t1a b49 9-11 plot 6-16-04 hearing fdr- tab 6-5 entire contents- suggested questions for 9-11 plot...

8/14/2019 T1A B49 9-11 Plot 6-16-04 Hearing Fdr- Tab 6-5 Entire Contents- Suggested Questions for 9-11 Plot Panel

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The 9/11 PlotSuggested Questions for 9/11 Plot Panel

Khalid Sheikh Mohamed (KSM). The idea for the September 11 attacks originatedwith Khalid Sheikh Mohamed. KSM has spent considerable time in Afghanistan and haslived in the United States. There have also been some claim s that KSM was in the UnitedStates in recent years.a. (For all) How much is known about his family history?b. (For all) When was he in the United States?c. (For FBI) Apart from wha t he has told his interrogators, how mu ch do weknow about the time he spent in the U.S.?d. (For all) Looking back now, w ith all of the benef its of hindsight, is there

any indication that he would become a terrorist? When and how does itappear that he first became interested and involved in terrorism? Did hehave any know n contact with law enfo rcement during this time?e. (For FBI) Have any of the claims that KSM was in the U.S. even after histime in school been verified?f. (For all) Apart from what has been disclosed in his interrogations, howmuch is known about KSM's life after he left the United States?

KSM and the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. KSM had some role in the 1993W TC bombing, which was planned by his nephew Ramzi Yousef. According to KSM, heprovided about $660 in funding to the conspirators in the bombing.

a. (For all) What was the nature of KSM's role in the 1993 WTC bombing?When was this role discovered?b. (For all) Is there any evidence that KSM participated in the 1993 bombingbeyond the provision of a small amount of money?

KSM and Bojinka. In 1994, KSM and Ramzi Yousef planned to bomb U Scommercialjets over th e Pacific. KSM claims that he and Yousef had the idea for the 9/11 plot at thistime.

a. (For all) What was the nature of KSM 's involvemen t? Where was theplot hatched? Who else was involved? How much time did KSM spendin the Philippines while participating in the plot? How w as KSM's role inthe Bojinka plot discovered?


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b. (For all) Is there any corroboration for KSM's claim that he and Yousefhad the 9/11 idea as of 1994?

c. (For all) What efforts were made by the United States to apprehend KSMonce his role in Bojinka was discovered?

d. (For all) How much is known about where he traveled during 1995 and1996?

Introduction of planes operation to Bin Ladin. KSM claims that he brought the ideaof the planes operation to Bin Ladin in a meeting in 1996.a. (For Mr. Davis) What evidence is there of a relationship between KSM

and Bin Ladin, apart from the KSM interrogations?b. (For Mr. Davis) How important was it for KSM to enlist al Qaeda's

support for the planes operation?c. (For Mr. Davis) What was the nature of the "scaled-up" version of the

9/11 plot that KSMpitched to Bin Ladin?Bin Ladin approves planes operation. KSM claims that he inally obtained Bin Ladin'sapproval for the planes operation in 1998.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What did KSM do, according to what he has said, afterBin Ladin approved the plan?

b. (For Mr. Davis) What is known about the reason why KSM favored theWorld Trade Center as a target?

c. (For M r. Davis) How much is known about the four original suicideoperatives who were picked for the operation (Nawaf al Hazmi, Khalid alMihdhar, Khallad and Abu Bara al Yemeni)?

d. (For all) Why was it more difficult for Yemeni passport holders to obtainUS visas?

e. What was the "smaller version of the Bojinka plot" intended for theYemeni operatives supposed to have entailed? How far does the SoutheastAsia part of the plot appear to have progressed?

f. What was the nature of the "elite training course" the four originaloperatives participated in?


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Kuala Lumpur. Allfour of the initial operatives selected for 9/11 traveled to KualaLumpur in early 2000. Hazmi and Mihdhar, -who were on their w ay to the United States,were allegedly there to switch their passports before traveling to the United States.Khallad w as reportedly conducting surveillance o n various flights.

a. (For all) What was the purpose of Hazmi and Mihdhar switching passportsin Kuala Lumpur? Has it been confirmed that they did so? Is there anyevidence that Hazmi and Mihdhar may have been pursuing some objectivebeyond simply switching passports?

b. (For all) Who else has been confirmed as being present at the KualaLumpur meeting? Is there any evidence to support open source claimsthat Binalshibh and KSM attended?c. (For all) Based on your review of all of the evidence, including thedetainee reporting, what do you believe was the purpose of the KualaLumpur meeting?d. (For all) Has any of Khallad's claimed travel in connection with his casingof airline security been confirmed?

Bangkok. As disclosed in Staff Statement No. 2, after Hazmi, Mihdhar and Khalladproceeded from Kuala Lumpur to Bangkok, Khallad met with some other operatives w hodelivered money to him.a. (For all) What is known about the Bangkok meeting?

KSM's original plans. KS M claims that he himself was to have played a leading role inthe planes operation as he originally proposed it to Bin Ladin. He also claims that th eproposal was no t adopted because i t was too complex.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Are you aware of any corroboration for this account?b. (For Mr. Davis) Based on your understanding of KSM as a person and therest of the evidence concerning the 9/11 plot, how much credence do youplace in KSM's account about his original proposal?

Hazmi and Mihdhar's selection for the plot. K SM a nd Khallad say thatNawafalHazmi andKhalid al Mihdhar - two9/11 hijackers whowere on board AmericanAirlines Flight 77, which crashed into the Pentagon were in the first group ofal Qaedasuicide operatives picked for the planes operation, in 1999.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What can you tell us about the background of each ofthese two operatives?


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b. (For Mr. Davis) What evidence is there about how they were recruited tojoin al Qaeda?c. (For Mr. Davis) What qualified Hazmi and Mihdhar to participate in theoperation?

Initial changes in the operation. According to K SM, the planes operation -was modifiedto include both a U.S. and Southeast Asia com ponent, so that Yem eni operatives like AbuEar a and K hallad w ould b e able to participate.a. (For all) How much evidence is there, apart from KSM's and Khallad's

statements, about the planning for the Southeast Asia part of theoperation? How far did the planning for the Southeast Asia part of theoperation advance?

b. (For all) If the Southeast Asia part of the revised plan simply had theobjective of destroying aircraft in mid-air, why was it necessary to includehijacking as part of the operation?

Arrival of Hazmi and M ihdhar in Los Angeles. As the staff statement notes, Hazm iand M ihdhar arrived in Los Angeles on January 15, 2000, ill equipped to deal -with l i f e inthe United States. They spoke no English an d neither ha d previously spent time in theWest. Once they were in San Diego, they received considerable assistance fromindividuals in the Muslim community. Their friends in San Diego helped them in everyaspect of their daily lives, by serving as translators, helping them find flight schools andhousing, and assisting them in opening bank accounts.a. (For FBI) Where did they stay in Los Angeles? If unknown, whatinvestigation was conducted to locate their residence?b. (For FBI) Did Hazmi and Mihdhar receive the type of assistance theyreceived in San Diego during their time in the Los Angeles? Or did theymanage on their own?

Life in San Diego. In San Diego, Hazm i an d M ihdhar lived quite openly, signingapartment leases, obtaining cellphones and landlines, and they were even listed in theSan Diego phone book. As a result, th e FBI has been able to learn a great deal abouttheir associations and living arrangem ents during their time in San Diego. By contrast,it has been far more difficult to determine w here the hijackers lived and with w hom theyassociated in Los Angeles. None of the hijackers' San Diego associates claim to knoww here the hijackers lived in Los Angeles, and in act, the hijackers w ent so far as to stateon a San Diego rental form that they had been in San D iego for those tw o weeks.


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a. (For FBI) Why do you believe that it has been so difficult to investigatethis aspect of the hijackers' activities?b. (For FBI) Do you believe that the hijackers intentionally covered theirtracks? If so, what is the reason for this and is there likely someone thehijackers were trying to protect?

KSM's instructions to Hazmi an d Mihdhar. KSMsays he recognized that Hazmi andMihdhar were no t well prepared to stage an operation in the United States, since neitherone had much exposure to western culture or spoke English. KSM also says he instructedthem to seek help at mosques after they arrived in the United States and to enroll rightaway in English classes so they could start flight training at the earliest possible time.a. (For FBI) What sort of investigation was done to confirm the enrollment

of Hazmi and Mihdhar in schools in Los Angeles? In San Diego?b. (For FBI) How well were Hazmi andMihdhar remembered at the schools

they visited? Did anyone at any of the schools take any steps to alert lawenforcement when Hazmi and Mihdhar enrolled?

Mohdar Abdullah. According to the s t a f f statement, Abdullah recently made commentsto fellow inmates indicating that he knew that Hazmi an d Mihdhar were in the U.S. toconduct a terrorist attack and that he had advance knowledge of the plot.a. (For FBI) What sort of evidence has the FBI uncovered tending to supportthe possibility that Abdullah or any of his San Diego associates may have

had advance knowledge of the attacks?Abdullah and Los Angeles. Abdullah apparently told on e inmate that he had receivedinstructions to pick up the future hijackers at the Los Angeles airport, an d that he drovethem f rom Los Angeles to San Diego.

a. (For FBI) Do you have any evidence which corroborates these statements?Do you have any evidence to the contrary?

b. (For FBI) For example: 1) what have you uncovered during yourinvestigation about how the hijackers traveled from Los Angeles to SanDiego? 2) what have you uncovered about whoif anyonemay havepicked them up at Los Angeles airport?

c. (For FBI) Do you have any information on who may have instructedAbdullah to pick up the hijackers?


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Abdullah's deportation. Abdullah -was deported by the U.S. governm ent to Yemenseveral w eeks ago, on ly a short t ime after the FBI learned of Abdullah's allegedcomments to his fellow inmates.omments to his ellow inmates.a. (For FBI) Given the seriousness of the allegations, why did the U.S.government allow the deportation to proceed?b. (For all) W hat investigation was conducted by the FBI in an attempt tocorroborate the statements allegedly made by Abdullah? Was anyconsideration given to prosecuting Abdullah? Was any considerationgiven to declaring Abdullah an "enemy combatant?" W hat arrangementshave been reached with the Yemeni government to ensure that Abdullahwill still be carefully m onitored no w that he is out of U.S. custody?

Chance m eeting with Bayoumi? As discussed in the s t a f f s tatement, K SM claims thathe instructed the tw o uture hijackers to live in San Diego, based on his initial resear chregarding language and flight schools in the United States. If so, it appears odd that thehijackers did not travel directly to San D iego, and that their chance encounter in LosAngeles happened to be an individual w ho w as w ell es tablished in San Diego.

a. (For all) Do you believe that KSM's statement casts doubt on Bayoumi'sassertion that his initial meeting with the hijackers in Los Angeles wasaccidental? During its investigation, has the FBI uncovered any otherinformation which suggests that the initial meeting between Bayoumi andthe hijackers was not an accident?Bayoumi's assistance. As noted in the s t a f f statement and has been w idely reported inthe press , B ayoumi provided the tw o future hijackers w ith cons iderable assis tance oncethey arrived in San Diego.

a. (For FBI) To what extent was welcoming and assisting newcomers to SanDiego in this fashion something that Bayoumi did regularly?b. (For FBI) During the course of the FBI investigation, what did the FBIlearn about how many others Bayoumi assisted in a similar fashion?

Who is Khallam? In a proffer ses s ion w i th the FBI in July of 2002, Abdullah als oacknowledged driving the tw o hijackers to Los Angeles in June of 2000. Abdullah saidthat during this trip, they visited the King Fahd mosquewhere th e hijackers greetedpeople they appeared to already knowand s tayed at a motel near th e mos que that night.According to Abdullah, an individual named "Khallam "visited th e hijackers at the motelthat night, and Abdullah said that he w as asked to leave the roo m during the hijackers'meeting with "Khallam."a. (For FBI) Has the FBI been able to determine the identity of "Khallam?"What investigative steps has the FBI taken in an effort to do so?


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King Fahd mosque. As noted in the s t a f f statement, it appears that the hijackersfrequented the King Fahd m osque and may have lived in an apa rtment near the mosqueduring the time they lived in Los Angeles.a. (For FBI) How would you rate the prospects for the hijackers to havereceived assistance from someone at the mosque? For instance, were there

individuals who took on the role of helping visitors or newly arrivedMuslims in the area in early 2000?b. (For FBI) What do you know about the presence of any extremist activityat the King Fahd mosque, particularly among its leadership, as of early2000?

Formation and development of Hamburg Cell. At a certain point in time, MohamedAtta, Marwan al Shehhi, ZiadJarrah and Ramzi Binalshibh became a group of radical,extremist Mu slims in Ham burg, determined to go on jihad.a. (For all) When and how did Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah and Binalshibh first meetone another? At what point did the four become such close associates?b. (For all) What do we now know about how and when the members of the"Hamburg cell" became radicalized? Who do you believe may haveplayed a particularly significant role in this regard? W as there a key eventthat was a turning point?c. As the members of the Hamburg cell grew more radical and focused onfighting in the jihad, to what extent were their friends an d family membersaware of and concerned about their transformation? Did any of thesefriends and family members make efforts to dissuade them from pursuingthis lifestyle?

Search for Shehhi. In late 2000, Shehhi's family grew concerned that they had notheard from him in some time. At this point, he -was already in the United States. W e havereviewed reports that a search for Shehhi ensued, and that U.A.E. government officials,the Hamburg police and Shehhi's family and friends all par ticipated in this search .a. (For all) Can you provide additional details on the extent of this search,when and why it was terminated, and why they were not able to locatehim?


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b. (For all) Are there any other instances where there was an official searchfo r one of the hijackers due to the fact that contact with their families hadbeen cu t off?Other members of the circle in Hamburg. In addition to Atta, Shehhi, Jarrah, andBinalshibh, there were a number of their associates in Hamburg who appeared to haveheld similar views. They include Mounir el Motassadeq and Abdelghani Mzoudi, whohave faced criminal prosecution in Germany, as well as SaidBahaji andZakariyaEssabar, who remain at large. We now know that this larger group would frequentlymeet and in the words of one witness, became something of a "sect."

a. (For all) How and when did the other members of the larger circlebecome associated with the Hamburg cell members?b. (For all) What do we know about: 1) where and when the larger groupwould meet; 2) who was involved in these meetings; 3) what they woulddiscuss during these meetings; 4) the views of the members of the group

regarding the United States and the West; 5) evidence of increasedradicalization of the group over time?The Hamburg group's travel to Afghanistan. Binalshibh claims that he and the rest ofthe Hamburg group were recruited into al Qaeda and the 9/11plot as a result of achance meeting with someone who directed the group to an al Qaeda member namedMohamedou Ould Slahi.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What intelligence is there about how the Hamburg groupwas induced to go to Afghanistan? What can tell us about Slahi and hisassociation with al Qaeda? Was he a recruiter for al Qaeda? Do youknow if he had knowledge of the 9/11 plot?

b. (For Mr. Davis) Is there anything to either corroborate or contradictBinalshibh's claim that the Hamburg group went to Afghanistan at Slahi'ssuggestion?

Binalshibh's failure to obtain a visa. Binalshibh, a Yemeni, did no t obtain a U.S. visa.According to KSM, he realized early on in the plot that it would be difficult to useYemenis fo r attacks within the U.S.due to difficulties in obtaining visas.a. (For Mr. Davis) Do we know why KSM nevertheless planned to make

Binalshibh one of the pilots for the attacks in the U.S.?Selection for the plot. It appears that the Hamburg group was selected for the 9/11attacks and Atta as emir airly quickly, as shown by the fact that when Binalshibhreached the camps, Atta an d Jarrah ha d already pledged ba y at and Shehhi ha d alreadyleft.


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a. (For Mr. Davis) Is there anything you can tell us about the process ofselecting those in the Hamburg group for the attacks? Why was Attachosen as the emir? Is there any possibility that Atta had prior contactwith al Qaeda or Bin Ladin? If there is no indication of previous contact,why did al Qaeda select the individuals from Hamburg so quickly?

Initial Target selection. There is reporting that in Atta's initial discussions with BinLadin, th e World Trade Center, the Pentagon, Congress and the White House werementioned as targets.a. (For Mr. Davis) Can you elaborate on the target selection? Were they all

picked by Bin Ladin? Was Atta given orders to attack certain targets ordid he have discretion between targets?

Return to Germany. The Hamburg cell members presumably did not want most othersin Hamburg to know that they had traveled to Afghanistan. When they returned fromAfghanistan to Hamburg, there ar e reports that they behaved an d dressed differently thanthey had prior to their travel. There were also numerouspress reports after th eSeptember 11 attacks thatJarrah was detained by UAE law enforcement authorities onhis way back from Afghanistan, at the request of the US Government.a. (For all) What role did their closest associates (Motassadeq, Mzoudi,

Essabar, and Bahaji) play in keeping their whereabouts a secret?b. (For all) What can you tell us about the apparent change in behavior ofthe Hamburg cell, and who may have instructed them to do so?c. (For all) What can you tell us about the incident with Jarrah in the UAE,

particularly in terms of any role of the US government?Ziad Jarrah. Jarrah's personal background makes it seem that he was an unlikelycandidate for a suicide attack. Jarrah also maintained close contact with his girlfriendin Germanyas well as his family in Lebanon throughout his time in the United States.

a. (For all) Do you have any information about when, and why, Jarrahbecame an extremist? Are there people who may have influenced him tobecome radical?

b. (For all) Did Jarrah disobey an order by Atta or the al Qaeda leadershipby taking so many foreign trips and maintaining contacts with his family?

c. (For all) What is your assessment as to whether Jarrah's girlfriend mayhave known about the plot? What does the one-way ticket for Jarrah's lastvisit to Germany indicate?


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Hatching of the plot. During the Mzoudi and Motassadeq trials in Germany, evidencewas presented indicating that the Hamburg cell members planned to attack the UnitedStates even prior to their travel to Afghanistan in late 1999. In fact, some of the evidencepresented appeared to support the proposition that the Hamburg cell members came upwith the planfo r 9/11 an d then traveled to Afghanistan to receive approval an d fundingto carry it out.

a. (For all) Based on the evidence you have seen, do you believe that theHamburg cell members intended to carry out an attack against the UnitedStates even before their trip to Afghanistan?

b. (For all) What evidence is there to indicate that the plan for 9/11 washatched in Hamburg?

Pre 9/11 Focus by U.S. and German governments on al Qaeda presence inHamburg.

a. (For all) What did the German government know prior to 9/11 about thevarious members of the group, including Mohammed Haydar Zammar?What information had the German government shared with the U.S. aboutthese individuals prior to 9/11?

b. (For all) How concerned were members of the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity prior to 9/11 that there might be an al Qaeda presence inHamburg? To what extent was this concern expressed to their Germancounterparts, and how responsive were the German government officialsto the U.S. Intelligence Community's requests?

c. (For all) To what extent were German intelligence and law enforcementagencies focused on Islamic extremism prior to 9/11?

Arrival of Hamburg pilots in the U.S. Atta andShehhi arrived without firm plans toattend a particular flight school, while Jarrah did makeplans to attend a flight school inFlorida. Atta and Shehhi looked at schools in the Northeast and in Oklahoma, but thentrained in the same small city in Florida as Jarrah.a. (For all) What evidence is there regarding Atta and Shehhi's original

plans to get flight training? Did they plan to train in the Northeast?b. (For all) Why did they travel all the way to Oklahoma? Have you found a

connection to the fact that Zacarias Moussaoui later trained at the schoolin Oklahoma that Atta and Shehhi chose not to attend? Is there evidenceof any other al Qaeda figure training at that same school previously?

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c. (For all) Do you know why Atta and Shehhi rejected various schools theylooked into? Do you think that Atta and Shehhi originally planned to trainsomeplace distant from Jarrah?

d. (For FBI) Can you elaborate on the training of Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah?What did they tell their flight instructors? What types of students werethey? Did they progress in their training at a typical rate? Do their flightinstructors recall anything unusual about them?

e. (For FBI) Why did Atta and Shehhi keep switching flight schools? Doyou consider this simply to be a sign of their hurry to get licensed, or asign of tradecraft?

f. (For FBI) Is there any evidence that Atta, Shehhi and Jarrah had meetingswhile they trained in Venice, Florida? How far apart were their schoolsand residences? What evidence is there of any communication amongthem?

Trips to Georgia. Investigation has not been able to identify'Atta and Shehhi'swhe reabouts from March 1, 2001 through March 12, 2001. They were last reported inStone Mountain, Georgia on March 1, 2001 and are accounted for on March 13, 2001 inDuluth, Georgia. Jarrah is unaccounted from March 5-14, 2001. Jarrah's phoneactivity places him in Levittown, PA on March 5, 2001. He is accounted for in Decatur,Georgia on March 15, 2001.a. (For FBI) Has every possible investigative measure been taken to identify

their whereabouts and more importantly have any associates or newtelephone numbers pertaining to possible associates been identified?

b. (For FBI)Were Jarrah's girlfriend's telephone numbers queried for allincoming calls during this time frame to identify Jarrah's whereabouts?

c. (For FBI) Atta also made several phone calls to his father, grandfather,mother and sister in February 2001. Was a request made to the foreigncounterparts to have these telephone numbers queried for incoming callsfrom US during this time period?

Hani Hanjour. Hanjour lived in the United States o f f and on since 1991, mostly inArizona. He seems to have spent much of his time flight training.

a. (For all) Why did he first come to the United States? What evidence isthere as to why he chose flight training, and why he chose to settle inArizona?

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b. (For all) Do you know what his views were when he first came to theUnited States? How sure are you that he did not come to the United Statesat the direction of al Qaeda? What do you know about his early trip toAfghanistan in the 1980s?

c. (For FBI) What have you found about Hanjour's time in Arizona duringthe 1990s? Did he spend all of his time flight training, or was he involvedin any other significant activities? How did he finance his education?

d. (For FBI) Who were his associates in Arizona? Were any of themextremists? What do you know about the people he trained with inArizona? How likely is it, based on the evidence you have seen, that thereis a support network of extremists in Arizona?

e. (For FBI) To what extent did any of Hanjour's associates in Arizona haveties to al Qaeda? Is it possible that one of his associates could haverecruited Hanjour into al Qaeda while in Arizona? Have you found anyconnection with Hanjour's associates in Arizona and the 9/11 plot?

f. (For FBI) Did Hanjour have any relationship with any of the individualsdiscussed in the "Phoenix memo" from July of 2001? What became of theindividuals named in the memo? Have you determined why they werepursuing training in the aviation field?

The 1999 America West incident. There was a w ell-publicized incident in November of1999 involving tw o Saudi students on an America West flight between Phoenix andWashington, DC in which th e students were briefly detained by the FBI due to reportsthat one of th e students was trying to get into th e cockpit.

a. (For FBI) Have you determined whether the incident was related in anyway to 9/11 or to Hani Hanjour?b. Did either of the two students involved in the incident have ties toAfghanistan?

Recruitment into the Plot. It appears that Hanjour arrived in the al Qaeda camps inAfghanistan in 2000 and was quickly recognized as an ideal candidate for the 9/11 plot.a. (For all) Do you have any information on how and why Hanjour ended upin the al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in 2000? Do you know if he wasinfluenced by a certain individual or event to go to Afghanistan?b. (For all) How long was he in the camps? How quickly was he selected forthe 9/11 attacks?

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c. (For all) Do you have any doubts that it was truly a coincidence that whenal Qaeda needed a pilot for the plot, Hanjour showed up in Afghanistan?

Hanjour's return. Hanjour returned to the United States in December 2000 tojoin withNawafal Hazmi. The two moved from San Diego to Phoenix so that Hanjour couldpursue additional flight training.

a. (For FBI) Do you know where Hanjour stayed when he arrived in SanDiego? How long was he in San Diego? What investigative steps haveyou taken to try to answer these questions?

b. (For all) Did Nawafal Hazmi receive notification that another operativewas joining him in San Diego? If so, how was he informed, and bywhom?

Hanjour's training. Hanjour appears to have obtained a significant amount of flighttraining, considering that he started in the 1990s. At least afew of Hanjour's flightinstructors seem to have discouraged him from continuing due to poor performance.

a. (For FBI) What have you found about his skills as a pilot? What do hisflight instructors in Arizona say about him in terms of skill andpersonality?

b. (For FBI) Have you determined whether Hanjour had enough skill andtraining to crash Flight 77 into the Pentagon?

Return to Arizona? There is some evidence that in June of 2001, Hanjour returned toArizona to obtain additional flight training.

a. (For FBI) What is the evidence suggesting that Hanjour returned toArizona at this time? Is there contradicting evidence? What is yourassessment on whether he returned to Arizona?

b. (For FBI) If Hanjour did return to Arizona, what would be the reason?Were there certain key associates who could have helped Hanjour with histraining?

Atta and Shehhi in Georgia. The staff statement reports that Atta andShehhi spent aconsiderable amount of time in the area surrounding Atlanta.

a. (For FBI) Have you been able to account for all of Atta and Shehhi's timein Georgia? Have you determined why they spent time in Georgia? Haveyou identified any individuals whom they met or associated with inGeorgia?

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Atta in Prague: The staf f s t a t ement expresses a belief t h a t the alleged meeting betweenAtta an d an Iraqi intelligence o f f i c e r did not occur.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What can you tell us, in an open hearing, about the originof the report that Atta met with an Iraqi officer? Can you discuss whathas been done to attempt to corroborate the report? What is yourassessment of the report?

b. (For FBI) What has the FBI done to attempt to resolve the issue? Whatgaps are there in Atta's travel during this time period? What has the FBIdone to investigate potential international travel by Atta during this timeperiod? What is your assessment about whether Atta went to Prague?

Investigation of April activities. Atta andShehhi are unaccounted for from April 4-10,2 0 0 1 . They were last reported in Virginia Beach, VA cashing a check in the amount of$8,000 on April 4, 2001. Atta andShehhi a re accounted or on April 11, 2001 in CoralSprings, Florida. I t has been suggested Atta ma y have been in Prague on April 9, 2001.

a. (For FBI) Were the Canadians asked to query their immigration recordsfo r departures from and arrivals to Canadian airports for Atta and Shehhiin April 2001? Were foreign airline carriers operating from Dulles,Norfolk and Richmond and surrounding areas asked to query their flightmanifests for Atta and Shehhi? (It is conceivable that they flew out of aUS airport and flew into an airport in Canada as all entries made in landports of entry were not always documented.)

b. (For FBI) If they did not travel abroad and remained in the US, werehotels and businesses along the major thoroughfares between VirginiaBeach, Virginia and Coral Springs, Florida queried for Atta and Shehhi?

c. (For FBI) How likely is it that Atta and Shehhi had witting or unwittingassociates, who have not been identified, assist them during the periodsthat they are missing?

Virginia Beach. In late February, Atta withdrew $4000from his joint account withShehhi while the two were in Virginia Beach. They also opened a mailbox in a privatemailbox facili ty, which they closed several weeks later.a. (For all) Have you been able to determine the purpose of Atta and

Shehhi's travel to Virginia Beach? Or why they opened a mailbox theretemporarily? What evidence is there as to any mail that may have beendelivered there?

Shehhi's travel: Shehhi took unexplained trips to Casablanca a nd Cairo while he wasliving in the United States.

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a. (For all) Have you found anything that possibly explains these trips?Have youbeen able to verify reports that Shehhi visited Atta's fatherduring the trip to Cairo?

The Muscle Hijackers All but one of the so-called 9/11 "musclehijackers " thoseoperatives who would storm the cockpits and control th e passengers on the four hijackedplanes came from Saudi Arabia. Most appear to have been swayed to join th e jihad inChechnya by contactsat local universitiesand mosques.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Based on the intelligence information you have seen, whywere nearly all of the muscle hijackers selected for the 9/11 attacks fromSaudi Arabia? Was it purely for practical reasons, i.e. ease of travel?Does there appear to have been any larger strategic or symbolic purpose?

b. (For all) Have any of the contacts at local universities and mosques whoinitially recruited many of the muscle hijackers in Saudi Arabia beenidentified by U.S. or Saudi authorities? If so, who are they and what canyou tell us about them?

c. (For all) If most of the muscle hijackers left Saudi Arabia to join the jihadin Chechnya, how did they end up becoming al Qaeda suicide operativesin Afghanistan? Does this mean that they were not initially recruited forthe 9/11 attacks, or even for a suicide operation?

Background of muscle hijackers. The muscle hijackers had a variety of backgrounds,and some were not even believed to be especially religious. Most appear to have brokencontact with their families by late 1999 and early 2000.

a. (For all) What do we know about how the muscle hijackers wereradicalized? What have their friends and families told U.S. and Saudiauthorities about any changes they noticed in these individuals?

b. (For all) Did any of the muscle hijackers know each other before theywere selected for the 9/11 operation? Were any a part of a similar circleof associates?

c. (For all) What, if any, common traits exist among the musclehijackers?d. (For all) Were any of them experienced al Qaeda operatives? Were any ofthem known to Saudi authorities prior to September 11? Had any of the

muscle hijackers come to the attention ofU.S. authorities prior toSeptember 11?

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Recruitment of muscle hijackers into the plot. The muscle hijackers volunteered tobecome suicide operatives for al Qaeda and were chosen by Bin Ladinfor the 9/11operation. After being selected, they were sent to Saudi Arabia to obtain U.S. visas andthen returned to Afghanistan fo r special training.a. (For Mr. Davis) Based on the intelligence you have seen, how did BinLadin select the 9/11 muscle hijackers? What criteria did he use? Whohelped him choose the operatives? When did this process occur?b. (For Mr. Davis) Why were the 9/11 muscle h ijackers first sent to SaudiArabia to obtain U.S. visas and instructed to return to Afghanistan for

special training?c. (For Mr. Davis) What kind of training did the mu scle hijackers receive?Was it different than the training p rovided to other al Qaeda operatives?How so? How long did their training last? Who trained them?

Facilitators in the UAE. After their training, the muscle hijackers were sent to theU.A.E., where they received assistance from two al Qaeda operatives,Ali Abdul Aziz A liand Mustafa al Hawsawi. The muscle hijackers were then sent to the United States inpairs.a. (For all) When were the muscle hijackers inform ed about the details of the

9/11 operation - the targets, timing, andmeans of attack? Whotold them?b. (For all) W hy were the muscle hijackers sent to the United States via the

U.A.E.? What types of assistance did they receive? What did thefacilitators know about the 9/11 operation?c. (For all) Why were the muscle hijackers sent to the United States in pairs?Did any of them attract the attention of security officials along the way?

Unidentified male with Ja rrah. The s t a f f statement reports that Jarrah was inPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania in June of 2001 a ttempting to fly the "Hudson corridor"from a flight school at the Northeast Philadelphia Airport. He was accompanied to theflight school by an otherwise unidentified Middle Ea stern male. Jarrah then drove toBaltimore/Washington International airpo rt on June 7 and flew to Las Vegas, Nevada.While renting an automobile at the Las Vegas airport Jarrah was accompanied by aMiddle Ea stern m ale fitting the description of the person in Philadelphia.

a. (For FBI) Has the person who accompanied Jarrah been identified? If not,what investigation is being conducted to determine his identity?

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Atta in Las Vegas. Atta traveled to Las Vegas on June 28 , 2001 from Boston, MA, andremained until July 1, 2001.a. (For FBI) What was the purpose of Atta's trip? Was there an evaluation of

Atta's travel in the Las Vegas area?

Atta in Boston. Atta failed to complete his scheduled airline connections from LasVegas through Boston, MA and on to JFK airport in New York City on 07/01/2001.Instead he remained in Boston and stayed at the Holiday In n Express on the FitzgeraldExpressway approximately 5 miles from Logan International Airport. Atta thenflew toNew York the next day.a. (For FBI) Has the FBI determined why Atta remained in Bostonovernight? Hamza al Ghamdi called the same motel several times on

09/09/2001. What is known, if anything about the interest in this motel bythe hijackers?

The July 2001 Spain Meeting In mid-July, Atta met Binalshibh at a small resort townin Spain, where, according to Binalshibh, they discussed the status of the 9/11plot. Attatold Binalshibh that he would still need several weeks before he could finalize a date fo rthe attacks.a. (For all) Why did Atta and Binalshibh meet in person? Were theyinstructed to do so? By whom?b. (For all) How did Atta and Binalshibh choose the location for theirmeeting?c. (For all) Did any others individuals meet with them while they were inSpain?d. (For all) Why did Atta need more time to finalize the date of the 9/11attacks as of mid-July 2001? What else did they discuss at this meeting?

Spanish Indictment. The Spanish government ha s indicted a number of individualsfrom the so-called "Spanish cell" ofal Qaeda led by an individual named BarakatYarkas on charges related to the September 11 attacks.a. (For all) Based on what you have seen, was there a Spanish connection to

the 9/11 attacks involving the individuals named in the indictment? Isthere any connection between the individuals named in the indictment andthe meeting between Atta and Binalshibh in July of 2001?

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Would Be Muscle Hijackers. There were a number of operatives selected to be musclehijackers who did not end up being apart of th e 9/11 attacks. These so-called"candidate "muscle hijackers either backed o ut of their assignment, could no t obtain th eneeded travel documentation, or were removed from th e 9/11plot by al Qaeda leaders.a. (For Mr. Davis) How many muscle hijackers per plane did al Qaeda think

would be necessary to carry out the 9/11 attacks successfully?b. (For Mr. Davis) How much did these candidate muscle hijackers knowabout the 9/11 plot?c. (For all) Did any of them come to the attention of Saudi authorities prior

to 9/11? Were any of them known by U.S. authorities?d. (For all) If these individuals were supposed to have taken part in the 9/11attacks, where are they today? Are they in custody? If so, have theyadmitted their potential role in the plot?

Saudi nationality. W e have identified at least nine candidate muscle hijackers, all ofwhom were Saudi nationals. W e have named them in the Staff Statement an d providedth e general reasons why they did not takepart in the 9/11 attacks.a. (For Mr. Davis) Ali Abd al Rahman al Faqasi al Ghamdi and Zuhair al

Thubaiti were removed from the 9/11 operation by the al Qaedaleadership. Why?b. (For all) Khalid Saeed Ahmad al Zahrani and Saeed Abdullah Saeed al

Ghamdi failed to acquire U.S. visas. Why were they unable to get U.S.visas, unlike the other muscle hijackers?Intervention of security officials. Qutaybah al Najdi was stopped an d brieflyquestioned by the airport security officials in Dubai, U.A.E., an d both he and Saeed alBaluchi got cold feet after this encounter.

a. (For all) Why was Najdi stopped? Did he raise any suspicions? Is thereany report of the incident?Intervention of families. Saud al Rashid an d Mushabib al Hamlan backed out of th eoperation when their families interceded.

a. (For all) Please elaborate on these two stories. How did their familiesknow what they were involved with? Did they know that these individualswere getting U.S. visas? How did their families prevent them from takingpart in the attacks? Did they notify the authorities?

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Saud al Rashid. Commission s t a f f , along with the FBI, interviewed one of the candidatemuscle hijackers, Saud al Rashid, in Saudi Arabia. Rashid admitted going toAfghanistan, bu t denied ever meeting Bin Ladin or KSM, beingpart of th e 9/11 plot, oreven hearing about al Qaeda until after he had returned to Saudi Arabia. Commissionstaff did not find Rashid's denials credible. Rashid, however, was released by Saudiauthorities.

a. (For Ms. Maguire) What was your evaluation of Saud al Rashid'sstatements?b. (For all) If Rashid was indeed slated to have been one of the musclehijackers for the 9/11 attacks, shouldn't he be in custody? Are U.S. orSaudi authorities aware of his current activities?

Internal Disagreement: Atta, Jarrah, and Moussaoui. There appears to have been aninternal disagreement among the hijackers, specifically between tw o of the pilots,Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah. This disagreement stemmed from th e extent of Jarrah'sautonomy fromAtta - unlike any of th e other 9/11 hijackers, he took frequent tripsabroad to visit hi s family and his girlfriend and Jarrah's feeling of exclusion from thedecision-making by Atta.

a. (For all) How close were Jarrah and Mohamed Atta when they lived inGermany?b. (For all) To what extent were the other hijackers allowed to maintaincontacts with their friends and family once they had arrived in the UnitedStates? Why was Jarrah allowed to visit his girlfriend and family so

often?c. (For all) What have those who have been interviewed about Jarrah, like

his flight instructors, said about him? What was he like? Did he seemparticularly religious, intense, or extreme in any way?d. (For all) Why did Jarrah spend so much of his time training in the UnitedStates alone? Once it became clear that Binalshibh would not be able toget a U.S. visa, why didn't Jarrah join Atta and train with him and

Marwan al Shehhi?

Possible second thoughts. During the summer of 2001, Jarrah may have had secondthoughts about participating in the 9/11 operation. Perhaps th e most significantevidence of this doubt was revealed in a mid-July conversation between K S M a n dBinalshibh. KS M and Binalshibh had a number of communications about th e plot duringthe spring and summer of 2001.

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a. (For Mr. Davis) What more can you tell us about these communicationsbetween KSM and Binalshibh about the 9/11 plot? When were U.S.authorities aware of these communications? The summer of 2001 hasbeen dubbed the "summer of threat" - were anyU.S. authorities aware ofthese communications at the tune?

b. (For Mr. Davis) How explicit were the contents of these communications?Do the communications appear to be operational in nature? Would therehave been any reason to suspect that the communications might concernplanning for a terrorist operation?

c. (For all) In retrospect, how many of these communications appear to haveconcerned planning for the 9/11 plot? What exactly did KSM andBinalshibh discuss during these communications?

d. (For Mr. Davis) What further details can you provide us about the mid-July 2001 conversation between KSM and Binalshibh? What wasdiscussed about Jarrah and his role in the 9/11 plot?

Zacarias Moussaoui. There is reason to believe that KSM-wanted money sent toZacarias Moussaoui toprepare him as apotential substitute pilot in the event Jarrahdropped out. Moussaoui was arrested on August 16, 2001, however, before completingflight simulator training.a. (For all) What can you tell us about Moussaoui's background? Was he a

trained as an al Qaeda operative? Had he traveled to Afghanistan like the9/11 hijackers? Did he volunteer to be a suicide operative?

b. (For all) Had Moussaoui ever met any of the 9/11 hijackers? Did hereceive the same training as they had?

c. (For FBI) What kind of flight training had Moussaoui received prior to hisarrest? Could he have piloted a commercial jet?

d. (For all) How could Moussaoui have been incorporated into the 9/11 plotas late as August 2001?

Second wave. Binalshibh says that KSM talked about Moussaoui as if he had been partof th e 9/11plot. KSM denies that Moussaoui was ever intended to be part of th e 9/11operation and was slated instead to participate in a so-called "second wave " of attackson the West Coast after September 11.a. (For all) What other information exists to support the idea that al Qaedamay have been planning a second wave of attacks after 9/11?

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b. (For all) What would have been the targets for the alleged second waveattacks? When were they supposed to occur?

c. (For all) Where is the other potential pilot that KSM says he recruited forthe second wave attacks, Faruq al Tunisi?

Timing and Targets Th e date of the attacks apparently was not chosen much more thanthree weeks before September 11. Attapassed the date to Binalshibh in mid-August. BinLadin, however, ha d been pressuring KSM fo r months to advance the date of the attacks.Despite Bin Ladin's wishes, the attacks seem to have been delayed during the summer o f2001.a. (For Mr. Davis) What intelligence do you have as to why Bin Ladin

wanted the attacks to occur sooner than September 11?b. (For all) Could KSM simply disobey Bin Ladin? How aboutAtta?c. (For all) Why was the operation delayed during the summer of

2001?d. (For all) Was there any particular significance attached to the date of

September 11?

White House or Capitol. Atta selected a date after the first week of September so thatthe U.S. Congress would be in session. The Capitol was on the preliminary target list asearly as the spring of 1999, which also included the White House, the Pentagon, and theWorld Trade Center. Bin Ladin preferred the White House over the Capitol. Based oncommunications between Atta and Binalshibh as late as September 9, 2001, it appears asif the hijackers planned to hit the White House i f possible b ut kept the U.S. Congress asan alternate target.

a. (For Mr. Davis) What other targets were on the preliminary target listdeveloped by al Qaeda?

b. (For all) Why did the hijackers believe the White House would be adifficult target?

c. (For Mr. Davis) If Bin Ladin wanted to hit the White House, did KSM orAtta have any choice?

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d. (For Mr. Davis) What more information can you provide about thecommunications between Atta and Binalshibh in the late summer of 2001?When did this information come to the attention of U.S. authorities?

Dissent Among al Qaeda Leaders Although access to details of the 9/11plot wascarefully guarded, word started to spread during the summer of 2001 that an attackagainst the United States was imminent. KSMwas widely known within al Qaeda to beplanning an attack against the U.S.,an d many were even aware that he was sendingoperatives to the U.S., as was reported by a CIA source in June 2001. Bin Ladin,moreover, specifically asked others in Afghanistan to pray for the success of an upcomingattack involving 20 operatives.

a. (For Mr. Davis) How did so many al Qaeda members know that an attackagainst the U.S. was coming, and that KSM was sending operatives to theU.S.?b. (For Mr. Davis) If this information was reported by a CIA source in June2001, during the summer of threat, what was done with this information?c. (For Mr. Davis) Were Bin Ladin or KSM at all concerned that the plotmight have been discovered during the summer of 2001, when word began

to spread about the upcoming attack?Disagreement with th e Taliban. With the news of an impending attack against the U.S.gaining wider circulation, a rift developed within al Qaeda's leadership. Bin Ladinwanted the operation to proceed as soon as possible, bu t several senior al Qaeda figuresthought they should follow the position of Mullah Omar, who opposed attacking the U.S.

a. (For Mr. Davis) Why did Mullah Omar oppose the attacks? Was heconcerned about the U.S. reaction?b. (For Mr. Davis) Did Bin Ladin's senior advisors oppose the attacks solely

out of deference to Omar? Were they concerned about the reaction oftheir Taliban host?

c. (For Mr. Davis) Did Bin Ladin generally ignore the views of his senioradvisors? Of Omar?

Final meeting in Las Vegas. On August 12, 2001, Atta booked airline tickets from acomputer terminal in an internet cafe in Ft. Lee, NJ, for a flight to Las Vegas. HaniHanjour was using the adjacent computer terminal to book flights to Las Vegas on adifferent flight. Atta flew to Las Vegas on August 13 , 2001 and met Nawafal Hazmi andHani Hanjour who had also flown to Las Vegas.

a. (For all) If known, what was the purpose of this meeting?

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Equipment for the attacks: Shortly before the attacks, Jarrah purchased a GlobalPositioning System (GPS) unit.a. (For FBI) Do you know if he used the GPS unit during the attacks?Would it have assisted the hijackers in any way?

Portland, Maine. Atta and al Omari drove a rental automobile f rom Newton, MA toPortland, M E o n September 10, 20011. They flew back to Boston, M A on U S Airwaysflight 5930 on the morning of September 11 and connected to American Airlines Flight11.a. (For FBI) Do you know what why Atta chose to fly from Portland to

Boston?Final days in Boston. A housekeeper at the Park Inn, Newton, MA in room 433, whichwas occupied by Wail an d Waleed al Sheri attempted to clean th e room o n September 11,2001 at 10:00 am. She was reportedly confronted b y a Middle Eastern male, who w as inthe room and stated that "someone is sleeping. "

a. (For FBI) Has the FBI determined if this is correct? Was thehousekeeper's key card used in room 433 at this time? Was thehousekeeper shown photographs of the known hijackers and theirassociates?

Financing for the plot: T he hijackers obtained funds for the plot through wire transfersf rom facilitators in the UAE. T he funds for the attacks -were deposited in a number o fbank accounts opened b y the hijackers.a. (For Mr. Drucker) Have you found violations of any laws or regulations

in the manner the hijackers received money through wire transfers?b. (For Mr. Drucker) Were there any instances where the banks that thehijackers used reported any suspicious activity? If so, how were those

incidents resolved?

c. (For Mr. Drucker) How do you know that there was no funding source forthe attacks within the United States? How confident are you in thatconclusion?

d. (For Mr. Drucker) Can you explain the FBI's investigation of the plotfinancing? How were you able to determine how the hijackers got theirmoney?

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e. (For Mr. Drucker) Could another group of terrorists use the samefinancing methodology today?

f. (For Mr. Drucker) The total amount spent for the 9/11 attacks seemsrather low. How confident are you that the funds you have identified wereenough to carry out the attacks?

Detainee credibility. Much of the inform ation about the plot is derived frominterrogations of detainees.a. (For all) How much of the "inside view" of the plot represents thecombined statements of various conspirators, and how much relies simplyon the accounts of one or two?b. (For all) How consistent have the statements attributed to conspirators inthe 9/11 plot been?c. (For all) How should we go about assessing credibility of theconspirators?d. (For all) How conversant are the individuals performing the interrogationsin the facts surrounding the 9/11 plot and plotters?

Foreign government cooperationa. (For all) How m uch of the 9/11 story that we've heard is the product ofinvestigation performed by officials of foreign governments?b. (For all) To what extent have you been able to conduct investigationabroad?

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t1a b49 9-11 plot 6-16-04 hearing fdr- tab 6-5 entire contents- suggested questions for 9-11 plot...

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