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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1) Introduction 3 2) Response to 2019 Committee recommendations 3

a) Response 4: H-18-8 updates – Juan Archilla 3 3

b) Response 2: Update on survey on fire protection of steel columns in interstitial space of VA Hospital Building System – David Klein 3

c) Response 1: FEMA P-58 trial studies – Juan Archilla 6

d) Response 3: Seismic risk assessment prioritization ranking of Utility Plants – Juan Archilla 11

e) Response 5: Façade Inspection Program risk assessment – Ian Doiran 11

3) Greetings and Introductions with CFM Leadership 13

4) Executive briefing by the Acting VA Chief of Staff 13

5) New Business 13 a) Seismic risk ranking of Ancillary buildings – Juan Archilla and Jacob Yoder 13 b) A look into proposed code changes to seismic ground motions in future

maps – Gyimah Kasali 14

6) Adjourn 15

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1) Introductions a) Call to Order, Welcome/Opening Remarks, Introduction of Members – Chairman John

Gillengerten i) Meeting called to order at 8:30 AM ii) Committee Chair, John Gillengerten officially opens the 2020 meeting of the Federal

Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities iii) Roll Call conducted by Juan Archilla iv) Overview of Meeting Protocols v) Overview of Meeting Agenda

2) Response to 2019 Committee Comments

a) Response 4: H-18-8 Updates – Mr. Juan Archilla

i) Recommendation 4 (2019): The Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities commends CFM Facilities Standards Service for their efforts to finalize the updates to H-18-8, Seismic Design Requirements. The Advisory Committee recommends that Table 1, Table 10, and the seismic map of the draft document, which pertain to Seismicity Levels, be removed from H-18-8 and incorporated into a separate document for VA use, since this information is not referenced elsewhere in the Seismic Design Requirements. The Advisory Committee recommends that the updated version of H-18-8 be finalized and adopted for use.

ii) VA Response: Concur. H-18-8 Seismic Design Requirements was published on November 1,

2019, and included removal of Table 1, Table 10, and the seismic map, which will be incorporated in a separate drafted document, Seismic Risk Definitions, for VA use.

iii) Di scuss i o n:

1) Recommendation from 2019 was that Tables 1, 10 and the seismic map be removed from H-18-8 and incorporated into a second document.

2) The Committee recommended that the finalized version be published and adapted to use.

3) H-18-8 was published in Nov 1, 2019 without Tables 1, 10, or the seismic map. 4) VA Risk Definitions have been drafted and included in the new document cover risk

assessment of existing structures. The methodology for risk prioritization is outlined in this document. It defines the specifics of what an “EHR/HR” building is, and defines scoring equation, and other factors considered in the scoring system. It also includes the Ss (spectral acceleration values) table and map that were removed from H-18-8.

5) It will be published as an informational document for VA risk assessment and prioritization.

6) Committee concurs that recommendation from 2019 is completed.

b) Responses 2: Update on survey of fire protection on steel columns in interstitial spaces of VA

hospital building system - David Klein

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i) Recommendation 2 (2019) : The Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities commends the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Office of Occupational Safety & Health Management (OSHM) for their efforts to identify buildings that lack fire protection on steel columns in interstitial spaces of VA facilities and thanks VHA OSHM for the preliminary results regarding the total VA Medical Centers (VAMCs) provided with VA Hospital Building System (VAHBS) interstitial spaces. The Advisory Committee requests additional information regarding the VAMCs that employ a VAHBS interstitial space where all columns within the space are not fireproofed.

The Advisory Committee recommends the subcommittee hold a teleconference meeting with VHA OSHM fire protection engineers to outline information requested from the specific VAMCs, including but not limited to: copies of all approved equivalencies held by the VAMC; life safety plans; construction type classification per NFPA 220; the number of stories in the facility (not including interstitial spaces); the number of interstitial spaces, the extent of sprinkler protection in the facility; and photographs of areas within the interstitial space. The conference call will take place by December 31, 2019.

The Advisory Committee requests VHA OSHM obtain the agreed upon information from the VAMCs to allow the subcommittee to provide possible recommendations for correcting these fire proofing deficiencies for consideration by VA.

ii) VA Response: Concur. The Fire Protection Subcommittee met with staff from VHA OSHM to

discuss the potential risks associated with unprotected structural steel within interstitial spaces in a building that meets the criteria of a VA HBS design. The subcommittee recommends that two options be approved by the Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities for each of the five facilities identified in the previous field survey where a VA HBS interstitial space contains steel columns that lack fire proofing. Recommended action is outlined below:

The Fire Protection Subcommittee recommends that the Structural Advisory Committee approves as being acceptable, that the condition will be addressed using one of the following two options. For each facility, VA will either:

Option 1. Ensure that fire proofing will be provided on unprotected steel columns within interstitial spaces in each facility that lacks fire proofing on steel columns in VA HBS interstitial spaces, in order to comply with the intent of the VA HBS design; or

Option 2. Accept the approval of the Structural Advisory Committee for existing non-protected steel columns within VA HBS interstitial spaces, provided that the building is sprinkler protected throughout (with the exception of the interstitial spaces) with quick response sprinklers. This option is based on the understanding that VA continues to perform its ongoing inspections of the facility to ensure compliance for existing facilities.

Note on Option 2: Typically, a National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101A Fire Safety Evaluation System (FSES) analysis will show that quick response sprinklers installed throughout a building will compensate for unprotected steel, including steel columns, on all

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floors of a building, including a high-rise. In addition, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) fire tests show that a walk-on deck constructed in accordance with VA HBS criteria provides protection for the structural steel within the interstitial space, including the columns, even though the tests were not intended to eliminate the requirement for protection of steel columns.

iii) Di scuss i o n:

(1) The survey of VAHBS structures has been completed. Five buildings were identified in the (self-reported) survey. VA Subcommittee recommended two options to address the problem.

(2) Option 1 is to provide fire proofing for the exposed steel in the interstitial space. (3) Option 2: Allow buildings to install quick response sprinkler systems in lieu of fire

proofing. NFPA 101A states that rapid response sprinklers can provide protection for structural members in the interstitial spaces in lieu of fire proofing. Ongoing fire protection inspections of other fire protection systems (fire doors, etc.) are required. The assumption is that fire would not start in an interstitial space. NFPA-13 requires interstitial spaces to not contain “excessive” combustible materials.

(4) The use of fire sprinklers in computer rooms was discussed. Computer rooms require “standard response” sprinklers, as opposed to the quick response sprinklers required by option 2. Existing VA guidelines state that there are certain rooms that require standard response sprinklers (computer server rooms, elevator machinery rooms, electrical rooms, etc.). NFPA-13 allows some exceptions to the “fully quick response sprinklered building” i.e. electrical rooms.

(5) Wording of recommendation was reviewed. Additional mitigating measures (i.e. two-hour fire rated walls enclosing a room in lieu of providing sprinklers in the room) may be required for rooms that cannot uses quick response sprinkler heads. VA fire protection manual spells out spaces that would require standard response sprinklers. Under VA design guidelines, these exceptions to “sprinklers throughout” as described in NFPA 13, are already addressed in VA fire protection design manual.

(6) The level of effort that both mitigating options would require was discussed. Option 1, fireproofing steel, would be onerous. Option 2 to replace standard sprinklers with quick response ones will also require retrofit work. It was determined that it would be easier to replace standard response sprinklers with quick response sprinklers. Either option requires some level of effort.

(7) Question of older buildings was raised, including whether 30-year-old buildings meet substantial compliance with current fire protection codes.

(8) The Advisory Committee passed a motion for the formal recommendation below:

iv) Recommendation 1 (2020)

The Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities commends the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) Office of Occupational Safety & Health Management (OSHM) for their efforts to identify buildings that employ a VA HBS interstitial space where fireproofing is not provided on all columns within the interstitial space.

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The Advisory Committee recommends that for each applicable VA HBS interstitial space, VA address the lack of protection on the steel columns within the interstitial space by utilizing one of the following options:

· Option 1. Ensure that fire proofing will be provided on unprotected steel columns within interstitial spaces in each facility that lacks fire proofing on steel columns in VA HBS interstitial spaces, in order to comply with the intent of the VA HBS design, OR,

· Option 2. Permit existing non-protected steel columns within VA HBS interstitial spaces, provided that the building is sprinkler protected throughout (with the exception of the interstitial spaces) with quick response sprinklers. This option is based on the understanding that VA continues to perform its ongoing inspections of the facility to assure compliance for existing facilities.

Note on Option 2: Typically, an NFPA 101A FSES analysis will show that quick response sprinklers installed throughout a building will compensate for unprotected steel, including steel columns, on all floors of a building, including a high-rise. In addition, the NIST fire tests show that a walk-on deck constructed in accordance with VA HBS criteria provides protection for the structural steel within the interstitial space, including the columns, even though the tests were not intended to eliminate the requirement for protection of steel columns. The building is considered to be sprinkler protected throughout with quick response sprinklers even if there are areas where standard response sprinklers are provided as required by NFPA codes and standards, or where standard response sprinklers are permitted by the VA Fire Protection Design Manual.

c) Responses 1: FEMA P-58 trial study – Juan Archilla i) Recommendation 1 (2019): The Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities

recommends that CFM carefully review the results and current implementations of the FEMA P-58 studies, particularly Vol. 5, in order to assess its applicability to VA’s categories of facilities specified in H-18-8 Seismic Design Handbook. The Committee recommends that VA staff utilize the current FEMA P-58 tools to assess the effect of H-18-8 provisions (i.e., limits on drift, etc.) on the performance of its structures and its ability to provide useful data for performance quantification for structures. The Committee further recommends, if the initial results are promising, that VA staff develop its own performance criteria and determine what extensions and additional data would be needed to adapt existing tools to better suit VA’s needs.

ii) VA Response: Concur. The Office of Acquisition, Logistics, and Construction (OALC) and

Office of Construction & Facilities Management (CFM) will utilize the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) P-58 Performance Estimation tool to assess the effect of H-18-8 seismic design criteria on the performance of VA facility categories and performance quantification. OALC will accomplish the assessment by selecting representative structures that correspond to the structures in FEMA P-58-5. The results will be compared to current performance criteria and expectations and presented to the Advisory Committee for review and consideration of future adapted FEMA P-58 studies for VA facilities with the goal of improving performance criteria to meet expectations.

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iii) Di scuss i o n:

(1) Study objectives: (a) Use FEMA P-58 Performance Estimation Tool (PET) to assess H-18-8 (drift) criteria

effects. (b) Can FEMA P-58 results be useful to quantify H-18-8 performance expectations of VA

facility categories? (c) Identify additional data derived from the FEMA P-58 methodology to better suit

VA’s needs (2) Overview of PET tool (Juan Archilla) – interactive tool that looks at 1755 archetypes

across 5 different lateral systems. Can be used to compare performance outcomes of different building systems and design criteria for various design criteria and seismic hazards. (a) Inputs are design space (allowable drift ratio and minimum base shear) – H-18-8 has

specific drift criteria used that are more stringent than ASCE 7. (i) H-18-8 does not have design criteria beyond code requirement for multiple of

base shear vs. minimum base shear. Because there are no additional VA criteria, the ASCE 7-10 lateral base shear was used for the study.

(ii) Inputs include lateral base shear, lateral resisting system, occupancy, risk category (II or IV, or Ancillary or Critical in VA terms), building height (low, mid, high), seismic design category (Low D, D, and E/F).

(iii) PET outputs are plotted as a function of seismic hazard intensity; 20, 40, 67, 80 and 100% of MCE. Only 67% and 100% were studied by VA. PET provides estimates of casualty rate, probability of collapse, median and mean loss/replacement cost, median and mean repair time, probability of unrepairable permeant drift, probability of total repairability, 90th percentile loss %, 90th percentile repair time, probability of unsafe placard.

(3) Summary of Study Findings– (a) The Committee was impressed with the results of the study – 100% repairability for

Critical facilities in 67% MCE (Design Earthquake) level shaking and 96% repairability in MCE level shaking.

(b) Low predicted casualties and collapse probability for VA Critical facilities suggest strong life safety performance in MCE events.

(c) The PET tool does not identify which building elements and components would be damaged during earthquake shaking, although the P-58 methodology does produce such data. Building-specific studies are needed in order to determine if the facility can still function as intended following an earthquake. All buildings will require some level of repair, but depending on the nature of the damage, these repairs may not disrupt essential functions.

(d) The Committee noted that VA criteria is delivering results that were anticipated and hoped for based on the provisions of H-18-8, which are slightly more stringent than model building code (ASCE 7).

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(e) It was noted that repair time only includes physical repair work, not the time required for planning, contracting or funding repair work.

(f) It was noted that low-rise buildings have longer repair times than mid-rise buildings. This is attributed to higher permitted drift limits for low-rise structures.

(g) Ancillary buildings performance matched expectations – low casualty rates and low likelihood of collapse correlated to strong life safety results in 2/3 MCE. However, some facilities may not be repairable following 2/3 MCE or higher.

(h) Compared VA H-18-8 drift to code maximum drift for Critical facilities. (i) H-18-8 limits design story drift to 50% of ASCE 7 drift limit. (ii) The PET tool could not be used to evaluate low rise Steel Special Moment

Resisting Frame (SMRF) and Reinforced Concrete SMRF critical facilities because the VA maximum drift limit is lower than the lower-bound limit set in the PET tool.

(iii) Maximum ASCE 7 drift limits could not be entered into PET for Special Concentrically Braced Frame (SCBF) and Special Reinforced Concrete Shear Wall (SRCSW) because they exceed the upper-bound drift limit PET set in the PET tool. However, studies conducted during the development of the P-58 PET tool show that code conforming steal SCBF structures are forced controlled, have low seismic story drifts, and are not governed by drift limits.

(i) Repair times for Critical facilities were compared for structures meeting H-18-8 and ASCE 7 code requirements. (i) Noted that PET predicts larger repair costs for Buckling Restrained Braced Frame

(BRBF) structures compared to other lateral force-resisting systems, because BRBF structures appear more susceptible to residual drift at story drifts near the ASCE 7 design limits. BRBF structures perform much better if designed to lower drift limits. BRBF structures show improved performance at 2/3 MCE when designed to VA H-18-8 criteria. A detailed study BRBF structures may permit establishing drift design limits that will improve post-earthquake repairability.

(ii) Median repair times are very similar for the different lateral bracing systems studied. For BRBF structures, mean repair times show improvement at 2/3 MCE using VA criteria for maximum drift, versus ASCE 7. It is assumed that shear wall structure repair costs will be very similar for VA and ASCE 7-compliant structures because of they are designed for similar story drifts. Performance benefits using VA code criteria increase as shaking approaches MCE levels, especially for BRBF structures.

(iii) Buildings limited to 1% drift limits of H-18-8 are expected to have excellent repairability, demonstrably better for structures at both 2/3 MCE and MCE shaking levels compared to those designed to ASCE 7 drift criteria. Similar benefits are seen for 90th percentile repair times.

(iv) The PET analysis predicts higher probabilities for unsafe placard for SCBF structures, compared to other lateral force-resisting systems. Similar, consistent trends were noted for BRBF structures designed to higher drift limits.

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(j) Results for low-rise Critical buildings designed to H-18-8 criteria provided performance similar to results obtained for midrise buildings for different lateral bracing systems.

(k) H-18-8 drift criteria at 2/3 MCE benefited low-rise BRBF and SCBF structures compared to comparable structures design to ASCE 7 drift limits. For other lateral systems, there was negligible difference between buildings designed to H-18-8 compared to ASCE 7 drift limits, although results begin to diverge beyond 2/3 MCE, favoring structures designed to H-18-8 criteria.

(l) The Committee discussed how FEMA P-58 results might be useful for broader application. FEMA P-58 techniques can help refine H-18-8 criteria to further improve performance. FEMA P-58 could also be used to quantify performance expectations for different categories of facilities.

(m) Detailed FEMA P-58 case studies of example buildings with typical VA attributes and equipment would be valuable. Specific fragilities for various structural elements and common VA Essential nonstructural components may help determine severity of critical repairs and probability of functionality after an earthquake. FEMA P-58 can also be used to evaluate the performance of other seismic protection systems such as base isolation as well.

(n) Concerns that the FEMA P-58 PET tool only uses archetype buildings and that they may not be realistic representations of VA buildings were discussed. Study of the underlying assumptions made to develop the PET tool could be made. If VA buildings substantially differ from the archetypes in the PET, then a more detailed investigation may be required.

(o) PET was designed as a “first look tool”. The Committee discussed several questions, including whether it is worth it to refine the FEMA P-58 study further, and is the initial analysis sufficient to conclude that H-18-8 design criteria are robust enough in their current state. SCBF lateral systems seem to be less robust than other systems. Should restrictions on SCBF systems be considered? Should current restrictions on the use of moment frame systems be reconsidered? (i) VA allows the use of special moment frames but they must be approved by VA

Seismic Safety Coordinator. The Committee recommends moving special steel moment-resisting frames to H-18-8 classification A and steel special concentric braced frames to classification B. Roberto Leon suggested further study is needed on how concrete special moment-resisting frames are evolving. In steel special moment-resisting frames, the gravity and lateral framing are well tied together and a degree of deformation compatibility is achieved. In concrete special moment-resisting frames, the lateral and gravity frames may differ substantially in nature (beams/columns versus flat slabs), may not be as well tied together, and may differ in deformation behavior.

(ii) A full FEMA P-58 analysis of a building can be very data and time intensive. Detailed FEMA P-58 studies may serve VA better as a tool to analyze broad trends rather than individual buildings. A full FEMA P-58 study may be useful for unique buildings, but this study has shown that H-18-8 holds up well for generic buildings using standard lateral bracing systems.

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(iii) The Committee raises the point that it may be a better use to use FEMA P-58 to study Ancillary buildings. Ancillary buildings are designed to base code standards. The following questions were: 1. Should these buildings be designed to withstand one earthquake, or is a

better analysis of their robustness required (for Ancillary and Essential buildings)?

2. Are there inexpensive tweaks to H-18-8 Ancillary structures requirements that can markedly increase performance? Critical buildings are about as good as they can get, but improvements are possible for other classes of structures.

3. How much will an AE designer charge to do an in-depth P-58 analysis? The Committee believes that the cost should be minor.

(iv) A large range in Ancillary buildings repair times was noted (30-310 days). It would be worth a more in-depth investigation to determine which variables most strongly affect that range.

(v) Does the VA accept that some Ancillary buildings will not be repairable? Is that acceptable? The Committee chair suggested looking for the factors that would reduce the vulnerability of Ancillary buildings (i.e. which lateral system). Currently, all Ancillary buildings (Risk Category II) meet life safety objectives. But are there lateral bracing systems that would improve the overall performance with relatively economic changes.

(vi) Focus of the study should be to raise awareness of what the FEMA P-58 analyses shows with respect to seismic performance of different bracing systems. The likelihood of a BRBF structure suffering excessive residual drift should be investigated. Possibly either take into consideration the stiffness for BRBF of the gravity systems or lower the design drift limit from the maximum permitted in code. There is currently no extra requirements for lateral bracing systems in Ancillary buildings (Critical buildings have requirements).

(vii) A draft recommendation that covers looking into Critical structures, the SCBF and SMRF issues was prepared. For Ancillary buildings, it recommends consideration of data showing variation in performance between different systems. VA should consider whether to act on this information (variability of repair times). It was noted that Ancillary buildings currently meet life safety objective, which is the purpose of CAT II buildings.

(p) The Advisory Committee passed a motion for the formal recommendation below:

iv) Recommendation 2 (2020)

The Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities commends CFM for their thoughtful review of the FEMA P-58, Vol. 5 studies, as they relate to VA’s categories of facilities specified in H-18-8 Seismic Design Handbook. The Committee finds that the CFM review demonstrates the beneficial effects of H-18-8 seismic design provisions (i.e., limits on drift, etc.) on the performance of its structures. The Committee recommends that VA staff develop refinements to

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the H-18-8 provisions that incorporate the information obtained from their review of FEMA P-58, Vol. 5. Suggested refinements include revising Section 3.2 to:

· Require approval of the VA Seismic Safety Coordinator for steel special concentrically braced frames, and

· Removing the requirement for VA Seismic Safety Coordinator approval for special steel moment-resisting frames.

The Committee also recommends that CFM study the possibility of using the FEMA P-58 data to identify options for reducing repair times for Ancillary buildings.

d. Responses 3: Seismic risk assessment prioritization ranking of Utility Plants – Juan Archilla

i) Recommendation 3 (2019): The Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities commends CFM Facilities Standards Service on their proposed revisions to VA’s Exceptionally High Risk (EHR) and High Risk (HR) ranking methodology of utility plants. The proposed revisions of removing the size restriction of Critical plants to qualify as EHR, replacing the plant size effect with the number of inpatient beds supported, and linking the score of plants to the facilities they support such that its score is not less than the highest scored facility it supports, clearly reflects the significance of utility plants on the ability of major VA Critical medical facilities to achieve their continuous operation goal after a major seismic event. Preliminary studies show that the proposed changes will impact VA facilities in areas of high seismicity, where currently a disconnect is found in the importance ranking between inpatient buildings and their Essential support facilities. Given the importance of this change, the Committee recommends, if possible, that the change be implemented on an interim basis until Directive 7512, Seismic Safety of VA Buildings, is formally amended.

ii) VA Response: Concur. Due to the importance of this change and effect on prioritization of planned seismic mitigation projects, the EHR and HR lists have been updated implementing these criteria until Directive 7512 is updated.

iii) Di scuss i o n:

(1) Utility plants have removed the square footage criteria for their ranking systems. They also have a score not less than that of the highest ranked building on the campus served by the utility plant in question. Example of West LA Building 500 (main hospital) and utility plant. Utility plant ranking is now equal to WLA Bldg. 500 (the highest ranked building on the EHR list).

e) Response 5: Façade Inspection Program Risk assessment – Ian Doiran i) Recommendation 5 (2019): The Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities

commends CFM Consulting Support Service for their efforts in continuing the Façade Inspection Program. The Committee recommends developing a risk assessment tool to

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prioritize facilities based on location, height, population, and materials. Special prioritization for brick and precast concrete panel façades is recommended.

ii) VA Response: Concur. OALC CFM is currently compiling information and developing associated measures, value ranges and weighting criteria to prioritize facilities.

iii) Di scuss i o n: (1) Façade inspection program is 13 years old, with focus on height and age (80ft and 30yrs

old) (2) Recommendation to develop risk assessment tool to prioritize facilities based on

location, height, population and materials. Special prioritization for brick and precast concrete were prioritized.

(3) Location- relevance to loads based on seismic, wind, freeze thaw cycles (a) Analysis uses FEMA P154 for seismic values, ASCE/SEI wind speed maps and FEMA

maps for tornados. Use IBC or ACI concrete exposure maps for freeze thaw cycles. (b) Height – currently only >80ft. Now, medium priority ranges from 2 stories to 80ft. (c) Population- city over 90,000 people is highest. Recognize that severity is tied to

population, façade ordinances in metropolitan areas are more restrictive (d) Materials – Masonry, concrete, metal panels (e) Filter FCA façade condition assessment, then use the above data to further refine

the list. Start with FCA grade F, D and the A, B, C are lowest priority. (4) Metrics are weighted, so mid-rise in high seismic outranks high rise in medium seismic. (5) Debate on how to further refine list. Seismic Façade failures tend to be catastrophic,

rather than wind/freeze-thaw failures. Currently no database with the level of fidelity required to make more nuanced decisions.

(6) Currently a funding shortfall – which requires intense prioritization. (7) Recommendation- continue to refine; look forward to reviewing example

implementation of the system.

iv) Recommendation 4 (2020)

The Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities commends CFM for their efforts to develop a Façade Inspection program risk assessment tool to create a rational process to develop a risk assessment for various building facades of VA facilities.

The Advisory Committee recommends that CFM continue to refine this assessment tool based in part on the Advisory’s Committee comments and discussions and then test its viability by applying it to a significant sample of buildings with various facade types, heights, and locations. The Advisory Committee further recommends that a review be made of the data to determine if the assessment mechanism as developed will provide the required information to be able to categorize the façade risk to the building and to any collateral damage caused by façade failure during various categories of hazards.

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3) Greeting and Introduction with CFM Leadership - Dr. Michael Brennan a) Commended the Committee for their contributions to the VA. Highlights importance of adding

speed and agility to reshape strategy of implementing recommendations from the Committee in order to better mitigate risk to facilities and veterans.

b) Different project delivery methods (design build, design bid build etc.). Move towards an integrated approach. Notes the vast institutional knowledge gap for the VA.

c) Revit models are noted to be very useful in industry. If we don’t have an enterprise system for modeling and coordination, then we should work towards one in the future.

d) Encouraged the Committee to think about ways to improve project delivery.

4) Executive Briefing by the Acting Chief of Staff - Brooks Tucker a) Brooks Tucker commends the Committee on the work they are doing. Highlights major efforts

the VA has been making including on Electronic Health Records Management. Brooks Tucker provides context and commends the Committee on their efforts to support the greater VA mission.

5) New Business a) Seismic risk ranking of Ancillary Building – Juan Archilla and Jacob Yoder

i) Discussion: (1) VA prioritizes Critical and Essential seismically deficient facilities for seismic mitigation

projects using the EHR and HR lists. (2) Committed to maintaining operations of these facilities during and after a major seismic

event. (3) VA is also committed to mitigating life safety seismic risks for Ancillary buildings.

(a) Have also identified a need to also rank Ancillary buildings by seismic mitigation priority.

(4) No current way to rank Ancillary buildings for priority. (5) A preliminary list of 227 non-exempt Ancillary buildings have been found in the VA

seismic inventory. EHR/HR ranking formula were used in the initial effort (6) The EHR/HR prioritizes immediate occupancy in the aftermath of a seismic event; the

Ancillary list should prioritize life safety based on applicable criteria. (7) Consider number of occupants; data is not easily attainable, requires large data call

from medical centers across the VA. Existing size scoring component is already intended to account for occupant load in a building.

(8) 24/7 Occupancy; data not easily available, Hoptels/quarters will be considered (9) Bed counts for lodging are not always included in current data sets. (10) Current number of beds score can be leveraged; eliminate min score of 5 (not

applicable for many facilities); assumes data is accessible (11) Veterans Services; outpatient buildings or other buildings visited by veterans are also

criteria suggested to include in Ancillary ranking system. (12) Create a high-risk list for Ancillary buildings?

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(13) Filtering criteria? List currently uses 2006 list of non-exempt buildings. New buildings could be added by new seismic studies that confirm deficiencies. (a) Should there be a size cap? 10k gsf? Quarters/residence buildings (generally small)

(14) Deficiency category can be used to target most-at-risk buildings. Can restrict list for most damage expected from buildings to be studied.

(15) Chairman Gillengerten mentioned screening tools exist to help rank existing, non-Essential buildings (size, structural attributes, date of construction etc.). Existing methodologies are available to determine risk level, such as FEMA P154/155, a rapid visual screening method for potential seismic hazards. (a) FEMA tools are assumed to be visual inspections. Already fully vetted and in use

across the country. Don’t necessarily need an expert to input data in the app. Data fed into a central database. Don’t need an engineer or architect to fill out this form. VA foresees difficulty in having stations fill out these forms correctly by untrained users. Possibility of adding this to the FCA program. Will cause the data to be delayed by 4-5 years to get Ancillary data. FEMA 154 is specifically developed with respect to life safety.

(16) The Committee supports investigating these buildings. Make use of the existing data in the interim. Longer term, next step will be to prioritize these buildings for seismic mitigation projects. Currently don’t have funding to address these buildings. Does VA start with these buildings, or finish Critical/Essential buildings? May uncover significant life safety issues and potentially prioritize them over Critical/Essential buildings. The Committee will provide a recommendation.

ii) Recommendation 3 (2020)

The Advisory Committee on Structural Safety of VA Facilities commends CFM for addressing the issue of ranking of Ancillary buildings at VA facilities and for the initial development of criteria to be considered in that process. The Committee recommends that CFM further develop these concepts and consider adopting existing rapid evaluation methodologies (i.e., FEMA 154 or similar) to develop both near- and long-term approaches of ranking such facilities. The Committee notes that some facilities classified as Ancillary may be large outpatient clinics or office buildings with potentially large occupancy, and thus a robust ranking system is needed to address their potential deficiencies. The Committee recognizes that this is a long-term project and that additional resources may be needed to implement it.

b) A Look into proposed Code Changes to Seismic Ground Motions in future Maps – Gyimah Kasali i) Relates to Multi-Period Response Spectra (MPRS). Proposals will affect ASCE 7 chapters 11,

20, 21 and 22 (NEHRP approved). Expected to see changes in ASCE 7-22. ii) Adds new “site specific” MPRS, deletes site coefficient tables, removes the site-specific

ground motion procedures of ASCE 7-16, updates vertical earthquake requirements (only in western US). Adds new site classification procedures as well as new site class shear wave velocity-based requirements.

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iii) Adds new deterministic MCEr scenario earthquake requirements and revised determination of SD1 from specific design spectrum. Can de-aggregate the hazard of an earthquake to determine which fault line contributes the most to an earthquake.

iv) Incorporates USGS update of MCEr ground motions based on 2018 update of USGS NSHM. Provides maps of SMS and SM1 for default site conditions (and provides values of ground motion parameters for default and other user specified site conditions via the USGS web service.

v) Main approach was to have the MPRS match the current 2 period response spectrum. vi) For softer sites, particularly those where seismic hazards are governed by large magnitude

earthquakes, frequency content of ground motions (spectrum shape) is not accurately characterized by the two period design response spectrum and site coefficients. The disparity between existing 2 period response spectrum (ASCE 7-16) and the MPRS (as will be seen in ASCE 7-22) short period acceleration is not terrible, but great differences between design spectrum and what should be implemented begin to be seen in longer period examples (1-2 seconds).

vii) Interim solution requires site specific analysis to determine design ground motions for softer sites. If structures on site class E with Ss greater than 1.0 then you must follow site specific ground motion procedures. For site class D and E, S1 greater than 0.2 you must follow these procedures. (1) Exceptions permit ELF and MRSA design using conservative values for seismic

coefficients viii) Long term solutions for MPRS is to define design ground motions in terms of multi period

response spectra. Also provide MPRS and associated values of seismic design parameters for user-specified values of site location and site class. (1) Deterministic MCEr provides the lower limit for seismic hazard. (2) Improved Values of Seismic Design Parameters. Derive values of seismic design

parameters (SDS and SD1) from “best fit” of the two-period spectrum to the multi-period design spectrum of the site of interest.

ix) Need to determine which sites are affected by these changes. Some site-specific changes may result in increases of 30-40%.

x) Issues with moving the “goalposts of spectral acceleration” without guidance on how to implement the changes. (1) May require overhaul of section 5 of H-18-8. Currently requires site specific evaluation.

May need to update H-18-8 in accordance with the new ASCE 7-22 guidelines.

6) Adjourn

a) Meeting adjourned at 5:30 PM – Chairman John Gillengerten