tail of the dragon (amato)
TRANSCRIPT
TAIL OF THE DRAGON: SRI LANKAN EFFORTS TO SUBDUE THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM
A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Military History
by
EDWARD J. AMATO, MAJ, USA B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1989
M.S., Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2001
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2002
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
ii
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
THESIS APPROVAL PAGE
Name of Candidate: MAJ Edward J. Amato
Thesis Title: Tail of the Dragon: Sri Lankan Efforts to Subdue the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Approved by: ____________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair Nicholas H. Riegg, Ph.D. ____________________________________, Member COL Timothy S. Heinemann, M.S. ____________________________________, Member Mr. William W. Mendel, M.A.
Accepted this 31st day of May 2002 by: ____________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
iii
ABSTRACT TAIL OF THE DRAGON: SRI LANKAN EFFORTS TO SUBDUE THE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM, by MAJ Edward J. Amato, 118 pages. This operational- level analysis, focused on campaign-planning issues, identifies shortcomings in the counterinsurgency efforts of the government of Sri Lanka (GSL), as it continues its conflict against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Despite foreign military and economic assistance, the GSL’s concerted efforts for nearly twenty years have failed to either defeat the LTTE or achieve a peaceful settlement. The LTTE continues to function effectively, if not thrive. The framework provided by JP 5-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning has been used to analyze three GSL campaigns: Operation Riviresa in 1995, Operation Jaya Sikurui in 1996, and Operation Kinihira in 2000. US principles of Internal Defense and Development and Foreign Internal Defense have also been utilized in assessing these campaigns. The thesis concludes that the GSL’s violation of several campaign-planning fundamentals significantly contributed to poor operational and counterinsurgency performance. Operations were compromised by insufficient political-military synchronization and poor tactical preparedness. The thesis validates the use of JP 5-00.1 as an effective methodology for analyzing situations other than war, and advocates the publication of principles concerning tactics, techniques, and procedures as a supplement to current US counterinsurgency doctrine.
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Many people assisted with this project. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Dr.
Nicholas Riegg, Mr. William Mendel, and Colonel Timothy Heinemann, my faculty
advisors, for their patience, guidance, and assistance in completing this work. I would
also like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Robert Walz, Dr. Larry Yates, Colonel
Lawyn C. Edwards, Lieutenant Colonel A. J. Deas, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Stuart
Lyon, Lieutenant Colonel Marlyn Pierce, and other faculty members of the United States
Army Command and General Staff College, all of whom provided invaluable insight and
guidance during this effort. I owe special thanks to Lieutenant Colonel (P) Frank L.
Rindone, U.S. Defense Attache, Sri Lanka; Colonel (Retired) Jack Moroney; Dr. John
Waghelstein; Colonel (Retired) John S. Crerar; Major Paul Marks, Bureau of Political
Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Major Lantz Turner, U.S. Army Pacific
Command; and Master Sergeant Dave Shell, U.S. Army Special Operations Command,
Pacific. Despite exceptionally busy schedules, each of these officers and
noncommissioned officers went out of their way to provide me with their personal
experiences and insight for this project. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their
tireless encouragement and support in completing this work.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
APPROVAL PAGE ......................................................................................................... ii
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................... iv
LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES .........................................................................................................viii
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................. 1
2. BACKGROUND................................................................................................ 8
3. OPERATION RIVIRESA (“SUNRAYS”) ........................................................ 27
4. OPERATION JAYA SIKURUI (“VICTORY ASSURED”)............................. 45
5. OPERATION KINIHIRA (“ANVIL”) ............................................................... 61
6. POSTSCRIPT..................................................................................................... 71
7. CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................ 73
FIGURES ......................................................................................................................... 92
TABLES........................................................................................................................... 99
APPENDIX
A. LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................101
GLOSSARY ....................................................................................................................105
vi
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................108
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ....................................................................................118
CARL CERTIFICATION FORM ...................................................................................119
vii
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ACTC All Ceylon Tamil Congress
COG Center of Gravity
DoD Department of Defense
FID Foreign Internal Defense
FP Federal Party
GSL Government of Sri Lanka
IDAD Internal Defense and Development
IPKF Indian Peacekeeping Force
JP Joint Publication
JVP People’s Liberation Front
LSSP Lanka Sama Samaja Party
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MSR Main Supply Route
PA People’s Alliance Party
PLOTE People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
SLA Sri Lankan Army
SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party
SLMC Sri Lankan Muslim Congress
TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization
TULF Tamil United Liberation Front
UNP United National Party
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
1. Political Map of Sri Lanka ..................................................................................... 92
2. Map of Jaffna Peninsula ......................................................................................... 93
3. Operation Riviresa.................................................................................................. 94
4. LTTE Attack on GSL Base in Mullaittivu ............................................................. 95
5. Map of Northern Sri Lanka (excluding Jaffna Peninsula) ..................................... 96
6. Operation Jaya Sikurui ........................................................................................... 97
7. LTTE Attack on GSL Base at Killinochchi ........................................................... 98
ix
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans .......................................................................... 99
2. Thompson’s 5 Principles of Counterinsurgency....................................................100
1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The conventional army loses if it does not win, the guerrilla wins if he does not lose.1
Henry Kissinger
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the shortcomings of the counterinsurgency
effort the GSL continues to wage against the LTTE. There is relatively little historical
analysis on this counterinsurgency, which is unfortunate; despite concerted military and
political efforts on the part of the GSL for over twenty years, the LTTE continues to
function effectively, if not thrive. External assistance from various nations, including
Great Britain and the United States, has similarly failed to enable the GSL to militarily
defeat or reach a peaceful settlement with the LTTE. One British diplomat compared the
LTTE--and its Tamil lineage--to a dragon, with its head in Delhi, heart in Madras, and
tail in Sri Lanka. He noted, “However much we cut the tail, it will grow.”2
The findings of this thesis are significant in historical context, yet equally
important to the military and political leadership of America today. Ethnic and cultural
conflict continues to spread across the globe. Indeed, Samuel P. Huntington argues in
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order that although nation-states
will maintain their dominance in world affairs, “their interests, associations and conflicts
are increasingly shaped by cultural . . . factors.”3 A National Security Strategy for a
Global Age, the national security strategy of the United States, identifies global
engagement as fundamental to peace at home and abroad. Additionally, US military
2
involvement in Kosovo and East Timor is cited to illustrate where “important national
interests” were protected--regional conflicts in which ethnic and cultural differences
played no small role.4 Continuing US commitment to engagement ensures such substate
conflicts will remain relevant to policymakers and military leaders of the future. An
analysis of the conflict in Sri Lanka may help frame further questions US doctrine writers
need answer about counterinsurgency.
Current US counterterrorism efforts further magnify the relevance of this thesis.
The LTTE is identified by the US State Department as a foreign terrorist organization
that has successfully integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program. 5
Notorious for its cadre of domestic suicide bombers and its implication in the 1972
assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, the LTTE targets key personnel,
and senior political and military leaders in Colombo and other urban centers. The
LTTE’s violent history and its transnational financing may attract closer scrutiny from
the global community in the future.
The operational- level analysis in this thesis identifies shortcomings in the GSL
counterinsurgency strategy from a campaign-planning perspective. The thesis uses the
new JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning as an analytical framework, as
well as principles of US IDAD and FID doctrine. This doctrinal approach facilitates
understanding by US military and political leaders and capitalizes on the considerable
knowledge amassed by the American military in the US Civil War and Indian Wars; in
the counterinsurgencies in Greece, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam;
and by working with the Nicaraguan Contras. From this experience, the body of US
3
counterinsurgency doctrine is impressive and well organized, facilitating academic
analysis. By using this standard, an important assumption is made regarding the validity
of US doctrine. Arguably, other nations have enjoyed greater success combating
insurgency than the US; the British experience in Malaya is often cited. In contrast, the
British faced more difficulty in Cyprus and Palestine and in confronting the Kaffirs in the
Transvaal, Boers in South Africa, Mau Mau in Kenya, and the Irish Republican Army.
Every insurgency is uniquely challenging; US doctrine does reflect a unique political and
social history, rich resource base, and ideology. For this reason, the analysis is balanced
with historical examples of other counterinsurgency campaigns.
Chapter 2 provides a brief background of the complex ethnic conflict in Sri
Lanka. Chapters 3 through 5 analyze the GSL’s counterinsurgency effort. These
chapters employ a case study methodology, analyzing three government campaigns:
Operation Riviresa in 1995, Operation Jaya Sikurui in 1997, and Operation Kinihira in
2000. The intent is not to provide an exhaustive narrative of each campaign, but to
highlight political and military shortcomings. These campaigns were selected because
they reflect recent GSL efforts that incorporate the most modern equipment, tactics, and
the benefit of lessons learned from earlier attempts to defeat the LTTE and other
insurgent groups. In addition, the sample includes somewhat successful campaigns, as
well as failures, as viewed by GSL forces. Although GSL military campaigns are used to
delimit this research, military efforts often play the supporting role in counterinsurgency,
and the other instruments of national power are not excluded from this analysis.
Diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts by the GSL are reviewed to analyze
4
their impact on particular campaigns. This campaign construct enables greater focus on
the synchronization of the GSL’s political and military efforts during specific periods of
time and narrows the scope of analysis of decades of conflict. Chapter 6 concludes by
summarizing shortcomings in the GSL’s strategy and advocating the publication of
principles concerning tactics, techniques, and procedures as a supplement to current US
counterinsurgency doctrine. The use of JP 5-00.1 as an effective methodology for
analyzing situations other than war is also discussed. Finally, issues for further study are
identified that might improve the overall understanding of counterinsurgency.
This analysis is not the first undertaken in the subject area. Of significant note is
the master’s thesis of Lieutenant Colonel Raj Vijayasiri, a Sri Lankan military officer
attending the US Command and General Staff College. His thesis, “A Critical Analysis
of the Sri Lankan Government’s Counterinsurgency Campaign,” is based on lessons
learned from firsthand experience and primarily identifies political and strategic flaws in
the GSL approach. 6 This work complements Vijayasiri’s personal account with an
operational- level analysis of specific campaign case studies. Additionally, this thesis
helps validate newly published US doctrine JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign
Planning, with respect to counterinsurgency. 7
The need to identify biases in sources has been an important element of this
research effort. In the midst of civil war, both GSL and LTTE information campaigns are
fully mobilized, and propaganda is abundant. Expert accounts and verifiable data are
difficult to obtain; the veracity of sources is often suspect. For this reason, the thesis
utilizes resources from the US Departments of State and Defense, independent scholarly
5
sources, and US military personnel with experience in Sri Lanka. Firsthand accounts
from Sri Lankan officers and civilians also proved immensely beneficial. Contributions
that could not be independently verified are so identified.
The definitions of insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism, and similar labels are
often value laden and hotly debated depending upon the political perspective. Whenever
possible, the definitions accepted in joint US military doctrine are used to avoid
confusion. This standard is not always sufficient. For example, current doctrine defines
insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.”8 The LTTE’s objectives
are secessionist and include the establishment of an independent state of Tamil Eelam,
but do not categorically espouse the overthrow of the GSL. Although Sri Lanka, a
Country Study--sponsored by the Library of Congress’ Federal Research Division--
repeatedly refers to the LTTE as an insurgency, the doctrinal definition of insurgency
would not include this conflict.9 In Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern
Revolutionary Warfare, Bard O’Neill offers a more precise definition of insurgency:
A struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics.10 The LTTE, in the prosecution of its insurgency, often employs the tactic of
terrorism, defined by the DoD as, “the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to
inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of
goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”11 Though the definition of
6
terrorism differs significantly not only among various authors, but also among various
agencies within the US government, the DoD definition is often cited and is arguably the
most precise.12
The doctrinal definition of counterinsurgency is rather broad and is thus less
problematic: “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic
actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”13 In practice, however, the US
military does not turn to a single reference for counterinsurgency doctrine. Instead,
programs, policies, and procedures for assisting other governments are outlined in
various sources, predominantly under the umbrella of FID, defined as:
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. 14 These definitions will not suffice for everyone; however, to become embroiled in
semantic debate would prohibit any meaningful analysis of the political and military
phenomena of counterinsurgency. Before examining specific campaigns, some
background study is useful to keep the analysis in the proper context.
1Justin Wintle, ed., The Dictionary of War Quotations (New York: The Free
Press, 1989), 363.
2Rohan Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency,” 2 December 1998 [article on-line]; available from http://www. counterror.org.il/ articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=57; Internet; accessed on 28 August 1999; article author’s endnote 33.
3Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 36.
4The White House, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, December 2000), 4.
7
5Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School (DKL) Web Committee, “Terrorist Group Profiles: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)” [article on-line]; available from http://www.nps.navy.mil/~library/tgp/ltte.htm; Internet; accessed on 9 March 2002.
6LTC Raj Vijayasiri, “A Critical Analysis of Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign” (Master’s thesis, US Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1999), 86.
7US Department of Defense, JP 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 January 2002), I-6.
8US Department of Defense, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 March 1994, as amended through 1 September 2000), 228.
9Russell R. Ross, ed., Sri Lanka, a Country Study, 2d ed. (Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, 1990), 177, 220, 221, 249, various.
10Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington: Brassey’s, Inc., 1990), 13.
11US Department of Defense, JP 1-02, 462.
12Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 38-39, 43.
13US Department of Defense, JP 1-02, 112.
14Ibid., 183.
8
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Of war men will ask its outcome, not its cause.1
Seneca, A.D. 65 This stunningly beautiful island nation--formerly known as the Dominion of
Ceylon--boasts a rich cultural and historical heritage reaching back over two thousand
years. This chapter provides an overview of Sri Lanka’s demographics, ancient history,
colonial period, and modern political and economic history as they relate to societal
divisions today. The island’s earliest recorded history suggests a multiethnic society.
The significant impact of centuries of colonization by the Portuguese, Dutch, and British
likewise did not diminish the unique religious and cultural traditions of Sri Lanka’s
natives. Indeed, much of the nation’s domestic turmoil today traces its origins to these
enduring institutions.
Sri Lanka’s population today is 74 percent Sinhalese, 18 percent Tamil, and 7
percent Moor and includes a minority 1 percent Burgher, Eurasian, Malay, and Veddah
ethnicities.2 Sinhalese speak Sinhala, and Tamils speak Tamil, though English is widely
spoken in the government and approximately 10 percent of the educated population. It is
significant to note that the language of the 7 percent Moor populace is also Tamil, though
incorporating several Arabic words. This Muslim contingent of the population shares
commonality of language, but not the Sri Lankan Tamil’s desire for Tamil Eelam
separatism. The Sinhalese majority, predominantly Buddhist, recognizes a further
distinction between Kandyan and low-country Sinhalese. Kandyan Sinhalese trace their
origins to the central highlands of the island and the Kingdom of Kandy, which was
9
largely able to resist European domination until 1818. The low-country Sinhalese
inhabited the coastal regions and were more subject to colonial influence. The Tamil
population of the island, primarily Hindu, also distinguishes between Sri Lankan Tamils
and Indian Tamils. Sri Lankan Tamils trace their origins to the earliest Dravidian settlers
on the island, as early as the third century B.C. In the nineteenth century, the British
brought Indian Tamils to the island as plantation labor. The caste system of Sri Lanka
further stratifies the ethnic groupings of Sinhalese and Tamils on the island. Caste
structure in Sri Lanka varies significantly from the Brahman-dominated system of their
Indian neighbors, as well as differing between Sinhalese and Tamils. Caste distinctions
are still reflected in Sri Lankan political parties, marriage, and in rural areas.
Urbanization, social mobility, and modernization, however, have rendered caste nearly
invisible in public life, and social interaction outside the home takes place without
reference to caste.3
Ethnic tension in Sri Lanka today has resulted in differing popular interpretations
of the nation’s ancient history. The Sinhalese claim to be the earliest inhabitants of the
island--Indo-Aryan settlers who colonized the dry north-central regions around the fifth
century B.C. These settlers founded a great civilization centered on the cities of
Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa. The Buddhist chronicle Madhavamsa (Great
Genealogy or Dynasty) relates the rise and fall of various ancient Sinhalese kingdoms,
and their guardianship of Buddhism. 4 From earliest times, state patronage of Buddhism
has impacted greatly on the Sinhalese national identity. This connection between
religion, culture, and language reinforces the solidarity of the Sinhalese as an ethnic
community.
10
Tamil ethnic consciousness is no less distinct. Sri Lankan Tamils comprise
approximately 12.7 percent of the island’s population and trace their heritage on the
island at least as far back as the third century B.C.5 The Tamil dynasties of Pandya,
Pallava, and Chola in India invaded Sinhalese Buddhist kingdoms on Sri Lanka
numerous times from the second century B.C. to the sixth century A.D. Many Sri
Lankan Tamils likely descend from settlers of these invasions and from Chola conquests
in the ninth and tenth centuries. Of particular note is one of the earliest Chola incursions
around 145 B.C., when the Sinhalese throne was usurped at Anuradhapura and remained
in Tamil control for forty-four years. The Sinhalese king Dutthagamani defeated the
Tamil invader after a difficult fifteen-year campaign, restoring the Sinhalese Buddhist
monarchy. This historical conflict is often portrayed today as a pivotal confrontation
between the Sinhalese and Tamil races. Several Sri Lankan historians cite the victory as
the beginning of Sinhalese nationalism, and maintain that the epic tale is still capable of
evoking ethno-religious passion from the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka today. 6
Regardless of the true ethnic identity of the first settlers to Sri Lanka, most
historians agree to the multiethnicity of the island from its earliest years. The constant
stream of migration from southern India since prehistoric times, coupled with evidence
that Sinhalese royalty often sought wives from the Tamil kingdoms of southern India,
make ethnic exclusivity an unlikely prospect.7
By the thirteenth century disease and dynastic disputes had weakened the
Sinhalese kingdoms markedly. Successive Tamil invasions of northern Sri Lanka further
pressured an empire already in decline, although the significance of these incursions has
been overstated and exploited in contemporary Sinhalese politics.8 The Sinhalese
11
withdrew to the central and southern regions of the island, intimidated by the proximity
of the overwhelming Hindu presence on the Indian mainland, and the increasing strength
of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the north. The Tamil kingdom, separated from the Sinhalese
to a large extent by vast stretches of jungle, looked to expand their control from the
Jaffna peninsula to neighboring regions on the northern part of the island.
By the 1500s, European imperialism had turned to the lucrative markets of South
Asia. The decline of the Chola as a maritime power coincided with the flourishing of
Muslim trading communities throughout the region. As the maritime supremacy of
Portugal expanded to commercial routes in the Indian Ocean, these communities
presented both a religious and commercial target of opportunity. The Portuguese
recognized the strategic advantage Sri Lanka offered, and seized every opportunity to
further their control of the island and its inhabitants. By 1619, only the Kingdom of
Kandy remained free of Portuguese influence.
Although the Portuguese did not actively alter the administrative structures of the
Sri Lankan kingdoms they dominated, they left at least two enduring legacies. The
religious zeal of Portuguese Roman Catholic missionaries, under the auspices of Lisbon,
fanatically discriminated against other religions, destroyed Buddhist and Hindu temples,
and succeeded--in isolated areas--in converting large numbers of natives.9 Today’s
Roman Catholic enclaves, and an abiding fear of foreign influence and occupation, are
legacies of Portuguese colonization. A collateral consequence was the educational legacy
left by the proliferation of mission schools. Many families of later prominence in
twentieth century Sri Lankan politics originally assumed Portuguese names, and
benefited from educational opportunities, of this era.
12
Dutch expansion in the early seventeenth century soon threatened Portuguese
monopoly of the regional spice trade. Ultimately, Dutch maritime power proved too
powerful for the Portuguese to stave off. The Dutch negotiated alliances with the
Kingdom of Kandy in 1638 to restore Portuguese conquests to the Sinhalese, but the
Sinhalese soon realized they had traded one foe for another. Dutch naval power
increased, and by 1658 the Dutch controlled Sri Lanka--notwithstanding the Kingdom of
Kandy in the interior--and dominated the Indian Ocean.
The installation of the Dutch East India Company consolidated the political,
administrative, and commercial control of the island. The Dutch were far more tolerant
of religion than the Portuguese had been, although European alliances caused them to
discriminate harshly against Roman Catholic converts on the island. Buddhist and Hindu
practices were largely ignored. As a result, the Dutch Reformed Church was far less
successful winning Protestant converts. Dutch influence on indigenous legal custom and
practice had far greater impact. Dutch occupation also saw a growing rift between
attitudes of the lowland Sinhalese, largely influenced by Western customs, and highland
Kandyans, who remained proud of their unconquered traditions.
As Great Britain’s global aspirations emerged in the eighteenth century, the
Kandyans once again reached out for assistance against their colonizers. Again, they
succeeded only in replacing one enemy with a much more powerful one, and one that was
to have far-reaching and lasting impacts on their society. In 1801, the Dutch ceded Sri
Lanka to the British, and the island became Britain’s first crown colony. Through
gradual assimilation, coercion, and conquest, the British came to control all of Sri Lanka.
By 1818, this included the Kingdom of Kandy for the first time in Sri Lanka’s history,
13
and effectively unified control of the island under one ruler for the first time since the
twelfth century.
In 1829, the British conducted an internal assessment of their colonial
administration of the island. This “Colebrook-Cameron Commission” recommended a
number of reforms, and has been referred to by some historians as “the dividing line
between the past and present in Sri Lanka.”10 The implementation of many of these
reforms dramatically changed Sri Lankan society--impacts that still reverberate in Sri
Lankan politics today. The commission proposed uniting administrative rule of the
colony under one system, with five subordinate provinces. The reformers felt the
existing practice of separate provincial rule for Sinhalese, Kandyan Sinhalese, and Tamils
encouraged social and cultural cleavages. This same principle of uniformity was applied
to the existing judicial system, eliminating distinctions of class or religion in the eyes of
colonial law. A decentralization of executive power in colonial government increased the
authority of the Legislative Council, and paved the way for opening the Ceylon Civil
Service to Sri Lankans. In turn, increased demand for English education led to a
proliferation of local English schools, and contributed to the creation of a Westernized
elite.11
On the economic front, the commission favored a laissez-faire approach.
Government monopolies were abolished, as were traditional institutions such as patron-
client granting of land for cultivation, and caste-based compulsory labor practices. A
resulting native labor shortage in the plantation economy drove a massive migration of
Tamils from India to meet labor demands for the coffee-harvesting season. Coffee
cultivation dominated Sri Lanka’s economy, and displaced many Kandyan Sinhalese
14
from the highlands to accommodate the cash crop. The modernization of the island’s
interior effectively ended isolation of the old Kandyan kingdom--even Buddhist temple
lands were not immune to coffee plantation expansion.
As the nineteenth century closed, British colonization and the island’s wildly
successful plantation economy had spurred modernization, but the rapid change caused
tension within the old Sinhalese-Buddhist order. Displaced Kandyan Sinhalese were
forced to compete with westernized lowland Sinhalese for status, education, and desirable
employment. Sri Lankan Tamils, populating the northern and coastal provinces, were
less integral to the plantation economy. Consequently, Sri Lankan attendance at English
schools in coastal urban areas was higher than Sinhalese attendance. The resulting
greater access to administrative and professional positions caused further tension between
Sinhalese and Tamil communities.12
Sri Lanka avoided devastation during World Wars I and II and actually benefited
from the modern infrastructure and health services the British imported to accommodate
their Southeast Asia Command headquarters. The nationalist movement in India, as well
as the relative demise of colonialism following World War II, fueled the independence
movement in Sri Lanka.
The British granted Independence in 1948, and the transition was well
orchestrated, amidst relative social calm. The new government faced an ethnic rift
however, between Sinhalese and Tamils on the island nation. The Sinhalese leader of the
UNP, Don Stephen Senanayake, led the first independent government, and all Sri
Lankans benefited from his impartial and objective approach to ethnic issues.
15
Unfortunately, objectivity did not survive Senanayake’s death in 1952, and the
subsequent passing of power to the SLFP in 1956.
The SLFP government, led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, assumed power on a
platform of “Sinhala Only,” and elevating the prestige of Buddhism in Sri Lankan
society--policies obviously unpopular with the island’s Tamil-speaking, Hindu
population. In the wake of such an emotionally charged election, an ethnic-related rumor
was all that was necessary to spark nationwide anti-Tamil rioting in May 1958.
Hundreds were killed, mostly Tamils, and the government responded by relocating over
25,000 Tamils from primarily Sinhalese areas to Tamil provinces in the north. This
episode of communal violence is often cited as the catalyst for today’s Sinhalese-Tamil
rift, sowing the seeds for future ethnic violence.
The SLFP has ruled, unilaterally or in coalition, for most of Sri Lanka’s post-
independence history, primarily under the leadership of S. R. D. Bandaranaike. The
world’s first female prime minister and widow of assassinated S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike,
S. R. D. B. vigorously enforced the policy of Sinhala as the only officially recognized
language of government. Her administration’s left-of-center policies succeeded in
nationalizing religious denominational schools, a major portion of the nation’s petroleum
business, and the island’s insurance industry, but were unsuccessful at attempts to
nationalize and monitor the Sri Lankan media. The SLFP and S. R. D. B. did manage to
alienate religious minority groups, including the Tamils, as well as traditional
international trading partners, including the US and Britain. During a brie f five-year
interlude in SLFP power, UNP Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake declared the nation’s
economy “virtually bankrupt” in the wake of SLFP economic policy. 13
16
Subsequent governments saw a decline in the representative power of Tamils in
the legislature, and the rift widened between the ethnic-majority Sinhalese, and the
minority Tamils. Surprisingly, it was an armed revolt by a Sinhalese organization, the
right-wing JVP, which first threatened the GSL in April 1971. A state of emergency
declaration, followed by sweeping increases in arrest and detention authority for security
forces, resulted in elimination of the JVP insurgency. Collateral violence,
disappearances, and abuses of authority were widespread however, and resulted in an
estimated 10,000 rebel and civilian fatalities. This uprising exacerbated the GSL’s
reluctance to make concessions to minority groups. In 1971 the SLFP sanctioned a
“standardization” policy that established lower university admissions standards for
Sinhalese than for Tamils--a policy that was ratified in the 1972 constitution. The
government and military leadership of the country had been, at independence, quite
balanced between Sinhalese, Tamil, and English-speaking Burgher, but were now
overwhelmingly Sinhalese.
The 1977 elections resulted in a landslide victory for the UNP. The new
President, Junius Richard Jayawardene, undertook significant changes in the structure of
Sri Lanka’s government. He directed the rewriting of the constitution in 1978, altering
the nation’s parliamentary government to a new presidential system with a powerful chief
executive. Now empowered with a six-year term, and the authority to appoint his prime
minister (with Parliamentary approval), Jayawardene ushered in the strong executive
form of governance that faces today’s challenges of civil war. Included in this system
was a huge cabinet, presided over by the president, of twenty-eight minister- level
appointments, in addition to special- function and district ministers. Including deputy
17
ministers, a president’s cabinet may have over eighty members, creating a powerful--
albeit unwieldy--patronage tool for the chief executive. Jayawardene’s rule, and that of
his UNP successor, Ramasinghe Premadasa, used this new authority to reverse the
socialist policies of their SFLP predecessors, launching a period of rapid economic
growth and prosperity for Sri Lanka.
Tamil political involvement took a decidedly different path. The power of the
moderate ACTC, established in 1944, declined significantly. In 1949 ACTC dissidents
founded the FP, important in Sri Lankan politics as a coalition partner. The FP was
instrumental in the UNP wresting control from the Sri Lankan Freedom Party for five
years in 1965. By 1970 the FP campaigned independently, disillusioned with its
association with the UNP. The 1972 constitution further frustrated the Tamil community
and resulted in the formation of the Tamil United Front, which became the TULF in
1976. An apparently false rumor during the 1977 elections held that Tamil extremists
had murdered Sinhalese policemen. This touched off a new wave of communal rioting
and anti-Tamil violence. One organization, the Tamil Refugee Rehabilitation
Organization, estimated the death toll at 300. By the late 1970s Tamil guerrilla and
terrorist activity was a reality, with the GSL claiming that Tamil militants were receiving
assistance and refuge in India, in the state of Tamil Nadu.
The 1982 presidential elections were boycotted by TULF, and pressure from
Tamil extremists resulted in less than 46 percent voter turnout in Jaffna District.
Increasing ethnic violence and the refusal of TULF members to recite an oath of loyalty
resulted in the expulsion of TULF from parliament, thus severing a critical link to the
political process for the Tamil community.
18
In 1983 the ambush of an army patrol left thirteen Sinhalese soldiers dead, and
triggered the worst incidence of communal violence in Sri Lanka’s history. By GSL
estimates, highly organized anti-Tamil rioting resulted in at least 400 deaths, mostly
Tamil. Shock waves from these attacks spread across the island. General consensus
usually cites 1983 as the start of Sri Lanka’s full-blown ethnic civil war.
Initially, Tamil separatist groups and disillusioned youth were known collectively
as Tamil Tigers. The LTTE, founded in 1972 by Velupillai Prabhakaran, proved to be
the strongest. By the late 1980s, the LTTE had ruthlessly become the dominant militant
group in Sri Lanka and effectively controlled the Jaffna Peninsula on the northe rn part of
the island nation.
In a bid to wrest the control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE once and for
all, the SLA launched a major military offensive in 1987, coupled with an economic
blockade of the region. India, eager to maintain leverage over the GSL, had provided
training and arms to Tamil militants in the past. Faced with apparent SLA successes in
1987, India airdropped humanitarian aid into Jaffna. Intense diplomatic pressure from
Indian mediators resulted in a ceasefire, agreement to immediately receive the IPKF, and
the Indo-Lanka Accord.
The 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord marked the GSL’s first request for foreign military
assistance since Sri Lanka’s independence from British colonial rule in 1948. Following
the anti-Tamil riots in 1983, President Jayawardene had adopted an official policy of
eliminating Tamil extremists through military action. Now, with the 1987 Accord,
occupation of the north by 100,000 Indian Army troops became a reality. The GSL
hoped to use the Indian Army to extend its own military capabilities against the LTTE.
19
The result was a direct military confrontation that could not have been farther from
Jayawardene’s desired outcome.
India’s role as mediator quickly deteriorated. The LTTE initially complied with
peacekeeping forces, and turned in significant quantities of arms and materiel.
Subsequently, without significant political proposals by the government in Colombo,
LTTE leader V. Prabhakaran declared the Accord a “stab in the back of the Tamils.”14
The LTTE anticipated no progress toward its goal of independence, merely an attempt to
curtail its domestic influence and capabilities. The Accord collapsed by October 1987,
and the LTTE took on both the Indian Army and government security forces.
In the south, JVP Sinhalese extremists made another bid for power in 1988, this
time more determined than in 1971. In 1988 alone, JVP rebels were credited by the GSL
with over 700 politically motivated killings.15 Capitalizing on popular discontent with
the GSL over the Indo-Lanka Accord, the resurgent insurrection met with disaster at the
hands of a ferocious GSL counterinsurgency campaign. In addition to emergency
regulations and curfews, sweeping arrest and detention powers were given to government
forces. Security forces were “given license to shoot curfew violators and protestors on
sight, and to dispose of bodies without an inquest.”16 Some 40,000 JVP leadership cadre
and sympathizers were captured and summarily executed between 1988 and November
1989, when the revolt was crushed.
The LTTE fortified its hold on the population by eliminating rival Tamil militant
groups, and stepping up attacks against the IPKF. Strikes against the civilian government
infrastructure proved particularly effective in forcing a boycott of the Northern and
Eastern Provincial Council Elections of 1988, supervised by the Indian Army. Although
20
the peacekeeping force was allowed to conduct elections, the LTTE issued threats to any
Tamils thinking of casting votes.
The LTTE declared a victory over the Indian Army, and again stepped up its
assault on government forces by attacking twelve police posts in June 1990.17 Dismayed
by the failure of new peace talks, the GSL initiated new offensives against LTTE
strongholds in the north. The government renewed sweeping arrest and detention powers
for its military forces. Army occupation of the villages of Mathagal, Illvalai, and
Vasavilan met with fierce guerrilla resistance. The Army used similar tactics as it had in
eliminating the smaller, right-wing JVP insurrection in the south; thousands of people
were killed or disappeared in custody as the Army attempted to gain absolute control of
the countryside.18 The more the government appeared to abuse its authority, mismanaged
violence, and lost control of collateral damage to life and property, the greater the
indirect, endogenous feedback and support provided to the rebels. Propaganda and
recruitment were areas of great LTTE expertise, and the government played handily into
them. Defense Minister Ranjan Wijeratne pointed out, “You cannot do things under
normal law. It takes a lot of time. By the time my good friends who are lawyers take
time to solve these things, the match will be over.”19
While the government in Colombo was still reeling in the dark from reorganizing
its intelligence apparatus, the LTTE underground was at the peak of its effectiveness.
This was reflected by a devastating series of assassinations that rocked the government
infrastructure: Defense Minister Wijeratne in March 1991, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi in September 1991, and Sri Lanka President Premadasa in May 1993. The killing
of Prime Minister Gandhi eliminated most of the LTTE’s support from Tamils on the
21
Indian mainland. Some authors contend that the assassination prevented any further
reintroduction of Indian peacekeeping force, and was therefore a necessary evil on the
LTTE’s part.20
Elsewhere in the international arena, the LTTE’s influence had dramatically
increased. Refugees and expatriates from the 1983 riots, as well as recent conflict with
India, were contacted and exploited by rebel organizers. This growing international
community became known as the Tamil diaspora, encompassing over 650,000 potential
supporters in the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere
throughout the world. The LTTE became adept at the complexities of financing and
supporting its insurgency from abroad. In 1989, authorities in Greece seized a plane
transporting 300,000 rounds of ammunition and 400 automatic rockets; the plane had
departed from East Berlin, had a delivery address in Colombo, listed a Switzerland firm
as the exporter, and a British firm as the broker. In another testament to international
sophistication, Egyptian authorities captured a Colombo-bound vessel with 92
machineguns, 100 pounds of TNT, 100 blasting caps, 35,000 rounds of 7.62-millimeter
ammunition, and 3,200 Browning cartridges. The vessel had an Asian crew, but had false
end user certificates issued in Nigeria.21
The elections of 1994 placed SLFP candidate Chandrika Kumaratunga at the helm
under the banner of the PA coalition party. The PA was a marriage of necessity for
parliamentary majority and is dominated by the SLFP, which holds 87 percent of its
parliamentary seats. Seven parliament members of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress and
the sole Up-Country People’s Front member constitute the remainder of the coalition.
Kumaratunga is well versed in the ethnic violence and political machinations that engulf
22
her island nation. Her father, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, established the SLFP in 1951,
and was assassinated by a Buddhist extremist when she was just fourteen. Her mother,
S. R. D. Bandaranaike, was the world’s first female prime minister, and led Sri Lanka for
much of the SLFP’s rule. Kumaratunga’s own husband was gunned down in 1989; she
pledged during her tenure to find a negotiated settlement with the Tamils:22
The first task is, therefore, a new approach predicated on unqualified acceptance of the fact that the Tamil people have genuine grievances for which solutions must be found. The polity of the country must be structured on the premise that all sections of society are entitled to recognition as constructive partners in a pluralistic democracy. 23 Kumaratunga declared an immediate cessation of hostilities and began several
rounds of talks with LTTE leaders. The president’s earnestness was met with
characteristic LTTE dissatisfaction. The insurgents set a deadline for the government to
respond to a list of demands, then withdrew from all negotiations when the demands were
not met. Divers of the Sea Tigers stealthily approached the Sooraya and the Ranasuru,
two Sri Lankan Navy gunboats in Trincomalee Harbor, planted explosives, and sunk
them.24 The conflict had resumed less than six months after negotiations had begun.
On 31 January 1996, the LTTE bombed the Central Bank in Colombo, the biggest
bombing in the conflict at that time, killing 80 and wounding over 1,300.25 In July 1996,
approximately 2,000 LTTE guerrillas attacked and overran the SLA base at Mullaittivu;
rebel losses numbered about 500. On 27 September 1998, the LTTE overran
Kilinochchi, another strategic and well- fortified SLA base, losing another 520 rebels. On
21 April 2000, rebel forces took and secured the critical Elephant Pass to the Jaffna
Peninsula, severing SLA supply routes to their garrisons in the north. The significance of
these assaults cannot be overstated. Regardless of the accuracy of rebel manpower
23
estimates, more important is the continual willingness of LTTE leadership to commit
such combat power. The GSL’s strategy of attrition does not bear close scrutiny; the
LTTE’s conscription and recruiting effort is alive and well.
The latest offensives, particularly the LTTE’s April 2000 capture of Elephant
Pass, reveal a great deal about current capabilities. The rebels’ ability to meet and defeat
elements of the SLA in direct conventional military confrontation is undeniable.
Advances in LTTE conventional capability have been facilitated by exploitation of the
international community. The LTTE maintains a small fleet of patrol craft that interfere
with SLA operations and continue to pose a credible threat to the Sri Lankan Navy.
Arms caches recovered from the LTTE routinely contain rocket-propelled grenade
launchers. During Operation Riviresa, the LTTE used night vision goggles for the first
time. The LTTE even purchased global-positioning satellite systems before the SLA was
equipped with them. In 1995, some sources asserted that LTTE suicide bombers had
been trained to pilot ultralight aircraft in France and Britain (though they have never been
used in this capacity). In 1996, one source identified an island off the coast of Malaysia,
where the LTTE hired former Norwegian naval personnel to establish a diving school, in
order to train cadre in underwater activities.26 Military observers noted in 1996 that
while the LTTE lost considerable territory during its offensives, “Their ability to wage a
guerrilla war has remained intact.”27 Even in 2001--as in 1998--the Army “has been
unable to secure a safe road to the south, and has to supply its forces by air and sea.”28
The LTTE’s overseas financing continues unabated, generating over 60 percent of
the rebel war budget through the Tamil diaspora and both legitimate and illegal
investments in real estate, restaurants, stocks, and money markets. Even films, food
24
festivals, and cultural events may contribute to insurgent income. The US Department of
State also reports that expatriate Tamil communities in Europe have been tied to narcotics
smuggling, another potential source of funding.29
The LTTE’s growth in capabilities, despite concerted operational efforts on behalf
of the SLA, demands a closer examination of the GSL’s counterinsurgency campaigns.
The following case studies provide some insight as to potential shortcomings in the
government’s approach.
1Wintle, The Dictionary of War Quotations, 26.
2“Sri Lanka,” CIA World Factbook [book on-line]; available from http://www. cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html; Internet; accessed on 18 February 2002; and Ross, Sri Lanka, a Country Study, xvi.
3Ross, Sri Lanka, a Country Study, 82, 84, 86.
4Ibid., 6-7.
5Ibid., 75.
6Ibid., 11-12.
7Ibid., 7.
8William McGowan, Only Man is Vile (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1992), 110-111; and Ross, Sri Lanka, a Country Study, 16.
9Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 45; and Ross, Sri Lanka, a Country Study, 21.
10Ross, Sri Lanka, a Country Study, 29.
11Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 45-46; and McGowan, Only Man is Vile, 134.
12McGowan, Only Man is Vile, 134.
13Russell R. Ross, ed., Sri Lanka, a Country Study, 49.
25
14“On the Warpath,” The Economist, 27 July 1996 [article on- line]; available from http://www.economist/archive.htm; Internet; accessed on 28 August 1999.
15“Sri Lanka: Internal Affairs,” Jane’s Sentinel - South Asia, November 2001-April 2002, 365.
16Roland E. Dutton, “A Case Study of Two On-Going Insurgencies in Sri Lanka and the Government’s Response to Neutralize and Defeat Them” (Case study, US Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1989), 15.
17M. Khan and D. Khosla, “Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka,” 24 July 1996 [article on- line]; available from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/sritamil.htm; Internet; accessed on 11 September 1999
18“On the Warpath,” The Economist, 27 July 1996 [article on- line]; available from http://www.economist/archive.htm; Internet; accessed on 28 August 1999.
19“Indictment Against Sri Lanka,” Sri Lanka Hansard 62 (25 January 1990): Col. 1249 [article on- line]; available from http://www.tamilnation.org/indictment/ indict27b.htm; Internet; accessed on 28 August 1999.
20Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency.”
21Ibid.
22O. Mehrotra, “Ethnic Strife in Sri Lanka,” 9 January 1998 [article on- line]; available from http://www.idsa-india.org/an-jan-9.html; Internet; accessed on 28 August 1999.
23Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation, 52.
24Sri Lanka Army, “Army in Operation: Eelam War III,” Sri Lanka Army Situation Report and News Archive [article on- line]; available from http://202.51.158.144/Operations6.htm; Internet; accessed on 10 March 2002.
25Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation, 28.
26Gunaratna, “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency.”
27“People Power,” The Economist, 11 May 1996 [article on- line]; available from http://www.economist/archive.htm; Internet; accessed on 28 August 1999.
28“Civil War Without End,” The Economist, 5 December 1998 [article on- line]; available from http://www.economist/archive.htm; Internet; accessed on 28 August 1999.
26
29Dudley Knox Library, “Terrorist Group Profiles.”
27
CHAPTER 3
OPERATION RIVIRESA (“SUNRAYS”)
The ability to run away is the very characteristic of the guerrilla.1
Mao Tse Tung
This chapter analyzes the first of three campaigns detailed in this thesis. Using JP
5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning as a framework for this analysis, the tenets
of US IDAD and FID doctrine provide a strong foundation for identifying shortcomings
in counterinsurgency strategy. Although Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning was not
developed for application to foreign militaries, it does provide a rigorous test for
assessing the synchronization of ends, ways, and means in military operations. Some
aspects of this doctrine, such as multinational integration or space operations, are clearly
outside the scope of analysis and can be disregarded. The campaign fundamentals
described in Table 1, however, illustrate how all the instruments of national power--
diplomatic, informationa l, military, and economic--may be integrated to achieve national
strategic objectives.
Prior to Operation Riviresa, the 1994 election of President Chandrika
Kumaratunga’s PA government created a spirit of cautious optimism in Sri Lanka. In
December 1994 thousands of peace activists marched in the streets of Colombo,
appealing to the new president to capitalize on the government’s sweeping mandate for
an end to the nation’s civil war. Similar peace activist overtures were warmly received in
Jaffna, the first civic delegation to visit the Tamil dominated peninsula since the LTTE
took control of the region in 1990.2 The government pledged to negotiate a settlement
28
with the LTTE, and to address growing concerns over human rights abuses. Although
less than two years had passed since the May 1993 assassination of President Premadasa
by the LTTE, in January 1995 the GSL secured the first ceasefire between the SLA and
the rebels in over five years.
Subsequent rounds of talks resulted in easing the GSL’s economic embargo of
Jaffna, but differences in GSL and LTTE agendas soon became apparent. Kumaratunga’s
representatives wished to simultaneously negotiate a comprehensive package of
reconstruction aid, as well as political initiatives to settle the ethnic conflict. The LTTE
delegation demanded a sequential process; from ceasefire, to redressing war grievances,
and only then progressing to political negotiations. As progress began to stall, the rebels
demanded four conditions as prerequisites for further negotiation: elimination of the
economic embargo, lifting of the ban on sea fishing, dismantling of the SLA camp at
Pooneryn, and the right for LTTE cadre to move unhindered throughout eastern Sri
Lanka. The GSL conceded to the first two demands, but suggested including the others
in more expansive proposals.3 The LTTE used this occasion to declare the government
negotiators evasive, and announced their withdrawal from talks on 18 April. The
following day LTTE Sea Tigers attacked and destroyed two gunboats of the Sri Lankan
navy in Trincomalee harbor. Announcing Eelam War III, the LTTE assaulted a number
of police and Army camps in the east, and demonstrated their first use of shoulder- fired
anti-aircraft missiles in the conflict on 28 April, downing two Sri Lankan air force AVRO
aircraft. 4
The state’s response was slow. President Kumaratunga revealed that she felt
“duped by the LTTE . . . that the LTTE agreed to the truce merely to regroup and
29
rearm.”5 Adding insult to injury, the President had recently cancelled $72 million of
military contracts as a sign of good faith to the Tamils. Sensing the need to act
decisively, the government began Operation Leap Forward in July 1995. The offensive
deployed 10,000 troops in the largest single operation undertaken against the LTTE yet.
The results were dismaying; having conquered 78 kilometers of territory from the rebels,
the SLA then relinquished all but 8 kilometers to LTTE counterattacks within a month.
Casualties were high, and the government admitted to killing 234 civilians, injuring 500,
and contributing to nearly 200,000 displaced persons.6
While regrouping and searching for new political alternatives, the Kumaratunga
government planned yet another massive offensive in October 1995 to allow her to
bargain from a position of strength. This undertaking dwarfed previous offensives,
assembling over 40,000 troops. Operation Riviresa was hailed as the “decisive effort to
end the 12-year Tamil insurgency.”7 The offensive was launched 17 October 1995 to
seize and control the Valikamam area of the Jaffna Peninsula. The overall commander of
the operation was Major General Rohan Daluwatte. Three divisions were task organized
for the attack: 51 Division, commanded by Brigadier General Neil Dias; 52 Division,
commanded by Brigadier General P. A. Karunathalaka; and 53 Division, commanded by
Brigadier General Janaka Perera. Dias’ and Karunathalaka’s divisions advanced abreast
along two main axes of attack, the Jaffna-Point Pedro Road in the west, and the Jaffna-
Palaly Road in the east. Both divisions attacked south to isolate Jaffna, successfully
reaching their initial limit of advance, a lateral line roughly connecting Kopay and
Kondavil (see figure 3).8
30
From this lateral line the trail 53 Division, consisting of an Independent Brigade,
Air Mobile Brigade, Armored Brigade and an Infantry Brigade, passed forward to
continue the attack into Jaffna. By 22 November 1995, Valikamam was isolated; cut off
from the Vadamarachchi and Tenamarachchi areas. Unexpected pockets of resistance
from LTTE cadre within the city delayed SLA occupation, but by 2 December the town
was securely in GSL control for the first time in twelve years. The Army Commander,
LTG Daluwatte, declared, “more than half the guerrilla war is over.”9 Authorities hailed
the capture of Jaffna as “the beginning of the end” of the insurgency. 10 Deputy Defense
Minister Anurudda Ratwatte confidently announced, “Very soon we will totally defeat
and annihilate the separatist terrorists.”11 These proclamations proved premature.
By many accounts, Operation Riviresa was a resounding military success, and
brought Jaffna under GSL control for the first time in nearly ten years. The operation
succeeded in capturing Jaffna with minimal property damage, which encouraged the
eventual return of many of the approximately 120,000 inhabitants of the city. The LTTE
chose not to make a determined stand in the face of such conventional firepower, and
offered only minimal resistance. In anticipation of the GSL offensive, however, LTTE
cadre instigated a massive civilian evacuation of Jaffna.12 As a result of this exodus the
SLA found “a virtual ghost town, populated only by thee sick and elderly” during its
initial occupation. 13 It is unclear to what extent the populace fled in fear of combat
operations, occupation by the SLA, or in response to LTTE coercion. In any event, the
GSL’s intent to demonstrate its legitimate authority to the Tamil populace, and replace
the shadow administration of the LTTE, was initially muted by the absence of a populace.
31
Initially, combined casualty figures claimed as many as 2,500 soldiers and rebels
killed, and over 7,000 wounded. More reliable government estimates later placed
casualties at 600 to 700 SLA killed and 3,000 wounded, with around 400 Tamil Tigers
killed and over 800 wounded.14
In the months of April and May 1996, sequels to Operation Riviresa were
launched (Riviresa 2 and 3) to wrest control of the Tenamarachchi and Vadamarachchi
areas in Jaffna peninsula. Unlike during the first stage of the operation however, civilians
continued to remain in these areas, defying the orders of LTTE cadre to vacate their
homes. Most of this populace consisted of those who had fled Valikamam during the
original operation. Eager to return, they had undergone considerable suffering at the
hands of the LTTE in refugee camps.15
Joint US doctrine declares, “Campaign plans are the operational extension of a
commander’s strategy.”16 The overall counterinsurgency effort the GSL is waging can be
viewed as a campaign; certainly, some of the more ambitious operations, which include
several branches and sequels, can be viewed independently as campaigns. In the case of
Operation Riviresa, four of the fundamentals outlined in JP 5-00.1 provide a framework
for useful insights on operational planning and execution. Equally important is the
synergistic effect of successfully considering all the campaign planning fundamentals, or
the relative weakness of plans that fail to do so.
Critical in any campaign is the effort to identify the adversary strategic and
operational centers of gravity and provide guidance for defeating them (see table 1).
Credit is due the GSL and its security forces in regard to implementing this planning
fundamental. In defining the COG Clausewitz states:
32
One must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything else depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed.17 In On Guerrilla Warfare, Mao reflects that guerrilla organization will fail “if its
political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy,
cooperation, and assistance cannot be gained.”18 The GSL correctly identified Tamil
public support as the LTTE’s strategic COG, and targeted support from the Jaffna
peninsula--the cultural, administrative, industrial, and political center with the highest
concentration of ethnic Tamils--as the operational COG.
To determine ways to defeat an opponent’s COG, which is generally a strength,
not a weakness, planners identify decisive points to attack. In the case of Operation
Riviresa, this was the Valikamam sector of the Jaffna Peninsula, which contained the
municipal limits of the city of Jaffna itself, as well as adjoining transportation and
administrative hubs. During the LTTE’s decade of control in Jaffna, cadre leadership had
established an administrative infrastructure to replace the void created by GSL absence.
The establishment of tangible LTTE civil administration in Jaffna, and providing services
to the populace, went a considerable way toward establishing the credibility of the
insurgents, as well as undermining the legitimacy of GSL authority. Rebel authorities in
Jaffna collected taxes, and placed levies on consumer goods sold in the city. A Tamil
police force was established, backed by a civil municipal court system, where judges
swore allegiance to LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran. Public utilities officials for
schools, transport services, hospitals, and agrarian services came from the ranks of LTTE
cadre, though ironically much of the funding for these services continued to filter in from
33
the GSL in Colombo. Rebel recruitment was understandably highest for the LTTE on the
peninsula, with many families required to enlist a member in return for permission to
leave the province. The LTTE became perhaps the only insurgent group in the world to
control and administer such a significant amount of territory, and a population of nearly
800,000. In his book, Defeating Communist Insurgency, Sir Robert Thompson stresses
giving priority to the elimination of the type of political subversion exemplified by LTTE
control of Jaffna. This is one of Thompson’s five principles of counterinsurgency, hard-
won lessons learned from the British experience in Malaya that remain influential today
(see table 2). The latest operations doctrine of the US Army, for example, emphasizes
enhancing the capabilities and legitimacy of the host nation as a fundamental
consideration when conducting FID, peace operations, or security assistance. Security
forces accurately considered this campaign planning fundamental, and waged a
successful military operation that secured its decisive point. What enabled the LTTE to
avoid culmination?
When resorting to military force, government and military leadership must clearly
define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential
post hostilities activities (see table 1). The observation that insurgency is foremost a
political struggle, with a formidable military component in the case of the LTTE,
underscores the importance of the political-military relationship in the execution of this
responsibility. Although the GSL is not renowned for its political-military
synchronization--Sri Lanka publishes no explicit national military strategy document--
this planning fundamental was duly observed for Operation Riviresa. President
Kumaratunga clearly wished to force the LTTE back to the negotiating table, with the
34
GSL in a strengthened bargaining position. Operational success criteria were similarly
clear, and were ultimately achieved by security forces in the occupation of Jaffna, and
restoration of government authority, administration, and services. The SLA, while
caught off-guard by the LTTE evacuation of civilians from Jaffna, captured the city with
minimal collateral damage, and transitioned relatively smoothly to civil administration
duties. The GSL appointed a Northern Province Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Authority, increased access to health services at the Jaffna hospital, and oversaw the
opening of banking branches, post offices, and pub lic transit services, as well as
promoting the opening of national retail outlets in Jaffna.19 In terms of US IDAD
principles, GSL actions sought to demonstrate responsive government in the pursuit of a
balanced development program for the Jaffna peninsula. By most accounts, Jaffna was
returning to normal by the middle of 1996.20 At least within the parameters of this
operation, GSL actions approached something of the overall plan envisioned by
Thompson. That the peninsula began a slow backslide out of government control during
the next several months is attributable to the GSL perception that Operation Riviresa
success equaled counterinsurgency campaign success. The seizure of Jaffna alone,
identified as the operational COG, failed to achieve the political endstate defined by
Kumaratunga’s success criteria. Ultimately, defeating this operational COG proved
insufficient to destroy the insurgent’s strategic COG.
The LTTE suffered a severe setback in losing Jaffna--in prestige, credibility,
revenue-generation, munitions resupply, and recruitment capability--but was not out of
the fight. The lack of coordinated efforts in conjunction with Operation Riviresa, or
determined follow-on operations, indicate both constrained GSL resources, and an
35
assumption that the insurgency would eventually wither on the vine following the defeat
of its operational COG. In truth, this assumption--along with GSL conflict termination
objectives--fell short of the reality needed for victory.
In terms of campaign planning, by viewing the seizure of Jaffna in isolation of the
overall counterinsurgency effort, the GSL had failed to sequence a series of related major
joint operations conducted simultaneously throughout the area of responsibility (see table
1). Resource constraints were undoubtedly a major consideration. While the LTTE’s
8,000 to 10,000 armed insurgents may pale in end-strength next to the GSL’s 123,000-
member armed forces, figures can be misleading in insurgent conflict.21 Government
forces must provide security for fortifications and bases throughout the 65,000 square-
kilometer island. In addition, the GSL’s large conventional formations have proven
unwieldy against guerrilla tactics in restrictive terrain. The LTTE enjoys the freedom to
mass and strike where and when it pleases, and a light, mobile force well suited to the
jungle terrain of the interior. Consequently, government forces remain more vulnerable
than overall force ratios would initially suggest. In mid-1995, security forces abandoned
over twenty bases in eastern Sri Lanka to support the manpower requirements for
Operation Riviresa, the main effort.22 Nevertheless, supporting efforts in the east were
necessary for force protection, to deny the rebels access to popular support, and to
destroy LTTE combat capabilities. The LTTE had retreated into the jungle in
observance of Mao’s dictum, “the first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the
enemy.”23 Preserving combat strength, the rebels transitioned easily to increased
guerrilla activity, and were able to maintain their presence in Jaffna. With persistent
reconnaissance and intelligence efforts, as many as 150 guerrillas had infiltrated the
36
Valikamam sector by March 1996, and were actively attempting to destabilize the area.24
Denied the sanctuary of the Jaffna peninsula, LTTE operations resembled T. E.
Lawrence’s description of his desert campaign against the Turks in his book, Seven
Pillars of Wisdom:
In character our operations . . . should be like naval war, in mobility, ubiquity, independence of bases and communications, ignoring of ground features, of strategic areas, of fixed directions, of fixed points. He who commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will! And we command the desert.25 Military manpower shortfalls, and the GSL inability to match the mobility of the
LTTE guerrillas, are challenges that have historically plagued counterinsurgency forces.
The French experience in nineteenth century Algiers is one example. Restricted to
command of the coastal cities by the hit and run attacks of guerrilla leader Abd el Kader’s
forces, it was the arrival of Marshal Bugeaud in 1840 that eventually turned the tide in
favor of French forces. Bugeaud was a superior administrator and colonial organizer, as
well as able tactician. Notably, his reorganization of the African army incorporated
indigenous forces. Bugeaud established decentralized commands, from which emanated
small, highly mobile strike forces, which he called the “boar’s head,” and “flying
formations.”26 French forces, eventually numbering over 160,000 in Algeria, gradually
overcame the effective irregulars of Abd el Kader, cutting off his lines of communication
and popular support.27 Variations of Bugeaud’s pacification strategy would continue to
be employed with some success for over one hundred years by the French. Though
successful, the decentralized method required large numbers of troops organized into
flexible, mobile formations. Most significantly, the strategy was only successful when
coupled with effective administrative and organizational control of the populace.
37
Late in the nineteenth century, the British had similar problems subduing the Boer
in South Africa. At the outset the 45,000 Boer militia and irregular horse were able to
rapidly strike and cripple the British forces in Africa, which numbered only 15,000.
Later, when the British forces were augmented to 250,000 to meet this colonial threat, the
Boer began a protracted guerrilla campaign, using hit and run tactics to keep the British
off balance.28
The strategy Lord Kitchener finally settled upon with his British forces was
reminiscent of French pacification techniques, though more brutal in employment in the
Boer case. Systematically sweeping across the veldt, Kitchener cut the Boer from their
bases of popular support and interned the population, a strategy that still required over
two years to subdue the guerrillas.29
By recognizing these historical lessons, an evolution of GSL tactics may help to
mitigate the inherent inadequacies of massed troop formations combating guerrilla forces.
Major Hilaire Bethouart’s essay, Combat Helicopters in Algeria, is a more modern
example, illustrating how helicopters can be used to envelop and maneuver by air, thus
negating the mobility advantage of the guerrilla in austere mountainous terrain. 30 The
SLA’s current effort to develop its air-mobility shows great promise. The author’s
experience--as a US Army Special Forces officer commanding a 1997 FID mission in Sri
Lanka--is that SLA combined arms coordination between air and ground is still in its
infancy. Until security forces are able to overcome this resource and mobility
disadvantage, elusive LTTE guerrillas will continue to locally overwhelm SLA
formations at the time and location of their choosing.
38
The disadvantages and challenges facing the SLA illustrate why government
forces had such difficulty with another campaign planning fundamental, identifying
friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and providing guidance to
subordinates for protecting them. In this contest for legitimacy, the GSL understood its
strategic COG to be domestic political support for the administration’s prosecution of the
war, a fact complicated by war weariness and partisan politics. Operational COG
included SLA forces and installations whose defeat would reflect incompetence in the
administration’s war effort. The operational methods of the military, however, left these
very forces vulnerable to enemy strengths, and ultimately exposed fr iendly COG to
attack.
In General Vo Nguyen Giap’s commentary on the Viet Cong struggle against the
French in Indochina, he relates the guerrilla strategy for victory in the face of seemingly
overwhelming offensive power:
Always convinced that the essential thing was to destroy the enemy’s manpower, the Central Committee worked out its plan . . . to concentrate our offensive against important strategic points where the enemy were relatively weak in order to wipe out a part of their manpower, at the same time compelling them to scatter their forces to cope with us at vital points which they had to defend at all costs. This strategy proved correct.31
Despite Thompson’s admonition to always secure base areas before conducting a military
campaign (see table 2), Operation Riviresa left government bases in the east woefully
undermanned. Following GSL occupation of Jaffna, the LTTE chose to strike the
military base at Mullaittivu in late July 1996.
The only military base on the eastern coast of Sri Lanka, the isola ted camp at
Mullaittivu maintained a brigade-sized element of approximately 1,600 personnel. The
39
base was of considerable significance to the military, both for early warning of LTTE Sea
Tiger activities, and as a potential staging area for operations inland. The camp was
moderately well defended by obstacles and anti-personnel mines, and supported by a
troop of artillery, but in the past had only to contend with sporadic rebel reconnaissance
probes. The resident brigade fell under the command of the dis tant division headquarters
at Elephant Pass in the north. 32
The LTTE launched a coordinated assault on the base at midnight, beginning with
an extensive artillery and mortar barrage. The ground attack from the north was
synchronized with a LTTE Sea Tiger attack from the seaward side of the base (see figure
4). Reports of the estimated strength of the attacking rebel forces vary from 2,000 to
3,000 cadre.33 Conclusive accounts are unavailable however, because both assaults
apparently achieved total surprise over the defenders, penetrated the camp’s defenses,
and quickly severed base communications to the outside. By daylight, insurgents had
compromised the defensive integrity of the installation and isolated pockets of SLA
resistance within the camp were all that remained.34
The GSL military attempted to relieve the beleaguered garrison from the sea
throughout the second day of fighting, but a substantial Sea Tiger suicide boat presence
frustrated the ad-hoc relief efforts. That evening, a SLA Special Forces regiment of 250
men air- landed south of the base in another reinforcement attempt. This force was
quickly surrounded, and likewise thwarted from linking up with the defenders.
By the third day, 18 July 1996, the garrison had been completely overrun. Nearly
all the defenders of Mullaittivu were killed in action, barring a few dozen survivors who
managed to evade capture by escaping into the jungle. Casualty estimates range from
40
1,200 to 1,600, and there are GSL allegations that wounded and surrendering SLA forces
were executed following the capture of the camp. Large amounts of military equipment
were captured with the base, including several armored personnel carriers, four 120-
millimeter howitzers, and recently purchased night-vision and surveillance optics.35
The desperate situation continued for two more days, as a second Special Forces
regiment was inserted to effect the extraction of the first, which by now had suffered
nearly 100 casualties, including the commanding officer. The second regiment
successfully fought its way through to the first, losing nearly thirty men and its
commanding officer in the process. Both units fought a running battle to the coast, where
security forces had established and enlarged a beachhead to withdraw remaining GSL
troops.36
Government sources claim rebel losses amounted to some 800 killed, and a
further 500 wounded.37 Even the rare admission by LTTE leadership that over 240 of
their fighters were killed in one battle indicates a dramatic loss of experienced cadre for
the insurgents.38 In wrangling over body counts, however, GSL leaders are likely to
overlook something far more important. The willingness of the LTTE to incur
predictably high losses in such a direct attack reveals their strong understanding of the
strategic value of such a target. Striking at the heart of GSL legitimacy, the insurgents
instilled fear and confusion in the wake of a jubilant government victory in Jaffna. One
extremely well coordinated attack, capitalizing on guerrilla strengths, and directly
striking an unprotected operational COG, proved devastating to GSL credibility. An
analogy can be drawn to the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam, where US claims of a
resounding military defeat of the North Vietnamese sounded hollow in the wake of
41
assertions that the enemy was incapable of launching such an offensive in the first place.
Many authors credit this event as the crippling blow to the credibility of US leadership
that catalyzed the final collapse of public support for the war effort.39
In hindsight, the ability of the LTTE to avoid culmination in the wake of
Operation Riviresa can largely be attributed to the GSL’s violation of campaign planning
fundamentals. In the context of US doctrine, security forces succeeded in identifying the
adversary strategic and operational centers of gravity. The operational success in Jaffna
resulted in a devastating loss for the LTTE, despite the preservation of their combat
power. The military, however, did not translate its understanding of the enemy into a
campaign plan comprehensive enough to decisively defeat the LTTE’s strategic COG. In
this regard, operational plans did not adequately address President Kumaratunga’s
attempt to clearly define what constitutes success, in terms of political and strategic
endstate. Allowing rebel forces to escape into the jungle, and naively believing the LTTE
would wither without its Jaffna sanctuary, reveals a lack of understanding on the part of
GSL leadership about the resiliency of this Maoist insurgency. Sri Lankan military
leaders have not demonstrated an appreciation for identifying and protecting friendly
strategic and operational centers of gravity. Unfortunately, this has presented the
insurgents with numerous opportunities to pit guerrilla strengths against SLA
weaknesses, as with the LTTE attack on Mullaitivu. Subsequent catastrophes at
Killinochchi, Paranthan, and Mankulam suggest this mindset has not yet changed.
Finally, despite the political challenges and resource shortfalls the GSL faces, it must find
a way to leverage the capabilities it does have, in order to sequence a series of related
major joint operations conducted simultaneously. Such a comprehensive campaign effort
42
could then achieve the synergistic effect of applying all the fundamentals outlined in JP
5-00.1.
1US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS)
Unconventional Warfare: Summary Sheet Packet (Special Forces Officer Qualification Course issue material, November 1991), 15.
2Kumudini Samuel, “Straining Consensus,” in “Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka,” Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, August 1998 [article on- line]; available from http://www.c-r.org/accord/acc_sri/index.htm; Internet; accessed on 10 March 2002.
3Ibid.
4“Sri Lanka: Internal Affairs,” 365-371; and Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific Committee on International Relations. Sri Lanka in Turmoil: Implications of Intensified Conflict (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996), 49.
5Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Sri Lanka in Turmoil, 49.
6Ibid.
7Khan and Khosla, “Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka.”
8Sri Lanka Army, “Army in Operation: Eelam War III,” Sri Lanka Army Situation Report.
9Iqbal Athas, “Surrendering Rebels to Get Amnesty,” The Sunday Times, 26 May 1996 [article on- line]; available from http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/parade/nm58/ command.htm; Internet; accessed on 28 August 1999.
10Khan and Khosla, “Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka.”
11“Sri Lankan Army Hails Capture of Jaffna,” CNN.com, 5 December 1995 [article on- line]; available from http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9512/sri_lanka/ index.html; Internet; accessed on 27 February 2002.
12Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 27.
13Ibid., 28.
14Ibid.
15“People Power,” The Economist.
43
16US Department of Defense, JP 5-00.1, vii.
17Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans., On War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595.
18Samuel B. Griffith, trans., Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Praeger Pulishers, 1961), 43.
19Iqbal Athas, “Yet Another Op-Riviresa in Valikamam,” The Sunday Times, 31 March 1996 [article on- line]; available from http://www.lancet.org/suntimes/960331/ sitrep.html; Internet; accessed on 27 February 2002.
20Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 28.
21Dudley Knox Library, “Terrorist Group Profiles.”
22Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 28.
23Griffith, Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla Warfare, 20.
24Athas, “Yet Another Op-Riviresa in Valikamam.”
25US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS), Unconventional Warfare: Summary Sheet Packet, 27.
26R. E. Dupuy, and T. N. Dupuy, The Harper Encyclopedia f Military History: From 3500 B.C. to the Present, 4th ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 855.
27John Arquilla, ed., From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1996), 141.
28Larry H. Addington, The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 124.
29Ibid.
30Department of the Navy, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-25, The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him (Virginia: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1990), 260.
31Ibid., 173.
32Vijayasiri, “Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 43.
33Ibid., 44; also, “On the Warpath,” The Economist.
44
34Vijayasiri, “Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 45.
35Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 28.
36Vijayasiri, “Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 45.
37Ibid., 46.
38“On the Warpath,” The Economist.
39Many sources subscribe to this view, among them: Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 559-560; Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1988), 717; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 237.
45
CHAPTER 4
OPERATION JAYA SIKURUI (“VICTORY ASSURED”)
Guerrillas never win wars, but their adversaries often lose them. 1
Charles Wheller Thayer, Guerrilla
In the wake of the GSL’s success during Operation Riviresa, a seemingly
intractable pattern of fighting and terrorism prevailed, making the capture of Jaffna a less
than decisive victory. In January 1996, Colombo saw LTTE terror bombings of the
Central Bank and a passenger train that together killed more than 150 people and injured
over one thousand more. In July 1996, the LTTE capture of Mullaittivu was a severe loss
to the GSL, in terms of casualties, captured military hardware, and loss of credibility.
Somewhat isolated on the Jaffna peninsula, the SLA met with increasing difficulty in
keeping open its lines of communication and MSR to the distant capital in Colombo.
This chapter describes the government’s subsequent military campaign to reinforce its
operational gains, and to secure the land MSR to Jaffna. The fundamentals outlined in JP
5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning, again frame the campaign analysis.
In response to increasing insurgent activity, and deteriorating security of the
government’s MSR south of Jaffna, the GSL launched Operation Jaya Sikurui on 13 May
1997. The operational objective was to recapture and secure the most northern 74
kilometers of the Colombo-Jaffna MSR, enabling resupply of the Jaffna peninsula from
the capital via Elephant Pass. Ultimately, the operation would entail offensives
conducted in two major phases: first, an attack southward, through Elephant Pass, to take
the crossroads at Parathan, and to prevent the LTTE from employing its captured artillery
46
pieces against the air base at Palay; second--nearly a year later--an offensive northward
from the vicinity of Puliyankuluam toward Mankulam and beyond, effectively
connecting the Kilinochchi district with the northern town of Vavuniya (see figures 5,
6).2 Securing the land MSR to Jaffna would have allowed the GSL to become more
responsive to the hardships of the Tamil populace there, in addition to dividing the LTTE
stronghold districts in the north into two.3
The ambitious operation included over 20,000 GSL troops, initially under the
overall command of Major General A. K. Jayawardene. Later phases of the campaign
would see operational command pass to Major General C. S. Weerisoriya, and ultimately
direct oversight by the Commander-in-Chief, President Chandrika Kumaratunga herself.
Over the ensuing eighteen months, Operation Jaya Sikurui was to prove the largest and
costliest military endeavor in Sri Lanka’s history.
To meet the manpower demands of this operation the SLA employed 53 Division
as the main effort, which took the brunt of the fighting, and 54, 55, 56, and 21 Divisions.
The Sri Lankan Air Force and Navy were also tasked to provide troops in a ground
combat role to help man the Forward Defense Line.4 During the initial phase of the
operation, the divisions’ axis of advance was the segment of the A9 Highway linking the
Jaffna peninsula to Kandy.
As security forces advanced southward from Jaffna, they met strong LTTE
resistance, particularly in and around Paranthan. The jungle terrain of the Wanni district
supported the LTTE’s guerrilla tactics, while the linear SLA formations proved
cumbersome and vulnerable in the restrictive terrain. The predictable southward advance
of the security forces ceded all initiative to the guerrillas, who counterattacked fiercely
47
and repeatedly. Employed as regular infantry, the Special Forces brigade of 53 Division
suffered similarly. Tasked to secure a bridge across Kanakarayan Aru, then cross the A9
Highway to link up with 55 Division, the brigade was caught in the open by heavy mortar
fire. The September 1997 engagement cost the brigade 48 killed and 308 wounded.5
Rebel mortar and artillery fire proved to be the highest casualty producer during
Operation Jaya Sikurui. Adding insult to injury, the LTTE’s liberal use of mortars was
facilitated by a hijacked shipment of ammunition and 81-millimeter mortars intended for
the SLA. The LTTE had seized the vessel’s cargo in February 1997, before the ship
reached port in Sri Lanka, and smuggled the mortars and over 32,000 rounds of
ammunition into the country via Mullaittivu. 6 The LTTE maximized the employment of
these weapons, and the howitzers captured at Mullaittivu, during the government
offensive.
Impending presentation of the GSL’s devolution proposals to Parliament, the 50th
anniversary of Sri Lanka’s independence, and upcoming local elections continued to
increase pressure to complete Operation Jaya Sikurui in a timely and successful manner.
As year-end monsoons approached, GSL forces had yet to secure some 24 kilometers of
their operational objectives. Nevertheless, Deputy Defense Minister General Anuruddha
Ratwatte announced to Joint Operational Headquarters in Vavuniya that he expected the
operation to be completed by 31 December 1997 and that “92 per cent of the war had in
fact been concluded.”7
On 4 December 1997, 53 Division advanced under cover of heavy artillery
barrage towards Mankulam, overcoming sporadic enemy resistance. Special Forces units
were leading infantry units in clearing three known guerrilla concentrations, when the
48
LTTE launched its largest counterattack yet. The SLA was forced to withdraw, losing
147 killed and 396 injured. The engagement was to result in the highest casualty rate
ever for the Special Forces brigade.8
Budgetary debates were scheduled in Colombo that week, as well as debates for
extending the current State of Emergency in Sri Lanka. Fearful that the setback would be
political ammunition for the GSL’s opposition, the following vague report was released
by the JOH:
Troops having advanced further from their earlier held positions confronted a large group of terrorists. . . . Troops overcame heavy enemy resistance causing heavy casualties among them. Terrorists continued to engage troops with mortars and artillery. Troops retaliated with artillery and mortars. Ground troops confirmed terrorists have suffered heavy casualties. The details of own casualties will be released later. . . . Troops are now in the process of clearing the area.9
Three hours following Parliament’s session, a subsequent press release announced:
Terrorists engaged troops from well-prepared defenses. . . . Fighting was at close quarters and intense. Fighting which broke out at 9 a.m. continued till late afternoon. The bodies of 36 soldiers including one officer killed have been handed over to their families. . . . The operation continues.10 By year’s end, Operation Jaya Sikurui had claimed over 1,000 GSL troops killed
in action, and more than 3,000 wounded.11 Government military reports indicate varying
statistics on LTTE casualties. Ground elements in contact estimate 858 killed, official
releases put the toll higher at 1,305 killed, and intercepted LTTE transmissions confirm a
minimum of 515 killed. Independent verification of casualties is problematic, due to
intense government censorship during this phase of the operation. 12
On 25 January 1998, an LTTE suicide bomber attacked the sacred Temple of the
Tooth (Dalada Maligawa) in Kandy, considerably damaging the building, as well as
killing and injuring dozens of worshippers. Of great religious significance, the Tooth
49
Relic is also closely associated with the sovereignty of Sri Lanka. Captured by the
British in 1818, its loss was considered symbolically more decisive than territorial
occupation by British forces. Its desecration by the LTTE attack outraged even secular
Sinhalese, and was seen more as an attack on the Sinahala people than the GSL. 13
The New Year saw a change of command, as operational responsibility for Jaya
Sikurui was passed to Major General Srilal Weerisuriya. New proclamations by General
Ratwatte assured the GSL that the MSR would be secured once and for all by 4 February
1998, an excessively optimistic prediction. The inevitable failure of GSL forces to meet
this deadline was ultimately blamed on bad weather.14
On 27 September 1998, as GSL troops continued to struggle to reach their final
operational objectives, LTTE cadre launched a large-scale offensive against the
Killinochchi defense complex, the southernmost strongpoint in a string of military
garrisons reaching north to GSL security force headquarters in Jaffna. The Killinochchi
garrison was home to the SLA’s 54 Division, and was manned with four infantry
brigades, including supporting armor, artillery, and engineer units.15 The defense
complex stretched some 15 kilometers, nearly three times the size of the base at
Mullaittivu, and included a concrete-reinforced Forward Defensive Line.
The LTTE assault began with a heavy mortar and artillery barrage. Special teams
of guerrillas, infiltrated before the attack, were able to adjust indirect fire precisely onto
key command and control targets.16 Simultaneous attacks from the west and southeast
were facilitated by the LTTE’s breach of the perimeter, using a captured T-55 tank, and
an explosive-filled armored vehicle (see figure 7).17 Taking advantage of the mostly
open terrain and scrub brush surrounding the complex, the LTTE maximized direct and
50
indirect fires to isolate the base from advancing reinforcements. After two days of
intense fighting, the order was given from the neighboring headquarters at Elephant Pass
to withdraw the remaining troops from Killinochchi, and the GSL forces consolidated at
Paranthan. 18
Reminiscent of the LTTE attack on Mullaittivu, the Killinochchi battle proved to
be the greatest debacle for GSL forces to date. Once again, rebel forces captured large
caches of weapons and ammunition after overrunning the complex. According to
government figures, casualties numbered 663 SLA troops killed. The International
Committee of the Red Cross reports taking control of at least 674 bodies from the LTTE.
Other SLA estimates report nearly 1,000 killed or missing, and a further 700 wounded.19
Political machinations continued unabated as Operation Jaya Sikurui dragged on
interminably. Despite the violence, the government proceeded with a scheduled round of
limited autonomy provincial elections in 1998. The leading opposition party, the UNP,
boycotted the parliamentary vote to amend the constitution to allow semi-autonomous
regional councils. Fighting between government forces and the LTTE continued
throughout the electoral period. Against a background of election-related violence
featuring attacks against both independence supporters and those favoring conciliation
with the government under the limited autonomy plan, no workable political solution
emerged. In May 1998, the mayor of Jaffna was assassinated. The Tigers blamed the
killing on a pro-government group called the TULF. Around this time, the Sri Lankan
government tightened press censorship, restricting coverage of the conflict in the Jaffna
region. The detention of several journalists coincided with the President stopping an
51
ongoing investigation of government corruption when the probe reached the level of
senior officials.
In June 1998, President Kumaratunga made an offer to the UNP to hold
presidential elections, originally scheduled for 2000, a year early if they would consent to
postponing the provincial elections in August. This was seen as a move to avoid a
possible loss in the elections due to the government’s slow progress in the Jaffna conflict.
The opposition rejected this deal. In August, a few weeks prior to the elections, the
president declared a state of emergency that indefinitely postponed the elections while
augmenting the power of state security forces. The government agreed to hold provincial
elections in January 1999, and the result was a sweeping victory for the ruling party in
the northern province. Thousands of UNP supporters protested the results and
independent election monitors attested to ballot stuffing by the government. Even the
LSSP, a government ally, criticized the ruling party for fixing the election after initially
delaying it by declaring a state of emergency.
As 1998 drew to a close, security forces had still failed to secure their original
operational objectives for Jaya Sikurui. The town of Mankulam had yet to be secured in
the south, and the rebel capture of Killinochchi had halted progress in the north. The
LTTE continued to successfully infiltrate the Jaffna peninsula, further threatening control
of the MSR. In May, the LTTE was able to assassinate Brigadier General Larry
Wijeratne, and successfully attacked army and police convoys throughout the year along
the Vavuniya-Mannar road, previously considered secure. These security force failures
indicated how overstretched the GSL had become. The Killinochchi defeat caused
President Kumaratunga to again reshuffle the leadership occupying senior military
52
commands, and to personally oversee progress of the operation. The President’s
involvement included personally interviewing officers from the battle areas, and
presiding at lengthy sessions of the National Council to develop her assessment of the
military’s performance.20 On 29 September 1998, GSL troops finally captured the town
of Mankulam, a key intermediate objective in securing the MSR. After consolidating
recent gains, the government decided to end the operation on a relatively high note.
Operation Jaya Sikurui officially drew to a close on 4 December 1998, leaving large
areas of the MSR between Killinochchi and Mankulam unsecured.21
Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning emphasizes the importance of identifying
any forces or capabilities that the adversary has in the area (see table 1). From a
campaign-planning perspective, Jaya Sikurui reveals a continuing deficiency in the
GSL’s ability to collect operationally responsive intelligence. The LTTE offensive
against Killinochchi in September 1998 represented a catastrophic intelligence failure for
security forces. The ability of insurgent forces to mount an organized combined arms
assault of some 3,000 guerrillas--in close proximity to SLA units conducting offensive
operations--represents an alarming lack of situational awareness among GSL security
forces. Likewise, the predictable nature of the SLA’s advance along the A9 Kandy-
Jaffna Highway does not excuse the repeated surprise achieved by LTTE counterattacks.
On the contrary, the simplicity of operational maneuver should have facilitated
reconnaissance and security efforts. Effective intelligence collection and analysis is
certainly instrumental to the success of any military operation, and acquires a special
significance during counterinsurgency operations.
53
The insurgent is not self-sufficient and requires considerable amounts of support
from the populace to sustain the force and to continue to conduct guerrilla operations.
Lacking strength in numbers, guerrillas depend on dispersion, stealth, and mobility as
combat multipliers. For this reason, intelligence operations against insurgents become
problematic for forces organized to fight conventional military formations.
A British commander during counterinsurgency operations in Malaya stressed
“the evolution of a coordinated intelligence network. The existence of an efficient police
force was invaluable in this connection, and in countries where this does not exist,
building one up may have to be the first step in the campaign.”22 Subsequent British
counterinsurgency operations coordinated the employment of police, intelligence,
military intelligence, and special operations forces, in order to focus collection and avoid
duplication of effort.23 The GSL possesses special forces units with unique training and
operational experience that could form the foundation for this capability in the future.
During Operation Jaya Sikurui, these units were misutilized as regular infantry and
suffered extreme casualty rates. Such employment is decidedly shortsighted, and quickly
decimates capabilities that often take years to acquire.
In Algeria, the French lifted the insurgents’ veil of secrecy using quadrillage, and
commandos de chasse. Dividing the entire country into sectors, French forces used
manpower intensive operations to gather intelligence on the activities and intentions of
insurgents. Forewarned by an intelligence apparatus employing extensive human and
technical collection means, French airmobile strike forces could respond rapidly to
destroy guerrilla elements.24 In another example of aggressive intelligence operations,
the US Phoenix program in Vietnam directly attacked the political legitimacy of the
54
insurgency. The program essentially sought to coordinate all collection assets in South
Vietnam, in order to identify and destroy the shadow political infrastructure of the Viet
Cong. 25 Repeated GSL disasters at Mullaitivu, Killinochchi, and others bear testament to
the critical need for security forces to develop a comprehensive, coordinated intelligence
architecture that is responsive to the operational commander.
Operation Jaya Sikurui further illustrated the inability of the GSL to conduct
major operations simultaneously. After successfully striking the enemy’s COG during
Operation Riviresa, GSL forces became bogged down in an 18-month campaign to secure
the MSR supporting the seized objective. Instead of being an important shaping effort,
securing the MSR to Jaffna rapidly became an end unto itself. Although phasing and
sequencing of operations are basic tenants of campaign plan design, they allow the
commander to exploit emerging operational opportunities, not forfeit strategic or
operational initiative to the enemy. Proper phasing and sequencing is described in JP 5-
00.1, and addresses how the process dictates allocation of resources. Correct sequencing
prevents friendly forces from culminating before operational objectives are attained, and
compels enemy culmination. In Sri Lanka, the operational initiative was ceded to the
LTTE following Operation Riviresa, and arguably never regained by GSL forces over the
course of Operation Jaya Sikurui. Given the resources available, the manner in which the
GSL employed its forces precluded the comprehensive operations needed to decisively
defeat the LTTE. Faced with similar challenges, other counterinsurgency forces have
historically approached the problem in innovative ways.
Consider the example of the US-led counterinsurgency effort in the Philippines at
the turn of the century. Emilio Aguinaldo initially opted to fight the US conventionally,
55
but by November 1899, the Filipinos, too, were forced to flee to the mountains north of
Luzon to wage a guerrilla campaign.26 Aguinaldo’s hit and run philosophy was
supported by his organization into “highly autonomous regional commands,” and
complemented with “a clandestine civil-military organization or infrastructure that acted
as a shadow government.”27 Eventually, the Americans were forced to employ over
65,000 troops and 35,000 short-term volunteers to control the insurrection. Even this
large troop presence, however, proved insufficient to secure the myriad jungle villages
throughout the islands. US Army commanders learned that mobility, flexibility, and
aggressiveness were needed to fight the Filipinos, and that decentralized authority was a
particularly effective way to achieve it.28 There remained the question, however, of
safeguarding the operational gains of these smaller, more mobile strike forces. Only in
this way could the rebels be separated from their base of support.
In response to this need, the US Army established the Philippine Constabulary.
Infrequent patrols had proven useless; the insurgents possessed sophisticated intelligence
and support networks among the population. Even small outposts were impractical
because of the scope of the requirement, and rebel forces easily overcame such small
garrisons. In contrast, the Constabulary was constituted from the indigenous populace--a
plentiful manpower pool. Although the ranks of the Constabulary were Filipino, and
technically an arm of the civil government, a US Army cadre profoundly influenced its
organization, training, and employment.
This cadre was handpicked by the commanding general of the US
counterinsurgency force. Brigadier General Henry T. Allen selected only “bright,
ambitious, and physically robust men who could not only withstand the rigors of bush
56
service, but who were also sensitive to the local sociopolitical environment.” The
Constabulary was trained as light infantry, with emphasis on ambush and counter-ambush
techniques, operations at night and during inclement weather, tactical deception, and
tracking techniques. In addition to irregular combat skills, the Constabulary was
instructed in police functions, court and legal matters, arrest procedures, and evidence
collection. Officers were trained to monitor the mood and disposition of their local
populace, and were required to learn the dialects and customs of the regions they were
posted to.
The Philippine Constabulary proved an enormous combat multiplier. With an
effective militia to secure operational successes, combat forces were freed for offensive
operations. The Constabulary provided a lasting presence in sufficient force to deter
counterattacks or reprisals by the rebels. Infiltration by the insurgents proved extremely
difficult, given the presence of indigenous security forces attuned to the local populace.
With the Constabulary in place, US-led pacification efforts progressed unimpeded.
Efforts included medical care, school construction, and the establishment of courts, roads,
and other administration infrastructure. By the end of the war, the government had over
15,000 native auxiliaries in its Philippine Scouts, Constabulary, local police, and
volunteer militia organizations. The insurgents were gradually, but effectively, isolated
from their bases of support. In areas most vulnerable to rebel influence and coercion, US
forces employed concentration, relocating local populations to towns and camps under
heavy military control. In parts of Cavite province, this policy left evacuated areas that
essent ially became free-fire zones, again denying sanctuary to the enemy.
57
Certain parallels between the insurgency in Sri Lanka and the threat that faced US
forces in the Philippines make the analogy a valuable one. The current operational
methods of GSL security forces often play to enemy strengths. Deprived of operational
intelligence and mobility, large, unwieldy SLA formations consistently cede the initiative
to LTTE guerrillas in restrictive jungle terrain. Using these methods, security forces are
unable to harness the combat power necessary to deal a decisive blow to the LTTE, while
still safeguarding their rear areas, securing LOCs, and sustaining operations. Climbing
desertion rates, with estimates as high as 15,000 during the Jaya Sikurui campaign,
indicate these manpower- intensive methods will be increasingly difficult to maintain in
the future. The operational record of Sri Lanka’s attrition-based strategy is not enviable,
and mounting losses may prove politically unviable for the current administration.
Ironically, the government’s need to mount Operation Jaya Sikurui stemmed in
part from its broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving theater-
strategic objectives during Operation Riviresa (see table 1). This fundamental of
campaign planning illustrates the importance of considering operational and sustainment
relationships, and ensuring these concepts support strategic objectives. Sustainment
operations for Operation Riviresa proved adequate as initially executed. Operational
success did not result in the strategic victory anticipated, however, proving the
sustainment concept to be similarly flawed. Once ousted from Jaffna, the LTTE wreaked
havoc on the MSR to Colombo. Air and sealift assets were unable to completely fulfill
this unforeseen requirement. Manpower requirements were difficult to sustain, because
units in the east had already been thinned for the offensive on Jaffna. In many respects,
58
the longest, costliest campaign in Sri Lanka’s history was mounted to salvage an earlier
operation.
Overall, Operation Jaya Sikurui was a dismal showing for President Kumaratunga
and GSL security forces. In terms of campaign planning, none of the shortcomings
observed during Operation Riviresa were remedied, and violations of JP 5-00.1
fundamentals continued to degrade the SLA’s chances for success. Constraints on
combat resources again led planners to mass combat power from garrisons across Sri
Lanka, creating unacceptable risk in many locations. Special operations, air force, and
navy personnel were all misutilized in a ground combat role during this operation. This
combat power was directed at terrain-oriented objectives along the MSR, with few
related supporting operations. Jaya Sikurui also revealed severe shortcomings in the
GSL’s operational intelligence capabilities, so ground elements found themselves
repeatedly surprised by guerrilla counterattacks, and unexpected artillery barrages from
captured howitzers. Operation Jaya Sikurui did not strike directly or indirectly at the
LTTE COG, unless viewed as a poorly phased sequel to Operation Riviresa.
Nevertheless, as losses mounted, more and more political capital was invested in the
campaign. The GSL became obsessed with succeeding, progress was measured in
kilometers of ground taken, and the operation soon took on a life of its own. At the
campaign’s conclusion the GSL had realized few operational gains, incurred enormous
losses in men and materiel, and absorbed a devastating strategic defeat at Killinochchi.
1Wintle, The Dictionary of War Quotations, 127.
2“Sri Lanka: Internal Affairs,” 29.
59
3Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 29.
4Sri Lanka Army, “Army in Operation: Op Jaya Sikurui,” Sri Lanka Army Situation Report and News Archive [article on- line]; available from http://202.51.158.144/Operations8.htm; Internet; accessed on 10 March 2002.
5Iqbal Athas, “Mortars Cause Highest Jaya Sikurui Casua lties,” The Sunday Times, 5 October 1997 [article online]; available from http://lacnet.org/suntimes/ 971005/sitrep.html; Internet; accessed on 14 April 2002.
6Ibid.
7Iqbal Athas, “Worst-ever Commando Debacle,” The Sunday Times, 7 December 1997 [article on- line]; available from http://lacnet.org/suntimes/971207/sitrep.html; Internet; accessed on 14 April 2002.
8Ibid.
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 29; and Athas, “Worst-ever Commando Debacle.”
12Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 29.
60
13Priyath Liyanage, “Popular Buddhism, Politics, and the Ethnic Problem” in “Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka,” Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, August 1998 [article on- line]; available from http://www.c-r.org/accord/acc_sri/index.htm; Internet; accessed on 10 March 2002.
14Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 29.
15Vijayasiri, “Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 53.
16Ibid., 54.
17Ibid.
18Iqbal Athas, “Killinochchi Calamity: Worst Debacle in 17 Years War,” The Sunday Times, 4 October 1998 [article on- line]; available from http://www.lacnet.org/ suntimes/981004/sitrep.html; Internet; accessed on 14 April 2002.
19Ibid.; and Vijayasiri, “Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 54.
20Iqbal Athas, “CBK Sets Jaya Sikurui on Professional Course,” The Sunday Times, 1 November 1998 [article on- line]; available from http://www.lacnet.org/ suntimes/981101/sitrep.html; Internet; accessed on 14 April 2002.
21Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 31.
22Department of the Navy, FMFRP 12-25, 127.
61
23Ian F.W. Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Checkmark Books, 2001), 111.
24Douglas Porch, The French Foreign Legion (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 594; and Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency, trans. Daniel Lee (Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, January 1985), 30-32.
25Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare (Portland: Frank Cass, 1998), 132-135.
26Andrew J. Birtle, US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine: 1860-1941 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998), 110.
27Ibid., 110-111.
28Addington, Patterns of War, 126.
62
CHAPTER 5
OPERATION KINIHIRA (“ANVIL”)
You may kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will lose and I will win.1
Ho Chi Minh
The Tamil-Sinhalese conflict has surged, ebbed and resurged numerous times
over the last two decades, with no clear prospect of resolution. Hostilities following the
completion of Jaya Sikurui escalated severely, encompassing both military battles for
territory and terrorist attacks on civilians. This chapter assesses the shortcomings of the
final of three government campaigns, using the framework provided by the campaign-
planning fundamentals of JP 5-00.1, and concludes with a synopsis of events following
the campaign to the present day.
At the end of 1998, the government prepared to mount another offensive in Jaffna
province. A rapid advance a few months later resulted in the army capturing twenty-four
villages, driving the LTTE into retreat. As government occupation commenced in the
area, thousands of Tamils fled to areas still controlled by the LTTE. Government gains
included two Hindu temples and a Christian shrine, and a dispute arose over access to the
holy sites. While the GSL restricted access to worshippers, the LTTE blocked shipments
of food to civilians in Jaffna. In August 1999, the GSL acceded to a previous rebel
demand for a five-kilometer demilitarized zone on either side of the main highway, and
distribution of food aid finally began. The government, opposition parties, and business
interests attempted to promote peace within a framework of devolution of power and
limited Tamil autonomy. The effort foundered against LTTE insistence on full
63
independence. The battle for Jaffna intensified and appeared headed for a climax. In
October 1999, the rebels went back on the military offensive and re-captured ten SLA
garrisons, reoccupying territory lost over the past two years and acquiring considerable
government weaponry abandoned in the rout.2 The LTTE offensives were a source of
significant embarrassment for the GSL, and the government was finding any of its claims
of military success greeted with increasing skepticism. President Kumaratunga had
grown increasingly unpopular for the widening war and its escalating costs. An earlier
July 1999 rally held by the UNP was attended by thousands of people, and subsequent
disorder led to government troops using tear gas and water cannons on opposition
supporters.
Worst of all for the GSL, in a major battle that lasted from late March through
early April 2000, the LTTE gained control of Elephant Pass, a strategic causeway linking
the Jaffna Peninsula with the main part of the island. Several hundred government
soldiers were apparently killed in fierce fighting, but unclassified details are difficult to
obtain due to official censorship. A short-term truce was arranged when rebels returned
the bodies of 126 government troops killed in action. 3 Fighting resumed and security
forces on the peninsula, estimated at 35,000 to 40,000, appeared in danger of being
completely cut off. Facing rising criticism of the GSL’s military strategy--with forces in
the field spread very thin and desertions by troops on the increase--the president relieved
several senior military commanders. Both India and Pakistan denied any intention of
offering military assistance to the GSL to fight the LTTE. The government of Norway
offered its services as a mediator, but no movement toward a negotiated settlement or
even a cease-fire appeared imminent. In mid-May 2000, Sri Lankan Foreign Minister
64
Lakshman Kadirgamar announced that the government would seek to purchase $800
million worth of armaments on the open market in order to continue its fight against the
LTTE. The buying spree was seen as an effort to provide security forces on the Jaffna
Peninsula with badly needed combat power, and as an alternative to the garrisons on the
peninsula becoming completely cut off from Colombo.4
On 17 September 2000, with newly purchased military hardware, the GSL
commenced Operation Kinihira. Unlike Operations Riviresa or Jaya Sikurui, continuity
in the Kinihira campaign is difficult to discern. By January 2001, GSL forces would
conduct nine phases of Operation Kinihira, each with two to four stages of employment.
The complexity of operational planning reflects the SLA’s attempt to isolate LTTE
defenses by sequentially securing numerous terrain-oriented objectives, then defeating
the insurgents in detail. The many villages, axes of advance, and terrain-anchored
references listed as objectives for these individual actions would only confuse analysis,
and are not presented here. Specific examples of the overall operational effort illustrate
the intent of GSL forces. In reality, these intermediate objectives only obscure the
ultimate purpose of the campaign, which was to secure key positions on the Jaffna
Peninsula, in order to position the armed forces to retake the strategic Elephant Pass lost
to the LTTE in May 2000.5
The propitious timing of the campaign--only weeks before general parliamentary
elections were scheduled--was not lost on Kumaratunga’s political opposition. The move
to achieve operational success against the LTTE was widely interpreted as a response to
her fast-dwindling support after a violence-marred first term belied her 1994 campaign
promises of peace, and the easing of autocratic central government control. Inevitably,
65
accusations were lodged that the president was trying to stave off a certain no-confidence
vote. Even slow initial SLA progress was blamed on Kumaratunga’s fear of a
catastrophic military defeat right before the December 2000 general elections.6 While
such manipulation is certainly a matter of course in Sri Lankan politics, in all fairness it is
unlikely that the GSL expected a major military breakthrough so soon before the
elections.
Prior to this GSL offensive, the LTTE had nearly succeeded in completely
surrounding security forces garrisoned in the city of Jaffna. The first phase of the
operation, Kinihira I, aimed to push rebel forces back from the outskirts of the city. The
primary operational objective was to secure the town of Chavakachcheri, in order to
isolate the rebels from supplies and reinforcements infiltrating along the Tthanankilappu-
Chavakachcheri road. Four divisions were allocated for the effort (51, 52, 53, and 55
Divisions), supported by recently purchased Kfir aircraft from Israel, and Mig-27
Flogger-J aircraft from the Ukraine, and placed under the overall operational command of
Major General Anton E. D. Wijendra. Two divisions were designated the main effort for
the attack from Jaffna, and the remaining two conducted division- level diversions in
support of the main effort. Operations went as planned, and three square kilometers
around Chavakachcheri were secured, up to the Kilali lagoon-front. By 26 September
2000, further attacks succeeded in extending GSL lines of control to areas west of
Sarasalai, and north of Madduvil. Releases by the GSL indicated 127 LTTE cadre killed
and a further 135 wounded, as well as over 300 soldiers killed and more than 1,300
wounded.7
66
Further phases of Kinihira met with stiffening LTTE resistance, and particularly
heavy mortar and artillery bombardment by the rebels. Increased LTTE activity was
noted by SLA intelligence, as was the near-continuous presence of prominent cadre
leaders along defensive lines on the Jaffna peninsula. To maintain offensive pressure, the
SLA began Kinihira IV with the aim of capturing the Nunavil East and Maduvil South
regions. The SLA 53 Division (comprised of the 6th, 7th, and 10th Sri Lanka Sinha
Regiments, the 6th Gajaba Regiment, and 3rd and 8th Sri Lanka Light Infantry
Regiments) conducted the dismounted assault, advancing south from Sarasalai. The 52
Division (comprised of the 4th Vijayaba Infantry and the 11th Volunteer Gajaba
Regiment) advanced west from the vicinity of Meesalai. The SLA achieved its objectives
by 10 December 2000, and penetrated further than expected after initially faltering under
a concentrated artillery barrage.
Operation Kinihira V was launched with the aim of capturing Madduvil and
Nunavil, and the A9 Highway including the Kaithadi and Navatkuli Bridges. The
bridgeheads would consolidate control of the MSR from Jaffna to Chavakachcheri, and
was considered key to supporting subsequent attacks east against the Elephant Pass.
Confronted by improved LTTE defensive positions, the 53 Division westward advance
was slow, and heavy casualties again occurred from LTTE indirect fires. Subsequent
SLA counter-battery fires were able to neutralize the rebel artillery, and facilitated the
Division’s capture of the Kaithadi Bridge by 22 December 2000. The Navatkuli Bridge,
however, remained in LTTE control. Occupying forces reported twenty-six guerrillas
killed, thirty-four wounded, and a large number of mortar tubes destroyed or abandoned.
The LTTE were also reported to be abandoning stockpiles weapons and munitions, and
67
leaving behind their dead and wounded. Two junior LTTE cadres had chosen to
surrender to security forces rather than take their cyanide pills.
The primary objective of Kinihira VIII was to capture the Navatkuli Bridge and
restore control the A9 MSR all the way from Jaffna to Chavakachcheri. Rebel artillery
bombardment was lessening, and security forces quickly advanced westward along the
A9 axis. Occupying SLA units were quick to note that defensive positions had been
thoroughly prepared, and booby-trapped with improvised explosive devices and anti-
personnel mines, indicating a planned withdrawal by the LTTE. Withdrawing guerrillas
left behind large stockpiles of partially destroyed arms and equipment. At the conclusion
of Kinihira VIII on 31 December 2000, GSL forces had secured the Navatkuli Bridge,
and were once again in control of the Jaffna Peninsula. A government release announced
that with the successful re-occupation of the Jaffna Peninsula, all the gains made by the
LTTE during its Operation Unceasing Waves IV in early 2000 had been reversed.8
The SLA’s intelligence proved correct, and the LTTE’s planned withdrawal
occurred shortly after the two strategic bridges were captured at Navatkuli and Kaithadi.
Following the successful completion of Kinihira VIII, intelligence reports indicated that
the guerrillas were consolidating just south of LTTE-held Thenmarachchi and
Vadamarachchi, and were stockpiling ammunition and strengthening defenses in
preparation for a counterattack. The SLA seized the opportunity to exploit the successes
of the past three months, and launched a final operation against the southernmost
insurgent defenses on the peninsula, Operation Kinihira IX.
Operation Kinihira IX began with the objective of destroying the insurgents at
Muhamalai, Avaraikkaadu, and Ponnar. The operation employed 55 Division as the main
68
effort, augmented with an armored brigade and commando brigade, against the bulk of
the defenses. Just to the south, 53 Division launched a diversionary attack in support of
the main effort. The 53 Division assault is noteworthy for its excellent application of
tactical intelligence. Several commando and special forces elements were able to
penetrate the outer defensive perimeter of the LTTE defensive positions at night,
pinpointing key defensive positions and command and control locations in advance.
Numerous guerrilla patrols were allowed to pass unhindered to avoid compromise, until
shortly before the attack special forces and commando teams destroyed several bunker
positions before withdrawing without casualties. Tactical surprise was complete, the
LTTE was unable to bring its indirect fires to bear before SLA forces had breached the
defensive perimeter, and the insurgents withdrew from Muhamalai under intense artillery
barrage by very well adjusted fires.9 Security forces occupied the tactically important
high ground on 19 January 2001. To the north, 55 Division advanced in two columns,
supported by multiple-barrel rocket launcher preparatory fires, and air strikes from
Israeli-made Kfir fighter-bombers. After repulsing LTTE counterattacks launched from
northeast of Avaraikkaadu, the division secured its objectives and ended Operation
Kinihira.
Subsequent to the operation, government releases announced that a total of 139
square kilometers of territory had been liberated during Kinihira. Security forces
sustained 268 killed in action, and over 1,300 wounded. The GSL reported rebel
casualties to be over 1,220 killed, and 1,250 wounded in action against the SLA since the
September launch of Kinihira.10 Admissions from the LTTE are much lower, citing
around 800 cadre killed during the operation. 11
69
Given the recent occurrence of this campaign, and the extraordinary censorship
imposed by the GSL, operational details for analysis of Kinihira are scarce.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of campaign-planning fundamentals, two significant
observations regarding Operation Kinihira can be made. First, on the positive side, the
SLA appears to have done a much better job identifying any forces or capabilities that the
adversary has in the area. Secondly, on the negative side, there does not appear to have
been any coordinated effort to launch a series of related major operations simultaneously.
Although the Kinihira campaign provides some good examples of well-executed
intelligence operations at the tactical level, there is little evidence to suggest that the
operational capabilities of the security forces have improved dramatically. The increased
success enjoyed by the SLA in intelligence operations on the peninsula can also be
attributed to the occupation of conventional, static defensive positions by the LTTE.
Ceding the advantages that normally accrue to the insurgent conducting guerrilla warfare,
LTTE defenders facilitated the SLA intelligence collection effort by establishing fixed
defenses. In addition, the populated, urbanized areas of the Jaffna district made it much
easier for the GSL to bring its resources to bear than in the jungles of the Wanni.
The sequencing of objectives by the SLA on the peninsula was undeniably
effective. On the other hand, no coordinated effort was made to isolate or contain
withdrawing guerrilla forces, so another valuable opportunity was missed. The guerrillas
were all the more vulnerable to the massed effects of superior GSL firepower while in the
relatively open terrain of the peninsula, particularly the air power employed with great
effect by security forces. The LTTE defenders who escaped these attacks faced the SLA
70
again at newly reinforced positions, in highly defensible terrain at the Elephant Pass,
which the GSL was unable to recapture after several concerted efforts.
1Wintle, The Dictionary of War Quotations, 359.
2“Sri Lanka: Internal Affairs,” 370.
3V. S. Sambandan, “The Fall of Elephant Pass,” Frontline, Vol. 17, Issue 9, 29 April-May 12 2000 [article on- line]; available from http://www.flonnet.com/fl1709/ 17091240.htm; Internet; accessed on 2 May 2002; and D. B. S. Jeyaraj, “The Taking of Elephant Pass,” Frontline, Vol. 17, Issue 10, 13-26 May 2000 [article on- line]; available from http://www.flonnet.com/fl1710/17100100.htm; Internet; accessed on 2 May 2002; and Iqbal Athas, “It is from Lessons Learnt from Failures that Future Successes are Fashioned,” The Sunday Times, 9 July 2000 [article on- line]; available from http:// www.lacnet.org/suntimes/981004/sitrep.html; Internet; accessed on 14 April 2002.
4Waruna Karunatilake, “We are Confident of Winning this War,” TimeAsia, 17 January 2001 [article on- line]; available from http://www.tme.com/asia/features/ interviews/2001/01/17/conv.wijendra.html; Internet; accessed on 11 November 2001; and Manoharan, “Cease the Fire and Catch the Peace,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 18 January 2001 [article on- line]; available from http://www.ipcs.org/issues/ articles/451-sl-mano.html; Internet; accessed on 5 May 2002.
5Sri Lanka Army, “Army in Operation: Operation Kiniheera,” Sri Lanka Army Situation Report and News Archive [article on- line]; available from http://202.51.158. 144/Operations19.htm; Internet; accessed on 10 March 2002.
6Scott MacDonald, “Sri Lankan President Sees Narrow Election Victory,” Reuters, 3 December 2001 [article on- line]; available from http://in.news.yahoo.com/ 011203/64/1a54y.html; Internet; accessed on 5 May 2002.
7In comparison with other sources, it is likely that these GSL casualty figures include losses incurred during the ill- fated Operation Rivikirana (“Sunrays”), an operation distinct from Kinihira, conducted on 3 September 2000; “Army in Operation: Operation Kiniheera;” and “Army Captures Chavakachcheri,” Sri Lanka Monitor, 26 September 2000 [article on- line]; available from http://www.gn.apc.org/brcslproject/ slmonitor/September2000/army.html; Internet; accessed on 11 November 2001.
8Ibid.
9Sri Lanka Army, “Army in Operation: Operation Kiniheera.”
10Ibid.
11Manoharan, “Cease the Fire and Catch the Peace.”
71
CHAPTER 6
POSTSCRIPT
Prior to the completion of the Kinihira campaign, on 21 December 2000, the
LTTE proposed a ceasefire as a gesture of its “sincere desire for peace and a negotiated
settlement.”1 Not entirely unexpected, the announcement was met with skepticism since
the rebels were now on the defensive. The cycle of negotiate and reconstitute, then
attack, was in character for the LTTE, as were their demands: immediate cessation of
ongoing military operations, lifting of the economic blockade on LTTE-controlled areas,
creating a conducive atmosphere for talks, and focusing talks on ‘core’ political issues.
Prior to her reelection, Kumaratunga remained resolutely opposed to these overtures,
vowing that the lifting of a ban on the LTTE and a ceasefire could only occur after
constructive peace talks had begun. She stated, “I cannot allow a separate state of Eelam,
or lift the ban. We are straightforward, no Eelam, no terrorism, then we have talks.”2
Subsequent to repeated failed attempts by security forces to re-take the Elephant
Pass, no new operations were mounted by the GSL, although the LTTE ceasefire offer
continued to be officially rejected. The pause in fighting allowed new initiatives to
begin. A Norwegian-brokered peace process began to take hold in 2001, under the
direction of chief facilitator Erik Solheim. In February 2001, however, the LTTE
suffered a new setback when Britain labeled them a terrorist organization, under new
legislation aimed at halting the funding for British domestic-based militant groups. In
July 2001, the LTTE conducted a devastating suicide attack on the International Airport
and the Air Force Base at Katunayake. The assault destroyed eight Air Force planes and
72
three Sri Lanka Airlines airbuses--25 percent of the Air Force’s fixed-wing capability,
and 33 percent of the commercial fleet--as well as killing 14.3
Also in July 2001, the politically beleaguered President Kumaratunga suspended
Parliament to save the collapse of her minority government from an anticipated vote of
no-confidence. New parliamentary elections were set for December 2001, at which time
the opposition UNP narrowly won the parliamentary election, and Ranil Wickramasinghe
was sworn in as Prime Minister with the new cabinet.
On 24 December 2001, the LTTE implemented a month-long unilateral ceasefire,
and the GSL announced it would also observe the truce. In January 2002, the GSL eased
its seven-year embargo on commerce entering the northern LTTE-controlled provinces.
More recently, the ceasefire has been extended, and on 21 February 2002 both the GSL
and LTTE agreed to a permanent ceasefire to pave the way for future peace talks.
Negotiations remain problematic, and have been overseen by the Norwegian facilitators
of the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission. Since 4 April 2002, ceasefire monitors have been
trying to prevent the LTTE from charging an entry tax on travelers along the A9
Highway, as they enter areas of the northern mainland controlled by the rebels. Although
attempts to de-militarize a zone on either side of the Elephant Pass have proven
successful to date, prospects for continued peace are uncertain.
1Manoharan, “Cease the Fire and Catch the Peace.”
2MacDonald, “Narrow Election Victory.”
3“Sri Lanka: Internal Affairs,” 371.
73
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
To them the jungle seemed predominately hostile, being full of maneating tigers, deadly fevers, venomous snakes and scorpions, natives with poisonous darts, and a host of half- imagined nameless terrors. They were unable to adapt themselves to a new way of life and a diet of rice and vegetables. In this green hell they expected to be dead within a few weeks--and as a rule they were…The truth is that the jungle is neutral. It provides any amount of fresh water, and unlimited cover for friend as well as foe--an armed neutrality, if you like, but neutrality nevertheless. It is the attitude of mind that determines whether you go under or survive. There is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so. The jungle itself is neutral. 1
F. Spencer Chapman
Prospects for a definitive peace settlement in Sri Lanka remain grim. The
preceding campaigns illustrate the obstinacy with which both adversaries refuse to
negotiate a compromise. Nevertheless, the “nameless terrors” of this substate conflict are
operational hurdles for security forces and insurgents alike. If GSL and military leaders
are able to modify their operational methods--to subsist on the metaphorical “diet of rice
and vegetables”--security forces can successfully exploit the vulnerabilities of the LTTE
insurgents. This operational- level analysis identified shortcomings in the GSL
counterinsurgency strategy from a campaign-planning perspective, used JP 5-00.1 as a
framework, and incorporated principles of US IDAD and FID doctrine. The intent of this
doctrinal approach is to facilitate understanding by US military and political leaders,
capitalizing on the considerable knowledge amassed by the American military. Other
relevant historical examples of counterinsurgency campaigns have been cited to balance
the analysis. Three government campaigns were analyzed: Operation Riviresa in 1995,
74
Operation Jaya Sikurui in 1996, and Operation Kinihira in 2000. This chapter
summarizes the shortcomings noted, and advocates the publication of principles
concerning tactics, techniques, and procedures as a supplement to current US
counterinsurgency doctrine. In addition, this thesis has discussed the use of JP 5-00.1 as
an effective methodology for analyzing situations other than war, and identified issues for
further study that might improve overall understanding of counterinsurgency.
Operations Riviresa, Jaya Sikurui, and Kinihira violated several campaign-
planning fundamentals as enumerated in JP 5-00.1. These violations contributed to
poorly coordinated campaigns, and prevented the synergy that is the goal of the
campaign-planning process. Despite GSL tactical and operational successes, this lack of
coordination enables the LTTE to reconstitute and return to the conventional battlefield at
a later date. Not surprisingly, the campaign-planning fundamentals are closely related
and mutually supporting. Neglecting one fundamental often ensures deficienc ies
elsewhere in the campaign-planning process. Finally, the GSL counterinsurgency effort
has been further compromised by insufficient political-military synchronization, and poor
overall tactical preparedness.
The JP 5-00.1 framework used in the preceding campaign analyses reveals a
common shortcoming among all; the inability of the GSL to sequence a series of related
major joint operations conducted simultaneously throughout the area of responsibility.
This is a particularly damaging deficiency. In many respects, this campaign-planning
fundamental provides the cohesion for a coordinated campaign. Without a series of
operations conducted simultaneously, major operational requirements may be neglected.
Relatively simultaneous execution ensures that no effort will go unsupported, or be left
75
vulnerable to piecemeal attack. Furthermore, if these operations are not properly
sequenced, there is little hope for unity of effort towards a common operational goal.
Even when the enemy operational COG is effectively identified and targeted, GSL forces
cannot afford to squander scarce resources on piecemeal attacks against terrain-oriented
objectives. Attrition is also a decidedly poor strategy against the insurgent. The
government must find a way to leverage the limited assets it possesses, in order to mount
a coordinated series of decentralized operations that do not allow the LTTE to
consolidate, recruit, and reorganize. This observation has significant doctrinal
implications for security forces, as well as potential organizational changes. Operational
doctrine is called for that negates the guerrilla’s mobility advantage. Equally important,
credible methods are needed to secure and safeguard the government’s operational gains.
The GSL has not demonstrated an ability to decisively strike the LTTE. Unless decisive
strikes occur, the LTTE will continue to challenge GSL forces conventionally when and
where it chooses, dispersing when necessary to husband forces, and pressuring the
government with terrorism and guerrilla tactics. Every LTTE operational victory on the
conventional battlefield scores a strategic blow against government legitimacy. Political
obstacles notwithstanding, the GSL needs to mitigate the negative operational impact of
manpower and resource shortfalls by developing an effective militia, implementing
conscription, employing resettlement programs, and emphasizing airmobile operations--
doctrinally and in task organization.
Numerous historical examples support the concept that a well trained, disciplined
militia could enable GSL military forces to offset its resource shortfalls in this
manpower-intensive counterinsurgency effort. In addition to the Philippine Constabulary
76
cited earlier, several British experiences met with considerable success. During the
Kenyan Emergency (1952-1960), a young British intelligence officer named Frank
Kitson was instrumental in raising the Kikuyu Home Guard of the Kenyan police’s
Special Branch. These “counter-gangs” of the Home Guard employed tribesmen loyal to
the British, and were a great force-multiplier in defeating the Mau Mau insurgency.
Kitson was then posted to Malaya toward the end of the Malayan Emergency (1948-
1960), where he again successfully focused on devolving responsibility for local security
to the indigenous populace. This freed army units to strike the guerrillas that were
isolated from their supporters.2
Admittedly, Sri Lankan anti-LTTE paramilitaries and state-sponsored home guard
organizations--the PLOTE, and the TELO, in particular--have a checkered history, at
best. These groups often collaborate with the SLA against the LTTE, but their assistance
routinely devolves into disorder and torture. Bankrolled by the GSL, the activities of
these groups indirectly become state-sponsored terror.3 The potential exists, however, to
leverage this infrastructure in favor of lawful participation that supports the
counterinsurgency effort. This could be an ideal mission for the two commando
battalions and three special forces battalions of the SLA that focus primarily on
counterinsurgency operations.4 Discipline, training, and effective employment could
potentially develop an effective constabulary force in a relatively short period of time.
As a precondition, the SLA must stop misutilizing their special operations forces as
regular infantry.
Finally, troop shortages have another, less obvious impact on operational
performance. Resource constraints have led military leadership to scour the armed forces
77
for available manpower. Units frequently rotate between short cycles of combat
operations, rest and reconstitution, and training--often spending as little as three months
in a given cycle.5 As security forces struggle to learn the most effective ways to combat
the LTTE, their lessons are lost to the entire force when they rotate out of combat
operations. The armed forces do have a Command and Staff College, and a professional
education system, but because officers and units are rotating through combat operations
on a near continual basis, these higher- level institutions face difficulty effectively
capturing and integrating the wealth of operational and tactical lessons learned. Shorter
curriculums--apart from the existing higher- level institutions--attended routinely by both
junior and senior leaders, might prove more effective at disseminating the lessons learned
in blood during operation after operation. Decades of civil war have produced a
considerable number of veterans of counterinsurgency operations; these experienced
former operators may provide a pool of instructor talent for this purpose.
The military and President Kumaratunga’s inability to “clearly define what
constitutes success,” in terms of political and strategic endstate, underscores another
major shortcoming in GSL campaigns. The definition of an endstate should
fundamentally include the delineation of conflict termination objectives and potential
post-hostility activities. Without the definition of such basics, the GSL capacity for
political-military synchronization will be minimal.
In the case of Operation Riviresa, the military somehow equated operational
objectives with the President’s strategic guidance. Military leaders mistakenly believed
the insurgency could not survive the blow of losing Jaffna. In this regard, the military’s
attempt to identify the adversary’s strategic center of gravity was flawed. Operationally,
78
the security forces’ assessment of the LTTE’s COG was on target; had other operations
been synchronized with Riviresa, their outcomes may have been different. Indeed,
although the combat power of the LTTE remained largely intact, the seizure of Jaffna
was potentially economically and operationally devastating for the rebels in the long run.
However, the security forces’ campaign plan was not comprehensive enough to
decisively defeat the LTTE’s strategic COG. Consequently, the LTTE was able to avoid
full culmination in 1995.
By not focusing sufficiently on the insurgents’ strategic COG--after nearly twenty
years of counterinsurgency against the LTTE--the GSL reveals its disturbing lack of
understanding about insurgency. Political and military leaders continue to obsess over
quantitative indicators, such as body count and kilometers of MSR secured. In doing so,
they fail to appreciate that repeatedly high LTTE casualties do not indicate that the war is
some percentage complete. The insurgents’ willingness to repeatedly meet the SLA on
the conventional battlefield, in spite of heavy losses, might indicate their superior
understanding of the strategic importance of a major conventional victory--such as
Killinochchi, or Mullaittivu. More sinister is the implication that insurgent forces are
continuing to replace their losses in the face of GSL offensives, perhaps indicating that
rebel recruits are not as finite as security forces would like to believe.
Government and military leaders must demonstrate greater appreciation for
friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity. This campaign-planning
fundamental is wedded to that of identifying adversary COGs, in the sense of preventing
the culmination of friendly forces while simultaneously seeking to compel enemy
culmination. Counterinsurgency is first and foremost a political conflict, and the contest
79
is for legitimacy. The GSL understands its strategic COG is domestic political support
for the prosecution of the war, but this fact is complicated by war weariness and partisan
politics. Operational COGs include security forces and installations whose defeat would
reflect incompetence in the administration’s war effort. The operational methods of the
military, however, leave these very forces vulnerable. Neglecting these relationships has
presented the insurgents with repeated opportunities to pit guerrilla strengths against SLA
weaknesses, as the LTTE did at Mullaittivu. Similar experiences during Operation Jaya
Sikurui proved even more costly, when special operations, air force, and naval personnel
were employed as regular infantry to make up for manpower shortfalls. The entire force
advanced in linear fashion along the MSR, and was subjected to repeat, debilitating
assaults by LTTE guerrillas. Evidently, force protection lessons yet to be learned by GSL
security forces.
Media relations and censorship will continue to play an important role in shaping
political support for the GSL’s counterinsurgency policies. It would be unfair to view the
GSL’s media relations through an American lens. The US perspective on freedom of the
press and access to information differs from that of most nations. Nevertheless, the
repeated need for stricter policies of censorship might be perceived as a barometer of
performance in the field and provide ammunition for Kumaratunga’s political opposition.
Likewise, security forces must avoid using disproportionate levels of violence against the
guerrillas, particularly in proximity to noncombatants. Massive conventional force is
unlikely to be effective against dispersed guerrillas in jungle terrain and will almost
certainly result in collateral damage and unintended consequences in populated areas.
Airstrikes are notorious for causing excessive collateral damage and civilian casualties,
80
and are frequently touted in LTTE propaganda efforts. For its part, the GSL should resist
public proclamations of unrealistic timelines. These statements serve only to pressure
security forces to take unnecessary risks, and increase the likelihood of using undue force
to achieve quick results. Decades of conflict should serve as indicator enough that
countering insurgency is neither a quick nor simple process.
One critical asset, conspicuous by its absence in the SLA, is an operationally
responsive intelligence apparatus. Accurate intelligence provides the foundation for any
operational planning, yet is uniquely significant during counterinsurgency operations.
Accordingly, one campaign-planning fundamental in JP 5-00.1 stresses identifying any
forces or capabilities that the adversary has in the area (see table 1).
Often the greatest challenge to intelligence operations in support of
counterinsurgency is effectively coordinating and integrating the effort. This substate
conflict spans the operational spectrum, including criminal organizations, terrorist
activities, cellular auxiliary networks, dispersed guerrilla warfare, and conventional
combat formations with air, land, and sea components. Traditionally, these targets are
often the focus of disparate agencies, including police, civilian intelligence communities,
special operations forces, military intelligence, and a host of other human and technical
means. The myriad sources and inputs of information can quickly overwhelm even the
most sophisticated organization.
The Sri Lankan intelligence community has undergone several restructuring
initiatives in the past two decades. The operational perfo rmance of security forces in the
field, however, suggests that more emphasis is needed at the operational level. The
recent formation of Deep Penetration Units may be a significant step in the right
81
direction. These small, covert, special operations teams are tasked with reconnaissance
and direct action strikes against the Tamil separatists in the north and east, usually far
beyond supporting range of SLA conventional units. Unfortunately, a recent police raid
on a house in the Columbo suburb of Athurugiriya arrested several of these teams,
mistakenly believing they had uncovered a plot to assassinate the Prime Minister.
Government spokesman Harim Peiris stated the raid had “caused extreme embarrassment
and loss of morale to the elite special forces Deep Penetration Units.”6 Rather than create
new elite units, the GSL should find it more productive to re-focus the efforts of its
special forces regiments as a whole on their original reconnaissance and
counterinsurgency missions. Subsequently improving the integration of these teams into
the planning and execution of task force operations--optimally at division or brigade
levels--should pay great dividends for field commanders.
On a final note concerning the campaign-planning fundamentals, it is worth
noting that JP 5-00.1 stresses the importance of broad strategic concepts of operations
and sustainment for achieving national objectives. This chapter has illustrated the close
relationships among the campaign-planning fundamentals. Similarly, sustainment
impacts upon every aspect of operational planning, and is the key to finishing the fight.
Historically, GSL sustainment planning has been weak. Operationally, Riviresa was
conducted with nary a nod to the complex logistics necessary to project and sustain an
offensive force nearly the length of the nation. In the wake of success, MSR interdiction
by the LTTE revealed no GSL contingency plans for sustaining their occupation of
Jaffna. Arguably, better logistic contingency planning may have obviated the need for
Jaya Sikurui.
82
Extended campaigns with uncertain outcomes and high casualty rates have made
recruitment problematic for the armed forces. In May 1998, the government attempted to
benignly rectify the problem of increasing desertions in the wake of Jaya Sikurui. The
GSL offered an amnesty over a five-day period for the estimated 15,000 deserters from
the SLA--only 5,000 availed themselves of the offer.7 The sweeping police arrests that
followed did not help recruitment drives. Even where manpower has been sustained,
turnover rates have increased dramatically. Replacements are continually funneled into
existing units to feed a rapidly growing force structure, yet the training infrastructure has
not expanded to accommodate the increased demand for leaders and troops.8 The small-
unit actions that predominate in guerrilla warfare in jungle operations would benefit
greatly from a better personnel replacement and integration system. Without one,
operations will feed a cycle of increased casualties, inexperienced recruits, and no time to
develop unit cohesion, resulting in lackluster performance that will cause yet more
casualties. This cycle will, in turn, feed desertions and hurt recruitment, as well.
Operational shortcomings in the GSL counterinsurgency effort are magnified by a
lack of political-military synchronization. Because insurgency is fundamentally a
political conflict, countering insurgency demands that policy objectives be understood,
clearly articulated to military leadership, and supported by feasible military objectives.
Recent GSL political-military activity suggests an inherent failure to command the
political power necessary to achieve this synchronization of effort.
The preceding campaign analyses are in many ways a reflection of the fractured
Sri Lankan political process. Consider that although Kumaratunga’s devolution
proposals are in line with the Norwegian-brokered peace process, they have been
83
consistently frustrated, in part, because her successive governments have lacked the
requisite majority to push through the constitutional changes needed. Some parties, like
the UNP, oppose the extent of Kumaratunga’s proposed devolution and extensive
constitutional reforms in principle, while others have come to resist them on the simple
grounds that the LTTE itself has said it will accept nothing less than outright
independence. Consequently, when she put her proposals before the Parliament in
August 2000, they met with almost unanimous opposition. The failure of the devolution
plan, coupled with the inability of the military to deal a decisive blow to the LTTE,
produced substantial strains within the PA coalition. In June 2001, a close Muslim ally
quit his ministerial post and defected to the opposition with six of his colleagues from the
SLMC. The move returned the PA to minority government status, and triggered the
UNP’s first attempt at mounting a no-confidence motion. Kumaratunga avoided defeat
on that occasion by suspending Parliament for 60 days and calling for a plebiscite on the
issue of constitutional reform. Unfortunately, a plebiscite was never a realistic option.
Almost every Sinhalese social organization, including the powerful Buddhist clergy,
either opposed or was extremely wary of her devolution plans, implying that the whole
exercise was simply a ploy to buy time to save her government.
Kumaratunga’s desperation was apparent in early August 2001, when she cut a
deal with the Marxist JVP. The JVP, which held 10 seats in the Parliament elected in
2000, refused to accept any ministerial posts but agreed to support the government in
Parliament, giving the PA a seven-seat majority. In return, however, the JVP demanded:
cancellation of the proposed constitutional referendum; reduction of the Cabinet by one-
half; appointment of independent commissions on elections, the civil service, police, the
84
judiciary, and state media; freezing of all privatization for a period of twelve months; and
a ban on the signing of new agreements with multilateral lending institutions.
Acceptance of the deal conceded to the JVP everything Kumaratunga had rejected during
earlier talks with the UNP.
Amidst this political in- fighting, the GSL must contend with the duplicitous
behavior of the LTTE. The ceasefires of 1989-1990 and 1994 are but two examples of
LTTE overtures designed to provide an operational pause in combat operations, enabling
the insurgents to reconstitute and further their separatist agenda. After decades of civil
conflict, the GSL must find the political will to abstain from this self-defeating cycle of
ceasefire, negotiation, and LTTE attack.
Despite these numerous domestic political hurdles, the senior political and
military leadership of the nation would undoubtedly benefit from a clearly articulated
national security strategy, and national military strategy. Heeding the immediate and
continuing threat the LTTE has been to the GSL, and ever mindful of the security forces’
limited resources, this strategy should revolve around the ongoing counterinsurgency. A
clear strategy would be a milestone toward reaching a political consensus on the
application of military power to coordinate a sustained, decisive campaign against the
insurgents.
One positive but inconclusive step toward military consensus occurred in 1985
with the establishment of a Joint Operations Command, but the forum was not
accompanied by the doctrinal or organizational changes necessary to vest sufficient
authority in the new chain of command.9 By continuing to develop the nexus of civil and
85
military power, the processes of political-military coordination should improve
dramatically.
Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning states, “campaign planning is an effective
methodology for situations other than war.”10 Though the stated purpose of the reference
is to guide the application of military power, the joint and interagency approach of the
publication addresses the integration of the diplomatic, informational, and economic
instruments of power, as well. In light of this fact, this thesis validates the use of JP 5-
00.1 as an effective general methodology for analyzing counterinsurgency. Using the
fundamentals of campaign planning as a framework for deconstructing GSL operations
proved comprehensive and insightful.
There are lessons to be learned from Sri Lanka’s conflict for US practitioners of
counterinsurgency. Some are revealed by the preceding limited analysis, yet many more
would benefit from continued research. Ordinarily, America’s military is not predisposed
toward unconventional approaches to warfare. Though the history of the US Army
includes many more small wars than large-scale conflicts, our doctrine and focus has
always been on the latter. In The American Way of War, Russell Weigley portrays
Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz as the principal influence on American military
strategy. 11 Clausewitz’s influence helps to explain why US doctrine overwhelmingly
seeks to destroy our enemy’s military forces by concentrating our firepower and combat
forces in decisive battle. His maxim, “The fighting forces [of the enemy] must be
destroyed: that is, they must be put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on
the fight,” has been the guiding principle for American maneuver warfare for over a
century. 12 Indeed, in the insightful book The Western Way of War, Victor Hanson argues
86
that the US concept of decisive battle is inextricably enmeshed with our Western
democratic heritage. Many military leaders see this “pitched battle” concept as “the only
way to defeat an enemy,” where superior mass and firepower “find and engage [the
enemy] in order to end the entire business as quickly as possible.”13 One can see the
parallels between this approach and the GSL’s conflict with the LTTE, yet this may not
be the only--or most effective--strategy for combating insurgency. When faced with an
opponent that refuses to meet our conventionally superior forces on equal terms, but
seeks to attack them indirectly, Americans react with a degree of uncertainty. The US
neatly labels such enemies guerrillas, irregulars, or unconventional--a predisposition for
overwhelming conventional might is apparent, and US experience has had mixed results.
The “pitched battle” concept was evident in Vietnam, as American forces--denied
the clear-cut certainty of decisive battle--used body count to gauge when enemy forces
would be “put in such a condition that they [could] no longer carry on the fight.” Even
the strategic hamlet resettlement programs, similar in ways to successful British programs
in Malaya and Oman, revealed a dichotomy in the American approach. Sir Robert
Thompson (the principle architect of the successful Briggs Plan during the Malayan
Emergency) advocated targeting the Mekong Delta region where the insurgents were
weakest, in accordance with his principle of securing base areas before conducting a
military campaign. Contrary to this advice, American resettlement targeted War Zone D
northeast of Saigon, where the Vietcong insurgent infrastructure was strongest. Many
leaders in the US Military Assistance Advisory Group favored this head-on approach.
The US preference for pitched battle has also manifested itself in our joint
doctrine, where practical references to counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and
87
procedures are rare. The capstone document for FID and IDAD--where much of US
counterinsurgency doctrine is articulated--is JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID). This publication is intended to assist in
unity of effort at the joint task force level, and has little practicality below that level. The
manual also reflects an extremely resource intensive US approach--an approach perhaps
well-suited for waging decisive, conventional, maneuver warfare, but not always
practical or effective for less-developed nations engaged in politically-charged substate
conflict. Current doctrine, therefore, poses a risk to US military leaders conducting
counterinsurgency operations--that of reinforcing the belief that hardware, firepower, and
resources are a panacea for combating the primarily political problem of insurgency.
This is a myth the Sri Lankan military is learning the hard way.
Currently, the US Army has no manual that addresses the practical aspects of
conducting counterinsurgency. Although US Army Special Forces doctrine does address
the mission in greater depth, this doctrine is formulated for units with unique training,
equipment, and missions, and would prove of little help to conventional Army
organizations tasked to perform counterinsurgency. In fact, not one Army field manual’s
title contains the term counterinsurgency. The closest reference is FM 90-8
Counterguerrilla Operations, which concentrates on tactics, but reflects somewhat dated
AirLand Battle doctrine. The manual notes the difference in section 1-12:
There is a difference in the terms counterinsurgency and counterguerrilla. The internal defense and development (IDAD) program is geared to counter the whole insurgency. It does this through alleviating conditions which may cause insurgency. This program, which addresses both the populace and the insurgent, can be termed counterinsurgency. Counterguerrilla operations are geared to the active military element of the insurgent movement only. To this end,
88
counterguerrilla operations are viewed as a supporting component of the counterinsurgency effort.14
The principles discussed in Counterguerrilla Operations are cogent, reflect a strong
foundation in Thompson’s Five Principles (see table 2), and have drawn lessons from
other successful efforts. The tactics, techniques, and procedures presented, however, do
not differ markedly from other US Army light infantry doctrine. Similarly, SLA
counterinsurgency efforts are operationally designed around fairly conventional military
methods, but forces on the ground often found themselves conducting tasks far outside
routine patrolling, roadblocks, or cordon and search operations.
The US Marine Corps has had considerably more success capturing its
experiences in doctrine. The celebrated Small Wars Manual of 1940 reflects precisely
the focus a conventional force should adopt when faced with such non-traditional
missions. Many practical counterinsurgency concerns are addressed in the Small Wars
Manual, including techniques for resettling noncombatants, utilizing animals for logistics
operations in remote areas, and using native troops to assist in pacification. Even the
Marines neglected this publication, however, for much of the century. When a Marine
officer prepared a 1960 training manual, Anti-Guerrilla Warfare, he was unaware the
1940 manual existed.15
A recommendation of this analysis is that the US Army develop a publication
concerning tactics, techniques, and procedures as a supplement to current US
counterinsurgency doctrine. Perhaps using the Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual of
1940 for focus, the updated reference should also not overlook the benefits and
limitations of utilizing emerging technology in counterinsurgency operations. Recent
89
operations in Afghanistan, in which precision-guided munitions were coordinated with
satellite communications by Special Forces operators on horseback, should provide
invaluable lessons--one hopes the experiences, positive and negative, are being captured.
Another important area for US attention is the effectiveness of unconventional
intelligence operations during counterinsurgency, and the difficulty of interagency
coordination. Sri Lanka’s military performance during Operation Jaya Sikurui revealed
shortcomings in its operational intelligence capabilities, but even the extensive
capabilities of the US military have fallen short, at times. Early in the 1992-93 Somalia
crisis, one Defense Intelligence Agency officer noted that the J2 Intelligence Officer
attempted to apply the same techniques used to portray Iraqi order of battle during the
Gulf War. He states:
When we entered Somalia in December 1992, we had a one-line database on the military forces there. Our attempt to use standard collection means and strategies was only partially successful because these conventional means could not deliver the kind of specific information we wanted. There were no Somali motorized rifle or tank divisions, no air defense system, no navy, and no air force.16
He concludes that military intelligence must pay more attention to geography, ecology,
history, ethnicity, religion, and politics in their threat assessments. Although US military
intelligence may not have focused on these topics during the decades of the Cold War,
this officer’s observation may hold great significance for American forces conducting
future counterinsurgency operations. Until US forces become more adept at processing
and using unconventional intelligence, we will be unable to remove the veil of anonymity
that lends terrorists and insurgents their advantages. For this reason, it would be
presumptuous for the US to ignore the potential lessons of Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency
operations.
90
The future is full of uncertainty for Sri Lanka. More certain is the fact that
insurgencies throughout history have been successfully countered by effective
government responses. Unfortunately, the lessons and principles learned from these
historical examples are seldom readily put into practice by conventional armies in the
field. Concessions leading to a lasting peace are not easily come by in a conflict that has
caused the amount of pain and suffering Sri Lanka has endured. The government’s
progress during Kinihira--albeit slow--and more recent events leading to the December
2001 unilateral LTTE cease-fire currently in effect continue to provide some hope.
Despite the British diplomat’s comparison cited at the beginning of this analysis, if the
GSL makes good use of this pause in the conflict to improve its operational methods, it
may yet strike a decisively fatal blow to the LTTE dragon, and avoid the futile tailcutting
that has plagued government forces in the past.
1US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
(USAJFKSWCS), Unconventional Warfare: Summary Sheet Packet, 19.
2Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare, 125-126, 152-153, 235.
3Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 60.
4Vijayasiri, “Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 58.
5MSG Dave Shell, US Army Special Forces, US Special Operations Command, Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii; interview with author, telephone interview, Seaside, CA, 10 August 2001.
6“Sri Lanka to Probe Police Raid on Army Hideout,” Reuters, 14 February 2002 [article on- line]; available from http://in.news.yahoo.com/020214/64/1gf48.html; Internet; accessed on 14 February 2002.
7Rotberg, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka, 31.
8Vijayasiri, “Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 48.
9Ibid., 38.
91
10US Department of Defense, JP 5-00.1, I-6.
11Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973), 210-212.
12Howard and Paret, On War, 90.
13Victor Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 19, xv, xvi.
14US Department of Defense, FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations, Department of the Army, 29 August 1986 [General Dennis Reimer On-Line Library]; available from http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-8/Ch1.htm#s3; Internet; accessed on 14 February 2002.
15United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940; reprint, Manhattan Kansas: Sunflower University Press), xii.
16Jeffrey B. White, “A Different Kind of Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare,” Studies in Intelligence, Volume 39, Number 5, 1996 [article on- line]; available from http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/index.htm; Internet; accessed on 15 October 2000.
92
FIGURES
Figure 1. Political map of Sri Lanka. Source: Sri Lanka political map, 1999; available from http://www.askasia.org/image/maps/srilan1.htm; Interne t; accessed on 14 February 2002.
93
Figu
re 2
. M
ap o
f Jaf
fna
Peni
nsul
a. S
ourc
e: M
ap o
f Jaf
fna
Peni
nsul
a; a
vaila
ble
from
ht
tp://
ww
w.e
elam
web
.com
/ope
ratio
n/w
aves
3/m
ap/n
orth
/; In
tern
et; a
cces
sed
15 M
ay 2
002.
94
Figure 3. Operation Riviresa. Source: Sri Lanka Army, “Army in Operation: Eelam War III.”
95
Figure 4. LTTE Attack on GSL Base in Mullaittivu. Source: Vijayasiri, “Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 106.
96
Figu
re 5
. M
ap o
f Nor
ther
n Sr
i Lan
ka (e
xclu
ding
Jaf
fna
Peni
nsul
a).
Sour
ce:
Map
of N
orth
ern
Sri L
anka
(exc
ludi
ng
Jaff
na P
enin
sula
); re
prod
uced
from
map
, “Sr
i Lan
ka,”
Nel
les
Map
s, 1
:450
,000
(Nel
les
Ver
lag
Gm
bH, D
-809
35
Mün
chen
, Fed
eral
Rep
ublic
of G
erm
any)
.
97
Figure 6. Operation Jaya Sikurui. Source: Athas, “Mortars Cause Highest Jaya Sikurui Casualties.”
98
Figure 7. LTTE Attack on GSL Base at Killinochchi. Source: Vijayasiri, “Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign,” 109.
99
TABLES
Table 1. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans
• Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national, and theater-strategic objectives.
• Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
• Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, or United Nations forces, as required.
• Incorporate the combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus.
• Identify any forces or capabilities that the adversary has in the area.
• Identify the adversary strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance for defeating them.
• Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.
• If required, sequence a series of related major joint operations conducted simultaneously throughout the area of responsibility or joint operations area.
• Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
• Serve as the basis for subordinate planning.
• Clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential post hostilities activities.
• Provide strategic direction, operational focus, and major tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
• Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required and authorized by the National Command Authorities.
Source: US Department of Defense, JP 5-00.1, I-3.
100
Table 2. Thompson's 5 Principles of Counterinsurgency
• Clear, political aim
• Function within the law
• Establish an overall plan whereby all political, socioeconomic, and military responses are coordinated
• Give priority to the elimination of political subversion
• Secure base areas before conducting a military campaign
Source: Beckett, Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare, 235.
101
APPENDIX A
LITERATURE REVIEW
A literature review of counterinsurgency in general, and Sri Lankan internal
conflict in particular, reveals valuable insight and background information for this study.
Of significant note is the Master’s thesis of Lieutenant Colonel Raj Vijayasiri, a Sri
Lankan military officer attending the US Command and General Staff College. The
thesis, A Critical Analysis of the Sri Lankan Government’s Counterinsurgency
Campaign, provides a comprehensive, firsthand account of shortcomings in the state
approach. His analysis primarily focuses on the government’s lack of political unity, a
general lack of intelligence on LTTE disposition and activities, and tactical deficiencies
in the Sri Lankan military.
A number of prominent works, many by Sinhalese and Tamil authors, may be
consulted for insight into the ethnic, political, economic, social, and historical origins of
this conflict. An excellent, well-balanced account by A. Jeyaratnam Wilson (a former
Sinhalese government official) is the recent, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins
and Development in the 19th and 20th Centuries (2000), which details the rise of Tamil
nationalism. The prolific Dr. K.M. DeSilva has authored several works relating the
Sinhalese, or state, perspective. His book, Ethnic Conflict, Management, and Resolution
(1996), provides a concise, thorough review of the non-military origins of this ethnic
conflict, and the government’s attempts to preserve democratic institutions in the face of
Tamil militancy. In The Traditional Homelands of the Tamils: Separatist Ideology in Sri
102
Lanka - A Historical Appraisal (1994), Dr. DeSilva evaluates the basis of the Tamil claim
for a separate homeland from the state’s perspective.
A number of sources provide balance to the Sinhalese outlook. Among them,
Narayan Swamy’s Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (1994), powerfully presents
the objectives and motivations of Tamil militants. The Sri Lankan Tamil: Ethnicity and
Identity (1994), by Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger, details the Tamils’
social, political, and historical claims for independence.
Any search for an unbiased account of this conflict should begin with the
numerous works published by independent authors and observers. A good review of
Tamil militant activity through 1988 can be found in The Cyanide War: Tamil
Insurrection in Sri Lanka 1973-88 (1989), by Edgar O’Ballance, a former officer in both
the British and Indian armies. Journalist William McGowan visited government and
LTTE military camps, as well as the offices of political officials, to pen his very balanced
account of the political violence in Sri Lanka, Only Man is Vile: The Tragedy of Sri
Lanka (1992). Finally, an excellent collection of essays published by the Brookings
Institution, Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation (1999) examines
the nation’s prospects for peace from economic, religious, ethnic, and political
perspectives.
This thesis relies on US military counterinsurgency doctrine for historical
analysis; however, because this doctrine reflects elements of different theoretical
approaches, a number of seminal works on the subject are worth noting. In general, the
study of insurgency enjoys a wealth of historical experience and empirical data, but a
relative paucity of developed theory. Counterinsurgency theory varies in proportion to
103
theories on sources and causes of insurgency, of which there are several. One superlative
analysis by Nathan Leites and Charles Wolfe, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic
Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (1970), refutes the idea of insurgency as predominantly a
struggle for the hearts ands minds of the people. Rather, they examine emergent
insurgency as “a system and an organizational technique,” and discuss counterinsurgency
“in terms of weakening its organization while strengthening the structure of authority.”1
Thomas A. Marks similarly argues the importance of organizational dynamics. In a
Small Wars and Insurgencies article, “Evaluating Insurgent/Counterinsurgent
Performance,” Marks stresses that societal causes are necessary, but not sufficient to
produce upheaval, a thesis he further develops in Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam
(1996).
Another perspective still common in many circles is presented by Colonel Harry
G. Summers, Jr., in On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. Summers
denies that the North Vietnamese forces were an extension of the guerrilla effort, and
posits that America failed in Vietnam by not prosecuting the military strategy to its
fullest. His examination illustrates where the US strategically and operationally violated
doctrinal principles of war. In direct opposition to this view is Larry Cable’s Conflict of
Myths (1986), and Andrew F. Krepinovich’s The Army and Vietnam (1986). These
authors assert that the US failure to understand the dynamics of insurgency led the Army
to blindly follow a conventional warfare modus operandi.
Forrest D. Colburn takes yet another tack in The Vogue of Revolution in Poor
Countries (1994), arguing that insurgency is first and foremost a war of ideas, where the
personalities of revolutionary leaders are of paramount importance. Colburn views
104
revolution as sudden, violent political change, eschewing the concept of insurgency as a
dynamic process. In The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle (1998), J. Bowyer Bell also
extols the “dynamics of the dream” of the revolutionary.
Finally, Andrew J. Birtle’s historical analysis in US Army Counterinsurgency and
Contingency Operations Doctrine: 1860-1941 (1998), concludes that US doctrine
employs facets of several approaches: hearts and minds programs that supplement, not
supplant, strong military action; a belief that benevolence alone would not defeat an
entrenched insurgency; the importance of using indigenous leaders and institutions; and
unity of the political and military pacification effort under a military commander.
1Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay
on Insurgent Conflicts (Santa Monica, California: RAND, R-462-ARPA, February 1970), 4.
105
GLOSSARY
The source for these definitions is JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 March 1994 (as amended through 1 September 2000). Many authors offer differing explanations of these terms; these doctrinal definitions are presented to provide a common point of departure for this analysis.
Campaign: A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or
operational objective within a given time and space. See also campaign plan. Campaign plan: A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing
a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. See also campaign; campaign planning.
Campaign planning: The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint
force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. See also campaign; campaign plan.
Centers of gravity: Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military
force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs.
Counterguerrilla warfare: Operations and activities conducted by armed forces,
paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas. Counterinsurgency: Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and
civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. End state: What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when
operations conclude--both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power.
Foreign internal defense: Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government
in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID.
Guerrilla: A combat participant in guerrilla warfare. See also unconventional warfare.
106
Guerrilla force: A group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.
Guerrilla warfare: Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or
hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. See also unconventional warfare.
Infiltration: 1. The movement through or into an area or territory occupied by either
friendly or enemy troops or organizations. The movement is made, either by small groups or by individuals, at extended or irregular intervals. When used in connection with the enemy, it infers that contact is avoided. 2. In intelligence usage, placing an agent or other person in a target area in hostile territory. Usually involves crossing a frontier or other guarded line. Methods of infiltration are: black (clandestine); grey (through legal crossing point but under false documentation); white (legal).
Insurgency: An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. Intelligence: 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration,
analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding.
Internal defense and development: The full range of measures taken by a nation to
promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD.
Line of communications: A route, either land, water, and/or air, which connects an
operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC.
Main supply route: The route or routes which the bulk of traffic flows in support of
military operations. Military operations other than war: Operations that encompass the use of military
capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW.
National military strategy: The art and science of distributing and applying military
power to attain national objectives in peace and war.
107
Paramilitary forces: Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.
Sabotage: An act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national
defense of a country by willfully injuring or destroying, or attempting to injure or destroy, any national defense or war material, premises or utilities, to include human and natural resources.
Security assistance: Group of programs authorized y the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.
Special operations: Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped
military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO.
Subversion: Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological,
political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare. Terrorism: The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended
to coerce or intimidate governments or societie s in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
Unconventional warfare: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations,
normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW.
108
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books Adams, Thomas K. US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of
Unconventional Warfare. Portland: Frank Cass, 1998.
Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. 2d ed. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994.
Ames, Roger T., trans. Sun-Tzu: The Art of Warfare. New York: Ballantine Books, 1993.
Arquilla, John, ed. From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern
Times. New York: University Press of America, Inc., 1996. Asprey, Robert B. War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. New York:
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1975. Austin, D. Democracy and Violence in India and Sri Lanka. New York: Council on
Foreign Relations Press, 1995. Beckett, Ian F. W. Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Checkmark Books,
2001. Birtle, Andrew J. US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine:
1860-1941. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1998.
Colburn, Forrest D. The Vogue of Revolution in Poor Countries. Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1994. De Silva, K. M., ed. Ethnic Conflict in Buddhist Societies: Sri Lanka, Thailand, and
Burma. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988. ________. A History of Sri Lanka. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981. Dupuy, R. E., and T. N. Dupuy. The Harper Encyclopedia f Military History: From
3500 B.C. to the Present. 4th ed. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993. Gooneratne, Yasmine. Relative Merits: A Personal Memoir of the Bandaranaike Family
of Sri Lanka. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986. Griffith, Samuel B., trans. Mao Tse-tung: On Guerrilla Warfare. New York: Praeger
Pulishers, 1961.
109
Guevara, Che E. Guerrilla Warfare. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc.,
1997.
Hanson, Victor. The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. Horowitz, Donald L. Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative
Perspective. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. Howard, Michael, and Peter Paret, trans. On War. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1984. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 2001-2002. London:
Oxford University Press, 2002. Kitson, Frank. Bunch of Five. London: Faber and Faber, 1977. Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986. Lawrence, T. E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company,
Inc., 1926. Leites, Nathan, and Charles Wolfe, Jr. Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on
Insurgent Conflicts. Santa Monica: RAND, February 1970. Manor, James. The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon. Massachusetts:
Cambridge University Press, 1989. Manor, James, ed. Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1984. Marks, Tom. Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam. Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1996. McGowan, William. Only Man is Vile. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1992. Millett, Allan R., and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense. New York: The Free
Press, 1984.
110
Molnar, Andrew R. Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revolutionary, and Resistance
Warfare. Washington, DC: Special Operations Research Office, The American University, November 1963.
O’Ballance, Edgar. The Cyanide War. New York: Brassey’s Ltd., 1989. O’Neill, Bard E. Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare.
Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 1990. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion. New York: Harper Perennial, 1991. Ross, Russell R., ed. Sri Lanka, a Country Study, 2d ed. Washington, DC:
Superintendent of Documents, 1990. Rotberg, Robert I., ed. Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War and Reconciliation.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999. Rubio, M. and K. Repusinghe, eds. The Culture of Violence. New York: United Nations
University Press, 1994.
Sheehan, Neil. A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House, 1988.
Tambiah, Stanley Jeyaraja. Buddhism Betrayed?: Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri
Lanka. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. ________. Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1986. Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Translated
by Daniel Lee. Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas: US Army Command and General Staff College, January 1985.
Weigley, Russell. The American Way of War. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1973.
Wilson, A. Jeyaratnam. The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1988.
________. Politics in Sri Lanka, 1947-1979. 2d ed. London: Macmillan, 1979. Wintle, Justin, ed. The Dictionary of War Quotations. New York: The Free Press, 1989.
111
Government Documents Department of the Navy. Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-25, The
Guerrilla and How to Fight Him. Virginia: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 1990.
United States Marine Corps. Small Wars Manual. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940. Reprint, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 2002.
US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS).
Special Text (ST) 31-88 Unconventional Warfare Checklist. Ft. Bragg, NC: Special Forces School, United States Army Institute for Military Assistance, January 1970.
________. Unconventional Warfare: Summary Sheet Packet. Ft. Bragg, NC: Special Forces Officer Qualification Course issue material, November 1991.
US Congress, House of Representatives. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Asia and
the Pacific Committee on International Relations. Sri Lanka in Turmoil: Implications of Intensified Conflict. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996.
US Department of Defense. FM 3-0 Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the
Army, June 2001.
________. FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 26 June 2001.
________. FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 2000.
________. FM 90-8 Counterguerrilla Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 29 August 1986. Document on- line, General Dennis Reimer Library. Available from http://155.217.58.58/ cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/90-8/Ch1.htm#s3. Internet. Accessed on 14 February 2002.
________. FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 5 December 1990.
________. FM 100-25 Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1 August 1999.
________. JP 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 March 1994 (as amended through 1 September 2000).
112
________. JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1995.
________. JP 3-05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. Washington, DC: US Joint
Chiefs of Staff, 17 April 1998. ________. JP 3-07.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal
Defense (FID). Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 June 1996.
________. JP 5-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning. Washington, DC: US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 January 2002.
The White House. A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington, DC:
US Government Printing Office, December 2000.
Unpublished Materials Amato, Edward J. “Street Smarts: Unconventional Warriors in Conventional Joint
Urban Operations.” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2000.
Davis, Kevin I. “Urbanization in the Third World: Implications for ARSOF in the 21st
Century.” Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1996.
Dutton, Roland E. “A Case Study of Two On-Going Insurgencies in Sri Lanka and the
Government’s Response to Neutralize and Defeat Them.” Case study, US Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1989.
First Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). “LCE Handbook.” Stuttgart,
Germany, 21 November 1995. Franco, George H. “Insurgency in Urban Areas: Implications for SOF.” Thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School, December 1996. Vijayasiri, Raj. “A Critical Analysis of Sri Lankan Counterinsurgency Campaign.”
Thesis, US Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1999.
Other Sources
“Air Force Bombing at Puthukkudiyiruppu.” Amnesty International News, 16 September
1999. Article on- line. Available from http://www.tamilrights.org/nems/1999n/ bombputhuk.htm. Internet. Accessed on 19 September 1999.
113
“Army Captures Chavakachcheri.” Sri Lanka Monitor, 26 September 2000. Article on-line. Available from http://www.gn.apc.org/brcslproject/slmonitor/ September2000/army.html. Internet. Accessed on 11 November 2001.
Athas, Iqbal. “CBK Sets Jaya Sikurui on Professional Course.” The Sunday Times, 1 November 1998. Article on- line. Available from ttp://www.lacnet.org/suntimes/ 981101/sitrep.html. Internet. Accessed on 14 April 2002.
________. “It is from Lessons Learnt from Failures that Future Successes are Fashioned.” The Sunday Times, 9 July 2000. Article on- line. Available from http://www.lacnet.org/suntimes/981004/sitrep.html. Internet. Accessed on 14 April 2002.
________. “Killinochchi Calamity: Worst Debacle in 17 Years War.” The Sunday Times, 4 October 1998. Article on- line. Available from http://www.lacnet.org/ suntimes/981004/sitrep.html. Internet. Accessed on 14 April 2002.
________. “Mortars Cause Highest Jaya Sikurui Casualties.” The Sunday Times, 5
October 1997. Article on- line. Available from http://lacnet.org/suntimes/971005/ sitrep.html. Internet. Accessed on 14 April 2002.
________. “Surrendering Rebels to Get Amnesty.” The Sunday Times, 26 May 1996. Article on- line. Available from http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/town/parade/nm58/ command.htm. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999.
________. “Worst-ever Commando Debacle.” The Sunday Times, 7 December 1997.
Article on- line. Available from http://lacnet.org/suntimes/971207/sitrep.html. Internet. Accessed om 14 April 2002.
________. “Yet Another Op-Riviresa in Valikamam.” The Sunday Times, 31 March
1996. Article on- line. Available from http://www.lancet.org/suntimes/960331/ sitrep.html. Internet. Accessed on 27 February 2002.
“Braving It.” The Economist, 1 March 1997. Article on- line. Available from http://www.economist/archive.htm. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999.
“Civil War Without End.” The Economist, 5 December 1998. Article on- line. Available from http://www.economist/archive.htm. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999.
“Demanding Sacrifice: War and Negotiation in Sri Lanka.” Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, August 1998. Article on-line. Available from http://www.c-r.org/accord/acc_sri/index.htm. Internet. Accessed on 10 March 2002.
Dudley Knox Library, Naval Postgraduate School (DKL) Web Committee. “Terrorist Group Profiles: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).” Database on-
114
line. Available from http://www.nps.navy.mil/~library/tgp/ltte.htm. Internet. Accessed on 31 August 1999.
Gunaratna, Rohan. “International and Regional Implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil Insurgency.” 2 December 1998. Article on- line. Available from http://www. counterror.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=57. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999.
Heinemann, Timothy COL. US Army Special Forces, Dean of Academics, US Army
Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, interview with author, telephone interview and e-mail, Seaside, California, 19 September 2000 and 8 November 2000.
Higgins, L. “Sri Lanka vs. Tamil Eelam: The Sinhalese and the Tamil Tigers.” 25
November 1998. Article on- line. Available from http://www.andover.edu/ history/h46/india/sri_lanka/home.html. Internet. Accessed on 11 September 1999.
“Indictment Against Sri Lanka.” Sri Lanka Hansard, Vol. 62, Col. 1249, 25 January 1990. Article on- line. Available from http://www.tamilnation.org/indictment/ indict27b.htm. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999.
Jeyaraj, D. B. S. “The Taking of Elephant Pass.” Frontline, Vol. 17, Issue 10, 13-26 May 2000. Article on- line. Available from http://www.flonnet.com/fl1710/ 17100100.htm. Internet. Accessed on 2 May 2002.
Karunatilake, Waruna. “We are Confident of Winning this War.” TimeAsia, 17 January
2001. Article on- line. Available from http://www.tme.com/asia/features/ interviews/2001/01/17/conv.wijendra.html. Internet. Accessed on 11 November 2001.
Khan, M., and D. Khosla. “Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka.” 24 July 1996. Article on-
line. Available from http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/sritamil.htm. Internet. Accessed on 11 September 1999.
“LTTE Tamil Tiger Terrorists Massacre.” 19 September 1999. Article on- line.
Available from http://www.spur.asn.au/LTTE_atrocities_on_18September_1999. htm. Internet. Accessed on 20 September 1999.
MacDonald, Scott. “Sri Lankan President Sees Narrow Election Victory.” Reuters, 3
December 2001. Article on- line. Available from http://in.news.yahoo.com/ 011203/64/1a54y.html. Internet. Accessed on 5 May 2002.
Mack, Andrew. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.” World Politics, January 1975, 175-200.
115
Manoharan. “Cease the Fire and Catch the Peace.” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 18 January 2001. Article on-line. Available from http://www.ipcs.org/ issues/articles/451-sl-mano.html. Internet. Accessed on 5 May 2002.
Mehrotra, O. “Ethnic Strife in Sri Lanka.” 9 January 1998. Article on- line. Available from http://www.idsa- india.org/an-jan-9.html. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999.
Mendis, O. “Sri Lanka and a Separate Tamil Kingdom?” 1998. Article on- line. Available from http://www.spur.asn.au/kingdom.htm. Internet. Accessed on 11 September 1999.
“On the Warpath.” The Economist, 27 July 1996. Article on- line. Available from http://www.economist/archive.htm. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999.
“People Power.” The Economist, 11 May 1996. Article on- line. Available from
http://www.economist/archive.htm. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999. Perkins, LTC. “HUMINT/CI.” CI and HUMINT Directorate, Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. Article on-line. Available from http://call.army.mil/call/spc_prod/humint/humint.htm. Internet. Accessed on 29 September 2000.
Rajeswari, P. “US Policy on Terrorism - Part II Cases of Hizbollah and Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam.” 8 November 1998. Article on-line. Available from http://www.idsa-india.org/an-nov8-7.html. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999.
“Road of Blood.” The Economist, 10 October 1998. Article on- line. Available from
http://www.economist/archive.htm. Internet. Accessed on 28 August 1999. Sambandan, V. S. “Tight Security for Sinhalese Villages.” The Hindu, 20 September
1999. Article on- line. Available from http://www.the-hindu.com/stories/ 03200001.htm. Internet. Accessed.on 28 August 1999.
________. “The Fall of Elephant Pass.” Frontline, No. 9, 29 April-May
2000. Article on- line. Available from http://www.flonnet.com/fl1709/ 17091240.htm. Internet. Accessed on 2 May 2002.
Shell, Dave MSG. US Army Special Forces, US Special Operations Command,
Pacific, Honolulu, Hawaii. Telephone interview with author, Seaside, California, 10 August 2001.
“Sri Lanka.” CIA World Factbook. Book on- line. Available from http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/ce.html. Internet. Accessed on 18 February 2002.
116
Sri Lanka Army. “Army in Operation: Eelam War III.” Sri Lanka Army Situation Report and News Archive. Article on- line. Available from http://202.51.158. 144/Operations6.htm. Internet. Accessed on 10 March 2002.
________. “Army in Operation: Operation Jaya Sikurui.” Sri Lanka Army
Situation Report and News Archive. Article on- line. Available from http://202.51.158.144/Operations8.htm. Internet. Accessed on 10 March 2002.
________. “Army in Operation: Operation Kiniheera.” Sri Lanka Army Situation
Report and News Archive. Article on- line. Available from http://202.51.158. 144/Operations19.htm. Internet. Accessed on 10 March 2002.
“Sri Lanka: Internal Affairs.” Jane’s Sentinel - South Asia, November 2001-April 2002,
365-371.
“Sri Lankan Army Hails Capture of Jaffna.” CNN.com, 5 December 1995. Article on- line. Available from http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9512/sri_lanka/index.html. Internet. Accessed on 27 February 2002.
“Sri Lanka to Probe Police Raid on Army Hideout.” Reuters, 14 February 2002. Article
on- line. Available from http://in.news.yahoo.com/020214/64/1gf48.html. Internet. Accessed on 14 February 2002.
Swamy, M. “Civil Administration.” 1997. Article on- line. Available from
http://www.eelamweb.com/admin.html. Internet. Accessed on 11 September 1999.
________. “Early Militancy from Tigers of Lanka.” 1997. Article on- line. Available
from http://www.eelamweb.com/early.html. Internet. Accessed on 11 September 1999.
White, Jeffrey B. “A Different Kind of Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare.”
Studies in Intelligence, Volume 39, Number 5, 1996. Article on- line. Available from http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/96unclass/index.htm. Internet. Accessed on 15 October 2000.
117
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
1. Combined Arms Research Library U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 250 Gibbon Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314 2. Defense Technical Information Center/OCA 8725 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218
3. Dr. Nicholas H. Riegg Department of Joint and Multinational Operations USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352 4. Colonel Timothy S. Heinemann Dean of Academics USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
5. Mr. William W. Mendel Foreign Military Studies Office USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352 6. Dr. Robert Walz Department of Joint and Multinational Operations USACGSC 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
118
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
1. Certification Date: 31 May 2002
2. Thesis Author: MAJ Edward J. Amato
3. Thesis Title: Tail of the Dragon: Sri Lankan Efforts to Subdue the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam 4. Thesis Committee Members
Signatures:
5. Distribution Statement : See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below: A B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL. 6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:
EXAMPLE Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s) Direct Military Support (10) / Chapter 3 / 12 Critical Technology (3) / Section 4 / 31 Administrative Operational Use (7) / Chapter 2 / 13-32 Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below: Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s) / / / /
119
/ / / / / / 7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature:
120
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals). STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following: 1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information. 2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government. 3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application. 4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware. 5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation. 6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination. 7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes. 8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2. 9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority. 10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage. STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above. STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above. STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10. STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R. STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).