T A N Z A N I A

C A P A C I T YB U I L D I N GQ U A R T E R L YM A G A Z I N E

March 2021 • Issue 4

TABLE OFCONTENTS

Page 1Interview with Mr. Takeh Sendze

Page 4Article By Gabriela Pedroso2020 Elections in Tanzania

Page 7Article By Marvin LindijerAccess to Justice in Tanzania

Page 9Article By Crystal LamRefugee Crisis in Tanzania

Page 11Infographic By Marianne AllamBarriers to secondary educationin Tanzania

Page 15Article by Sara TroianTanzania and The ICC

GUEST BLOG

Page 18Article by Manuel PreciosoTanzania and Mozambique to joinoperations in Cabo Delgado

Page 21Article by Bruna Luis Eberhard PostEradicating Child Labour in Tanzania

Page 23Call Pool for Writers

Page 24EditorialStaff Page

Q. Could you tell us a little about your journey as alawyer from Cameroon to working for the UNIRMCT? My mental journey began with my deep admiration forthe first common law barrister of the Cameroon Bar—Barrister Luke K. Sendze—my uncle, mentor and a finegentleman. The manifestation of my journey as alawyer began in September 1996 when I enrolled as afreshman into the law department of Anglo-SaxonUniversity of Buea in Cameroon. After three excitingyears studying the laws of evidence, criminal Law andprocedure, equity and so on, I graduated top of my lawclass in 1999 with an LLB Honours Degree. Convincedthat I wanted to practice law in the international arena,I proceeded to obtain a Master's degree inInternational Law from the University of Hull (UnitedKingdom) in the year 2001. Between 2001 and March2002, I walked the streets of London everyday seekingemployment or pro bono work in various law firms andlegal institutions. In March 2002, I was blessed with theopportunity to serve as a legal intern at theInternational Bar Association (IBA) where I workeduntil September 2002. From the IBA, I was recruited asa legal intern in the Office of the Prosecution of theUnited Nations International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda (ICTR) where I worked for six months underthe tutelage of Mr. Chile Eboe-Osuji, Mr. AbdoulayeSeye and Mr. Charles A. Adeogun-Phillips. After gaininginvaluable experience in international human rightsand criminal law practice at the IBA and ICTR, I packedmy bags in March 2003 and returned to my belovedcountry Cameroon. Though my family and friendswere happy to have me back, and I equally happy tohave returned home, my professional aspirationstrapped some part of my heart and kept a burningdesire in me to return to the international scene. In June 2004, I was recruited to return to the ICTRProsecutor’s office as a case manager under theleadership of senior trial attorney Mr. Don Webster.This marked the beginning of my professional journeyin the field of international criminal law. From June2004 to 2012, I worked very hard and got married to asmart, strong and beautiful lady with whom I raised afamily alongside the wider family of ICTR. With theopening up of the UN International ResidualMechanism for International Criminal Tribunals(UNIRMCT/ the Mechanism) in July 2012, I transitionedfrom the ICTR to the Mechanism as an appealscounsel. This marked the beginning of my days at theMechanism. Since July 2012, I continued to work in theOffice of the Prosecutor of the Mechanism. From 2015to 2019, I served as an assistant appeals counsel at theMechanism in The Hague. Currently, I am a legalofficer at the Arusha Branch of the Mechanism.

Interview with Mr. Takeh Sendze

I

"For every journey, you must equipyourself with faith, hard work, integrityand good relationships."

Q. Can you share some insights about themandate of the UNIRMCT and specifically itspurpose of having a seat in Arusha, Tanzania? Simply stated, the Mechanism is mandated tocontinue the material, territorial, temporary andpersonal jurisdictions, and the rights andobligations previously carried out by the ICTRand the International Criminal Tribunal for theformer Yugoslavia (ICTY). The Mechanism wascreated on 22 December 2010 by the UnitedNations Security Council Resolution 1966 as asmall, temporary and efficient structure withbranches in Arusha and The Hague. The Arushabranch inherited functions of the ICTR whileThe Hague branch inherited functions from theICTY. In essence, the Security Councilestablished the Mechanism in order toguarantee that the closure of the ICTR and ICTYdoes not open the way for impunity to reignonce more in Rwanda and the formerYugoslavia. As it is one institution that took overthe functions of two ad hoc tribunals, theMechanism has two equal branches with theirrespective seats in Arusha and The Hague.

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Q. Can you shed some light on the contempt caseagainst Maximilien Turinabo et al.? The progress andwhat can we expect when the defence phase starts inthe first quarter of this year? The contempt case against Maximilien Turinabo et al.(Turinabo el al.) is an on-going case initiated against Mr.Maximilien Turinabo, Mr. Anselme Nzabonimpa, Mr.Jean de Dieu Ndagijimana, Mrs. Marie Rose Fatuma,Mr. Dick Prudence Munyeshuli and ICTR convict Mr.Augustin Ngirabatware—all Rwandan nationals. Inessence, the Turinabo el al. accused are charged withcriminal responsibility for knowingly and wilfullyinterfered with the ICTR and Mechanism’sadministration of justice. More specifically, the accused are charged withindividual criminal responsibility pursuant to Article 1(4)(a) of the Mechanism Statute and relevant provisions ofRule 90 of the Mechanism Rules of Procedure andEvidence (Rules) for (1) committing contempt, (2)inciting others to commit contempt, (3) disclosingprotected information about protected witnesses and(4) for having prohibited contact with protectedwitnesses in violation of a court order.

The accused are alleged to have committed thesecrimes through their involvement in a criminal schemein Rwanda between 2015 and 2018 that targeted fivekey protected prosecution witnesses whose evidencewas crucial for proving the crimes for which Mr.Augustin Ngirabatware was convicted by the ICTR. Aspart of the criminal scheme, the accused are alleged tohave inter alia (1) influenced protected witnesses torecant or deny their trial testimonies whichunderpinned Mr. Ngirabatware’s conviction—thuspaving the way for an application by Mr. Ngirabatwarefor a review of his final judgement pursuant to Rule 146of the UNIRMCT Rules, (2) instructed the protectedwitnesses regarding what information to provide tocourt officers and the judge when questioned about

the circumstances surrounding their allegedrecantations and (3) offered and paid bribes toprotected witnesses in exchange for their cooperationwith the Ngirabatware defence team during theanticipated Review hearing.

The Turinabo et al. trial started at the Mechanism’sArusha branch on 22 October 2020 before Single JudgeVagn Joensen with an opening statement by theProsecution. The Prosecution presented its casethrough nine witnesses who testified in person or viavideo-link during 16 in-court trial days; and through theadmission of approximately 1,800 items ofdocumentary evidence in lieu of oral testimony. Thepresentation of the Prosecution case was characterisedby skillful direct examinations and stringent crossexaminations of all witnesses. Approximately 1,200judicial submissions and decisions on a variety of legalissues have so far been made. The Prosecution closedits case on 27 November 2020.

The Defence case is anticipated to begin in the firstquarter of 2021. It is my expectation that should theSingle Judge finds that the Prosecution has presentedevidence capable of supporting convictions, theaccused persons will present the best possible defenceto refute or challenge the body of evidence already onrecord and the criminal allegations they face. I am notin a position to anticipate how long it will take for theDefence to present their case. However, the SingleJudge has indicated that Defence witness testimony,collectively, is expected to last no more than six weeks.I do anticipate some judicially stimulating days aheadduring the Defence phase of the Turinabo et al. case. I invite all readers to following theproceedings via the Mechanism’s website(www.irmct.org).

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Q. Do you think UNIRMCT should spread its wings ormore tribunals like IRMCT should be set up in differentparts of Africa to bring about stability andaccountability in the region? The Mechanism cannot 'spread its wings' beyond itsassigned mandate. With the establishment of theInternational Criminal Court (ICC), it was anticipatedthat ad hoc tribunals like the ICTR, ICTY or Mechanismwill be a thing of the past. Whether other ad hoctribunals will ever again be established by the UNSecurity Council in other African countries or any othercountries around the world is surely a matter for theUN Security Council.

In my opinion, every nation’s quest for stability andaccountability must begin with the establishment ofstable, reliable and accountable institutions andsystems, including judicial systems, within the nation.Stable, reliable and accountable domestic institutionswill be more effective because they will be establishedand operated with an understanding of the cultural,economic and socio-political context of the personsover whom they will exercise jurisdiction. While thismay sound idealistic, it is truly my conviction thatreliable and accountable domestic institutions are bestplaced to bring about stability and accountability in thevarious nations of the world – Hence the old adage'charity begins at home'. The Bible also holds in 1stTimothy chapter 5 verse 8 that 'if anyone does notprovide for his own, especially those of his own house,he is worse than an infidel'. I call on all nations of theworld to build, nurture and promote Stable, reliableand accountable domestic institutions that will bringabout the stability and accountability deserving of ourbeing.That said, I think ad hoc tribunals of aninternational nature have made and cancontinue to make significantcontributions towards the goal ofbringing stability and accountability incountries where grievous crimes havebeen perpetrated. I am not opposed tothe establishment of ad hoc tribunalwhere they are considered necessary tofight impunity.

Q. In your view, do you think the level of generalknowledge as well as professional legal knowledgearound international criminal law (ICL) and humanrights (HR) is sufficient in African countries? What doyou think could be the best approach going forward toincrease that knowledge?

I cannot claim to be qualified to speak to thesufficiency of knowledge about ICL and HR in Africancountries. But what I can certainly say is that, all Africancountries and many of their citizens have a generalknowledge of ICL and HR: African countries aremembers of the United Nations and signatories ofnumerous Human Rights treaties, including theInternational Convention on Civil and Political Rights.Many African countries are also signatories of theRome Statute which established the ICC. In any event,the level of general knowledge around HR andInternational law can be enhanced through theinclusion of these subjects in school curriculums and incapacity building programs in the public and privatesectors. In relation to the extent of 'professional legalknowledge', it is my view that while there are manyAfricans like myself involved in the professionalpractice and teaching of ICL and HR, many moreAfricans should participate. Judging from myprofessional journey, I think this can be achievedthrough sponsored internship programs in ICL and HRinstitutions for African graduates.

For example, while the ICC, the Mechanism and theAfrican Court for Human and Peoples Rights offerinternship programs, the lack of sponsorship is a majorreason why African graduates are not able to explorethe benefits of these programs. With adequatelysponsored internship programs, there is a good chancethat professional legal knowledge around ICL and HRwill grow in African countries. I encourage all Africangraduates to seek and pursue and exploit all possibleinternship opportunities in the field.

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2020 Elections in Tanzania: A time to challenge theorthodoxy

When elected for the first time in 2015, President John Magufuli’s from the ChamaCha Mapinduzi (CCM) party had four mainpledges in his campaign: to boost economicperformance, to fight corruption, to tackleyouth unemployment, and to stablish freeprimary and secondary education inTanzania. On 5 November 2020, PresidentMagufuli started a second five-year term inthe country. The elections took place on 28October 2020 and he won with 84 % of thevotes[1], a large margin over his opponentTundu Lissu of the Chadema party (13 % ofthe votes). The CCM party also succeeded inelecting a president in Zanzibar, as HusseinAli Mwinyi won with 76% of the vote.

Indeed, the Tanzanian government hascracked down heavily on corruption since2015.[2] Nevertheless, corruption is still adaily reality in the country, affecting itspolitics, business and even the judiciary. Inthe past few years, hundreds of officialssuspected of committing such crime havelost their jobs, however only a few legalproceedings were in fact initiated – givingthe impression that such popularpersecutions were politically motivated. –For instance, in the 2019 CorruptionPerception Index[3], Tanzania scores 37 outof 100 and holds the 96th position out of 180.

In the Ibrahim Index of AfricanGovernance[4], Tanzania scores 53 out of100, ranking 19th out of 54. It is clear thatthe country still needs systemic andstructural reforms that are able to buildlasting and meaningful change. Magufuli’s government has not onlycracked down on corruption, but also oncritics in the political opposition, the pressand civil society. For instance, Tanzania isconsidered as ‘partly free’ in the 2020Freedom in the World Report[5], scoring40 out of 100 (down 5 points year-on-year). According to the document, sincethe 2015 elections, there was a severegrowth on a campaign of repressionagainst opposition parties, withharassment, arrests and detentions ofprominent political figures. As anexample of the government’sauthoritarian rule, the Tanzanian PoliticalParties Act was amended in January 2019,allowing bans on political parties thatwould engage in common forms ofactivism.

1] Africa Confidential, ‘Bulldozing to victory’ (Africa Confidential, 5 November 2020) <www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/13126/Bulldozing_to_victory>accessed 2 December 2020[2] Kaunain Rahman, ‘Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in Tanzania’ (Transparency International, 30 September2019<www.knowledgehub.transparency.org/helpdesk/overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-tanzania-1>accessed 2 December 2020[3] Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perception Index 2019’ (Transparency International, 1 January 2020) <www.transparency.org/en/countries/tanzania> accessed 2 December 2020[4] Mo Ibrahim Foundation, ‘Ibrahim Index of African Governance’ (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020) <www.iiag.online> accessed 1 December 2020[5] Freedom House, ‘2020 Freedom in the World Report’ (Freedom House, 2020) <www.freedomhouse.org/country/tanzania/freedom-world/2020>accessed 1 December 2020

By Gabriela Pedroso

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Disclaimer: This article was written before President John Magufuli's death.

Moreover, in March 2020, eight senior figures of the mainopposition party were found guilty on several charges,sentenced to pay fines or to stay five months in jail. On the onehand, public gatherings and political rallies were temporallybanned by the government, which used the COVID-19pandemic as a justification for such measures. On the otherhand, the government has resisted imposing a lockdown[6],standing apart from its neighbours and insisting that economicgrowth had to be prioritized. According to Africa Confidential,the country’s response to the pandemic was marked by‘chaotic frontline healthcare, confused public healthmessaging, and a commitment to limiting the public's accessto information’.[7] BBC News stated that, when it comes to thecoronavirus situation, Tanzania operates in ‘data darkness’.[8]

The 2020 polls in Tanzania were considered one of the keyelections in Africa[9], as it could disrupt the peace of one of themost stable countries in the continent. In the 2019 localelections, there was a massive government interference, whichdisqualified 90 % of the opposition candidates, caused anopposition boycott and resulted on the CCM ruling partyowning almost the total number of seats. In October 2020, thelandslide victory of Magufuli occurred – again – amidallegations of fraud and repression. According to the country’slaw, the presidential results cannot be challenged once thewinner has been declared by the National ElectoralCommission – which was done on 31st October.[10] – Theopposition alleged ‘shameless’ fraud in the elections[11] andpeople were banned from holding streets protests.[12] Amongothers, refusals of nominations of opposition candidates andparty capture of the electoral commission were reported[13], aswell as arrests of up to 300 rival party members[14], policeviolence and the killing of civilians.[15] The opposition leader,Tundu Lissu, has asked the international community, especiallythe African Union, to not recognize the ‘illegitimate’ results.[16]According to the Tanzania Elections Watch, the vote ‘markedthe most significant backsliding in Tanzania’s democraticcredentials’.[17]

Such allegations and explicit repressions could not only createproblems when it comes to receiving political support fromother countries, but also when it comes to receiving economicsupport.

[6] Africa Confidential, ‘Magufuli the outlier’ (Africa Confidential, 2 April 2020)<www.africa-confidential.com/article preview/id/12914/Magufuli_the_outlier> accessed 2 December2020[7] Africa Confidential, ‘The Magufuli experiment’ (Africa Confidential, 14 May 2020)<www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/12958/The_Magufuli_experiment>accessed 2 December 2020.[8] Basillioh Mutahi, ‘Tanzania President John Magufuli: The man who declared victory over coronavirus’ (BBC News, 2 November 2020) <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54603689> accessed 3December 2020.[9] Rudolf Ogoo Okonkwo, ‘These are the key African elections to watch in 2020’ (Quartz Africa, 13 January 2020) <www.qz.com/africa/1783924/african-elections-in-2020-ghana-ivory-coast-ethiopia-tanzania>accessed 3 December 2020.[10] Tanzania National Electoral Commission, ‘The Commission announces Dr. Magufuli was elected President of the United Republic of Tanzania on 28th October 2020’ (TanzaniaNational Electoral Commission, 31 October 2020) <www.nec.go.tz/news/commission-announces-dkt-magufuli-elected-to-be-the-president-of-united-republic-of-tanzania-on-28th-october-2020> accessed 2 December 2020.[11]BBC News, ‘Tanzania elections: Tundu Lissu alleges “shameless” fraud’ (BBC News, 28 October 2020) <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-54703693> accessed 2 December 2020.[12] See footnote 8.[13] See footnote 1.[14] The Citizen, ‘Chadema claims 300 arrested as Lissu lands in Belgium’ (The Citizen, 12 November 2020) <www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/chadema-claims-300-arrested-as-lissu-lands-in-belgium-3019350> accessed 3 December 2020.[15] Human Rights Watch, ‘Tanzania: Repression Mars National Elections’ (Human Rights Watch, 23 November 2020) <www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/23/tanzania-repression-mars-national-elections> accessed 3 December 2020.[16] Cai Nebe, ‘Tanzanian election: Magufuli declared winner in landslide while opposition cries foul’ (DW,30 October 2020) <www.dw.com/en/tanzanian-election-magufuli-declared-winner-in-landslide-while-opposition-cries-foul/a-55444555>accessed 3 December 2020.[17] Aljazeera, ‘Magufuli wins re-election in Tanzania; opposition cries foul’ (Aljazeera, 30 October 2020) <www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/30/magufuli-wins-re-election-in-tanzania-says-electoral-commission> accessed 3 December 2020.

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Donor countries have publicly raised theirconcerns about civil and human rightsviolations[18], which might result in a cut onthe funds given to Tanzania. Human RightsWatch states that the country’s authorities‘should take prompt, credible, and impartialsteps to investigate the allegations ofelection-related killings, beatings andassaults by security forces, and hold thoseresponsible accountable’.[19] Furthermore,the United Nations High Commissioner forHuman Rights Michelle Bachelet wasdisturbed by reports of continuedintimidation and harassment during theTanzanian general elections.[20] She urgedthe country’s government to ‘respect andfacilitate exercise of the rights to freedom ofexpression and of peaceful assembly’. TheHigh Commissioner called for the ‘immediaterelease of those detained for exercising theirhuman rights’. She also stressed that,according to the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights, assemblies shouldbe presumed as peaceful.

The constrain of civil and political rights entaila huge barrier to the legitimacy of theTanzanian 2020 elections. The currentpresident stands for a party that has neverlost the presidency.

Additionally, the main opposition leader isstill recovering from an assassinationattempt and has now left the country forsecurity and health reasons.[21] With the2020 elections being defined as ‘the leastfree since multiparty democracy began in1995’[22], it seems to be no room forreconciliation between the country’s twomain parties. Moreover, the repressive lawsand policies in Tanzania clearly go againstinternational and regional human rights law,especially the African Charter on Humanand Peoples' Rights. As the Tanzanianopposition has proven itself incapable ofkeeping Magufuli and his party in check, theinternational community will have to do so.The increasing authoritarianism in Tanzaniaand the international criticism it hasreceived indicates that this might be thetime to challenge the orthodoxy by buildinglasting and meaningful change. The AfricanCourt on Human and People’s Rights hasmade significant headway in bringingattention to accountability. Nonetheless,human rights crises continue to occur andits mandate is now more needed than ever.The international community, especially theAfrican Union, need to rise to the challenge,otherwise basic human rights will continueto be violated and critics will continue to fearfor their future.

[18] Africa Confidential, ‘Unpopularity contest’ (Africa Confidential, 16 April 2020)<www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/12936/Unpopularity_contest> accessed 4 December 2020.

[19] See footnote 15.

[20] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘UN rights chief disturbed by harassment of opposition following Tanzania elections’ (United Nations High Commissioner for

Human Rights, 10 November 2020)<www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26489&LangID=E>accessed 4 December 2020.

[21] See footnote 14.

[22] See footnote 1.

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Access to Justice in TanzaniaBy Marvin Lindijer

Defining 'access to justice' is a challenging taskthat encompasses a number of different aspects.A worthwhile attempt to define it would be 'theequity in which members of differentbackgrounds are able to obtain from the givenjustice system'.[1] Ultimately, this regard is notlimited to: the fairness in which various litigantsare treated, the justness of the results deliveredby the court systems, the speed in which casesare processed and the responsiveness of thegiven system in regard to those who use it. Itsimportance in Tanzania cannot be understated,it is pivotal for the foundations necessary foressential and necessary development. An Afrobarometer study conducted in 2017 found thatTanzanians trust in courts of law was at a mere69% with its perception of corruption amongjudges and magistrates at 36%.[2] The lack ofaccess to justice in Tanzania plays a pivotal rolein the development processes; from stateformation to the enriching of democraticprinciples, from the regulation of economicmatters to the protection of human rights. Allproviding the benchmark for wholesomeeconomic and social interaction.

There are a number of factors that restrict accessto justice in Tanzania. Chronic underfundingcoupled with the misuse and corruption of thesystem by economic and political elites serve asa significant barrier.[3]

1] Bowd, R. (n.d.). Access to Justice in Africa (Knowledge Empowers Africa, Issue brief No. 13). Institute for security studies. doi:https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/112459/NO13OCT09.pdf[2] Logan, C. (2017). Ambitious SDG goal confronts challenging realities: Access to justice is still elusive for many Africans(23rd ed., Policy paper, Tech.). AFR Barometer.[3]Sanga, E. H. (2014). Challenges of Access to Justice in Tanzania to Obtain Legal Assistance for Street Children Facing Physical Violence by Police (Doctoral dissertation, International Institute ofSocial studies). The Hague. [4] Vrushi, J. (2019). Citizens views and and experiences of coruption (Afrobarometer, Rep.). Transparency International.doi:trancperency.org[5] ibid 1

A recent African corruption barometer carriedout by transparency International found that 18%of Tanzanians directly experienced legalcorruption in 2019. In turn, the lack of accessplays a significant role in hindering and fightingcorruption. An effective legal system is anefficient avenue in championing anti-corruptionintitatives.[4] The effective rule of law and thejustice system represent effective mechanism’sin ongoing political, social and economicdevelopment landscapes. Access to justice whenefficient, reflect the interest of citizens as itprovides an avenue in which their interests canbe protected. To that end, access to justice andanti-corruption initiatives go hand in hand.

Information and illiteracy or the lack thereof is afurther factor in the hindrance of achievingadequate access to justice. Recent studies haveshown that in Tanzania the basic understandingof the law may intimidate individuals where theyend up engaging with informal systems forresolution in which they are more familiar with.There is a clear correlation between those livingin rural areas and in urban settings where theliteracy rate is generally higher.[5] This can beattributed to a number of reasons includingaccess to media, access to institutions, basicunderstanding of the law but also ignorance ofcivil and human rights. Low literacy level is aclear hindrance to effective access of justice,where there is any attempt to increase suchaccess one must not ignore literacy levels andthe lack of legal awareness.

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Likewise, due to significant factors ofgeography there are sizable portions ofTanzania that are considered rural and still fallunder the jurisdiction of informal justicesystems. Although Tanzania is a country thathas seen rapid urbanisation in the last decade,its legal system includes a mix of informal andformal justice systems.[6]. Where customary,informal and traditional systems fill the gap offormal mechanisms of resolution, it does notcome without its problems. For instance, beingcouched in tradition these customary legalsystems often marginalise and exclude women.Furthermore, it is well-known that theseinformal courts do not necessarily recogniseinternational protocols, conventions andtreaties but instead promote traditional rightsover individual rights. It should be notedhowever that without these informal ruralcourts, access to justice for the masses would be even further restricted. However, withcertain restrictions placed on these courts it isinevitable that certain difficulties arise inregards to partiality and independenceparticularly for women and those of loweconomic status. Chronic corruption andunder-resourcing of these courts in Tanzaniafurther exuberate the problem. While access tojustice is limited for a significant part of theTanzanian population, these courts continue toserve the purpose of maintaining status quo ofcertain elites for their own benefit.[7]

Correspondingly, poverty is perhaps the mostsignificant challenge to adequate access tojustice. In the most recent human developmentreport Tanzania’s gross domestic product percapita is $744; these values are in the lowestthird of African states.[8] As a recent studyindicated, patterns of trusts in courts amongAfrican countries showed a clear correlationbetween those who lived in high poverty incomparison to who did not.[9] The mostsubstantial barrier in this case is the inability tomeet the costs of legal representation. In fact,most of the problems associated with a lack ofaccess to justice is one way or another relatedto economic inadequacies.

Furthermore, the structural changes that need tobe implemented to increase access almostexclusively rely on monetary influence. The efficientuse of human recourses and adequate levels offunding for relative institution’s framework willundoubtedly improve access of justice in Tanzania.

That being said, there are a number ofrecommendation that could enhance the level ofaccess to justice for Tanzanians. The provision oflegal aid institutions that guarantee independencefrom government should be increased.Furthermore, the use of paralegals can significantlydecrease the information gap between those withlow literacy levels providing basic education of thelaw in ways that can be easily understood by regularTanzanians. Also, civil society can play aconsiderable role in increasing awareness regardinglegal issues particularly among marginalisedcommunities. Considering the divide between ruraland urban areas; synergy between the informal andformal legal systems is important in the overalldevelopment of legal systems, a basis must beformed in order for both the systems to workeffectively side by side. It must also be imperativethat the infrastructure is adequately developedfinancially to be able to adequately meet the needsof ordinary Tanzanians. Finally, an emphasis shouldbe made for women and other marginalised groupsby civil society, government as well as theinternational community in order to prioritise theprovision of legal services to those who need itmost. Where the rule of law is upheld and justice isapparent the process of democracy anddevelopment is supported equally, where no justiceexists then all these processes are undermined.Significant barriers such as poverty, cumbersomelegal challenges and illiteracy present long termchallenges to this goal. Increasing this level ofaccess would require unparalleled effort to ensurethe recommendations are carried out and equalityof access is established.

[6] Nyanduga, B. T. (2006, November). Guide to Tanzanian Legal System and Legal Research. Retrieved January 02, 2021, fromhttps://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Tanzania.html[7] Tanzania: Killings, arbitrary detention and torture of opposition members in aftermath of elections. (2020, November 20).Retrieved January 02, 2021, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/11/tanzania-killings-arbitrary-detention-and-torture-of-opposition-members-in-aftermath-of-elections/[8] United Nations Development Programme, Sierra Leone National Human Development Report 2007, Freetown: UNDP, 2007/8.[9] Ibid 2

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CORRUPTION

PERCEPTIONS

INDEX 2019

Tanzania has a long history of hosting refugeedue to the ethno-political armed conflicts in itsneighbouring countries. Currently, around350,000 displaced persons mainly from Burundiand the Democratic Republic of the Congo havefled and settled in the three camps of Nyarugusu,Nduta and Mtendeli.[1] Despite internationalassistance, the main humanitarian challenge ofTanzania’s scarce resources leads to a chronicallyunderfunded refugee programme. The crisisbecame even more concerning because of theunlawful forced return policy since 2019 and thereported abuse of Burundian refugees byTanzanian authorities between October 2019 toAugust 2020. Tanzanian refugee law and policy.The legal protection of refugees in Tanzania istrilateral. Internationally, Tanzania has acceded tothe 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status ofRefugees (the 1951 Refugee Convention) in 1964and worked closely with the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).[2]Regionally, Tanzania is a partner state of theOrganization of African Unity (OAU) and has anobligation to adopt and comply with initiativeswithin the regional bloc. In particular, the 1969OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects ofRefugee Problems in Africa (the 1969 AfricanRefugee Convention) requires new nationallegislation to ensure effective compliance.[3] TheRefugee Act of 1998 and the National RefugeePolicy of 2003 were enacted and issued as aresult.[4] However, both laws tend to imposeincreasingly stringent conditions on freedom ofmovement and restrictions on economicactivities which prove contradictive to theintention

intentions of the 1951 Refugee Convention andthe 1969 African Refugee Convention.[5]

Voluntary repatriation

In practice, the Tanzanian position on refugeestatus and determination has been inconsistentand erratic. While refugees were initiallywelcomed and some were offered citizenship,the government revoked the prima facierecognition approach in 2017 that grantedrefugee status based on nationality and declarednon-admission of asylum seekers in 2018.[6]Burundian refugees who fled after the politicalviolence in the 2015 election are the mostaffected by the government’s hardened policy.Under a tripartite agreement among Tanzania,Burundi and the UNHCR, “informed voluntary”repatriation of Burundian refugees to theircountry of origin has been implemented.UNHCR has conducted detailed interviews andfacilitated almost 100,000 returns from 2017 to2020 despite its official stance against themeasure. [7] Controversy arose as authoritiesannounced an accelerated timeline for refugeesto return “whether voluntarily or not” by the endof 2019.[8] On top of that, the Tanzaniangovernment has a troubling history ofemploying means of coerced repatriation suchas closing camps by burning or bulldozinghouses, and by shutting down markets.[9] Underthe 1998 Refugee Act and 2003 National RefugeePolicy, asylum seekers could travel outside andwork within the designated areas once obtaineda permit.

Refugee Crisis in TanzaniaBy Crystal Lam

[1] ‘Tanzania crisis briefing’ (Rescue, 2020) <https://www.rescue.org/country/tanzania#what-caused-the-crisis-in-tanzania>accessed 25 January 2021[2] Leonard Chimanda & Stéfanie Morris, ‘Tanzania’s National Legal Framework for Refugees’(2020) 5 LERRN 1, 7-9 <https://carleton.ca/lerrn/wp-content/uploads/LERRN-Working-Paper-No.-5-Tanzania.pdf> accessed 25 January 2021[3] Chimanda & Morris (n2) 10-11[4] Chimanda & Morris (n2) 14[5] UNHCR ‘Global Report 2003’(2003) 164, 165<https://www.unhcr.org/40c6d7730.pdf> accessed 25 January 2021[6] Chimanda & Morris (n2) 24‘[7]Tanzania: Burundian Refugees ‘Disappeared,’ Tortured’ (Human Rights Watch, 2020 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/11/30/tanzania-burundian-refugees-disappeared-tortured>accessed 25 January 2021

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It is reported that the application procedures forsuch permit were designed to create difficultyand confusion so that refugees’ freedom ofmovement and right to work were greatlycurtailed. These measures were meant to pushthe repatriation agenda.[10] Reports from NGOsalso showed the threats of deportation, violenceand arrest are driving refugees out of Tanzania.Burundian refugee population with insecurelegal status who lacked access to aid wastargeted due to their vulnerability. Suspectedmembers of the Burundian ruling party’s youthleague, the Imbonerakure, were allegedlyaccountable for disappearances and killings in ornear the camps. The Tanzanian police becameincreasingly violent whereas the living conditionand security of the refugee camps deterioratedrapidly. Tanzanian officials imposed mountingpressure to expedite refugees to return fromexile, which made the UNHCR’s mandate toverify the voluntary nature of returnee’s decisiondifficult.[11]

Non-refoulement

Non-refoulement obligations in internationalcustomary law complement the 1951 RefugeeConvention and the 1969 African RefugeeConvention, which prohibit states to transfer anyindividual to another country if there is animminent danger of human rights violations or areal risk of irreparable harm.[12] Refoulementoccurs when a government directly expels arefugee but also when indirect pressure is sointense people are left with no choice but forcedto return. The state obligation extends to asylumseekers who have not yet formally acquired therefugee status.[13] In Burundi, serious humanrights violations against perceived supporters ofthe opposition party including the returneescontinue. The Tanzanian government’spreference of voluntary repatriation as a solutionto the overcrowded refugee camps over localintegration or resettlement outright neglects itscommitments to international and regional law.[14]

Inhumane treatment in forms of enforceddisappearance, arbitrary detention and torture A report from Human Rights Watch hasdocumented how the Tanzanian authoritiesgravely abused Burundian refugees and asylumseekers between October 2019 to August 2020.There were at least seven cases of enforceddisappearance in the Nduta and Mtendeli campswhere the police arrived at the victims’ housesafter midnight without an arrest warrant andbrought the victims away. When family membersenquired the whereabouts of the victims the nextday, the police claimed the victims were not intheir custody and the victims went missing sincethen. In the 11 reported cases of arbitrarydetention and torture, victims were taken toKibondo police station which locatedapproximately 11 kilometres from Nduta campand 25 kilometres from Mtendeli camp. Theywere detained for up to several weeks in a dark,windowless room with no water or toilets, oftendeprived of food and clothes. Detainees werehandcuffed, suspended by rope from the ceiling,threatened, beaten by sticks, severely whippedand interrogated. The police and intelligentagents use electric shocks as a method of torture.In one particularly egregious case where thevictim failed to fulfil the police’s extortion request,his genital was pierced by bike spokes andrubbed with chilli. After being detainedincommunicado without charge, eight of thedetainees were forcibly returned to Burundi inAugust 2020. They were handed over toBurundian intelligence officers at the border andthen held in Bubanza and Muramvya prisons.Information disclosed during interrogations hasshown a blatant collaboration between theTanzanian and Burundian authorities.[15]

UNHRC has expressed concerned over thealleged disappearances of refugees in Tanzaniaand demanded a full official investigation. Yet, asthe discrepancies between the local practice andinternational regulatory framework widen, thedanger of refugees and asylum seekers inTanzania remains.

[10] Chimanda & Morris (n2) 26-27 1[11] ‘Tanzania: Burundians Pressured into Leaving’ (Human Rights Watch, 2019) <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/12/tanzania-burundians-pressured-leaving> accessed 25 January 2021[12] UNHCR ‘Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol’(26January 2007) 8-10 [13] Human Rights Watch (n7)[14] Chimanda and Morris (n2) 19[15] Human Rights Watch (n7) Page 10

LIKE MILLIONS OF ADOLESCENTSIN TANZANIA, IMANI, 23, FROM

MWANZA, A REGION INNORTHWESTERN TANZANIABORDERING LAKE VICTORIA,

WANTED TO STUDY AS MUCH ASSHE COULD.

FROM THE AGE OF 14, WHEN SHEENTERED SECONDARY SCHOOL, SHETRAVELED MORE THAN AN HOURAND A HALF EVERY MORNING TO

GET TO SCHOOL.

I HAD A DREAMTO FINISHSCHOOL

HTTPS://WWW.HRW.ORG/REPORT/2017/02/14/I-HAD-DREAM-FINISH-SCHOOL/BARRIERS-SECONDARY-EDUCATION-TANZANIAGLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER AFRICA 2019 CITIZENS'VIEWS AND EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION, TRANSPARENCYINTERNATIONAL

BARRIERS TO SECONDARY EDUCATION IN TANZANIA

BY MARIANNE ALLAM

IMANI'S PLANS CHANGED

WHEN SHE WAS ONLY 16

YEARS OLD. SHE WAS

SEXUALLY ABUSED BY HER

PRIVATE TUTOR, A

SECONDARY SCHOOL

TEACHER.

ON THE THIRD MONTH OF

PREGNANCY, SCHOOL OFFICIALS

FOUND OUT SHE WAS PREGNANT.

"MY DREAM WAS SHATTERED

THEN". SHE WAS EXPELLED FROM

SHOOL AND HOME.

LIKE MANY ADOLESCENT GIRLS IN

TANZANIA, IMANI TRIED MANY

WAYS TO GET BACK INTO

EDUCATION ONCE SHE HAD HER

BABY. IN JANUARY 2016, MANI

START A COMPUTER LITERACY

PROGRAM SET UP BY A NGO IN

MWANZA.

Page 11

EDUCATION AT SECONDARY SCHOOL IN TANZANIA IS NOW FREE. BUT OTHER THINGS COST A

LOT OF MONEY LIKE:

TRANSPORT TO SCHOOL BOOKS SCHOOL UNIFORMS

MANY FAMILIES DO NOT HAVE THE MONEY TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO SECONDARY

SCHOOL.

EDUCATION IS ONE OF EIGHT PRIORITY AREAS.

BUT MANY YOUNG PEOPLE IN TANZANIA DO NOT GET ANY EDUCATION OR

TRAINING AFTER PRIMARY SCHOOL. AND MANY YOUNG PEOPLE DO NOT FINISH

SECONDARY SCHOOL IF THEY START IT.

MANY YOUNG PEOPLE WORK IN

DANGEROUS JOBS INSTEAD OF

GOING TO SCHOOL. THIS IS TO

EARN EXTRA MONEY FOR THEIR

FAMILIES.

MANY YOUNG PEOPLE HAVE TO

TRAVEL A LONG WAY TO GET TO

SECONDARY SCHOOL.

THERE ARE NOT ENOUGH SAFE

PLACES FOR GIRLS TO STAY NEAR

THEIR SCHOOLS.

STUDENTS HAVE TO TAKE AN EXAM AT THE END OF PRIMARY SCHOOL.

THEY HAVE TO PASS THE EXAM TO GO TO SECONDARY SCHOOL.

THEY CANNOT TAKE THE EXAM AGAIN IF THEY FAIL. THIS MEANS THAT MANY YOUNG

PEOPLE DO NOT GO TO SECONDARY SCHOOL BECAUSE OF THIS EXAM.

CHILDREN WITH

DISABILITIES DO NOT

GET A GOOD SUPPORT

FROM TEACHERS

BECAUSE THEIR LACK

OF TRAININGS

BARRIERS IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN TANZANIA

NOT ENOUGH

QUALIFIED

TEACHERS

OVERCHARGED

CLASSROOMS

IMPOSSIBLE FOR GIRLS TO

GET BACK TO SCHOOL IF

THEY GET PREGNANT OR

MARRIEDABUSE BY TEACHERS

& OTHER ADULTS

PROBLEMS WITH

SECONDARY SCHOOLS

https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Tanzania.html#_Legal_Education

Ambitious SDG goal confronts challenging realities: Access to justice is still elusive for many Africans by Caroline Logan, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 39

| March 2017

Page 12

WHILE THE TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN TANZANIA HAS DROPPED FROM 11.7% IN 2006

TO 10.7% IN 2011, YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IS STILL AN ISSUE OF GREAT CONCERN. MORE

RECENTLY, THERE HAS BEEN LESS FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

FROM DEVELOPED NATIONS. THE UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AMONGST YOUNG PEOPLE AGED 15 –24 YEARS IS 13.4%. UNEMPLOYMENT IS ALSO HIGHER AMONGST YOUNG WOMEN (14.3%)

THAN AMONGST YOUNG MEN OF THE SAME AGE, 12.3%.

CORRUPTION PERCEPTION IN TANZANIA

REALITY AFTER GRADUATION

18% OF PUBLIC SERVICE USERS PAID A BRIBE IN THE PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS

31% OF PEOPLE WHO USED POLICE PUBLIC SERVICES PAID A BRIBE IN THE

PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS

TANZANIA IS RANKED 96 OUT OF 180 COUNTRIES SURVEYED ON PERCEPTIONS OF

PUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTION IN TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL’S 2019 CORRUPTION

PERCEPTIONS INDEX, WITH A SCORE OF 37 OUT OF 100

10% THINK CORRUPTION

INCREASED IN THE PREVIOUS

12 MONTHS

THINK THAT ORDINARY CITIZENS

CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THE

FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

23% THINK THEIR GOVERNMENT IS

DOING A BAD JOB OF TACKLING

CORRUPTION

MAJORITY OF TANZANIANS

WHO ENTER THE LABOR

MARKET EACH YEAR ARE

EMPLOYED IN THE

AGRICULTURE AND

INFORMAL SECTORS WHICH

IS ESTIMATED TO BE MORE

THAN 70% OF THE

ECONOMY.

Statistica 2020

https://mdmlaw.co.tz/5-steps-to-becoming-a-lawyer-in-tanzania/

https://www.statista.com/statistics/447731/employment-by-economic-sector-in-tanzania/

https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/tanzania

Higher Education System and Jobless Graduates in Tanzania, Lyata Ndyali, Public Administration Department, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan

Page 13

GUESTBLOG

Page 14

The United Republic of Tanzania signed theRome Statute in 2000 and deposited itsinstrument of ratification on 20 August 2002.Tanzania holds a history of firm commitmentstowards the fight against impunity; it indeedhosts the International Criminal Court forRwanda (ICTR) in Arusha where someperpetrators of the 1994 genocide have beentransferred to and prosecuted. Moreover,Arusha is also the place where a sub-regionalconference was held to advocate in favour ofthe Rome Statute, the event that paved theway for the ratification thereof by Tanzania,Kenya and Uganda. An additional positiveattitude of Tanzania towards internationalmeans of justice is evident when consideringthe tense relationship between theInternational Criminal Court (ICC) and theAfrican Union (AU). From 2009 onwards, theAU adopted resolutions hostile to the work ofthe Court and promoting non-cooperation incases such as the proceedings against Al-Bashir, and in the Libyan and Kenyansituations. This opposition is shared by manyAU Member States and eventually lead the AUto call for a mass withdrawal from the ICC in2017. While some countries, like Burundi, theGambia and South Africa, followed thisresolution and indeed initiated the withdrawalprocess, Tanzania deliberately expressed itssupport for the Court and declared it had nointention to withdraw. Within this frameworkof genuine engagement against injustice onthe global stage, recent Tanzanian acts sparksome doubts. This article will try to shed lighton these issues and reflect on the possibleconsequences they might have on therelationship between Tanzania and the ICC.

To begin with, to date the government of theRepublic of Tanzania has yet to amend itsdomestic legislation to fully implement theRome Statute. In 2011-12, many external as wellas internal efforts were made to advance a billthat would officially incorporate the ICC treaty.A bill was drafted and submitted to theCommittee on Constitutional, Legal andPublic Administration of the TanzanianNational Assembly and even transmitted tothe Ministry of Justice. However, debates onapproval deterred the realisation of the act.Later on, during the 2015 conference aimed ataddressing the domestic legal framework onthe death penalty and victim’s access tojustice, the Tanzanian government brought upthe pending full domestic implementation ofthe Rome Statute. The Parliament advancedand proposed implementation bills to theexecutive, yet no actual progress has beenmade ever since.

A second obstacle towards the full integrationinto the domestic realm of an internationaltool for criminal accountability is illustrated bythe way whereby Tanzania dealt with theratification of the crime of aggression. In 2010,the ICC State parties gathered in Kampala todraft the amendment to Article 8 of the RomeStatute to introduce the crime of aggressionunder the Court’s jurisdiction. Suchamendment defined the concept of 'crime ofaggression' and granted the ICC the ability toprosecute any crime thereof in accordancewith the referral rules of the Statute. Duringthe 2014 session, Tanzania showed a genuineintent to make concrete commitmentstowards the ratification of the amendments,yet it did not sign the Kampala Agreements.

Tanzania andthe ICC

By Sara Troian

Page 15

Lastly, Tanzanian authorities were accused ofgross human rights abuses against Burundianrefugees since October 2019 whereas the mostrecent cases were reported at the end ofNovember 2020. Ever since Burundi becamethe hotspot for grave human rights violationsand pushed millions of citizens to flee in 2015,the Tanzanian government realised an ad hocimmigration policies and refugee shelters toease the settlement of Burundian asylumseekers. However, from 2019 on, police andintelligence officers started to target, tortureand extort Burundian refugees. Tanzanianauthorities also transferred refugees back toBurundi, both arbitrarily and upon the refugees'request when they believed they had no otheroptions. The UNHCR denounced therefoulment, a prohibited practice that occurswhen refugees are returned in any manner toplaces where their lives and basic rights arethreatened. A Human Rights WatchCommission of Inquiry reported that in Burundi'returnees have sometimes been victims ofserious violations that have forced them to goback into exile' or they have been imprisonedwithout charge. Even though Tanzania is not aparty to the Convention against Torture nor itratified the Convention for the Protection of allPersons from Enforced Disappearance, thethreats on Burundian refugees constitute aviolation to international and regional humanrights law.

On top of that, the torture and forcible disappearances of asylum seekers may amount to crimesagainst humanity within the meaning of Article 7 of the Rome Statute. The situation has caught theattention of many NGOs, think tanks and lobby groups that have already not only urged thegovernment of Tanzania to take the necessary steps to cease these abuses, but also called forregional human rights organisation to investigate this unlawful behaviour. If the situation remainsunchanged, the ICC may get involved. However, the prospect that the ICC may step in might havecumbersome consequences. First, it may reinforce the assertion upheld by the AU that the Court isbiased towards African situations and given that Tanzania would be the country under scrutiny, itmay cede to this idea and increment the African resistance against the Court. Second, it maydistance Tanzania even more from the full realisation of international criminal liability at thedomestic level, making it hard to see the ratification of the crime of aggression in the near future orthe passing of the ICC bill into domestic law. The alleged fact that Tanzanian officials are molestingBurundian refugees and that the government did not take action may prove an increasingseparation from international justice. Lastly, such illegitimate behaviour from a country that used topromote criminal accountability triggers many questions as to why and how this critical reversaloccured. There is also the alarming risk that Tanzania's unfavourable attitude against the Court mayspill over to other African States.

Page 16

This odd relationship between Tanzania and the ICC, and the international criminal regime in

general, highlights a tense stretch between a positive interest in using international tools to foster

the rule of law domestically and a blocking administrative class for the sake of self-interest, an

indispensable yet inconvenient attribute of sovereignty. Tanzania has not made any substantive

progress in the past 10 years, despite being one of the first few African states with a concrete will

towards the fight against impunity. To make matters worse, Tanzania seemed to have skewed its

demeanor towards a rather adverse viewpoint. On the other hand, pressures towards international

justice in Tanzania are still strong. Due to the operation of the ICTY on its national soil, together

with its historic engagement, there is hope that Tanzania will continue to support a more

thorough integration of international criminal law in the region as it did with the Rome Statute in

2000.

Page 17

Tanzania and Mozambique to join operations in Cabo Delgado: anopportunity for a larger and comprehensive regional response

By Manuel Precioso

Cabo Delgado province, located in the Northof Mozambique has become a redoubt forradicalism in the last few years. In Tanzania, asin Mozambique, Christianism is a majoritarianreligion, and Muslim communities are oftenmarginalised, facing unemployment andpoverty, something ostensible in CaboDelgado itself.[1] With increasingdiscontentment, attacks by different extremistgroups have increased, mainly by Ahlo SunnahWa-Jama, known locally as Al-Shabaab,(though there is no connection with theSomali organisation of the same name), whichlast year pledged allegiance to ISIS under thename of Islamic State of Central AfricanProvince.[2] These incidents were initiallydisregarded by Mozambican authorities, whopictured their perpetrators as mere'bandits'[3], since need for external aid was tobe avoided.[4]

However, at the beginning of 2020, violence inthe province has triplicated, accounting for atotal of 600 attacks and more than 2,000deaths, at least half of them civilians,according to the Armed Conflict Location andEvent Data, a US organisation monitoringviolence.[5] Since then, the organisation’smajor attack took place in Xitaxa, accountingfor 100 victims and the coastal city ofMocímboa da Praia has been occupied.[6] Allof which, has led to increasing displacements,which account for nearly half a million.[7]

Last October, a contingent of 300 militantsdecided to take the next step and cross the northborder to Kitaya, a village in the Tanzanianprovince of Mtwara to execute their first claimedattack in Tanzanian, setting fire to as many as 175houses, beheading locals and looting properties,just to get back to their headquarters in CaboDelgado right after.[8] Logically, the incidentsraised concerns in Tanzania, acknowledging somelocal groups’ help to perpetrate the attack, andsaw it as a threat to peace and security that couldbe repeated in the near future. The reaction to theattacks on Tanzanian floor did not wait much.During a meeting held in November, securitychiefs of Tanzania and Mozambique held adiscussion and announced they would startdealing with the problem in unison.[9] Theagreement materialised during a meeting inMtwara, where both parts signed a memorandumof understanding and officially announced jointoperations that would consist of Tanzaniansending of troops and mutual sharing ofintelligence.[10]

This was not the first time Tanzania addressed thedanger of insurgency in Cabo Delgado, since anoffensive against jihadists in the forests along theborder with Mozambique was announced.[11] Still,it is evident that the attacks in October were aturning point regarding Tanzanian positiontowards the insurgence. Indeed, days before thementioned meeting between the security forcesin November, Simon Sirro, Tanzania’s InspectorGeneral of Police (IGP) communicated thedetention of people that were trying to join theIslamist insurgency in Mozambique.[12]

[1] Eric Morier-Genoud “How a local Mozambique Islamic group became Africa’s latest terror threat” Quartz (24 February 2019), < https://qz.com/africa/1558111/mozambiques-islamist-threat-al-shabaab-has-roots-in-tanzania/amp/>[2] Alex Vines “Why The Insurgency in Northern Mozambique Has Got Worse” Chatham House (1 April 2020) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/04/why-insurgency-northern-mozambique-has-got-worse?AMP>[3] “Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa” Crisis Group Africa Report N°265, (21 September 2018), page 16 < https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/265-al-shabaab-five-years-after-westgate-still-menace-east-africa>[4] Ringisai Chikohomero “Can SADC come to Mozambique’s rescue?”,Institute for Security Studies (2 June 2020) <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/can-sadc-come-to-mozambiques-rescue[5] Andrea Carboni “CDT Spotlighy: Escalation in Mozambique” ACLED (April 2020) <https://acleddata.com/2020/04/30/cdt-spotlight-escalation-in-mozambique/>[6] Joseph Hanlon, “Mozambique: Mocimboa da Praia Still Occupied by Insurgents, Admits FDS” AllAfrica (10 November 2020) <https://allafrica.com/stories/202011100811.html>[7] Sean Rajman “Mozambique: WFP assists families fleeing conflict in Cabo Delgado”, World Food Programme (29 October 2020) <https://www.wfp.org/stories/mozambique-wfp-assists-families-fleeing-conflict-cabo-delgado>[8] Christopher Kidanka, “Tanzania arrests youth recruited by Somali militants” The East African (1 December 2020) <https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-arrests-youth-recruited-by-somali-militants-3215042>[9] “Mozambique, Tanzania in ‘terrorism’ pact –report” Club of Mozambique (21 November 2020) <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/mozambique-tanzania-in-terrorism-pact-report-177942/[10]Abdul Halim, “Will Tanzania and Mozambique’s joint efforts stamp out Islamist insurgents?”, The Africa Report (24 November 2020) <https://www.theafricareport.com/51870/will-tanzania-and-mozambiques-joint-efforts-stamp-out-islamist-insurgents/>[11] Andrew Harding “Mocimboa da Praia: Mozambique battles for port seized by IS” BBC News (13 August 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53764943>[12] “Tanzania detains people trying to join Islamist insurgency in Mozambique – “coming from Kigoma, Mwanza and elsewhere” Club of Mozambique (20 November 2020) <https://clubofmozambique.com/news/tanzania-detains-people-trying-to-join-islamist-insurgency-in-mozambique-coming-from-kigoma-mwanza-and-elsewhere-177880/>

Page 18

They came from regions such as Kigoma, Mwanza andelsewhere according to Siro, located in the North and East ofTanzania, far from where the attacks took place. The latteroperation proves that the insurgency problem could easilyextend to larger territories. Therefore, the attacks in Mtwaracould not only be observed as a turning point in the attitudeof Tanzanian authorities, but also for the Cabo Delgadoinsurgency, who succeeded in gaining momentum amongneighbouring countries and spoiled their breeding ground.[13]

Regardless of the implications for insurgent groups, the steptaken by Tanzanian authorities should be regarded as anexample of the needed cooperation when targeting regionalinstability, especially within the Southern Africa DevelopmentCommunity (SADC). In fact, this organization claimed theneed of joint efforts in Cabo Delgado to be taken by MemberStates in one of their meetings as early as May, but no othercountry has shown further compromise.[14] Not evenZimbabwe, who took the lead in those meetings and offeredhelp but never showed further compromise.[15]

Among SADC Member States that have not acted upon thesituation is one of its most powerful ones. South Africa hasnot mentioned the possibility of sending military assistanceto Mozambican forces, despite being a border country andsharing an economic corridor with them. Even though therehas been an explicit call for help, South African President CyrilRamaphosa is being hesitant[16], probably aware that anymove supporting Mozambique could have a reprisal.

Moreover, many voices are warning about the growinginfluence in Tanzania and neighbouring countries, whichparallels the previous evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Notonly the possibility of a civil war similar to that of Al-Shababwithin Somalia, but a regional escalation is a clear possibilityfor the foreseeable future if no action is taken.[17] This riskincreases when we consider the current pandemic situation.Larger poverty, unemployment and scarcity can throwregional youth in the arms of the insurgence, who havealready profited the context to promote themselves as asource of stability and solidarity by, for example, handing foodto local villages.[18}

[13] SungutaWest, “Islamic State Fighters’ First Claimed Attack in Tanzania: Strategic Calculations and Political Context” Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18

Issue: 22 (3 December 2020) <https://jamestown.org/program/islamic-state-fighters-first-claimed-attack-in-tanzania-strategic-calculations-and-political-context/>

[14] SADC “Communiqué Of The Extraordinary Organ Troika Plus Republic Of Mozambique Summit Of Heads Of State And Government” (19 May 2020)

<https://www.sadc.int/files/9315/8991/2199/Communique_of_the_Extraordinary_SADC_Organ_Troika_Summit_held_on_19_May__2020.pdf>

[15] Kisepile Nyathi, “Zimbabwe: Mnangagwa Pledges Support for Mozambique to Fight Militants” (11 November 2020) <https://allafrica.com/stories/202011120090.html>

[16]Tonderayi Mukeredzi, “Mozambique’s Insurgency Is a Regional Problem”, Foreign Policy (1July 2020) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/mozambique-islamist-insurgency-

regional-problem-cabo-delgado/>

[17] Francisco Almeida dos Santos “War in resource-rich northern Mozambique– Six scenarios” CMI Insight, N. 2 (May 2020) <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/7231-war-in-

resource-rich-northern-mozambique-six-scenarios.pdf>

[18] Emilia Columbo & Marielle Harris “Extremist Groups Stepping up Operations during the Covid-19 Outbreak in Sub-Saharan Africa”,

CSIS (May 1 2020) <https://www.csis.org/analysis/extremist-groups-stepping-operations-during-covid-19-outbreak-sub-saharan-africa>

Page 19

As it stands, Tanzania’s involvement does notmean that the situation is going to handleitself. Many efforts are to be taken whendealing with such a problem, one of thembeing addressing it adequately. Effortsconsisting of violence and military raids haveproven quite helpless for assessing the roots ofthe situation and there are concerns about theheavy-handed approach Tanzanian authoritiestend to employ when dealing with thesesituations. For instance, IGP Sirro himselfdeclared that if the insurgents don’t stop “theywill end up dead or face legal measures”.[19]This approach relates to human rights andopposition fear about violation of humanrights of captured insurgents in Tanzania.Furthermore, they claim that little informationis being made available about the agreementwith Mozambican forces or about the recentincidents and police raids and that enactmentof alarm state is needed.[20] Transparency iscrucial for such situations.

Perspectives

Cooperation between Tanzanian andMozambican forces should be considered astep forward for Tanzania in their involvementin the situation at their South border.Although Mtwara region attacks had to takeplace for Tanzania to take further action, theyshould prove enlightening for the wholeregion to realise the imperative of joint efforts.Even though the insurgency is mainly locatedat the Cabo Delgado province, the intensity ofits activity should not be overlooked, it is aregional issue, and escalation in Tanzaniashould be a lesson for all bordering countries.

Many observe parallels with the original BokoHaram situation in Nigeria,[21] and point out atthe exemplarity of the regional efforts thattook place. Precisely because of thosesimilarities[22], SADC Member States shouldkeep that in mind, and act as soon as they can,before the insurgency is too large to control.

In addition, joint efforts do not mean mereforce cooperation that aims to clashinsurgency by military means. It is quiteobvious that roots are deeper, and requireintelligence gathering and cooperation, aswell as other efforts that aim at assessingcritical problematics like heavy repression,Muslim exclusion or youth neglection. Finally,some other lessons could be learned fromKenyan terrorism management in the last fewyears,[23] which moved from an approachthat consisted on military actions andrepression to one of increasingcommunication and local delegation ofauthority and management.

Therefore, both Tanzania, as the first countryto assist Mozambique, and the SADC have aunique opportunity to coordinate a regionaleffort in an exemplary manner, setting aprecedent for the future by dragging fromprevious lessons.

[19]“Tanzania detains people trying to join Islamist insurgency in Mozambique”, Reuters (19 November 2020 <https://es.reuters.com/article/idAFL1N2I51LO>[20] Charles Combe “Tanzania Teams Up with Mozambique to Contain Terrorists” VOA News (26 November 2020) <https://www.voanews.com/africa/tanzania-teams-mozambique-contain-terrorists>[21]Anne-Marie Bissada “Mozambique: Can Cabo Delgado’s Islamist insurgency be stopped?” The Africa Report (29 July 2020) <https://www.theafricareport.com/35435/mozambique-can-cabo-delgados-islamist-insurgency-be-stopped/>[22] “Terrorism in Mozambique needs African solutions” Institute for Security Studies (18 November 2020) <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/terrorism-in-mozambique-needs-african-solutions>[23] “Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate” Crisis Group <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/265-al-shabaab-five-years-after-westgate-still-menace-east-africa>

Page 20

In the absence of good governorship, where thedevelopment of labour law is still ongoing, there is aconsiderable number of children between the age of 5and 14 that are forced into child labour in Tanzania. Itdeprives children of a proper education, which can bedetrimental to their physical, emotional, andbehavioral integrity.

Anti-child Labor Day on 12 June was established by theInternational Labor Organization in 2002, to promotethe eradication of child labour. But in Tanzania,children are placed in various sectors of work fromagriculture such as the plantation of coffee, sisal, tea,tobacco, cloves, sugar cane, to tanzaniten or goldmining. Gold-mining is especially dangerous due tothe risk of mercury poisoning. Children can gettrapped in collasped tunnels due to unlicensedoperations. Other jobs include housework, such aswashing and ironing. And the worst forms of childexploitation are illicit work, such as drug trafficking,and commercial sexual exploitation.

Article 11 of the Tanzanian Constitution gurantee theright to education for all without discrimination and inTanzanian law, only a child who has finishedelementary school and is 14 years old or older canwork no more than 6 hours a day. But in reality, manychildren cannot attend schools because of work. Manychildren work longer than 6 hours, some even work 24hours in a row. They have no time for leisure or to playwith other children of the same age. The discrepancybetween the law and reality is due to insufficient legalsupervision and lack of proper enforcement.

EradicatingChild Labour inTanzaniaBy Bruna Luisa EberhardPost

There is a number of social programmesfunded by international organisations tocompensate the immature child labour lawnationally, with the aims to reduce anderadicate child labour by collective effort.The involvement of the UN, ILO, Terre desHommes, WFP and USDOL are worth-mentioning.

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It would be very important to add thatthere could be a fixed monthly financialfund, for these families, coming from thegovernment in partnership withinternational institutions, to have anincome to be able to feed themselves, andfor basic hygiene, in view of the obligationof these children to attend schools, it isnecessary to believe that by participatingin school education, their talents couldevolve, to the point of helping theircommunity, or at least their family, to notallow their children to submit to childlabour. Children are obliged to workwithout a choice when there is no food onthe table, and they even become thefinancial heads of the house to help outtheir sick parents or young siblings.

Without a unified social assistanceprogramme nationwide, with the objectiveof providing financial assistance to familiesthat keep their children in school, and todemand the presence of these children inclassrooms, in exchange for financialsupport that is sufficient to maintain theirneeds. Basic needs such as food, clothing,health, and hygiene, do not address theopportunity for these children to stopworking obligatorily.

An example of this type of programmethat obtained excellent results, and whichin addition to combating child labour,solved the problem of the so-called'generational poverty cycle' wasimplemented in Brazil, under the name ofBolsa Familia. This program had verysignificant results in a short period of timein terms of combating child labour anderadicating extreme poverty, with asuccess rate of 75% between 2001 and2014. The World Bank, as Brazil's mainpartner, helped to finance and structurethis conditional cash transfer system,which now copied in several parts of theworld such as Mexico (OportunidadesProgramme) and New York (OpportunityNYC Programme).

Tanzania must invest in partnerships withother countries and entities in order tofinance a program along these lines, whichwill definitively heal these wounds andbring new hope to these families.

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Writers who focus on International Criminal Lawand Human Rights, especially in Africa, are invitedto send us submissions.

Entries should be max. 1200 words and citationsshould follow the OSCOLA style.

We will feature your article on our website or inthe next issue of our quarterly Legal CapacityBuilding magazine.

All entries should be sent to:info@centreforafricanjustice.orgcc:rishi@centreforafricanjustice.org

Join our pool ofwriters

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Gabriela Pedruso

Marvin Lindijer

Crystal Lam

Marianne Allam

Sara Troian

Manuel Precioso

Bruna Luisa

Eberhard Post

GuestWriter

Rishi Taneja

Project Manager Project Officers

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CB Team

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