task force cmrcf - technical - by engr norberto oller

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OVERALL FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS, COMMENTS & REMARKS ON THE

PROJECT ENGINEERING IMPLEMENTATION/MANAGEMENT ASPECTS

By: Engr. Norberto Oller

From the Chronology and Events, and other Sources

August 23, 2004 - formation of Iligan City Solid Waste Management Board- Executive

Order No. 79 various meetings, field trips to Solid Waste Facilities site

(Pagadian, Zamboanga, Malolos, Los Baños, Barangays in Metro

Manila, etc) and Bonbonon and other City Barangays

- Listening by the ICSWMB of various SWM Technology proponents

____ 4, 2005 – Order of Mayor Cruz for a Task Force to prepare a Feasibility Study

report “ for loan requirement from the banks “

September 14, 2005 - Submission of Feasibility Study

September 15, 2005 - Meeting and presentations with the DBP officials, Mayor

Lawrence Cruz and Councilor Ruiz (MOA of 9M ready for

signing by the City Mayor)

September 23, 2005 – Letter of Intent from the City Mayor submitted to DBP for loan of

P180M

September 26, 2005 – Certificate on availability of funds

March 23, 2006 - Engr. Quitos designated as Project Manager by virtue of Executive

Order No. 101 S. 2006

June 22, 2006 - Loan approval with DBP for P163M

August 9, 2006 - First trance ( P69M )

August 16, 2006 - Site development started

Remarks:

a. It took two (2) years to start site development from the formation of

ICSWMB; and

b. It took eleven (11) months from first availability of funds to start site devel-

opment

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BIDDINGS:

July 5, 2006 - Electronic copy for bid documents to BAC for supply and installation of

CMRCF equipment, infrastructure and appurtenances

July 25-26, 2006- Councilor Ruiz, Engr. Quitos, ML Lagaras, Taban and R. Dumadag visit

Pulilan, Bulacan (LACTO-ASIA) to finalize number of bins for CMRCF

Remarks:

a. It was specifically made known through personal interview that some technologi-

cal document used for bidding were supplied by LACTO-ASIA

August 18-24, 2006 – Publication for Invitation to bid and qualify

MAJOR CONTRACTS:

A. BRIMA CONSTRUCTION (November 3, 2008 , signed) buildings, etc.

for 150 calendar days

P 34,576,359.21

B. DACODECO Package B ( March 31, 2010, signed )


P 27,584, 055.04

C. LACTO-ASIA Package A ( July 8, 2010, signed )


P 29, 683, 485. 77

Remarks:

All these contracts had no proper date of completion.

Total amount for three packages is P 91, 843, 900. 02 with P197, 819,000.00 as total

cost of project. Therefore, for the three, the amount of contract is

91, 843, 900.02 = 46.43%

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197,819,000.00

The major component of the CMRCF is only 46.43% of the total project cost.

IRR- RULE IX WASTE SEGREGATION AT SOURCE

Sect. 1. Waste Segregation & Volume reduction at Source.- Volume reduction at the

source shall be the first priority of the ecological SWM system. All LGUs shall actively pro-

mote among its constituencies the reduction and minimization of wastes generated at

source; responsibility for sorting and segregation of biodegradable and non-biodegradable

wastes shall be at the household level, business, commercial, industrial and institutional

centers, and in all other point sources of solid wastes.

actively promote –-> none

no mention of % reduction, much more 25%

no mention of how said reduction be made, unlike in the following rule (Rule X)

wherein the how are spelled out .

RESOLUTION 09-373 STRENGTHENING R.A. 9003

Sect. 20a. Source Reduction.- Waste generators shall think of ways to reduce (generation

of wastes before they enter the solid waste stream).

Sect. 1, Rule IX of IRR specifies LGU's to actively campaign, the local resolution ( in support

of R.A. 9003 ) conferred upon the waste generators the “how” to reduce wastes. There is no

complementarity between the law and the resolution.

3. Per contract, all three should have been completed by December 2010. The years 2011,

2012 and the first half of 2013 would have been used to:

a. make the CMRCF be fully operational; b. know its defects, flaws, problems and corrections made; c. the marketing aspect would have been put in place; d. barangay (and residence) participation would have been in place

Sadly, because of poor project management, all the above ( a,b,c and d ) were not real-

ized and the problem is inherited by the new administration.

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ANALYSIS: INTEREST EXPENSES Re: CMRCF

For the loan of P163, 638,000 from DBP signed June 22, 2006, the Project Proponent

of the City Material Recovery and Composting Facility made these withdrawals, to wit:

August 9, 2006 - P69, 978,000.00

January 31, 2009 - P78, 050,000.00

January 31, 2012 - P15, 610,000.00

On first glance, the tranches made looks remarkable, one every three (3) years. On

deeper analysis, it will show such withdrawals caused the project (and the city) unneces-

sary interest expense.

This project did not have cash disbursement schedule – the amount of expenses that

are estimated to be incurred within, say a 3, 6, or 12 months’ time. Had it have such, the

tranches from the bank would have made to coincide with the schedule of payments- such

that the amount withdrawn from the bank would just be enough (or a little more than the

estimated expenses).

Remember, that the interest payment (and that of the principal) starts upon with-

drawal of any amount. Any amount withdrawn and unused after 6 or 12 months incurred

unnecessary interest expense.

The summary (and subsequent computation) will show the unnecessary interest

payments, corresponding to the amounts, cash-on-hand after each indicated dates.

The interest expense is computed at:

COH x 10% x 6/12 = Interest Expense

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From the SUMMARY: SUBSIDIARY LEDGER

INTEREST EXPENSES

*2 - P3,323,000 6 months

*3 - P3,498,000 12 months

*4 - P713,000 3 months

*5 - P3,993,000 6 months

*6 - P3,723,000 6 months

*7 - P3,579,000 6 months

*8 - P2,569,000 6 months

*9 - P1,822,000 6 months

*10 - P1,113,000 6 months

*11 - P356,000 6 months

*12 - P862,000 6 months

*13 - P706,000 6 months

*14 - P471,000 4 months to date ( Jan 31,2014) ________________

P 26,729,000

Had there been a cash disbursement schedule tied with the withdrawals from the

bank to insure say P2, 000,000 cash-on-hand at the end of every 6 months, the amount for

interest expenses (unnecessary) for the above periods would have been minimized to

P2,600,000.00

SUMMARY: SUBSIDIARY LEDGER

August 3, 2006 – September 30, 2013

Date CASH-ON-HAND DRAWDOWN New COH EXPENSES

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April 3, 2006 9,000,000 9,000,000

Aug. 9, 2006 2,951,309 69,978,000(01) 72,929,309

71,597,791 1,331,713 *1

March 6,2007 70,249,218

Aug. 15,2007 66,469,737 *2 6,459,972

Feb. 12, 2008 43,567,547

Aug.8,2008 34,978,867 *3 31,490,870

Nov.20,2008 28,538,074 *4 5,186,453

Jan. 31, 2009 26,821,496 78,050,000(02 ) 104,871,496

July 1, 2009 79,876,950 *5 24,794,546

Dec.31,2009 74,468,795 *6 5,408,155

July 2, 2010 71,519,239 *7 2,949,556

Dec.31,2010 51,394,251 *8 20,124,988

July 1, 2011 36,454,417 *9 14,939,834

Dec. 31, 2011 22,262,654 *10

July 3, 2012 7,132,577 *11

July 31, 2012 7,055,048 15,610,000(03 ) 22,665,048

Dec 31, 2012 17,252,420 *12 5,412,628

June 30, 2013 14,137,615 *13

Sept 30, 2013 14,144,881 *14 3,107,533

Legend:

*1. Amount paid to DBP upon loan approval

01 - 1st tranche

02 - 2nd tranche

03 - 3rd tranche

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*3 – P 18,748,706 (December 28, 2007 adjustment on unrecorded debit memo for fur-

ther verification due to insufficient data

= 2,000,000 x 10% x 13 periods

= 2,600,000

The interest expense that would have been prevented or minimized would be:

= P 26,729,000

- 2,600,000

______________________

P 24,129,000 total unnecessary interest expenses in CMRCF project (due to early

drawdowns)

OBSERVATIONS (major):

- Seemingly, a lot of irregularities plagued the projects, to wit:

a. Per chronology of events from Sept. 14, 2005 (Submission of Feasibility Study)

to July 8, 2010 (Contract signed between Lacto-Asia and the City Government

of Iligan)

a1. Four (4) years and ten (10) months from FS to contract signing

a2. This contract was supposedly for 150 calendar days completion (or Dec.8, 2010 )

but was actually “delivered and turned over” March 2011 – delayed by 3months. Same

equipment set up started operation September 23, 2012 (another period of 1 ½ years ),

but still not fully commissioned.

b. From documents (Solid Waste Management Project- Accomplishment Report )

July 14, 2010 April 4, 2012

b1. Lacto-Asia- CMRCF Equipment ( Package B )

P 29,683, 485.27 – project cost

July 14, 2010 – project started

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Duration - 150 days

Dec. 10, 2010 - target date of completion

1st Time extension - 92 days (Dec 10, 2010 to march 12, 2011)

2nd time extension - 19 days (March 12, 2011 to March 31, 2011)

Suspension Order - April 1, 2011 (unavailability of power supply/transformer)

“Project had test run on September 24, 2012 but without actual capacity run- NO

COMMISSIONING DONE”

b2. BRIMA- BUILDINGS

P 34,576,359.21 - project cost

3,385,988.60 - 1st Extra Works

2,188,001.19 - 2nd Extra Works

-P 5,573,989 (Total of Extra Works =16.10% of project cost)

40,150,349.00 - total cost

Nov. 26, 2008 - date started

Duration - 150 days

April 16, 2009 - target date of completion

June 26,2009 - revised target date (1st)

Sept 26, 2009 - revised target date (2nd)

“No record of completion date”

June 30, 2011 - last payment (final Billing)

b2. Questionable entries in costs are:

P 3,101,502 - lump sum bid for special items facilities to the engineer

25,680 - five (5) entries- miscellaneous works (reproduction of plans,

Supporting documents, contracts, testing of materials and

permit

Fees (P 128,400- total)

128,400 - similar entries for administrative building only

___________________________

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P 3,358,302 -- total

--- A 16.12% Extra Works is too much

--- How would one consider the above amount P 3, 358,302? Highly questionable?

C. DACODECO – Package A

P 27,584,055.53 - contract amount

1,481,128.34 - Change Order No. 1

3,130,309.62 - Extra Work No. 1

1,691,627.02 - Extra Work No. 2

-P 6,305,065.00 total Change order, Extra works 1&2

-22.85% of contract amount

33,889,120.52 - total

May 18, 2010 - date started

Duration - 150 days

Oct. 14, 2010 - target date of completion

Feb. 21,2011 - revised target date, (1st)

May 5, 2011 - revised target date, (2nd)

May 21,2011 - revised target date, (3rd)

“NO record of Completion date”

March 2, 2011 - record of last payment at 98.99% accomplishment

P128,800 - recorded unit price for “miscellaneous works for

(Reproduction of plans, supporting documents, contracts,

Testing of materials and permit fees)”

“Compare this with BRIMA whose amount for same

Miscellaneous Works is P 128,400”

OVERALL REMARKS:

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1. The Project Proponent clearly does not have experience in project man-

agement.

a. People selected similarly lack skills and know-how in project design,

engineering, implementation and overall management

2. There was clear reliance and preferential treatment with a contractor,

from the preparation of the feasibility study, design and consequent

“marketing” of product. Prices and cost of equipment were bloated. ---

LACTO-ASIA

3. In two (2) other contractors:

a. The Extra Works of 16.12% and 22.85% of contract amounts are

subject to Annex “E” Contract Implementation Guidelines for the

Procurement of Infrastructure Projects of IRR-A of R.A. 9184 yet

none were made.

b. There were no record of penalties despite the many revision of

target (contracted completion dates). One contractor, DACODECO,

contributed to so much delay, yet no action was ever made.

c. Both use similar (almost) unit price in a “miscellaneous” item that

one could only think of a very glaring “uniform treatment.”

4. Three (3) units in the financial report “do not have a clear explanation”

D1.from actual expenditure as of 12/31/2013

P 19,257,254.50 -garbage trucks and related expenses

6,228,356.00 - repair and upgrading of seven (7) units existing

Garbage trucks

4,808,847.32 - other expenses (payloader)

______________________

30,294,457.82 - government requirement for the SWM project

“an explanation should be made”

D2. From Subsidiary Ledger (July 1, 2005 to September 30,2013)

P 18,748,706.90 -posted Dec. 28, 2007 “Adjustment on Unrecorded Debit Memo-Trade Operations dated 10/09/07 (for further verification due to insufficient data) “an explanation should be made”

5. The DBP Loan Agreement allowed multiple drawdowns. Once a draw-

down is made, the terms of payment start (principal and interest pay-ments). Had there been a “serious effort in projecting (and making) a pro-

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ject disbursement (or expense) schedule”, the drawdowns- amount and number- would have been so scheduled so as to get just the right amount (with little buffer or extra) such that at the end of every 6 months of 12months, the remaining cash-on-hand would be minimal, thereby in-curring high and premature interest payments.

The effect of no proper financial management is the unnecessary premature interest expense of about P 24,129,000.00 Clearly, not only was there poor project management, there was also MANIPULATED financial mismanagement.

CONCLUSION: The major contributions to the tragic result of the project: a. Poor management (project/financial) b. Personality infusion c. Political patronage d. Inadequate experienced personnel e. Non-engagement of proper consultants f. Non-involvement of civil society organizations

PROJECT CONCEPT ANALYSIS

165 165

40? 125

BCS BCS

PSD PSD

PSD Residual residual (+45)

H.M.H.R Hos FuP H.M.H.R. HoS FuP

BMRF (40) B.M.R.F. (40)

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85 sorted M 80 sorted M

raw raw

materials materials

compost

residual compost

residual

RESIDUAL AREA RESIDUAL AREA

CURRENT SITUATION

PSD

165

80

raw materials

85

compost

residual

CMRCF (80 tpd) C.M.R.C.F.

H.M.H.R. Hos FuP

CMRCF

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option:

Controlled Dumpsite—short/medium term

Sanitary Landfill--- Medium and Long term

PROJECT CONCEPT:

1. Source Reduction (20%)

- Highly unrealistic

- Highly un-implementable

- Needs so much effort or campaign

- Ningas Cogon mentality of the people

2. Use of barangay Materials Recovery and Facility

Areas of concern:

- Continuing budget support from city

- Concept of marketing (highly a dream)

- Needs people to manage and sell

- Space- a question with neighbors

- Needs Barangay collection facilities and people collector

- Residual- for transport to CMRCF or final residual area

3. CMRCF

Areas of concern:

- Budget

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- People / Organization

- Operational/ management/ Financial support

- Facilities (dumptrucks, payloaders, etc…)

- Raw materials (for compost)

- Facility maintenance

- Areas ---- sorted materials / residuals

OBSERVATIONS AT SITIO BANGKO, BARANGAY BONBONON: ( JANUARY 07, 2014)

Today, we went to Bonbonon- site of CMRCF

1. Road is uphill most of the time, paved

-will mean more maintenance cost for delivery trucks

2. Area – approach, concreted is too steep downhill. Vehicle/car may slip

3. Bodegas are full of segregated materials, still inside, are eating of lot of space. No end to

disposal problem.

4. Area outside are filled with segregated materials, again eating a lot space- no one re-

design

5. Compost bins – may filled up – appears not moving, or no takers

6. Equipment set-up

a. Receiving Hopper- of thin material will erode in a year or two.

Supports-to light duty-

b. Materials dumped are truly mixed- plastic, cartons, papers, organic, etc.. The

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feeding to a small feed conveyor was too slow.

c. conveyors are slow speed, not even 10% filled, plenty of segregates (#20+)

d. Rotary Screen – only one ( 1 )- purely to segregate organic (and small size) from

plastics

e. Hammermill- 2 units, almost empty, (feed end)

f. Compactor – 28 units

-Manually feed by a wheel barrow from the end-of-conveyor-

one wb/45 minutes

-“droppings (wet) goes to floor - had to be swept

g. waste vault – no access for cleaning and withdrawal

h. Transformer- MAIN

- the 3 transformers initially delivered (off-specs and second-hand)

are still inside the compound.

• From the time we arrived (≈9am) up to time we left (≈11am), there was no garbage

delivered

• Discharge points (2 at both ends) of hopper are manned by a person each,

Hooking the garbage to a receiving conveyor. Feed slow, controlled

• All conveyors seem to slow

• All conveyors barely filled

• So much “sorter” at practically all conveyors

• Ground too messy

• Sorted or segregated materials go to another place or bins for further sorting- then

what?

• Only one rotary screen. Normally should have been in tandem so if one conks out,

the other one should remain, no disruption in operation.

• Feed to the rotary composter drums (28) is via conveyor, then to a wheelbarrow.

Discharge with only one /28 RCD was operating.

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• Again, spill outs for RCDrums goes down to concrete floor and has to be swept.

Remarks:

A. Manpower

1.too labor intensive- so many sorters

- worker at almost all equipment

-so much manual activities

-so much work, rework , re-rework

• Delivery of garbage

• Feeding to conveyors- CMRCF equipment

• Sorting/segregation

• Watching at/feed and head end (conveyors/rotary screens)

• Removal of sorted materials

• Transfer of dump material from head-

• Sweeping of floors CMRCF buildings, warehouses, open areas)

QUESTIONS:

• Where will the segregated materials go?

• From composting bins, where will the compost go?

• How are hazardous (hospital) waste delivered to its storage area- no means of ac-

cess

Overall Remarks:

1. Project: A failure!

A1. In area of capacity:

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Actual garbage collected is 165 tpd. Capacity of CMRCF is only 80 tpd. Reliance on

sources and barangays to reduce by 80tpd not achieved due to: (i) poor Information Educa-

tion Campaign; (ii) misinterpretation of R.A. 9003; (iii) unrealistic assumptions

B. Project Implementation:

• Two major contractors, BRIMA and DACODECO incurred so much delays but with-

out penalties whatsoever

• Same contractors had extra works beyond 10% as allowed by law, but appeared tol-

erated as extra works/changed orders were split to small sizes

The other contractor, LACTO-ASIA plainly went into Dry Run/ Test Run without proper

presentation for a real commissioning run. Yet, the contract was deemed accept-

ed/completed.

• The personnel (City) assigned to oversee. Administration portion of the project took

so long to implement then- with so much cost (P44M).

C. Financial Management

• The project does not have a real honest-to-goodness implementation schedule of

start and implementation such that it did not have a cash disbursement/expense schedule.

With the above, the drawdowns from the bank, DBP would have been so contacted and

scheduled as to have only a minimum amount at the end- every 6 months period, which

would have resulted to minimum interest charges. Per our findings, the City could have

avoided aprroximately P24M in interest payment. Interest payment from Aug 06->Feb2012

is P56,675,000.00

• On administration implementation part of the projects, the salaries and wages was

approximately P11M which was about 25% of the cost, quite unrealistic, and which were

during 2007 & 2009/2010- campaign and election period.

• From financial reports –“subsidiary ledgers”, “summary of expenses and appropria-

tions” project summary, etc.. questionable entries abound:

• Such entries indicate collusions, preferences, prior arrangements, etc. which shows

that the personnel either do not know what they were doing or were part of the “system”.

D. Overall Project Management

• The project proponent does not know anything about managing a project, with its

related resource management. He handpicked people from the City Employees- from prep-

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aration of FS to project designing and implementation- all of whom do not have the track

record/experience in those areas. The wrong concept of not hiring consultants truly

knowledgeable in project and financial management caused the long implementation and

additional costs.

E. Personal Interests:

The many findings of the group shows so much personal interests placed ahead of the pro-

ject interest. The major findings:

E1.preference of project contractor

E2.Extra works beyond 10% of contract price

E3.Project delays without penalties, without record of turn-over but with 10%

retention paid

E4. No commissioning run

E5. Many questionable cost/expense inputs at all points (administration, dump trucks, and

three contractors)

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OUTLINE:

Iligan used as open dumpsite Barangay Santiago for more than 30 years.

Republic Act 9003 promulgated on January 26, 2001 “ An Act Providing for an Ecological

Solid Waste Management Program, Creating the Necessary Institutional Mechanisms and

Incentives, Declaring Certain Acts Prohibited and Providing Penalties, Appropriating Funds

Therefore, And for Other Purposes.

Implementing Rules and Regulations specifies;

Open Dumpsite - prohibited by 2005

Controlled Dumpsite - prohibited by 2007

On August 23, 2004:

City Mayor Cruz issued Executive order No. 79 constituting the composition of Iligan City

waste management Board (ICSWB) pursuant to provision of Republic Act 9003.

On September 10, 2004:

A Technical Working Group (TWG) was formed and this group made visits to Pagadian;

Zamboanga City; Ozamiz; Malolos, Bulacan; and Los Baños, Laguna to see various technol-

ogies.

Solid Waste Technology presentations were likewise made (Lacto-Asia,G & O and La Salle).

Visits to various sites in Iligan City for MRF were likewise made.

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On September 14, 2005:

A Feasibility Study was completed in compliance to the directive/letter of Mayor Cruz and

as part of a loan requirement from the banks that a feasibility study shall be prepared.

The Feasibility Study showed among others:

The members of the Feasibility Study team, except for one, are all permanent employees of

the City Government, handpicked by the project proponent.

Comment/Remark:

For projects, bidders are normally invited by virtue of their track records on similar

projects and eventually (normally), the one with best track record and who comply with

the Approved Budget of the Contract (ABC) gets the award. In this case, however, on a very

important project that affects the life of major component of the residence of Iligan, the

personnel used were purely “there”, chosen without regards to whether they had under-

taken similar activity (such as the preparation of the F/S) in the past. The quality of the F/S

depends a lot on the people preparing it! Sadly, the result showed the negative, as the suc-

ceeding comments will show.

From page 15/54 of F/S.

The projected volume of the municipal solid waste (MSW) of the City is 123

tons per day at 0.69 kg/capita and at 0.85% collection efficiency (Annex 4.1)

Comment/Remarks:

The above statement is not correct in relation to Annex 4.1 which shows:

a. 280, 662 - projected area population

b. 0.69/day/pax - waste generation per capita

c. 193.7 tpd - estimated generation loose

d. 164.6 tpd - estimated waste collection (at 85% efficiency)

e. 25% - assumed waste reduction

f. 123.5 tpd - daily, total mixed (MSW)

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Item d, 164.6 tpd is the volume of municipal solid waste (at 85% collection of 193.7

tpd loss generation volume), not 123.5 tpd that will be collected.

d1. It seems that even on a simple interpretation, those who made the study do not

know.

d2. There is a big difference between 0.85% (page 15/54) from that of 85% (at An-

nex 4.1), another clear indication of people not knowing that they are writing, much more

interpreting.

From page 15/24 of F/S

Eighty tons (80 tpd) shall be processed by CMRCF while the remainder of 43 tons

shall be handled by the Barangays who are mandated by R.A. 9003 to also set up their own

individual Barangay material Recovery Facility (BMRF). An active waste segregation pro-

gram shall also be instituted in order to reduce the volumes expected for processing.

Comment/Remarks:

Section 20 of R.A. 9003 mandates diversion of 25% of all solid waste from waste

disposal facilities, wherein the volume of municipal solid waste would be;

164.6 tpd x (1-25%) = 123.5 tpd

The 123.5 tpd is the result of 25% reduction (from 164.6 tpd collected) at the Ba-

rangay Material Recovery Facility- for year 2007. Therefore, with 2007 as base year (ac-

cording to project proponent, this was the target completion of project) the capacity of

CMRCF should then be 123.5 tpd, not 80 tpd.

However, since the project proponent has the so called “10 years Solid Waste Man-

agement Plan” the capacity of CMRCF should then have been on the capacity required on

the 10th year, and that should be 149 tpd based on their own table (Annex 4.3).

The project proponents made as reason for the two (2) 25% reduction the following:

a. 25% from barangays

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b. 25% from source

Comment/Remarks:

4A. Sect. 20 “Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion - Each LGU plan shall in-

clude an implementation schedule which shows that within five (5) years after the

effectivity of this Act, the LGU shall divert at least 25% of all solid waste from waste dispos-

al facilities through re-use, recycling and composting activities and other resource recovery

activities; Provided, That the waste diversion goals shall be increased every three (3) years

thereafter; Provided, further, That nothing in this Section prohibits a local government unit

from implementing re-use, recycling, and composting activities designed to exceed the

goal”. (Sect. 20 of R.A. 9003)

This section specifies 25% diversion of solid waste “from waste disposal facilities”

meaning, municipal solid wastes would have to be collected first and delivered to a wste

disposal facility where the 25% diversion shall be done.

-this has bearing on the numbers of vehicles needed for collection

-the remaining 75% goes to the final Central Material Recovery Facility

4B. Sect. 21. Mandatory Segregation of Solid Wastes - The LGUs shall evaluate alter-

native roles for the public and private sectors in providing collection services, type of col-

lection system, or combination of systems, that best meet their needs: Provided, That seg-

regation of wastes shall primarily be conducted at the source, to include household, institu-

tional, industrial, commercial and agricultural sources: Provided, further; That wastes shall

be segregated into the categories provided in Sec. 22 of this Act.

For premises containing six (6) or more residential units, the local government unit shall

promulgate regulations requiring the owner or person in charge of such premises to:

(a) provide for the residents a designated area and containers in which to accumulate

source separated recyclable materials to be collected by the municipality or private center;

and

(b) notify the occupants of each buildings of the requirements of this Act and the regula-

tions promulgated pursuant thereto ( Sect. 21 of R.A. 9003)

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This section specifies “segregation of wastes shall be conducted at the source”.

There is not a single word in here that “mandates” reduction at source. Yet, the project

proponents made as basis of the capacity of the CMRCF the two (2) 25% reduction. Please

note again on preceding enumeration 4A, that barangay participation and its campaign was

done only in years 2011 and 2012. ( Status Report of Engr. Quitos, Jr. pp 6-10)

Page 89 of same report dated December 2012 states “An Active waste segregation

program shall be instituted immediately in order to reduce the volumes expected for pro-

cessing”, showing proof that there was NO program, yet, properly in place by that time, yet

such reduction in capacity of CMRCF had been sadly incorporated. For the household and

other sources of wastes, there was no proper program disseminated, much more commit-

ment of support.

(This holds true also on the barangay level-there was no commitment of support as there

was no honest to goodness program convincing enough for the barangays.)

The F/S never mentioned of other means to solve the garbage problem (use of equipment

technology, sanitary landfill, etc.) It did not have also any comparative analysis whatsoever

between the technologies available (using equipment). The F/S went straight into use of

the system of an inventor (Lacto-Asia) as foundation of CMRCF.

Please Note:

September 14, 2005 - F/S signed, submitted

December 26-27, 2006 - CB Garay/Philwide Builders Asia Envirocon Consortium was

declared “lowest evaluated bidder” post qualification by BAC-TWG

dated Jan. 2, 2007

February 1, 2007 - Comments from Hon. C.D. Ruiz to the BAC regarding TWG post

qualification report

April 3, 2007 - BAC Resolution No. 033 S. 2007

- Recommend failure of bidding for the CMRCF project (Construction,

Supply, Installation) thru design, build and operate

source of implementation

of 24

August 6, 2007 - Evaluation Committee agreed on use of mechanized segregation

with composting technology

December 8, 2008 - pre-procurement conference ( Package A & Package B)

September 23, 2009 - only one bidder submitted bid proposal (LACTO-ASIA) for

Package B

March 4, 2010 - Package B failure of bidding (2nd time)

April 8, 2010 - Pre-bid Conference Package B

April 22, 2010 - Submission of two (2) bidders for Package B

(Brima Construction & Ent./ I.M. Bongar & Co, Inc (JV) / LACTO-ASIA)

June 10, 2010 - BAC declared Lacto-Asia as Investment Calculated responsive Bid

July 6, 2010 - Lacto- Asia accepted Award

July 8, 2010 - Contract signed between Lacto-Asia & CG1.

“NEGOTIATED CONTRACT FOR ILIGAN SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROJECT-

PACKAGE B”

The above narrative will show to what extent Lacto-Asia was given special treatment in

this project.

The word “negotiated” did not appear in the contract with BRIMA & DACODECO

This “special treatment” had been planned way in advance as stated in pages 12/54 of the

F/S to wit:

The City Material Recovery and Composting Facility shall be operated by the FACILITY

MANAGER, – which is the winning supplier of the material recovery and composting facili-

ties to be bid out.

Submitted by:

Engr. Norberto Oller

task force cmrcf - technical - by engr norberto oller

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