targeting and leakages in transfer programs - innovations for
TRANSCRIPT
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Targeting and Leakages in Transfer Programs
Rema Hanna
Associate Professor, Harvard
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Targeted Social Programs
• Social programs that are directed towards the poor
• Increasingly common:
–Conditional Cash Transfer Programs, Food Subsidy Program, Health Insurance Schemes,
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Key Challenges
• Targeting:
– How do you identify the poor?
– Hard to observe income:
• Underground economies, in-kind income, instable/multiple forms of income
• Leakages:
– Once you find the poor, how do you ensure that they actually receive the social programs?
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“PMT” Targeting
• Common method as it does not rely on observing household income: 1. Using pre-existing survey data, create a
formula which maps hard-to-hide assets and demographics to consumption
2. Conduct asset census to collect these assets variables
3. Assign all households a consumption “score” based on formula
4. Those below cutoff are given program access
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Involving Communities
Strengths • Community may have
better information: – Harder to conceal income
from neighbors – PMT focus on assets may
miss transitory shocks
• Greater legitimacy, especially if PMT gets it wrong by community perception
Weaknesses • Risk of elite capture in
community methods (loss of legitimacy of program?)
• Community perception of poverty differs from government?
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Randomized Experiment
600 villages enrolled in
unconditional cash transfer program
PMT
(200 villages)
Community
(200 villages)
Hybrid
(200 villages)
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Randomized Experiment
600 villages enrolled in
unconditional cash transfer program
PMT
(200 villages)
Community
(200 villages)
Hybrid
(200 villages)
Due to random assignment, villages are the same other than the treatment -- Can compare outcomes across groups to learn relative effects of each method
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Community Targeting
• Community Meeting
–Stack of index cards, one for each household (randomly ordered)
–Facilitator led discussion on the poor (about 15 minutes)
–Start with the first two cards, then keep ranking cards one by one
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Hybrid
• Combine community and PMT
–Community meeting determines who the government should interview
–PMT determines eligibility
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Who should be at the meetings?
• Cheaper to just organize local leaders than large meetings…but increased risk of elite capture!
• Randomly divide half the community meetings and observe if outcomes differ:
–Local leaders invited (both formal and informal)
–Full community invite
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Beneficiaries Poorer Under PMT
• PMT centered to the left of community methods—better performing on average
• However, community methods select more of the very poor (those below $1 per day)
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However….
• Community methods better at matching “village” perceptions of who is poor and individual’s own “self-assessment” of their own poverty status
• Deeper analysis reveals that communities choose those that they perceive to be more vulnerable to poverty
–E.g. widows, those with bad shocks, lower education, more kids
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Elite Capture?
• We find no differences in targeting error rates between elite and full community meetings
• Two stories:
–No elite capture
–The elites also fully captured the community meetings/PMT
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No Elite Capture
• Look at targeting outcomes for the actual elites and their relatives
• In community methods, elites and their relatives are actually less likely become beneficiaries
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Satisfaction with Methods?
0
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Any Poor Households Excluded?
PMT Community Hybrid
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Community Method Has Highest Satisfaction and Legitimacy
• In measure of satisfaction we look at, community method ranked higher
• Hybrid ranks higher than PMT, but not as high as pure community
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Conclusion
• PMT targeting was better at finding the poor (based on consumption) than community methods, but the difference was not large
• Community methods was good at finding the poorest households, was not subject to elite capture, matched communities perception of poverty, and enjoyed the highest satisfaction level
• Method to choose based on government objectives
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Targeting II
• Findings from Targeting I experiment led to follow-up study
• Randomized experiment comparing PMT with self-targeting and an “improved” hybrid