t1 b34 workplans fdr- 4-28-03 workplan team 1 w mission statement-objective (least redacted of all)...

8/14/2019 T1 B34 Workplans Fdr- 4-28-03 Workplan Team 1 w Mission Statement-Objective (Least Redacted of All) 277

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I. Key Questions/Lines of InquiryW e propose to organize our initial research around three over-arching questions,which will be used as principal lines of inquiry:1. What is the history of al Qaeda and its linkages to other terrorist entities prior

to the 9/11 attacks?2. What can we determine through a comprehensive examination of all evidence

now available synthesizing the information available earlier with thatobtained post-9/11 - regarding theplann ing, preparation, financing, andexecution of the 9/11 attacks?3. What is now known of the present com position of al Qaeda and its affiliatedentities an d what threat do they no w pose?Each of these lines of inquiry is a building block that encompasses ma ny specific

component questions. We can identify some of these component questions at the outsetof the research, and they are listed below as a means of focu sing the initiation of ourresearch. How ever, new com ponent questions will emerge from our discoveries as ourresearch progresses. Thus, one of the aims of the initial research is to identify additionalkey compon ent questions for our research. One of the crosscutting issues to which wewill pay close attention is al Qaeda's collaborative relationships and connections w ithvarious other entities because these fac tors will be critical in assessing al Qaeda's meansand capabilities for future attacks.The following is a list of some of the key com ponent questions that will be thefocus of our initial research:1. W hat is the history of al Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attack?

a) W hat are al Qaeda's origins, ideological roots, doctrines, andworldview , and how have they evolved over time? W ho have been itskey functionaries? How has it recruited personn el?b) What attacks before 9/11 can we now connect with al Qaeda, eitheroperating alone or in collaboration with other terrorist group s? Howwere they carried out?c) W ith wh at other terrorist g roups has al Qaeda been affiliated, either incollaborative operations or through funding an d logistical supp ort?d) How has al Qaeda functioned organizationally and financ ially?e) What have been its relationships with governments or governmentcompon ents acting outside the purview of their ow n political


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leadership, including , but not limited to those governments or factionsthat provided al Qaeda w ith support and sanctu ary?2. W hat can we determine through a comprehensive exam ination of allevidence now available synthesizing the inform ation available earlierwith that obtained post-9/11 - regarding theplanning, preparation,

financing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks?a) What can we now understand regarding the strategic objectives of theattack?b) How were the targets and means of attack chosen? By whom? Howwas intelligence collected and employed for this purpose?c) What do we know of the origins and details of the operational plann ingfor the attack, e.g., the designation of operational command, theselection of the hijacking teams, the establishment of logistic and

financial support? When was the plan finalized? Was it fixed orflexible?d) W hat were the key planning an d decision variables? For example, isthere any evidence of any variables that w ould have resulted in adecision to abort the plan? Who had the final authority to carry out theplan or abort it?e) W hat training, exercises, and/or rehearsals were carried o ut?f) W hat staging areas and support networks were employed in carrying

out the plan? Did affiliated entities play an y role in staging orsupporting the attacks?3. W hat is now know n of the present com position of al Qaeda and itsaffiliated entities and what threat do they now po se?

a) How has al Qaeda sought to adapt and compensate for its losses?What changes have taken place since 9/11 in such areas as tactics,doctrine, personnel, an d financial practices?b) What is the current status of al Qaeda's active membership and its

access to weapons and training?c) What ha s happened to the many thousands who passed through thetraining and vetting camps in Afghanistan?d) What role has al Qaeda played in terrorist attacks mounted since 9/11,whether thwarted or actually carried o ut?


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e) What ha s been the role, if any, of affiliated an d collaborative entities inthese attacks, and what is the status of the connections between alQaeda an d other terrorist groups?

f) Is there an y evidence that al Qaeda is currently receiving an y supportfrom any state actor?

g) What is the status of al Qaeda's efforts to acquire WMD?II. Outlining a Research Plan

We will start ourresearch on the first line of inquiry - in effect, theconstruction of the "base building block" - in the 1989-1990 time fram e, whenUsama bin Laden's "base" or "al Qaeda" was set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, andbin Laden himself returned to Saudi Arabia. After the deployment of U.S. forcesto Saudi Arabia an d other Gulf states in 1990, bin Laden began his tirades againstthe "apostate" regimes in the Muslim world and called for the expulsion of theAmerican "infidels" from the land of the "sacred sites" of Islam. In 1991 binLaden moved his base to Sudan.

Some context:During this time frame several major terro rist operations tookplace in which bin Laden is known to have been involved, as well asadditional attacks for which there is evidence of , at least, bin Laden'ssupport. These attacks include the 1992 bombing of a hotel in Yemenwhere American troops on their way to Somalia were staying; th e

February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC I); the "Day ofTerror" plot, targeted at New York City landmarks, a plot that was brokenup by law enforcement in June 1993; the 1995 "Bojinka Plot" in Manila,which included plans to blow up 12 airliners over the Pacific Ocean,assassinate the Pope and the U .S. president, and fly an airplane ladenwith explosives into the CIA's headquarters; and the 1995 bombing of theSaudi National G uard building in Riyadh that killed five U.S. soldiers. Inaddition, although the attacks on the Am erican Em bassies in Kenya andTanzania did not take place until August 1998, the planning was alreadywell underway while bin Laden was residing in Sudan and he reportedlyreviewed th e plans for the attacks and the reconnaissance photos used fo rthose plans.

The multiple connections between these operations o f f e r insightsinto the evo lving structure of al Qaeda. For example, Wadih el-Hageserved as bin Laden's personal secretary while the al Qaeda leader wasbased in Sudan. Prior to that, from 1991 to 1992 El-Ha ge headed a so-called charitable organization in New York City that ostensibly raised


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funds for veterans of th e Afghan jihad; th e organization had previouslyraised funds to support those fighters during th e jihad. While in New YorkCity El-Hage also had contact with at least one of th e participants in W TCI and he was later convicted for his role in the 1998 Embassy bombings.Similarly, Ramzi Yousef, who managed WTC I , escaped after the attackan d ended up in Manila, where he work ed with future 9/11 comman derKhalid Sheikh Mohammed on the 1995 Bojinka Plot.

Our research will then follow bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in the spring of1996 and the establishment of his infrastru cture there. We will focus on one of the keydevelopmental lines during this period, the further expansion of al Qaeda's global reachthrough recruitment, indoctrination, training and the dispersal of its cells, at least some ofwhich played critical roles in the later 9/11 attacks.Some context:

A l Qaeda 's base an d operational infrastructure expanded by asignificant order of magnitude after bin Laden's move to Afghanistan in1996, entrenching its "army" infrastructure of bases fo r training inweapons, tactics, an d production of explosive devices. Th is infrastructurealso provided centers for ideological indoctrination and for screening theranks to spot and vet individuals for the inner cadre of terrorist cells. Thiswas the source of a large portion of the individuals dispatched to formcells in cities around the globe - aprocess vividly demonstrated in whatwe now know about many of the 9/11 hijackers.

The home base in Afghanistan also facilitated sequesteredgatherings for strategic and operational planning, an d for collaborationsessions with leaders of other terrorist groups. We now understand that asignificant expansion of consortium arrangem ents with other terroriststook place from th e Afghan bases. For example, there is evidence that alQaeda collaborated w ith two Asian terrorist groups in attacks carried outin Manila an d Jakarta in December 2000. This same connection was usedto set up the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur,including individuals who would later be involved in the attack on the USSCole in October 2000, the 9/11 attacks, and in the October 2002 Balibombing.

Similarly, a report released by the Singapore police reveals thatth e Southeast Asian terrorist organ ization Jema 'a h Islamiyya planned toprovide the foot soldiers for the aborted suicide strikes planned for Man ilaan d Jakarta in early 2002; al Qaeda leaders made th e strategic planningdecisions at meetings in Afghanistan an d provided the financing and muchof the target reconnaissance.


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Research into Key Question/Line of Inquiry 2, dissecting and reconstructing theplanning, preparation, financing and execution of the 9/11 attacks in rigorous detail fromits origins to execution, will proceed in parallel, with part of the team merging newlydeveloped intelligence (including findings emerging from the research on al Qaeda'sorigins and development) w ith information from existing sources. Our specificobjectives include the identification of al Qaeda's links with other entities, includingpossible links with state sponsors. These links could be a ma jor part of the threat alQaeda poses in the future.

Some context-Evidence no w available indicates that the concept of using aircraftas weapons crashing them into major sites - wa s raised with top alQaeda leaders as far back as the mid-1990's, at the same time the Manila-based Bojinka Plot was underway. Some have also theorized that theconcept of employing hijackers with pilot training evolved from the failedattempt of Algerian hijackers to force pilots to steer a hijacked aircraft

into the E i f f e l Tower in 1995. Th e process of selecting individuals fo rpiloting the aircraft, bringing together the operational teams, moving thefinancial support for the training an d maintenance of the teams, and, mostnotably, coordinating the actions of the diverse components of the attack -- entering the United States from both sides of the continent, an dcoordinating the implementation of the plot with flights from three majorairports ar e prima facie indications of the linchpin role of the "centralstaff" of al Qaeda's inner circle.

The results of these research efforts will provide a base for honing specific areasof focus and identifying sources for pursuing the third line of inquiry: What hashappened to al Qaeda in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the intensified worldwidecoalition in a war against terrorism, and, of even greater importance, what this revealsabout al Qaeda's present composition and its threat to the United States.

The research on al Qaeda's earlier developments will naturally feed into theunderstanding of al Qaeda's current situation. How ever, w e plan to step back at variousintervals to examine wh at specific component questions and branches of inquiry haveemerged from our research into al Qaeda's evolution and use these questions to sharpenour focus on the current threat.III. Categories of Documents to be Reviewed

W e propose to initiate ou r research by digging into key known lodes ofinformation. This needs to be understood as a starting point, however, because one of thedesired products of an in-depth research effort is the identification of new branches andpotential sources for further research. We plan to look preliminarily to open sources,many of which have already been used to begin shaping our detailed timeline of alQaeda's emergence and actions since its formation in the late 1980's. (Some of the most


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usefu l books are listed in the attached list of suggested reading materials.) W e thenpropose to examine th e following key sources:1. The records compiled by the Joint Inq uiry, both as s ubstantive sources ofinformation and as a means of identifying w hat else to look for and where tolook. All of the docume nts that have been m ade available to the Joint Inquiry

are maintained in specific storage areas by the agencies from which theyoriginated.2. The FBI's Penttbom file, wh ich contains the details ofwhat has been learnedfrom th e investigations of the 9/11 conspiracy, including a detailed timeline ofwhat the FBI knows of the origins an d movements of each of the plot'sparticipants.3. Records of statements of individuals interrogated in connection with

several major terrorist prosecutions in the Southern District of New Yorkand elsewhere. This is a critical lode of inform ation for exam ining theevolving cell structure, transnational connections and key players in theevol ution. The docum ents include records of investigations and interrogationsfrom the first trial of participants in the WTC I attack, which concluded inMarch 1994; the trial of the cons pirators in the N ew York City landma rkscase, including the "Blind Sheikh," which concluded in October 1995; the twotrials of Ramzi Youse f, first for his role in the Bojinka Plot, concluded inSeptember 1996, and then for his role in WT C I, concluded in Nove mbe r1997; the pre-empted "Millennium strike" on Los Angeles InternationalAirport; and the prosecution of the perpetrators of the African Embassybombings, which concluded in Ju ly 2001. In addition, th e gunman in the 1990assassination of Meir Kahane, the leader of the Jewish Defense League, w aslater convicted for his involvement in the 1993 plot to bomb New York Citylandmarks. We intend to review the records from the K ahane assass inationand other related investigations to determine the origins of the New Yorkterrorist cell.

4. Documentary reports of information relating to the 9/11 attacks and thehistory of al Qaeda that were obtained from individuals and materialtaken into custody since 9/11. The Intelligence Community has obtained avast amount of information from the large numbe r of operatives, docume nts,and equ ipment captured s ince 9/11. W e w ill start with th e Director of CentralIntelligence's Review Group, which hasbeen tasked w ith accumu lating allinformation on bin Laden, al Qaeda, an d terrorist plots against the UnitedStates worldw ide.This information is critical to the task of examining al Qaeda's development,structure, key players and collaborative ties with other regional andtransnational terrorist entities, which is particularly important in assessing thethreat al Qaeda curre ntly poses.


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Law Enforcement Privacy

Other CIA officers current ly under official coverNew York Cr imina l Cases a nd PENTTBOM Invest iga t ionRobert S. Muel ler , II I (FBI Director)Louis Freeh (former FB I Director)Dale Watson (former Deputy Executive Assistant Director, FBI)Patrick Fitzgerald (former Assistant U.S.Attorney, S.D.N.Y.)J o h n M ul l a ly (New York Police Department)

1 iNew York Joint Terrorism Task Force)](FBI New York)"KFBI New Y ork)N e w Y o r k )K en Karas (Assis tant U.S.Attorney, S.D.N.Y.)Andrew McCar thy (Ass i s t an t U.S.Attorney, S.D.N.Y.)Mary Ga l l igan (FBI Headquarters, lead agent o n Pent tbom invest iga t ion)

1 """TFBI Headquarters)Michael Rol ince (FBI Headquarters)P asqua l e J . D ' A m u r o (Deputy Execut ive A ssis tant Direc tor , FBI)I T(FBI New York )Scholars a nd Outside ExpertsBruce Hof fman (RAN D Corpora tion )Dan ie l Ben j amin (CSIS)Steven S imon (RA ND )Rohan Gunara tna (Saint Andrews) x'9/11 Closed by Sta tu t eM a g n u s R a m s t r o p (St.Andrews ) :: ;Zacha ry Abouza //Bernard Lewis //U.S. Department of State/NSC /JINR/NESA)JINR/TNC)

Richard Clarke (former Chair , CSG, N S C )Barbara Bodine (former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen)Prudence Bushnel l ( former U.S.Ambassador to K e n y a )Michael Shaheen (former Coordinator fo r Counter terror i sm)Foreign ServicesOfficials from va r ious foreign services, potent ia l ly i nc lud ing officialsfrom thel Iforeign services.

9/11 Law Enforcement Sensitive


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V. Suggested Unclassified ReadingOn the origins and evolution of the al Qaeda global terrorist consortium,we suggest either Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., (Touchstone, 2002) or RohanGunaratna, Inside Al-Qa'ida (Columbia U niversity Press, 2002). Although both

were published within a few months after the 9/11 attacks, both authors ha d beguntheir research into al Qaeda years earlier and both conducted extensive interviewswith key actors in foreign settings. The differen ces are mainly in presentation .Bergen employs a m ore journalistic narrative style, while Gu naratna is somew hatmore scholarly and offers substantial depth on key p oints.For insight into the Washington perspective an d what was known of theterrorist threat presented by bin Laden and al Qaeda prior to 9/11, we suggestDaniel Ben jamin an d Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror (Random House,

2002).

For a detailed, intimately inform ed layout of the complex interconnectionsof individuals and cells involved in the terrorist plots in New York and severalindividuals who later turne d up in various al Qaeda op erations, read John M illerand Michael Stone, The Cell (Hyperion Books, 2002).Bernard Lewis' book What Went Wrong? (HarperCollins 2002) provides aconceptual background introduction to the Middle Eastern and Islamicenvironment in which al Qaeda grew.


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MISSION STATEMENT/OBJECTIVETo construct a detailed exam ination of the 9/11 terrorism conspiracy and al Qaedatransnational terrorist consortium - includ ing analysis of leadership and personnel,organizational evolution, procedures, finances and objectives, global connections and

affiliations, and all known and suspected terrorist operations in which it has beeninvolved- up to its present status. Onepurpose of this would be to provide - with the acknowledged benefit ofhindsight and the information nowavailable post 9/11 - a picture that helpsexpose the observables in a way that could be employed in other studies and inefforts to design recomm endations for future measures and practices within theU.S. security architecture. Equ ally critical, it would seek to expose th e nature and reach of the globaltentacles of the al Qaeda terrorist consortium, much of which has only recentlybegun to be apparent, an d which could be a central factor in the shape an dmagnitude of the evolving th rea t . .

KEY QUESTIONS/LINES OF INQUIRYW e propose to organize our initial research a round /our over-arching questions,

which wil l be used as prin cipa l "lines of inquiry."1. W h a t is the history of al-Qaeda prior to the 9/11 at tack?2. W h a t can we now determine, through a comprehens ive exam inat ion of allevidence now avai lable, (synthesizing th e inform ation avai lable ear lier with thatobtained post-9/11) regarding th e planning, preparat ion, financing, and execut ion

of the 9/77 attacks?3. W h a t has happened to al-Qaeda in the wake of 9/11, with it s expuls ion fromAfghanis tan , th e capture of some of its key leaders, and confrontat ion with anintensified wor ldwide coal i tion in the war against terrorism?4. W h a t now is k n o w n of the compos i t ion an d level of threat posed by al-Qaeda andit s affiliated ent i t ies?These l ines of inquiry in effect constitute building blocks. Each encompassesmany specific component ques t ions , which are in effect bui ld ing b locks to the largeroverarching quest ions. Some of these com pon ent quest ions can be identified at the outsetof th e research and are l isted below as a means of focusing th e initiation of our research,but new com ponent quest ions wil l emerge from discoveries as the research progresses.One of the aims of the initial research wil l in fact be to identify th e additional keyquest ions on whi ch to direct th e research. One of the crosscu tting issue that will be givenespecial attention are col laborat ive relat ionsh ips and connect ions w ith var ious other

entities, as these wil l be critical in assessing means and capabilit ies fo r future at tacks.The fo l lowing is a list some of the key subsets of com ponen t ques t ions that will

be engaged to focus th e ini t ia l research:


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1. What is the history of al-Qaeda prior to the 9/11 attack?a. Wh at are its origins, ideological roots, doctrines, and worldview, and how havethese evolved over time? W ho have been its key functionaries? How has itrecruited p ersonnel?b. What attacks before 9/11 can we now connect with al-Qaeda, mounted on its ownor in collaboration with other terrorist groups? H ow were they carried out?c. W ith what other terrorist groups has it been affiliated, whether in collaborativeoperations or funding and logistic support?d. How has it functioned organizationally and how has it managed its finances?e. How has it adapted in response to the Western countermeasures? To differentoperating locales and to changes in its own main base - from Sudan toAfghanistan, for example.f. W hat have been its relationships with governments, including but not limited tothose that provided support and sanctuary, and other actors in the Muslim world?

2. Wh at can we now determine, through a comprehensive examination of all evidencenow available, (syn thesizing the inform ation available earlier w ith that obtained post-9/1 1) regarding th e planning, preparation, financing, and execution of the 9/77 attacks?a. What gaps are left in the picture? For example, regarding timing of the planningand preparation process? A ny role played by affiliated entities?b. Is there any evidence of state sponsorship or assistance?c. Wh e n was the plan conceived? B y whom? How, when , where , and by w h atmeans did the plan ners collect their intelligenc e? . . prepare detailed plans? ...recruit and equ ip th e attack teams? ... plan and handle logistics?d. W h a t can we now unders tan d regarding s trategic objectives of the attack?3 . W h a t has happened to al-Qaeda in the wake of 9/11 , w i th it s expu ls ion fromAfghanis tan, th e cap ture of some of its key leaders, and confron ta t ion with an in tensif iedworldwide coalit ion in a war against terrorism?/ a . W hat additional terrorist at tacks have been m ounted post 9/11 - whether actually

! carried out or thwarted?b. W h a t affiliated and collaborative entit ies have played a role in these attacks , andwhat w as their role?c. How has al-Qaeda sought to adapt an d compensate for its losses? What changeshave take n place since 9/11 in such areas as tactics, doctrine, personnel, andfinancial practices?d. W hat role have affiliat ions w ith other terrorist groups played in th is adaptation?

. ^ W h a t is k n o w n of the present com posit ion and threat posed to the Un ited States by al-Qaeda and its affiliated entit ies?a. W h i c h affiliated groups are s ti l l operative? What is the nature of the i rconnect ions w ith al-Qaeda? A re there any new connect ions or groups em erging?b. To what ex ten t do al-Qaeda and its affil iated groups retain popular suppor t andideological appeal in the M us lim "s treet ."


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c. W ha t is the current status of active membership, and its access to weapons an dt raining? What has happened to the many thousands w ho passed through th et raining and vetting camps in A fghanis tan?d. W hat if any is the evidence of links to radical states?e. W hat is the status of the efforts to acquire W M D ?

OUTLINING A RESEARCH PLANResearch tracking th e first line of inquiry (Key Question 1) - in effectconstruction of the "base building block" - will start in the 1989-90 time frame, by whichtime bin Laden ' s "base," or "al Qaeda," was set up in Peshawar, Pakistan, and hereturned to Saudi Arabia. After th e deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia and otherGulf states in 1990, he began his tirades against the "apostate" regimes in the Muslimworld an d expulsion of the U.S. "infidels" from th e land of the "sacred sites" of Islam.

This research will track th e developments accompanying his establishment of hisheadquarters in Sudan, and the linkages and affiliations that expanded thet ransnat ional terrorist consortium during this period.Some c o n tex t .During this t ime f rame several major terrorist operations took place in whic h binLaden is k n o w n to have been invo lved , and some addit ional ones in wh ic h the re is

ev idence of a t leas t h is c o nnec t io n and suppo r t . These inc lud e th e b o m b i n g of a ho te l inYemen in tend ed to ki l l U.S. servicem en enrou te to Somalia , the 1993 WTC at tack, thepre -empted plo t to a t tack mul t i p l e lan dm ark s i tes in the US, the 1994-95 Mani la -c en te redplot for m u l t i p l e ai rc raf t h i j a c k i n g s an d assass inat ion of the Pope a n d US president , an dth e N o v e m b e r 1995 bo mbing of the Saud i Na t io na l Gua rd b u i l d i n g in Riyad h tha t ki l ledf ive US servicem en. And a l t hou gh the a ttacks on the U.S. embassies in Ken ya andT a n z a n i a did not take place un t i l August 1998, th e p l a n n i n g w as a l read y wel l und erw ayw hi l e b i n - L a d e n w as res id ing in S u d a n and he was in fact perso na l ly rev iewing th e p lansand reconnaissance photos .T h e m u l t i p l e branc hes an d c o nnec t io ns revea led in w h a t is now k n o w n of theseoperat ions offer ins igh t s in to th e evo lv ing s t ruc tu re of a l Qaeda. F or e x a m p l e , th e personwho served as bin Laden's personal "secretary" w hile he was based in Suda n, and whohas now been ident i f ied as a key play er in the A fr i c an embassy bo mbings , had p rev io us ly( in 1991-92) headed a so -c a ll ed c ha r i t ab le o rgan iz a t io n in New Yo rk C i ty o s tens ib lyra is ing f u n ds fo r ve te rans of the J ihad in Af gh an is t an ( ea r l ier it had raised funds fo rf ighters) . A t tha t t ime th is person h ad c o n tac t s wi th a t least one of the pa r t i c ipan t s in the1993 a t tack on the WTC. Ramzi Yousef , who managed the 1993 WTC at tack, escapedand end ed up in Mani la , wo rk ing wi th future 9/11 c o mmand er Ka l l id She ikh Mo hammed ,on the aborted plot (1 9 9 5) for mul t iple a i rc raf t h i j a c k i n g s and the c o n j u r i n g of p lans fo rassass inat ion a t temots on the Pooe and U.S. Pres ident .

The research wil l then follow th e trail of bin Laden 's move to Afghanis tan in thespring of 1996 and the e s t ab l i s hm e n t of his inf ras tructure the re . One of the keydeve lopmenta l lines to be e x a m i n e d in this period wi l l be the further e xpans io n ofglobal reach t hrough r e c ru i tm e n t , indoctr inat ion, t ra in ing and dispersal of cells, atleast some of w h i c h played cri t ical roles in the la te r 9/11 attacks .


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Some context .Evidence now reveals a s ignif icant expans ion of consor t ium ar rangemen ts withother terrorist took place from th e A f g h a n bases. Examples include col laboration withtw o Asian terrorist groups in attacks carried out in Mani la an d Jakarta in December 2000,th e thwarted m ult ip le at tacks in Singapore an d Malaysia slated for early 2002. This samecollaborative connection was used to set up the January 2000 al Qaeda planning meetingin Kua la Lumpur, w hich included individuals that wo uld be involved in the attack on theUSS Cole in October 2000 and the 9/11 attacks, and the Bali bombing in October 2002. .

Research into Key Question/Line of Inquiry 2, dissecting and reconstructing th eplanning, preparation, f inancing, and execution of the 9/11 attacks in excruciating detail,from it s origins to execution, will proceed in parallel, with part of the team merging th einflow of newly developed information (including f indings emerging from the parallelresearch on the al Qaeda origins and development) w ith that available from existingsources. Among th e specific objectives, as noted above, will be identification of keygaps in the picture in relation to linkages with other entities, or to potential linkages withstate sponsors.

The results of these research efforts will provide a base for honing the specif icareas of focus and identification sources for pursu ing th e third and fourth lines ofinquiry , on what has happened to al-Qaeda in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the face ofthe intensified wo rldwide coal it ion in a war ag ainst terrorism, and what all of this revealso f its present composition and the threat it and its affiliated entities pose to the US.> W hile the research on the earl ier developm ents up thro ug h the 9/11 attacks wi l lby itself feed into th e u n d er s t an d in g of the more cu rrent l ines of inquiry , w e planto step back at various intervals to examine what specif ic component questionsand "branches" of inquiry have emerged from th e research on the evolution trail,an d use these to sharpen th e focus of the examinat ion of the specif ic issues of

current threat potentials.

S O U R C E S U R V E YW e propose to initiate our research by digging into key k n o wn "lodes" ofin fo rmat ion . This needs to be understood as a start ing point , how ever, because one of thedesired products of an in-depth research effort is the identif ication of new branches andpotent ia l sources for fu r the r research. In add i t ion to the open sources, (some of the most

useful books are l isted in the attached reading materials) the key information lodes wherew e propose to in it iate our research includ e:1. A s a starting point, th e records of information obtained by th e Joint Inquiry, both assubstant ive sources and as a m e a n s of ident i fying w ha t else to look for and w h e r e to look.A ll of the d o cu men t s tha t have been made avai lab le to the Jo in t Inquiry are main ta ined inspecific "storage bins" by t h e agencies from wh ich t hey o r i g in a ted - wh ethe r d o mes ti csecuri ty agencies or In te l l igence C o m mu n i ty co m p o n en t s . T hese i nc lude d o cu men t scompl i ed by the D C I ' s " R ev iew G ro u p" c rea ted af ter th e 9/11 a t t ack s , wh ich h as pulled


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author i t ies is a rich lode, as is exemplified by the report submitted to the SingaporePar l i amen t by i ts Minis t ry of H ome Affa i r s on 7 January 2003 (now released to thepub l i c )The initial survey of these ma ter ials wil l then be employed to des ign th e moredetailed targeting of the research.A n extens ive l ist of individuals with wh om interview s wil l be sought has alsobeen started, and w i l l co n t i n u e to be unfo lded as the process unfolds . These interviewsw i l l be aimed at obtaining both subs tant ive information and guidance and clues to otherpotential information lodes to be mined. These cues wil l be especial ly impor tant in re-sur fac ing th e record trails of so m e of the earlier terrorist actions . Some of those w ithw h o m w e wil l be seeking early contact are l is ted be low.

The Ne w York Dis tr ic t Trai lDale WatsonPatr ick FitzgeraldJohn M ul la l ly1Jack CloonanLK en KarasAndrew McCar thy

FBI/CT (N Y inves t igat ions)DoJ/U.S. A t t . (M ul t ip le t e r ro r i st inves t iga t ions N Y Dis t r i c t )N Y P D ( Inves t iga t ion , t r ial in K a h a n e assassination 1990-91)JTTF (1992-2000) ( In ve s t ig at io n, prosec ut ions 1993 WTC)JTTF (Yousef inves t igat ions re 1993 W T C an d M ani la p lo t s)JTTF\Y\FBI/NYFBI/CIYNYF^I/CTC/DCl\ F B I / CT / N YD oJ (Prosecut ion - Landmark plots )

Foreign IntelligenceMichae l SheuerC ofe r BlackR u d i RussoLou A n d r e

C TC /D C IDC-.I R ev i ew TeamD IA ^ \\A \\, ou t s i d e e x p e r t s \\\eH o f f m a n R A N D Cor|\l B e n j a m i n

9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy


17/17

BASELINE READINGFirst tier - origins, evolution , transna tional conne ctions, record of terrorist operations ofthe al Qaeda global terrorist consortium:.Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror, (New York: Rando mHouse, 2002)Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaida,Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Bin Laden, (Durham , North Carolina: D uke UniversityPress, 2002)Peter Bergen, Holy W ar Inc., (New York: Touchtone, 2002)

Anonymous, Through o ur Enemy's Eyes, (Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's, 2002)Joint Inquiry Final Report