Tami Fawcett GS 335 Dr. Bhatti December 18, 2013

Laicism, Neoliberalism and the Headscarf in Turkey and France

Few, if any, parts of the human body have been more politicized than Muslim

women’s hair. It has been at the center of discourses on secularism and modernity in the

Middle East and beyond since the late nineteenth century. It has been a focus of feminist

liberation and when covered, has even been deemed a threat to democracy. In recent years,

there have been laws and policies enacted to forbid women in countries such as Germany,

France, Canada and Turkey from wearing the veil in certain public institutions. Despite the

fact that both Christian and Jewish women from various sects may cover their hair (with a

nun’s habit, for example), Muslim women have been the focus of these polarizing narratives

and legislation aimed at defining and reifying secularism and neoliberal citizenship. Several

important questions can be raised regarding the imbroglio over the headscarf: What are

the current international implications of the veil debate? In what ways does this debate

indicate new relations between the government, the secular state and its citizens? What

impact have supranational organizations such as the European Union (EU) or the European

Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had on what have traditionally been considered national

affairs and how has this changed over time?

I will examine two cases of secular states, Turkey and France, which have become

entangled in the headscarf debate. These two states are particularly important in this

research because: (a.) Turkey is a majority Muslim state, with over 99% of its population

calling themselves Muslim, and (b.) France has the highest population of Muslims out of

any western European nation. The decisions that are made in each of these nations

regarding the veil issue will set a precedent for future policies and socio-political

frameworks. The headscarf debate intersects several different fields, such as gender,

human rights, religion, politics, and liberal identity, to name a few. There has been excellent

scholarship written concerning these fields in relation to the headscarf debate. It is

important to note that this debate is a complex issue, therefore it is important to avoid a

reductionist approach in attributing the source of debate to one particular aspect or

another. However, this paper will focus particularly on the political economy of secularism

in Turkey and France and the meaning of the veil within the context of neoliberalism and

globalization in the modern world.

Secularism and Laicism

Before examining the cases of Turkey and France, it is important to trace the origins

of secularism and understand its meaning and evolution. Secularism is a political ideology

that has its roots in early liberalism and the Enlightenment. It emphasizes universality,

rationality and individual autonomy (Asad 2003; Yavuz and Esposito 2003). The

fundamental principle behind secularism is separation of the public and private realms,

especially the state and its institutions and religious influences (Casanova 1994). The core

of secularism lies in the premise that public realms and institutions must be neutral, or free

of ‘particularisms’ such as religion and ethnic allegiances (Taylor 1998). Those who adhere

to secularism are particularly focused on the strict separation of church and state in order

to ensure democracy and liberal society.

Secularism is often thought of as what is left once religion fades away (Calhoun

2010). It is the exclusion of religion from the public realm. However, secularism, as a

principle, is often seen as neutral and unbiased. Calhoun argues that “we need to see

secularism as a presence” and that it is not a neutral ideology (2010). He also asserts that

working under the assumptions of the false dichotomy of religious versus secular is

problematic because it clouds the ways that we understand how religious people engage in

our world, it prevents us from seeing the ways in which the sacred can have a secular

orientation and how secular perspectives shape religion into a category from without, not

from within (2010). Calhoun is not the only scholar to touch upon secularism as a presence,

rather than an absence. Gokariksel and Mitchell invoke Foucault in explaining how

secularism is not only a political ideology, but is also associated with more utilitarian aims

related to state formation and economic development (2005). These scholars apply

Foucault’s concepts of discipline and regulation to secularism as an effort to cultivate

neoliberalism and modern state subjects. Neoliberal, as defined in this sense by these

scholars indicates “an active achievement of a laissez-faire economic system,” though they

do acknowledge that it plays out differently in different historical and geographical

contexts (2005). It is generally characterized by certain processes, such as privatization

and deregulation of publicly held institutions and resources, the extension of free trade

agreements and the discrediting of government ‘aid’ (2005). Secularism, in this sense, is

used as a means to control actors existing outside the cultural boundaries of the nation,

such as in wearing the headscarf, to shape and reify the neoliberal subject.

Both France and Turkey adhere to a particular type of secularism known as laicism.

Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, was inspired by the French system of

government and political ideology, and therefore modeled many of his secular reforms

after French laïcité. Though many scholars translate laïcité to mean “secularism” in English,

laïcité has many more “anti-clerical, even anti-religious, connotations” (Movesian 2010).

Seyla Benhabib also notes that laïcité goes beyond a separation of church and state and can

best be understood as “the public and manifest neutrality of the state toward all kinds of

religious practices, institutionalized through a vigilant removal of sectarian religious

symbols, signs, icons and items of clothing from the official public sphere” (2010).

Originally, the concept of laicism was a way to separate the church from the state. Today,

laicism is accepted as the foundation of the republic (in both Turkey and France) and

serves to create a national identity by unifying citizens as enlightened, rational members of

a liberal society. Some scholars argue that laicism, like secularism, is not, in fact, neutral in

practice and operates under not only ideological, but also utilitarian premises (Gokariksel

and Mitchell 2005). As stated above, this becomes especially visible when we examine the

creation of government policies inspired by laicism, such as the headscarf bans in Turkey

and France. Today, the principal of laicism has produced a polarization of society in both

France and Turkey, particularly when taking into account the headscarf bans and policies.

Laïcité in France

It is important to understand the history of laïcité in France, as well as in Turkey.

For centuries prior to the French Revolution, France had a special relationship with the

Catholic Church and was even known as the “eldest daughter” of the Church (Kuru 2009).

The monarchy was closely tied to the Catholic Church and monarchical authority had to be

approved by the Church in order to be considered legitimate. Two groups enjoyed a

privileged position within French society—the nobility and the clergy. The clergy held the

most privileged position due to both its sacred character and its role as state administrator.

Laicism was originally a militant ideology that was strongly at odds with French

Catholicism, particularly during the time of the French Revolution (Movesian 2010). It was

ultimately imposed from the top down and often with much opposition (Yildirim 2012). It

was particularly imposed upon the public school system in an effort to create a certain type

of citizen—a modern, liberal, enlightened citizen (Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005; Hashmi

2010).

During the French Revolution, revolutionaries challenged not only the hegemony of

the clergy, but also the legitimacy of the divine right doctrine, the clergy’s primary source

of legitimizing its power. Religion was seen as the cause of the decline of the kingdom and

the revolutionaries sought to maneuver religion out of the public sphere (Vojdik 2010).

Therefore, in establishing the new French state, the leadership saw religion as something to

protect the public sphere against. Religion was relegated to the private sphere in an effort

to keep the public sphere “neutral.” The revolutionaries asserted that sovereignty was not

derived from God, but from the people themselves, and thus, the idea of popular

sovereignty was born. Popular sovereignty is a nationalist concept that does not allow for

privileged clergy or divine rule. The concept of popular sovereignty is the reason why

laicism cannot be separated from the debate on national unity and identity in France.

There were two formative periods for laïcité in France, the first between 1789 and

1805, the second between 1879 and 1905 (Gunn 2004). The first time period was

characterized by a rather intense hostility toward religion and enacted strong state control

over the church. It was believed that one could not be both genuinely Catholic and

genuinely French (2004). Revolutionaries tried to sever ties between Catholicism and

French identity by defining a new type of citizenship and nationhood. This new type of

citizenship—Republican citizenship, was seen as universal, all-inclusive and secular.

Because of the way in which the French nation is conceived, ethnic, cultural and religious

differences cannot function as exclusionary mechanisms. Yet, the very creation of this new

type of national identity and the establishment of laicism as a political doctrine was

enacted via exclusionary measures. Exclusion played a significant role in unifying and

mobilizing the nation against the royalists, the clergy and others, and perpetrated the

imprisonment and repression of these groups. The revolutionaries justified their

exclusionary policies as necessary to protect the unity of the nation. For the

revolutionaries, any communitarian belief or loyalty would threaten national unity. In

1905, the law known as the Separation Act gave meaning to French laicism. It “remains the

base of all relations between religions and state in France, the rule of all principle activity

of French laicization” (Bauberot 2007). Laïcité was not established by consensus, but

instead was a product of legal and political processes and shaped by conflict between

Republicans and clericals (2007). This conflict persists today as a confrontation about

national identity. In recent times, however, laïcité has been used as a justification for the

headscarf bans in public education institutions in France as geopolitical shifts have moved

from the threat of the Catholic Church to Islam.

Laiklik in Turkey

Laicism, or laiklik, in Turkey has its roots in the early Turkish Republic after the fall

of the Ottoman Empire. Like in France, laiklik was implemented from the top down in

response to the “backwards” ways of the Ottoman Empire’s Muslim sultanate. Due to the

economic and military defeats of the Ottoman Empire, in its final days, the Ottoman elite

moved to transform the state structure and created a hybrid system of both secular and

religious institutions. For example, the Tanzimat, a secular, mixed commercial court was

established alongside the Sharia courts (Kuru 2009).

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic,

Ataturk, was heavily influenced by French laicism and adopted it to fit a modernizing and

westernizing Turkey. He, and other elites such as The Young Turks, attributed Islamic

institutions as obstacles to modernization. As in France, this new ruling elite attacked the

Islamic clerics and pursued policies that weakened their power in state affairs. It is

important to note, however, that Ataturk and his followers were not against Islam (Tarhan

2011). They simply wanted to eradicate Islam from the public sphere, which included

education, government and politics, in an effort to create a liberal citizenry in the footsteps

of their European counterparts, like France.

Ataturk and his followers, known as Kemalists, sought to exclude religion from

Turkish national identity, much like the revolutionaries did in France. However, despite

their attempts and the overall secularization of the Turkish state, national identity in

Turkey largely remains tied to Islam (Tarhan 2011). It is in this area where laiklik diverges

from laïcité. In Turkey, the state is still not completely separate from Islam. Instead of a

theocratic religious authority, the state has political religious authority. Islamic cleric

appointments and the administration of mosques are handled by the state department,

Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi (DIB). The aim of the DIB is to create national solidarity through

religion. This shows that religion (particularly Islam) is recognized as a tool to facilitate

national identity and unity in Turkey. It is important to note, however, that this

endorsement of Islam by the state refers only to a particular type of Sunni Islam which is

considered to be more ‘modern’ and more ‘civilized.’

Education, as a tool for controlling religion, has played a huge role in modernizing

and nationalizing Turkey. For example, the Imam Hotep Schools were funded by the

Turkish state to train officials for the performance of religious services. This ensured a

Republican, Muslim cleric class that supported the modernization objectives of the

Kemalists. It is in this way that laicism in Turkey has come to mean the control of religion

by the state, rather than the separation of religion and state.

The Headscarf Debate and Neoliberalism

There is much overlap in the root causes of the hijab bans in France and Turkey. For

example, many scholars attribute the politicization of the veil to its association with being

backwards, or “pre-modern” (Hashmi 2010; McRobbie 2011; Yildirim 2012). Both France

and Turkey have created national identities that depend upon the concept of the modern,

liberal republic. The veil is seen as a threat to the progress made by each of these nations.

Yildirim invokes Edward Said to argue that the founders of the Turkish Republic bought

into the European view of “The Orient” and worked to create Turkey in the image of

Western Europe (2012). It then becomes essential for Turkey to ban the hijab as a visual

reminder of its modernity and liberalism. Turkey attempts to move as far away as it can

from its “backward and uncivilized” Ottoman past, whereas France tries to move as far

away from its memory of the failed ”civilizing mission” in Algeria and the bloody war that

resulted (Hashmi 2012).

Another common theme in the headscarf debate shared by both Turkey and France

is the women’s liberation argument. Many scholars, particularly Western feminist scholars,

argue that the veil is a sign of patriarchy and female submissiveness. Therefore, unveiling is

equivalent to the liberation of women. These scholars assert that women are coerced or

forced into wearing the hijab by men in their families and this represents control over

women and their bodies (Yildirim 2012; McRobbie 2011; Hashmi 2010; Vojdik 2010). This

ties into the last point regarding modernity, as well, because female liberation and equality

are seen as markers of a modern society. However, there is also critical scholarship that

calls into question the validity of the women’s liberation cause of the headscarf bans in

Turkey and France. This is particularly interesting because it questions the ways in which

laws have been passed and court proceedings handled. For example, the exclusion of

testimony from actual women who choose to wear veils in school and the failure to

understand the various motivations for wearing a veil and how they differ between women

are called into question (Vojdik 2010).

A wide range of literature exists that focuses particularly on the politics of the

headscarf bans in Turkey and France. Most literature cites politics, such as laïcité, and the

history of modernity in Turkey and France as the reasons for the headscarf bans. Other

literature focuses on feminism and masculinity and their relationships to the liberation of

women and the use of women’s bodies as political battlegrounds. However, while these

factors play a significant role in how the debate is framed and understood, there is a hole in

this scholarship in relation to the political economies of both France and Turkey and the

influence of neoliberalism and globalization.

Drawing upon Foucault’s theories on discipline, power and governmentality in

modernity, the headscarf bans in both Turkey and France can be seen as a way to

constitute a certain modern, neoliberal subject who will further the aims of and be a

productive member of the secular, modern, and neoliberal state. Secularism, and especially

laicism, represent a particular narrative of modernity and progress which wields power

over the “wayward bodies of those defined as existing outside the cultural boundaries of

the nation, particularly women and immigrants” (Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005). These

groups are seen to interfere with the progress, particularly the economic progress, of the

nation. The rhetoric of secularism is strategically manipulated to imply that religiosity, as

exemplified by veil-wearing women, is pre-modern or anti-modern. These women are seen

as “overly” religious and are framed as obstacles to progress, particularly economic

development, and are seen as threats to the influence of the nation in the regional and

global marketplace due to the visible representation of difference. The neoliberal individual

must not look “different” or show any particularistic ties that would prevent her from

competing effectively in the globalized market. It is in this way that globalization (and in

turn, neoliberalism) is seen not in the frame of tolerance for different cultures or as a way

to bring people together, but instead as a homogenizing process aimed to create a certain

type of neoliberal consumer.

Another interesting component in the creation of the neoliberal subject through

secularism is the triangulation of the state, economics and women’s autonomy. Veiled

women are often linked by those in power to the anti-liberal retardation of democracy,

economic development and women’s equality. This strategic trio serves a few main

purposes in the creation and reification of the neoliberal state. The first being the

construction of urban, cosmopolitan men as the ideal neoliberal subject in the globally

connected liberal nation. The second being the concept of the liberal state as the only

institution that can grant women protection and autonomy. It is through this state

protection and autonomy that women, like men, can also become individuated, neoliberal

subjects and finally assume their “rightful place as productive modern citizens” (2005).

This is especially true in Turkey, where the ideal secular, modern woman was not only

educated, professional and politically active, but also did not wear a veil. She became a

defeminized and asexualized subject, devoted completely to the economic progress of her

nation. It is also in this way that the veil has come to be associated with low class status and

provinciality, antitheses to the modernizing, neoliberal process.

Transnational Implications

It is important to note the involvement of supranational institutions in the headscarf

debate. There are two primary institutions that have become embroiled in this debate, the

EU and the ECHR. While there are other important implications, such as human rights and

gender equality concerns, I will focus particularly on the political economy of the situation.

Since the 1990s, several cases have been brought before the ECHR concerning Turkey and

France’s headscarf policies. The ECHR has ruled in favor of both Turkey and France on

several occasions, citing the maintenance of public order and democracy as main reasons

for upholding the bans on headscarves over the individual rights of the women involved.

The history of the EU and the admittance of Turkey to its member ranks is also of particular

interest, given that Turkey has been awaiting membership for almost fifteen years, longer

than any other country.

The most telling aspect of this issue, in terms of political economy, is the framing of

the rights of these Muslim women in each of these countries. Some opponents of the

ECHR’s rulings, such as non-governmental organizations and human rights advocates,

argue that since these women are tax-paying citizens in their respective countries, they

have a right to wear the headscarf as an assertion of their full rights of citizenship granted

to those who pay taxes to the government (Gokariksel and Mitchell 2005). These women

are effectively painted as consumers of the public spaces and services that they pay for

through taxes, and thus, have a right to equal access of those spaces and services, just like

their non-veiled tax-paying counterparts. It is through this assertion that we see not only

the state implementing a neoliberal framework for arguing against the donning of the

headscarf, but also by the opponents of such policies.

Turkey’s admittance to the EU is also another intersection of the neoliberal project

and veiled women. The motivations for Turkey joining the EU are primarily economic.

Membership would grant Turkey’s emerging economy a likely boost and solidify its place in

regional and global trade networks. Yet, the EU is easily seen as a ‘Christian club,’ given its

member states. Therefore, liberal political groups in Turkey are even more motivated to

adapt and enforce certain policies that show its neoliberal and secular qualities in an effort

to gain the admission to this exclusive alliance. Policymakers in Turkey, over the years,

have generally adopted and implemented laws and policies that concede to the commonly

held Western European belief of Islam as backwards and pre-modern. Although, the most

recent Islamist regime in Turkey has struggled to lessen the prevalence of this anti-Islamic

rhetoric. It remains to be seen what path the EU will take with Turkey or if Turkey will turn

away from its neoliberal regarding the headscarf, given the re-election of the current

Islamist regime.

Conclusion

Although the debates surrounding the headscarf have different origins in Turkey

and France, there are a certain threads of commonality, such as the narrative of

neoliberalism employed in defense of secularism, and in particular laicism. The concept of

laicism has been important to not only the political development of both Turkey and

France, but also to their economic development. In the modern era, laicism has also been

employed as a means of constituting the ideal, unattached neoliberal subject who is a

productive consumer in neoliberal society. This subject is disciplined and molded by the

liberal state through its policies regarding the “other,” such as veil wearing Muslim women,

and also by the policies of supranational institutions. Overall, the perpetual attention paid

to Muslim women’s headscarves in Turkey, France and throughout the world reflects the

fragility of (neo)liberalism and secularism. This becomes evident by not only the policies

adapted by each respective nation, but also the policies and rulings of transnational actors,

such as the ECHR and EU. Islam, as played out by the global headscarf debate in this

instance, has taken over the role that communism once held as a perceived threat to the

neoliberal global order.

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