system dynamics and coin modeling v13.ppt
TRANSCRIPT
UNCLASSIFIED
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CAPT Brett Pierson
Warfighting Analysis Division
J8/WAD
A System Dynamics model of the FM 3-24
COIN Manual
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Assess the Full Range of Military OperationsAssess the Full Range of Military Operations
• Warfighting analysis – assess proficiency
– Multiple scenarios
– Wide range of variables within scenarios
– Alternative CONOPs
– Alternative campaign objectives
– Force equivalencies/force substitution
– Multiple analytical models
• Other force structure requirements – assess sufficiency
– Day–to–day demands: Forward basing, forward presence,lesser contingencies, homeland defense, theater securitycooperation
– Peak demand of overlapping warfights
– Sustained surge demand of post-hostilities operations
– Force equivalencies/force substitution
• Analysis of Irregular Warfare challenges
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Study Objective
• Senior Leader insights
Methodologies
• Intellectual approach
• Rationale
• Physical assumptions
• Philosophical assumptions
• Tank guidance
• SPG tasks
Tools
• Workgroups
• Mission Analysis
• Data
• Models
• Scenarios
• Metrics
• Wargaming
• Interagency partners
• Senior Leader reviews
• Peer reviews
• Partner nations
Analysis FrameworkAnalysis Framework
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Conventional Campaigns Non-Traditional Campaigns
JICM, ITEM, Thunder, …System Dynamics, Agent-Based Models, Wargames, ….
Comparison of Traditional and Non-Traditional AnalysisComparison of Traditional and Non-Traditional Analysis
Characteristics
Data
Models
Scenarios
Results
Metrics
Structurally complex, limited
geographic focus, kinetic domain,
means are predominately Military
Physics based, authoritative
sources identified, JMEM
(historical, published, formatted)
DoD centric, generally accepted;
historic, repeatable validation
Focused on Phase III Operations,
approved MSFDs (MCOs)
Physical warfight outcomes,
measurable and explainable
“Victory” clearly defined, quickly
understood, well-established
Interactively complex; global focus;
human, social, cognitive domain,
means integrate all elements of
National Power (DIME)
Perishable, culturally relevant, “soft”
aspects, questionable reliability, no-
JMEM equivalent
Expertise outside DoD; exploring non-
DoD models; still in research mode;
structural validation, “useful/credible”
More than Phase III Operations, draft
vignettes, wargames for event list
Identify “High Leverage” areas and
trends; insights on capabilities
“backed-out” and often not DoD
Many on-going efforts to define
“Victory” (JCS J5, SOCOM J3/J5)
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SME and
Theory ExpertsHistoric Analogy
Analytic
Models and
Wargames
Analysis in Irregular Warfare
Uncertain distance with known error Uncertain error with known distance
Efforts to refine the solution risk missing a fleeting opportunity to attack
Triangulation Search in the Physical World Uncertainty Space in the Analytic World
Sensor 1 Sensor 2
Sensor 3
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Why System Dynamics Modeling?
• Characteristics of systems problems include:
– Dynamic—changes over time and inherent system delays
– Tendency to overshoot and crash or oscillate
– Frequent over-reactions that drive exponential growth in costs
– Multiple players, diverse interests
– Interdependencies across borders and across disciplines
– Proposed solutions that appear simple and are usually wrong
– Very difficult to communicate!
• System Dynamics Modeling can add value in several areas. Itprovides a platform for…
– Effectively framing issues and problems.
– Representing the essence of the interdependencies that underlie systemperformance; minimize policy resistance
– Reliably inferring the dynamics associated with a set of initiatives
– Communicating—creating a single “sheet of music” to play
Excerpts from “An Introduction to Dynamic Modeling with STELLA & iThink” Workshop
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System Dynamics Disclaimer
• Various software and consultants being used within DOD
– STELLA / iTHINK – modeling software
– VENSIM – modeling software
– PA Consulting / Boeing / VMASC / MIT – consultants using a mix ofcommercial and proprietary software to develop SD solutions
Excerpts from “An Introduction to Dynamic Modeling with STELLA & iThink” Workshop
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System Dynamics Software
• STELLA / iTHINK – isee systems – Barry Richmond
• Language of stocks and flows, graphics user interface
• Innovator in application to social systems – “STELLA in theclassroom” to study Hamlet in High School
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Building a Simple STELLA Model
Savings account
• Stock – savings
• Flows in – deposits and interest
• Flows out – withdrawals
• Simulation – what is the effect of various interest rates? How about deposits and
withdrawals? Where is my leverage?
Most of the things that concern people are entities that accumulate
or dissipate over time – and we are concerned with trends. Unlike
the simple example above, most don’t have a closed-form solution
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Using a STELLA-Based Presentation
• Begin with a cause and effect relationship diagram
• Expand into a model structure that captures all elements andassigns assumptions about relationships
• “Troubleshoot” model structure and validate against some sort oftruth data…historical data, research, or in this case doctrinaltheory
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
COIN operations must accomplish three tasks
simultaneously:
• Influence insurgent-minded individuals to adopt a neutral
disposition.
• Influence neutral-minded individuals to adopt a
supportive disposition.
• Retain supportive individuals.
These operations are conducted in an environment where
tensions and hostilities between groups may destabilize a
society and provide opportunities for insurgents
• This environment may suggest courses of action aimed
at reinforcing or widening seams
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Economic
Development
Economic
Investment
Coalition
Funding
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
• An increase in Coalition funding will influence
economic investment and development.
• A strengthened economy will influence movement
from the insurgent- and neutral-minded groups
toward the supportive group.
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Expectations for
Essential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown of
Essential ServicesDeveloping andRestoring Essential
Services
Time to Develop
Essential Services
EconomicDevelopment
Economic
Investment
CoalitionFunding
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
• An increase in Coalition funding will significantly
impact the restoration of essential services.
• Improvements in the provision of essential services
will influence movement from the insurgent- and
neutral-minded groups toward the supportive
group.
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
EconomicDevelopment
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
Perceived
Security
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
External Material
Support
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
A government that is established, recognized, and
that maintains a secure environment is in a position
to
• Send a positive, credible message of success to
the populace.
• Provide an environment that enhances stable
employment of the workforce.
• Persuade insurgents and neutrals to consider
becoming supporters.
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
EconomicDevelopment
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
PerceivedSecurity
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total Force
Density
Host Nation
Force Density
Coalition Force
Density
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host Nation
Security Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact of
Illegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
Appropriate
Strategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
An appropriate force mix, and correct operational
tempo, timing, and synchronization will have very
significant impacts on
• The restoration of essential services.
• The populace’s perception of security.
• The Government’s and COIN forces’ credibility in
their communications efforts with the populace.
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
EconomicDevelopment
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
PerceivedSecurity
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total ForceDensity
Host NationForce Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix ofEffort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host NationSecurity Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
EconomicDevelopment
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
PerceivedSecurity
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total ForceDensity
Host NationForce Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix ofEffort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host NationSecurity Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
Support for
InsurgencyNeutral
PopulaceSupport for HN
Government
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
EconomicDevelopment
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
Perceived
Security
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total ForceDensity
Host NationForce Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host NationSecurity Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Basic Information Ops Loop
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
EconomicDevelopment
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
PerceivedSecurity
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total ForceDensity
Host NationForce Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host Nation
Security Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
EconomicDevelopment
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
Perceived
Security
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total Force
Density
Host Nation
Force Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host Nation
Security Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
Economic
Development
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
Perceived
Security
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total ForceDensity
Host NationForce Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host NationSecurity Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support for
InsurgencyNeutral
PopulaceSupport for HN
Government
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
Economic
Development
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
Perceived
Security
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total Force
Density
Host Nation
Force Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host Nation
Security Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support for
InsurgencyNeutral
PopulaceSupport for HN
Government
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Expectations for
Essential ServicesEssentialServices
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
Economic
Development
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
Perceived
Security
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total Force
Density
Host Nation
Force Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host Nation
Security Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support for
InsurgencyNeutral
PopulaceSupport for HN
Government
Satisfaction with
Essential Services
Expectations for
Essential ServicesEssentialServices
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
Economic
Development
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
Perceived
Security
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total Force
Density
Host Nation
Force Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix of
Effort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host Nation
Security Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Comprehensive Information Loop
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
Satisfaction withEssential Services
Expectations forEssential ServicesEssential
Services
Breakdown ofEssential ServicesDeveloping and
Restoring EssentialServices
Time to DevelopEssential Services
Governance
Time to Develop
Governance
EconomicDevelopment
Economic
Investment
Available
Workforce
CoalitionFunding
PerceivedSecurity
Insurgent Acts ofViolence
Total ForceDensity
Host NationForce Density
Coalition ForceDensity
Appropriate Mix ofEffort and Use of Force
PsychologicalOperations
Effectiveness
IntelligenceExternal Material
Support
Host NationSecurity Forces
Time to Develop HNSecurity Forces
Impact ofIllegitimate Actions
Individual Competence,Judgment, and Ability
to Execute
AppropriateStrategic Emphasis
Understanding andKnowledge of Social
Structures
Insurgent to ForceDensity Ratio
PotentialFractiousness
of Society
The Logical Lines of Operations from FM 3-24
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The STELLA Model - InterfacesThe STELLA Model - Interfaces
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The STELLA Model - StructureThe STELLA Model - Structure
Population
Governance
Security
Economic
Development
Essential Services
Host Nation
Security Forces
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The STELLA ModelThe STELLA Model
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
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Using the Model in Analysis
COA Option – Adjust Mix of Effort and use of Force to focus totally on security
– Technology-driven and reactive cost imposing strategy
– Ignores FM 3-24 recommended effort on non-security LLOs
2:35 PM Wed, Oct 24, 2007
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Months
1:
1:
1:
2:
2:
2:
3:
3:
3:
0
50
100
1: Support for Government 2: Support for Insurgency 3: Neutral
1
1
1
2 2
2
3
3
3
4:31 PM Wed, Oct 24, 2007
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Months
1:
1:
1:
2:
2:
2:
3:
3:
3:
0
50
100
1: Support for Government 2: Support for Insurgency 3: Neutral
11 12
2 2
3
3 3
Appropriate mix of effort set to a balanced
focus on all Logical Lines of Operation
All effort focused on Perceived Security and
Host Nation Security Forces, others zero
Waiting to start on the Non-Security LLOs until Security is established is an inherently
flawed and self defeating strategy. The LLOs are too interdependent.
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Optimizing a Solution
7:49 AM Tue, Oct 30, 2007
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Months
1:
1:
1:
2:
2:
2:
3:
3:
3:
0
50
100
1: Support for Government 2: Support for Insurgency 3: Neutral
1
1
1
2 2
2
3
3
3
Results with balanced mix of effort on LLOs combined
with slight reduction in External Material Support and
slight reduction in Potential Fractiousness of Society
“One of the most important lessons in Afghanistan and in Iraq is that military
success is not sufficient. Our efforts must also address economic development,
institution building, the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good or at
least decent governance, public services, training and equipping indigenous
security forces, effective, strategic communications, and more.”
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 29 January 2008
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Coalition Input Coalition Input –– Optimized 3-24 case Optimized 3-24 case
Manning and Funding held sufficient through the entire period
A sustainable peace – we remain involved and remain invested as intervener
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Coalition Input Coalition Input –– Kilcullen case Kilcullen case
Manning and Funding get ramped down as Host Nation capacity increases
A durable peace – one left to thrive as a better version of itself with less cost to us
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Coalition Input Coalition Input –– Ramped up effort case Ramped up effort case
Manning and Funding get ramped up as needed to face crises
No peace – mired in strife at the same cost to us as Kilcullen case over the period
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Coalition Input Coalition Input –– the long slow grind the long slow grind
Eventually the corner is turned – assuming no return to major hostilities
Requires persistent sufficient investment many times longer despite greater losses
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Is It Working?
“..in this agrarian area where date
palms outnumber buildings…”
(Knowledge and Understanding of
Social Structure)
“They are making their
community safe”
(Perceived Security)
“…counter false perceptions…”
(Psychological Operations
Effectiveness)
“…install security among
all tribes, not just Sunni…”
(Potential Fractiousness)
“…the money they receive…”
(Economic Development)
“...they will become members of
the Iraq security Forces.”
(Host Nation Security Force
Development)
“…political infighting…”
(Governance)
“..it is a security program, not
an attempt to create armed
militias…”
(Perceived Security)
“…is distrustful of the
government…”
(Psychological Operations
Effectiveness)
“…he will renew the
contracts…”
(Economic Development)
“..four IED attacks…”
(Insurgent Acts of Violence)
“…concerned citizens are
being paid…”
(Economic Development)
(Governance)
Christian Science Monitor – October 2nd 2007: “Violence dropped dramatically”
Credit for success is given to efforts that directly map to FM 3-24
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Contextual Mapping
Contextual Mapping helps metrics
point towards the appropriate LLOs
What can you say about these except
“I hope they start getting greener”
To be useful, metrics need a contextual mapping, which infers a framework
Overall Status
Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend
!"##$ %$&'" '&$( )*+ ,-./ $ '&"$.
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4$5.
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;#7 !#1"6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530
./$. ? 231'/. 4&3µ µ( 8$7
Perceived Security
Desired Outcome 3: xxx.xxxx
Overall Status
Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend
!"##$ %$&'" '&$( )*+ ,-./ $ '&"$.
01µ2"& 34 $µ"0".-"5
600$!&$07 0", 819$.- ./$. '3"5 :"&(
4$5.
;#7 </-." 83';#7 1974 =$µ$&3 ./$. /$5 2""0
$&3107 43& $ 01µ2"& 34 ("$&5
;#7 !#1"6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530
./$. ? 231'/. 4&3µ µ( 8$7
Governance
Desired Outcome 3: xxx.xxxx
Overall Status
Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend
!"##$ %$&'" '&$( )*+ ,-./ $ '&"$.
01µ2"& 34 $µ"0".-"5
600$!&$07 0", 819$.- ./$. '3"5 :"&(
4$5.
;#7 </-." 83';#7 1974 =$µ$&3 ./$. /$5 2""0
$&3107 43& $ 01µ2"& 34 ("$&5
;#7 !#1"6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530
./$. ? 231'/. 4&3µ µ( 8$7
Essential Services
Desired Outcome 3: xxx.xxxx
Overall Status
Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend
!"##$ %$&'" '&$( )*+ ,-./ $ '&"$.
01µ2"& 34 $µ"0".-"5
600$!&$07 0", 819$.- ./$. '3"5 :"&(
4$5.
;#7 </-." 83';#7 1974 =$µ$&3 ./$. /$5 2""0
$&3107 43& $ 01µ2"& 34 ("$&5
;#7 !#1"6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530
./$. ? 231'/. 4&3µ µ( 8$7
Host Nation Security Forces
Desired Outcome 3: xxx.xxxx
Overall Status
Metric(s) Significant Activities Status/Trend
!"##$ %$&'" '&$( )*+ ,-./ $ '&"$.
01µ2"& 34 $µ"0".-"5
600$!&$07 0", 819$.- ./$. '3"5 :"&(
4$5.
;#7 </-." 83';#7 1974 =$µ$&3 ./$. /$5 2""0
$&3107 43& $ 01µ2"& 34 ("$&5
;#7 !#1"6 :"&( 0-9" >$&#"( 8$:-7530
./$. ? 231'/. 4&3µ µ( 8$7
Economic Development
Desired Outcome 3: xxx.xxxx
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TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500
“Commander’s Appreciation and
Campaign Design”
Campaign Design
To access TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500 go to: http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pamndx.htm
Topic of Army ‘Stand-To’ e-newsletter, 1 Feb 2008
• Commander’s Appreciation
– Need to develop a shared understanding ofcomplex operational problems
– Structured problem framing (and re-framing!)
• Problem structure
– well structured (structurally complex, linear):professionals agree on how to proceed –apply the Science of War
– ill-structured (interactively complex, non-linear): professionals disagree on how tosolve this problem – apply the Art of War
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Science of War
linear phenomena
that can be controlled
professional soldiers
can agree
doctrine, training, and
leader development
Operational Problem(well or medium
structured)
Gap in "State of Affairs"
between what is and what
ought to be
Concern to lessen or a
Military Action to achieve
an end state
Action(s) to be
Taken
professional consensus
and authoritatively
prescribed in doctrine
Art of War
Intuition and Genius
(harmonious combination of
courage, powers of intellect,
and strength of will)
Analysis of the Mission
(breaking it down into specified,
implied, and essential tasks)
Understanding is not a matter of
capturing reality sufficiently correctly,
[it is a matter of] constructing an
interpretation that is sufficiently
useful in dealing with reality
Complex Operational
Problem (unstructured
problem)
Giving a Complex
Problem enough structure
so that further planning
can lead to useful action
easy to control through technical
reduction and a systematic
method-based solution
OperationalDesign
Link near-term
actions to the
strategic aim of the
campaign
OperationalEngineering
Detailed plan for
action (blueprint)
Simultaneously building and
understanding of the problem
through the creation of a
conceptual solution or design
1
2
2) Arranges operations is spaceand time and identifies
capabilities and resources
Agreement on a
Shared Starting
Hypothesis
Commander's Appreciation
1) Seeks to explain the qualitativerelationships embedded within
complex problems
Mutually respectfulcompetition of opposing ideas
(candid and free)
Detailed series of executable
missions that directly affect allies,
adversaries, and the environment
Resolving the natural tension
between the formulation of
strategy and the planning for
its implementation
Operational Art
Campaign plans at each
level should nest in the
same way that tactical
orders do
An iterative process that integrates ends, ways,
and means across the levels of war
Problem framing—and its military use
during a campaign
Reframing as
understanding expands
Commander's Appreciation
and Campaign Design
A System Dynamics View of Campaign Design
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED39
A Framework for Success
Three Completely Different entities – The DoD; The USIP; and Dr. Paul Collier,an Oxford Economist with a lifetime of working aid issues in Africa
Since these disparate groups can agree on the problem statement and solution path,
how are we in the USG working together to operationalize the answer?
Security
Laws and Charters
Trade
Aid
Safe and Secure Environment
Rule of Law
Stable Democracy
Sustainable Economy
Social Well Being
Security
Host Nation Security Force Development
Governance
Economic Development
Essential Services
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED4040
The STELLA Model The STELLA Model –– Demo/Questions Demo/Questions
Support forInsurgency
NeutralPopulace
Support for HNGovernment
“Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of
shaping behavior of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the
people in between.”
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007
“Success will be less a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of
shaping behavior of friends, adversaries, and most importantly, the
people in between.”
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, 10 October 2007
“You don't kill or capture your way out of an industrial strength
insurgency.”
Gen. David Petraeus, 14 September 2008