symposium2010-print

Unity and Self-Determination

in Sudan

United Nations Mission In Sudan Future Trends Foundation

Symposium on

Khartoum, 2-3 November 2009

�

Symposium - November 2009

e would like to thank our partners, the Future Trends Foundation, for their support and advice in convening the symposium.

Special thanks go to Dr. Francis Deng, UN Undersecretary General and Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, for allowing UNMIS to reproduce his keynote speech.

Our gratitude is also extended to Sir Derek Plumbly, Chairman of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, who contributed to the closing session and actively participated in other sessions.

We equally appreciate the sponsorship of the event by Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Alor and Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salahuddin. Their contribution added the necessary catalyst for this debate to gain momentum and reiterated the two peace partners’ commitment to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement despite their differing perspectives.

We would also like to express our appreciation to the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sudan, Ashraf Qazi, for hosting the symposium and making available the Mission's resources. In addition, a large number of colleagues contributed to the success and smooth running of the symposium with their hard work and patience. Special thanks to Mona Mohamed, Salah Mohamed, Ayman Mohamed and Ismini Palla who worked for months to make this event happen. Ashraf Eissa, Habib Labidi, Shantal Persaud, Mohamed Ibrahim, Kemal Eltyeb, Antonette Miday, Ola Elmagboul, Monica Dudu, Arnold Temple, Jacob Nyang and Ahmed Attiya from UNMIS and Mamdouh Ahmed, Sami Ahmadia and Fakhr Eldin Jamal from FTF who collectively helped to bring the loose ends together. Thanks also go to Sudanese flute musician Hafiz Abdul Rahman and his band for their role in making the closing dinner party enjoyable.

2 Acknowledgment

3 Forward

4 Executive Summary

6 Session I: How to Make Unity Attractive

10 Session II: The Media and Public Discussion onUnity and Self-Determination

12 Session III: Self-Determination and theReferendum

14 Session IV: Sudan Economic Outlook beyond 2011

16 Session V: Wrap-up and Recommendations

17 Keynote address: Prospects for Reconciling Self-Determination with Unity in Sudan by Dr. Francis Deng

w

Table of content

Acknowledgment

River Kiir or Bahr el Arab, Abyei.

Misserya cattle camp, Abyei.

Pupils carrying Sudanese flag outside a meeting on development projects for South Kordofan State, Kauda, Nuba Mountains.

AK-47’s burning at the launch of DD

R program

, Juba.

UNITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION IN SUDAN

�

he symposium was motivated by sense of urgency as the country rapidly approaches the concluding chapters of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in �011. With less than �0 months to the conclusion of the interim period in mid �011, as set out in the Agreement signed by the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), and with repeated delays in passing the referenda legislation and other critical deadlines, discussions within the Sudanese political class about possible day-after scenarios did not take off seriously;

a lack of productive dialogue was also manifested amongst the ranks of the intelligentsia and the opinion makers, and to a larger extent, the Sudanese public.

While the CPA marked the end of one of the longest civil wars between north and south Sudan over power sharing and resources. It signalled a move towards peace and stipulated in its provisions the need to make unity attractive while preserving the right of the southern Sudanese people to self-determination. However, no substantial debate or action in this direction had taken place between the two parties to discuss either eventuality in a post �011 Sudan. There was a need to hold such a forum, in order to look into various unity and self-determination scenarios.

UNMIS Communications and Public Information Office and the Sudanese think tank, the Future Trends Foundation, joined forces to organise this crucial forum, not to bring a list of policy recommendations, but to enable Sudanese experts, academics, commentators, and analysts to deliberate on the myriad of issues relevant to unity and self-determination. A general consensus was agreed upon to limit the panel of international experts to four people, two of them were Sudanese who live and work overseas. Some 65 intellectuals, academics, opinion makers, politicians, and analysts participated in the symposium representing northern and southern Sudan.

To enhance candour and openness, the Chatham House rule was applied. All sessions were held behind closed doors, with the exception of the closing one which was open to the public and the media.

The prominent Sudanese political and intellectual figure, Dr. Francis Deng, currently serving as the UN Secretary General Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, was the keynote speaker.

The closing session included remarks from Sir Derek Plumbly, Chairman of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC), the body responsible for monitoring the CPA, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deng Alor, Presidential Advisor, Ghazi Salahuddin and the then Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Sudan, Ashraf Qazi, who hosted the event.

The following proceedings without attribution to panellists and participants reflect the views, and discussion points emerging from the symposium.

It is our hope, that this contribution could form the basis to spur further open dialogue and public debate on the many outstanding issues of unity and self-determination. Whichever path the Sudan takes in �011 should be peaceful and to the benefit of the people who live in this country. For this to happen, any decisions and agreements on how to handle the outcome of the �011 referendum by the politicians need to be popularised and discussed around the country by the people whose very lives will be affected. Only the understanding, acceptance and support of the people of Sudan for such choices as hard as they might be, could guarantee the hard-won peace.

Needless to say that neither UNMIS nor FTF necessarily endorse any of the views, information or statements included in this report. However, they believe that the report represents a faithful picture of what transpired in the symposium by a representative cross section of the Sudanese public opinion on the various issues whose resolution will determine the future of this country for a long time to come.

FORWARD

Khaled MansourDirector of Communications and Public InformationUnited Nations Mission in Sudan

Mohamed Mahgoub HarounDirector of Future Trends FoundationKhartoum

T

4


he following synopsis gives highlights of significant issues raised in the symposium. Four schools of thought emerged from the opening session on ‘making unity attractive’:

Firstly, participants favoring unity agreed that a number of stalemates will need to be addressed and a display of genuine political will by both parties will have to be demonstrated by rapidly implementing outstanding provisions of the CPA. Additionally, stipulation of the “popular consultation”, a process vaguely defined in the CPA to determine the “will of the people” of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States on CPA issues, will need greater clarity. Failing this, a fear of disintegration into smaller states across the north-south divide was expressed, with the potential of creating a third and contested Sudan.

Secondly, those in pursuit of making secession attractive recommended post-secession dialogue on wealth-sharing issues such as oil, water, pasture and grazing land. They suggested furthermore addressing the social implications (such as property and business rights) of this scenario for the large numbers of southern Sudanese living in the north.

Thirdly, an agenda was put forth as a road map for unity after separation, thus assuming that separation was almost inevitable. It was suggested that rather than concentrating on making either unity or secession an attractive option, the focus should be on ensuring that secession takes place efficiently and peacefully, thus allowing in the future for a reunification. A phased approach to secession was discussed, thus if secession is chosen in the referendum, a new state could be smoothly created.

Fourthly, some proposed replacing the referendum with a mutual agreement between the two sides granting full autonomy to southern Sudan, establishment of a confederation between north and south and revisiting the referendum every 10 years.

During the session on the role of media, a general opinion was expressed, that both northern and southern media outlets subscribe to the use of hate language rather than serve as a positive platform to encourage peaceful co-existence. This trend had created a sense of separatism and accusatory debate on the prospects of unity. To address the damage and curb the hate rhetoric which the media had been allowed to escape with unchecked, some suggested the

establishment of a joint national television and radio station broadcast in two languages to be operated by journalists from both the north and the south; publishing of material that would foster peaceful co-existence, and nation building; improving infrastructure to facilitate movement, including media personnel; support community media outlets; and hold a conference on media, enhancing possibilities for creating an atmosphere conducive for peace.

The issues of self-determination and the referendum were discussed at the third plenary session, with emphasis revolving around the census, border demarcations, and the elections. It was noted that southern Sudanese had opted for self-determination based on inequalities suffered between north and south, and the failure to manage and accommodate the country’s diversity. In addition, the opinion that the identity question was systemic and core to the country’s problems was expressed. Reservations on what kind of unity southern Sudanese should vote for was also an issue of concern, as well as what kind of nation will emerge in the south if Sudan is divided. A call for good neighborliness to remain was voiced should the south chooses to secede. It was agreed that post referendum arrangements were a top priority, and the following actions were suggested in order to facilitate a peaceful process:

draft a new constitution to address post �011 issues; establish an independent group to discuss issues of separation, with emphasis on civic education, conflict mediation and the role of communities in maintaining peace; establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to assist with reconciliation efforts;and organize a forum to discuss possibilities of postponing the elections, and issues pertaining to the ICC and Sudan.

Sudan’s economic outlook beyond �011 was discussed at the last closed session of the symposium. The plenary criticized the central government’s relatively low expenditure on development and raised concern over its economic and fiscal policies which were seen by some participants as severely lacking in sectors such as education and health. Concern over oil revenues which, some participants argued, had not been efficiently utilized by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was also expressed. High poverty levels and

••

•

•

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

T


5

development disparities rampant across Sudan were seen as major catalysts for igniting conflict. While it was generally accepted that the CPA under the Wealth Sharing Agreement called for alleviating poverty and reducing inequalities, the varying socioeconomic realities of Sudan indicate that severe inequalities persist despite the economic growth the country has experienced since the second half of the 1990s. Further criticism was made of a north-south economic disconnect, where the majority of southern Sudanese turn to East Africa for goods which are cheaper and easier to access compared to trade from Khartoum. Recommendations to

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

overcome some of the economic and development obstacles called for major reform to the central government’s fiscal policy, as well as structural reforms which would allow a more inclusive approach to economic development; better use of oil revenues in the provision of basic services, and a more transparent approach from GoSS in the expenditure of oil revenues; clearer wealth sharing provisions for the post referendum period; better economic cooperation between the central government and GoSS; and reform of the banking sector with improved relations between northern and southern financial institutions.

Aerial view of Khartoum and Nile river.

Dinka cattle camp, Abyei.

6


author argued that positions are strongly held by the protagonists while the international influence diminishes as the key moments approach. Hence, the greatest need now is for leadership in north and south Sudan. It may be better, therefore, for the internationals to lower their profile and reduce their engagement, restricting it to the key issues instead of "tying down the two parties with trivia".

he main paper for this session, dealt at length with ambiguities of the Sudanese quest for an identity and the question of who is Sudanese. It argued that despite the CPA's call to make unity attractive,

the issue remains open to different interpretations of how this could be achieved. Three major routes have been advocated:

Peace dividend argument where 'making unity attractive' was seen by many as essentially an exercise in swaying southern public opinion by towards favouring unity through providing social and economic development and extending services to the south;Political transformation that late Dr. John Garang sought to bring about through a political restructuring of Sudan; Elite buy-in which is based on the perspective of the northern political elites of a patronage approach that only focuses on the elite in southern Sudanese and neglects development and services for the populace.

The author also argued that the fact that in the next five years some 50% of Sudan's population will live in cities could impact the prospects of unity.

The paper noted that the remaining months of the Interim Period are not sufficient for these three routes for "making unity attractive" to secure a reasonable chance for unity. It pointed out that subsequent to January �011, north and south Sudan will remain neighbours and the same issues shall remain important, both for internal governance and for relations between the two neighbours.

On the Referendum, the paper argued that it is "not an act of separation under International Law" but rather an opinion poll which may bind the national government to action on the basis of its result. It described secession as a process and separation as an outcome. A recognized government will need to request that the State of Southern Sudan be recognized. Preferably that government should be the Government of Sudan.

The presenter pointed out that CPA provisions on issues of the referendum could be amended with, for example, an extension of the six-month period leading to separation.

On the national significance of state partition, the

•

•

•

THow to Make Unity Attractive

DiscussantsThe first discussant opened his comments with an

interpretation of the CPA. He made a number of points in that respect:

Intellectuals and the international community pose the following questions: Does the CPA address the root causes of conflict in Sudan? Is it an interim arrangement? Has it gained consensus amongst the Sudanese people? In his response to these questions, the discussant argued that:

The CPA has indeed addressed the root causes of the conflict in Sudan that include, inter alia, issues of wealth, power sharing and identity. The CPA is not an interim arrangement. It provides the people of southern Sudan with the choice of whether or not to accept the governance system as cited in the CPA as a basis for the unity of Sudan. The Constitution also stipulates that should the people of southern Sudan vote for unity, the parties should discuss a new system of government on the basis of the CPA. On whether the CPA has gained the support of the Sudanese people, the discussant stated that there was hope and peace in Sudan indicating that the CPA represented the aspiration of Sudan. The problem does not lie in how the CPA is designed but rather it is related to the political will and commitment to implement the provisions of the agreement. This is what the people of Sudan, especially in southern Sudan, are watching and here is where we have had a setback.

He added that all outstanding provisions of the CPA should be implemented in good faith because that is the commitment the parties have made to the people of Sudan. We have to respect the provisions for Popular Consultation for the people of the Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

SESSION I


7

because these are the ones who are going to bind the two sides together.It is high time focus on making secession attractive and to start thinking of what to do to prepare the grounds if the people of southern Sudan opted for secession. We should focus on discussing post-secession arrangements such as economic (oil, water, pasture, etc.), social (citizenship and properties of some one million southern Sudanese residing in the north) and political.

The second discussant took an opposing view to his predecessor in that he put forward an agenda that can clearly be perceived as a roadmap for separation, making it almost inevitable.

Instead of focusing now on making unity or secession attractive, it is better to focus on making secession smooth and peaceful because:

The problem is not in the implementation of the CPA but rather in the fact that the Government of Southern Sudan has in fact been acting as a sovereign state-in-waiting since inception; southern Sudan is in fact a de facto state. SPLM attitude towards the end of the Interim Period shows that it has indeed given up on unity and decided to go south. Two examples are the recent statements by a senior GoSS official encouraging southern Sudanese to vote for secession and for the SPLM to pull out from parliament and from cabinet discussions on the national fiscal budget.

It is preferable nevertheless to adopt a segmented approach to secession that concentrates on certain regional aspects. In Africa, when secession is desirable, it is not necessarily justifiable.When southern Sudanese secession is announced, a new state will be created without even waiting for the six months period. A self-determination referendum could be an opinion poll if the state did not agree on it before hand. In that case, you can start negotiating different forms of association between North and South. There is no doubt that a new state would be created as soon as the announcement is made. All other negotiations would be of mere formalities. I don’t think that a post-referendum three-year period is a good idea. Instead of making unity attractive, it will make secession less peaceful and instead of giving the Sudanese state another chance, it would lead Sudan into statelessness.

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

The third discussant subscribed to the main speaker’s characterization of Sudanese politics as being based on deferment and re-negotiating major issues. He noted the following:

The symposium is a wake-up call. There is a need to focus on what comes next and how to handle the type of issues the coming period throws at us. There has been no genuine implementation of the CPA. He argues that that 85% of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has been touched upon and that 15% has not been addressed at all. The political marketplace mentioned by the presenter in his paper is a characterization not only of this regime but also of former regimes. Unfortunately, most politicians in the country are involved in this marketplace. Commenting on the plenary paper’s “urbanization” argument, the discussant noted that this may in fact offer opportunities for politicians to work on creating a proper integration but nobody has seized the opportunity to do so. He was also agreeable to the main speaker's view that the international community should give the Sudanese people the opportunity to work on their issues. He added that the international community thinks of deadlines while the Sudanese want to give one another more time and space to sit together and mull over issues. Therefore, deadlines should not be imposed. He agreed there is a need for the international community but pointed out that the international community needs to think very carefully how they are handling the situation. He concluded by saying that the definition of Popular Consultations for the two areas lacks clarity. It needs a clearer vision and a more definitive approach while tackling it. Otherwise, the choice is not really a secession of south from north but also the creation of a third and contested Sudan starting from the boundaries with Ethiopia all the way to the boundaries with Chad and the Central African Republic.

In their discussion, participants expressed the following views:

Some were disappointed saying that they came here with the hopes of hearing practical solutions for the debate on unity and secession debate but found none. Some expressed the view that the symposium came late in the day. Some agreed that the referendum will inevitably lead to secession and expressed wishes for a non-violent

•

•

•

•

•

1.

�.

�.

SESSION I

�


process.Some urged the NCP and the SPLM to bear in mind the historic responsibilities they shoulder over the fate of the country because the secession of Southern Sudan may lead to fragmentation in the north and south. One participant argued that the secession of Southern Sudan may even lead to the fragmentation of the country to three states – with parts of the Blue Nile and South Kordofan states going their way. The worst scenario is that the south would secede, the war would break out and the north and south would each disintegrate. Some expressed fears that friction between the two CPA partners may increase as elections and the referendum draw nearer and thus lead to a non-smooth secession or to armed conflict around the border areas. Some hoped that should secession occur, the two sides should agree on the rights of people to free movement, residence, work and ownership on the two sides of the boarder. Some participants showed optimism and said there is still hope for unity. Others expressed concern over whether or not secession would be good for southern Sudan and called for an all-inclusive review of the CPA provisions.Some were of the opinion that the problem is not the implementation of the CPA but it lies in the insistence of northern Sudan to impose their beliefs and norms on southern Sudan. A participant noted that "interaction between different cultural, religious and ethnic groups will continue even if the south secedes".Others deplored the blame game in which the parties to the CPA were engaged. One participant argued that this game invites more international intervention.Other participants agreed but pointed out that the Sudanese are the ones who should decide what assistance they require from the international community. Some noted that neither the NCP nor the SPLM fully represent the north and south respectively. They noted that the SPLM's vision for a New Sudan was buried with the death of the late Dr. John Garang and the movement has since advocated for secession. There was concern by some participants that the CPA has enabled the two parties to “hijack” the country and hold it hostage to their political projects. Some argued that a great deal of the CPA was implemented especially with regards to the establishment of a government in southern Sudan, but that the dominant trend at the moment in the south favours secession. The implementation of the CPA solely is not enough to

4.

5.

6.

7.

�.

9.

10.

11.

1�.

1�.

14.

15.

encourage the southern Sudanese to vote for unity. One participant argued that the main issue was not about secession versus unity but about freedom; it is not an issue of unity of the land but rather the unity of the people.Some discussants disagreed with the main speaker's argument that there is an identity crisis in Sudan. There was also some dissent on the statement made by one of the discussants about making secession peaceful. One participant said that it is a major departure from the spirit of the CPA that urges for making unity attractive.A participant noted that only a few provisions of the CPA remain unimplemented and that the differences could easily be sorted out.The issues that we could capitalise upon to make unity attractive include the elections and the historic north-south relations, one participant argued. We should not be dependant on the international community as it has not shown commitment to its pledges for support, he added. One participant argued that the CPA has helped us shelf the centralised system of government. What is now required is leadership. It is the one vital element lacking from the equation.The Sudanese should shelf ideologies and the beliefs that are keeping them apart. The best way to make unity attractive is to guarantee equal rights to all citizens, a discussant commented.Given the gravity of a referendum against the background of current tensions and uncertainties of further disintegration, some participants suggested that the parties to the CPA should bring together all other political forces to sensibly review the CPA provisions on the referendum and other key issues including Abyei. One participant urged political forces, civil society organisations, intelligentsia and all other groups must exert pressure on the parties to the CPA to re-negotiate the CPA provisions of the referendum in order replace it with an agreement between the two sides granting Southern Sudan full autonomy; agree to establish a confederacy between north and south to appease both unionist and separatists and revisit the referendum every 10 years.Some participants acknowledged the important role of the international and regional community, but insisted that the Sudanese have to sit down together and reach a consensus on the role required by these outside communities in Sudan.

16.

17.

1�.

19.

�0.

�1.

��.

��.

�4.

�5.

SESSION I


9

he two presenters of the session gave an overview of the role played by the media in Sudan history focussing on the Interim Period and the role it should play in the countdown to the referendum. They gave a rundown of the media environment

before and after the signing of the CPA. Citing examples of former Yugoslavia, they underlined the key role any media can play towards the unity and self-determination debate. They also cited examples of Rwanda's RTLMC and Kangura to illustrate negative role played the media in crisis situations.

The presenters outlined elements of hate speech in northern and southern Sudanese media. They emphasised the detrimental impact this separatist and accusatory discourse could have on the public opinion in relation to the prospects of unity. They noted that while the northern and southern media discourse has not reached the same levels of hate spewed out by the genocide-era Rwandese media, they warned that some media content is not far away from that level of rancour.

The two presenters went on to highlight the impact of the vigorous debate amongst politicians from both sides on the political horizon and media reporting. They underlined the need for vigorous but responsible debate on the future of the country and on the role that major political forces could play in minimising divisiveness and enhancing chances for unity. They noted that it is high time for north and south Sudan to engage in a fruitful dialogue.

the media has not fostered trust-building among the various communities in the country and this has been a key ingredient to the country's woes. He argued that the media has not served as a forum for proper dialogue amongst the Sudanese people. In addition, it failed in building trust not only between the two parties to the CPA but also amongst all components of the political spectrum in the country. If utilised properly, he added, mass media could have helped identify common grounds for unity, democracy and good governance and bridged the gap among antagonists in the country.

A number of participants drew attention to the fact that the word of mouth in Sudan still spreads faster than electronic or print media content. The media, they argued, could not counter the messages channelled through interpersonal communications such as the Hakamat of Darfur and Kordofan. The danger of verbal hearsay as a medium is that it lends itself to manipulation and misinterpretation more than the written word; hence it could be a source of inaccurate and often insidious rumours. These could create a drastic and negative impact on efforts of promoting unity and reconciliations, especially in places where there is no regular access to print media and other means of mass communication, or where the oral culture is paramount. This is a serious gap that needs to be addressed, especially as the time for elections and referenda draws closer.

It was argued that nation-building does not seem to be part of the media strategy in Sudan. Therefore, there is an urgent need for community-based media to shore up the CPA and foster peaceful co-existence..

Broadcast journalism, national and international, has also come under fire from participants who suggested that Radio and TV played a major role in aggravating the situation in Sudan. Broadcast media, argued some participants, continue to encourage polemics among the antagonists in Sudan. It reinforces the local political dogma that encourages statement and counter-statement from opposing sides. Such an approach has not helped improve the situation nor has it promoted the creation of political common grounds for dialogue.

The Media and Public Discussion on Unity and Self-Determination

SESSION II

T

Role of the mediaIn an interactive discussion, there emerged a consensus

that the media after the signing of the CPA has not played a quarter of its role in fostering peace when compared to its escalatory and inflammatory role during wartime.

A participant went as far as arguing that the general political situation in Sudan would have been better off without media coverage. Another agreed and added that

10


The media environmentA participant pointed out that there is no real freedom of

the media in Sudan. The media, he argued, has been denied the freedom required to reflect the diverse opinions of the people in Sudan. He noted that the current laws in the north and the south need to provide more freedoms to allow the media to play a role in promoting good governance and to act as a tool for public accountability.

The importance of local languages in media content was also highlighted as an important factor for recognising and promoting diversity. This, the participant pointed out, has been encouraged by the advent of new media. Vernacular Radio and forums, if appropriately utilised, could strengthen national dialogue and enforce unity.

A participant stated that the Government no longer holds a monopoly over the media and added that there are currently some 17 privately owned radio stations. He noted

SESSION II

that besides the Government and the private sector, the UN has also been introduced as an independent radio operator. He argued that this should not happen in a sovereign state and expressed concern over the impact such a medium could have in shaping Sudanese life. He further pointed out the impact of the many satellite television channels that have penetrated the airwaves in Sudan.

Some participants advocated the formation of national television and radio service run jointly by journalists from both north and south, and broadcasting bilingually. Others gave more priority to the establishment of community-based media.

Several participants called for widening of private print media coverage to include issues of concern to the south in particular and other regions in general.

A participant called for publishing some sections in the private media in the English language.

Participants urged the Government to put a lid on hate rhetoric and not let it go out of hand. Some called for encouraging content that aims at nation-building.

Media coverage during the 4th anniversary celebration of signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement.


11

he main presenter gave an overview of self-determination within the framework of the IGAD, International Law and the CPA and noted how difficult it has been for the Sudanese people to work out who

they are as a nation. The paper discussed the elections at length and briefly delved into discussing deals that need to take place in �010 regarding several issues such as the census, border demarcation, the elections and popular consultations, in order to prepare for the post-referendum period.

The presenter pointed out that all the above mentioned processes require massive state engagement and communications with millions of citizens. He regretted that the parties did not manage to resolve the human and local factor of these processes and may try to sort them out, possibly in the shadow of a US mediator.

He also said he expected that the presence of the American mediator would lead to last-minute high-level meetings during this period turning the CPA more and more into an elite deal and warned that this would serve to perpetuate the politics of exclusion into the post-referendum period.

He warned of problems that southern Sudanese citizens residing in the north may have to endure should the south opt for secession without clear post-referendum arrangements. He pointed out that secession will not necessarily resolve the real problems of the country.

Elite deals may still hold part of the answer to the country's problems, he said, but cannot provide a full resolution of Sudan’s political woes.

Self-Determination and Referendum

SESSION III

Tidentity watered down the Sudanese agreement of 1947 which provided for having a united Sudan where everybody belonged regardless of their ethnic origins. This view was not supported by some participants.

Most participants agreed that the identity dilemma has always been at the core of the country's problems. A participant noted that the calls for self-determination in Sudan have also been sparked by failure of the centre to recognise others and give them a proportionate voice. He praised the Sudanese army for championing the cause of unity in Sudan throughout the country’s history.

Uncertainty about the kind of unity southern Sudanese should vote for was cited as another problem. Participants pointed out that separatists from the north and south should think about what kind of nation they are going to create in their respective sides. This, they said, should have been considered earlier so that the possible scenarios are clear to all when the time comes.

Neither northern nor southern Sudan are now prepared for separation, argued a participant. She explained that the north has much to do in terms of the democratic transformation process while the south does not even have proper state institutions and would need to work hard in that area to build capacity and institutions.

On a positive note, a participant pointed out that despite the late hour, there is still time to make unity attractive but urged the Sudanese people to embark on discussing post-referendum arrangements that would guarantee good neighbourliness should the south opt to secede.

ElectionsOne of the participants noted that the CPA should be

regarded as a comprehensive agreement meaning that equal focus should be granted to all the benchmarks and not only the referendum. He pointed out that the CPA provisions are cumulative in nature and cannot be tackled in a piecemeal fashion. Discussions are ongoing on the referendum bill and the parties hope to reach a deal on the outstanding issues of voter and eligibility criteria required for the referendum, percentages for endorsement of the results, the referendum commission, among other outstanding issues. Once these issues are thrashed out and the other CPA milestones are

Self-determinationAfter the presentation, the discussion embarked on

considering the question of self-determination. Participants noted that southern Sudanese have opted for a referendum mainly because the Sudanese have failed to manage their diversity and because of the inequalities they suffered. A participant pointed out that the 1950s Egyptian-led calls for pan-Arabism, and attempted affirmation of Sudan’s Arab

1�


achieved successfully, there will be a good chance for a peaceful referendum.

Possible further disintegrationThe fear of a further disintegration of Sudan into smaller

states across the north-south divide was once again articulated. This reflected a genuine concern among a few participants who believed it was imperative to start without further delay serious discussions on post-referendum arrangements and to explore the day-after scenarios. There was a consensus in the symposium that this approach was vital to avoid further possible disintegration in Sudan after �011.

Post-referendum arrangementsParticipants agreed that post-referendum arrangements

have to be put in place ahead of January �011. A participant noted that Sudan should learn from the experiences of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict that flared because no detailed post-secession plan was put in place. He called upon the people of Sudan to worry about the day after and said that this historic period requires exceptional leadership, a comprehensive approach to addressing the problems and arrangements for the protection of the population whatever the outcome of the referendum is. He added that southern Sudan needs to make arrangements on how to handle its future neighbours should it opt for secession. He said that he found the discussions over such key historic issues as perfunctory and lacking in passion and depth.

Another participant agreed that exceptional leadership is lacking especially when it comes to matters of reconciliation after a long protracted civil war and inter-tribal clashes. He called for a South African-style Truth and

Reconciliation commission that may help heal the wounds of war. He expressed fears that should secession occur, the wish of either party to control oil fields in some parts of the country may trigger fighting between the two sides.

The formation of a confederacy was raised as a possible exit to the problems. Another participant pointed out that a confederacy may be considered after the �011 referendum.

A participant urged the UN to organize a symposium to disseminate the CPA, discuss issues pertaining to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Sudan and discuss possibilities of postponing the forthcoming elections.

Another advocated the formulation of a post-CPA constitution to address post-�011 issues to help preserve a Sudan united on a new basis.

Some participants called for the formation of an independent group to discuss issues of separation with regards to civic education, conflict mediation and the role communities could play preserve the peace.

A participant warned that the status quo will inevitably lead to war and proposed that the referendum be on whether the south should secede or remain united with the north in a five-year confederacy.

SESSION III

Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir (left) and President of Government of Southern Sudan and First Vice-President of Sudan Salva Kiir Mayardit (above) voting on the first day of election, 11 April �010.

Photo: Mohamed Siddigi.


1�

DiscussionsA participant postulated that the majority of southern

Sudanese turn to the East Africa region to meet their basic needs because goods there are relatively more accessible and cheaper compared to goods coming from Khartoum. He deplored the fact that southern Sudan has seen no meaningful development since the 1970s.

A participant noted that the CPA was a very complicated document on wealth sharing and was sometimes contradictory. He pointed out that the Central Bank of Sudan has so far done all it could to "level the playground" and set the rules of the game. If the Government of Southern Sudan had done its part, he claimed, southern Sudan would have had a fully functioning secular banking system. He noted that some in the SPLM wrongly believe that the NCP alone is responsible for implementing the CPA. Other participants strongly disagreed.

A participant argued that Southern Sudan needs the north because it does not have the know-how required to run the oil industry. He pointed out that oil should be a source for national revenue managed from the centre and not through two axes as is the case now. He argued that no one can envisage how wealth could be shared post-�011 and added that time is required to resolve these issues in case southern Sudan seceded.

The ten-point economic renaissance programme ushered in by the government in the mid 1990s came under heavy fire, with one participant arguing that the failure of this programme is to blame for most of the social problems in the country. Uneven development opportunities also provided the catalyst for conflict, he added.

Another participant argued that poor fiscal planning and spending that has not been properly prioritised are also to blame for the country's woes.

Some participants called for reforms to Central Government fiscal policy. This included structural reforms that would allow a more inclusive approach to economic development and a better utilisation of oil revenues in the provision of services. A participant called for a development oriented budget.

Many participants called for agreement on clearer wealth-sharing provisions to be applied after the referendum..

Some advocated closer economic cooperation between

he panellists gave an overview of the economic developments in Sudan over the past few years and looking ahead at the near future. Inter alia, they tackled government expenditure, the dual

banking systems (conventional and Islamic), the oil sector, and the agricultural sector.

Dilemma of uncertaintyThe session drew a panel of experts who highlighted the

fact that one of the greatest risks to the hard won peace was the high poverty levels and development inequalities that existed among the different regions in the country.

Panellists also indicated that the CPA fully recognized the risk of poverty and inequalities and provisions to mitigate them were fully made in Article 1.4 of the Wealth Sharing Agreement. Yet Socio-economic realities of Sudan continue to indicate a severe deficit in tackling these inequalities despite the economic growth the country has witnessed since the second half of the 1990’s. The panellists called for a more inclusive approach to economic development that gives equal attention to key indicators across gender, rural-urban populations, and at the regional and sub-regional levels.

There was also emphasis from the panel that oil revenues have not been utilized efficiently by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and the golden opportunity of high price levels and stable production have passed us by.

Some panellists criticized what they termed as an imbalance in the government expenditure priorities especially the relatively low level of allocations to the social sectors. Some panellists described the central government economic and fiscal policies as lacking in many respects and discussed specific shortcomings in relation to various sectors like education, health and transfers from the center to the states.

At the conclusion of the panel’s presentation one participant drew a graphic picture of how hard it was for both the peasant and the top business executive to make decisions based on an uncertain political and economic outlook. He underlined the need to live in harmony, for equal basic rights to all and for unity for the sake of a better future.

Sudan Economic Outlook beyond 2011

SESSION IV

T

14


central Government and GoSS.A participant called for more

transparent approach from GoSS as regards dispensation of oil revenues.

Several participants called for reforming the banking sector to allow closer cooperation between northern and southern banking systems.

SESSION IV & V

he sponsors of the symposium held a brief session with participant. Directors of UNMIS Communications and Public Information Office and of Future Trends Foundation thanked the participants for

their serious and honest efforts to tackle some of the most sensitive issues of the CPA and commended the sincere and candid dialogue they had during these two full days.

The sponsors called upon the participants to take these discussions to their individual interlocutors and

Wrap-up and Recommendations

Taudiences with the hope that this would engage all the Sudanese at the grassroots level in such an important debate that will contribute to determining their future.

They informed the participants that the symposium proceedings will be published by UNMIS under the Chatham House rule to encourage a healthy dialogue on the substantive issues involved. Using the Chatham House rule should steer any follow-up discussion towards the real substantive issues rather than the speakers and the positions of their political factions.

Grids from seismic testing used to determine oil deposits and drilling areas. Bentiu, Unity State.

Victims of inter-tribal violence in Jonglei State waitting for distribution of food and non-food items.


15

Three, in light of the above principles, as long as there is time still left, efforts should be intensified to follow the age-old adage, “Better late than never.” I have invested much of my adult life in promoting the cause of peace and unity in our country and it would be incongruous with my life-long commitments to give up because of the lateness of the hour.

D. As Abdelwahab El-Affendi and I have co-authored a position paper embodying our shared perspective, my talk should be seen as a complement to the arguments and proposals advanced in that paper.

II. Participant-Observer’s StandpointA. To put my views in context, it may be useful to highlight

some personal positions in my role as a participant-observer in the painful history of post-colonial Sudan, in which I have lived my adult life.

B. Ever since I became politically conscious, and as those of you who have either read my writings or heard me talk on the subject will attest, I have been a strong supporter of unity, but on the basis of full equality and a shared sense of belonging to the nation, with pride and dignity as citizens. I have also supported the right of self-determination for the South, not because I wanted the South to secede, but in order to motivate the national leadership, specifically in the North, to create appropriate conditions that would make unity appeal to Southerners in a self-determination referendum.

C. In September 19�9, barely three months after the Revolution for National Salvation seized power, I came to Khartoum, following a visit Bona Malual and myself made to Addis Ababa to meet with the leadership of the SPLM, acting on my long-standing principle of maintaining contacts with all the parties to the conflicts in our country. I was very well received, allowed to visit members of the previous government who were detained, and given the honour to address

•

Keynote Speech

I. Opening RemarksA. It is a great pleasure and honour to have been invited to

address this important meeting at this critical juncture in the history of our beleaguered country. I do so with humility and needless to say, in my personal capacity and not as the Special Advisor of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide.

B. To be frank, this is an honour I was initially reluctant to accept for two principal reasons:

First, I thought it was rather late in the process to be advocating making unity attractive as we approach the end of the interim period, during which unity was to be made attractive to the Southern voters in the self-determination referendum, an objective which, arguably, has not been achieved.

Second, the positions of the principal parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on the appropriate framework for unity seem too far apart to bridge in time to positively influence the referendum outcome.

C. In the end, and upon reflection, I agreed to participate, for several reasons:

First, the seminar is sponsored by my colleagues in UNMIS, an organ of the United Nations in which I serve.

Second, I reminded myself of a number of principles which have guided me over the years in my efforts to contribute to the cause of peace and unity in our country. Among these principles are:

One, optimism is a vital tool for constructive engagement, while pessimism is a path that leads to a dead-end.Two, everyone is called upon to play a role in promoting the overriding goal of peace and unity and, although only a few eventually catch the limelight as the champions of the peace process, it is the cumulative effect of all the invisible contributions that bring about the desired outcome.

•

•

Prospects for Reconciling Self-Determination with Unity in Sudan

*Keynote Speech delivered by Dr Francis Deng, UN Secretary General’s Special Adviser, at Al-Saha Hotel, Khartoum at the end of the first day of the Symposium.

*

16


the National Dialogue on Peace Issues, which was about to begin. I recently re-read what I said then and was struck by how much it still resonates with the challenges confronting the country today.

D. My stance for conditional unity has deep roots in my background in the sensitive North-South border area of Abyei, whose bridging role the Abyei Protocol of the CPA acknowledges and upholds. It is indeed ironic that an area which has played such a vital role of bridging and reconciling the North and the South should have become a point of confrontation, hopefully now resolved by the outcome of the Hague Arbitration.

E. With this background, I have been honoured to participate in many forums in promotion of peace and unity over the years, both within and outside the Sudan. Some of my efforts have been in partnership with world leaders, such as the then former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, and former President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, and some have been with institutions such as the U.S. Department of State, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and the Centre for Strategies and International Studies (CSIS). I was also a member of an informal Resource Group convened by the Inter-Africa Group to support the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) peace initiative on the Sudan.

F. CSIS focused on developing a U.S.-Sudan Policy that provided guidance for the mediation role the Bush Administration eventually played in partnership with others to end the North-South conflict through the CPA.

G. As co-chair and the only Sudanese in the CSIS Task Force, I played a role that was both conscious of my rather anomalous position as a Sudanese contributing to the shaping of U.S.-Sudan Policy and strategic in providing the insights that eventually resulted in what I believe was a balanced report.

H. A critical element in that report was the need to reconcile two contrasting visions for the country from the North and the South through the “One Country, Two Systems” formula that was later adopted by the CPA as the corner-stone of the agreement.

III. Root-Causes of the War and the CPA SolutionsPeople do not go to war to kill and risk being killed without

a compelling cause; fighting is a measure of desperation, based on the assumption that all peaceful efforts have failed to remedy an intolerable situation. And although rights

and wrongs are rarely equal, it is important to appreciate the concerns of both sides to a conflict and address them equitably.

The critical questions that therefore need to be asked and answered are:

What were, and are, the wars in the Sudan all about?To what extent has the CPA addressed and resolved the

root causes of these wars?What challenges remain to be addressed to achieve

sustained, genuinely comprehensive, peace and unity throughout the country?

A. The Root Causes of Sudan’s War(s) One word that is often used these days as a root cause of the regionally proliferating conflicts in the Sudan, and is so widely applied to grievances throughout the country as to have lost its original focus on the South, is “marginalization.”What this means is that the Center has monopolized power and national wealth to the exclusion of the peripheries in both the South and the North, which have thereby been “marginalized“.There is, however, a deeper logic to stratification in the Sudan and that is the extent to which the identity factors of one group, the Islamic Arab North, have been used to provide a national identity framework, which inevitably stratifies groups on those grounds and discriminates against both the non-Arab, non-Muslim Southern Sudanese, and the Muslim, but non-Arab, groups in the marginalized regions of the North.Placed in its historical context, the Islamic-Arab assimilationist process in the North provided opportunities for self enhancement to a respected status out of the denigrated categories of the non-Muslim Blacks, while the South adopted an identity of resistance to assimilation engendered by the indignities of gross historical mistreatment.Divisive subjective factors of self identification eventually overshadowed the objective realities which embodied shared elements of identities, racial, ethnic and cultural. This divisive identity framework was recognized, reinforced and consolidated by colonial policies, which, by introducing elements of gross inequalities into existing diversities, sewed the seeds of post-colonial conflicts.Initially, this identity framework pitted the North against the South, seen as the most neglected and the most embittered by negative memories of

1.

�.

�.

4.

5.

6.

Keynote Speech


17

painful history and continuing internal domination.Southern reaction was initially manifested in a secessionist war that united the whole North against the South and was eventually resolved through a compromise of autonomy for the South.The unilateral abrogation of that agreement by the central government triggered the second war, but one in which the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) that championed the cause replaced secessionist objectives with a call for a New United Sudan, of full equality, without discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, culture or gender. By the same token, the vision of the New Sudan inevitably threatens the identity-based interests of the dominant group in the North, which can be expected to resist such a radical transformation. This began to capture the imagination of the marginalized, largely non-Arab, regions and groups in the North, beginning with the Nuba and the Ingassana (Funj), and eventually extending to the Beja, the Darfurians, and even the Nubians to the far North.The call for the New Sudan began to tear down the walls that had historically dichotomized the country into North and South. Even those in the North, who resist radical transformation towards a new Sudan have made significant concessions, although a considerable gap has yet to be bridged.

B. The Solutions in the CPAThe CPA has addressed the national identity crisis between the North and the South by granting the South autonomy during the interim period and the right to opt out of unity through a referendum to be held at the end of that period.It did not, however, resolve the national identity crisis comprehensively, although it lay a foundation for the democratic transformation of the governance system in the whole country.Although the CPA stipulated that efforts be exerted during the interim period to make unity attractive to the Southern voters in the self-determination referendum, the “One Country, Two Systems” formula that was aimed at reconciling the two contrasting visions for the country paradoxically entrenched the differences between the two, inadvertently favouring Southern secession, and

7.

�.

9.

10.

1.

�.

�.

leaving the crisis of marginalization in the North unresolved.Although the CPA was intended to provide not only a framework for the democratic transformation of the governance system in the country, but also principles for resolving the regional conflicts in the North, it ironically became a tool for containment by the National Congress Party, which, as we argue in our joint paper, doubles as the Government of the North and the dominant party in the Government of National Unity.Despite rhetorical declarations by leaders calling for unity, the unity option, far from being made attractive to the South, appears to have diminished, as there is no evidence that it has been, or is being, made attractive. And yet, aspirations for national unity on the right basis continue to rise on both sides.Indeed, the vision of a New Sudan has so captured the imagination of Sudanese across the North-South divide that even if the South were to secede, the national crisis of identity and the struggle for the transformation of the governance system in the North would continue. Likewise, as the current inter-ethnic tensions and violent conflicts in the South, whatever their origin or sources of support, indicate, an independent South is also likely to confront charges of domination and marginalization, making the call for a New Sudan of full equality challenging to the South. Considering that those who stand for the New Sudan in the North are either members or allies of the SPLM, an independent South under the leadership of the SPLM can be expected to continue to support their cause. Southern dissidents too are likely to continue to look to the North for support, especially if the North and the South are antagonistic towards one another.By the same token, the prospects of reunification in the event of the New Sudan emerging in the North and the South cannot be ruled out.It is obvious, therefore, that the secession of the South would not necessarily end the conflicts in the Sudan without resolving the national identity crisis in the North and establishing an equitable governance system in the South. Likewise, the prospects for the unity of the country do not necessarily cease with the independence of the

4.

5.

6.

7.

�.

9.

Keynote Speech

1�


South.For all these reasons, it is urgently important to assess the situation and reflect on what can still be done at this late hour to resolve the crisis in the country comprehensively, not only to implement the CPA with credibility and genuine good will, but also to resolve the crisis in Darfur and prospective conflicts in other regions of the North, building on the principles laid down in the CPA. This could generate a surprisingly positive environment in the country and enhance the prospects of salvaging the threat of disintegration throughout the country.

C. The Challenges to be addressedAt this juncture, the country faces pressing challenges with two sets of critical questions:

First, can anything be done at this late hour to make unity attractive to Southern votes in the Self-determination referendum?

Second, what can be done to anticipate the worst case scenarios in the event of the South voting for independence and to prepare constructive remedial responses?

�. Making unity attractive requires action on both material and moral grounds.

Material action would require making peace dividends immediately visible: embarking on massive construction of roads and other infrastructural projects; providing social services to the people, particularly in the areas of health and education; generating rural development activities; and sending messages of good will, genuine change of heart, and readiness to address the grievances that have divided the country since independence.

Moral areas of action call for sending a clear message that Sudan is embarking on a genuine and sincere search for the common ground, based on what unites rather than on what divides. Subjective self-identification has led to a self-enhancing distortion of the objective realities that reflect more in common and provide a sound ground for a uniting sense of national identity as Sudanese. Proclamations by national leaders in that direction could immediately create a climate conducive to a sense of a common cause and a new ground for prospective unity.

3. However, as we argue in our joint paper, unity should not be seen as an end in itself or as the only option in the pursuit of human fulfillment and dignity. A vote for Southern independence, therefore, confronts the nation with challenges that must be addressed constructively in the interest of both

10.

1.

North and South. This should mean making the process of partition as harmonious as possible and laying the foundation for peaceful and cooperative coexistence and continued interaction. Practical measures should be taken to ensure continued sharing of such vital resources as oil and water, encouraging cross-border trade, protecting freedom of movement, residence and employment across the borders, and leaving the door open for periodically revisiting the prospects of reunification.

IV. Concluding remarksA. Sudan is confronted with an extraordinary dilemma:

Sudanese and the world would prefer the Sudan to remain united, but the contrasting visions for the country seem too far apart to be bridged.

B. The question the Sudanese must answer at this late hour is: What is the most important consideration for them, building on the self perceptions of identity that both distort the objective realities of the country and divide the nation, or searching for a common ground and a re-structuring of a uniting national identity framework.

C. If the latter is agreed to be the case, then action needs to be taken immediately to not only open a new page, but to also make it credibly and conspicuously evident for all to see.

D. The elements of such a new dispensation should be:Decentralization throughout the country in which all regions of the country, North and South, enjoy self rule similar to the system accorded the South, short of the right to secedeEquitable representation in the Government of National Unity, with due consideration to proportional representation based on demographic weight, but with due safeguards for minoritiesA declaration of principles for full equality of citizenship, without discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, culture, religion or genderThe creation of mechanisms and institutions for ensuring the immediate implementation of these policies, with the objective of showing visible results well ahead of the referendum in the South.Engaging the international community to support these last-minute efforts to salvage and promote the essential principles of making unity attractive to the Southern voters in the self-determination referendumWorking with all concerned not only to advocate

1.

�.

�.

4.

5.

6.

Keynote Speech


19

the cause of unity, but also to prepare to counter the negative consequences of separation, and promote peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the North and an independent South

E. If I may, I would like to end with passages from my book: War of Visions: Conflict of Identities in the Sudan. Under the title, “Critical Options,” I wrote:

The Sudanese have a limited number of options from which to choose among the discernable positions of the parties. One is to redefine the national identity so as to be genuinely uniting and to foster full equality of opportunity in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the country; another is to create a framework that would reconcile the idealistic aspirations for unity and the realities of diversity; and a third is to recognize that obstacles to national unity are perhaps insurmountable and that partition might permit both sides to move on with the more positive tasks of reconstruction and development on the basis of their own self perceptions and aspirations (pp.�05-�06).

I underscored the role the leadership is called upon to advance the cause of unity:

The best guarantee for unity is for the leadership, especially at the national level, to rise above factionalism and to offer the entire nation a vision that would inspire a cross-sectional majority of the Sudanese people, irrespective of race, ethnicity, region, or religion, to identify with the nation and stand together in collective pursuit of their common

destiny…only through mutual recognition, respect, and harmonious interaction among African and Arab populations throughout the country can the Sudan achieve and ensure a just and lasting peace and live up to its role as a true microcosm of Africa and a dynamic link between the Continent and the Middle East. Tragically, this has remained a mirage since independence.

F. If, as I have argued, both the North and the South will continue to face internal challenges in the event of Southern independence, and if, as I have also argued, the prospects for reunification under the right conditions cannot be ruled out, and, further, if aspirations for unity are widely shared, as appears to be the case, then an expedited search for genuinely comprehensive peace and unity becomes urgently compelling. Consequently, the referendum and the possible independent vote should not be viewed as the end of the road, the search for harmonious and productive relations among Sudan’s many component parts is surely an ongoing process that will continue to challenge Sudanese on all sides as the nation searches for an inclusive identity and common sense of purpose rooted in their shared destiny.

G. It is to be hoped that this seminar will not be a purely intellectual exercise and that it can produce some tangible proposals for action which the national leaders on all sides will consider seriously and act upon promptly in the interest of the people and the country, united or divided.

Keynote Speech

Traditional dancing in Roseres, outside Ed Damazin, Blue Nile State.

United Nations Mission In Sudan Future Trends Foundation

Organized by the United Nations Mission in Sudan - Public Information Office in collaboration with Future Trends Foundation

Prodduction: UNMIS Public Information Office - Photography: Tim McKulka - Design: Sezar Aminwww.unmis.unmissions.org

symposium2010-print

Documents

closing session

unity attractive10 session

session v

determination12 session

special thanks

sudanhe symposium

thereferendum14 session

mohamed ibrahim