talmage division linguisticlabour

IS THERE A D IV IS ION OF L INGUIST IC LABOUR?

CATHERINE J.L. TALMAGE

In 'The Meaning of "Meaning'" Hilary Putnam put forward the view that there exists in our linguistic community, and perhaps in linguistic communities generally, a division of linguistic labour. This view has come to be widely accepted, even, it seems, by philosophers who are otherwise unsympathetic to the idea that linguistic meanings are determined socially.' However, this widespread acceptance of Putnam's view is, I think, largely unreflective. I suspect that many of those who have endorsed the view have done so either because they do not understand fully what the view is or because it fits with one of their most basic ideas about the nature of linguistic meaning, an idea that they may not even have consciously acknowledged let alone subjected to critical examination. In this paper I will discuss both the issue of what exactly Putnam's view is and the issue of how someone might come to endorse it. I will conclude, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, that not only is Putnam wrong in claiming that there is a division of linguistic labour but that he is wrong for reasons he himself gave in 'The Meaning of "Meaning'". Indeed, I will argue that the view that there is a division of linguistic labour arises from a way of thinking that was itself Putnam's main target in 'The Meaning of "Meaning'".

I Putnam introduces the notion of a division of linguistic labour by

way of the following example:

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Gold is important for many reasons: it is a precious metal, it is a monetary metal, it has symbolic value .... etc. Consider our community as a 'factory': in this 'factory' some people have the 'job' of wearing gold wedding rings, other people have the 'job' of selling gold wedding rings, still other people have the 'job' of telling whether or not something is really gold. It is not at all necessary or efficient that everyone who wears a gold ring...or discusses the 'gold standard', etc., engage in buying and selling gold. Nor is it necessary or efficient that everyone who buys and sells gold be able to tell whether or not something is really gold in a society where this form of dishonesty is uncommon (selling fake gold) and in which one can easily consult an expert in case of doubt. And it is certainly not necessary or efficient that everyone who has occasion to buy or wear gold be able to tell with any reliability whether or not something is really gold.

The foregoing facts are just examples of mundane division of labor (in a wide sense). But they engender a division of linguistic labour: everyone to whom gold is important for any reason has to acquire the word 'gold'; but he does not have to acquire the method of recognizing if something is or is not gold. He can rely on a special subclass of speakers. The features that are generally thought to be present in connection with a general name--necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the extension, ways of recognizing if something is in the extension .... etc.--are all present in the linguistic community considered as a collective body; but that collective body divides the 'labor' of knowing and employing these various parts of the 'meaning' of 'gold'. 2

Consider, then, an individual in our linguistic community who has the 'job' of wearing a gold wedding ring but who lacks the ability to tell whether or not any given sample is really a sample of gold.

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IS THERE A DIVISION OF LINGUISTIC LABOUR?

Putnam's view, which does seem quite plausible, is that the word 'gold' as uttered by this person means gold. What must be explained is just how this word as uttered by someone who cannot reliably identify samples of gold can have this meaning. According to Putnam, when the person in question acquired the word 'gold' she did not acquire anything that fixes the extension of this word as the set of all gold things (TMOM, p. 229). Therefore, he apparently reasons, this person must, in using the word 'gold' to mean gold, be relying on certain other members of our linguistic community, namely, those who have acquired something that fixes the extension of this word as the set of all gold things. But if individuals rely on others in this way, then it is clear that our linguistic community divides not only the labour involving gold but also the labour associated with the word 'gold'.

1I It is sometimes suggested that Putnam's view that there is a

division of linguistic labour has absurd consequences. Putnam holds that an individual can rely on other members of his or her linguistic community to secure the meanings of his or her words. But now suppose that there is an individual who, despite being in other respects a more or less competent speaker of English, not only lacks the ability to tell whether or not any given sample is really a sample of gold, but knows simply that the word 'gold' is a mass noun in the language of her community. This person might well take to pointing to things and saying, 'Is this gold?'; and she could also, if she wished, say things like, 'Gold is wet', or 'Gold is dry'. Surely, however, it would be absurd to hold that the word 'gold' as uttered by this person means just what it does in English. But if Putnam were right that the labour of knowing the meaning of this word rests with a small subclass of English speakers, a subclass that is presumably doing its job, would it not have to be concluded that the word 'gold' as uttered by this person does in fact mean gold?

Some might respond to this objection by insisting that there simply is no distinction between what a word as uttered by a particular individual means and what the word conventionally means and, hence, that it is perfectly correct to hold that the word 'gold' as uttered by the person in question means gold. Putnam himself, however, presumably

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would not respond in this way. In 'The Meaning of "Meaning'" he says explicitly that 'we don't assign the standard extension to the tokens of a word uttered by Jones no matter how Jones uses the word' (THOM, p. 246), and this would seem to be a straightforward denial of the claim that the notions of conventional meaning and word meaning are to be equated. But if Putnam allows (as I think he should ~) that these notions are distinct, then he is obliged to take this objection seriously.

Although Putnam cannot dismiss the objection outright, he can, it seems, argue that it is founded on a superficial reading of the passage quoted in the preceding section. In that passage, Putnam is concerned not with everyone who is, in a broad sense, a member of our linguistic community, but only with those who have a 'job' in the 'factory' concerned with gold. 4 But what is involved in having such a 'job'? As Putnam himself suggests, to have a 'job' in the 'factory' concerned with gold is to consider gold to be important for some reason. Moreover, everyone in our linguistic community who does consider gold to be important must, Putnam claims, have acquired the word 'gold'.' But what is involved in acquiring this word? In a later passage, Putnam identifies two ways in which speakers inform others of what the words they utter mean (TMOM, p. 229). First, a speaker may give another person an ostensive definition. So, for example, someone who means gold by the word 'gold' may point to a sample of gold in the presence of someone else and say, 'This is a sample of gold'. Second, a speaker may give another person a description. So, for example, someone who means gold by the word 'gold' may say to someone else, 'Gold is a bright yellow metal'. Now the individuals who are addressed in these two examples clearly cannot be counted as having acquired the word 'gold' unless they understand fully what has been said to them. In particular, they must understand that the word 'gold' as uttered by the individuals who addressed them is a natural kind term. But in what does such an understanding consist?

The following answer seems to be in keeping with Putnam's own analysis of natural kind terms (see TMOM, pp. 230-33, 243 & 250). In the first example, the person must understand that what is really salient to whether a particular thing can correctly have the word 'gold' applied to it is not, say, whether it has the same superficial features as

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the sample that was identified ostensively, but whether it has the same hidden structure as this sample. Similarly, the person in the second example must understand that what is really salient to whether a particular thing can correctly have the word 'gold' applied to it is not, say, whether it fits the description 'bright yellow metal', but whether it has the same hidden structure as the things to which this description is causally connected. Thus it would seem that acquiring the word 'gold' involves acquiring an appropriate notion of what is salient to the correct application of the word, either by coming to associate the word in an appropriate way with an ostensively identified sample of gold or by coming to associate the word in an appropriate way with a description that is causally connected to samples of gold. ~

Through a consideration of certain views expressed by Putnam, we have, then, arrived at a basic understanding of what is involved in acquiring the word 'gold'. But given this understanding, it would seem that Putnam can easily answer the charge that his view that there is a division of linguistic labour has absurd consequences: If a person in our linguistic community knows only that the word 'gold' is a mass noun in English, then she cannot have had this word defined for her either ostensively or through the use of a description; but if she is not acquainted with either an ostensively identified sample of gold or a description that is causally connected to samples of gold, then this person cannot have acquired an appropriate notion of salience. Without an appropriate notion of salience, however, this person cannot be counted as having acquired the word 'gold'; but if she has not acquired the word 'gold', then gold cannot be important to her, which is just to say that it cannot be the case that she has a 'job' in the 'factory' concerned with gold. But then given that he holds that it is only those who have such a 'job' who can reap the benefits of dividing the labour of knowing the meaning of the word 'gold', Putnam can, it seems, consistently deny that this word as uttered by the person in question means what it does in English.

III This answer to the original objection seems perfectly satisfactory.

Unfortunately, however, it gives rise to a second, more serious objection. Given what has been said, it would seem that the notion of

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salience acquired by any individual who has acquired the word 'gold' will in fact fix the extension of this word as the set of all gold things. For instance, in the first of the two examples given in the preceding section, the person who is addressed acquires the word 'gold' by acquiring a notion of salience that implies that something is in the extension of this word if and only if it has the same hidden structure as the sample that was identified ostensively (i.e., a particular sample of gold). This, however, directly refutes Putnam's claim that members of our linguistic community commonly acquire the word 'gold' without acquiring anything that fixes its extension as the set of all gold things. But if this claim is refuted, then Putnam has no grounds whatsoever for holding that some individuals rely on others to ensure that the word 'gold' as uttered by them means gold. And if there is no division of linguistic labour in this case--the very case Putnam uses to explain his view--then there is no reason to believe that there is a division of linguistic labour in any case.

IV One may be reluctant to accept the foregoing conclusion, for one

may think that by rejecting the view that there is a division of linguistic labour, one renders oneself unable to account for the fact that it is possible for an individual to mean by a word just what the experts mean by it even though he or she lacks the experts' knowledge. Consider, for example, the person in our linguistic community who has the 'job' of wearing a gold wedding ring but who cannot reliably identify samples of gold. Now suppose that this person has knowledge of the hidden structure of a certain bracelet (i.e., suppose that she knows such things as the atomic weight, relative density and melting point of the stuff out of which the bracelet is made). Despite having this knowledge, this person would be unable to tell whether or not the bracelet is really gold. 7 But how can it be that someone who has expert knowledge about the bracelet nonetheless lacks the experts' ability to tell whether or not it can correctly have the word 'gold' applied to it? Putnam's answer would of course be that this person lacks the experts' ability because, unlike the experts, she has not acquired anything that fixes the extension of the word 'gold' as the set of all gold things; and he would use this answer as the basis for his claim that this person is

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able to use this word to mean gold solely by relying on the experts. But how can one account for this case if one refuses to invoke a division of linguistic labour?

In fact, one can quite easily do this. For suppose, for example, that the person in this case holds that what is really salient to whether a particular thing can correctly have the word 'gold' applied to it is whether it has the same hidden structure as the things to which the description 'bright yellow metal' is causally connected. Given this, there is an obvious answer to the question posed in the preceding paragraph: the person is unable to tell whether or not the bracelet can correctly have the word 'gold' applied to it because, although she has knowledge of the hidden structure of the bracelet, she lacks knowledge of the hidden structure of the things to which the description 'bright yellow metal' is causally connected. Now presumably the knowledge that the person lacks is possessed by the experts. However, it clearly does not follow from this that the person is linguistically dependent on the experts, for it is apparent that what she is relying on them for is information about certain things in the world and not information about the meaning of a word. It may be concluded, therefore, that this case involves only a mundane division of labour.

V I have argued that if one reflects on what is involved in acquiring

the word 'gold', one comes to see that there is no basis for the claim that some members of our linguistic community rely on others to ensure that they mean by this word what is conventionally meant by it. I will now consider more closely why the view that our linguistic community divides the labour associated with this and other words has come to be so widely accepted.

As we have noted, it is possible for an individual to mean by a word what the experts mean by it even though he or she lacks the experts' knowledge. Now I suspect that some of those who have endorsed Putnam's view that there is a division of linguistic labour have taken themselves simply to be acknowledging this possibility. But since one can, as we have seen, acknowledge this possibility while accepting the existence of only a mundane division of labour, it is clearly a mistake for these people to claim that they agree with

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Putnam. Most of those who have endorsed Putnam's view, however, have understood that it consists in more than the acknowledgement of this possibility. They believe, with Putnam, that the mundane division of labour that exists in our linguistic community engenders a division of linguistic labour. But why exactly do they believe this?

The reason they believe this is, I think, that they are committed (consciously or not) to a traditional idea about the nature of linguistic meaning, namely, the idea that the meaning of a word is to be equated with a conception that is associated with the word. To see how a commitment to this idea gives rise to the belief that the mundane division of labour engenders a division of linguistic labour, consider once again the person who has the 'job' of wearing a gold wedding ring but who cannot reliably identify samples of gold. Now this person does not in fact associate with the word "gold' a conception that fixes its extension as the set of all gold things--she, we may assume, conceives of the stuff to which she holds it correct to apply this word as a bright yellow metal. On the other hand, the experts presumably do associate with this word a conception that properly fixes its extension. Thus if one accepts not only the claim that the person in question means gold by the word 'gold' but also the traditional view that for a word to mean gold is for it to be associated with a conception that fixes its extension as the set of all gold things, then one will quite naturally conclude that the meaning of this person's word is secured by something that the experts possess.

It may seem that we have at last found a way to support Putnam's claim that there is a division of linguistic labour. But, unfortunately, the crucial idea is one that Putnam himself rejects. Recall the first stage of his famous Twin Earth thought experiment. In 1750 Oscarl, who has acquired the word 'water' by being shown samples of water but who lacks knowledge of the hidden structure of these samples, conceives of the stuff to which he holds it correct to apply this word as a colourless, tasteless liquid. Moreover, since there is in Oscarl's linguistic community no one who is expert about this stuff, the other members of this linguistic community who have acquired the word 'water' presumably conceive of the stuff to which they hold it correct to apply this word as a colourless, tasteless liquid. Accordingly, if one holds that this word cannot mean water unless there is associated with

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it a conception that fixes its extension as the set of all samples of water, then one will have to claim that no one in Oscarl's linguistic community means water by the word 'water'.

But suppose that Oscarl has a Doppelganger in the present. Oscar3, as we shall call him, likewise conceives of the stuff to which he holds it correct to apply the word 'water' as a colourless, tasteless liquid. However, in Oscar3's linguistic community there presumably are individuals who have knowledge of the hidden structure of this stuff. Hence if one believes both that it is possible to mean what the experts mean without knowing what the experts know and that meaning is to be equated with associated conception, then one will quite naturally hold that Oscar3 does mean water by the word 'water' and that this is possible just because the conception associated with this word by other members of his linguistic community fixes its extension as the set of all samples of water. And in doing so, one will, of course, be claiming that there is a division of linguistic labour in this case, one that is indeed engendered by a mundane division of labour.

How would Putnam respond to this way of treating these two cases? There is no question that he would object to the assessment of the first case, for he holds explicitly that even though the word 'water' was not in 1750 associated with a conception that fixes its extension as the set of all samples of water, Oscarl does mean water by this word. But in holding this, Putnam is clearly rejecting the idea that meaning is to be equated with associated conception; indeed that this traditional idea must be rejected is the central thesis of 'The Meaning of "Meaning'". How, then, is it that Oscarl means water by the word 'water'? The fact that it is water to which he applies this word does not on its own ensure that this is the case,.for if he applied~this word to water while holding that what is really salient to whether something can correctly have this word applied to it is whether it fits the description 'colourless, tasteless liquid', he would not mean by the word 'water' what is conventionally meant by it. The only plausible explanation is that Oscarl means water by the word 'water' because in acquiring this word through the use of ostensive definition, he acquired a notion of salience that fixes its extension as the set of all samples of water.'

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This brings us to Oscar3. Would Putnam likewise object to the assessment of this second case? In fact, given what he says about the word 'gold', it seems likely that instead of objecting to this assessment Putnam would wholeheartedly endorse the conclusion that Oscar3 is able to mean water by the word 'water' solely by relying on other members of his linguistic community. But are there any grounds for distinguishing between these two cases in this way? After all, Oscarl and Oscar3 have both acquired the word 'water' by being shown samples of water. The only real difference is that Oscar3 can find out from others the hidden structure of these samples, whereas Oscarl is without this resource. This, however, is just to say that there exists in Oscar3's linguistic community a mundane division of labour that does not exist in Oscarl's linguistic community. But why suppose that this mundane division of labour engenders a division of linguistic labour? The only reason for supposing this is, it seems, a commitment to the idea that it is only because some members of Oscar3's linguistic community conceive of the stuff to which the word 'water' is correctly applied as H20 that this word as uttered by Oscar3 means water. But such a commitment is clearly inconsistent with a rejection of the idea that meaning is to be equated with associated conception, something that is, as we have seen, implicit in Putnam's discussion of Oscarl. It must be concluded, therefore, that Putnam's view that there is a division of linguistic labour rests on a traditional idea that he himself repudiates.

This conclusion forces a reassessment of the significance of 'The Meaning of "Meaning'". Putnam himself says that its significance lies in its having drawn attention to the fact that philosophers of language have traditionally overlooked two contributions to the determination of extension--the contribution of the real world and the contribution of society (TMOM, pp. 245 & 271). Our investigation supports the claim that the real world contributes to the determination of extension; but it also makes it clear that this contribution is mediated by the beliefs of individual speakers. Consider, for example, Oscarl and his Doppelg/inger on Twin Earth, Oscar2. Oscarl, let us suppose, holds that for something correctly to have his word 'water' applied to it it must have the same hidden structure as the things that were identified ostensively when he acquired this word (i.e., samples of H20).

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Similarly, Oscar2 holds that for something correctly to have his word 'water' applied to it it must have the same hidden structure as the things that were identified ostensively when he acquired this word (i.e., samples of XYZ). Neither Oscarl nor Oscar2 has knowledge of the hidden structures of the relevant samples, and so each one conceives of the stuff to which he holds it correct to apply his word 'water' as a colourless, tasteless liquid. Nonetheless, Oscarl and Oscar2 have acquired different words: Oscarl's word 'water' is correctly applied to samples of H20, whereas Oscar2's word 'water' is correctly applied to samples of XYZ. This shows that the conception associated with a word is not necessarily the word's meaning, for it may be the case that what the word means depends crucially on how the world is. However, the fact that the real world can contribute to the determination of the extension of a speaker's word does not make the speaker linguistically at the mercy of the real world, since the real world can make no contribution at all unless it figures in the speaker's own notion of salience.

What, then, of the alleged contribution of society to the determination of extension? What Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment reveals, I have argued, is that there is no such contribution. The experts conceive of the things to which words are applied in ways that are more sophisticated (and sometimes more accurate) than are the ways in which others conceive of them. But if we appreciate the force of the idea that the real world contributes to the determination of extension--if, that is, we come to acknowledge the fact that meaning cannot be equated with associated conception--we will not be tempted to see the experts as thereby knowing more about meanings than others do, but simply as thereby knowing more about the things of the world. Hence, in my view, Putnam has failed to see the full implications of the central argument of 'The Meaning of "Meaning'". Once the full implications of this argument are appreciated, Putnam's claim that there is a division of linguistic labour is perhaps best seen as a telling reminder of just how difficult it is 'to stop thinking of the meanings of words as conceptions that are associated with them.

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CATHERINE J.L, TALMAGE

VI In 'The Meaning of "Meaning'" Putnam sums up his discussion of

the notion of a division of linguistic labour with the following suggestive remark:

...there are tools like a hammer or a screwdriver which can be used by one person; and there are tools like a steamship which require the cooperative activity of a number of persons to use. Words have been thought of too much on the model of the first sort of tool. (TMOM, p. 229)

If, as I have argued, there is no division of linguistic labour, then the analogy Putnam suggests must be rejected. But once we deny that words are like steamships, should we then hold that they are like screwdrivers? This is, I think, a somewhat better analogy; but it too is misleading. There is, it seems, just one basic way to use a screwdriver to drive in a screw. So, it seems, each person who uses a screwdriver successfully has acquired the same basic skill. Thus this analogy suggests that each person who uses a word to mean what is conventionally meant by it must have acquired the same thing. This suggestion is not, however, in keeping with the findings of this paper, for the discussion in section II makes it clear that although each person who uses the word 'gold' to mean gold must have acquired a notion of salience that fixes the extension of the word as the set of all gold things, there is not one particular notion of salience that each one must have acquired. In light of this, it seems that it would be more appropriate to say that words are like ropes--just as one can learn to tie any number of different knots and still succeed in securing something with a rope, so one can acquire any of a number of different notions of salience and still succeed in meaning by a word what is conventionally meant by it.

These remarks reveal just how little the view developed in this paper has in common with the traditional account of linguistic meaning. Traditionally it is held, first, that whatever determines the extension of a word is its meaning and, second, that what does determine the extension of a word is a conception associated with it. I

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have argued that Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment shows that this second idea is mistaken, that associated conception does not always determine extension. In addition, I have identified something that does determine the extension of a word, namely, the speaker's own notion of what is salient to the correct application of the word. But since, as we have seen, two individuals can mean the same thing by a word without having acquired the same notion of salience, it would, in my view, be wrong to conclude that the meaning of a word is to be equated with the speaker's notion of salience. Thus the traditional idea that whatever determines the extension of a word is its meaning must, I believe, be rejected. But if this traditional idea is mistaken, then how should we conceive of meanings? The question itself is ill-founded, I think, for the simple reason that there are no such things as meanings. Thus, in my view, there simply is no point in trying, as Putnam did, to determine the meaning of 'meaning'.

UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA

CANADA V6T 1Z1

NOTES See for example Tyler Burge, 'Individualism and the Mental', in Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV: Studies in Metaphysics, P.A. French, T.E. Uehling, Jr. and H.K. Wettstein (eds.) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), p. 117; Akeel Bilgrami, 'An Externalist Account of Psychological Content', Philosophical Topics Vol. XV, No. l (Spring 1987), p. 200; and Donald Davidson, 'The Social Aspect of Language', unpublished manuscript, p. 3. While Burge is sympathetic to the idea that linguistic meanings are determined socially, Bilgrami and Davidson are not. Hilary Putnam, 'The Meaning of "Meaning'", in Mind, Language and Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 227-28. Hereafter this article is cited in the text as TMOM. That the notions of conventional meaning and word meaning are distinct has been argued persuasively by Donald Davidson. See especially 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs', in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, E.

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LePore (ed.)(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 433-46. Davidson's arguments make it clear that it is not necessary to equate word meaning with speaker's meaning in order to draw a distinction between it and conventional meaning. Although Putnam is surely right not to be concerned with every member of our linguistic community, he should perhaps extend his discussion to cover those who, despite not having a 'job' in the relevant 'factory', are nonetheless qualified for such a 'job'. (Extending the discussion in this way would have no effect on the conclusions reached below.) Of course it is in principle possible for someone in our linguistic community to consider gold to be important without having acquired the word 'gold', for he or she might somehow have acquired another word (presumably peculiar to his or her own idiolect) that has the same meaning. Putnam, however, is clearly excluding such exceptional cases. One can, of course, have an appropriate notion of what is salient to the correct application of the word 'gold' without being able to give an explicit statement of that notion. What is crucial is that one use the word as a natural kind term, and not that one be able to explain what a natural kind term is. I am assuming, as Putnam surely is, that someone who has the 'job' of wearing a gold wedding ring but who cannot reliably identify samples of gold does not have knowledge of the hidden structure of gold. My reason for assuming this is that I take it that if someone did have this knowledge then he or she would have, or at least be qualified for, some 'job' in the 'factory' concerned with gold other than that of wearing a gold wedding ring. It is not entirely clear that this is the answer that Putnam would give, however. Although Putnam notes that this case does not involve a division of linguistic labour in any ordinary sense, he claims that it can be construed as involving a division of linguistic labour across t ime (TMOM, p. 229). Thus Putnam might hold that Oscarl is able to mean water by the word 'water' solely by relying on certain members of a future linguistic community. This view, however, is highly implausible, for surely Oscarl would have been able to mean water by the word 'water' even if no one in the future had taken an interest in discovering the hidden structure of water. In any case, that Putnam makes this suggestion is, I think, evidence that he has not completely abandoned the idea that meaning is to be equated with associated conception.

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