Aspects of a Systemic-Functional Grammar of Finnish

Susanna Shore

Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for thedegree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Englishand Linguistics, Macquarie University, Sydney, N.S.W.

July 1992

Contents

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viiAbstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix

Chapter 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.1. Purpose and Scope of this Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2. Outline of the Chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41.3. Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61.4. Glosses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.5. Theory and Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter 2: An Outline of Systemic-Functional Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132.2. The London School of Linguistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.2.1. General Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132.2.2. System and Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142.2.3. Restricted Languages and Speech Fellowships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152.2.4. A General Linguistic Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182.2.5. Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192.2.6. Rejection of Saussurean Structuralism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202.2.7. Firth and SF Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2.3. SF Theory: General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222.3.1. Language as a Linguistic Behaviour Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222.3.2. The SF Interpretation of Langue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232.3.3. The Individual and the Social Aspect of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252.3.4. Knowledge of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.3.5. A Reality Construction View of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302.3.6. Language and Mind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332.3.7. Grammar, Semantics and the Context of Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342.3.8. The Notion of Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

2.4. Central Notions in SF Grammar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422.4.1. Introductory Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 422.4.2. A Brief Historical Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432.4.3. The Triplanar Organization of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442.4.4. Units and the Rank Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 462.4.5. Types of Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 492.4.6. System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512.4.7. Delicacy and Realization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 542.4.8. Metafunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 562.4.9. An Integrated Lexicogrammar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 602.4.10. The Principle of Grammaticalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 632.4.11. The Ineffability of Grammatical Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

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2.4.12. Prototypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 652.4.13. Grammatical Proportionalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 662.4.14. Synoptic vs. Dynamic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Chapter 3: The Finnish Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693.2. Background Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693.3. Some General Characteristics of Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

3.3.1. General Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 743.3.2. Verb Inflexions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 773.3.3. Finnish Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

3.4. Issues in the Received Description of Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873.4.1. The Problem of the Accusative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 873.4.2. Boundedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 943.4.3. Traditionally Defined Grammatical Subject in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Chapter 4: Constituency and Dependency in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054.2. Ranked Constituency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1054.3. Some Problems with the Rank Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

4.3.1. Discontinuous Constituents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1104.3.2. Inclusion of Morphology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

4.4. Phrases in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144.4.1. Nominal Phrases (NP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1144.4.2. Pre- and Postpositional Phrases (PP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1234.4.3. Verb Phrases (VP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1314.4.4. Adverbial Phrases (AdvP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1334.4.5. A Further Note on Unmodified P-Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

4.5. Preliminary Analysis of Clause Complexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1374.5.1. General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1374.5.2. Interdependency: Parataxis and Hypotaxis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1394.5.3. The Function of a Clause Complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1464.5.4. Relativization and Embedding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1494.5.5. Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Chapter 5: Interactional Structure in the Finnish Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1675.1. Preliminary Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1675.2. From Rhetorical Functions to Grammatical Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

5.2.1. The Clause as an Exchange or Interactive Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1725.2.2. Congruent and Metaphorical Realization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1775.2.3. Problems with Hallidays Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1835.2.4. Alternative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188

5.3. Interactional Options in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

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5.4. Interactional Functions in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1975.4.1. Finite, Mood Marker, and Residue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1975.4.2. The Grammatical Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201

Chapter 6: Experiential Structures in the Finnish Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2056.1. Preliminary Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

6.1.1. General Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2056.1.2. Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2106.1.3. Inherent and Non-Inherent Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

6.2. Process Types in Finnish: An Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2136.3. Relational Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

6.3.1. Intensive Relational Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2146.3.1.(i) Attributive Intensive Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2156.3.1.(ii) Identifying Intensive Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2196.3.1.(iii) Other Intensive Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231

6.3.2. Inclusive Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2376.3.3. Ambient Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2406.3.4. Circumstantial (Relational) Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244

6.3.4.(i) Introductory Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2446.3.4.(ii) General Circumstantial Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2446.3.4.(iii) Possessive Circumstantial Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249

6.3.5. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2566.4. Material Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

6.4.1. Introductory Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2566.4.2. General Features of Material Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2576.4.3. Subtypes of Material Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

6.4.3.(i) Meteorological Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2666.4.3.(ii) Experiencer Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2676.4.3.(iii) Behavioural Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272

6.5. Mental Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2746.5.1. Internal and External, Verbalized Consciousness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2746.5.2. Defined by Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2766.5.4. Human Consciousness and Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

6.6. Experiential Metaphors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2846.7. Macro-Roles in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288

6.7.1. Medium and Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2886.7.2. The Problem of the Existential Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2926.7.3. A Note on Derivational Affixes and External Causation . . . . . . . . . . 301

6.8. Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306

Chapter 7: Textual Structures in the Finnish Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3077.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3077.2. Given and New . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308

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7.2.1. Brown and Yules Approach to Given and New . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3087.2.2. Hallidays Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3107.2.3. Segmental Markers of Information Structure in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . 315

7.3. Theme and Rheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3197.3.1. Introductory Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3197.3.2. Topical Theme (Topic) in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3207.3.3. Subsidiary Topical Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3277.3.4 Topical Themes in Post-Verbal Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3347.3.5 Theme and Topic-Worthiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3367.3.6. Clause-Initial Interpersonal and Textual Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

7.4. Theme in Clause Complexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3417.4.1. Relative Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3417.4.2. Clause as Theme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3437.4.3. Theme-Rheme in Hypotactic Complexes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344

7.5. Additional Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3457.5.1. Non-realization of Inherent Human Participant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3467.5.2. Non-Realization of Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3487.5.3. Habitive and Manifestation Clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360

7.6. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365

Chapter 8: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3678.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3678.2. The Grammatical Analysis of a Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3688.3. Alongside and Beyond this Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3728.4. Recurring Themes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376

Appendix 1: Analysis of the Cat Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381Appendix 2: Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405Appendix 3: Form Glosses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409Appendix 4: Function Glosses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410Appendix 5: Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411Appendix 6: System Network Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435Maps and Figures

Map 1: Finnish Dialect Groupings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Figure 2-1: Planes in Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Figure 2-2: Levels in Language (Halliday 1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46Figure 2-3: Simultaneous Paradigmatic Options in English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52Figure 2-4: Metafunctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

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Figure 2-5: Transitivity Options in English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61Figure 2-6: Action Options in English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

Figure 3-1: Consonant Gradation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Figure 3-2: Vowel Harmony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Figure 3-3: Present Indicative Forms of asua to live/dwell) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78Figure 3-4: Imperative Forms of ottaa (to) take . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80Figure 3-5: Negative Forms of ottaa (to) take . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81Figure 3-6: Common Case-Forms for Nominals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83Figure 3-7: Convenient Groupings of Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Figure 3-8: Non-Productive or Semantically Restricted Case-Forms . . . . . . . . . . 85Figure 3-9: Infinitives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85Figure 3-10: Common Case Forms for Non-Finite Verb Stems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Figure 4-1: The Rank Scale in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107Figure 4-2: Constituency and Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111Figure 4-3: Tactic Relationships in a Clause Complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Figure 5-1: Variables in an Interactive Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173Figure 5-2: Primary Speech Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173Figure 5-3: Mood Options in English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174Figure 5-4: Semantics as an Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175Figure 5-5: Congruent Realizations of Speech Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177Figure 5-6: Hallidays Symmetrical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188Figure 5-7: Alternative Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189Figure 5-8: Mood Options in Finnish . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196

Figure 6-1: Major Process Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213

xAcknowledgements

This text ) like any other text ) is pervaded by the intertextual sources that

engendered it. These intertextual sources are a reflection of my ties with both

Australia and Finland. I am deeply indebted to all of my teachers, colleagues and

friends ) at Macquarie University, the University of Sydney, the University of

Helsinki, and elsewhere ) for the critical and constructive dialogue without which

this study would not have materialized.

I am especially grateful to Professor Ruqaiya Hasan, my supervisor at

Macquarie University, for her advice and for her critical comments. Her question-

ing of me at various stages of writing this study has been an important catalyst in

the development of my thinking. I should also like to express my thanks to

Professor Pentti Leino of the Department of Finnish at the University of Helsinki

for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this thesis and for giving me

the opportunity to work and to do research in an academic environment. I am

indebted to Dr. Maria Vilkuna for her lengthy and thoughtful comments and

criticisms on an earlier draft of this thesis. Marja-Liisa Helasvuo, Ilona Herlin,

Associate Professor Esa Itkonen, Anne Thwaite, and Dr. Eija Ventola have also

read earlier versions of this thesis or parts of it. I am deeply grateful to all of them

for their comments and criticisms.

This thesis would not have been possible without financial support from the

Kone Foundation of Finland and the Australian Government Postgraduate Awards

Scheme.

Last, but not least, I wish to thank my family for their encouragement and

support over the years. I dedicate this study to my mother, Saara Rantamki, who,

through her example, taught me the meaning of the Finnish expression kest kuin

nainen endure ) like a woman.

xi

Abstract

This study is a functional analysis of Finnish based on systemic-functional theoryas developed by Michael Halliday and other linguists. The focus is on the description ofclause types in Finnish in terms of a number of simultaneous grammatical structures,which are fused together in the process of realization. While the description of Finnish isnot based on any particular text or set of texts, the majority of examples are attestedexamples from written Finnish or Finnish as it is spoken in the Helsinki area.

There are three introductory chapters to the study. The first chapter serves as anintroduction proper to the thesis and discusses some general issues concerned with theoryand data and the status of intuition in linguistic description. The second chapter is anintroduction to systemic-functional theory and it also discusses a number of issues (e.g.knowledge of language) from a wider metatheoretical perspective. The third presents anethnographic account and a general outline of Finnish.

Chapters 4 to 7 constitute the main body of this thesis. Chapter 4 defines grammati-cal units in terms of ranked constituency and gives a preliminary outline of clausecomplexing in Finnish. Chapter 5 is concerned with structures in the Finnish clause thatreflect its internal organization as an exchange. A slightly modified version of Hallidaysmodel is proposed: the parameters involved are whether the orientation of the exchangeis primarily linguistic (i.e. the exchange of words) or non-linguistic (i.e. directed ataction). The sixth chapter is concerned with the analysis of clauses into process types andtheir concomitant participant and circumstantial roles. As in English, it is argued that inFinnish there is also a basic division into relational processes, material processes andprocesses of human consciousness (mental and verbal). The establishment of these processtypes is based on Prototype Theory. Chapter 7 deals with textual structures. It presents apreliminary discussion of Given and New and analyses the Theme-Rheme structure of theFinnish clause. It is argued that the topical Theme in Finnish is realized by the experientialelement in the position preceding the finite verb, and that another subsidiary experientialTheme needs to be recognized for Finnish. The Theme-Rheme structure is illustrated withthe analysis of a complete text reproduced in Appendix 1.

The study concludes by bringing together a number of recurring themes and bypresenting an analysis of a small fragment of text. The purpose of the text analysis is toshow how the various structures described in the main body of the study are intertwinedand conflated in a text and how the analysis presented in this study fits into a wider andmore comprehensive framework.

Chapter 1Introduction

1.1. Purpose and Scope of this Study

This study is a dialogue with linguists from two different traditions in linguistics.It is a dialogue with Finnish linguists, particularly those working within theframework of traditional linguistics and in applied areas of linguistics, and it is adialogue with systemic-functional linguists, since the theory of language on whichit is based is systemic-functional theory.

Although based on systemic-functional theory, the study also relies oninsights that have been gained from other linguistic theories and from traditionalgrammars of Finnish. Traditional linguistics in Finland (generally referred to asFennistics) has tended to be theoretically eclectic, which ) from a positiveperspective ) can be seen as not being bound to any particular theory. From anegative perspective, however, Fennistics could be seen as a mixture of varioustheories, in which many of the critical and basic assumptions are not explicated.This study offers Finnish linguists a way into systemic-functional theory, a wayinto a theory that is concerned with explicating basic assumptions about languageand the study of language and with developing a coherent and comprehensivetheory of language.

It also offers Finnish linguists a new perspective on the analysis of Finnish asit presents a functional description of Finnish grammar. The essence of a functionalgrammar ) at least a systemic-functional grammar ) is that it relates the linguisticsystem to texts, either spoken or written texts, and these texts, in turn, can berelated to human contexts of living. Moreover, in a systemic-functional perspec-tive, the relation between language and human contexts of living is seen in bothdialectic and symbiotic terms. This has far-reaching repercussions for the way inwhich the role of language in human activity is conceived ) for example, its rolein socialization, in education, in issues of ideology, race, gender (see, for example,

21 The last time I heard words to this effect the speaker was, in fact, a Finnish linguist, and hewas not being facetious.

2 This is not meant to imply that grammatical and phonological phenomena are identical, butI think it is useful ) particularly for those who are unacquainted with SF theory ) to drawsome sort of a parallel.

Halliday 1991, forthcoming). While this study focuses on grammar, it is a grammarthat will hopefully be of particular relevance to the study of spoken and writtentexts and their function in Finnish society.

What is being offered to systemic-functional linguists in this study is aninsight into the grammatical description of a non-Indo-European language and theproblems that it poses. With a few exceptions, systemic-functional linguists ) likemany other linguists ) have tended to concentrate on the description of English.There is often an implicit assumption in theoretical linguistics that a theory oflanguage need only be tested with the description of English: all too often onehears or reads the words Take a language, for example, English.1 This study initself is an act of meaning (Halliday forthcoming), an act of meaning which maychange the meaning of saying something like Take a language, for example,Finnish or Take a language, for example, Gooniyandi.

The purpose of the study is to provide a broad outline of a particular type offunctional grammar, systemic-functional grammar, as applied to Finnish. The focusis on the description of clause types in Finnish in terms of a number of simul-taneous grammatical structures. What this means is that the representation of aclause is not seen as a single structural pattern, but as a number of patterns, whichare conflated, i.e. mapped onto each other or fused together, in the process ofrealization. This approach to grammatical structure can be seen as a developmentand an extension to grammatical phenomena of Firths analysis of phonologicalstructure (see e.g. 1957, Ch.9).2 A similar approach is taken in autosegmentalphonology. According to Halle and Vergnaud (1982: 65), for example:

3The major insight lying at the base of autosegmental phonology is that the phonologicalrepresentation is composed not of a single sequence of entities roughly corresponding to a lineof type, but rather that the phonological representation is made up of several parallel sequencesof entities, resembling thus more a score for a musical ensemble, than a single line of type.

The musical analogy that is used in this quotation echoes a similar analogy madeby Halliday, who compares grammatical structure to polyphonic music (e.g. 1978:56). As is obvious from the above, the term grammatical structure as used heredoes not only refer to constituency structure but to any kind of (non-random)organization that is (more or less) restricted in scope to the boundaries of a clause.

The grammatical scope of this study is quite broad. In view of this, the degreeof detail (or delicacy in systemic-functional terms) is restricted: only the mostgeneral type of organization is presented. A number of other restrictions on thescope of the study are presented in the next section, in which there is an outline ofeach chapter. One important restriction needs to be mentioned immediately: thedescription presented here is not concerned with the systemic side of systemic-functional theory, i.e. the setting up of systems networks to model the paradigmaticoptions available in a language. The label systemic-functional (henceforth: SF)is, nevertheless, used throughout to distinguish the approach taken here from otherbrands of functionalism (see, e.g., Dirven & Fried (eds.) 1987, Matthiessen &Halliday (forthcoming)). The systemic side is, nevertheless, implicit in the analysisthat is presented: in SF theory, the grammatical organization of a language ismodelled as a number of parallel complexes of networks, which represent variouskinds of meaningful (paradigmatic) options available in the language being inves-tigated. This model of grammar iconically reflects the notion that the grammaticalsystem of a language is a potential for expressing and making meanings. Aparticular combination of meanings ) at the grammatical level ) will result in anumber of simultaneous grammatical structures.

41.2. Outline of the Chapters

This chapter serves as an introduction and discusses some general issues concernedwith theory and data. The next two chapters give background information: as SFtheory is relatively unknown in Finland and as Finnish is relatively unknown to themajority of linguists outside Finland, I have tried to accommodate possible readersof this study by giving some background to SF theory in Chapter 2 and by givingan ethnographic account and a general outline of Finnish in Chapter 3.

Chapters 4 to 7 constitute the main body of this study. Chapter 4 is primarilyconcerned with one particular type of grammatical structure in Finnish )constituency structure. Constituency refers to the part-whole relationships whichextend from the smallest grammatical unit, the morpheme, to the largest unit, theclause. The chapter will also contain some discussion of clause complexing, whichcan be regarded as straddling the area between grammatical and textual organiza-tion.

The fifth chapter is concerned with structures in the Finnish clause that reflectits internal organization as an exchange or interactive event. This is reflected inmood structures, which are regarded as being related to the way in which the roleof the interactants is construed in language. Another aspect of interactive orinterpersonal clause-internal organization in SF theory is concerned with whatHalliday refers to as modality (assessments of probability and usuality) andmodulation (assessments of obligation or inclination) (Halliday 1985a: 86, 334 ff.;Halliday in Kress ed. 1976: 189-213); however, this area of Finnish grammar willnot be dealt with in this study.

Chapter 6 is concerned with the way in which the clause in Finnish providesa model of reality, i.e., a linguistic representation of the world around us, of theworld inside us, and of the world of our imagination. Central to the structure of theclause as a model of reality is the analysis of clauses into process types and theirconcomitant participant and circumstantial roles. For example, Akira Kurosawa

5ohjasi tmn elokuvan Akira Kurosawa directed this movie construes (encodesand constructs) a material process, a happening or an action, whereas AkiraKurosawa on japanilainen elokuvaohjaaja Akira Kurosawa is a Japanese filmdirector construes a relational process in which the Carrier, realized by the propernoun Akira Kurosawa is assigned an Attribute.

In the seventh chapter, the clause in Finnish is discussed in terms of the wayit is structured as a message, i.e., in terms of what Prague School linguists refer toas the Functional Sentence Perspective (Halliday in Kress ed. 1976: 26-31; and e.g.Dane (ed.) 1974, Dane 1987). From the point of view of the message, thestructure of the clause can be looked at in terms of its Theme-Rheme and Given-New structure. According to Halliday (1985a: Chapter 8), the Given-New structurein English is realized in intonational patterns (pitch movements) in the tone group.While there is some preliminary discussion of Given and New in Finnish, aphonetic analysis of the intonational patterns in Finnish is beyond the scope of thisstudy. The discussion of the Theme-Rheme structure of the Finnish clause focuseson the topical Theme. The analysis is illustrated by a complete text, which is repro-duced in Appendix 1.

The study concludes with the analysis of a small fragment of text in Chapter8. This analysis is intended to show how the various structures described in themain body of the study are intertwined and conflated in a text and how the analysispresented here fits into a wider and more comprehensive framework. Chapter 8 alsobrings together a number of recurring themes in the study.

61.3. Data

This study is based primarily on the Finnish that is spoken in the Helsinki area andon standardized written Finnish, as this is the Finnish that I am familiar with.However, the study is at such a primary degree of delicacy that is seems to me thatthe analysis ) for the most part ) is also valid for at least those varieties of Finnishthat are spoken in Finland (see 3.2).

While the analysis and description here is not based on any particular text orset of texts, the majority of examples in the main body of the text (Chapters 4 to 7)are attested examples from either spoken or written Finnish. Each attested exampleis followed by a reference to its source in square brackets. The sources are listedin Appendix 2. In some instances, I have tidied up the original examples, e.g.omitted false starts and stutters, since these are irrelevant to the functionally charac-terized grammatical structures that are being explicated. For the same reason, Ihave also standardized certain phonological features of dialect forms. In somecases, I have also omitted parts of the clause if they are irrelevant to the point beingmade.

Since the majority of examples are authentic examples, instead of giving justone or two examples to illustrate a grammatical phenomenon, a number ofexamples are given. This is done to clearly illustrate the kind of phenomenon thatis being described. With constructed examples, it is relatively easy to construct anexample that clearly and unambiguously illustrates a grammatical point. Anintransitive material process, for example, could be illustrated by the exampleLapsi juoksee The child runs/is running. However, examples like this are rare inactual text. An authentic example often contains constituents that are irrelevant tothe point being made and this extraneous matter cannot be omitted withoutsacrificing the authenticity of the example.

Some of the examples are also constructed, i.e. based on my knowledge ofFinnish. This has been done for two reasons: 1) to illustrate a grammatical point by

7comparing an authentic example with a possible variant and 2) in cases where aparticular type of example ) although commonly used and uncontroversial ) isunlikely to occur in the corpora available to me, or it seemed that to search for anexample like mua palelee Im freezing would be taking the use of authenticexamples to unnecessary extremes (see below). To avoid taxing the non-Finnishreader, I have also used simple, constructed examples in Chapter 3, which presentssome of the main features of Finnish in a nutshell.

I have not based this grammatical description on a particular corpus, becausewhat I am investigating is grammatical phenomena, phenomena that are notrestricted to a particular genre, a particular text or discourse type. While SF theoryrecognizes both a semantic and a (lexico)grammatical plane in language,grammatical categories are also seen as categories of meaning: they aregrammaticalizations of highly generalized semantic categories (Matthiessen 1989:4).

Grammatical meaning is, thus, distinguished from meaning in a broader sense:how we understand what someone else has said or written can depend on a wholerange of factors. A particular language enables (and predisposes) us to expresscertain general or particular semantic distinctions through its lexicogrammaticalresources; but when we begin to analyse the meanings that are created in aparticular text ) whether spoken or written, monologue or dialogue, informal orinstitutionalized, and so on ) then we need to widen our perspective. We not onlyneed to augment a theory of the lexico-grammatical resources of a language (someaspects of which are illustrated by this study) with a theory of cohesion (of the wayin which grammatical structures relate to the co-text and context (see e.g. Halliday& Hasan (1976)), but, as Lemke (1988, 1989, 1990) points out, we need incorpo-rate a wider text-semantic theory. A text-semantic theory would need to encompasssuch notions as genre, intertextuality, and heteroglossia and would need to addresssuch issues as the social and ideological positions, the values, beliefs, attitudes etc.of the interactants.

81 The notion of a language as a whole is, of course, problematic: Firth (see section 2.2.3)maintained that there was no such thing; needless to say, a grammatical description based onthis notion of language can only be based on regularities and tendencies, and not on hard andfast rules.

If one regards the grammar of a language as a resource that underlies the useof language in a variety of different contexts, then to base ones grammaticaldescription on a particular corpus would unavoidably distort the picture. The notionof grammar can only make sense if it is applied to a language as a whole. Theonly access we have to a language ) more or less as a whole1 ) is through ourknowledge of the way in which it is used in a multiplicity of contexts (cf. section2.3.4, which discusses E. Itkonens (1983a, 1983b) view of the precedence ofintuition, i.e. knowledge, in grammatical description). It would be pointless to basean analysis of the grammatical options available in Finnish on a corpus of casualconversation, for example, or even on the large computer corpora of writtenFinnish that are now available. In any of the available corpora, it would be difficultto find many examples of imperatives or examples like mua palelee Im freezing.If the example is common and uncontroversial, then it is pointless to ignore itbecause for some reason it does not occur in the particular corpus that has beenselected for analysis.

However, I have avoided the use of intuited or invented examples in theanalysis of Finnish presented in this study (Chapters 4 ) 7) because they smack ofa decontextualized view of language. Moreover, often our so-called intuitionsabout language are influenced by the view of language that we have receivedthrough schooling and an educational system that goes back for centuries. Ourintuitions may also be influenced by standardizing pressures on the language: whatwe consider to be acceptable may, in fact, be unduly influenced by what we havebeen told is correct.

91.4. Glosses

In Appendix 3 and Appendix 4, there are keys for the form and function glossesused in the Finnish examples. Other notation conventions are listed in Appendix5 and Appendix 6. There are two copies of each of the appendices, one of whichis detachable so that the reader can easily refer to it while reading the text. (Theloose copy is enclosed in a pocket on the inside cover of the study.) The non-Finnish reader is advised to look at the glosses and not at the translation, as thetranslation is an attempt to convey the meaning and not the grammatical relationswithin the Finnish clause.

1.5. Theory and Description

This section is a brief, general discussion on theory per se, as it seems to me thatthere is not necessarily a consensus on what is meant by theory and a theoreticalapproach to the study of language. In my view, a theoretical approach is, in the firstinstance, an attempt to put ones cards on the table. It is an attempt to makeexplicit the fundamental assumptions we have about language and the study of it.

Regardless of whether they are explicated or not, we all have assumptionsabout language. The problem with linguistic descriptions that are not based on aparticular theory is that one is never sure what is meant by a particular term ornotion, and how the theoretical terms that are used in the description are related toeach other. If we take almost any article or book written about Finnish ) or anyother language for that matter ) regardless of whether the writer has avowedlytaken a theoretical approach, we are likely to find a plethora of linguistic terms.This is true of traditional Fennistics. It is also true of ethnomethodologicalconversation analysis, a more recent approach to linguistic analysis in Finland andelsewhere, which has its roots in sociology. In Finland, at least,ethnomethodological conversation analysis has been critical of theory andpreconceived theoretical categories (see A. Hakulinen ed. 1989, Ch. 1-2). The

10

following terms are a random selection from some articles on ethnomethodologicalconversation analysis published in Finland (Hakulinen & Sorjonen 1986; A.Hakulinen ed. 1989; A. Hakulinen 1991; Tainio et al. 1991; Sorjonen & Heritage1991):

syntaksi syntax, kielioppi grammar, kieliopillinen kokonaisuus a grammatical entirety,rakenne structure, syntaktinen kokonaisuus a syntactic entirety, morfeemi morpheme,lauseke phrase, lause clause/sentence, virke sentence, partikkeli particle, idiomiidiom, kysymys question, leksikaalinen aines lexical substance, modaalinen ainesmodal substance, modaaliverbi modal verb, kskylause command/imperative clause,imperatiivi imperative, NP, fonologis-morfologinen virhe phonological-morphologicalmistake, leksikaalinen virhe lexical mistake, funktio function, kytt use, viittaus refer-ence, viitata refer, pronomini pronoun, nomini noun/nominal, verbi verb, topikaali-nen koheesio topical cohesion, suora lainaus direct quote, ajatusreferaatti reporting ofthought, prosodinen kokonaisuus prosodic entirety, adverbiaali adverbial, subjektisubject, konteksti context, diskurssimaailma universe of discourse, semantiikkasemantics, semanttis-pragmaattisesti semantico-pragmatic, lismerkitys secondary/addedmeaning, implikaatio implicature, spesifinen specific, geneerinen generic, kieliopilli-nen kuvaus grammatical description, ellipsis, co-referentiality, topical focus etc.

Similar terms are, of course, found in traditional descriptions of Finnish. Surely itis of relevance to ask, for example, What is grammar? What is syntax? What islexis? Are they related to each other? If so, how? What is the nature of therelationship between them? What is a grammatical entirety? What is a syntacticalentirety? What is a prosodic entirety? Are they related to each other? If so, how?Is a virke sentence a grammatical unit? etc. etc. Even if linguistic terms such asthe ones that are listed above are not used in a particular article, the fact remainsthat they are part and parcel of the implicit assumptions underlying any analysis:the study of language is theory-laden.

However, making ones assumptions explicit is not always an easy thing todo: there are various difficulties involved in the explication of theories andtheoretical concepts. One of the problems in presenting SF theory to linguists whohave been schooled in or have been influenced by other theories is that it quiteclearly belongs to a different paradigm, in Kuhns (1970) sense of the word. Kuhnwas of the opinion that different paradigms are incommensurable, and, thus, mutualunderstanding is impossible, or near impossible. Moreover, the language of theory,

11

like language itself, is not monoglossic: it, too, is inherently intertextual andheteroglossic.

In spite of the difficulties involved, at least it can be said of a theoreticalapproach is that it explicitly rejects what Chalmers (1982) has referred to as anaive inductivist position. According to the naive inductivist, we start bycarefully observing and faithfully recording what we see and hear, and we do thiswith an unprejudiced mind. Then we make statements about our observations, andon the basis of these statements, we begin to develop our theories. The inductivistworks on the assumption that a general law or principle can be inferred byobserving particular instances. He or she assumes that observation precedes theoryand that we can make observation statements that are independent of theory, thatwe can have direct, unadulterated and atheoretical access to what is happening inthe world around us. Such a view has long been questioned by philosophers ofscience: no-one is born into a vacuum; our observations, and the statements wemake about them, depend on our education, our expectations, our knowledge, ourexperiences and our culture, all of which can be referred to as low-level theory(Chalmers 1982: 28). Observation does not precede theory, it presupposes theory.

The above is true of any of our observations, but when it comes to theanalysis of language, then any educated linguist has had at least twelve years ofexposure to a western European notion of language as it is enshrined in theeducational system (see e.g. Harris 1981, Mhlhausler 1987) and at least someexposure to so-called traditional grammar, ie. grammatical description in which theunderlying theoretical assumptions are not explicated. Moreover, there are manyfolk linguistic notions about language, which are part of the received view oflanguage in any society. Statements made by linguists about language are boundto be theory-laden, the assumptions are simply not explicated (see also Joseph &Taylor (eds.) 1990).

However, with any description of language, whether explicitly theoretical ornot, there is always the danger of making the data fit the categories that one set up

12

or even making it fit the unexplicated assumptions one has about the data. Withlinguistic theories, all too often the theory becomes a self-sufficient end in itself,without regard to the nature of the phenomenon that it purports to describe (cf. A.Hakulinen 1989: 45 ff.). The linguistic categories that are originally set up toaccount for similarities and oppositions in a language become reified (cf. Halliday1988a: 27-28), and the dialectic between theory and description that should be thebasis of linguistic analysis is lost.

The importance of a dialectic between theory and description has beenstressed from the earliest systemic work. Firth, whose ideas laid the foundation forSF theory, repeatedly refers to the somewhat mystical sounding renewal ofconnection (e.g. Firth 1957: 24; in Palmer ed. 1968: 19,175-176). By this hemeant the testing of a theory or hypothesis with data. This topic is taken up byFawcett in the foreword of a recent volume of systemic papers, which echoesearlier statements to a similar effect (e.g. Halliday, McIntosh, & Strevens 1964: 32;Halliday in McIntosh & Halliday 1966: 41):

The theory that [this volume] discusses is always theory that arises out of the actual textual dataof languages, and that leads back to further description ) thus completing the cycle of therenewal of connection, which J.R. Firth wisely advised us to remember to make. One mighteven propose as a guiding principle: No theory without description, and no descriptionwithout a theory ) the theory, of course, often turning out to be inadequate. (Halliday &Fawcett (eds.) 1987: ix.) [Emphasis added.]

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Chapter 2 An Outline of Systemic-Functional Theory

2.1. Overview

This chapter provides a short introduction to SF theory, from the early scale andcategory grammar to what was known first as systemic theory and later assystemic-functional theory. There is particular emphasis on those aspects of thetheory that are relevant to an understanding of the grammatical analysis that ispresented in this study and the assumptions that underlie it. It also discusses anumber of issues (e.g. knowledge of language) from a wider metatheoreticalperspective. The chapter is divided into three sections. Section 2.2 is a briefdiscussion of the London School of Linguistics, which is important because itprovided the base from which SF theory has developed. Section 2.3 is concernedwith general theoretical issues and some of the basic assumptions of SF theory.Section 2.4 deals with more specific features of SF grammar. The focus in section2.4 is on the present position, although there is some discussion of developmentsthat have occurred since the earliest work. As not all SF linguists would concur onall of the theoretical issues mentioned, an attempt will be made to bring togetherwhat is common to those working within a SF framework, and take a critical lookat some of the assumptions.

2.2. The London School of Linguistics

2.2.1. General Remarks

SF theory has developed out of the London School of linguistics (see Robins 1967:213-220; Butler 1985: 1-13; Sampson 1980: 212-235), a loosely framed school ofthought influenced by the ideas of J.R. Firth (1890 ) 1960). Firths theory oflanguage, if it can be referred to as a theory, was never fully and coherentlyexplicated. His ideas about language are sketchily presented in two early works

14

1 For a short overview of Firths ideas, see Henderson 1987.

meant for the non-specialist (Firth 1930, 1937; republished in one volume in 1964)and two collections of articles, one of them posthumously edited by F.R. Palmer(Firth 1957; Palmer (ed.) 1968).1

Firths main areas of interest were 1) phonology, in particular, prosodicanalysis and 2) meaning, where linguistic meaning was seen as being contextuallydetermined, both in terms of a) the linguistic context (or, in Saussurean terms, thelinguistic value) of an item at a particular level or stratum and b) the extralinguisticcontext of situation. Firth (1957: 27) reserved the word semantics for meaningin this latter sense, i.e., meaning considered in terms of the extralinguistic context.This has also been referred to as both contextual meaning (Firth 1957: 195) andsituational meaning (Robins 1961: 195).

2.2.2. System and Structure

Out of Firths work in phonology came two sets of notions which were to be ofsignificance in SF theory: a) system and structure and b) a multi-structural andpolysystemic approach to language (in Palmer (ed.) 1968: 200). Firths notions ofsystem and structure are based on the structuralist notions of paradigmatic andsyntagmatic relations, paradigmatic relations (first used by Hjelmslev 1959 [1938]:152) being a development of Saussures psychologically oriented associativerelations (Saussure 1983 [1916]: 121-125). However, in contrast to Saussure, Firthdid not regard these notions as being applicable to the language as a whole (seenext section).

For Firth, a system and a structure are complementary: a structure is formedby elements in syntagmatic relation at a particular level of analysis, while a systemis made up of the mutually exclusive paradigmatic options that come into play at

15

a particular place in a structure (in Palmer (ed.) 1968: 103). This relationship hasbeen mnemonically illustrated by the following diagram (Dinneen 1967: 305):

sys

s t r u c t u r eem

Firths approach is, however, both polysystemic and multi-structural (inPalmer (ed.) 1968: 200). The term multi-structural refers to the fact that anystructure may be the result of the integration of two or more co-existing structures.For Firth (1957: 121-123, 137), a given language is polysystemic in that it involvesa plurality of systems. The notion of polysystemicity seems to be a generalprinciple which can be applied in various ways (see Firth 1957: 121 ff., 136; inPalmer (ed.) 1968: 43; Robins 1964: 167; 1967: 219).

2.2.3. Restricted Languages and Speech Fellowships

Because of the vastness, complexity and diversity of language, Firth (in Palmer(ed.) 1968: 97-98,110,112; cf. Bakhtin 1981) saw the task of describing itexhaustively an impossible one. He insisted that the techniques of descriptionshould be applied to restricted languages, not to the language as a whole. Arestricted language is seen as a delimited or circumscribed sub-language within thegeneral language with its own grammar and dictionary (in Palmer (ed.) 1968: 29-30,87). It provides data that is already fenced off, as Firth put it, for the linguist.The examples given by Firth would seem to indicate that the manner in which arestricted language is fenced off was not important for Firth: his examplessuggest that a restricted language corresponds not only to a register, but also to thelanguage of a particular text or set of texts. Examples given by Firth (in Palmer(ed.) 1968: 29,87,98, 106,112,118-119) include the language of modern Arabicheadlines, of politics or meteorology, or of a particular text or a particular writer.

16

1 Personality, in the Firthian sense, can thus be seen at the intersection of the various socialnetworks (in the sense of Milroy 1987) to which a person belongs.

As well as making a distinction between the general language and a restrictedlanguage, Firth also made a distinction between the general language communityand what he referred to as a speech fellowship. In a speech fellowship, the speechof a group reflects a bond of fellowship based on the sharing of a truly commonexperience (Firth 1957: 186). Speech fellowships are reflected in the study ofpersons or what Firth referred to as personalities, i.e. social (or sociallyconstructed) entities who actively participate in the creation and maintenance of aparticular culture or sub-culture. While Firth maintained that he was interested inthe specific person, he qualified this by saying that those that are to be studied arerepresentative or usually typical of an important speech fellowship in a widerspeech community (1957: 143,226; in Palmer (ed.) 1968: 32,187). Such personsare seen as being in command of a constellation of restricted languages whichare governed by personality in social life and the general language of thecommunity (in Palmer (ed.) 1968: 207-208).

Thus, for Firth what was linguistically salient was the social entity, thepersonality, rather than the biological or natural entity, which Firth referred toas the individual. Firth (1957: 28,184) saw the social person as the product of thevarious social roles she or he has to play in a particular society and likened aperson to an actor in a play with various roles to play.1 Social roles are learntalmost from birth as a person is incorporated into various speech fellowships in aparticular society.

Members of a speech fellowship belong to a wider language community, andthe widest community based on English is the English-speaking world. This widercommunity is not homogeneous, but based on diversity; it is not founded on astandardization which neutralizes the various accents, registers and dialects, but onthe diversity of linguistic personalities:

17

Members of various speech fellowships may, however, belong to larger speech or languagecommunities without conflict of values. Both sets of values deserve respect. The vastenterprises of the English-speaking world, operated by English, go on without standardizationof accent. You may estimate the relative values of what is called an Oxford accent, anAberdonian accent, a Boston, a New York, or an Australian accent, but the main thing is awider language community with room for diversity of personality. (Firth 1957: 186.)[Emphasis added.]

As suggested earlier, Firth was aware of the problems inherent in describinga monolithic system which purported to reflect the unity of language:

The multiplicity of social roles we have to play as members of a race, nation, class, family,school, club, as sons, brothers, lovers, fathers, workers, ... public speakers, involves also acertain degree of linguistic specialization. Unity is the last concept that should be applied tolanguage... There is no such thing as une langue une and there never has been. (Firth1957: 29.) [Emphasis added.]

Thus, Firths notion of a general language, such as English or Swahili or Finnish,can be seen as the union of a vast number of subsets of restricted languages. Firthsresponse to the complexity and diversity of language phenomena was to confinethe analysis to restricted subsets of the language.

Firths approach to the vastness of language phenomena can be contrastedwith the approach taken by Chomsky. Chomskys (1965: 3-4) response was to setup a dichotomy between competence and performance, between the speaker-listeners knowledge of a language and the actual use of language (as an individualactivity) in concrete situations, and, furthermore, to regard linguistic theory asbeing concerned with an ideal speaker-listener in a perfectly homogenous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly.

Thus, while Firth at least purported to be concerned with abstracting andmaking generalizations from the speech of specific persons typical of a speechfellowship, Chomsky was concerned with the representation of the grammaticalknowledge of a collective uniformity. The ideal speaker-listener is a fiction: itis a member of society in which there are no divisions according to race, sex, class

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or social position. Chomskys approach could be seen as focusing on theintersection of the restricted languages within a given language, or, given hisemphasis on what is common to all languages, on the intersection of the intersec-tions of the restricted languages of all languages. Consequently, Chomskysapproach has led to a view of grammar where all variation is neutralized andgrammatical analysis is restricted to a small set of phenomena which are possiblecandidates for language universals. No doubt, Firth would have felt thatChomskyan linguistics had very little to do with the living of life (in Palmer (ed.)1968: 169). Regardless of their theoretical manifestos, however, in practice bothFirth and Chomsky have based their grammatical descriptions on middle-to-upperclass standard varieties. Firths phonetic and phonological analyses of English (inFirth 1957), for example, are clearly based on a standard middle-to-upper classvariety.

2.2.4. A General Linguistic Theory

Firth (1957: 144; in Palmer (ed.) 1968: 152, 190-202) was interested in a generallinguistic theory, a theoretical framework with which to approach the descriptionof any given language, but not in a theory of linguistic universals in the sense thatit has become familiar in Chomskyan and post-Chomskyan linguistics:

What is here being sketched is a general linguistic theory applicable to particular linguisticdescriptions, not a theory of universals for general linguistic description. (Firth in Palmer (ed.)1968: 190.)

In response to universalist statements such as there are no real adjectives inSwahili, Firth warned against the hypostatization, or reification, of grammaticalcategories. The grammatical categories for a particular language are abstractionswhich are determined by the interrelations in the systems set up by the linguist forthat language, not realities which are either present or absent in a language. (Seealso Hasan 1971.) Moreover, a grammatical category is regarded by Firth (inPalmer (ed.) 1968: 39) as ineffable: it eludes our conscious attempts to define it.

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(This problem has been taken up by Halliday (1988a) and will be discussed insection 2.4.11 (p. 63).)

2.2.5. Meaning

Firth saw meaning as the cornerstone of linguistic theory: the study of languageis the study of linguistic meaning (1957: 190; in Palmer (ed.) 1968, Ch.1).Moreover, linguistic meaning could only be understood by appreciating theintimate relationship between language and society. As Firth (1957: 226; in Palmer(ed.) 1968: 12-13) points out, words are not isolates which somehow have meaningin and by themselves, as logicians and some linguists would have us believe; theyhave meaning because they function in the particular society in which the speakershappen to live. Thus, language is seen not in terms of an individual mental activityor as an abstract construct divorced from reality, but as an integral part of thephysical and social world in which we live. Meanings are created in society:

As we know so little about mind and as our study is essentially social, I shall cease to respectthe duality of mind and body, thought and word, and be satisfied with the whole man, thinkingand acting as a whole in association with his fellows. I do not therefore follow Ogden andRichards in regarding meaning as relations in a hidden mental process, but chiefly as situationalrelations in a context of situation and in that kind of language which disturbs the air and otherpeoples ears, as modes of behaviour in relation to other elements in the context ofsituation. (Firth 1957: 19.) [Emphasis added.]

Firth extended Malinowskis (1923) view of meaning as function in contextto incorporate linguistic contexts at all levels: meaning originates not only in thesocial context but in successive linguistic contexts. Linguistic meaning in itsentirety was thus seen as a complex of contextual relations:

Meaning ... is to be regarded as a complex of contextual relations, and phonetics, grammar,lexicography, and semantics each handles its own components of the complex in its appropriateenvironment. (Firth 1957: 19.)

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Each successive linguistic context is, thus, seen as providing a step in the accessto the total meaning of an utterance. Firth, pace Harris (1987a), advocated a two-way approach: one can either work from the context of situation to phonology orfrom phonology to the context of situation (1957: 192).

In discussing his approach to meaning, Firth (e.g. Firth 1957: 19; in Palmer(ed.) 1968: 200) often used the analogy of the dispersion of light waves into aspectrum: just as white light is the fusion of a number of colours of differingwavelengths, linguistic meaning is the fusion of a number of different modes ofmeaning. This fusion of meaning is impossible to analyse until it is dispersed (ordeconstructed) into various modes of meaning.

It is necessary ... to split up the problem of meaning into its components or elements. Theprocess may be compared, metaphorically speaking, to the dispersion of white light into aspectrum by means of a prism. The prism in our case is descriptive linguistics and the spectrumis the multiple statements of meaning at various levels. (Firth in Palmer (ed.) 1968: 108.)

2.2.6. Rejection of Saussurean Structuralism

While Firths notions of a system and a structure are based on the Saussureannotions of syntagmatic and associative relations, and, in some respects, hisapproach to meaning relies on Saussures notion of value, Firth did not considerhimself a Saussurean and explicitly rejected many of Saussures ideas (Firth 1957:36,179-181; in Palmer (ed.) 1968: 127-129; Halliday 1978: 51). What is central tothe Saussurean model of language is langue, a static synchronic system in whichthere are no positive terms and everything is defined negatively in terms of abstractrelations of opposition (Saussure 1983 [1916]: 118). Such a conception oflanguage, as Firth (1957: 180-181) points out, excludes not only actual words andsounds, but also the actual speakers of the language. Thus, Saussurean structural-ism leads to a reification of langue, and the concrete dialogic nature of languageis ignored (cf. Voloshinov 1973 [1930]). If we ignore the constant dialecticbetween language as system (or as multiple systems) and language as speech and... texts related to the living of, and therefore to the meaning of life (in Palmer

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1 See section 2.4.14, for a further distinction between a synoptic and a dynamic perspectiveon language.

(ed.) 1968: 169), then we also ignore inter alia the means of exploring linguisticvariation and change. This distinction between language as system and languageas speech and text is comparable to Hjelmslevs (1953: 5) notion of language assystem and language as process, which, in later SF terms could be glossed aslanguage as system and language as (spoken or written) text.1 For Firth, thedialectic between system and text is central:

Renewal of connection with the processes and patterns of life in the instances of experience isthe final justification of abstract linguistics. (Firth 1957: 24.)

2.2.7. Firth and SF Theory

Many of the assumptions underlying Firths approach to linguistic analysis werecarried over into SF linguistics. While there have been many changes of emphasisand direction, Firths influence and input is still evident. SF theory has retainedFirths focus on text and has built upon and developed his ideas on restrictedlanguages, the context of situation, and on the notions of system and structure.More importantly, however, Firths influence is evident in the multifaceted andwide-ranging approach to meaning: SF grammar is about meaning, about theresources that are available in a language that allow us to say and do meaningfulthings. It is about the lexicogrammatical resources that allow us to make meanings.

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2.3. SF Theory: General Considerations

2.3.1. Language as a Linguistic Behaviour Potential

For systemic-functional linguists, linguistic behaviour is a form of social behaviour(Halliday 1978: 36-39): people are socialized into a particular culture and havelearnt to interact in meaningful ways. For example, ways of coming into actualphysical contact with another person (e.g. shaking hands, touching another personsshoulder or leg, hugging, kissing, slapping, and hitting) are meaningful and themeaning of a particular action can vary from one culture (or sub-culture) to the nextand can co-vary with any of a multitude of factors such as gender, social status,class, profession etc. A particular culture thus embodies a number of choices in itssocially sanctioned forms of interaction. These choices can be seen as making upa resource or a potential of socially significant ways of behaving. This resource orpotential is referred to by Halliday as a behaviour potential.

Although much of our social behaviour, i.e. the behaviour we learn as webecome socialized into a particular group or society, is expressed in non-linguisticways, more significant, at least from the point of view of linguistics, is the way inwhich we behave linguistically. If, for example, A and B are both speakers ofEnglish, and A wants B to close the door, it is conceivable that A could point in thedirection of the door with appropriate gestures or glare at both B and the open door,but there are a number of ways of achieving this linguistically, e.g. How manytimes have I told you to close the door behind you, Please close the door,Would you please be so kind as to close the door behind you, Were you bornin a tent? etc. From this perspective, a language can be seen as a form ofbehaviour which finds expression linguistically. It is a resource or a potential fordoing meaningful things, enabling us to achieve certain ends in certain ways. It canbe represented as a system of choices or options. The use of the term choice oroption, however, is not meant to suggest that choices in language are simply amatter of the speaking making a rational decision (see next section and Thibault1987: 604,607).

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A language can be seen as a meaning potential or a semantic potential(see e.g. Halliday 1973: 51,72); or, perhaps, more appropriately, as a meaning-making potential ) the notion of a potential should not be misunderstood as astatic inventory of predetermined meanings. The semantic potential of a languageis realized in terms of the linguistic resources that are available, i.e. in terms of thelexicogrammatical system of the language. The semantic potential and the (non-linguistic) behaviour potential together contribute to the total semiotic potential ofa society.

2.3.2. The SF Interpretation of Langue

To see language as a resource, rather than as a structure or as a system of rules, hasimportant repercussions for the way in which Saussures notions of langue andparole are interpreted. In SF linguistics, this distinction is seen in terms ofpotential vs. actual (Berry 1975: 24; Halliday 1978: 37-38; Fawcett 1980: 55). Apotential can be regarded as what it is possible for people to say in a particularlanguage, it can be regarded as a system of lexical and grammatical choices ) themeaning-making resources ) that are available in any language. Actual linguisticbehaviour can be seen as what is said at a particular time and place, as theparticular configuration of choices that is made.

In contrast to Firth, who did not think it was feasible to look at language asa whole and wanted to restrict linguistic analysis to a subset of a language asreflected in his restricted languages, systemic-functional linguists see languageas the union of all of these subsets. Like Firth, however, they would still reject thenotion of language as a unity. Language is not unified, but inherently variable.While there is variation in language, it is not random, but can be correlated withvarious factors. These factors can be roughly grouped under a number of headings:

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(1) Variation that can be associated with social phenomena such as gender,class, etc. (see e.g. Hasan 1987a, 1988, 1989; Hasan & Cloran 1990).(2) Variation related to differences in the contexts of language use (see 2.3.7).(3) Variation related to regional (or geographical) differences in language.

An important consequence of regarding langue as a potential is that it allowsus to say that not all individuals (or, more correctly, groups of individuals) have thesame access to this potential. (This also applies to the linguist; see next section.)An obvious example, is the differential access to legal institutions: many of us areunfamiliar with legal procedures and courts of law, and, consequently, have to relyon the services of a lawyer. However, there are also more subtle ways in whichsome social groups do not have access to potential forms of linguistic interaction,and this may put them at a social or educational disadvantage. For example,Bernstein has attempted to show that the ways in which it is natural for lowerworking class pupils to interact is different from the ways in which middle classchildren interact, and, because the educational system is based on middle classassumptions, working class children are at a disadvantage. (For an overview, seeBernstein 1987.)

Saussure (1983[1916]) saw langue as basically a property of the speechcommunity, and, in this sense, the SF notion of langue as a potentiality is closerto the Saussurean notion than Chomskys (1957) notion of competence, which isa property of the individual. For Saussure (1983: 19), however, while langue wasa distillation of social behaviour, it takes the form of a totality of imprints ineveryones brain, rather like a dictionary of which each individual has an identicalcopy, and it is this position which has led to an internalization of the object ofinquiry, as taken up by Chomsky and others. With Chomsky, this has led to anextreme psycho-biological approach to language. Many other linguists, while theymay not share Chomskys views, still tend to view linguistics as a branch ofcognitive psychology.

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2.3.3. The Individual and the Social Aspect of Language

Systemic-functional linguists stress the social and interactive nature of language(Halliday 1978: 12-13; 38-39; 56-57; Fawcett 1980: 6; Berry 1975: 22-23).However, language as a social and interactive phenomenon can be viewed fromtwo perspectives. Halliday (1978: 12-16, 56-57) contrasts what he refers to asinter-organism and intra-organism perspectives, which he sees as complemen-tary. This is similar to Saussures (1983: 8-9) view of the complementarity of theindividual and social aspects of language. According to Saussure, the individualand the social are complementary in the sense that they are dependent on eachother: one is not conceivable without the other.

The inter-organism perspective sees language externally: as something thatis happening between people. The intra-organism perspective looks at it internally:as something that is going on in a persons head. Hallidays main interest is in aninter-organism perspective on language; there are others within SF linguistics,notably Fawcett (1980), who subscribe to an intra-organism perspective.

The intra-organism perspective on language is further complicated by the factthat it can be interpreted in various ways. When Halliday first made the distinctionit was made at a time when linguistics was dominated by Chomskys assumptionsabout the nature of language and the purpose of linguistics. In Chomskys (1968,1976) approach, knowledge of language refers to abstract knowledge of the rules,principles, and conditions that characterize all human languages. This knowledgeis abstracted by the linguist from context-free sentences, and related to innate,but as yet unknown, mechanisms in the human brain. However, knowledge oflanguage involves a lot more than abstract rules about the organization of language:

We do not simply know our mother tongue as an abstract system of vocal signals, or as if itwas some sort of grammar book with a dictionary attached. We know it in the sense ofknowing how to use it; we know how to communicate with other people, how to chooseforms of language that are appropriate to the type of situation we find ourselves in, and so on.All this can be expressed as a form of knowledge: we know how to behave linguistically.(Halliday 1978: 13.) [Emphasis added.]

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It is in this wider sense that an intra-organism perspective is seen as beingcomplementary to an inter-organism perspective.

An intra-organism perspective on language in use is somewhat different toHymes (1967, 1986) notion of communicative competence. As Halliday (1978:92) points out, the very notion of communicative competence assumes that thereis a distinct kind of competence (i.e. Chomskys grammatical competence) that isbased on ones knowledge of language in vacuo. From a SF perspective, the onlykind of competence is communicative competence:

If our goal is the pursuit of system-in-language (Fishman 1971: 7), this is surely linguistics,and linguistics always has ... accepted what Hymes (1967) calls the socio-cultural dimensionsof its subject-matter, the link between language and the social factors that must be adducedto explain observed linguistic phenomena. By the same token, however, we do not needcommunicative competence, which has to be adduced only if the system has first beenisolated from its social context. If we are concerned with what the speaker-hearer knows, asdistinct from what he can do, and we call this his competence, then competence iscommunicative competence; there is no other kind. (Halliday 1978: 92.) [Emphasisadded.]

2.3.4. Knowledge of Language

On the other hand, from the perspective of the philosophy of science, it has beencogently and convincingly argued by E. Itkonen (1983a, 1983b) that knowledgeis epistemologically prior in any investigation, whether the object of investigationis language or electricity. Any investigation of language must be based onassumptions that a linguist makes about the regularities in that language, and thisis true whether the language in question is the investigators native language, aforeign language, or even a extinct language. Regularities or tendencies or rules arenot concrete entities that can be observed, they can only be intuited or abstractedon the basis of our analytical reasoning processes.

While Itkonen talks of knowledge of language, he does not give it amystical status, but insists on the primarily social nature of knowledge andlanguage, and on the intersubjectivity of the rules of language (E. Itkonen 1978).

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1 An idealist might want to deny this. The fact remains, however, that while there isdifferentiation according to class, race, ethnicity, education, age or sex in any society andregional variation in nationally recognized languages, a privileged status is only afforded tocertain varieties: it would be difficult to imagine the president of Finland giving a speech inSavo dialect or a black American judge handing down a sentence in black English vernacular,except in a comedy programme on television.

Moreover, when he describes it as intuitive, the implication is not that a nativespeakers knowledge of a language is innate, but that it is internalized, and, in orderto be explicated, involves introspection. The analysis of a linguists knowledge ofthe rules of a language is referred to by Itkonen as autonomous linguistics (i.e.this is how Itkonen (1978) defines autonomous linguistics). According to Itkonen(1983a: 1), autonomous linguistics investigates language in itself, abstractingfrom either the social or psychological mechanisms that sustain it. It is theconceptual precondition of linguistic investigations dealing with external evidence(Itkonen 1983a: 10). As such, autonomous linguistics does not make use ofexternal evidence, and the use of a corpus is justified only in the analysis of unclearcases and in the testing of descriptions.

While it seems clear that Itkonen is correct in maintaining that a linguist mustalways proceed from (intuitive) knowledge of a language, and this is an importantconsideration in the development of a theory, 1) one needs to carefully consider theimplications of what it means to say that knowledge of language is primarily social,and 2) one needs to look more closely at the status of a corpus in linguistic theoryand description. The first point will be discussed first.

If knowledge of language is social, then it is learnt from experience, throughinteraction with other socialized beings. Our knowledge of a language, thus,depends on our capacity to abstract from our experiences with a particular languageand language community. If this is accepted, then it follows that a linguistsknowledge of language will depend not only on her or his social positioning butalso on the types of language that are legitimized through social and educationalinstitutions.1

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Moreover, when we attempt to articulate this knowledge, we cannot assumethat we have direct or unadulterated access to it (cf. 1.5): we cannot overlook thefact that many of our supposed intuitions about language depend on a receivedview of what language is and how it works. Harris (1981), for example, hasreferred to the received view of language in Western societies as the languagemyth, a myth which he sees as having been perpetuated by modern theoreticallinguistics. One facet of the language myth is the fixed code fallacy, a fallacywhich has been institutionalized by an educational and political system intent onstandardizing the linguistic behaviour of pupils and which is based on thesacrosanctity of the dictionary and grammar book.

Furthermore, our view of language is also influenced by the language wespeak, since any language incorporates theories about reality in its very structureand organization (Whorf in Carroll 1956; Popper 1972: 165). Language itself ispart of that reality, and as Reddy (1979) has demonstrated, the English language,for example, incorporates certain ways of talking about language, and, conse-quently, predisposes us to talk about language in a particular way. The situation isfurther complicated when we look at the position of the linguist as compared withthat of the non-linguist. While even the theoretically naive native speaker isexposed to esoteric knowledge about language, i.e. the kind of knowledge that isconstructed in educational institutions, the position of the linguist is more complexin that she or he, like any scientist, is schooled into a particular way of seeingthings (cf. Kuhn 1970).

To turn to the second point concerning the status of a corpus in linguistictheory and description, as stated earlier, Itkonen (1983a, 1983b) sees the use of acorpus as being justified only in the analysis of unclear cases and in the testing ofdescriptions. While Itkonen (1983a: 10) does not claim that the use of a corpus isincompatible with autonomous linguistics (as he defines it), he nevertheless givesa prior and privileged status to the use of intuited examples. More recently,however, there seems to be a slight shift in Itkonens position (1990: 354-355):

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instead of minimizing the role of external evidence, he stresses the need for asymbiotic relationship between a corpus, on the one hand, and, on the other hand,ones knowledge of language as manifest in the use of intuited examples andgrammatical tests (such as the deletion test used in determining, for example, thecore or obligatory actants in a process (see Chapter 6)).

One the other hand, one cannot simplistically assume that a corpus isobjective simply because it consists of text or fragments of text that have not beenintuited by the linguist. As Itkonen (1983a: 8) points out, an act of observation isnot necessarily any less subjective than an act of intuition. The choice of oneexample rather than another is a subjective choice, as too is the choice of the textfrom which the example is taken. Thus, the choice of a particular text representa-tive of a particular genre ) e.g. newspaper editorials, dialects interviews (orfragments from them), interpersonal (casual) conversations ) are not objectivechoices, but necessarily involve theoretical assumptions and skew the descriptiontowards a particular genre. In all of the examples just given, for instance, languageis constitutive rather than ancillary ) as in a service encounter or in a game of icehockey ) and this is true of the vast majority of linguistic corpora that I am awareof.

As pointed out in Chapter 1, I have avoided the use of intuited examplesbecause 1) they smack of a decontextualized view of language and 2) onesknowledge of (the use of) language is often unduly influenced by received viewsof language. This study, however, is not a corpus-based study in that it is not basedon a particular corpus. The text examples have been selected on the basis of myknowledge of the way in which Finnish is used in Finland: they are used toillustrate my knowledge of Finnish. This, as Itkonens points out, must be thestarting point.

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2.3.5. A Reality Construction View of Language

The view of language assumed in SF theory and in this study is what Grace (1987)refers to as a reality construction view of language. Grace is not a systemic-functional linguist, but his views are presented here as it seems to me that they aremore accessible to those unfamiliar with systemic-functional linguistics than thewritings of systemic-functional linguists. While the views of systemic-functionallinguists may be more developed than those of Grace (1987), they are also morecomplex and, possibly, more esoteric (see, e.g. Halliday 1973, 1974, 1978, 1984,1987; Hasan 1984a, 1988, 1989).

Grace distinguishes his construction view of language from a mapping ofa common reality view. In the mapping view, languages are analogous to mapsof a common reality; in the construction view, language is seen as one of theessential means by which reality is socially constructed. Grace subscribes to aconstruction view of language, as would many systemic-functional linguists. Thediscussion that follows is based mainly on Grace (1987); however, as I do notentirely agree with his interpretation of a reality construction view, I depart fromit in some respects. First, I shall explore some of the implications of the mappingview.

The mapping view is seen as the predominant view in linguistics; it is theview of language which underlies normal science (Kuhn 1970). It assumes thereis a pre-existing language-independent reality, which can be talked about throughlanguage. Each language is like a map of this reality. Although each language does,in fact, provide a somewhat different mapping of reality, the differences are merelydifferences in classification: languages divide reality up in different ways, theyprovide different maps of the same content. The key assumption of the mappingview, according to Grace, is the intertranslatability postulate, i.e. anything can besaid in any language. This assumption can be made because languages are seen asempty codes which mediate a universally-shared reality.

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1 To say that reality is unknowable is not, of course, the same thing as saying that it does notexist.

Because languages are like maps of a language-independent reality, thesemantics of language is seen in terms of truth-conditions. This truth-conditionalapproach is criticized by Grace and others (e.g. Harris 1987b) for seriouslymisrepresenting the way in which language really works. In Harriss view, truth-conditional semantics is part of a view of language which divorces language fromhuman activities and truth from human morality and values, it is a semantics forrobots, not human beings (1987b: 159). (See also Shore 1991a.)

Whereas the mapping view is based on objectivist assumptions about reality,the unknowability of reality is central in a reality construction view. Becausereality is unknowable,1 the languages we speak cannot represent it; instead, theyprovide models of it (Grace 1987: 6; Halliday 1987). Language is assumed torepresent a reality which has been created by human beings rather than reflectingsome objective external reality. (Grace 1987: 118.) The constructionist viewemphasises the social and cultural shaping of our effective environment, i.e. theworld in which we live and conduct our daily affairs. It is a world which, to a largeextent, has been created by language and knowledge of which is maintained andtransmitted through language.

In a constructionist view (Grace 1987: 10,121-124), there is no clear linebetween thinking, bringing a thought into being, and encoding the thought byputting it into words. Grace sees thoughts as being dependent on words. I wouldexpand this to say that thoughts are dependent on our semiotic systems, and themost important of our semiotic systems is the language that we use in everydaylife. (Another important consideration is how one understands the notionthought. Some linguists appear to see thought in terms of problem-solving ratherthan as a semiotic (meaning-making) process.)

A constructionist view rejects a truth-conditional approach to semantics.

Grace (1987: 49) discusses semantics in terms of goodness of fit: instead of a

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1 It is clear from the context, that Halliday is referring to truth in the truth-conditional sense.

sharp line between truth and falsity there are degrees of goodness of fit. Thus,

when someone makes a statement such as The dog bit the man or, to use Austins

example, France is hexagonal, according to Grace, the statement is judged on the

basis of the goodness of fit between the model and the actual reality. It seems to

me, however, that Grace is still tied to a tradition that sees semantics as being

primarily concerned with truth and falsity, in Graces case, with degrees of truth

or falsity. Halliday (1985: 76), on the other hand, maintains that semantics has

nothing to do with truth1, and this is reflected, for example, in his analysis of

polarity and modality. Semantics is seen as being concerned with how we use

language as a resource for meaning, how we can do meaningful things with

language, either truthfully or falsely. (See also Harris (1987b: 158 ff.) discussion

of truth-conditional seman