sybil attack
DESCRIPTION
Sybil Attack. Hyeontaek Lim 15-744 November 12, 2010. Sybil Attack. Generates multiple false identities to attack systems relying on identity Example - Product rating a_honest_user : 2 stars. “Not worth the money.” another_honest_user : 1 star. “DOA.” john: 5 stars. “Highly recommended.” - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Sybil Attack
Hyeontaek Lim
15-744November 12, 2010
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Sybil Attack
• Generates multiple false identities to attack systems relying on identity
• Example - Product rating– a_honest_user: 2 stars. “Not worth the money.”– another_honest_user: 1 star. “DOA.”– john: 5 stars. “Highly recommended.”– bob: 4 stars. “Well done.”– sam: 5 stars. “Excellent!”– Average: 3.4 stars (should be 1.5 stars)
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Truste
d certi
fication
No solution
Resource
testi
ng
Recurri
ng costs
Truste
d devices
Observa
tion0
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Sybil Attack Domains and Solutions• Domains– Mobile networks– Auditing– Cash economics– Reputation systems
• No solution applies to every case
Brian Neil Levine, Clay Shields, N. Boris Margolin. A Survey of Solutions to the Sybil Attack. 2006.
SybilGuard CAPTCHA
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SybilGuard
• Use social network to defend against Sybil attack
• No extra links btw honest nodes and sybil nodes
Diagrams from authors’ slides
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Random Route
• 1:1 mapping from incoming edge to outgoing edge– Convergent & back-traceable
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Random Route Intersection
• Verifier and suspect use fixed-length random route
• Random routes from honest verifier & honest suspect are highly likely to intersect at some point
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Bounding Number of Sybil Groups
• Routes traversingsame edge traverse same intersection point
• # of sybil groups <= # of attack edges
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Bounding Size of Sybil Groups
• Accept ~[route length] nodes per intersection point
• Size of sybil group <= [route length]
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Discussion
• Validity– Side effects of using random routes– No real world evaluation
• Limitations from using social network– Privacy concerns– Ambiguous notion of trust– Compromised nodes
• Performance– High-degree nodes