PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETINForrest, Feldman / DETECTING DECEPTION

Detecting Deception and JudgesInvolvement: Lower TaskInvolvement Leads to Better Lie Detection

James A. ForrestRobert S. FeldmanUniversity of Massachusetts at Amherst

Videotaped samples of target individuals making honest or dis-honest statements were shown to 66 male and female partici-pants who judged each sample in terms of honesty. The partici-pants were either highly involved in the judging task or relativelyuninvolved. It was assumed that highly involved participantswould engage in central route processing and therefore attendmore to the verbal message, whereas less-involved participantswould engage in peripheral route processing and thereforeattend more to the nonverbal behavior of the targets. Becausenonverbal cues are most indicative of deception, it was hypothe-sizedand foundthat low-involvement participants wouldbe more accurate at detecting deception than would high-involvement participants. Furthermore, gender differences andsupport for a motivational impairment effect were found, inwhich lies told by people who were highly motivated to lie success-fully were more easily detected.

A significant body of research has examined thedegree to which people are able to identify deceptivemessages emanating from a target person (DePaulo,1994; Feldman & Rim, 1991). For instance, Kraut(1980) found that people are able to differentiate cor-rectly between honest and dishonest statements about60% of the time, not terribly impressive in light ofchance being 50%. Other research finds that althoughmembers of particular groups, such as U.S. Secret Serviceagents, show relatively greater success at detectingdeception (Ekman & OSullivan, 1991), the accuracy ofmost groups at distinguishing between people being hon-est and dishonest is not much better than chance levels.

Much of the research examining the ability to detectdeception has focused on demographic and personalityfactors, with limited success. For example, Keating andHeltman (1994) hypothesized that being a good deceiver

might be one way in which highly dominant peopleachieve social power, but they found no relationshipbetween dominance and the ability to detect deception.DePaulo and Tang (1994) found that socially anxiouspeople are worse at detecting deception than arenonsocially anxious individuals. Gender differencesalso have been investigated, and women have beenfound to be better than men at detecting peoples actualaffective state (Ekman, 1985) and better at decodingnonverbal behaviors (Zuckerman, Lipets, Koivumaki, &Rosenthal, 1975). Although a greater ability to decodenonverbal behaviors could translate into greater abilityto detect deception, a meta-analysis of the literaturefound no significant differences between men andwomen in detecting deception (DePaulo, Epstein, &Wyer, 1993).

Other studies suggest that the most accurate judges indetecting deception are those who pay attention to thenonverbal behaviors of communicators because nonver-bal behaviors are more predictive of deception than areother types of behavior (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter,1985a; Ekman & OSullivan, 1991; Zuckerman, DePaulo, &Rosenthal, 1981; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985). Specifi-cally, DePaulo et al. (1985a) showed, through meta-analyses of deception studies, that various cues are relia-bly associated with deception. For example, speech

Authors Note: This material is based on work supported under a Na-tional Science Foundation Graduate Student Fellowship and the Uni-versity of Massachusetts Office of Minority Graduate StudentRecruitment to the first author. Correspondence concerning this arti-cle should be addressed to James A. Forrest or Robert S. Feldman at theDepartment of Psychology, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA01003; e-mail: jforrest@medusa.sbs.umass.edu or feldman@psych.umass.edu.

PSPB, Vol. 26 No. 1, January 2000 118-125 2000 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

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hesitation, pitch, and speech errors are cues that predictdeception.

Despite the existence of a large body of research onnonverbal cues and deception, relatively little researchhas focused on theoretical explanations for theprocesses that underlie the ability to successfully detectdeception. Consequently, it is useful to turn to broaderdomains of interpersonal communication to develop abetter theoretical understanding of deception. Specifi-cally, the literature on persuasion, which involves con-vincing a target to accept a message, seems relevant tosituations in which communicators are attempting toconvince a target that their message is true.

One theoretical approach from the persuasion litera-ture that is particularly relevant to the deception litera-ture is the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of Pettyand Cacioppo (1981, 1986). This model suggests thatpeople who are highly involved in a judgment task willuse what Petty and Cacioppo refer to as central informa-tion processing. While using central processing, peoplerely on a rational process in which they attend to the con-tent of what is being said, seek to understand it, andmake an evaluation of the message. Petty and Cacioppo(1986) also suggest that there is a second processingroute that people might use when encountering a per-suasive message: peripheral information processing. Inperipheral processing, people pay attention to periph-eral cues, which are factorssuch as a speakers nonver-bal behavior or demeanorthat are not related to thecentral arguments of the message.

In a study that provides some evidence for associatingperipheral processing with nonverbal cues and centralprocessing with verbal cues, Stiff et al. (1989) found thatpeople engaging in systematic processing only pay atten-tion to verbal cues when judging deception, whereaspeople using peripheral processing pay attention toboth visual and (to some extent) verbal cues. Given thatthe cues that are most predictive of deception are non-verbal cues, which may be unrelated to the central meritsof a persuasive appeal, the ELM leads to an interestingpossibility: Increases in personal involvement, whichlead to central route processing, might lead to worseidentification of deception. In contrast, lower degrees ofinvolvement, in which processing follows the peripheralroute, might lead to better identification of deception.

In sum, by combining the ELM framework and theresearch on cues to deception, several hypotheses can besuggested concerning motivation to scrutinize and itseffect on the accuracy of detecting deception: (a) whenusing the central route, people attend to what a targetperson is saying and then make an assessment about theveracity of that message and (b) when using the periph-eral route, people attend more to peripheral cues, whichinclude the nonverbal cues associated with deception.

Consequently, when judging a message for sincerity, it isreasonable to assume that people who use differentroutes for message processing will attribute deception indifferent ways. Specifically, people using the centralroute will presumably attend more to the verbal compo-nents of a message, which are relatively poor indicatorsof deception (DePaulo et al., 1985a). In contrast, peopleengaged in peripheral route processing might attendless to the relatively uninformative verbal aspects of amessage and more to its nonverbal aspects and conse-quently be better detectors of deception. In short, highmotivation to scrutinize a message may actually lead toless success at detection than low motivation to scruti-nize a message.

In this study, we manipulated the motivation of decep-tion detectors to vary central and peripheral processing.It was expected that judges who were highly motivated toscrutinize a message would engage in central processingand consequently would be less likely to use the moreinformative nonverbal cues to deception, focusinginstead on the verbal message. In contrast, less-motivated judges were expected to engage in peripheralprocessing and consequently would be more likely to usenonverbal cues. In short, it was predicted that the lessmotivated lie detectors were, the more accurate theywould be in distinguishing honest from dishoneststatements.

Several other aspects of lie detection also were investi-gated in this study. Previous research suggests that peo-ple who are highly motivated to deceive (because decep-tive ability is viewed as either a mark of competence orseems highly relevant for some other reason) are less suc-cessful at deceiving than are people who are less moti-vated (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1988; DePaulo, Kirkendol,Tang, & OBrien, 1988). Furthermore, although meta-analyses show no difference between men and women intheir ability to detect deception (DePaulo et al., 1993),DePaulo, Stone, and Lassiter (1985b) suggest that insome situations, female targets might be more motivatedto appear sincere than males and thus tell lies that aremore discernible.

To summarize, this study manipulates judges involve-ment in the task to investigate the underlying processesrelated to detecting deception. Target motivation, targetsex, and judge sex also were investigated as possible fac-tors in determining accuracy at detecting deception.Assuming that highly involved people primarily attendto the verbal aspects of a deceptive message and thatless-involved people primarily attend to the nonverbalaspects of a deceptive message, we hypothesized thatjudges in the high-involvement condition would be lesssuccessful at differentiating between honest and dishon-est statements than would judges in the low-involvementcondition.

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METHOD

Overview

In the first part of the study, the procedure used byDePaulo et al. (1988) was replicated to create videotapesof people being deceptive or honest. Undergraduateparticipants (targets) were asked to present certain atti-tudes to their partners, who supposedly were behind aone-way mirror. The target persons motivation wasmanipulated by instructions that described the ability tomake favorable impressions as related (high motivation)or not related (low motivation) to achievement in sociallife, professions, and school. The targets were given fourissues to talk about and were instructed to give proattitu-dinal arguments for two of those issues (honest condi-tion) and counterattitudinal arguments for the othertwo issues (dishonest condition).

In the second part of the study, judges watched video-tape samples of the messages provided by the targets andjudged each message in terms of the targets perceivedsincerity. Judge involvement was manipulated by amethod similar to that used by Chaiken (1980), who toldjudges that after the tape was viewed, questions would beasked about the messages on the tape (high involve-ment) or about different messages that were not on thetape (low involvement). Judges rated each message interms of the perceived sincerity of the target person.

Targets

Twenty-four University of Massachusetts at Amherstintroductory psychology students (12 men, 12 women)received experimental credits for their participation.Two individuals who did not consent to the use of theirtaped interviews were excluded, as were six individualswho did not follow instructions. Furthermore, becauseZebrowitz, Voinescu, and Collins (1996) found a rela-tionship between attractiveness and perceived honesty,the 16 remaining targets (8 mean, 8 women) were ratedfor attractiveness. Twenty graduate and undergraduatestudents rated each target person on a 7-point scaleanchored at very attractive and very unattractive to screenout individuals who differed significantly from thenorm. No target person was rated above or below 2 stan-dard deviations from the mean, so all of them wereemployed.

Encoding Procedure

Targets were run one at a time and were told, Thestudy consisted of peoples ability to make impressionson others in different situations. First, the target personwas told that the other participant had not arrived yetbut in the meantime he or she could fill out a question-naire. While waiting for the other participant (who wasfictitious), the target person was asked if he or she

agreed or disagreed with each of the four attitude state-ments. The statements were as follows: (a) The deathpenalty should be instituted in all states; (b) There is toomuch violence on television; (c) Nuclear power plantsare not very safe; and (d) The government should putfurther restrictions on immigration. These four attitudestatements were selected from a larger pool of state-ments on the basis of the following criteria: (a) the meanattitude rating for each item was close to the midpoint,(b) the items were not intercorrelated, and (c) most peo-ple did not regard the issue described in the items asvery important or very unimportant.

After 2 minutes, the experimenter collected the ques-tionnaire and handed out a set of instructions. The tar-get person read the instructions, which explained thatthe aim of the study was to examine the ability to makeimpressions on others in difficult circumstances. Thetarget persons motivation to make a good impressionwas manipulated by varying the characterization of theability to make impressions. In a high-motivation condi-tion, targets were told that the ability represented anextremely important skill . . . [which] predicts very wellsuccess in professions such as business, counseling, andhealth . . . the ability to make and maintain friends . . . andintelligen[ce] in a way that is not measured by the con-ventional IQ tests. In a low-motivation condition, tar-gets were told that the present study is not concernedwith determining who is and is not skilled at impression-management but instead focuses on the process bywhich impressions are created. The experimenter wasblind to this manipulation.

While the target person read the instructions, theexperimenter prepared four envelopes, labeled 1through 4, each of which contained instructions for oneof the issues. Each instruction form indicated the tar-gets own position, the partners alleged position, andthe position that the target should convey on the video-tape. The partners position was manipulated to be thesame as the targets position on half of the statementsand opposite to the targets position on the other half. Inaddition, each target was asked to convey his or her trueposition on two of the issues and a false position on theother two issues. Consequently, each target conveyedtwo honest messages and two dishonest messages. Theorder of the issues, and the order of the type of message(honest/dishonest), was randomly assigned to each tar-get person.

When the experimenter returned, each target personwas told that during the session, he or she would have toopen one envelope, read the instructions, think aboutwhat to say, and present a position on each of the attitudestatements. This procedure was followed until all theenvelopes were opened and all four attitude statementswere addressed. After each target person was finished

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with all four attitude messages, he or she was debriefedand consent was obtained to use the videotapes forfuture research.

Preparation of Stimulus Materials

The videotapes from the first part of the study, con-taining the honest and deceptive messages, were editedonto a master tape. That tape was approximately 26 min-utes long and consisted of 64 clips, each lasting approxi-mately 15 seconds with a 10-second delay between eachclip. Each of the eight male and eight female targetsappeared four times on the tape, being honest half thetime and dishonest the rest of the time. Also, half of thetargets on the tape were in the high-motivation condi-tion and the other half were in the low-motivation condi-tion. The clips were arranged in a random order.

Participants

The participants, who acted as judges, were 66 stu-dents enrolled in introductory psychology classes. Inthose classes, persuasion and deception were discussedsuperficially, if at all. Participants were recruited towatch the videotape and rate how honest each of the tar-gets seemed. For their participation, the judges receivedclass extra credit. Four of the judges did not completethe study or did not follow instructions, and 2 judgeswere excluded from the final sample because their firstlanguage was not English.

Judging Procedure

Each judge was given written instructions thatincluded the four issues that the targets would addressand the involvement manipulation. The instructionsstated that the targets might sometimes try to give a falseimpression, sometimes being dishonest and sometimesbeing honest. Judges were told that they should evaluatehow sincere each target seemed after each statement.Furthermore, the instructions also introduced theinvolvement manipulation. In the high-involvementcondition, the judges were told that after completing thefirst task (i.e., the evaluation of target sincerity), theywould be asked some questions concerning the argu-ments presented in the video and that the successfulcompletion of the task was associated with intelligenceand good social skills. Judges in the low-involvementcondition were told that after viewing the tape, theywould be asked questions regarding their thoughtsabout several issues different from those discussed in thetapes and that the task was not aimed at assessing intelli-gence or abilities but at evaluating what people thoughtabout the issues.

After the judges read the instructions, the videotapedclips were presented. The judges rated each of the 64clips on a 7-point scale anchored at very insincere (1) and

very sincere (7). To simplify the task, focus the judgesattention, and reduce tedium (so that judges in all condi-tions would attend fully to the rating task), the judgeswere asked to make only one rating per clip. After thefinal clip was shown, a manipulation check was adminis-tered where the judges were asked how important theissues presented were to them on the videotape on a7-point scale ranging from not very important (1) to veryimportant (7), along with some filler questions. Subse-quently, judges were debriefed.

Manipulation Check

Ratings of issue importance by judges in the high- andlow-involvement conditions were significantly different,t(38) = 2.08, p < .05. As expected, judges assigned to thehigh-involvement condition regarded the issues on thetapes as more important (M = 3.81) than did thosejudges assigned to the low-involvement condition (M =3.05). These ratings were below the midpoint of thescale, suggesting that people in general did not considerthese issues as not very important to them. Furthermore,men and women did not differ in their judgments of taskimportance and there was no interaction between sexand involvement condition on the manipulation checkmeasure.

RESULTS

Differentiating Honestand Dishonest Statements

The data were analyzed using a 2 (judges involve-ment: low/high) 2 (judges sex) 2 (targets motiva-tion: low/high) 2 (targets sex) 2 (type of message:honest/dishonest) mixed-design analysis of variance.Judge involvement and judge sex were between-participants factors, and target motivation, target sex,and message type were within-participants factors. Thedependent measure was judges sincerity ratings, wherea higher score indicated that the message seemed moresincere, and the judges were the unit of analysis.

Previous research has shown that people can differen-tiate honest from dishonest statements at a level betterthan chance (e.g., DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979), and asignificant main effect for type of message replicated thisfinding. Overall, honest statements were rated as signifi-cantly more sincere (M = 4.52) than were dishonest state-ments (M = 4.14), F(1, 56) = 57.27, p < .0001. There wasalso a slight positivity bias in the ratings of sincerity,where both honest and dishonest statements were ratedhigher than the midpoint of the scale.

Effects of Judges Involvement

We predicted that judges involvement would berelated to their accuracy at differentiating between hon-

Forrest, Feldman / DETECTING DECEPTION 121

est and dishonest statements. This hypothesis was sup-ported. The Judge Involvement Type of Message inter-action, which tests the hypothesis, was significant, F(1,56) = 4.14, p < .05.

As Figure 1 shows, the difference between the ratingsfor honest and dishonest statements made by the judgesin the low-involvement condition was significantlygreater than the difference between the ratings of hon-est and dishonest statements by judges in the high-involvement condition. Judges in the low-involvementcondition were very successful at distinguishing betweenhonest and dishonest statements, rating the honest state-ments as more sincere (M = 4.60) than the dishoneststatements (M = 4.11). Although judges in the high-involvement condition also rated honest statements asmore sincere (M = 4.45) than dishonest statements (M =4.17), they did so to a smaller degree than judges in thelow-involvement condition. A post hoc WSD Tukey testrevealed that the difference between the mean ratings ofhonest and dishonest statements by high-involvementjudges was not significant WSD(29) = 2.76, p = ns, MSE =.31. This test also revealed that participants in the low-involvement condition rated the honest statements assignificantly more sincere than the dishonest state-ments, WSD = 4.82, p < .01, MSE = .31 (see Figure 1).

Differential Detection of Deception:Target Motivation Effects and Sex

The interaction between Target Motivation Type ofMessage was marginally significant. Judges differenti-ated between the honest and the dishonest statementsmore when targets were in the high-motivation condi-tion (honest = 4.46, dishonest = 3.99) rather than thelow-motivation condition (honest = 4.58, dishonest =4.28), F(1, 56) = 3.77, p < .06. The Target Sex Type ofMessage interaction was significant, F(1, 56) = 79.96, p