USASMA Class 38 C200 Strategic Concepts Briefing (Culture and Military Operations)

SYRIA

Strategic ConceptsSyria

Problem Statement• Syria’s stability and role in regional security have become steadily

more uncertain since early 2011 due to continued civil protests. • The country’s opposition forces mainly

occupy rural areas and smaller cities and continue with increased armed resistance but a lack of unified effort. • President Bashar al-Assad’s continued use of his Alawite-led

security forces to restore order and quash unrest has had little or no impact on descent.

• The US and EU have initiated unilateral sanctions, asked the UN to deepen international pressure and have openly called for President Bashar al-Assad to step aside.

Country Overview - Syria• Type of Regime: Authoritarian• Head of State: Bashar al-Assad• Parliament: Elected Parliament• GDP (US$): $55.1 Billion• GDP per capita (US$): $2,688• Population: 20.5 Million• Inflation: 6.9%• Regular Army Total: 289,000• SSMs: 50 (CBRN capable)• Tanks: 4,600 (w/ 1200 in static positions or in

storage), nearly 1,500 72M w/ many upgraded. More than 5k other AFVs and 3.6k in Arty.

• Combat Aircraft: 350, 30+ Mig 29s• SAMs: 100+ (H), 65+ (M), 85+ (L)• Missile equipped vessels: 22• Recent Acquisitions: Russia has sold nearly

$4 billion recently. The list includes T72 and Mig 29 upgrades, new Mig 29M2,  Bastion and Yakhont ASCMs, Kornet and Metis anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft “Pancyr C” complexes including upgrades to existing ADA.

• Formal Name: Syrian Arab Republic (Al Jumhuriyah al Arabia as Suriyah).

• Short Form: Syria. • Term for Citizen(s): Syrian(s). • Capital: Damascus (population

estimated at 5 million in 2004). • Other Major Cities: Aleppo

(4.5 million), Homs (1.8 million), Hamah (1.6 million), Al Hasakah (1.3 million), Idlib (1.2 million), and Latakia (1 million).

• Independence: Syrians celebrate their independence on April 17, known as Evacuation Day, in commemoration of the departure of French forces in 1946.

Historical Background - Syria• Present-day Syria is a small portion of the ancient

geographical Syrian landmass today referred to as the Levant. It is a region situated at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea from which Western powers created the contemporary states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel after the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI.

• The Levant or Greater Syria is a region connecting three continents (Asia, Europe and Africa). It has served both as a crossroads for commerce and a battleground throughout history.

• Syria has benefited from the cultural diversity of the people who have claimed parts or all of the Levant contributing to the religious and intellectual development of Syrian culture.

• Throughout history, Syria has been the focal between the Middle East and the West. Today, Syria remains a key player in the socio/ political developments of the volatile region.

Geography - Syria• Location: Syria is located in southwestern Asia, at the eastern

end of the Mediterranean Sea, with Turkey to the north, Iraq to the east, Jordan to the south, and Israel and Lebanon to the west.

• Size: Syria is about the size of North Dakota, with a total land area of 185,180 square kilometers (184,050 square kilometers of land and 1,130 square kilometers of water), including 1,295 square kilometers of Israeli-occupied territory.

• Land Boundaries: Syria’s land boundaries total 2,253 kilometers with the bordering nations of Iraq (605 kilometers), Israel (76 kilometers), Jordan (375 kilometers), Lebanon (375 kilometers), and Turkey (822 kilometers).

• Disputed Territory: Territory disputed by Syria includes 1,295 square kilometers of the Golan Heights occupied by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. A portion of the Golan Heights also is claimed by Lebanon. In addition, the Syrian government has never recognized the legality of Turkey’s possession of Hatay Province, which was the Syrian province of Iskenderun until France ceded it to Turkey in 1939. Diversion of water from the Euphrates River for dams is a continuing source of conflict between Syria and both Turkey and Iraq.

• Time Zone: Greenwich Mean Time (H+2).

• Climate: A semiarid zone extends across about three-quarters of the country between the humid Mediterranean coast in the west and the arid desert regions to the south and east. This area experiences significant rainfall mostly between November and May. Annual mean temperatures range from 7.2° C in January to 26.6° C in August.

• Natural Resources: Syria has deposits of petroleum; natural gas; phosphates; chrome, iron, and manganese ores; asphalt; rock salt; marble; and gypsum. It also has hydropower resources, although operation of Syria’s Euphrates Dam has been hampered by Turkey’s diversion of water from the upper Euphrates for several dams of its own. Syria’s use of the Euphrates in turn impedes water flow into Iraq.

Society - Syria• Population: Syria’s population is estimated

at 20.5 million. Syria is one of the most densely populated countries in the Middle East, but there are significant regional variations. The population is concentrated along the coast in the west, in the south around Damascus, and in the Euphrates River Valley in the northeast. More than 400,000 Palestinian refugees are believed to reside in Syria. In addition, Syria has some 170,000 internally displaced people, mostly from the Golan Heights. An estimated 40,000 people remain in the Golan Heights, including about 20,000 Arabs and 20,000 Israeli settlers.

• Ethnic Group(s): Approximately 90 percent of Syrians are Arabs, and about 9 percent are Kurds. Armenians, Circassians, and Turkomans make up the remaining 1 percent of the population.

• Languages: Arabic is the official language of about 90 percent of the population. Minority languages include Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, and Circassian. Both English and French are widely understood, especially by educated elites in major urban areas.

• Religion: The majority of Syrians are Sunni Muslims, comprising 74 percent of the population. Minority religious groups include Alawis, a heterodox Shia Muslim sect (12 percent); Christians (10 percent); Druze, a religious group located in southern Syria whose beliefs contain elements of Shia Islam, Christianity, and paganism (3 percent); and small numbers of other Muslim sects, Jews (who have tiny communities in Damascus, Al Qamishli, and Aleppo), and Yazidis (a small religious group whose religion contains elements of Islam, Judaism, and Christianity).

Military Posture - Syria• Foreign Military Relations: Syria’s primary military alliance was with the Soviet bloc prior to

1990, though arms transfers, training, and other military assistance from Russia and other former Soviet states have continued. Syria also is believed to have engaged in military cooperation with Iran, China, and North Korea. Currently there are approximately 150 Russian military personnel present in Syria serving primarily as ADA advisors. Russian has also established a naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus.

• Major Military Units: 1) Syria’s ground forces: Are organized into three corps with a total of 12 divisions (seven

armored, three mechanized, one Republican Guard, and one Special Forces) as well as 4 SIBs, 1 Border Guard BGD, 2 SABs, 2 AT BGDs, 10 SF Regs, 3 (SSM) BGDs, and 2 coastal defense ASCM BGDs.

2) Syrian Navy: Three bases, at Latakia, Minet el Baida, and Tartus. 3) Syrian Air Force: Nine fighter/ground-attack squadrons and 16 fighter squadrons. The Air

Defense Command is organized in two air defense divisions with 25 air defense brigades and 2 surface-to-air missile regiments.

• Security Forces: The internal security organization is large and dispersed throughout the country. The

departments include: 1) Political Security Directorate (PSD) 2) Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) 3) General Intelligence Directorate (GID) 4) Air Force Security (AFS)• External Threat: Syria regards Israel as its principal

enemy and to recover the Golan Heights, seized by Israel in 1967.• Internal Threat: The repression of internal dissent has resulted with thousands of Syrian civilian deaths since early 2011 in response to the recent civil and armed uprisings. Sectarian rivalry within Syria’s

many religious and ethnic communities have the potential instability, in particular resentment of the well-connected Alawite minority who hold key positions in the military and government and the Sunni majority. The regime has also systematically represses the Kurdish minority, fearing any push for Kurdish autonomy.

Regional Stake Holders• Turkey: Turkey’s key concern is the Kurdish issue which could

escalate both in Turkey and along the frontier with Syria should Damascus destabilize further.

• Israel: Syria could agitate anti-Israeli Palestinian groups and other groups in an effort to destabilize Lebanon, Israel’s northern flank, and potentially along the Golan Heights. The majority of Syrian defenses are oriented towards Israel with the entire country within range of Syrian SSMs.

• Iraq: Further escalation in Syria could result in spillover effects into Iraq and most likely could not be easily be contained due to the recent withdrawal of US troops. Sunni-Shi’a sectarian violence could be rekindled there as well.

• Lebanon: Sunni-Shi’a tensions could escalate leading to potentially deeper violence with the nations Christian minority and across its boarders into Israel. Hezbollah is based there and by default Lebanon would bear the collateral damage of any attack against Hezbollah.

• Jordan: Faces pressure from its own internal Islamist political forces and further instability in Syria could instigate internal unrest in Jordan.

Other Key Stake Holders• United States: Instability in Syria presents the US with the opportunity to

undermine Iran’s regional posture, weaken or change the leadership of one of its key regional allies and potentially downgrade Iran’s role in the Arab-Israeli conflict through Hezbollah.

• Western Powers (EU/ NATO): The EU and NATO allies are entertaining the prospect of creating a “humanitarian corridor” in Syria, potentially along the border with Turkey, to provide relief to both the Syrian population and dissident groups opposed to the Assad regime. This implies the potential for joint and combined military operations much like those conducted in Libya.

• Sunni Arab States: Syrian opposition forces opposed to the regime are backed by Arab League state such as Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia in particular has a vested interest in countering Iranian influence in the region.

• Iran: The possibility of further escalation in Syria may trigger reactions from both Iran and its proxy Hezbollah. This includes deflecting attention from Syria and heightening the costs of US/ NATO intervention by escalating tensions with Israel.

• Russia and China: The Assad regime enjoys not only the support of its key regional ally Iran, it also has strong international backing from Russia and China. Russia has a growing influence in the region and is a long friend of Syria. Russia could heighten tensions further with an increased military presence in the Mediterranean and continued military aid to Syria in an effort to deter the US/ EU/ NATO from further escalation regarding Syria. China could also be expected to team with Russia at the UN Security Council regarding Syria.

Non-State Players and Regional Sectarian impacts

• Hezbollah: Syria is the key lifeline of support for Hezbollah from Iran. The loss of this support would be detrimental to the group’s local and regional posture. Hezbollah could be call upon by either Syria or Iran to initiate asymmetric actions in the region. Syria could also transfer sensitive military hardware, such as advanced SSMs, major SAMs or ASCMs to the Shi’a group.

• Alawite/ Sunni demographic and political power disparity: Though not a new issue, the Assad regime could attempt to escalate Sunni-Alawite tension further making it difficult to bring under control. Further escalation in Syria’s instability increases the risk of sectarian violence, also potentially leading to greater regional sectarian instability.

• Kurds: The Assad regime has had a strained relationship with the country’s Kurds for decades, suppressing their independence efforts domestically and while encouraging them abroad. If Syria tries to instigate Kurdish separatist (i.e. PKK) in Turkey, or loses control over its own Kurdish population, it could trigger a Turkish military response.

Issues Requiring US Diplomatic or Military Action

• The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq has created strategic competition with Iran over influence in the region lending itself to decisive US action regarding Syria.

• Instability in Syria presents the US with the opportunity to undermine Iran’s regional posture and weaken or change the leadership of one of its key regional allies (Syria).

• A humanitarian crisis now exists with thousands of Syrians dead and thousands more forces into exiles and refugee status.

• Further escalation of internal instability in Syria could result in hostilities spilling over into neighboring countries further destabilizing the region and/ or inflaming already heightened Arab-Israeli or Iranian-US tensions and re-inflaming sectarian violence in Iraq.

US Interests, Objects and Activities• US National Interests and Objectives: 1) The security of the United States, its citizens, U.S. allies and partners 2) A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international

economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity 3) Respect for universal values at home and around the world 4) An international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace,

security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges.• US Regional interests and Objectives: The security of our allies both NATO and

non-NATO and to counter the growing influence of Iran by maintaining a strong diplomatic, economic and military presence

• US Domestic Considerations: After 9 years of prolonged conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan the US public is not keen on engaging in another military operation in the Middle East.

• Recent US Activities in the Region: 1) Diplomatic – US Secretary of State has met with the Syrian Opposition in Bonn,

Switzerland. Has called for Bashar Assad to step down 2) Economic – US has pressed the international community for increased

sanctions against the Assad Regime. 3) Military – USS George H. W. Bush Carrier group deployed

off the coast of Syria as a show of US presence. 4) Informational – Unknown

Analysis of Syria• General: The Assad family has ruled Syria since 1970. President Bashar al Assad has had

total control over domestic politics and has directed foreign policy in multiple arenas in the Middle East despite Syria’s small size and lack of resources. Now, with the country in turmoil, many observers are interested in how prolonged Syrian instability might affect U.S. foreign policy priorities in the region. As of November 8, 2011, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that that over 3,500 civilians have been killed. In addition, Syrian human rights groups report that over 12,000 Syrian protestors have been arrested. Unrest in Syria shows no sign of lifting and the country’s future remains unclear. The Alawite-dominated regime, in one form or another could remain in power even if Assad is removed. Recent violent clashes between Alawites and Sunnis reflect a trend toward heightened sectarian tension.

• Interests and Objectives: It seems apparent that the primary interest and objective of the Assad Regime in Syria currently is to maintain power and counter the international calls for regime change in Syria also working to ensure the continued support of Iran, Russia and China.

• Most Likely Syrian COA: Continue to crack down on the opposition, working to keep them disorganized and lacking unified effort until all active resistance has been put down. Meanwhile Syria would work to continue open and friendly relations with Iran, Russia and China using their international and regional influence to keep US, NATO, and EU efforts towards Syria at bay.

• Most Dangerous Syrian COA: The Assad regime may react by pursing strategies that risk deeper regional destabilization as a means of deterring its regional and international opponents. It could also undertake desperate efforts to secure the future of the Alawite community. Syria’s potential responses – which include turning to regional proxies and its CBRN-capable ballistic missile holdings – range in scale but all have potentially catastrophic consequences for Syria and the region. They also vary considerably based on what triggers Syrian escalation.

US COA 1• COA 1 places diplomacy, informational efforts, and economic sanctions as the main effort

with military power projection as the supporting effort. • It could be argued that even without further escalation, a year of Syrian instability has been a

critical setback not only to the Assad regime, but also to Iran and Hezbollah. Syria’s future will be determined in large part by uncertainty and prolonged internal conflict.

• After nearly a year of popular unrest, Syria’s internal stability and its role in regional security politics have both become far more uncertain. As the regime continues its crackdown on dissent, international pressure on Syria has also steadily increased. The US and EU have bolstered unilateral sanctions regimes, turned to the UN to deepen international pressure and have openly called for President Bashar al-Assad to step aside. Turkey, until recently one of the regime’s closest allies, has been one of Syria’s most vocal critics. Lastly, the conservative Gulf monarchies, which continue to have reservations about regional popular unrest, have nonetheless pushed ahead with Arab League efforts to further isolate Syria.

• Continued international pressure and US diplomatic efforts with the Syrian opposition as well as the neighboring countries appears to be the best COA thus far and should be continued.

• This COA w/ the inclusion of the USS George H.W. Bush Carrier Group in the Mediterranean as a symbol of US National Power has proven to be adequate, feasible, and acceptable (i.e. US and international public opinion). It is distinguishable from similar operations in Libya as the main effort is diplomatic and does not involve direct military action. Finally it does present a complete option as it includes all the elements of National Power.

• In short, COA 1 provides for adequate pressure on the Assad Regime and support for the Syrian Opposition Forces through diplomatic efforts that baring further escalation resolution to the conflict in Syria could be determined by her people with a collapse of the Assad Regime.

US COA 2• COA 2 focuses direct military intervention in support of

Syrian Opposition forces, to establish a “No Fly Zone” as well as to establish and further secure a humanitarian corridor along Syria’s boarder with Turkey. With military intervention as the main effort, diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts would be the supporting efforts in the form of diplomatic efforts to establish a coalition force and direct talks with the Assad Regime combined with “Free Syria” radio broadcasts and social media efforts, continued sanctions impacting the capabilities of the regime.

• Syrian forces opposed to the regime backed by the West, and key Arab and Sunni states such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey have expressed interest in the prospect of creating a “humanitarian corridor” in Syria to provide relief to both the Syrian population and dissident groups opposed to the Assad regime. A US lead coalition would be key to this as the Syrian opposition lacks unity of command and the combined military resources.

• Direct military action would require specific targeting of key Syrian military assets so as to suppress Syria’s air defense network, neutralize the country’s air force, and eliminating Syria’s asymmetric deterrence by containing unconventional threats from long range missiles and instability along the Golan Heights.

• The US played a key role in the NATO-led military effort in Libya and the same could apply to Syria. Only the US has the mix of capabilities and capacity to support and sustain such a military effort.

• CAO 2 is clearly distinguishable from COA 1. Given the US military capability and that of our allies that would undoubtedly comprise a coalition against Syria this plan would also be feasible and could adequately accomplish the desired task. Direct military action against Syria though could result in unintended consequences and further regional escalation and public opinion would be harder to garner. The Acceptability of this plan would be in question.

Evaluate and Compare COAs COA 2• Syrian military forces have qualitative limitations but

remain on high alert in anticipation due to recent heightened tensions between Israel and Iran. Albeit dated, Syrian ADA defenses are vast and covers the country in depth. Significant improvements in coastal and air defense have been incorporated with modern Russian SAMs and ASCMs.

• Despite defections and desertions, Syria’s military units may have little choice but to rally around the Assad regime. Given their limited prospects in a post-Assad Syria, Alawite elite units with sizeable numbers of loyal Sunnis could be forced into determined resistance in the event of outside military intervention.

• The Assad regime may react by pursing strategies that risk deeper regional destabilization as a means of deterring its regional and international opponents. Syria’s potential responses – which include turning to regional proxies and its CBRN-capable SSMs – range in scale but all have potentially catastrophic consequences for Syria and the region. They could also vary considerably based on what triggers Syrian escalation.

• Syria’s military installations are primarily centered in the countries larger population centers. Any efforts to neutralize these sites will result in significant civilian collateral damage.

COA 1• Military intervention in Libya was successful in that it

helped hasten the overthrow of Moammar Ghadhafi. Libya and Syria though are significantly different countries in almost every respect. Libya had a small population in a large country consolidated in a few key cities, limited ethnic disparity and a relatively week military.

• Diplomatic pressure was the key to the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power in Egypt primarily due to a unified effort and consolidated opposition. The people were the driving force for change with the outside support and concerted pressure from the US and Western Powers.

• The situation in Syria does not present such a clear picture as with Libya and Egypt. Unlike Libya, Syria has a large population in a smaller country more densely arrayed, significant ethnic disparity and a relatively large and potentially formidably military. The Syrian Opposition forces are not unified and have little shared focus other than the ouster of Bashar al-Assad. This is also in contrast to Egypt and their apparent “grass roots” effort, albeit unified by the Muslim Brotherhood.

• COA 1 provides a balanced approach between diplomacy and military action with a active emphasis on diplomacy and a passive emphasis on military action; “talk softly but carry a big stick.”

Recommendation * COA 1 *

• COA 1 leads with diplomacy and COA 2 leads with military intervention. Both COAs share several screening criteria:

1) Feasible – both are feasible from the perspective that the US retains the capability and resources to execute either plan.

2) Adequate – there is significant evidence that either COA would accomplish the end result of removing Bashar al-Assad from power.

3) Distinguishable – either plan is distinguishable from the other but do share some common aspects of other recent foreign policy efforts in Libya and Egypt.

4) Complete – both COAs are complete in that they both incorporate all elements of National Power; diplomacy, information, economic, and military

• The key screening criteria not shared though is acceptable.• COA 2 leads with military intervention and presents significant risks of collateral

Syrian civil damage and deaths, heightened risks of spill-over effects into neighboring countries, heightened risks of direct or indirect confrontation with Russia, and public opinion would fair low both internationally and domestically.

• COA 1 is the recommended COA for this operation as it contains all aspects of the screening criteria and given the socio-political dynamics of Syria and all the key players, Syria’s demographic and ethnic disparities, and a significantly reduced risk of further escalation or spill over, it is likely that strong diplomatic efforts on all fronts backed by a strong military presence will bring about the intended US goals most effectively and efficiently.

References• Middle East Military Balance Studies – Syria,

Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Updated 19/ 10/ 2011

• Country Profile: Syria, Library of Congress – Federal Research Division, April 2005

• Instability in Syria - Accessing the Risks of Military Intervention, Aram Nerguizian, Working Draft 13/ 12/ 2011, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)

• Unrest in Syria and US Sanctions Against the Assad Regime, Jeremy M. Sharp & Christopher M. Blanchard, 9/ 11/ 2011, Congressional Research Service