synthetic biology and illegal weapon development promises, promises brett edwards
TRANSCRIPT
Synthetic Biology and Illegal Weapon Development
Promises, PromisesBrett Edwards
Overview
- Synthetic Biology and misuse concern- Promises about Synthetic Biology and
governance - Underperformance and narrowing of focus- The next steps: Re-invigoration or distraction?
Synthetic Biology (1)
• Defined initially by funding councils and research communities
• Promissory• Interdisciplinary• Controllable Biology• Application of engineering Principles?
Synthetic Biology (2)
• Six subfields (Lam et al 2009)– DNA circuits
• standard biological parts
– Synthetic metabolic pathways• biological synthesis of chemicals
– Proto-cell creation• model of a cell
– Unnatural components• New proteins, with functions
– Synthetic microbial consortia• Cells, working together
Range of misuse concernsScenario ExampleTerrorist misuse Terrorist group use technologies and scientific
knowledge to synthesis select-agent. Bad scientific practice A Scientist, through bad biosafety practice, allows
dangerous pathogen to escape ‘home-made’ lab. Criminal misuse of technology
The use of new techniques for the development of illegal drugs such as LSD.
Prank/ Publicity stunt
Student group release modified organism which cause harm or public panic.
State level misuse Scientists directly/indirectly contribute to covert weapons programme.
Inside Job Rogue scientist in biodefense programme orchestrates attack.
Why So much Synthetic Biology Chatter?
Synthetic Biologists National Security ELSI Community Gene Synthesis Industry Non-proliferation Bio-hackers
Early Anxieties 2003-2006Concerns about Gene- Synthesis technology
2003US/ UK government and emerging US SB
community
Concerns integrated in to EU then UK funding Criteria for Synthetic
Biology research networks
Concerns integrated into US NSF funding Criteria for
SynBERC - Concerns broadened to include:
State, terrorist and amateur misuse
Concerns prominent in ethics reports
SB community and industry identified as central in forward
looking responses
National focus of response
• Dual-use research– i.e identification of experiments of concern
• Dual-use Technology– I.e Industry screening of DNA sequences
• Dual-use techno-science– i.e changing innovation practices and relationship
of fields with existing governance systems
Key Promises
• Action of a responsible scientific community in developing responses
• Eventual response by state– Significant driver of self-governance response, also
added legitimacy• Anticipatory responses to ensure safe
development.
Policy developments and narrowing (2006-2012)
• Risk assessment and policy response activities in the US and UK- Narrowed to focus on terrorism and Laboratory
biosafety and biosecurity- Slow moving Federal Response US on both
research and tech concerns- Stalled response from UK government
Main out come
• Over-reach– US and UK institutions better at articulating
concerns than responding to them• NSABB/ Community/ Ethics bodies
• Externalisation of long term trend and militarization concerns
• Government adopts scientists/ industry responsibility and biosafety framing.
Examples
Forward looking concerns narrowed- Sloan report:
- Problem definition ‘feed back’- Industry outpaces government
- Absence of support for screening- uncertainty over future of screening
Consequential myths
• Belief that issue has ‘already been dealt with’ within some aspects of the community
• Belief that there has been a separate government strand of policy development
• Belief that Industry and Scientific community can identify fully respond to early ethical concerns (2003-2006)
Possible Contradictions
• Low substantive knowledge within much of the scientific community
• Absence of international agreement on gene-synthesis industry
• Continued case by case focus• Embryonic dual-use/ethics review in military investors• Absence of risk assessment criteria. • Struggles to implement ‘up-stream’ engagement
– Synbio communities– Regulators
Outcome
• We are waiting for the next ‘big thing’.– Threat/ incident/ tech-advance
Positives
• Synthetic Biology has become a ‘test- case’ often referred to at international level
• Evidence of awareness raising outreach• Expressed positions by key institutions to
some aspects of the field
