t7 b11 morse fdr- entire contents- 9-15-03 mike morse mfr w notes 208

8/14/2019 T7 B11 Morse Fdr- Entire Contents- 9-15-03 Mike Morse MFR w Notes 208

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M E M O R A N D U M F O R T H E R E C O R DEvent : Interv iew with Mike M orse, FAA National Security C oordination StafferType of Event: InterviewDate: September 15, 2003Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Lisa SullivanTeam Num ber : 7Location: FAA He adquarters, W ashington, DC

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Participants - Non-Com mission: Mike Morse, FAANationa l Sec urity Coo rdination Working-levelStaffer; and Susan Caron, FAA Office of the Chief Counsel .., EmployeeParticipants - Com mission: John Raidt, Bil l Johnstone, andLisa SullivanBackground(Unc) Prior to coming to the FAA in 1986, Morse w as in the U .S. Air Force Office ofSpecial Investigations. He dealt with counterintelligence and counterterrorism from 1966to 1986. In 1986, he moved to the FAA where he assisted in the establishment of anintelligence division for civil aviation security. He nam ed Richard C larke, Oliver North,andI las three mem bers of the Administration who were instrumental inestablishing an intelligence div ision for FAA because of their perception that FAAneeded help in its overseas intelligence. Initially, FAA's connection to the intelligencecommunity was an on line data system, Flashboa rd, hosted by the Na tional Secu rityAgency. A secure intelligence facility (SCIF) was built at FAA Headqu arters toaccommodate the division. Between 1986 and 1994, Morse served as Deputy Directoran d then Acting Director of Civil Aviation Se curity Intelligence.(Unc) Morse was m ade De puty Director of Aviation Security Operations in 1994. Heheld a variety of posts within security operations fo r FAA over the nex t 7 years, includingdome stic operations division manager; standards and eva luation division m anager andspecial activities. He was Special Assistant to the Director of Aviation SecurityOperations from 1999 through 2001. At first, this was Bruce Butterworth, but by 2001(including 9/11), the Director was Lee Lon gm ire.(Unc) As of the end of October 2001, Morse w as mad e responsible for sett ing up anoffice (Litigation Support Staff) within FAA to coordinate and expedite FA A respon sesto Congressional an d Executive inquiries. He reported that FAA fielded 20-30 calls perday from Hill staffers an d members alike. The Administration wanted answers as well .

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COMMISSION SENSITIVEThere were 7-8 congressional hearing s in a 3-4 week period. His role helped to decreasethe impact of the response process on regular FAA operations as m uch as possible. Asthe name of Morse's new office suggests, the FA A saw the potential for major l i t igationas a result of 9/11 . Morse and his staff acted as a central repository for all essential an drelevant records related to the attacks. Issue papers, records , includ ing all of the emai ltraffic, were saved. All of these materials have been sent to TSA. Morse has mostrecently mov ed into the lead role on the National Security Coordination Staff within theFAA. He was ins t rumental in the set-up and design of this office. The staff is made upof himsel f and two intell igence officers. National Security Coordination Staff is the entrypoint for all outside requests to the FAA from the intell igence community on projects,data, and people that might be needed to conduct cland estine projects at hom e andabroad.(Unc) On the split between FAA and TSA, M orse indicated that he was directly involvedin the development of the Memorandum of Understanding of February 28 , 2003 whichprovided for transfer of funct ions and personn el to TSA . Mo rse further stated that he wasth e "keeper" of the MO U for FA A. In order to maintain a single source for aviationintell igence, Annex 5 of the M O U , TSA agreed to provide FAA with intelligenceinformation. W ith respect to security, FAA is still responsible fo r security of its ownfacilities (including the Air Traffic Control System) and for providing FAA support fo rclandestine government operations (especially mili tary and intelligence).(CS) Morse depicted the FAA before 9/11 as str ictly a regulatory ag enc y. In thatcapacity, th e organization often "got its nose bloodied" in attempting to exert influenceover th e industry s takeholders , and to do mo re than th e system would sustain. CivilAviation Secur i ty officials wanted to do more, but absence o f public or Cong ressionalsupport, th e security system did "as good a job as it could." This was the greatestweakness of the system, according to Morse. An example he used to describe this pointwas an attempt by the FAA to insti tute background checks for those who were givenunescorted access to secure areas in airports in the late-1980s. FAA proposals receivedsevere pushback from Congress and the industry stakeholders. The most unpopu lar onessuch as this would often result in legislation (appropriations riders ) that wo uld restrictFA A ability to enforce such unpopular proposals. Morse said Karl Shrum ( $ fromFAA policy would remember the specific details of the backgrou nd investigation issue.(CS) W hen asked how it was that the FAA arrived at the conclusion to proposebackground checks for all employees with unescorted access to the airports, Morse saidthat th e movem ent fol lowed th e crash of flight TW A 800 and came at a time when "thedomestic threat level had significantly increased." In addition to TWA 800, he referredto the W orld Trade Center attack and the Bojinka plot as incidents that com bined tofinally prod uce Con gressional concern that enabled the FAA to try to raise the securitybaseline. Morse indicated that some significant improvements were made at this time.(CS) Morse referred to the "tombstone mentali ty" of the system as a whole. Theindustry stakeholders believed th e justifications the FAA provided fo r tighter securitymeasures were not valid. Airlines wanted to see mo re specific indications of threats.

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(CS) Morse characterized th e regulatory process as a weakness in the aviation securitysystem. He we nt on to say that financially, the airline s were in "dire straits." Thiscontributed to their resistance to security regulations imposed by the FA A. In addition toth e rulemaking process, Morse identified deficiencies in the number of inspectors and thelack of a streamlined enforcement mechanism as sources of the FAA's regulatoryweaknesses. Without the enforcement authority it needed to ensure security directiveswere followed, there was little the FAA could do to significantly improve civil aviationsecurity, despite good intelligence the FAA was receiving that i t was imprudent not to doso .(CS) Morse felt that fines and other enforcement m echanisms w ere not an effective toolin produc ing better perform ance. The airlines and airports saw penalties as a "cost ofdoing business," and Morse quoted one airline security director as commenting that, "Weplane fo r these violations like bad weather." Frequent reductions in the fines frustratedth e security inspectors, lowering their morale.

i On the topic of checkpoint screen ing, Morse dwelt on the h u m a n factor inseparablefrom this layer of the security system at the airport. With screener turnover as high as400 percent in some places, there was no room for job-perform ance im provement. M orseindicated that one factor contributing to the high turnover rate is the "failure m eant fire"mentality of the checkpoint supervisors. [I \ program m ust be devised to achieve ,higher performance levels from the screeners. J} LlassihedInformat ion

When asked what he thought the mission of civil aviation security was before9/11/01, Morse said it was "to keep bombs off of planes. . . Before Pan Am 103, all wecould talk about was hijackings." After Pan Am 103, FAA Security w as concerned mostabout the possibility of a sophisticated explosive device getting on a commercial flight.He candidly admitted that screening at the checkpoint did not do a good enough job toprevent it, observing that "screening is inherently tough." The deploym ent of EDSmachines marked the F A A ' s best effort to address the problem that it saw as the biggest,most probable threat to the industry.(CS) Nei ther the FAA nor the industry w as prepared for the type of attack th e countryfaced on 9/11/01. None of the security measures in place could have prevented it.(CS) Morse said that before 9/11/01, it was not F A A ' s role to actively provide protectionfor th e aviation industry. Exceptions, where a direct federal security role was in place,included putting K-9 teams at airports, maintaining the small Federal Air Marshalprogram, and conducting research and developm ent.(CS) Compliance w ith FAA regulations and procedures w as what FAA was looking forfrom the airports. Essen tially, this is what the Special Assessmen t team s covertly testedfor at airports.



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(CS) M orse was asked to discuss the "Common Strategy," the doctrine and trainingmaterials developed by the FAA , in consultation with the FBI and ATA , and provided tothe industry on how to deal with hijack ings. The strategy, which he indicated was "easilymisunderstood," was many years old, dating back to around 1980, and was also thesubject of an FAA/FBI MO U w hich had last been updated in 1997. Morse said the pointof the strategy, which w as incorporated into the train ing vide o shown to pilots and flightcrews d uring training, was to "o ptimize actions taken by a crew to resolve hijackingspeacefully." It was geared toward a systematic delay through appeasement of thehijackers. Appeasement was employed to prevent th e hijackers from doing anythingrash. M orse said that over time, history had shown that th e longer a hijacking persisted,th e more likely it was to have a peaceful resolution. One reason fo r this might be that th ehostages had time to develop relationships with th e hijackers.(CS) The Common Strategy operated on the assumption that hijackers issue demands,most often for asylum or the release of prisoners from jail . Morse admitted the scenariowhich played out on 9/11/01 was not imagined when designing th e strategy; they thoug htthat "suicide wasn't th e game plan" of hijackers.(CS) Prior to the 1996 Atlanta Olym pics, the FAA tried to update the "C omm onStrategy" video used by the airlines for training its flight crews because of changes inaircraft an d communicat ions which had rendered the old version obsolete. Over th eyears, some of the carriers, such as Co ntinental and Am erican, had dev eloped their ownupdated trainin g materials to supplem ent the antiquated FAA video. The training itselfha d always been th e responsibility of the airlines. Morse would sit in on training sessionsfrom time to time. Morse indicated that the training materials developed by AmericanAirlines "mocked" the Com mon Strategy, apparently in an effort to use hu mo r to get thepoint across. Co mm ission staff has not viewed th e Am erican Airlines training materials.

part of its efforts to update the Comm on Strategy, FAA gave the training film tothe FBI to review (1996-1997) because th e content of the video was based on aMemorandum of Understanding between the FAA and FBI on delegation ofresponsibilities in the event of a domestic hijacking. The Bureau reported back that it had"lost track" of the Com m on Strategy principles. Morse said that the FBI had not beenkeeping track on incidents of hijackings abroad or the changes in technolog y that couldbe used in or would be relevant in a hijack situation.

Morse reported that at that time, the FAA and the FBI "renegotiated" th eMemorandum of Understanding that had established the Com mo n Strategy. The FBIcame back and said that the substan tive content of the video was n ot, in fact, irrelevant; itwas pretty good. H owe ver, it agreed the tape could use updating for the be nefit of theviewers. The idea of suicide hijackers never entered their discussions. Looking back,Morse realizes now that in their discussions, key factors weren't considered such as thecomm unications improv ements ov er the years (air phones, cell phones, ACA RSmessages, etc). It goes without saying that on 9/1 1/01, these com mu nicat ion tools w ereinstrumental to our understanding of what happened that day.

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COMMISSION SENSITIVE(CS) Aro un d 1999, some of the airl ines, particularly US A ir 's S ecurity D irector LauraGimle t , were also concerned that the FA A training m aterials were sub stantively irrelevantan d used obsolete eq uipm ent. Since many of the airlines, including US Air, were on theverge of bankruptcy, an effort w as made on the part of the airlines and FAA to worktogether to finance a new video.(SSi) In late 1999 or early 2000, the topic of updating the training materials for theCommon Stra tegy w as raised at a meeting at ATA Morse attended with the airlinesecurity directors. The FAA needed the air carriers to invest in the project. Morsereported, "It did not go well;" no one wanted to help. For instance, no airline wanted toloan a plane to the project for fi lming, and there was l it t le enthusiasm from A TA . Inspite of this reaction, FA A proceeded with plans to update the Strategy, primari ly throughplanning on use of current plane outfitted with current com mu nications devices(including AC AR S an d cell phones). In response to a question, Morse indicated that atthis t ime (2000 and early 2001) he was "not so sure" the basic doctrine w as sti l l sound.

In 2000 an d 2001, Morse held a n u mb e r o f meet ings on updat ing th e C o m m o nStrategy with groups such as military counterterrorism forces an d "U.S. governmentspecialists" on how to "absolve an aircraft" in the event of hijacking; several with FBI;the State Dep artment; and with represen tatives from the airline carriers. He ind icated thattheir existed a "disconnect" between the military and the FBI on tactics in the event of ahijacking, but the hi jacking model was the same (i.e. non-suicide).In May 2001, a m eeting was held in Qu antico to bring all interested parties togetherto discuss upd ating the Co mm on S trategy. I t included three airl ine captains with securityclearances, A TC representatives, other FA A representatives, but not N O R A D . Thesuicide hi jacking model was not formally discussed, but discussions did take place on theimperative of keeping hijacked planes o n the ground, and they d id seek to develop

techniques for the crew to disable aircraft to achieve this goal.(CS) Morse reported that ATA continued to "drag it s feet" on revising th e trainingmaterials.(CS) In the summ er of 2001, the joint project to update the Com mon Strategy wasunderway and they began f i lming the new training video. A highjack exercise wasconducted in collaboration with th e Mi a mi FB I Field Office, M iami Dade County Pol iceDepartm ent, the SW AT team, and V arig Airlin es, uti l izing a 767. The underlyingdoctrine w as sti ll under developm ent at this tim e, and w as not finalized before 9/1 1/01 .The video and all of the materials have been turned over to T S A .

When asked how he assessed the possib ili ty of a suicide hijack mission, Morse saidthat in the back of his mind, he w as aware of the po ssibili ty of the event (based onincidents in the 1970s an d 1980s), but he stressed that he never saw any specificintelligence on a suicide h ijackin g plot. Morse adm itted that he feared hijacking couldbecom e a popu lar tactic with terrorists again. W hen they looked at the Air Francehijacking, authorities suspected and feared that explosives may have been used in that



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attack. Other possible terrorist tactics,Care a viable threat to theommercial flight , are hard to prevent. Today,industry .

(SSI) Morse indicated that he intended to raise some concerns about the possibility (albeitunlikely) of the suicide hijacking tactic in the Common Strategy update.

The FAA and industry's treatment and attitude towards knives and knife detection;has not changed significantly since before 9/11/01. The 4-inch standard was set in part \ e k n i v e s of shorter lengtwhich had a 3 inch threshold) and were thus not regulated. Furthermore, they could nothave prohibited anything smaller than a 4-inch blade even if they wanted to because themachines are not sophisticated enough to detect them. Finally, their thinking at the timewas that, giving the experience with hijacker motives and tactics up till that time, short-bladed knives were not seen as a menacing, credible means of controlling passengers orf l ight crews. A question of, "where do you put your energies?" had to be consideredwhen deciding what went on the prohibited items list. Bombs could easily be disguisedas laptops and ball point pens could be used as just as lethal a weapon as a small blade,whet her prohibited or not.

9/11 ClassifiedInformation

The Checkpoint Operations Guide (COG) was developed by ATA and RAA,approved by FAA, and then sold by ATA and RAA back to their members. FAA wantedto insure that t he C OG didn't fall below th e minimum standards called for in the AirCarrier Standard Security Program (ACCSP). Morse remembers that ATA wasparticularly focused on prohibiting or restricting items which looked "menacing."

\d these actions, given it s role at the time there was not much more the FAAcould do with respect to knives, according to Morse.The Inter-agency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) was sponsored byth e National Security Council. The FAA Intelligence division had a seat on the

Committee. The Committee discussed guidelines for the intelligence community as awhole. It defined terms an d priorities, functioned as a nexus point for the differentagencies, and fostered analyst-to-analyst exchanges. It also did periodic threatassessments.

F AA intelligence thought th e intelligence community needed to be more responsiveto the aviation industry's need for intelligence on the domestic threat level. As a result,the DCI's (Director for Central Intelligence) staff provided a report on threat estimateswhich the FAA used to establish evidence that the baseline budget needed to be raised forsecurity. This contributed to the overall effort to raise th e baseline for the FAA.(C S) Morse was home sick on the morning of 9/11/01. At 8:30 a.m., his wife called andtold him about the first plane that crashed into the World Trade Center. He immediately



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COMM I S SI ON S E NS I T IVEstarted in to FAA headqua rters. It took him app roxima tely one hour to get there by car.Along the w ay, he heard al of the rumors and false alarms (he mentioned the supposedcar bom b at the State De partm ent which was widely reported that day). By 10:00 a.m.,he was at headquarters an d went to the Command Center, where he stayed for the next 24hours. The Command Center was run by Lee Longm ire that day. Initially, Peter Falconemay have been in charge of the Center when Morse arrived. Morse spent the better partof the day acting as a "dispatcher" of sorts for the primary net.(CS) Longmire, Falcone, and Morse rotated in and out of positions on the dais, facing th estaff members answering calls. A "SCIF" adjacent to the C omm and Center was w heresecure video and teleconference communications took place that day, between nationalleadership, FAA , and the m ilitary. Fran Lozito, a FAA representative to one of the aircarriers, manned phones from the Com ma nd Center that day; as did Janet Riffe, who wason (among other calls) the primary and tactical nets that day. Riffe was the PrimarySecurity ftrveatigstar for American at the t ime.(CS) The p rimary com munications net w as unclassified and was used by air carriers andair traffic controllers involved in the incident. The tactical net was used fo r discussionsof deploying assets. Intelligence w as another communications provider in the sense tha tit linked people through the internet.(CS) Because th e crisis unfolded and ended relatively quickly, th e Command Center'sfunction quickly changed to consequence managem ent. They were worried aboutdeploying resources. Questions they needed answered pertained to what kind of cargothe flights had on board, whether or not any law enforcement people were on board, thephysical lay-out of the planes, the amou nt of gas in the tanks.(CS) Before 9/1 1, it was the C om m and Cen ter's job in a crisis to direct the activities oflaw enforcement in response to a hijack. It was organized that way because FAAprovided the expertise to determine what could and could not feasib ly be done to thwart ahijacking unde rway . Law enforcement does not have such expertise. (Morse reportedthat the FBI w as not necessarily pleased by this arrangem ent.) The AssociateAdministrator for Civil Aviation Security (ACS-1) was responsible for coordinatingFA A's response to a hijacking. On 9/1 1/01 , the lead FAA staff were Lee Longm ire, whoserved as Director, and M orse, w ho served as Information Manager.(CS) Information gathered on 9/1 1 at the Com mand Cen ter was compiled for theAdm inistrator. Most of the information was kept togeth er in what is now room 312 A atFA A headquarters. I I led the..effort to sort through the information on thefour separate hijacks including all of the miscellaneous reports (including many "redherrings," as Morse called them). It wa s in this room that th e "butcher paper" w as h u n g 9/11on the walls to keep track of information as it came in. Morse did not think the paper Working-levelstill exists. If it did, he thought he would know about it . Employee(CS) Morse recalled that Lee Longmire questioned Janet Riffe (sometime between 10 and12) on her initial report of a gun being fired on one of the hijacked Am erican flights,

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COMM ISSION SENSITIVEbased on reporting from American. Morse in formed Com m ission s taf f that Ri f f e w astalking to all of the air carriers that day, not jus t Am erican. Mo rse recalled that Rif fe , atth e t im e, indicated to Lon gm ire that, "I think I got" the info rm ation on the g un, indica tingsome u ncertainty on her part. In subsequent discussion, Am erican Airlines denied theywere the source of the inform ation.(CS) Morse said, "It is almost impossible to overstate th e chaos of that day." He addedthat Janet Riffe m ay have been in one of the m ost "stressful roles that day." No one hadever anticipated the num ber of attacks at the sam e time.(CS) Morse was not sure w ho typed up the information from thebutcher-paper (he 9/11thought it might have been| ~| )"th'a't day for the Adminis t ra tor ' sbriefing book. The report of the gun was still in there for several hours, but was Employeesubsequently destroyed when it was determined to have been erroneous. AdministratorGarvey in formed Morse that she never saw the briefing book report on gun usage. Mo rsespeculated that som eone w ithin FAA "pulled it off the hard drive and leaked it to themedia."(CS) Morse indicated that they started getting m ore in form ation during that day on theweapons which may have been used in the hijackings (from m edia and other accounts)and "it was clear we had short-bladed weapons involved."

y (CS) The GAO Office of Special Investigations did an investigation on the gun issue.M orse recalled that the FAA had received a written response from them concluding that agun on board Flight 11 was highly un likely, given the inf orm ation their investigatorswere able to uncover.(CS) Having brough t down the fl ights, Morse conceded that there is no way to kn ow fo rsure if other aircraft were invo lved in the plot that day. Morse speculated that the m ostsenior level people in the secure video teleconference in the SCIF would have discussedprocedures for the planes to follow once they landed. Mo rse him self could not say wh atsteps had been taken by law enfo rcem ent or security at that stage. Jane Garvey, M onteBelger, and Lynne O smus would have been involved in any such discussions, along withATC officials and other senior DOT officials.(CS) Morse said that someone in the Com m and Cente r had spoken w ith ATA about whatthey could or should tell their m em bers. M orse's experience in the past had been thatATA was helpful in disseminat ing inform ation in emergencies, an d that they w ouldwillingly take on such responsibil ities.(CS) No com prehensive After-Action R eport was ever com pleted by the FA A. Everyonewas w ork ing day and night on em ergency m easures. The potential for other attacks wasreal. Mo nths later (March/April), an attempt was m ade to com plete a report, but thecreation of TSA was underway and it was increasingly diff icult to get all of the principlesin one place to discuss what happened and generate "lessons-learned." Morse reportedthat Larry Bruno , the security regulatory m anager, was initial ly tasked w ith writing the



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COMMISSION SENSITIVEjob in regula t ion and inspection and "in m an y respects, security is now worse." H ebelieves that TSA's expedited rulemaking autho rity is a good thing, bu t that the agencyneeds a better managem ent focus to fix problems w ith inspection, enforcem ent andcompliance.

(CS) Morse recommended that a strong and independent testing mechanism be\d for the aviation security system. He said TSA has hired talented anddworking people with law enforcement backgrounds and no aviation or regulatoryxpertise. The regulatory function of FAA did not survive the transfer to TSA. Keypeople have left appointments since TSA's inception. Morse believes this is due to thetendency to underestim ate the com plexity of the sk ill-set needed in leade rship roles forregulation of aviation in this country. He warned, "When all you hav e is a ham m er,everything looks like a nail." Morse concluded that law en forcem ent is not a "cure-all"for th e system of transportation security in this country.

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t7 b11 morse fdr- entire contents- 9-15-03 mike morse mfr w notes 208

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