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Systematic Theology [1878]

by

Charles G. Finney

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About Systematic Theology [1878] by Charles G. Finney

Systematic Theology [1878]Title:http://www.ccel.org/ccel/finney/theology.htmlURL:Finney, Charles Grandison (1792-1875)Author(s):Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal LibraryPublisher:Public DomainRights:All; TheologyCCEL Subjects:

http://www.ccel.org/ccel/finney/theology.htmlhttp://www.ccel.org/ccel/finney/authInfo.html

Table of Contents

p. iiAbout This Book. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 1Title Page. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 3Note by the Editor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 4Prefatory Material. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 4Preface by Rev. Georger Redford, D.D.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 6Preface by the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 10Contents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 20Systematic Theology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 20Lecture I. Moral Law.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 24Lecture II. Moral Government.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 36Lecture III. Moral Obligation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 53Lecture V. Foundation of Moral Obligation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 62Lecture VI. Foundation of Moral Obligation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 75Lecture VII. Foundation of Moral Obligation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

p. 89Lecture VIII. Foundation of Moral Obligation. The Practical Tendency ofthe Various Theories.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

p. 102Lecture IX. Unity of Moral Action. Can Obedience to Moral Law bePartial?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

p. 120Lecture X. Obedience Entire.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 128Lecture XI. Obedience to the Moral Law.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 138Lecture XII. Attributes of Love.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 147Lecture XIII. Attributes of Love.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 156Lecture XIV. Attributes of Love.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 164Lecture XV. Attributes of Love.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 176Lecture XVI. What Constitutes Disobedience to Moral Law?. . . . . . . . .p. 179Lecture XVII. Attributes of Selfishness.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 191Lecture XVIII. Attributes of Selfishness.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 201Lecture XIX. Sanctions of Moral Law, Natural and Governmental.. . . . .p. 207Lecture XX. Human Government.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 214Lecture XXI. Human Government.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 219Lecture XXII. Moral Depravity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 226Lecture XXIII. Moral Depravity.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

p. 235

Lecture XXIV. Moral Depravity. Further Examination of the ArgumentsAdduced in Support of the Position, that Human Nature is in ItselfSinful.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Charles G. FinneySystematic Theology [1878]

p. 246Lecture XXV. Atonement.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 261Lecture XXVI. Extent of Atonement.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 268Lecture XXVII. Regeneration.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 277Lecture XXVIII. Regeneration.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 285Lecture XXIX. Evidences of Regeneration.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 293Lecture XXX. Evidences of Regeneration.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 302Lecture XXXI. Natural Ability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 320Lecture XXXII. Gracious Ability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

p. 329Lecture XXXIII. The Notion of Inability. Proper Method of Accounting forIt.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

p. 338Lecture XXXIV. Repentance and Impenitence.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 347Lecture XXXV. Faith and Unbelief.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 355Lecture XXXVI. Justification.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 373Lecture XXVII. Sanctification.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 392Lecture XXXVIII. Sanctification. Paul Entirely Sanctified.. . . . . . . . . . .p. 401Lecture XXXIX. Sanctification.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 414Lecture XL. Sanctification.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 426Lecture XLI. Sanctification. Further Objections Answered.. . . . . . . . . .p. 435Lecture XLII. Sanctification. Remarks.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 443Lecture XLIII. Election.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 459Lecture XLIV. Reprobation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 474Lecture XLV. Divine Sovereignty.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 482Lecture XLVI. Purposes of God.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 501Lecture XLVII. Perseverance of Saints.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 509Lecture XLVIII. Perseverance of the Saints Proved.. . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 517Lecture XLIX. Perseverance Proved.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 537Lecture L. Perseverance of Saints. Objections Answered.. . . . . . . . . .p. 554Lecture LI. Perseverance of Saints. Further Objections Answered.. . . . .p. 567Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 574Publisher’s Epilogue. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 575Indexes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 575Index of Scripture References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 578Greek Words and Phrases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 578Latin Words and Phrases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .p. 579Index of Pages of the Print Edition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv


iLECTURES

on

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY;

BY THE

REV. CHARLES G. FINNEY

LATE PRESIDENT OF OBERLIN COLLEGE AND PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY

EDITED BY

PRES. J. H. FAIRCHILD

Published by

COLPORTER KEMP

Whittier, Calif.

ii


This edition originally published in 1878 by E. J. GoodrichRe-published in 1944 by Colporter Kemp

Second Edition 1946

iii

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NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

Two editions of President Finney's Lectures on Systematic Theology have been published —the first in this country in 1846, the second in England in 1851, — the English edition beingsomewhat more full than its predecessor. Both editions have been exhausted, and the book hasdisappeared from the market.

The present edition has been prepared from the English edition by a process of condensation,omitting, to some extent, restatements or repetitions of the argument, paragraphs of a hortatorycharacter, and other parts not essential to the expression or elucidation of the doctrine.

Aside from these omissions, no changes have been made. No liberties have been taken withthe author's style or thought. Every sentence is his own, and even in those parts where, in thejudgment of the editor, the author's views are not elaborated with perfect consistency, as in thepresentation of sin as selfishness, and in the lectures on sanctification, no attempt has been madeto secure consistency, as might have been done by judicious omissions. The author was in the habitof thinking and speaking for himself while living, and no one can undertake to speak for him nowthat he is dead.

This condensed edition, it is believed, will not be less valuable, as an exponent of Mr. Finney'steaching, than the English edition, but even more valuable. Unnecessary bulk in a volume is ahindrance and discouragement to the reader. The topics will be found to be presented with allnecessary fullness.

J. H. F.

OBERLIN COLLEGE, 1878.

ivv

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PREFACE.

BY REV. GEORGE REDFORD, D.D.,

EDITOR OF THE ENGLISH EDITION.

THE Lectures of the Rev. PROFESSOR FINNEY, which are here given to the British public, were

first delivered to the class of theological students at the Oberlin College, America, and subsequentlypublished there. They were unknown in this country, except to a few of the Author's personalfriends, until his arrival in England, about two years since. His name, however, was well known,and several of his works had been extensively read.

The Editor having had the pleasure and honor of forming a personal acquaintance with theAuthor soon after his arrival in this country, did not long remain ignorant of his Theological Lectures.After his first hasty perusal of them, he ventured strongly to recommend their publication, both forthe sake of making the British churches better acquainted with the Author's doctrinal views, andalso on account of the direct benefit which students, and other inquirers into the theory of gospeldoctrines, would be likely to derive from a work so argumentative, and so unlike all the works onsystematic and dogmatic theology known to the English schools. After due consultation anddeliberation, the Author pressed upon the Editor the work of revision, and placed the Lectures inhis hands, with the request that he would read them carefully, and suggest such alterations as hemight deem desirable to adapt the work to the English reader; and then submit the whole to theAuthor's adoption or rejection.

This task the Editor undertook, and has performed in the best manner his time and ability wouldallow. The Author has carefully examined every part of his work again, and made such correctionsand alterations as to him seemed needful. The Editor has merely per formed the part of a friend, in

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suggesting such improvements as might make the Author's meaning better understood; but withoutinterfering with that meaning, and without intending to give it an unqualified approbation. In fact,the Lectures have been to a considerable extent re-written by the Author, and in this edition proceedas strictly from his own pen, as in the American edition.

The Editor, however, would not have ventured to recommend the publication of these Lecturesin this country, if he had not deemed them, as a whole, eminently deserving the attention andexamination of British theologians. When they first came into his hands, they struck him as sopleasingly unlike all the other systems of dogmatic theology and moral philosophy it had ever beenhis lot to peruse, so thorough in their grappling with difficulties, and often so successful in thesolution of them; so skillfully adjusted to modern metaphysical speculations, and so comprehensiveof what is valuable in them; so manifestly the production of a masculine intellect and independentthinker, that he was not only pleased with the air of freshness and originality thrown over old themes

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of dry and elaborate discussion, but greatly benefited and instructed by some of the Author's viewsof important moral and theological questions. It may not be the same with all the Author's Englishreaders; but assuredly few will rise from the perusal of the whole work without confessing that, atleast, they have seen some points in a new and impressive light, have been constrained to thinkmore closely of the opinions they hold, and in other respects have been benefited by the perusal.

As a contribution to theological science, in an age when vague speculation and philosophicaltheories are bewildering many among all denominations of Christians, this work will be consideredby all competent judges to be both valuable and seasonable. Upon several important and difficultsubjects the Author has thrown a clear and valuable light which will guide many a student throughperplexities and difficulties which he had long sought unsuccessfully to explain. The Editor franklyconfesses, that when a student be would gladly have bartered half the books in his library to havegained a single perusal of these Lectures; and he cannot refrain from expressing the belief, that noyoung student of theology will ever regret the purchase or perusal of Mr. Finney's Lectures.

One recommendation he begs respectfully to offer to all readers whether old or young; it is this:suspend your judgment of the Author and his theology until you have gone completely through hiswork. On many subjects, at the outset of the discussion, startling propositions may be found which

vii

will clash with your settled opinions; but if you will calmly and patiently await the Author'sexplanation, and observe how he qualifies some strong or novel assertions, you will most probablyfind in the issue, that you have less reason than you supposed to object to his statements.

In many respects Mr. Finney's theological and moral system will be found to differ both fromthe Calvinistic and Arminian. In fact, it is a system of his own, if not in its separate portions, yetin its construction; and as a whole is at least unique and compact; a system which the Author haswrought out for himself, with little other aid than what he has derived from the fount itself ofheavenly truth, and his own clear and strong perception of the immutable moral principles and lawsby which the glorious Author of the universe governs all his intellectual creatures.

There is one circumstance that will recommend the volume, and ought to recommend it, toimpartial inquirers who are not bound to the words of any master save their Divine one; it is, thatthe Author in his youth was trained in none of the theological schools of his country, and hadimbibed, therefore, no educational preference for one system more than another. He had beendisciplined to argumentation, logic, and the laws of evidence, in a very different arena; and hadadvanced in the science of the Law before he had felt the truth of Christianity, or thought of studyingits doctrines. His views, therefore, will be found more deserving of attention and examination, fromthe fact of his mental independence in the formation of them.

Should the work be read in a calm, devout, unprejudiced and liberal spirit, there can be no doubtthat the reader will derive both pleasure and instruction. The earnestness, single-mindedness, deep

5


piety, and eminent usefulness of the Author, both as a preacher and lecturer, justly entitle thisproduction of his pen to the candid and patient investigation of English divines.

Apart from the peculiarities which will be observed, and the critical objections to which somewill deem his theology justly liable, there can be no doubt that many will find in it a treasure ofinestimable worth, a key to many perplexing enigmas, and a powerful reinforcement of their faithin the Christian verities. With at least the hope that such will be the effects of its publication inEngland, the Editor has cheerfully contributed his humble aid, and now commits the work to theblessing of Him by whose Word of Truth its real value must be finally tested.

G. R.

Worcester, (Eng.) 1851.

viiiix

PREFACE BY THE AUTHOR

1. To a great extent, the truths of the blessed gospel have been hidden under a false philosophy.In my early inquiries on the subject of religion, I found myself wholly unable to understand eitherthe oral or written instructions of uninspired religious teachers. They seemed to me to resolve allreligion into states either of the intellect or of the sensibility, which my consciousness assured mewere wholly passive or involuntary. When I sought for definitions and explanations, I felt assuredthat they did not well understand themselves. I was struck with the fact that they so seldom defined,even to themselves, their own positions. Among the words of most frequent use, I could find scarcelya single term intelligibly defined. I inquired in what sense the terms “regeneration,” “faith,”“repentance,” “love,” etc., were used, but could obtain no answer, at which it did not appear to methat both reason and revelation revolted. The doctrines of a nature, sinful per se, of a necessitatedwill, of inability, and of physical regeneration, and physical Divine influence in regeneration, withtheir kindred and resulting dogmas, embarrassed and even confounded me at every step. I oftensaid to myself, “If these things are really taught in the Bible, I must be an infidel.” But the more Iread my Bible, the more clearly I saw that these things were not found there upon any fair principlesof interpretation, such as would be admitted in a court of justice. I could not but perceive that thetrue idea of moral government had no place in the theology of the church; and, on the contrary,that underlying the whole system were the assumptions that all government was physical, as opposedto moral, and that sin and holiness are rather natural attributes, than moral, voluntary acts.

These errors were not stated in words, but I could not fail to see that they were assumed. Thedistinction between original and actual sin, and the utter absence of a distinction between physicaland moral depravity, embarrassed me. Indeed, I was satisfied either that I must be an infidel, or

6


that these were errors that had no place in the Bible. I was often warned against reasoning andleaning to my own understanding. I found that the discriminating teachers of religion were driven

x

to confess that they could not establish the logical consistency of their system, and that they wereobliged to shut their eyes and believe, when revelation seemed to conflict with the affirmations ofreason. But this course I could not take. I found, or thought I found, nearly all the doctrines ofChristianity embarrassed by the assumptions above named. But the Spirit of God conducted methrough the darkness, and delivered me from the labyrinth and fog of a false philosophy, and setmy feet upon the rock of truth, as I trust. But to this day I meet with those who seem to me to bein much confusion upon most of the practical doctrines of Christianity. They will admit, that sinand holiness must be voluntary, and yet speak of regeneration as consisting in anything but avoluntary change, and of Divine influence in regeneration, as anything but moral or persuasive.They seem not at all aware of what must follow from, and be implied in, the admission of theexistence of moral government, and that sin and holiness must be free and voluntary acts and statesof mind. In this work I have endeavored to define the terms used by Christian divines, and thedoctrines of Christianity, as I understand them, and to push to their logical consequences the cardinaladmissions of the more recent and standard theological writers. Especially do I urge, to their logicalconsequences, the two admissions that the will is free, and that sin and holiness are voluntary actsof mind. I will not presume that I have satisfied others upon the points I have discussed, but I havesucceeded at least in satisfying myself. I regard the assertion, that the doctrines of theology cannotpreserve a logical consistency throughout, as both dangerous and ridiculous.

2. My principal design in publishing Systematic Theology at first, was to furnish my pupilswith a class or textbook, wherein many points and questions were discussed of great practicalimportance, but which have not, to my knowledge, been discussed in any system of theologicalinstruction extant. I also hoped to benefit other studious and pious minds.

3. I have written for those who are willing to take the trouble of thinking and of forming opinionsof their own on theological questions. It has been no part of my aim to spare my pupils or any oneelse the trouble of intense thought. Had I desired to do so, the subjects discussed would haverendered such an attempt abortive.

4. There are many questions of great practical importance, and questions in which multitudesare taking a deep interest at present, that cannot be intelligently settled without institutingfundamental inquiries involving the discussion of those questions that lie at the foundation ofmorality and religion.

5. Most of the subjects of dispute among Christians at the present day are founded inmisconceptions upon the subjects discussed in the volume. If I have succeeded in settling the

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xi

questions which I have discussed, we shall see, that in a future volume most of the subjects ofdisagreement among Christians at the present day can be satisfactorily adjusted with comparativeease.

6. What I have said on “Moral Law” and on the “Foundation of Moral Obligation” is the keyto the whole subject. Whoever masters and understands these can readily understand all the rest.But he who will not possess himself of my meaning upon these subjects, will not understand therest.

7. Let no one despair in commencing the book, nor stumble at the definitions, thinking that hecan never understand so abstruse a subject. Remember that what follows is an expansion and anexplanation by way of application, of what you find so condensed in the first pages of the book.My brother, sister, friend — read, study, think, and read again. You were made to think. It will doyou good to think; to develop your powers by study. God designed that religion should requirethought, intense thought, and should thoroughly develop our powers of thought. The Bible itselfis written in a style so condensed as to require much intense study. I do not pretend to so explaintheology as to dispense with the labor of thinking. I have no ability and no wish to do so.

8. If any of my brethren think to convince me of error, they must first understand me, and showthat they have read the book through, and that they understand it, and are candidly inquiring aftertruth and not “striving for masteries.” If my brother is inquiring after truth, I will, by the grace ofGod, “hear with both ears, and then judge.” But I will not promise to attend to all that cavilers maysay, nor to notice what those impertinent talkers and writers may say or write who must havecontroversy. But to all honest inquirers after truth I would say, Hail, my brother! Let us be thorough.Truth shall do us good.

9. It will be seen that the present volume contains only a part of a course of Systematic Theology.Should the entire course ever appear before the public, one volume will precede, and another succeedthe present one. I published this volume first, because it contains all the points upon which I havebeen supposed to differ from the commonly received views. As a teacher of theology, I thought itdue to the church and to the world, to give them my views upon those points upon which I hadbeen accused of departing from the common opinions of Christians.

10. I have not yet been able to stereotype my theological views, and have ceased to expect everto do so. The idea is preposterous. None but an omniscient mind can continue to maintain a preciseidentity of views and opinions. Finite minds, unless they are asleep or stultified by prejudice, must

xii

advance in knowledge. The discovery of new truth will modify old views and opinions, and thereis perhaps no end to this process with finite minds in any world. True Christian consistency doesnot consist in stereotyping our opinions and views, and in refusing to make any improvement lestwe should be guilty of change, but it consists in holding our minds open to receive the rays of truthfrom every quarter and in changing our views and language and practice as often and as fast, as we

8


can obtain further information. I call this Christian consistency, because this course alone accordswith a Christian profession. A Christian profession implies the profession of candor and of adisposition to know and obey all truth. It must follow, that Christian consistency implies continuedinvestigation and change of views and practice corresponding with increasing knowledge. NoChristian, therefore, and no theologian should be afraid to change his views, his language, or hispractices in conformity with increasing light. The prevalence of such a fear would keep the world,at best, at a perpetual standstill, on all subjects of science, and consequently all improvementswould be precluded.

Every uninspired attempt to frame for the church an authoritative standard of opinion whichshall be regarded as an unquestionable exposition of the word of God, is not only impious in itself,but it is also a tacit assumption of the fundamental dogma of Papacy. The Assembly of Divines didmore than to assume the necessity of a Pope to give law to the opinions of men; they assumed tocreate an immortal one, or rather to embalm their own creed, and preserve it as the Pope of allgenerations; or it is more just to say, that those who have adopted that confession of faith andcatechism as an authoritative standard of doctrine, have absurdly adopted the most obnoxiousprinciple of Popery, and elevated their confession and catechism to the Papal throne and into theplace of the Holy Ghost. That the instrument framed by that assembly should in the nineteenthcentury be recognized as the standard of the church, or of an intelligent branch of it, is not onlyamazing, but I must say that it is most ridiculous. It is as absurd in theology as it would be in anyother branch of science, and as injurious and stultifying as it is absurd and ridiculous. It is betterto have a living than a dead Pope. If we must have an authoritative expounder of the word of God,let us have a living one, so as not to preclude the hope of improvement. “A living dog is better thana dead lion;” so a living Pope is better than a dead and stereotyped confession of faith, that holdsall men bound to subscribe to its unalterable dogmas and its unvarying terminology.

11. I hold myself sacredly bound, not to defend these positions at all events, but on the contrary,to subject every one of them to the most thorough discussion, and to hold and treat them as I would

xiii

the opinions of any one else; that is, if upon further discussion and investigation I see no cause tochange, I hold them fast; but if I can see a flaw in any one of them, I shall amend or wholly rejectit, as further light shall demand. Should I refuse or fail to do this, I should need to blush for myfolly and inconsistency, for I say again, that true Christian consistency implies progress in knowledgeand holiness, and such changes in theory and in practice as are demanded by increasing light.

On the strictly fundamental questions in theology, my views have not, for many years, undergoneany change, except as I have clearer apprehensions of them than formerly, and should now statesome of them, perhaps, in some measure, differently from what I should then have done.

THE AUTHOR

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xv CONTENTS.

LECTURE I.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

1Definition of the term law. — Distinctionbetween physical and moral law. — Theessential attributes of moral law. —Subjectivity — Objectivity. — Liberty, asopposed to necessity. — Fitness. —Universality. — Impartiality. —Practicability. — Independence. —Immutability. — Unity. — Expediency. —Exclusiveness

LECTURE II.

MORAL GOVERNMENT — Continued.

6Definition of the term government. — Distinctionbetween moral and physical government.— The fundamental reason of moralgovernment. — Whose right it is to govern.— What is implied in the right to govern.— The limits of this right. — Moralobligation. — The conditions of moralobligation

LECTURE III.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

19Man a subject of moral obligation. — Extent ofmoral obligation

LECTURE IV.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

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27What is intended by the foundation of moralobligation. — Self-evident principles. —That the sovereign will of God is not thefoundation of moral obligation. — Thetheory of Paley. — The utilitarianphilosophy

LECTURE V.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. FALSE THEORIES.

38Right as the foundation of obligation

LECTURE VI.


49The goodness or moral excellence of God as thefoundation of obligation

xviLECTURE VII.


64Moral order as the foundation of obligation. —The nature and relations of moral beings asthe true foundation of obligation. — Moralobligation as founded in the idea of duty.— The complexity of the foundation ofobligation. — Summing up

LECTURE VIII.

FOUNDATION OF MORAL OBLIGATION. PRACTICAL BEARINGS OF THE DIFFERENT THEORIES.

80The theory that regards the sovereign will of Godas the foundation of moral obligation. —The theory of the selfish school. — Thenatural and necessary results ofutilitarianism. — Practical bearings andtendency of rightarianism. — The practical

11


bearings of the true theory of the foundationof obligation

LECTURE IX.

UNITY OF MORAL ACTION.

95What constitutes obedience to moral law. —Obedience cannot be partial. — Possiblesuppositions. — Objections considered

LECTURE X.

OBEDIENCE ENTIRE.

115Nothing virtue but obedience to the law of God.— No rule of duty but moral law: Conditionof justification

LECTURE XI.

OBEDIENCE TO THE MORAL LAW.

124What is not implied in entire obedience to thelaw of God

LECTURE XII.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE.

135Certain facts revealed in consciousness. —Attributes of that love which constitutesobedience to the law. — Voluntariness. —Liberty. — Intelligence. — Virtuousness.— Disinterestedness. — Impartiality. —Universality

LECTURE XIII.

ATTRIBUTES OF LOVE — Continued.

145Efficiency. — Complacency. — Opposition tosin. — Compassion

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xviiLECTURE XIV.


157Mercy. — Justice. — Veracity

LECTURE XV.


166Patience. — Meekness. — Self-denial. —Condescension. — Stability. — Holiness,or Purity

LECTURE XVI.

DISOBEDIENCE TO MORAL LAW.

180What disobedience to moral law cannot consistin. — What disobedience to moral law mustconsist in

LECTURE XVII.

ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS.

183Voluntariness. — Liberty. — Intelligence. —Unreasonableness. — Interestedness. —Partiality. — Efficiency. — Opposition tobenevolence or to virtue. — Cruelty. —Injustice

LECTURE XVIII.

ATTRIBUTES OF SELFISHNESS — Continued.

196Falsehood, or lying. — Pride. — Intemperance.— Total moral depravity

LECTURE XIX.

SANCTIONS OF MORAL LAW.

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208What constitutes the sanctions of law. — In whatlight sanctions are to be regarded. —Duration of the penal sanctions of the lawof God

LECTURE XX.

HUMAN GOVERNMENT.

214Me ultimate end of God in Creation. —Providential and moral governmentsindispensable to the highest good of theuniverse. — Human governments anecessity of human nature. — This necessitywill continue as long as human beings existin this world. — Human governments areplainly recognized in the Bible as a part ofthe moral government of God. — Objectionsanswered. — The limits of the right ofgovernment

xviiiLECTURE XXI.

HUMAN GOVERNMENT — Continued.

222No form of civil government universallyobligatory. — Revolutions. — In what caseshuman legislation is valid, and in what casesit is null and void. — The rights and dutiesof governments and subjects in relation tothe execution of the penalties of law

LECTURE XXII.

MORAL DEPRAVITY.

228Definition. — Distinction between physical andmoral depravity. — Mankind bothphysically and morally depraved. — Moraldepravity of mankind universal. — Moraldepravity total

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LECTURE XXIII.

MORAL DEPRAVITY — Continued.

235Proper method of accounting for moral depravity.— Dr. 'Woods' view of physical and moraldepravity examined. — Standards of thePresbyterian Church examined

LECTURE XXIV.

MORAL DEPRAVITY — Continued.

245Further arguments in support of the position thathuman nature is in itself sinful. — The propermethod of accounting for moral depravity. —Summary of the truth on this subject — Remarks

LECTURE XXV.

ATONEMENT.

258Established governmental principles. — The termatonement. — Affirmations of reason upon thesubject. — The fact of atonement. — Christ'sobedience did not constitute the atonement. —The atonement not a commercial transaction. —The atonement a satisfaction of public justice

LECTURE XXVI.

EXTENT OF ATONEMENT.

274For whose benefit the atonement was intended.— Objections answered

LECTURE XXVII.

REGENERATION.

282The common distinction between regenerationand conversion. — The assigned reasons for thisdistinction. — Objections to this distinction. —

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What regeneration is. — The universal necessityof regeneration. — Agencies employed inregeneration. — Instrumentalities employed inthe work. — The subject both passive and active.— What is implied in regeneration

LECTURE XXVIII.

REGENERATION — Continued.

291Different theories of regeneration examined. —The taste scheme. — The divine efficiencyscheme. — The susceptibility scheme. — Theoryof a divine moral suasion. — Objections to thistheory. — Remarks

LECTURE XXIX.

EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION.

300Wherein saints and sinners may agree. —Remarks

LECTURE XXX.

EVIDENCES OF REGENERATION — Continued.

309Wherein saints and sinners must differ

LECTURE XXXI.

NATURAL ABILITY.

320The Edwardean notion of ability and of naturalinability. — Natural ability identical withfreedom or liberty of will. — The human willfree. — Moral inability according to theEdwardean school. — This distinction betweennatural and moral inability nonsensical. —Fundamental error of the Edwardean school onthe subject of ability. — Another scheme ofinability

LECTURE XXXII.

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GRACIOUS ABILITY.

341What is intended by the term. — This doctrineabsurd. — In what sense a gracious ability ispossible

LECTURE XXXIII.

THE NOTION OF INABILITY.

353Proper mode of accounting for it

LECTURE XXXIV.

REPENTANCE AND IMPENITENCE.

364'What repentance is not, and what it is. — Whatis implied in it. — What impenitence is not. —What it is. — Some things that are implied in it.— Some evidences of ft

xxLECTURE XXXV.

FAITH AND UNBELIEF.

373What evangelical faith is not. — What it is. —What is implied in it. — What unbelief is not. —What it is. — What is implied in it. — Conditionsof both faith and unbelief. — The guilt ofunbelief. — Consequences of both faith andunbelief

LECTURE XXXVI.

JUSTIFICATION.

382What justification is not.—What it is. —Conditions of justification. — Foundation ofjustification

LECTURE XXXVII.

SANCTIFICATION.

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402Some points that have been settled. — Definitionof terms. — The real question. — Entiresanctification attainable in this life

LECTURE XXXVIII.

SANCTIFICATION.

423Paul entirely sanctified

LECTURE XXXIX.

SANCTIFICATION.

433Conditions of its attainment. — Relations ofChrist to the soul

LECTURE XL.

SANCTIFICATION.

448Objections answered

LECTURE XLI.

SANCTIFICATION.

462Objections continued

LECTURE XLII.

SANCTIFICATION.

472Remarks

xxiLECTURE XLIII.

481Election

LECTURE XLIV.

499Reprobation

LECTURE XLV.

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515Divine Sovereignty

LECTURE XLVI.

524Purposes of God

LECTURE XLVII.

PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.

544The different kinds of certainty. — What is notintended by the perseverance of the saints

LECTURE XLVIII.


554The doctrine proved

LECTURE XLIX.


563Further proof

LECTURE L.


585Objections considered

LECTURE LI.


605Further objections

xxii1

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SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

LECTURE I.

MORAL LAW.

LAW, in a sense of the term both sufficiently popular and scientific for my purpose, is A RULE

OF ACTION. In its generic signification, it is applicable to every kind of action, whether of matter

or of mind—whether intelligent or unintelligent—whether free or necessary action.

Physical law is a term that represents the order of sequence, in all the changes that occur underthe law of necessity, whether in matter or mind. I mean all changes whether of state or action, thatdo not consist in the states or actions of free will. Physical law is the law of the material universe.It is also the law of mind, so far as its states and changes are involuntary. All mental states oractions, which are not free and sovereign actions of will, must occur under, and be subject to,physical law. They cannot possibly be accounted for, except as they are ascribed to the law ofnecessity or force.

Moral law is a rule of moral action with sanctions. It is that rule to which moral agents oughtto conform all their voluntary actions, and is enforced by sanctions equal to the value of the precept.It is the rule for the government of free and intelligent action, as opposed to necessary andunintelligent action. It is the law of liberty, as opposed to the law of necessity—of motive and freechoice, as opposed to force of every kind. Moral law is primarily a rule for the direction of theaction of free will, and strictly of free will only. But secondarily, and less strictly, it is the rule forthe regulation of all those actions and states of mind and body, that follow the free actions of willby a law of necessity. Thus, moral law controls involuntary mental states and outward action onlyby securing conformity of the actions of free will to its precept.

The essential attributes of moral law, are,

1. Subjectivity. It is, and must be, an idea of reason developed in the mind of the subject. It is

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an idea, or conception, of that state of will, or course of action, which is obligatory upon a moralagent. No one can be a moral agent, or the subject of moral law, unless he has this idea developed;for this idea is identical with the law. It is the law developed or revealed within himself; and thushe becomes “a law to himself,” his own reason affirming his obligation to conform to this idea, orlaw.

2. Objectivity. Moral law may be regarded as a rule of duty, prescribed by the supreme Lawgiver,and external to self. When thus contemplated, it is objective.

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3. Liberty, as opposed to necessity. The precept must lie developed in the reason, as a rule ofduty—a law of moral obligation—a rule of choice, or of ultimate intention, declaring that which amoral agent ought to choose, will, intend. But it does not, must not, can not possess the attributeof necessity in its relations to the actions of free will. It must not, cannot, possess an element orattribute of force, in any such sense as to render conformity of will to its precept unavoidable. Thiswould confound it with physical law.

4. Fitness. It must be the law of nature, that is, its precept must prescribe and require just thoseactions of the will which are suitable to the nature and relations of moral beings, and nothing morenor less; that is, the intrinsic value of the well-being of God and of the universe being given as theground, and the nature and relations of moral beings as the condition of the obligation, the reasonhereupon necessarily affirms the intrinsic propriety and fitness of choosing this good, and ofconsecrating the whole being to its promotion. This is what is intended by the law of nature. It isthe law or rule of action imposed on us by God, in and by the nature which he has given us.

5. Universality. The conditions and circumstances being the same, it requires, and must require,of all moral agents, the same things, in whatever world they may be found.

6. Impartiality. Moral law is no respecter of persons—knows no privileged classes. It demandsone thing of all, without regard to anything, except the fact that they are moral agents. By this it isnot intended that the same course of outward conduct is required of all; but the same state of heartin all—that all shall have one ultimate intention—that all shall consecrate themselves to oneend—that all shall entirely conform, in heart and life, to their nature and relations.

7. Practicability. That which the precept demands must be possible to the subject. That whichdemands a natural impossibility is not, and cannot be, moral law. The. true definition of law excludesthe supposition that it can, under any circumstances, demand an absolute impossibility. Such ademand could not be in accordance with the nature and relations of moral agents, and therefore

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practicability must always be an attribute of moral law. To talk of inability to obey moral law is totalk nonsense.

8. Independence. It is an eternal and necessary idea of the divine reason. It is the eternal,self-existent rule of the divine conduct, the law which the intelligence of God prescribes to himself.Moral law, as we shall see hereafter more fully, does not, and cannot originate in the will of God.It eternally existed in the divine reason. It is the idea of that state of will which is obligatory uponGod, upon condition of his natural attributes, or, in other words, upon condition of his nature. Asa law, it is entirely independent of his will just as his own existence is. It is obligatory also uponevery moral agent, entirely independent of the will of God. Their nature and relations being given,and their intelligence being developed, moral law must be obligatory upon them, and it lies not inthe option of any being to make it otherwise. Their nature and relations being given, to pursue a

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course of conduct suited to their nature and relations, is necessarily and self-evidently obligatory,independent of the will of any being.

9. Immutability. Moral law can never change, or be changed. It always requires of every moralagent a state of heart, and course of conduct, precisely suited to his nature and relations. Whateverhis nature is, his capacity and relations are, entire conformity to just that nature, those capacitiesand relations, so far as he is able to understand them, is required at every moment, and nothingmore nor less. If capacity is enlarged, the subject is not thereby rendered capable of works ofsupererogation—of doing more than the law demands; for the law still, as always, requires the fullconsecration of his whole being to the public interests. If by any means whatever, his ability isabridged, moral law, always and necessarily consistent with itself, still requires that what isleft—nothing more or less—shall be consecrated to the same end as before. Whatever demandsmore or less than entire, universal, and constant conformity of heart and life, to the nature, capacityand relations of moral agents, be they what they may, is not, and cannot be moral law. If therefore,the capacity is by any means abridged, the subject does not thereby become incapable of renderingfull obedience; for the law still demands and urges, that the heart and life shall be fully conformedto the present, existing nature, capacity, and relations. Anything that requires more or less than this,cannot be moral law. Moral law invariably holds one language. It never changes its requirement.“Thou shalt love,” or be perfectly benevolent, is its uniform and its only demand. This demand itnever varies, and never can vary. It is as immutable as God is, and for the same reason. To talk ofletting down, or altering moral law, is to talk absurdly. The thing is naturally impossible. No being

4

has the right or the power to do so. The supposition overlooks the very nature of moral law. Morallaw is not a statute, an enactment, that has its origin or its foundation in the will of any being. It isthe law of nature, the law which the nature or constitution of every moral agent imposes on himselfand which God imposes upon us because it is entirely suited to our nature and relations, and istherefore naturally obligatory upon us. It is the unalterable demand of the reason, that the wholebeing, whatever there is of it at any time, shall be entirely consecrated to the highest good ofuniversal being, and for this reason God requires this of us, with all the weight of his authority.

10. Unity. Moral law proposes but one ultimate end of pursuit to God, and to all moral agents.All its requisitions, in their spirit, are summed up and expressed in one word, love or benevolence.This I only announce here. It will more fully appear hereafter. Moral law is a pure and simple ideaof the reason. It is the idea of perfect, universal, and constant consecration of the whole being tothe highest good of being. Just this is, and nothing more nor less can be, moral law; for just this,and. nothing more nor less, is a state of heart and a course of life exactly suited to the nature andrelations of moral agents, which is the only true definition of moral law.

11. Expediency. That which is upon the whole most wise is expedient. That which is upon thewhole expedient is demanded by moral law. True expediency and the spirit of moral law are alwaysidentical. Expediency may be inconsistent with the letter, but never with the spirit of moral law.

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Law in the form of commandment is a revelation or declaration of that course which is expedient.It is expediency revealed, as in the case of the decalogue, and the same is true of every precept ofthe Bible, it reveals to us what is expedient. A revealed law or commandment is never to be setaside by our views of expediency. We may know with certainty that what is required is expedient.The command is the expressed judgment of God in the case, and reveals with unerring certaintythe true path of expediency. When Paul says, “All things are lawful unto me, but all things are notexpedient,” we must not understand him as meaning that all things in the absolute sense were lawfulto him, or that anything that was not expedient was lawful to him. But he doubtless intended, thatmany things were inexpedient that are not expressly prohibited by the letter of the law,—that thespirit of the law prohibited many things not expressly forbidden by the letter. It should never beforgotten that that which is plainly demanded by the highest good of the universe is law. It isexpedient. It is wise. The true spirit of the moral law does and must demand it. So, on the otherhand, whatever is plainly inconsistent with the highest good of the universe is illegal, unwise,inexpedient, and must be prohibited by the spirit of moral law. But let the thought be repeated, that

5

the Bible precepts always reveal that which is truly expedient, and in no case are we at liberty toset aside the spirit of any commandment upon the supposition that expediency requires it. Somehave denounced the doctrine of expediency altogether, as at all times inconsistent with the law ofright. These philosophers proceed upon the assumption that the law of right and the law ofbenevolence are not identical but inconsistent with each other. This is a common but fundamentalmistake, which leads me to remark that—Law proposes the highest good of universal being as itsend, and requires all moral agents to consecrate themselves to the promotion of this end.Consequently, expediency must be one of its attributes. That which is upon the whole in the highestdegree useful to the universe must be demanded by moral law. Moral law must, from its own nature,require just that course of willing and acting that is upon the whole in the highest degree promotiveof the public good,—in other words, that which is upon the whole in the highest degree useful, andtherefore expedient. It has been strangely and absurdly maintained that right would be obligatoryif it necessarily tended to and resulted in universal and perfect misery. Than which a morenonsensical affirmation was never made. The affirmation assumes that the law of right and ofgood-will are not only distinct, but may be antagonistic. It also assumes that that can be law thatis not suited to the nature and relations of moral agents. Certainly it will not be pretended that thatcourse of willing and acting that necessarily tends to, and results in, universal misery, can beconsistent with the nature and relations of moral agents. Nothing is or can be suited to their natureand relations, that is not upon the whole promotive of their highest well-being. Expediency andright are always and necessarily at one. They can never be inconsistent. That which is upon thewhole most expedient is right, and that which is right is upon the whole expedient.

12. Exclusiveness. Moral law is the only possible rule of moral obligation. A distinction isusually made between moral, ceremonial, civil and positive laws. This distinction is in some respectsconvenient, but is liable to mislead, and to create an impression that something can be obligatory,

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in other words can be law, that has not the attributes of moral law. Nothing can be law, in anyproper sense of the term, that is not and would not be universally obligatory upon moral agentsunder the same circumstances. It is law because, and only because, under all the circumstances ofthe case, the course prescribed is fit, proper, suitable, to their natures, relations, and circumstances.There can be no other rule of action for moral agents but moral law, or the law of benevolence.Every other rule is absolutely excluded by the very nature of moral law. Surely there can be no lawthat is or can be obligatory upon moral agents but one suited to, and founded in their nature, relations,

6

and circumstances. This is and must be the law of love or benevolence. This is the law of right, andnothing else is or can be. Every thing else that claims to be law, and to impose obligation uponmoral agents, must be an imposition and “a thing of nought.”

LECTURE II.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

THE primary idea of government, is that of direction, guidance, control by, or in accordancewith, rule or law.

All government is, and must be, either moral or physical; that is, all guidance and control mustbe exercised in accordance with either moral or physical law; for there can be no laws that areneither moral nor physical.

Physical government is control, exercised by a law of necessity or force, as distinguished fromthe law of free will, or liberty. It is the control of substance, as opposed to free will. The onlygovernment of which substance, as distinguished from free will, is capable, is and must be physical.This is true, whether the substance be material or immaterial, whether matter or mind. States andchanges, whether of matter or mind, that are not actions of free will, must be subject to the law ofnecessity. They must therefore belong to the department of physical government. Physicalgovernment, then, is the administration of physical law, or the law of force.

Moral government consists in the declaration and administration of moral law. It is thegovernment of free will by motives as distinguished from the government of substance by force.Physical government presides over and controls physical states and changes of substance orconstitution, and all involuntary states and changes. Moral government presides over and controls,or seeks to control the actions of free will: it presides over intelligent and voluntary states andchanges of mind. It is a government of motive, as opposed to a government of force—controlexercised, or sought to be exercised, in accordance with the law of liberty, as opposed to the lawof necessity. It is the administration of moral as opposed to physical law.

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Moral government includes the dispensation of rewards and punishments; and is administeredby means as complicated and vast as the whole of the works, and providence, and ways, and graceof God.

7The fundamental reason of moral government.

Government must be founded in a good and sufficient reason, or it is not right. No one has aright to prescribe rules for, and control the conduct of another, unless there is some good reasonfor his doing so. There must be a necessity for moral government, or the administration of it istyranny. Moral government is indispensable to the highest well-being of the universe of moralagents. The universe is dependent upon this as a means of securing the highest good. This dependenceis a good and sufficient reason for the existence of moral government. Let it be understood, then,that moral government is a necessity of moral beings, and therefore right.

Our nature and circumstances demand that we should be under a moral government; becauseno community can perfectly harmonize in all their views and feelings, without perfect knowledge,or to say the least, the same degree of knowledge on all subjects on which they are called to act.But no community ever existed, or will exist, in which all possess exactly the same amount ofknowledge, and where the members are, therefore, entirely agreed in all their thoughts, views, andopinions. But if they are not agreed in opinion, or have not exactly the same amount of knowledge,they will not, in every thing, harmonize, as it respects their courses of conduct. There must, therefore,be in every community, some standard or rule of duty, to which all the subjects of the communityare to conform themselves. There must be some head or controlling mind, whose will shall be law,and whose decision shall be regarded as infallible, by all the subjects of the government. Howeverdiverse their intellectual attainments are, in this they must all agree, that the will of the lawgiver isright, and universally the rule of duty. This will must be authoritative, and not merely advisory.There must of necessity be a penalty attached to, and incurred by, every act of disobedience to thiswill. If disobedience be persisted in, exclusion from the privileges of the government is the lowestpenalty that can consistently be inflicted. The good, then, of the universe imperiously requires thatthere should be a moral governor.

Whose right is it to govern?

We have just seen that the highest well-being of the universe demands, and is the end of moralgovernment. It must, therefore, be his right and duty to govern, whose attributes, physical andmoral, best qualify him to secure the end of government. To him all eyes and hearts should bedirected, to fill this station, to exercise this control, to administer all just and necessary rewardsand punishments. It is both his right and duty to govern.

That God is a moral governor, we infer—

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81. From our own nature. From the very laws of our being, we naturally affirm our responsibility

to him for our conduct. As God is our creator, we are naturally responsible to him for the rightexercise of our powers. And as our good and his glory depend upon our conformity to the samerule to which he conforms his whole being, he is under a moral obligation to require us to be holy,as he is holy.

2. His natural attributes qualify him to sustain the relation of a moral governor to the universe.

3. His moral character also qualifies him to sustain this relation.

4. His relation to the universe as creator and preserver, when considered in connection with thenecessity of government, and with his nature and attributes, confers on him the right of universalgovernment.

5. His relation to the universe, and our relations to him and to each other, render it obligatoryupon him to establish and administer a moral government over the universe. It would be wrong forhim to create a universe of moral beings, and then refuse or neglect to administer over them a moralgovernment, since government is a necessity of their nature and relations.

6. His happiness must demand it, as he could not be happy unless he acted in accordance withhis conscience.

7. If God is not a moral governor he is not wise. Wisdom consists in the choice of the best ends,and in the use of the most appropriate means to accomplish those ends. If God is not a moralgovernor, it is inconceivable that he should have had any important end in view in the creation ofmoral beings, or that he should have chosen the best or any suitable means for the promotion oftheir happiness as the most desirable end.

8. The conduct or providence of God plainly indicates a design to exert a moral influence overmoral agents.

9. His providence plainly indicates that the universe of mind is governed by moral laws, or bylaws suited to the nature of moral agents.

10. If God is not a moral governor, the whole universe, so far as we have the means of knowingit, is calculated to mislead mankind in respect to this fundamental truth. All nations have believedthat God is a moral governor.

11. We must disapprove the character of God, if we ever come to a knowledge of the fact thathe created moral agents, and then exercised over them no moral government.

12. The Bible, which has been proved to be a revelation from God, contains a most simple andyet comprehensive system of moral government.

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13. If we are deceived in respect to our being subjects of moral government, we are sure ofnothing.

9What is implied in the right to govern?

1. From what has just been said, it must be evident, that the right to govern implies the necessityof government, as a means of securing an intrinsically valuable end.

2. Also that the right to govern implies the duty, or obligation to govern. There can be no right,in this case, without corresponding obligation; for the right to govern is founded in the necessityof government, and the necessity of government imposes obligation to govern.

3. The right to govern, implies obligation, on the part of the subject, to obey. It cannot be theright, or duty, of the governor to govern, unless it is the duty of the subject to obey. The governorand subjects are alike dependent upon government, as the indispensable means of promoting thehighest good. The governor and the subject must, therefore, be under reciprocal obligation, the oneto govern, and the other to be governed, or to obey. The one must seek to govern, the other mustsubmit to be governed.

4. The right to govern, implies the right and duty to dispense just and necessary rewards andpunishments—distribute rewards proportioned to merit, and penalties proportioned to demerit,whenever the public interest demands their execution.

5. It implies obligation, on the part of the subject, cheerfully to acquiesce in any measure thatmay be necessary to secure the end of government, and in case of disobedience, to submit to meritedpunishment, and also, if necessary, to aid in the infliction of the penalty of law.

6. It implies obligation, on the part both of the ruler and the ruled, to be always ready, and whenoccasion arises, actually to make any personal and private sacrifice demanded by the higher publicgood—to cheerfully meet any emergency, and exercise any degree of self-denial, that can, and will,result in a good of greater value to the public than that sacrificed by the individual, or by any numberof individuals, it always being understood, that present voluntary sacrifices shall have an ultimatereward.

7. It implies the right and duty to employ any degree of force, which is indispensable to themaintenance of order, the execution of wholesome laws, the suppression of insurrections, thepunishment of rebels and disorganizers, and sustaining the supremacy of moral law. It is impossiblethat the right to govern should not imply this; and to deny this right, is to deny the right to govern.Should an emergency occur, in which a ruler had no right to use the indispensable means of securingorder, and the supremacy of law, the moment this emergency occurred, his right to govern would,and must, cease: for it is impossible that it should be his right to govern, unless it be at the same

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10

time, and for the same reason, his duty to govern; and it is absurd to say, that it is his right and dutyto govern, and yet at the same time, that he has not a right to use the indispensable means ofgovernment. If it be asked, whether an emergency like the one under consideration is possible, andif so what might justly be regarded as such an emergency, I answer, that should circumstancesoccur under which the sacrifice necessary to sustain, would overbalance the good to be derivedfrom the prevalence of government, this would create the emergency under consideration, in whichthe right to govern would cease.

The limits of this right.

The right to govern is, and must be, just co-extensive with the necessity of government. Wehave seen, that the right to govern is founded in the necessities of moral beings. In other words,the right to govern is founded upon the fact, that the highest good of moral agents cannot be secured,but by means of government. But to avoid mistake, and to correct erroneous impressions, whichare sometimes entertained, I must show what is not the foundation of the right to govern. Theboundary of the right must, as will be seen, depend upon the foundation of the right. The right mustbe as broad as the reason for it. If the reason of the right be mistaken, then the limits of the rightcannot be ascertained, and must necessarily be mistaken also.

1. The right to govern the universe cannot be founded in the fact, that God sustains to it therelation of Creator. This is by itself no reason why he should govern it, unless it needs to begoverned—unless some good will result from government. Unless there is some necessity forgovernment, the fact that God created the universe can give him no right to govern it.

2. The fact that God is owner and sole proprietor of the universe is no reason why he shouldgovern it. Unless either his own good or the good of the universe, or of both together, demandgovernment, the relation of owner cannot confer the right to govern. Neither God, nor any otherbeing, can own moral beings, in such a sense as to have a right to govern them, when governmentis wholly unnecessary, and can result in no good whatever to God, or to his creatures. Government,in such a case, would be perfectly arbitrary and unreasonable, and consequently an unjust, tyrannicaland wicked act. God has no such right. No such right can, by possibility, in any case exist.

3. The right to govern cannot be founded in the fact, that God possesses all the attributes, naturaland moral, that are requisite to the administration of moral government. This fact is no doubt acondition of the right; for without these qualifications he could have no right, however necessary

11

government might be. But the possession of these attributes cannot confer the right independentlyof the necessity of government: for however well qualified ha may be to govern, still, unlessgovernment is necessary to securing his own glory and the highest well-being of the universe, hehas no right to govern it. Possessing the requisite qualifications is the condition, and the necessityof government is the foundation of the right to govern. More strictly, the right is founded in the

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intrinsic value of the interests to be secured by government, and conditioned upon the fact, thatgovernment is the necessary means of securing the end.

4. Nor is the right to govern conferred by the value of the interests to be secured, nor by thecircumstance of the necessity of government merely, without respect to the condition just abovementioned. Did not God’s natural and moral attributes qualify him to sustain that relation betterthan any one else, the right could not be conferred on him by any other fact or relation.

5. The right to govern is not, and cannot be, an abstract right based on no reason whatever. Theidea of this right is not an ultimate idea in such a sense, that our intelligence affirms the right withoutassigning any reason on which it is founded. The human intelligence cannot say that God has aright to govern, because he has such a right; and that this is reason enough, and all the reason thatcan be given. Our reason does not affirm that government is right because it is right; and that thisis a first truth, and an ultimate idea. If this were so, then God’s arbitrary will would be law, and nobounds could possibly be assigned to the right to govern. If God’s right to govern be a first truth,an ultimate truth, fact, and idea, founded in no assignable reason, then he has the right to legislateas little, and as much, and as arbitrarily, as unnecessarily, as absurdly, and injuriously as possible,and no injustice is, or can be done; for he has, by the supposition, a right to govern, founded in noreason, and of course without any limit. Assign any other reason, as the foundation of the right togovern, than the value of the interests to be secured and the necessity of government, and you maysearch in vain for any limit to the right. But the moment the foundation and the condition of theright are discovered, we see instantly, that the right must be co-extensive with the reason uponwhich it is founded, or in other words, must be limited by, and only by the fact, that thus far, andno farther, government is necessary to the highest good of the universe. No legislation can be validin heaven or earth—no enactments can impose obligation, except upon the condition, that suchlegislation is demanded by the highest good of the governor and the governed. Unnecessarylegislation is invalid legislation. Unnecessary government is tyranny. It can, in no case be foundedin right. It should, however, be observed, that it is often, and in the government of God universally

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true, that the sovereign, and not the subject, is to be the judge of what is necessary legislation andgovernment. Under no government, therefore, are laws to be despised or rejected because we areunable to see at once their necessity, and hence their wisdom. Unless they are palpably unnecessary,and therefore unwise and unjust, they are to be respected and obeyed as a less evil than contemptand disobedience, though at present we are unable to see their wisdom. Under the government ofGod there can never be any doubt nor of course any ground for distrust and hesitancy as it respectsthe duty of obedience.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

The idea of obligation, or of oughtness, is an idea of the pure reason. It is a simple, rationalconception, and, strictly speaking, does not admit of a definition, since there are no terms more

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simple by which it may be defined. Obligation is a term by which we express a conception or ideawhich all men have, as is manifest from the universal language of men. All men have the ideas ofright and wrong, and have words by which these ideas are expressed, and, perhaps, no idea amongmen more frequently reveals itself in words than that of oughtness or obligation. The term cannotbe defined, for the simple reason that it is too well and too universally understood to need or evento admit of being expressed in any language more simple and definite than the word obligationitself.

The conditions of moral obligation.

There is a distinction of fundamental importance between the condition and the ground ofobligation. The ground of obligation is the consideration which creates or imposes obligation, thefundamental reason of the obligation. Of this I shall inquire in its proper place. At present I am todefine the conditions of obligation. But I must in this place observe that there are various forms ofobligation. For example, obligation to choose an ultimate end of life as the highest good of theuniverse; obligation to choose the necessary conditions of this end, as holiness, for example; andobligation to put forth executive efforts to secure this end. The conditions of obligation vary withthe form of obligation, as we shall fully perceive in the course of our investigations.

A condition of obligation in any particular form is a sine qua non of obligation in that particularform. It is that, without which, obligation in that form could not exist, and yet is not the fundamentalreason of the obligation. For example, the possession of the powers of moral agency is a conditionof the obligation to choose the highest good of being in general, as an ultimate end, or for its ownsake. But the intrinsic value of this good is the ground of the obligation. This obligation could not

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exist without the possession of these powers; but the possession of these powers cannot of itselfcreate the obligation to choose the good in preference to the ill of being. The intrinsic differencebetween the good and the ill of being is the ground of the obligation to will the one rather than theother. I will first define the conditions upon which all obligation depends, and without whichobligation in no form can exist, and afterward proceed to point out the conditions of distinct formsof obligation.

1. Moral agency is universally a condition of moral obligation. The attributes of moral agencyare intellect, sensibility, and free-will.

(1.) Intellect includes, among other functions which I need not name, reason, conscience, andself-consciousness. As has been said on a former occasion, reason is the intuitive faculty or functionof the intellect. It gives by direct intuition the following among other truths: the absolute—forexample, right and wrong; the necessary—space exists; the infinite—space is infinite; theperfect—God is perfect—God’s law is perfect, etc. In short, it is the faculty that intuits moralrelations and affirms moral obligation to act in conformity with perceived moral relations. It is that

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faculty that postulates all the à priori truths of science whether mathematical, philosophical,theological, or logical.

Conscience is the faculty or function of the intellect that recognizes the conformity ordisconformity of the heart and life to the moral law as it lies revealed in the reason, and also awardspraise to conformity, and blame to disconformity to that law. It also affirms that conformity to themoral law deserves reward, and that disconformity deserves punishment. It also possesses apropelling or impulsive power, by which it urges the conformity, and denounces the nonconformityof will to moral law. It seems, in a certain sense, to possess the power of retribution.

Consciousness is the faculty or function of self-knowledge. It is the faculty that recognizes ourown existence, mental actions, and states, together with the attributes of liberty or necessity,belonging to those actions or states.

“Consciousness is the mind in the act of knowing itself.” By consciousness I know that Iam—that I affirm that space is,—that I also affirm that the whole is equal to all its parts—that everyevent must have a cause, and many such like truths. I am conscious not only of these affirmations,but also that necessity is the law of these affirmations, that I cannot affirm otherwise than I do, inrespect to this class of truths. I am also conscious of choosing to sit at my desk and write, and I amjust as conscious that liberty is the law of this choice. That is, I am conscious of necessarily regardingmyself as entirely free in this choice, and affirming my own ability to have chosen not to sit at mydesk, and of being now able to choose not to sit and write. I am just as conscious of affirming the

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liberty or necessity of my mental states as I am of the states themselves. Consciousness gives usour existence and attributes, our mental acts and states, and all the attributes and phenomena of ourbeing, of which we have any knowledge. In short, all our knowledge is given to us by consciousness.The intellect is a receptivity as distinguished from a voluntary power. All the acts and states of theintellect are under the law of necessity, or physical law. The will can command the attention of theintellect. Its thoughts, perceptions, affirmations, and all its phenomena are involuntary, and undera law of necessity. Of this we are conscious. Another faculty indispensable to moral agency is—

(2.) Sensibility. This is the faculty or susceptibility of feeling. All sensation, desire, emotion,passion, pain, pleasure, and, in short, every kind and degree of feeling, as the term feeling iscommonly used, is a phenomenon of this faculty. This faculty supplies the chronological conditionof the idea of the valuable, and hence of right and wrong, and of moral obligation. The experienceof pleasure or happiness develops the idea of the valuable, just as the perception of body developsthe idea of space.. But for this faculty the mind could have no idea of the valuable, and hence ofmoral obligation to will the valuable, nor of right and wrong, nor of praise-worthiness andblame-worthiness.

Self-love is a phenomenon of this department of the mind. It consists in a constitutional desireof happiness, and implies a corresponding dread of misery. It is doubtless through, or by, this

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constitutional tendency that the rational idea of the intrinsic value of happiness or enjoyment is atfirst developed. Animals, doubtless, have enjoyment, but we have no evidence that they possessthe faculty of reason in the sense in which I have defined the term. Consequently they have not, aswe suppose, the rational conception of the intrinsic worth or value of enjoyment. They seekenjoyment from a mere impulse of their animal nature, without, as we suppose, so much as aconception of moral law, obligation, right or wrong.

But we know that moral agents have these ideas. Self-love is constitutional. Its gratification isthe chronological condition of the development of the reason’s idea of the intrinsically valuable tobeing. This idea develops that of moral law, or in other words, the affirmation that this intrinsicgood ought to be universally chosen and sought for its own sake.

The sensibility, like the intellect, is a receptivity or purely a passive, distinguished from avoluntary faculty. All its phenomena are under the law of necessity. I am conscious that I cannot,by any direct effort, feel when and as I will. This faculty is so correlated to the intellect that whenthe intellect is intensely occupied with certain considerations, the sensibility is affected in a certain

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manner, and certain feelings exist in the sensibility by a law of necessity. I am conscious that whencertain conditions are fulfilled, I necessarily have certain feelings, and that when these conditionsare not fulfilled, I cannot be the subject of those feelings. I know by consciousness that my feelingsand all the states and phenomena of the sensibility are only indirectly under the control of my will.By willing I can direct my intellect to the consideration of certain subjects, and in this way aloneaffect my sensibility, and produce a given state of feeling. So on the other hand, if certain feelingsexist in the sensibility which I wish to suppress, I know that I cannot annihilate them by directlywilling them out of existence, but by diverting my attention from the cause of them, they cease toexist of course and of necessity. Thus, feeling is only indirectly under the control of the will.

(3.) Moral agency implies the possession of free-will. By free-will is intended the power ofchoosing, or refusing to choose, in every instance, in compliance with moral obligation. Free-willimplies the power of originating and deciding our own choices, and of exercising our ownsovereignty, in every instance of choice upon moral questions—of deciding or choosing in conformitywith duty or otherwise in all cases of moral obligation. That man cannot be under a moral obligationto perform an absolute impossibility, is a first truth of reason. But man’s causality, his whole powerof causality to perform or do anything, lies in his will. If he cannot will, he can do nothing. Hiswhole liberty or freedom must consist in his power to will. His outward actions and his mentalstates are connected with the actions of his will by a law of necessity. If I will to move my muscles,they must move, unless there be a paralysis of the nerves of voluntary motion, or unless someresistance be opposed that overcomes the power of my volitions. The sequences of choice or volitionare always under the law of necessity, and unless the will is free, man has no freedom; and if hehas no freedom he is not a moral agent, that is, he is incapable of moral action and also of moral

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character. Free-will then, in the above defined sense, must be a condition of moral agency, and ofcourse, of moral obligation.

As consciousness gives the rational affirmation that necessity is an attribute of the affirmationsof the reason, and of the states of sensibility, so it just as unequivocally gives the reason’s affirmationthat liberty is an attribute of the actions of the will. I am as conscious of the affirmation that I couldwill differently from what I do in every instance of moral obligation, as I am of the affirmation thatI cannot affirm, in regard to truths of intuition, otherwise than I do. I am as conscious of affirmingthat I am free in willing, as I am of affirming that I am not free or voluntary in my feelings andintuitions.

Consciousness of affirming the freedom of the will, that is, of power to will in accordance with

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moral obligation, or to refuse thus to will, is a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation.For example, no man affirms, or can affirm, his obligation to undo all the acts of his past life, andto live his life over again. He cannot affirm himself to be under this obligation, simply because hecannot but affirm the impossibility of it. He cannot but affirm his obligation to repent and obeyGod in future, because he is conscious of affirming his ability to do this. Consciousness of theaffirmation of ability to comply with any requisition, is a necessary condition of the affirmation ofobligation to comply with that requisition. Then no moral agent can affirm himself to be underobligation to perform an impossibility.

2. A second condition of moral obligation is light, or so much knowledge of our moral relationsas to develop the idea of oughtness. This implies—

(1.) The perception or idea of the intrinsically valuable.

(2.) The affirmation of obligation to will the valuable for its own sake. Before I can affirm myobligation to will, I must perceive something in that which I am required to will as an ultimate end,that renders it worthy of being chosen. I must have an object of choice. That object must possess,in itself, that which commends itself to my intelligence as worthy of being chosen.

All choice must respect means or ends. That is, everything must be willed either as an end ora means. I cannot be under obligation to will the means until I know the end. I cannot know an end,or that which can possibly be chosen as an ultimate end, until I know that something is intrinsicallyvaluable. I cannot know that it is right or wrong to choose or refuse a certain end, until I knowwhether the proposed object of choice is intrinsically valuable or not. It is impossible for me tochoose it, as an ultimate end, unless I perceive it to be intrinsically valuable. This is self-evident;for choosing it as an end is nothing else than choosing it for its intrinsic value. Moral obligation,therefore, always and necessarily implies the knowledge that the well-being of God and of theuniverse is valuable in itself, and the affirmation that it ought to be chosen for its own sake, thatis, impartially and on account of its intrinsic value. It is impossible that the ideas of right and wrong

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should be developed until the idea of the valuable is developed. Right and wrong respect intentions,and strictly nothing else, as we shall see. Intention implies an end intended. Now that which ischosen as an ultimate end, is and must be chosen for its own sake or for its intrinsic value. Untilthe end is apprehended, no idea or affirmation of obligation can exist respecting it. Consequently,no idea of right or wrong in respect to that end can exist. The end must first be perceived. The ideaof the intrinsically valuable must be developed. Simultaneously with the development of the idea

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of the valuable the intelligence affirms, and must affirm, obligation to will it, or, which is, strictlyspeaking, the same thing, that it is right to will it, and wrong not to will it.

It is impossible that the idea of moral obligation, or of right and wrong, should be developedupon any other conditions than those just specified. Suppose, for instance, it should be said thatthe idea of the intrinsically valuable is not necessary to the development of the idea of moralobligation, and of right and wrong. Let us look at it. It is agreed that moral obligation, and the ideasof right and wrong respect, directly, intentions only. It is also admitted that all intentions mustrespect either means or ends. It is also admitted that obligation to will means, cannot exist until theend is known. It is also admitted that the choice of an ultimate end implies the choice of a thing forits own sake, or because it is intrinsically valuable. Now, from these admissions, it follows that theidea of the intrinsically valuable is the condition of moral obligation, and also of the idea of moralobligation. It must follow also that the idea of the valuable must be the condition of the idea thatit would be right to choose, or wrong not to choose, the valuable. It is, then, nonsense to affirm thatthe ideas of right and wrong are developed antecedently to the idea of the valuable. It is the sameas to say that I affirm it to be right to will an end, before I have the idea of an end; or wrong not towill an end when as yet I have no idea or knowledge of any reason why it should be willed, or, inother words, while I have no idea of an ultimate end.

Let it be distinctly understood then, that the conditions of moral obligation, in the universalform of obligation to will the highest well-being of God and of the universe, for its own sake, arethe possession of the powers, or faculties, and susceptibilities of a moral agent, and light or thedevelopment of the ideas of the valuable, of moral obligation, of right and wrong.

I have defined the conditions of obligation in its universal form, i. e. obligation to be benevolent,to love God and our neighbor, or to will the universal good of being for its intrinsic value. Obligationin this form is universal and always a unit, and has always the same conditions. But there are myriadsof specific forms of obligation which relate to the conditions and means of securing this ultimateend. We shall have occasion hereafter fully to show that obligation respects three classes of thewill’s actions, viz. the choice of an ultimate end—the choice of the conditions and means of securingthat end—and executive volitions or efforts put forth to secure the end. I have already shown thatmoral agency, with all that is implied in it, has the universal conditions of obligation to choose thehighest good of being, as an ultimate end. This must be self-evident.

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Obligation to choose the conditions of this end, the holiness of God and of all moral agents, forexample, must be conditioned upon the perception that these are the conditions. In other words,the perception of the relation of these means to the end must be a condition of the obligation to willtheir existence. The perception of the relation is not the ground but simply the condition of obligationin this form. The relation of holiness to happiness as a condition of its existence, could not imposeobligation to will the existence of holiness without reference to the intrinsic value of happiness, asthe fundamental reason for willing it as a necessary condition and means. The ground of theobligation to will the existence of holiness, as a means of happiness, is the intrinsic value ofhappiness, but the perceived relation of holiness to happiness is a condition of the obligation. Butfor this perceived relation the obligation could not exist, yet the perceived relation could not createthe obligation. Suppose that holiness is the means of happiness, yet no obligation to will holinesson account of this relation could exist but for the intrinsic value of happiness.

Conditions of obligation to put forth executive acts.

Having now defined the conditions of obligation in its universal form, and also in the form ofobligation to choose the existence of holiness as a necessary means of happiness, I now proceedto point out the conditions of obligation to put forth executive volitions or efforts to secure holiness,and secure the highest good of being. Our busy lives are made up in efforts to secure some ultimateend, upon which the heart is set. The sense in which obligation extends to these executive volitionsor acts I shall soon consider; at present I am concerned only to define the conditions of these formsof obligation. These forms of oblig

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