-state actors and external forces.

Local civil society groups had begun tomount pressure principally through

protest politics and lobbying for

democratic change. These internalpressures for democratic transition were

also complemented by diplomaticexhortation on the Swazi monarchy by

several regional states especially thepresidents of Botswana, South Africa,Mozambique and Zimbabwe6. Anemergency meeting of the presidents ofthese countries and a representative of

King Mswati III led to the appointmentof a 30-member Constitutional Review

Committee (CRC) by the King toexamine the constitutional system,determine citizens wishes regarding afuture system of government and tomake recommendations on a new

6Lodge, T., Kadima, D. and Pottie, D. eds.

Compendium of Elections in Southern Africa, p.

326

constitution. This process took fiveyears. 7

It worth noting, though, that numerouscivil society organisations in Swazilandhave criticised the Kings constitutionalreform process on a number of groundsincluding the following:

The intended end-product of thereview process and the entrenchedinterest of the monarchy incontrolling the whole process;

The nature of the appointment of themembers of the CRC;

The lack of information and civiceducation on the wholeconstitutional review process;

The Terms of Reference for theCRC;

The method of work of the CRC; The nature of composition and

representativeness as well as the

leadership of the CRC; Mode of submissions to the CRC

especially the fact that grouprepresentations were disallowed.

Thus, various civil society organisationsincluding the banned, but fairly activeopposition party the Peoples UnitedDemocratic Movement (PUDEMO) have expressed their lack of confidence

in the process and its outcome. Inconsequence, not only have these forces

boycotted the constitutional reviewprocess, but they have also not shown

any enthusiasm for general elections todate.

It is worth noting that while the CRCwas chaired by Prince MangalisoDlamini, a brother to King Mswati III,the Chairman of the Constitutional

7International Bar Association. 2003. Striving

for Democratic Governance: An Analysis of the

Draft Swaziland Constitution :Report, p. 4


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Drafting Committee (CDC), which wasestablished in early 2002, was PrinceDavid, yet another brother to King

Mswati III. That the Judiciary, theExecutive and the Legislature wereneither consulted and that the judiciaryin particular played no role in the reviewand the drafting process is instructive ofthe political intrigues that have marredthe constitutional engineering inSwaziland. Be that as it may, CDCfinally presented its draft constitution tothe nation on 31st May 2003. However, aclear-cut method of the adoption of the

new Draft Constitution is yet to bedetermined and clarified and indeedthis is a crucial matter to be addressed,

if the constitution is to gain democraticlegitimacy. 8 Against this backdrop, towhat extent, then, is the constitutionalreview a panacea to Swazilands badlytarnished democratic credentials?

Review of Substance of the

Constitutional Engineering and Its

Implications for Democracy

The proof of the pudding lies in theeating; so it is with the new draft

Swaziland constitution. Its actualmeaning for democracy lies both in itssubstance and content as well as the wayin which it will be adopted andimplemented in the final analysis.

However, anecdotal evidence suggeststhat first, it would be an uphill struggle

to turn this new document into a nationallegal framework for democraticgovernance in Swaziland and second, itwould be difficult to have it adopted as acollective constitutional vision for thesmall Southern African kingdom. Acursory glance at the substance andimplications of the draft document

8Ibid., p. 5

vividly illustrates this awkward politicalpredicament.

This brief review rotates primarilyaround (a) the role of the monarchy, (b)the role of the executive, (c) the role ofthe legislature, (d) the role of thejudiciary, (e) the role of the civil serviceand (f) the role of the securityestablishment.

Although, the draft constitution does notsay this in so many explicit words, itessentially entrenches absolute or

executive monarchy as introduced afterthe 1973 Royal Proclamation. This iscertainly the principal thrust of the draft

supreme law of Swaziland. In respect ofthe prescription of the Draft Constitutionon the monarchy, it is abundantlyevident that this constitutionalframework simply protects and extends

the already embedded politicalhegemony of the monarchy in

Swaziland. For instance, the Draft

Constitution prescribes that the King isthe:

Commander-in-chief of the DefenceForces;

Commissioner-in-chief of the PoliceForces; and

Commissioner-in-chief of theCorrectional Services

The simple implication of thisarrangement is that more and more

power is currently being centralised inthe monarchy through firmer controlover the security institutions.

In regard to executive authority, the

Draft Constitution states that executiveauthority is vested in the King as Head

of State, including the right to: Assent to and sign bills;


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15

Summon and dissolve Parliamentand cabinet;

Receive foreign envoys and appointdiplomats;

Issue pardons, reprieves orcommute sentences;

Declare a state of emergency; and Confer honours.

Although the King exercises thesepowers on the advice of the cabinet, hehas ample room to undertake thesefunctions on the basis of his owndiscretion without reference to anyadvice where a disagreement is real or

apparent. This is hardly surprising, giventhat both the cabinet and the PrimeMinister are appointees of the Kinghimself on the basis of his AdvisoryCouncil.

As is the case with executive authority,

the Draft Constitution prescribes thatsupreme legislative authority is vested inthe King. Essentially therefore,

executive and legislative power is fusedtogether in the King on one hand, and

the cabinet and the Parliament whereaswhen the die is cast, real power in factlies with the King. The nature of thelegislature has not been fundamentallychanged by the Draft Constitution. First,the legislature is still constituted on thebasis of the Tikhundla system and thushas not been opened for politicalcompetition by parties as these

institutions remain banned. Second, thecomposition of Parliament is still apreserve of the King. Of the 30 Senators,20 are appointed by the King and of 70members of the House of Assembly, 10are appointed by the King. According tothe expert opinion of the InternationalBar Association, there are nostipulations as to whom the King mustconsult when making these

appointments. Therefore, of the 100Parliamentarians, almost one-third arenot democratically elected.

Only in respect of the judicial powersdoes the Draft Constitution state that thisis the sole preserve of the judiciary.Thus, the Draft Constitution doesprovide for some modicum of judicialindependence from the omnipotentpower of the King. Furthermore, in thisvein, the Draft Constitution states clearlythat in the exercise of the judicialpower of Swaziland, the judiciary, in

both its judicial and administrativefunctions, including financialadministration, shall be independent and

subject only to this constitution, andshall not be subject to the control ordirection of any person or authority.9This proposed independence of the judiciary is to be ensured by the

establishment of an autonomous JudicialService Commission. However, the

catch comes with the composition and

manner of appointment of theCommission. According to the Draft

Constitution states that the Commissionshall consist of the following:

The Chief Justice, who shall be thechairman (sic);

Two legal practitioners of not lessthan seven years practice and in goodprofessional standing to be appointed

by the King; The chairman (sic) of the Civil

Service Commission; and Two persons appointed by the

King.10

Part of the key functions of the proposedJudicial Commission is essentially to bean advisory agency for the King on a

9Draft Constitution of the Kingdom of

Swaziland, 2003. p. 8110

Ibid, Article 160 Section (1), p. 90


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people who are like rapists, they break inand rule. They are imposed. Manypresidents are going to hell, together

with their people no matter how manythey are.13 Reverend Mkhuluza Zwanecorroborated the Kings and ReverendKhumalos statements by noting thatthere is no single verse in the Biblewhich says that there should be apresident ruling a country. When peopleare given the right to choose, theyalways choose evil. There are peoplewho are sponsored to dethrone you,Your Majesty, and these are the people

who advocate for democracy.14 Second,the constitutional engineering, in anycase, seeks merely to legitimise the

already centralized governance regime inSwaziland which, to all intends andpurposes, rotates around the King andhis lieutenants within the politicalscheme of things in the small Kingdom.

This is the case despite pretencestowards decentralisation through the

Tikhundla system of rule as it were.

Third, the constitutional arrangement isunlikely to end the protracted tensions

and conflicts between the traditional andmodern institutions of governance and

resolve the imperatives for democraticchange and the popular struggles aroundthis. If any thing, quite frankly,anecdotal evidence points to a likelyintensification of the conflict and the

popular struggle to which the dominantdynastic elite is likely to respond with

the invigorated wrath of the lawenforcement agencies whipping popularforces into line. Fourth, it remainsdebatable whether or not it is thereforeprudent to have had a general electionbefore resolving the constitutionalquestion In metaphorical terms, this maysound like a nightmarish chicken and

13 Ibid14

Ibid

egg paradox; but this much morecomplex than that, for it suggests in factthat what we are witnessing the

Swaziland is essentially a clear case ofproverbial cart pulling the horse. Fifthand finally, then, it is only fair tosurmise that the election of October2003 may not make much of afundamental difference to Swazilandspolitical landscape for it is aimed tomaintain the status quo ante. This mayexplain in part why there is littleinternational interest in the event, evenin terms of simple election observation,

by the hordes of observers who oftenflood a country holding an election, aswas vividly demonstrated in the 2001

election in Zambia and the 2001parliamentary and 2002 presidentialelections in Zimbabwe.

References

http://www.irinnews.org.

International Bar Association. Striving for

Democratic Governance: An Analysis ofthe Draft Swaziland Constitution:Report,2003 (mimeo).

Kingdom of Swaziland.Draft Constitutionof the Kingdom ofSwaziland, 2003.

Lodge, T., Kadima, D. and Pottie, D. eds.Compendium of Elections in Southern

Africa, 2002.

Mzizi, J. Constitutiona l Developments in

the Kingdom of Swaziland, September2001.

Mzizi, J. Leadership, Civil Society andDemocratisation in Swaziland, 2002


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18

THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL

POWER IN SWAZILAND

Claude Kabemba

The political environment in theKingdom of Swaziland has been highlyconflict-ridden. It is marked by tensionbetween the monarchy one hand andcivil society and banned political partieson the other. The King has been underserious pressure from the pro-democracyforces to transform the political systemaway from the Tinkhundla system.

The current political crisis in the countryis obviously traceable to the 1973proclamation in which the King declaredthat:

Now, therefore I, Sobhuza 11, king of

Swaziland, hereby declare that, incollaboration with my cabinet ministers

and supported by the whole nation, Ihave assumed supreme power in the

kingdom of Swaziland and that all

legislative, executive and judicial poweris vested in myself and shall, for the

meantime, be exercised in collaborationwith a Council constituted by my cabinet

ministers.

The new Constitution still to be adopted

maintains the king in his position ofexecutive, and fails to provide a clear

enumeration of his powers. Beforelisting the powers of the executive, the

Draft Constitution simply states TheKing in his capacity as Head of State hasauthority, in accordance with this

Constitution or any other law, amongother things toassent to and signbillssummon and dissolveparliamentreceive foreign envoys andappoint diplomatsissue pardons,reprieves or commutesentencesdeclare a state of emergency;

andconfer honours. The inclusion ofthe phrase among other things preventsthe enumerated powers from being

interpreted as the limits of the Kingsauthority. Therefore, while theConstitution does not specificallyaddress the Kings power to legislate bydecree, it also does not appear tospecifically prohibit it. It also places theKing securely above the law, statingThe King shall be immune fromsuitor legal process in any civil cause inrespect of all things done or omitted tobe done by him in his private capacity;

andbeing summoned to appear as awitness in any civil or criminalproceeding.While Swaziland is not the

only country where a monarch enjoyslegal privileges, the Swazi kings status,as the executive, makes these privilegesremarkable. The new Constitutioncontinues to make Parliament no more

than an advisory body to King Mswati,who may make or decree law rejected by

Parliament or promulgate laws without

parliamentary participation. Pro-democracy groups have called Members

of Parliament "rubber stamps" whoselack of legislative independence and any

real power have made them redundant.

But traditionalists who support and wantthe continuation of the current systemargue that the Swazi system is in fact

democratic. Leaving aside the finersubtleties of that argument, Swazilands

recent deterioration in governance mayreflect the fact that the system includesno checks on the executive authority ofthe monarchy. While the two chambersof Parliament are actors in the legislativeprocess, and the Swazi nation does,through various channels, have theopportunity to communicate with theking, none of these actors are vetoplayers on political decisions.


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20

The absence of political parties inSwaziland further contributes to theerosion of government accountability.

One of the most important functionscarried out by parties in polity is to keepthe government accountable. Althoughpolitical accountability takes place bothat the horizontal and vertical levels,political parties act in facilitatinggovernment accountability withpolitical parties controlling thegovernment, it is clear who isresponsible for the governmentsaction1

Civil society in Swaziland dealing withissues of governance and democracy is

diversified. It includes studentorganisations, labour movements, andNGOs. The major groups include theSwaziland Federation of Trade Unions(SFTU), The Swaziland Youth Coalition

(SWAYOCO), and The NationalCouncil of Churches (NNC). Civil

society together with under ground

political parties such the peoples UnitedDemocratic Movement (PUDEMO) and

The Ngwane National LiberatorCongress (NNLC), have been pushing

for change. Since in 1997, pro-democracy forces organised themselvesinto the Swaziland Democratic Alliance(SDA). This body is seen as filling therole the United Democratic Front (UDF)

during South Africas liberationstruggle, unifying all of the pro-

democracy forces under a single bannerand directing them according to a sharedvision. The pro-democracy forces inSwaziland have been weak owing to the

1Dalton, R. and Wattenberg, M., Unthinkable

Democracy: Political Change in Advanced

Industrial Democracies, In Dalton, R. andWattenberg, M. (eds), Parties without Partisan:

Political Change in Advanced Democracies,

2000

lack of coordination. But in recent time,especially this year, they havecoordinated their activities efficiently,

thus increasing pressure on the Kingmore than ever before. But thegovernment has remained recalcitrantand has not opened up the politicalmarket place for free competition. Thus,the key demands of the pro-democracyforces include the following:

A democratically elected constituentassembly to draft a legitimateconstitution for the country;

The unbanning of political parties;Removal of all political hostilities,free trade union organisation, freemedia and the independence of thejudiciary;

Unconditional release of all politicalprisoners; and

Restoration of womens dignity andan end to the abuse of women in thename of culture;

The political confrontation reached itspeak in early 2002 when a disturbingtrain of events pushed the Swazilanddemocratic movement to call fornational strikes, the dissolution ofParliament and the resignation of thePrime Minister.

The King has been sensitive to thispressure and it has pushed him tointroduce the limited reforms contained

in the new Draft Constitution. Theseinclude the immediate dismissal ofPrime Minister Jameson MbiliniDlamini, who was perceived to behalting the process of politicalliberalisation, and his replacement byPrince Sibusiso Dlamini as the Prime

Minister, who is regarded more as asympathizer of the pro-democracy


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forces.2 Even here, the change is stillbeing questioned: why is the head of theexecutive, the Prime Minister of

Swaziland always a Dlamini? - whilepublic office in general is a preserve formembers of the Royal Family and theirfriends to the total exclusion of themajority of the people. This might bethe reason why the King, after dissolvinghis cabinet, in preparation for thecoming general election, appointed PaulShabangu as interim head of state.Swazilands Parliaments law of October1992 make provision for the cabinet to

be dissolved prior to election, but thishas been done only once before. Thiswas the case in 1993 demonstrating that

the Kings decision is law. Normally thecabinet is dissolved to give ministerssufficient time to campaign for theelections and stop them from abusingtheir office, power and position to obtain

necessary votes. In Swaziland one needsto be elected to become a minister.

One major problem evident in Swazilandis the total disregard for the rule of law

by the monarchy. The deterioration ofthe rule of law has been observed by the

Lawyers for Human Rights as a majorchallenge to Swazilands political future,calling for some redress. The mostserious royal error in recent time was itsdisregard, in February 2003 of a Swazi

court decision, which had found that theKing had acted illegally when he

removed two chiefs. The Prime MinisterSibusiso Dlamini asked the court toignore two appeal judgments whichchallenged the supreme power of theKing. This situation forced many HighCourt judges and the entire Court ofAppeal bench to resign and many othersrefused to conduct the business of the

2 Dlamini, K. Political Change: Swazilands

Future in the Balance, 1997.

courts. The threat to the independence ofthe justice system and interference in itswork by the government on behalf of the

king was seen as demonstrating theKings unwillingness to introducechange into the political system. Thetension between the Attorney Generaland the Prime Minister forced the formerto leave the country under pressure, fordefeating the ends of justice. Thissituation forced the democraticmovement in Swaziland to call fornational strikes, the dissolution ofParliament and the resignation of the

Prime Minister. This confrontationadded pressure to already strainedrelationships following unsatisfactory

constitutional reforms. The mainlimitation to the rule of law isrepresented by the power and dominanceof the King over all institutions in thecountry.

The judicial crisis remains unresolved,and is a major point of tension between

Swaziland and international donors. Thisdecision reflected a serious disregard forthe rule of law. The manipulation of the judiciary by the monarchy in particularin recent months and its various attemptsto curtail its independence has provokedmuch concern on the issue of itsdependence and usefulness among thein-country donors. The reaction againstwhat is perceived as an attempt toweaken the justice system also came

from the Parliament. Here a group ofMPs threatened to step down or force the

king to dissolve Parliament if the PrimeMinister was not replaced. Thisdemonstrates that in Swaziland, whilethe King has all the powers, the othermembers of government do not

necessarily have the power they pretendto have. A critical look, however, might

suggest that MPs were already at the endof their term with elections looming.


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They had nothing to lose by challengingthe Prime Minister.

The Swaziland Coalition of ConcernedCivic Organizations has since begancalling for the King to intervene toreturn to the rule of law and ensure thatthere is dialogue between governmentand civil society organisations whichhave been expressly excluded from theconstitutional reform process. Without afirmly entrenched democraticConstitution, the country would continueto have the propensity for abuse of

power and political instability.

Political instability was alsodemonstrated when pro-democracyforces exposed the lawlessness of theroyal leadership during the Global 2003Smart Partnership InternationalDialogue. Civil society in Swaziland

continues to draw its strength fromregional partners by organising activitiestogether with attending regional events

where they use the opportunity topresent the situation in their country and

call for sustained pressure on thekingdom. The contact is organised with

the South African Congress of TradeUnions (COSATU). For the first time amajor involvement in Swaziland politics

came from the South African tradeunions through COSATU. COSATU

obtained permission from a magistratescourt in South Africa to protest against

the holding of the Global SmartPartnership summit in the country whilstthe people of the country were suffering

from the harshness of the royal regime.

The 2003 elections have alreadyattracted several international bodies.The Commonwealth has sent a team toobserve the registration exercise as earlyas July 2003. The team, which comprises

justice Hilary J Mkate, Commissioner,National Electoral Commission ofTanzania and William A Sage, Deputy

Chief Electoral Officer, Alberta, Canadaalso visited the different registrationcentres through out of the country. TheCommonwealth has also previously beento Lesotho, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone toobserve the registration process. Butcivil society and political parties havecriticised the Commonwealth forlegitimising a process that Swazis haverejected. In a very contradictory move,several leaders of the banned political

parties are standing as candidates forParliament in the coming elections, andhave progressed to stand for the

parliamentary elections. These includeDlamini, president of the bannedpolitical party, Ngwane NationalLiberatory Congress (NNLC), one ofthree prominent progressives who have

advanced into the line- up for nextmonth's general elections. Also elected

as run-off candidates from their districts

were NNLC chairman Jimmy Hlophe,and NNLC member Boniface Mamba.

References

Dalton, R and Wattenberg, M.

Unthinkable Democracy: PoliticalChange in Advance Industrial

Democracies In: Dalton, R. &Wattenberg, M. (eds), Parties withoutPartisan: Political Change in Advanced

Democracies, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2000

Dlamini, K. Political Change:Swazilands Future in the Balance,

Indicator SA, Vol. 14 , no. 1, 1997


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23

SWAZILANDS ELECTORAL

PROCESS

ShumbanaKarume

The Tinkhundla System

In several previous elections,Swazilands electoral system and itsassociated institutions have come underthe spotlight. It is no different on thisoccasion; the general elections inSwaziland are set for October 2003 andare expected to proceed even though the

majority of demands, largely fromwithin the Kingdom and theinternational community have gone

unnoticed. As has been discussed in theother sectio ns of this Dossier, much ofthe attention Swaziland receives,typically in this pre-election period isdominated by the demands from the pro-

democracy forces in Swazi civil societyupon the ruling monarchy to introducepolitical reform. The most momentous

modification demanded regards theabolishment of the current electoral

system otherwise known as theTinkhundla system which has been

rejected by many groups for lack ofdemocratic credentials. The Tinkhundlasystem is the electoral system

operational use in Swaziland today - theKingdom uses it to elect its

parliamentarians by holding regularparliamentary elections under a no-party

dispensation.

The Tinkhundla system as it stands does

have principles, though far fromsufficient, upon which leaders inSwaziland are chosen. As previouslyexplained, the system was, in factdesigned to replace the Westminstermodel and to facilitate the integration ofthe traditional and the modern system of

government. This provides a reason forits deficiency in embodying a completespectrum of democratic principles.

Leaving that aside, a full description ofhow the Tinkhundla actually functionsreveals a system that has been operatingpurely for the basis of providing asemblance of public representation inParliament. To reiterate, Parliamentaryrepresentatives are initially elected fromspecific constituencies or Tinkhundlathrough a three stage electoral process.There are a total of 55 constituencies(Tinkhundla ) in the Kingdom of

Swaziland, and each constituency isfurther divided into several chiefdoms.The first stage of the process entails

public nominations of candidates usuallybetween 4-10 in each chiefdom. The2003 nominations took place on the 23-24 August, and the primary elections;the second stage in the process followed

a week later. Technically in this stage,each chiefdom chooses the candidate

who will represent it at the

Tinkhundla /constituency level, by secretballot. The elected candidate in the

primary elections is then expected tocompete in the secondary elections, after

they have been dutifully introduced tothe constituents. The election processends with those candidates receiving themost votes representing the constituencyin the National Assembly.

The elected parliamentary

representatives conclude the process bybecoming members of the bicameralparliamentary system constituted by theNational Assembly and the Senate. TheNational Assembly is constituted fromthe 55 members elected through theTinkhundla and ten Kings appointees.These members then elect 10 membersto the Senate which consists of 30members in total; the rest of which are


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appointed by the King. Publicrepresentation is also dutifullyadministered at the local level through a

local council, also known as theInkundla the second level ofgovernment. The electoral systemdescribed above has been operative since1993 and, including this years elections,would then have covered the past threeelections.

Prior to this, elections were conductedunder a slightly different system. Afterthe repeal of the Constitution in 1973,

which had provided for a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy,Swaziland experienced a five year hiatus

during which period no elections wereheld until the establishment of theParliament Order in 1978 1. In theabsence of any electoral laws, theParliament Order was introduced

without much opposition. It was thisOrder that ushered in the unique

traditional electoral system commonly

known as the Tinkhundla . Electionsunder this system were conducted on a

non-party basis at the primary electionsstage through public queuing - each

voter wishing to voter for a particularnominee queued behind their favoritecandidate who normally would be sittingat a gate, and the counting officercounted the voters as they each passed

the gate2. Winners of these electionswould then form an Electoral College

from which the House of Assembly wasconstituted. Their only responsibility,once elected was to select 40 membersfrom the public to make up theParliamentary numbers. The obviousshortcomings of this system, mostnotably the lack of a secret ballot,necessitated a review; and this resulted

1 Lodge, T., Kadima, D., Pottie, D., eds, , 20022Ibid.

in the establishment of the currentsystem through a number of minorlegislative amendments. These were the

Parliament Order no.2 of 1992, theElection Order no.2 of 1992 and theVoters Registration Order no.3 of 19923.Needless to say, the system currently inplace has its own limitations; the mostserious of which, given the variation insize of the constituencies, is that usuallythe candidate from the largestconstituency wins the secondaryelections. Moreover it lacksaccountability, it is non participatory and

it is the least competitive form ofrepresentation in both Parliament andgovernment.

Election Administration

The Electoral CommissionThe management of elections in

Swaziland has been entrusted to theElection Office since 1992, and is under

the charge of a chief Electoral Officer

known as the Umphatsi Lukhetfo. He isresponsible for the overall supervision of

elections and preparations of all electoraldocuments and officers under his

jurisdiction. The Umphatsi Lukhetfo, forexample, is assisted by the DeputyElectoral Officer, whose position, atpresent, remains vacant. The chain ofcommand then passes to a recently

established Secretariat, and finally, notnecessarily in this order, electoral

officers, registration officers, returningofficers, presiding officers, countingofficers and polling officers make up theorganisational structure. There is oneconsiderable difference from otherregional electoral commissions and thatis its top leadership is always appointedby the King and remains accountable tohim. These are the Chief, Deputy

3Ibid.


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Electoral Officers and the head of theSecretariat, who then appoint the rest ofthe officers from the ranks of the public

service. The electoral and registrationofficers are mostly principal secretariesfrom various government ministries, andthe presiding officers professionalbackground is that of schoolheadmasters and government departmentheads.

The Elections Office underwentorganisational restructuring during 2002and earlier in 2003 to enable it to carry

out its activities more efficiently. Anumber of propositions for thisendeavour were formulated; for instance

it was proposed that regional electionofficers be appointed with theresponsibility for all the electionarrangements including continuous voterregistration, civic and voter education in

all the four regions of the country.Officials responsible for such an

undertaking have already been seconded

from the government ministries. As alegal requirement, there are, of course,

other officers who assist in the conductof elections with diverse responsibilities;

from returning officers to presidingofficers, and counting and pollingofficers. In addition to this, a Secretariatcomprising three positions was createdas part of the overhauling exercise to

support the Chief Electoral Officer on apermanent basis. These are the Head of

Secretariat for Elections, ElectionsOfficer and the Information andEducation Officer.

The capacities of the electoral officersare usually restricted by limitedresources; and furthermore, relying onofficers who are temporarily employedfrom the ranks of senior civil servantsplay a role in preventing the proper

conduct of elections in Swaziland. Asone would expect, the use of civilservants who are normally seconded

three months prior to an election has itslimitations. Essentially, the ElectoralOffice is manned through-out the fiveyears before the elections by only twopeople; all plans and systems necessaryfor the conduct of elections areconsequently structured by a limitedworkforce. In response to this obviousskills gap the Election Office offers atwo-day training programme that beginsonce the entire electoral staff has been

recruited.

Voter Registration

About a quarter of the one millionpopulation of Swaziland are eligible tovote, and this is more or less reflected inthe recently compiled Voters Roll. Thevoters register had a total of 228,616

voters, of which 109,258 are males and119,352 are females. Arranged by

region, the figure stands as follows:4

Hhohho 61, 999

Lubombo 44, 424Manzini 63, 638

Shiseweni 58, 555

The registration is open to any citizen ofSwaziland who is the age of 18 andolder. There are certain factors as

specified under the Voters RegistrationOrder of 1992 that may disqualify a

voter. A person, for instance is notentitled to vote if he/she is judgedinsane. The registration is undertaken ineach of the constituency where a voter isallowed to register in any one of the

Inkhundla. It must be noted that toregister in a constituency, a person must

4 Press Statement from the Elections office 18th

September 2003


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26

have resided in that constituency for acontinuous period of three months.

Method of identifying potential votersdiffers in the rural and urban areas. Inrural areas, chiefs with the assistance ofother community elders verify theidentity of registrants. In urban areas, arange of identity documents such aspassports, national ID and birthcertificates are presented by registrantsas legitimate proof of Swazi nationality.Once all the particulars of a potentialvoter have been accordingly registered, a

certificate of registration which is validfor five years from the date ofregistration is then issued to the

registrant.

The registration process did experiencesome minor complications; for instancethere were some delays due to staff

shortages. A two week extension had tobe given to the processes which had

initially been allocated a month

beginning 23 June ending 20 July 2003.As a result, the Elections office did not

make the Voters Roll available to thepublic on time for display at either

regional administration offices, subregional offices or the ElectoralOfficers Office. In terms of the VotersRegistration Order of 1992, the votersregister is required to be open for public

inspection to allow voters to verify it byobjecting to the inclusion, retention,

restoration, addition or removal of anyname in the voters list. 5 The roll wasonly made accessible to the returningofficer in each Inkhundla (constituency)and supposedly the public on 18September 2003.

5Report of the Commonwealth Expert Team on

Voter Registration in Swaziland 14-18 July

2003

In addition, there have been reports thatsome people have registered in wrongplaces, and have been refused transfer,

and, as a result many have institutedcivil court action. Although according tothe Elections Office, transfers have beenmade for those voters who applied fortheir names to be transferred to wherethey will be voting. Many of the courtcases are still pending, and this is likelyto lessen the voters presentation incertain constituencies. This indicateshow challenging a task registration hasbeen for the Elections Office In general,

however, reports that assessed thevoters registration process, concludedthat the overall registration process was

implemented in an efficient manner bythe Elections Office.

Voter Education

The Election Office instituted a nationwide voter education programme. It used

the states radio and television facilities

to advertise the elections. Pamphlets andbooklets were also distributed informing

people on all the different stages of theelections; these ranged from the

registration, nominations, campaigningto the voting phase for both primary andsecondary elections. Pamphlets, nowcurrently in use are meant to educatecitizens in acknowledging the aspiring

MPs as they campaign. The pamphletsalso inform the populace of the

processes in which the Elections Officeis currently engaged. The ElectionsOffice also used dramatisations in thecommunities to explain the electionprocesses. They hired an acting group tocarry out plays which depicted how toregister, how to vote, who is eligible tovote and other necessary details.6

6 Information given by Ms. Mawane Sithebe,

Electoral officer at the Elections office


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27

Several NGOs, however, charge that thecontent of their voter educat ion isnarrow and not well structured usually

their programmes are not very detailedand do not engage voters that voting isabout issues. Its a process thatsclouded in secrecy and exclusion.7According to CANGO, the local mediahas reflected a populace that has notbeen adequately educated on electionissues; insinuating that the ElectionsOffice voter education programmes maynot necessarily succeed in encouragingvoters to vote in large numbers and on

appointing appropriate candidates.

Some NGOs announced that it has been

difficult for them to conduct votereducation, especially at the communitylevel due to the sensitive nature of theexercise; as a result generally, votereducation has been very scanty. For

instance, civil society organisationsplayed no role in educating and

mobilising voters to register. For most of

the local NGOs voter education has beena sporadic exercise as the Constitution

has diverted attention from theelections 8. Issues related to the elections

have been sidelined and instead, NGOsthrough an Elections Support Network,have engaged people on constitutionalissues as it provides a larger frameworkfor instituting political reform. Some

NGOs even advocated the postponementof the general elections until public

consultations on the Draft Constitutionhad been completed. Generally it is felt

7Comments from a member of CANGO

(Coordinating Assembly of NGOs), Swaziland8

Pro democracy groups in Swaziland havebegun a process of drafting an alternative

constitution to counter the current government

draft. Its been charged that the constitution

process has been exclusionary in nature andconsequently the draft constitution is not

representative of all Swazis.

among the NGO community that theprovision of education on electoral rightsand election related issues appears to be

the responsibility of the Election Office.

Electioneering

Campaigning in Swaziland is allowed,save for a few restrictions placed on theprocess. It is only independentcampaigning that is prohibited; meaningthat permission to campaign and holdmeetings of a political nature has to besought from both the constituency

headman and the Electoral Office. Inaddition, once permission has beenobtained, candidates are chaperoned to

their respective chiefdoms to campaign.This is done by the returning officer forthe Tinkhundla who takes the candidatesto various chiefdoms to meet thecommunity and discuss issues of local

concern with the community.Campaigning commenced on Monday

22 September and was completed on 17

October 2003, the day before the generalelections.

Because candidates have no party

platforms to follow, the y usually woovoters with promises of clinics, roadsand employment generating projects.Most of the recent campaign promiseshowever, have focused largely on

HIV/AIDS related issues. Femalecandidates for example have promised to

establish a parliamentary section forchildren, orphans and one that willconcentrate on HIV/AIDS matters.Another popular subject reflected in thecampaigns promises focuses on theconcerns pro-democracy forces havevoiced around the deterioration of therule law in Swaziland. Essentiallycandidates localise their campaign to suittheir constituency; in the end, due to the


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type of governance structures operatingin Swaziland, candidate promises arerestricted to issues around living

conditions.

References

Commonwealth Expert Team on VoterRegistration in Swaziland 14-18 July2003.Report, 2003.

Elections Office(Swaziland). PressStatement, 18 September 2003.

Lodge, T., Kadima, D., Pottie, D., eds.Compendium of Elections in Southern

Africa. Johannesburg: Electoral Institute

of Southern Africa, 2002.

Kabemba, C. ed. EISA SwazilandMonograph. Johannesburg: ElectoralInstitute of Southern Africa, 2003

(Forthcoming).


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REVIEW OF PREVIOUS

ELECTIONS IN SWAZILAND

Khabele Matlosa

Introduction

As in all other African countries thatexperienced colonial rule, electoralpolitics came with the introduction ofpolitical independence. This is notsurprising, for colonial rule, was, by itsvery nature an authoritarian form ofgovernance which did not draw its

legitimacy and credibility from the ballot(consensus and free choice) but ratherfrom the bullet (coercion and

imposition). Thus, like elsewhere inAnglophone Africa, the British colonialadministration in Swaziland relied uponthe twin strategies of repression (tocoerce the indigenes into submission)

and accommodation (to placate thetraditional authorities to comply with

colonial interests). This is the stark

reality that confronted Swaziland underthe British protection as it was then

called, for Botswana, Lesotho andSwaziland were regarded as British

Protectorates and as such not perceivedas colonies in the strictest sense of theterm. However, in terms of the actualmodus operandi of the distinctionbetween a colony and a protectorate was

more academic than real. The commondenominator of the two was that

elections were not a feature of theformation and removal of governmentduring that time throughout the Africancontinent. Swaziland was not anexception to this general rule of thumbwhich marked the continents colonialhistory. Thus, it is fair to observe thatelections are a fairly recent phenomenonin Africa, dating, as it were, only as farback as the 1960s.

Party Politics in Swaziland

At the heart of electoral politics is the

existence of political parties that, in tur nactively participate in the politicalsystem and in the process, contest for thecontrol of state power.

According to the Encyclopedia ofDemocracy, political parties are groupsor organisations that seek to placecandidates in office under a specific label.Parties are among the most importantorganisations in modern politics. In the

contemporary world, they are nearlyubiquitous; only a small percentage ofstates do without them1 (my emphasis).

Among the small percentage of states thatdo not operate a multiparty democracy isthe Kingdom of Swaziland since thebanning of political parties through aRoyal Proclamation of April 1973. This

remains a daunting challenge for all thestakeholders that are involved in one way

or the other in the governance arena of the

country. It thus goes without saying thatparties are part of many ingredients that

make up a functioning democracy;conversely, where parties do not exist or

are dysfunctional, a system in thatparticular country, as a rule, suffers severedemocratic deficit as well a legitimacycrisis of rule. Political parties play acentral role in the shaping and further

development of a political system as awhole and the legislature in particular. A

political party mobilises votes premisedupon a particular type of political interestand ideology with the ultimate goal ofassuming the reins of government andcontrolling state power. Thus, politicalparties aggregate and represent socialinterests, provide a structure for politicalparticipation, act as a training andrecruitment ground for local and national

1Encyclopedia of Democracy, 1995, p. 925


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leadership and political parties contestand seek to win elections in order tomanage government institutions.2

After contesting elections, political partiesthen represent their specific constituenciesin the legislature and provide leadershipfor the effective functioning of theexecutive organ of the state. In essence,therefore, political parties play animportant role within the Parliament inshaping the relationship between theexecutive and the legislature and inprioritising the legislative agenda.3

Having made this point, it goes withoutsaying, therefore, that a democraticgovernance system gains more strength

through existence and activities ofpolitical parties both within and outside ofthe Parliament. Political parties influencethe legislature in more ways than one,such as:

Whether a legislature exists at all orhas any meaningful powers;

The relationship among politicalparties in the legislature;

The legislatures relationship with theexecutive; and

The legislatures internal organisation,stability and dynamics.4

In general, therefore, political parties arecentral not only to the way in which theexecutive and the legislature becomemore effective in driving the governance

project, but also in terms of deepeningdemocratic governance itself. Toborrow, once again, from the

Encyclopedia of Democracy, studentsof political parties have commonlyassociated them with democracy itself.

2 Policy Dialogue on Legislative Development,

20023Ibid.4

http://magnet.undp.org

Democracy, it is argued, is a system ofcompetitive political parties. Thecompetitive electoral context, in which

several political parties organise thealternatives that face the voters, is whatidentifies contemporary democracy.

Non-party states are predominantly

traditional dynasties (such as Saudi

Arabia) and a few military regimes;

their numbers have declined in recent

years5 (emphasis mine). Includedamong the declining species of non-party states is, obviously, the Kingdomof Swaziland dating as far back as the

early 1970s. This suggests thatSwaziland still faces an enormouschallenge of transition from dynastic

authoritarianism towards a firmly party-based democratic governance.

Noteworthy within the context of Swazipolitics is that, in comparison with other

parts of Africa, political parties emergedfairly late, for reasons that have not yet

become clear to this author. We can only

surmise that the preponderance of thetraditional institutions and the hegemony

of the royal power may have been sooverwhelming that there has, over time,

been little, if any, space for partypolitical activity in Swaziland. Whereasthe general trend in Africa has been thatpolitical parties emerged as early as the1910s with the African National

Congress (ANC) in South Africaestablished in 1912, for instance, in

Swaziland political parties were onlyestablished in the 1960s, about eight (8)years before political independenceSwaziland, therefore has no record ofdecolonisation movements that mountedpressure upon colonial administration forpolitical independence, which followingdecolonisation, then transformed intopolitical parties (ruling and opposition).

5Encyclopedia of Democracy, 1995, p. 924


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Lodge et al remind us that although itarticulated political views, the Swazi

Progressive Association (SPA) founded

in 1929, did not transform itself into apolitical party until 1960 when it became

the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP),the countrys first political party. The

career of its leader, J.J. Nquku, had

included journalism and teaching. Dr.

Ambrose P. Zwane who had completed

his medical studies in South Africa, wasthe partys secretary general. Having

graduated from Fort Hare College (later

Fort Hare University) and the University

of Witwatersrand in South Africa, Zwanewas no stranger to politics.6

To examine party development in moredetail, typical of factional politics inmuch of the African continent, theSwaziland Progressive Party (SPP)experienced a split leading to the

establishment of the Ngwane NationalLiberatory Congress (NNLC) in 1962

under the leadership of veteran

politician, Dr. Ambrose Zwane. TheNNLC, in some sense, adopted a fairly

radical political posture espousing pan-Africanism and advocating for political

independence of Swaziland under aconstitutional monarchy embracinguniversal suffrage, as Lodge goes on tosay. Another party established atapproximately the same time was the

liberal Swaziland Democratic party(SDP) a little on the right of the NNLC

ideologically and led by SimonNxumalo and later by Dr. AllenNxumalo. A handful of white liberalsjoined the SDP.7

Let us not forget that the Swazilandpolitical landscape has always been acontested terrain in which the two major

6 Lodge, et al, 2002, p. 3237Ibid

protagonists have locked horns in afierce conflict over the monopoly of thecountrys political system namely the

monarchy and the chieftainship, on theone hand and the modern politicalinstitutions such as political parties andcivil society organisations on the other.So, it came to pass that the monarchywould respond to the early proliferationof parties in Swaziland by establishing acounter-force in the form of theImbokodvo National Movement (INM)in 1964, the same day of the pre-independence Legislative Council

election and just four years beforeindependence itself. Hatched in thepalace, the INM was, and still is, the

most conservative political party whichessentially espouses traditionalismwithin which state power and thegovernance process is centralised in themonarch and implemented largely

though the Kings scions. Although alatecomer in the political game in

Swaziland, the INM quickly became not

only a political force to reckon with, butalso a dominant force that was able to

exert its weight and entrench itshegemony within the political economy

of the country since its formation to thisday. As Lodge et al refresh ourmemories, thanks to its substantialresources and wide-rangingconnections, the INM became a

formidable force. In the pre-independence elections of 1964 and

1967 it won all seats in the LegislativeCouncil. However, as more power

became concentrated in the hands of the

King, the role of political partiesdiminished.8

Political parties were effectively bannedthrough a Proclamation by H.E. KingSobhuza II dated 12th April 1973 and

8Ibid


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duly made public by Attorney-GeneralMr. David Cohen on the 16 April 1973.The Proclamation prescribed, among

other things, that: The Constitution of the Kingdom of

Swaziland which commenced on the

6th September 1968 is herebyrepealed;

All political parties and similarbodies that cultivate and bring aboutdisturbances and ill- feelings withinthe Nations are hereby dissolved andprohibited;

No meetings of a political nature andno processions or demonstrationsshall be held or take place in anypublic place unless with the priorwritten consent of the Commissionerof Police; and consent shall not begiven if the Commissioner of Policehas reason to believe that suchmeeting, procession ordemonstration, is directly oindirectly related to politicalmovements or their riotous

assemblies which may disturb thepeace or otherwise disturb themaintenance of law and order; and

Any person who forms or attempts orconspires to form a political party orwho organises or participates in anyway in any meeting, procession ordemonstration in contravention ofthis decree shall be guilty of anoffence and liable, on conviction, toimprisonment not exceeding six

months.9

The 1973 Royal Proclamation outlinedabove was further affirmed andreinforced by Decree No. 2 of 2001,signed into law

swaziland election update 1 2003

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