Syria: Laying the Foundations for a Credible andSustainable TransitionYakinthou, Christalla; Wolff, Stefan; Lucas, Scott

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Syria: Laying the Foundations for a Credible andSustainable Transition

Scott Lucas, Christalla Yakinthou & Stefan Wolff

To cite this article: Scott Lucas, Christalla Yakinthou & Stefan Wolff (2016) Syria: Laying theFoundations for a Credible and Sustainable Transition, The RUSI Journal, 161:3, 22-32, DOI:10.1080/03071847.2016.1193353

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ThE RusI JOuRnal

RUSI JOURNAL JUNE/JULY 2016 VOL. 161 NO. 3 pp. 22–32 DOI: 10.1080/03071847.2016.1193353

On 14 March 2016, RussianPresident Vladimir Putinsuddenly declared that hiscountry was withdrawing ‘most’ of itsforces from Syria, following thousands ofair strikes in support of the Syrian regimeand its Iranian, Hizbullah, Iraqi, Pakistaniand Afghan allies. The announcementbrought yet another phase in Syria’s five-year conflict to an end; however, as withthe previous phases, it has not heraldedany advance towards a resolution of thecrisis.

Instead, the Russian interventioncontributed to a consolidation of spacein which leading Syria-based actors – theregime of President Bashar Al-Assad, theopposition rebel bloc: and the Kurdishmovement (dominated at this point bythe Syrian Kurdish Democratic UnionParty, PYD, and its militia, known asthe People’s Protection Units, YPG) –exercised and entrenched their authoritylocally. This occurred alongside effortswhich were nominally concentratedon diminishing the power of the othertwo actors, Daesh (also known as theIslamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) and

the Al-Qa’ida-affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra.This consolidation has been helped alongby the support that the opposition rebelbloc receives (primarily from Saudi Arabiaand other Gulf States), a partial ceasefirethat has been in place since 27 February2016 and several rounds of negotiationsin Geneva.

At the time of writing, the ceasefirebetween rebels, the Syrian military andthe Assad regime’s external allied forces(Russia, Hizbullah, Iran, and Iraqi andAfghan militias) is breaking down innorthwest Syria, notably near Aleppoand in the coastal Latakia province. Atthe same time, Kurdish YPG fighters areattempting to take territory from therebels, while fighting has also continuedbetween Daesh and rebels in northernSyria near the Turkish border. None ofthese contests are likely to concludewith a decisive military victory for anyside. The situation in Syria is thus onecharacterised by a political and militarystalemate and de facto partition. As theprospects of moving beyond this statusquo in the near future are limited, afurther consolidation of the various

front lines between regime, Kurdish andopposition forces is more likely to offer astabilisation of the situation across muchof Syria.

This analysis does not, in linewith most of the literature on civil warsettlement,1 advocate the partition ofSyria as a long-term solution to thecountry’s ongoing conflict. However,equally one cannot rule out that suchpartition – de facto or de jure – willbe the eventual outcome of a civil warnow in its sixth year. Therefore, thequestion this article addresses is notwhat a comprehensive and sustainablesettlement of the conflict may look like inthe future, but rather how to connect thelegitimacy recently conferred on variousSyrian actors by the Geneva negotiationsand other international discussions toexisting and future local arrangementsestablishing stability and security on theground. These, in turn, are necessaryconditions for a credible and sustainabletransition from the current civil war.Arrangements put in place now forgovernance, reconstruction, provisionof services, justice and civic engagement

sYRIa: laYIng ThE FOunDaTIOnsFOR a cREDIBlE anD susTaInaBlETRansITIOnscOTT lucas, chRIsTalla YakInThOu anD sTEFan WOlFF

Despite its extreme fragility, the ceasefire in place in Syria since February 2016 hasafforded the opportunity to assess the options for a set of interim governance andtransitional justice arrangements. These could establish the foundations for a transitionfollowing the conclusion of the Syrian civil war, regardless of its endpoint. Drawing onthe specifics of the Syrian case and wider studies of interventions in, and transitionsfrom, civil war, Scott Lucas, Christalla Yakinthou and Stefan Wolff consider the challengesof peace- and state-building, identifying both risks and mitigating actions. The articleargues that risk mitigation is possible and should begin now. These efforts need to besupported by the international community in order to lay the foundations for a credibleand sustainable post-civil war transition in Syria.

© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading asTaylor & Francis GroupThis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the CreativeCommons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproductionin any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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will lay the foundation for, and shape thedirection of, the political, legal, economicand social constructions that will benecessary if there is ever again to be ameaningful ‘Syria’ in the sense of a singlestate, or even if several entities emergein the aftermath of the civil war. Thesearrangements must be made now, ratherthan waiting for a terminal momentin the conflict. They must be based onrecognition of the necessity of a ‘bottom-up’ approach, establishing connectionswith local groups rather than imposinga preconceived international model ofthe proper, ‘moderate’ procedures andactors.2

It is against this background thatthis article assesses the options of aninterim system which – following thedeclaration of a cessation of hostilities– could establish the foundations fora subsequent transition, regardless ofits endpoint. Thus, this analysis beginsfrom the ground up, rather than froma top-down projection of ‘Syria’ fromthe outside. Drawing on the specifics ofthe Syrian case and the wider studies ofinterventions in, and transitions from, civil

war,3 the article considers the challengesof peace- and state-building, and oftransitional justice, identifying both risksand mitigating actions.4 The key pointhere is that risk mitigation needs to beginnow – and it needs to start with a soberanalysis of the realities on the ground,rather than with the types of wishful,evasive and hyperbolic thinking thathas characterised so much of Westernintervention for more than a decade.

This article sits alongside effortssuch as those of James Dobbins, PhilipGordon and Jeffrey Martini.5 It echoesUS President Barack Obama’s call forsuggestions which respond to thequestion: ‘[S]pecifically, precisely, whatexactly would you do, and how wouldyou fund it, and how would you sustainit?’6 The aforementioned analystsfocus on the creation of safe zones, thepartition of territory with internationalguarantors of the respective regime,opposition and Kurdish areas, prisonerreleases, humanitarian deliveries anda co-operative destruction of Daesh. Incontrast, this examination focuses onthe governance and transitional justice

arrangements needed for a credible andsustainable post-civil war transition inSyria that can and should be supportedby the international community now.

The next section offers a conceptualframework for the argument, drawing onexisting literature on conflict settlementand post-civil war transitions. It makesuse of a wide range of open-source dataand it then offers a brief chronologicalnarrative of the developing crisis in Syria.This forms the empirical basis for thesubsequent analysis of the requirementsfor a credible and sustainable post-civil war transition in Syria and howsteps taken now by the internationalcommunity can contribute to layingthese foundations. The article concludeswith some brief policy recommendationsembedded in an assessment of thebenefits and shortcomings of theproposal.

Preparing the Ground for Post-Civil War TransitionsThere is broad agreement in theliterature on civil war settlements thatthe success of war-to-peace transitions

Syrian Kurdish refugees at a refugee camp in Suruc, on the Turkey–Syria border, October 2014. Courtesy of AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis.

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is dependent on a number of factors,many of which are beyond the controlof external actors whose engagement isnevertheless often critical to success.7Among those factors that are, at leastpartially, under the control of domesticand external actors is the design ofpost-civil war institutions: that is, thenegotiated (or at times imposed) rulesof the political game after the civil warconcerning the forms of representationand participation (or exclusion) ofdifferent actors, and the distribution ofpower and resources among them.8 Fromthis perspective, transitions from civil warare often exercises in both peace-buildingand state-building,9 which require athorough analysis of the underlyingconflict (including the causes of its onsetand persistence).10

Most of the literature on conflictsettlement and post-civil war transitionsis focused on building democratic states.This is primarily based on the assumptionthat democracy in itself is a form ofconflict settlement and helps to preventconflict recurrence,11 despite significanttheoretical arguments and growingempirical evidence to the contrary.12Several recent studies emphasise theimportance of local conditions to thesuccess of democratic state-buildingafter civil war, as caution against over-confident external democracy-buildersthat lack strong and committed localpartners whom they can support.13Timothy D Sisk, in his account of thedilemmas of power-sharing in the Syriancivil war and more generally, has arguedpersuasively for ‘the need for scholars todevelop more contingent- and context-specific knowledge’ if academic researchis to make a meaningful contribution topolicy.14

Thus, there is first of all a need foran approach that starts with a thoroughassessment of the situation in Syria as itis, rather than what observers might wishit to be. The following section offers suchan assessment, albeit with the caveatthat the situation in Syria and the regionmore broadly remains highly fluid.

Second, while ‘models’ of post-civilwar transitions, both in terms of thetransition process and its substantiveoutcomes, are certainly limited in theirtransferability from one situation to

another, there are nonetheless someuseful parallels that can be drawn fromsimilar transitions in the past. Moreover,based on an analysis of conditionson the ground in Syria, such modelscan be adapted in order to establishsome contingent predictions on likelytrajectories of a post-civil war transitionin the country. Predominantly, this isabout lessons learned over time.

Third, the authors’ own pastresearch has generally confirmed thesignificance of domestic factors, and inparticular the role of local leadership, inthe success of war-to-peace transitions.These domestic factors can be shapedand success can ultimately be facilitatedthrough a combination of institutionaldesign and international diplomacythat enables local leaders to build onand leverage a shared commitment topeace.15

Taking the second and third pointstogether, the current situation of relativestalemate and de facto partition can beused productively to shape the domesticconditions that will eventually createthe foundations on which a post-civilwar transition in Syria will be built. Thisarticle focuses on two areas of particularimportance: future governance structuresand transitional justice mechanisms fordealing with the conflict’s legacy. Theseare not opportunistically chosen issues;instead, they reflect an establishedconsensus on the importance ofinstitutional design and the role thatexternal actors play in its negotiation,16as well as on the need to reckon with thelegacy of conflict-related violence in orderto (re-)establish trust in those institutions.This, in turn, shapes a number of policy-relevant conclusions – not in terms ofthe design of any particular outcome ofa post-civil war transition in Syria, but ofthe steps that can and should be takennow by the international community tomake a credible and sustainable transitionpossible.

Syria’s De Facto Partition: LocalDynamics and External AgendasFrom its very beginning in 2011, thedynamics of Syria’s civil war have beenshaped simultaneously by local factors,and the agendas of external regionalplayers (Turkey, Iraq, Iran and the Gulf

States) as well as other global actors(the US and Russia). Overall, politicalconditions were characterised by failedattempts to broker political solutionsexternally under UN mediation and ahighly fragmented and localised spectrumof armed opposition movements unableto form or sustain a common platform.Militarily, the overall trajectory has beenone of regime contraction, the initialexpansion of Daesh after summer 2014and increasing territorial control of awide range of anti-Assad forces, albeitaccompanied by significant in-fightingamong various groups in the oppositionspectrum.

Until the summer of 2014, externalmilitary intervention was relativelylimited and consisted of Western andGulf Cooperation Council support ofthe opposition in the form of trainingand equipment. Similar Russian andIranian support was given to the regime,complemented by a larger number ofmilitary advisers, as well as fightersprovided by Hizbullah, Iraqi and Afghanmilitias, and the Iranian RevolutionaryGuard which supported the Syrian army.

This changed in late 2014. TheUS-led coalition began operations againstDaesh following its expansion in Iraqand northern Syria, which included anoffensive which threatened the Kurdishcentre of Kobane on the Turkish border.Even more significant was the backing ofrebel factions by Gulf States. Reorganisedin blocs such as Jaish Al-Fatah and theSouthern Front, the groups advancedagainst the Syrian military in both thenorthwest and the south. As Assad’sposition became more and moreprecarious over the course of 2015, dueto rebel victories and simultaneous Daeshoffensives in the northeast and the centreof Syria, Russia decided to intervenewith a two-pronged strategy of militaryintervention and diplomatic initiatives.17

On the diplomatic front, Moscowled efforts for international discussionson a ‘political transition’, but without aspecific requirement for the departureof Assad. This initial diplomatic effortwas frustrated by Saudi Arabia, whichembarrassed Russia by bluntly declaringat a Moscow press conference inmid-2015 that Assad’s removal was aprerequisite for negotiations. However,

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Russia’s simultaneous build-up of militaryassets, particularly warplanes, at a basein western Syria and the beginning of airstrikes on 30 September fundamentallyaltered the political dynamics. The US,European states and even Turkey – aleading backer of the Syrian opposition– accepted that Assad could remainin power for at least six months whiletalks developed. Some US analysts andpoliticians went even further, saying thatWashington now had to co-operate withthe regime, even if it was responsible forthe deaths of hundreds of thousands ofSyrians.18

Meanwhile, the Russian militaryeffort began to have an impact on thebattlefield, consolidating and enhancingthese political and diplomatic gains.Advanced battlefield equipment,hundreds of ‘advisers’ including specialforces and spotters for aerial operations,and thousands of sorties – more than80 per cent of which extended intoopposition areas – supported groundoffensives on six fronts by the Syrianmilitary, Iranian commanders andtroops, Hizbullah units and otherforeign militias, particularly from Iraqand Afghanistan. The offensives initiallystruggled; however, by the end of 2015,they had stabilised Assad’s defence linesfrom western Syria to Damascus. Theattacks also began to erode rebel controlin parts of northern and southern Syria,retaking almost all of Latakia provinceand achieving further, if limited, gainsnear Aleppo and south of Damascus.19

The Russian intervention thussucceeded in its immediate aim of savingthe Assad regime from military collapse.Yet, by consolidating Assad’s position onthe ground – and thus, in effect, creatinga military stalemate – and by contributingto the resumption of the political processin Geneva, Russia’s intervention has led tothe entrenchment of a de facto territorialpartition of Syria. This in turn has created,and partly legitimised, the forces incontrol of those areas and has openedup political space for other groups,including the regime’s opponents.20 Asthese still-fragmented groups seek tofind ways to govern the territories theyoccupy and to engage in broader politicaldiscussions with the regime through theUN-mediated Geneva process,21 external

actors have an opportunity to contributeto laying the foundations of an eventualpost-civil war transition by strengtheningand supporting some of the localinitiatives that have emerged.

Given the domestic andinternational consensus that there will beno place for Daesh and Jabhat Al-Nusra inpost-civil war Syria, the focus of Westernactors and their regional allies needs tobe on their non-regime partners in Syria:the Kurdish movement and the broaderopposition rebel bloc. Therefore, theremainder of this section focuses ontracing the events and processes throughwhich, over the past eighteen months,both of these actors have come to occupytheir current position.

Syria’s Kurdish movement,specifically the PYD and the YPG, hasboth benefited from, and caused,regional schisms. The Kurdish movementbegan to receive US assistance, includingaerial intervention, in 2014, in order toprevent Daesh’s takeover of Kobane, thecentre of a Kurdish canton on the Turkishborder. However, Moscow’s entry into theconflict, as well as the failure of a high-profile $500 million ‘train-and-equip’programme for rebels, prompted the USto incorporate this support for Kurdishfactions into a new strategy. Rather thancontinuing the ill-fated train-and-equipprogramme and other forms of militarysupport for various rebel factions,Washington encouraged the formationof the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),led by the YPG with a token inclusion ofArab and Assyrian units, to fight Daesh –even though Turkey believes the Turkishinsurgent Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)is directing the PYD and its militia.22

As Washington supplied arms,ammunition, special forces and air cover,the SDF advanced against Daesh ineastern and northern Syria. In December,the forces captured the Tishreen Damand, despite a Turkish ‘red line’, crossedto the western bank of the EuphratesRiver. This caused considerable anxietywithin the Turkish government andarguably triggered the subsequentescalation of hostilities with the PKK inTurkey’s southeast. Discussions betweenWashington and Ankara maintained anuneasy balance between US support forthe SDF, including the formal deployment

of more special forces in April 2016, andTurkey’s promotion of a ‘safe zone’ innorthern Syria along the border.

That balance was further threatenedby the YPG’s launch of a new front, withattacks on rebels in northwest Syria, inJanuary. The Kurdish forces, supportedin some cases by Russian air strikes,seized towns and villages near theTurkish border as well as the MenaghAir Base. Although Turkey intervenedwith shelling in order to check the YPG’sassault on the important border town ofAzaz, the offensive raised the prospectof the Afrin canton in northwest Syriabeing linked with the Kobane and Cezirecantons in the northeast, thus creatinga contiguous area under Kurdish controlalong the Turkish border which would beconnected to the neighbouring Kurdistanregion of Iraq. The cessation of hostilitieson 27 February has limited this battle,but the conflict continues in sectionsof Aleppo city, along key supply routesand in Kurdish-occupied towns near theTurkish border.

Alongside a strengthened militaryposition, the PYD sought, withRussian backing, to enter the politicalnegotiations. The effort appeared tohave paid off with a possible invitationfrom UN envoy Staffan de Mistura to jointalks in Geneva at the end of January2016; however, it was blunted by Turkishobjections and threats to boycott theprocess, and de Mistura subsequentlydenied that any approach had beenmade. Russia’s inclusion of PYD co-leader,Salih Muslim, on an alternative, fifteen-name list to the opposition rebel blocalso had little effect – other Kurdishgroups objected to the PYD’s claim to berepresentative of Syrian Kurdistan.23

Viewed through Washington’sprism of a Daesh-first strategy, supportof the SDF has been a partial, short-term response to the accusation thatthe US and its allies cannot pursuean effective intervention in the Syrianconflict. However, the PYD and YPG arenot recognised as the unquestionedleaders of the Kurdish movement, as thedispute over representation at Genevashowed. Furthermore, the short-termaccommodation between Turkey and theUS is unlikely to continue, especially if thePYD expands its political control and the

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YPG continues offensives in northwestSyria.24

Most importantly, the strategydoes not address the central, continuingdimension of the civil war, which is thedeadly fight for authority between theAssad regime, the Syrian opposition andthe rebels. While the opposition rebelbloc has been plagued by a high degreeof fragmentation and localisation sincethe beginning of the war in 2011, it isstill the central actor on a national scalein the political and military contest forlegitimacy.

Until late 2015, the movementcontinued to struggle for coherenceand a unified political leadership, butthe Russian initiative for political talks inthe autumn of 2015, and its acceptanceby the US, forced the different factionsto reconsider their positions. This wasencouraged by Saudi Arabia, whosesupport had become even moreimportant as Washington began lookingto Kurdish groups as an increasingly vital,and more reliable, ally inside Syria. Bymid-December 2015, opposition politicalmovements and rebel forces agreedto a 33-member High NegotiationsCommittee, with former Prime MinisterRiyad Hijab as co-ordinator. Jaish Al-Islam,the main rebel faction near Damascus,joined the committee. Ahrar Al-Sham, thelargest rebel group, initially signed thedocument, although it stepped back amidinternal debates among its leadership andtook on the role of interested observer ofthe Geneva talks.25

This high-level realignment hasintersected with the developmentof local opposition rebel institutionsthat started earlier in 2015 amid thetakeover of territory in areas such asIdlib province. Local committees havetaken on the challenges of security,governance, systems of justice, repair ofinfrastructure and provision of services.Factions, including Ahrar Al-Sham, havebegun to distance themselves from theproblematic Jabhat Al-Nusra, even asthey co-operate with the jihadist groupin some battles.

The developing Kurdish andopposition rebel movements cannotcreate the conditions for a long-termsettlement. In part, this is becauseof the conflicting demands of the

two sides, but it is also because ofthe immovable obstacle of the Assadregime’s conditions for negotiating anagreement. Damascus has ruled outKurdish autonomy in a ‘federal’ Syria,even though the regime’s ally, Russia, putforth the idea in February 2016. PresidentAssad, in effect, pre-empted the Genevanegotiations in late March when he saidthat he would never accept a transitionalgoverning authority, the central elementof international proposals in the periodsince June 2012. His position wasreinforced at the subsequent talks bythe regime delegation’s refusal of anynegotiations over the president’s future.26

However, if the prospects ofinclusive negotiations and constructiveengagement in Geneva – let alone ofany significant breakthrough – remainslim, the territorial and partial politicalconsolidation among non-regimemovements offers possibilities for aneventual transition. Kurdish politicaland military success against Daeshhas buttressed de facto legitimacy asthe authority in much of northeasternSyria, although this position remainssomewhat tenuous, both in cities ofdivided control, such as Qamishli,and in relation to the rebels overattempts to join the Kurdish-dominatednorthwestern and northeastern cantons.The opposition rebel movement – havingwithstood bombing by both the regimeand Russia, increased intervention onthe ground by Iran, Hizbullah and otherforeign fighters, protracted sieges,and attacks by the YPG and Daesh– can consequently claim a politicalspace which is unlikely to disappear.This is most obviously the case in Idlibprovince, but will require externallyfacilitated local agreements in still-contested spaces in the divided city ofAleppo and the Damascus suburbs.

The key point here is about theexistence of relatively consolidated localspaces, occupied by political actors thatare potential partners for the West andits regional partners, now and in aneventual post-civil war transition. Suchpotential partners are needed regardlessof whether Syria’s current de factopartition is overcome in the context ofa national solution or becomes morepermanent in the longer term. The

emergence of these spaces and actorspresents an opportunity for engagementand for strengthening and supportinglocal initiatives that can critically shapethe nature and direction of a futuretransition. The different options availableto the West and its partners in thiscontext are the focus of the followingsections.

Post-Civil War GovernanceArrangements in Syria: What toExpect and How to PrepareBased on this article’s analysis so far, itis possible to make some reasonableassumptions about different optionsand about the process and substance ofa post-civil war transition in Syria. Oncethese are established, it is also possible toidentify the key risks such options entailand to consider actions to mitigate thoserisks, laying the foundations of a credibleand sustainable transition. To do this,this section first summarises the currentstate of affairs in Syria (as of May 2016)and then, based on more generalisedfindings from existing research on civilwar settlements, extrapolate a possibletrajectory for Syria. Special attention isgiven to the opportunities that the Westand its regional partners now have towork with those non-regime forces whichare politically, militarily and territoriallymore consolidated.

The starting point of the discussion,therefore, is that the contraction of theAssad regime seems to have been haltedand its imminent defeat is unlikely. Theregime has recovered and is now likelyto co-exist with a diverse and sometimesopportunistic alliance of rebel groups,with differing ethnic, religious andpolitical bases. Some are local entities,others are regional or national, backed byvarious external patrons whose agendason Syria (and beyond) are, individually,not always coherent and, collectively,virtually incompatible. Those groupsconverge in three areas: the rejection ofAssad and the senior political andmilitaryleadership of his regime; the rejection ofDaesh and Jabhat Al-Nusra as legitimateplayers in a future transition; and thepreservation of Syria’s territorial integrity,rather than a negotiated break-up ofthe country into two or more successorareas.

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In the current environment,characterised by a patchwork of slowlystabilising local battlefields acrossdifferent front lines (the regime and thoseloyal to it versus the rebel oppositionbloc; the regime and those loyal toit versus Daesh; the rebel oppositionbloc versus Daesh; and the intra-rebelopposition bloc), it is unlikely that anyof the factions will have such resoundingmilitary dominance on the battlefieldthat it will be able to impose its will onothers concerning future governancearrangements in Syria. Nor is it likelythat any would be able to sustain suchan imposition beyond the short term.As a consequence, one should expectsome form of a settlement negotiatedprimarily among the main rebel factionsand their key external backers. Such asettlement will need to take account offive dimensions; and the extent to whichthese will be reflected in a balancedway in the terms of the settlementwill determine its sustainability. Theyinclude: the ethnic, religious/sectarian,local and political divisions in Syria thathave been hardening over the course ofthe civil war since 2011; the ‘un-mixing’of formerly diverse local communities,and the consequent flows of internallydisplaced persons and refugees; theintense hatred and desire for revenge, aswell as the deep distrust, between andwithin communities in Syria, resultingfrom the suffering endured during morethan five years of civil war in which morethan 400,000 people have been killed,more than 11 million displaced and morethan 4.8 million have become refugeesin neighbouring countries; the economicand humanitarian devastation of thecountry; and the regional, cross-border,and transnational ethnic, religious andsectarian alliances in which the Syriancivil war is embedded.

Given both the complexity of theconstellation of actors in the Syrian civilwar and of the issues at stake, existingresearch on civil war settlements27suggests that the most likely settlementwill have three main characteristics. First,it will be rigid, with a predeterminedcomposition of key transitionalgovernance institutions and a territorialre-organisation of the state reflectingboth the balance of power and the extent

of spatial control by different factionsin the winning alliance at the time of aceasefire or settlement. Second, it willbe hybrid, reflecting pre-existing local,political, territorial and demographicrealities on the ground. Third, it willbe ambiguous, leaving significantroom for competing and conflictinginterpretations of settlement provisionsand implementation procedures.

In other words, a viable negotiatedagreement is likely to combine weakpower-sharing arrangements at thecentre with a multipolar and hybridterritorial system of self-governancethat will usher in a tense and contestedtransition period, with the aim ofachieving a more permanent set ofarrangements.28

In light of recent experiences ofpost-civil war transitions, it is possibleto envisage four ‘models’ or pathways.The first is the (pre-2015) Yemenmodel: a parallel (pre-)transitionperiod characterised by a transitionalgovernment of national unity alongsidea national dialogue, followed by aconstitutional drafting process, alloverseen and facilitated by the UN.29The second is the Bosnia model: aUN-sponsored peacekeeping operationoverseeing the implementation ofa constitution agreed as part of acomprehensive peace agreement.30 Thethird is the Iraq model: the drafting andimplementation of a constitution undermilitary occupation.31 The fourth is theLibya model: a rapidly disintegrating,domestically led process of post-conflictstate-building.32

Of these four models, the Libyamodel is clearly undesirable, whilethe Iraq and Bosnia models are, todifferent degrees, unlikely as there isat this stage no realistic expectation ofthe necessary military footprint in Syriathat would accompany either of thesemodels. This leaves, realistically, only aversion of the Yemen model. While thetransition process in Yemen is far fromcomplete and does not, at the moment,advertise itself as a resounding successof either international or regional crisismanagement, it offers a number ofimportant insights into how to preparefor an eventual post-civil war transitionin Syria, providing observers with the

opportunity to identify and potentiallymitigate the likely risks that will beencountered.

The first question to ask is what canpotentially go wrong in the negotiationand implementation of a politicalsettlement. The Yemen model – aswell as other recent experiences fromthe Arab uprisings of 2011 (including,in particular, Egypt and Libya), fromSudan’s Comprehensive PeaceAgreement and the subsequent civilwar in post-independence South Sudan,from Afghanistan and Iraq, and fromearlier conflict and crisis managementexperiences in the Western Balkansand the former Soviet Union – suggeststhat there are a number of key risks.These include: prolonged and eventuallyinconclusive peace negotiations after aninitial, but potentially volatile, ceasefirehas been established; a partial and notfully inclusive agreement, in whicheither crucial aspects of post-civil wargovernance arrangements are notcovered in sufficient detail or are simplyleft for later negotiations; a partialagreement from which key players areexcluded or subsequently walk away;a protracted transition period in whichthe implementation process stalls;or transitional arrangements whicheventually become permanent.

All these risks bring with themthe potential of defections froman agreement and the consequentpossibility of renewed civil war, instigatedby domestic or external actors (possiblythrough the creation of new proxyforces or through more direct forms ofintervention), or by a combination ofboth.

Acknowledging these risks is animportant first step towards earlyand effective mitigating action. Whilethere is no guaranteed recipe thatcan conclusively and comprehensivelymitigate all of them, there are a numberof steps that can, and should, be takennow by the international communityto avoid the nightmare scenario ofanother Libya and to avoid repeating themistakes made in Yemen. Three sets ofconsiderations should shape the thinkingof the international community inpreparing for a credible and sustainablepost-civil war transition in Syria.

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The first of these is to recognise,and act upon, the need for flexible,inclusive and expanding negotiationformats. This relates to both theparticipants and the issues. In termsof participants, now is the time toindividually and collectively reach outto, and work with, as many players inthe insurgency as possible at all levels.This should involve, at a minimum,discussions with willing parties on aformal or informal pre-negotiationagreement that would outline theprinciples of and an agenda forsubsequent negotiations. As this processevolves, more parties can be brought in,creating a broader and more inclusivebasis of future settlement negotiationsand widening the consensus on its keyprinciples and agenda items.

In parallel, the West and itsregional partners now also have abetter opportunity to build capacitywithin the opposition rebel bloc, whichin turn can also help to overcome initialreluctance and persuade individualplayers to engage with a moreestablished negotiation format. At thesame time, such a process can sensitiseinternational mediators and facilitatorsto the degree to which specific issuesare particularly contested. It can furtherhelp them to shape an agenda for futurenegotiations that is sequenced in sucha way that a breakdown of negotiationscan be avoided and allow them to drawup contingency plans if negotiations stallover certain issues. It is also conceivableto imagine that NGOs currently engagedin humanitarian relief efforts couldplay a significant role in this process,especially as far as capacity-building atthe local level is concerned. This needsto happen in such a way that it does notjeopardise their primary role, providinghumanitarian relief; that it responds tolocal demand, instead of being drivensolely by international conceptionsof assistance; that it contributes tothe involvement of civil society actorsand organisations and prevents themonopolisation of the process bymilitary and political elites; and that itenables a level of co-ordination with theinternational community that does notrun counter to the long-term feasibilityand viability of a political settlement.

The second set of considerationsderives from the localised nature of theanti-Assad coalition and of non-regimeforces more widely. It concerns theneed to integrate top-down andbottom-up approaches in managing thetransition process. On the one hand, anypotentially sustainable settlement willneed to reflect the military, political,economic and demographic realities inand beyond Syria. On the other hand,international efforts need to consider,shape and leverage local deals beingmade now, including assessing theimpact of emerging local arrangementson the feasibility of future national-levelstructures. These efforts need to shapesuch deals wherever possible so thatviable state structures can still emergein a broader political settlement, andalso so that they leverage the possibilityand reality of local deals as buildingblocks for such a settlement. In allof this, it will be essential to factor inthe current level of displacement ofpeople within and beyond Syria, andthe possibility and sustainability oftheir return and resettlement. Evenif the current de facto partition ofSyria cannot be overcome in the longterm, addressing displacement wouldcontribute to stability and securitywithin and between each of the entitiesand thus reduce the likelihood of a laterresurgence in violence. Critical to thiswould be the management of still-highlycontested spaces like the divided city ofAleppo or the suburbs of Damascus.

The third and final set ofconsiderations concerns thesustainability of the transition processas a means of both establishing andpreserving peace and stability withinand beyond Syria and of (re)buildingthe social, political and economicfoundations of a viable state in asituation in which local capacity todo so is in short supply, trust acrosscommunities is very low, and divisionsare deep and entrenched. Consequently,careful consideration needs to be givento the use of settlement guarantees atdifferent levels (local, national, regional,global) and across different sectors(political, economic, military). Suchguarantees should be tied to incentivesfor the various Syrian parties (and

their external backers as appropriate)so that they limit the extent andimpact of potential defections fromthe agreement. Equally importantly,now is the time to think about how theimplementation of any future agreementcan be sequenced such that all partieswill remain committed to it.

Beyond GovernanceArrangements: Addressing theConflict’s LegacyOne of the key destabilising factors duringand after any post-civil war transitionperiod is the impact of the conflict’slegacy on efforts to rebuild viable statesand societies.33 Transitional justiceprogramming is meant to address suchissues, but it is in itself a highly contestedarea of academic and policy debate.Moreover, it is one that intersects closelywith state-building efforts inasmuchas rules of the post-war political gameare likely to determine what is possiblein terms of transitional justice and viceversa. Those who negotiate peace andfuture governance arrangements arelikely to be guided as much by their ownpersonal interests as by those of thecommunities they claim to represent;and are unlikely to volunteer for custodialsentences or for exclusion from positionsof influence because of crimes andatrocities they committed.

Though little can meaningfully beplanned to address atrocities and theconflict’s legacy until the conditionsfor moving forward are understood,three main points stand out. First, ifa transitional justice strategy is not tobecome isolated and meaningless, itwill need to be embedded in existingnetworks, able to utilise them and currentactors. This means confronting morallycomplex terrain. Second, the Syriantransition may well force the underlyingassumptions and implementationmechanisms of transitional justice tobe rethought; that is, the transitionprocess may have the potential to‘reshape’ transitional justice. Third, andrelated, transitional justice cannot bedisengaged from local processes. Donorsand international advisers must plan theirstrategies, and learn from past errors.The Syrian conflict has not left completelyclear lines between insurgent groups,

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non-militant organisations and civilsociety actors. With the militarisation ofthe conflict, actors that have arisen outof insurgency groups have often eclipsedthose who have emerged from civilsociety, and in some cases they have beenconnected with one another. Becausemany activists have been killed, detainedor forced to flee Syria, the initial force forreconstruction in ‘liberated’ areas is theleadership of rebel units. A decimatedcivil society also provokes questionsabout what capacity it may have to buildor deepen local democratic structures.Rebuilding civil society structures andaddressing the deep divisions withincommunities will take some time.

The experience of Ahrar Al-Sham,the largest faction in the rebellion,provides an interesting illustration ofthe issues that any transitional justiceprocess will have to address. Makingsavvy use of social media, public relationsand outreach strategies, Ahrar Al-Shamhas rebranded itself,34 moving from anorganisation with links to Jabhat Al-Nusrato a mainstream Syrian opposition groupthat calls for ‘a national unifying project’ –one that, in the words of its internationalspokesman Labib Al-Nahhas, ‘shouldnot be bound to a single ideology’. Ithas broad internal networks across thespectrum of actors as well as good accessto international media. Its 2015 articlesin the Washington Post and the DailyTelegraph have demonstrated this newhybrid and its power.35

Looking ahead, it is possible thatactors like Ahrar Al-Sham, and othergroups (or their offshoots) that becomeincreasingly ‘moderate’ as they aregradually incorporated into a peaceprocess, will form the foundationsof transitional justice work. They willcertainly have an opinion on it andthey will have access to media that willenable them to communicate thoseopinions. With these dynamics, a primarychallenge will be ensuring that theprocess does not become a whitewashingof past crimes, nor a public relationstool for groups with one leg in militantcamps and another in peace-buildingprocesses. Civil society organisationsand humanitarian actors with pre-existingnetworks on the ground are likely tobe key allies in any transitional justice

process. Groups such as the SyrianJustice and Accountability Centre, theLocal Coordination Committees, theViolations Documentation Center, theFoundation to Restore Equality andEducation in Syria, the Syrian Networkfor Human Rights, together with lawyersand activists, amongst others, havebeen involved in some of the mostsophisticated, innovative and strategicdocumentation efforts that have everexisted during a conflict. A number ofhuman rights actors have conductedsteady and consistent work collecting,documenting and mapping evidence ofhuman rights violations. The resultingrepository of data is not only being usedto track the scale of human and materialloss, but is likely to form the backboneof any (unlikely) prosecutions and (morelikely) reparations and reform processes.These organisations are likely to beready to begin their work ‘day one’ aftera settlement. In other words, the mostrelevant work regarding accountabilityfor conflict-related atrocities in Syriawill probably come from activistswithin local communities and fromleading social media campaigns. Localcouncils operating in non-Assad partsof Syria, supported by a network ofcivil society organisations, are alreadydealing with issues of criminal justiceand the radicalisation of local youthwith micro-empowerment programmesand vocational training. These are likelyto be the voices that shape practicalthinking about dealing with the legaciesof conflict-related violence.

Yet an important caveat also applieshere: civil society actors have largelybeen marked by the same divisionsas the rest of the conflict parties andare likely to be involved in the sameinternecine conflicts, an involvementthat will probably become increasinglyapparent as discussions aroundtransitional justice begin in earnest. Asregional and international organisations,foreign governments and their associateddonor and development agencies startto think about post-civil war options fortransitional justice, they should bearin mind a number of broader lessonsto be learnt from other experiences ofdealing with the legacy of conflict-relatedviolence.

First, it will be important to thinkfrom the outset about a meaningful rolefor civil society in any transitional justiceprocesses. Donor states should supportthe inclusion of civil society organisationsat the initial planning stage. Moreover,human rights organisations shouldkeep pressure on donors to rememberthat civil society organisations are keyvectors for the construction of networks,social trust and, ultimately, socialcohesion. The corollary of this is thatadequate funding should be allocatedfrom the outset for civil society actors.Past experiences indicate that very fewresources were allocated to such actorsduring transitional justice programming,a shortcoming which both significantlyinhibits their ability to foster meaningfulchange and also hinders the objectivesof transitional justice programming.36The inclusion of civil society perspectivesin initial decision-making processesoften improves long-term collaborationbetween civil society and the state, andcan assist in the establishment of civilsociety actors as legitimate partners with(or counterweights to) the state. It will beimportant to allow time for civil society torebuild its internal relationships. It is alsoimportant not to rush that process for thesake of keeping to an externally imposedtimeframe or roadmap.37

Following from this, donors willneed to think very carefully about fundingratios among different transitionaljustice initiatives. The allocation offunding is notoriously lopsided and thishas damaged holistic approaches totransitional justice in the past. Includingcivil society actors in the process ofdonor and government prioritisation andstrategy-setting from the beginning canensure that the needs of stakeholdersand relevant communities are reflectedin national policies.

Equally, as discussions move towardstruth-telling and truth-seeking, theprocess needs to be genuinely inclusive,and not rushed by external actors andtimelines. The processes of truth-seekingare often inherently as important as – orsometimes more important than – anyfinal report. This is particularly so whendivisions are as deep as those in Syria.

Donors also need to develop atransitional justice strategy, rather

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than funding discrete and unconnectedprojects. The strongest engagementswith transitional justice processeshave been those that foresaw a long-term commitment and respondedappropriately to evolving needs.However, this approach needs vision,planning, sustained engagement andcommitment, as well as flexibility. Finally,just as the conflict has lasted muchlonger than many people predicted, sorecovery will similarly take more timethan expected. Dealing with the conflict’slegacy will be a multigenerationalexercise. It will take time, it will sufferpolitical setbacks, and it will require anawareness that there will be highs andlows. Long-term commitment will benecessary to overcome cycles of conflictand atrocity.38

ConclusionWith the partition of Syria now a reality,and likely to remain so for at least theforeseeable future, a clearer strategy isneeded to facilitate a gradual transitionto a post-civil war order in which Assadand his inner circle may or may nothave a permanent place. The spacein the northwest of the country – andpotentially the south, depending onmilitary and political developments –needs to be consolidated and furtherlegitimised. This needs to happen locallythrough the further development of localgovernance structures, including publicservice and judicial systems. Nationally,it requires the continuation of thenegotiation process within and amongthe different factions in the civil war.Regionally and globally, efforts need tocontinue to protect non-regime spaces,to push back Daesh and Jabhat Al-Nusra,and to work towards a permanent andstable ceasefire between them that canbe part of a post-civil war transition.

In those areas controlled by theopposition rebel bloc and the Kurdishforces, the West and its regional partnersneed to support nascent local efforts tomeet the immediate challenges. Theseinclude the provision of food, shelter

and basic goods for both residents andthe many displaced Syrians in the region;the creation of inclusive governanceinstitutions; and the establishment of alegal system that follows due process andrecognises legal rights.

International support forfunctioning governance needs to beseen as the beginning of a long processleading towards a de-escalation andresolution of the Syrian crisis, ratherthan as its endpoint. Pursued carefully,it can contribute to: establishing workingrelationships between the West, itsregional partners and groups that haveconsolidated their presence in Syriancommunities; consolidating a minimalpolitical consensus among factionsparticipating in the High NegotiationsCommittee; developing a more realisticand coherent approach to the Syriancrisis that is broadly shared by theWest and its regional allies and thusrenewing relations between thoseallies, including France, Turkey and theGulf States, all of whom have expressedfrustration with indecision inherent toand incoherence of US and British policy;offering an alternative to the long-termprospect of a protracted civil war andthe consolidation and possible furtherexpansion of territorial control by Daesh;and starting a process to assist in dealingwith the ever-worsening humanitariancrisis.

This is by no means an optimalsolution to the Syrian conflict, but thereis no ‘optimal solution’ in the currentsituation because there is no singlecountry, no single external coalition, nosingle strategy and no single anti-regimeforce. The rebels are consolidating theirde facto state in the northwest. With thebacking of Russia, Iran and Hizbullah,the Assad (or other Alawite-dominatedsuccessor) regime is almost certainto hold onto its heartland from theMediterranean and Lebanese bordersthrough Homs to Damascus. For theirpart, the Kurds are unlikely to give uptheir territorial gains or their vision of afederal Syria as a model for the future.

The political, legal and socialdevelopment of opposition and Kurdish-held areas protected by a viable andexternally guaranteed ceasefire istherefore themost productive approach. Itprovides for legitimacy and responsibility,while also addressing those issues thatfed the uprising as well as encouraginggroups with disparate viewpoints to seekprogress through dialogue rather thanconfrontation. The establishment ofgovernance and the provision of justicenot only provides a counter to the Assadregime. It also confirms the existenceof alternatives to Daesh. Eventually, itallows groups to be distinguished fromfactions such as Jabhat Al-Nusra. Finally,if Assad should happen to fall quickly, asMuammar Qadhafi did in Libya, or slowlyand inconclusively, as Ali Abdullah Salehdid in Yemen, then the provision of thatalternative could mitigate some of theviolence and political instability that havemarred the aftermaths of other ‘ArabSpring’ revolutions.

Scott Lucas is Professor of InternationalPolitics at the University of Birminghamand Editor of EA WorldView, a leadingwebsite for news and analysis of theSyrian conflict.

Christalla Yakinthou is a BirminghamFellow with the Institute for Conflict,Cooperation and Security in theUniversity of Birmingham’s PoliticalScience and International StudiesDepartment. She specialises in conflicttransformation and transitional justice.

Stefan Wolff is Professor of InternationalSecurity at the University of Birminghamand Associate Fellow at RUSI. Hisresearch focuses on war-to-peacetransitions and post-conflict state-building.

Stefan Wolff gratefully acknowledgessupport from the Economic andSocial Research Council under grantES/M009211/1, which facilitated part ofthe research conducted for this article.

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Notes

1 On partition as a solution to civil wars,see, for example, Erin K Jenne, ‘WhenWill We Part with Partition Theory?Flawed Premises and ImprobableLongevity of the Theory of EthnicPartition’, Ethnopolitics (Vol. 11, No. 3,2012); Brendan O’Leary, ‘AnalysingPartition: Definition, Classificationand Explanation’, Political Geography(Vol. 26, No. 8, November 2007);Nicholas Sambanis and JonahSchulhofer-Wohl, ‘What’s in a Line?Is Partition a Solution to Civil War?’,International Security (Vol. 34, No. 2,Fall 2009). Suggested policy applicationsinclude John J Mearsheimer and RobertA Pape, ‘The Answer: A Partition Planfor Bosnia’, New Republic, 14 June 1993,pp. 22–28 on Bosnia; Leslie H Gelb, ‘TheThree-State Solution’, New York Times,25 November 2003, A27 on Iraq.

2 On the need for local arrangementsand negotiations with local actors, seeFrederic C Hof, ‘The Self-GovernmentRevolution That’s Happening under theRadar in Syria’,Washington Post, 26 July2015.

3 See, for example, Virginia Page Fortna,‘Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace?International Intervention and theDuration of Peace after Civil War’,International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 48,No. 2, 2004); Darya Pushkina, ‘A Recipefor Success? Ingredients of a SuccessfulPeacekeeping Mission’, InternationalPeacekeeping (Vol. 13, No. 2, 2006);Patrick M Regan, ‘Interventions intoCivil Wars: A Retrospective Survey withProspective Ideas’, Civil Wars (Vol. 12,No. 4, December 2010); Stefan Wolffand Oya Dursun-Özkanca, ‘Regionaland International Conflict Regulation:Diplomatic, Economic and MilitaryInterventions’, Civil Wars (Vol. 14, No. 3,2012).

4 The article deliberately uses the term‘transition process’ to denote a moreopen-ended outcome than that impliedby terminology such as ‘transition todemocracy’, as there is considerabledoubt that Syria can likely achieveany kind of democracy aligned withthe conventional understanding ofthe concept. See, for example,Amitai Etzioni, ‘The DemocratisationMirage’, Survival (Vol. 57, No. 4,August–September 2015). By the same

token, the authors do not categoricallyrule out that possibility either.

5 James Dobbins, Philip Gordon andJeffrey Martini, ‘A Peace Plan for Syria’,Perspectives, RAND Corporation, 2015.US Secretary of State John Kerry alsofloated a suggestion for temporarypartition in February 2016, fromwhich he has since distanced himself.See Patrick Wintour, ‘John Kerry SaysPartition of Syria Could be Part of “PlanB” if Peace Talks Fail’, The Guardian,23 February 2016.

6 Barack Obama, ‘Press Conference by thePresident’, White House, Washington,DC, 2 October 2015, , accessed 28 April 2016.

7 Timothy D Sisk, ‘Peacebuildingas Democratization: Findings andRecommendations’, in Anna K Jarstadand Timothy D Sisk (eds), FromWar toDemocracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2008), pp. 239–59.

8 Stefan Wolff, ‘Post-Conflict StateBuilding: The Debate on InstitutionalChoice’, Third World Quarterly (Vol. 32,No. 10, 2011).

9 Charles T Call and Vanessa Wyeth (eds),Building States to Build Peace (Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008).

10 On the conceptual links between conflictand conflict settlement, see ThomasOhlson, ‘Understanding Causes ofWar and Peace’, European Journal ofInternational Relations (Vol. 14, No. 1,2008); StefanWolff, ‘Managing Ethno-National Conflict: Towards an AnalyticalFramework’, Commonwealth andComparative Politics (Vol. 49, No. 2, 2011).

11 Madhav Joshi, ‘Post-Civil WarDemocratization: Promotion ofDemocracy in Post-Civil War States,1946–2005’, Democratization (Vol. 17,No. 5, 2010); Francis Fukuyama, ‘TheImperative of State-Building’, Journal ofDemocracy (Vol. 15, No. 2, April 2004).

12 For a detailed analysis of the likelihoodof democracy to result from externallyimposed regime change, see Alexander

B Downes and Jonathan Monten,‘Forced to Be Free: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads toDemocratization’, International Security(Vol. 37, No. 4, 2013).

13 See, for example, Jochen Hippler,‘Democratization after Civil Wars– Key Problems and Experiences’,Democratization (Vol. 15, No. 3, 2008).On the significance of domestic factors,see also J Michael Greig and Andrew JEnterline, ‘The Durability of ImposedDemocracy’, International Interactions(Vol. 40, No. 2, 2014).

14 Timothy D Sisk, ‘Power-Sharing in CivilWar: Puzzles of Peacemaking andPeacebuilding’, Civil Wars (Vol. 15,Supplement 1, 2013), p. 17.

15 Wolff and Dursun-Özkanca, ‘Regionaland International Conflict Regulation:Diplomatic, Economic and MilitaryInterventions’; Stefan Wolff and ChristallaYakinthou (eds), Conflict Management inDivided Societies: Theories and Practice(London: Routledge, 2011).

16 Christine Bell, Colm Campbell andFionnuala Ní Aoláin, ‘Justice Discoursesin Transition’, Social and Legal Studies(Vol. 13, No. 3, September 2004);Charles T Call, ‘UNMediation and thePolitics of Transition after ConstitutionalCrises’, International Peace Institute,2012; Jai Kwan Jung, ‘Power-Sharingand Democracy Promotion in Post-CivilWar Peace-Building’, Democratization(Vol. 19, No. 3, 2012); Katia Papagianni,‘Power Sharing, Transitional Governmentsand the Role of Mediation’, Centre forHumanitarian Dialogue, 2008; StefVandeginste and Chandra Lekha Sriram,‘Power Sharing and Transitional Justice: AClash of Paradigms?’, Global Governance(Vol. 17, No. 4, October–December 2011).

17 Scott Lucas, ‘Why Putin Gambled onAirstrikes in Syria – andWhat Might ComeNext’, The Conversation, 1 October 2015.

18 See, for example, Joshua Landis andSteven Simon, ‘Assad Has It His Way: ThePeace Talks and After’, Foreign Affairs,19 January 2016.

19 Scott Lucas, ‘The Effects of RussianIntervention in the Syrian Crisis’, GSDRC,December 2015.

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20 See Scott Lucas, ‘Syria AudioAnalysis: Will Saudi Arabia IncreaseSupport to Rebels?’, EA WorldView, 6February 2016, , accessed 11 May 2016.

21 See Marga Zambrana, Emma Graham-Harrison and Shiv Malik, ‘Ex-UK StudentClocks Up Air Miles on Mission toRebrand Syrian Islamists’, The Guardian,22 February 2016;Middle East Eye, ‘NewJaish Al-Islam Chief Says Group Will NotPull Out of Peace Talks’,Middle East Eye,30 December 2015; Patrick Wintour,‘Syria’s Opposition Grows Impatient asGeneva Talks Show Little Progress’, TheGuardian, 20 March 2016.

22 Aron Lund, ‘Origins of the SyrianDemocratic Forces: A Primer’, SyriaDeeply, 22 January 2016.

23 ARA News, ‘PYD Leader: We Should BeInvited to Geneva Talks as Representativesof Syrian Kurds’, 14 April 2016.

24 Francis Ricciardone and Aaron Stein,‘Mitigating US-Turkish Disagreement overthe PYD’,MENA Source, 24 February 2016.

25 Dylan Collins, ‘Expert Roundup onRiyadh’s Opposition Conference’, SyriaDeeply, 15 December 2015.

26 Scott Lucas, ‘Syria Daily: Talks End inGeneva as Ceasefire Breaks Down’,EA WorldView, 27 April 2016, , accessed 11 May 2016.

27 See, for example, Greig and Enterline,‘The Durability of Imposed Democracy’;Desirée Nilsson, ‘Partial Peace: RebelGroups Inside and Outside of Civil WarSettlements’, Journal of Peace Research(Vol. 45, No. 4, July 2008); MichaelaMattes and Burcu Savun, ‘FosteringPeace after Civil War: CommitmentProblems and Agreement Design’,International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 53,No. 3, September 2009); Wolff, ‘Post-Conflict State Building’.

28 There is a significant body of comparativeresearch pointing in this direction. See,for example, Monica Duffy Toft andStephen M Saideman, ‘Self-DeterminationMovements and Their Outcomes’, inJames J Hewitt, JonathanWilkenfeld

and Ted Robert Gurr (eds), Peace andConflict 2010 (Boulder, CO: ParadigmPublishers, 2010); Marc Weller, ‘SettlingSelf-Determination Conflicts: RecentDevelopments’, European Journal ofInternational Law (Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009);Stefan Wolff, ‘Conflict Management inDivided Societies: The Many Uses ofTerritorial Self-Governance’, InternationalJournal on Minority and Group Rights(Vol. 20, No. 1, 2013).

29 For example, Kevin A Davis, ‘Yemen’sTurbulent Transition’,Washington Reporton Middle East Affairs (Vol. 34, No. 2,2015).

30 For example, Roberto Belloni, ‘Bosnia:Dayton is Dead! Long Live Dayton!’,Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (Vol. 15,No. 3–4, 2009).

31 For example, Gareth Stansfield, ‘ThePolitical Parameters of Post-WithdrawalIraq’, International Affairs (Vol. 86, No. 6,2010).

32 For example, Candice Moore, ‘Four Yearsafter the Fall of Gaddafi: The Role of theInternational Community in Stabilising aFractured Libya’, Conflict Trends (No. 1,2015).

33 Literature on how transitional justiceefforts canmitigate this problem hasgrown over the past decade. See, forexample, Jaya Ramji-Nogales, ‘DesigningBespoke Transitional Justice: A PluralistProcess Approach’,Michigan Journal ofInternational Law (Vol. 32, No. 1, 2010);Dawn L Rothe and Scott Maggard, ‘FactorsThat Impede or Facilitate Post-ConflictJusticeMechanisms? An EmpiricalInvestigation’, International Criminal LawReview (Vol. 12, No. 2, 2012).

34 Throughout 2015, Ahrar Al-Sham wentthrough internal discussions aboutideological development amidco-operation with other rebel factionsand opposition groups, as it hasdistanced itself from Jabhat Al-Nusraand its previous allegiance to Al-Qa’ida.These discussions have led to debateamong more astute analysts of theSyrian conflict about the future of AhrarAl-Sham, both in its own right and in itsrelationship with other groups on thebattlefield, and in terms of governance.See, for example, Aron Lund, ‘AbuYahia Al-Hamawi, Ahrar Al-Sham’s NewLeader’, Syria Comment, 12 September

2015, , accessed 11 May2016; Charles Lister, ‘Syrian IslamistsReach Out to the U.S., but SeriousIssues Remain’,Markaz, 14 July 2015.Actors such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar,as well as Syrian opposition and rebelgroups, have encouraged elements ofJabhat Al-Nusra to leave the factionand join blocs which include AhrarAl-Sham. The initiative has reinforcedthe calls by some officials – such asRobert Ford, the former US ambassadorto Syria – for engagement with AhrarAl-Sham. However, misreporting by themainstream media led to the inaccuratedeclaration that former US militarycommander and CIA Director DavidPetraeus was embracing JabhatAl-Nusra and Al-Qa’ida. See Robert S Fordand Ali El Yassir, ‘Yes, Talk with Syria’sAhrar Al-Sham’, Middle East Institute,15 July 2015; Shane Harris and NancyA Youssef, ‘Petraeus: Use Al QaedaFighters to Beat ISIS’, Daily Beast, 31August 2015. Without taking a positionon the specific initiative of splitting offmembers of Jabhat Al-Nusra, it is thisarticle’s contention that the creation ofspace for governance, transitional justiceand dialogue offers a more productiveenvironment for discussions establishingpolitical, judicial and military institutionsthat present a clear alternative to Al-Nusra.

35 Labib Al Nahhas, ‘The DeadlyConsequences of Mislabeling Syria’sRevolutionaries’,Washington Post, 10July 2015; Labib Al Nahhas, ‘I’m a Syrianand I Fight ISIL Every Day. It Will TakeMore than Bombs from the West toDefeat This Menace’, 21 July 2015. Seealso Lund, ‘Abu Yahia Al-Hamawi, AhrarAl-Sham’s New Leader’.

36 Paige Arthur and Christalla Yakinthou(eds), Transitional Justice, InternationalAssistance, and Civil Society: MissedConnections (New York, NY: CambridgeUniversity Press, forthcoming 2016).

37 Paige Arthur and Christalla Yakinthou,‘Funding Transitional Justice: A Guide forSupporting Civil Society Engagement’,Public Action Research, 2015.

38 UN, ‘Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach toTransitional Justice’, March 2010; Etzioni,‘The Democratisation Mirage’.

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