G.R. No. L-77194 March 15, 1988VIRGILIO GASTON, HORTENCIA STARKE, ROMEO GUANZON, OSCAR VILLANUEVA, JOSE ABELLO, REMO RAMOS, CAROLINA LOPEZ, JESUS ISASI, MANUEL LACSON, JAVIER LACSON, TITO TAGARAO, EDUARDO SUATENGCO, AUGUSTO LLAMAS, RODOLFO SIASON, PACIFICO MAGHARI, JR., JOSE JAMANDRE, AURELIO GAMBOA, ET AL.,petitioners,vs.REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK, PHILIPPINE SUGAR COMMISSION, and SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, respondents, ANGEL H. SEVERINO, JR., GLICERIO JAVELLANA, GLORIA P. DE LA PAZ, JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ET AL., and NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS,intervenors.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:Petitioners are sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers, who have come to this Court in their individual capacities and in representation of other sugar producers, planters and millers, said to be so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court although the subject matter of the present controversy is of common interest to all sugar producers, whether parties in this action or not.Respondent Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM, for short) was formerly the government office tasked with the function of regulating and supervising the sugar industry until it was superseded by its co-respondent Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA, for brevity) under Executive Order No. 18 on May 28, 1986. Although said Executive Order abolished the PHILSUCOM, its existence as a juridical entity was mandated to continue for three (3) more years "for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits by or against it and enables it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property and to distribute its assets."Respondent Republic Planters Bank (briefly, the Bank) is a commercial banking corporation.Angel H. Severino, Jr., et al., who are sugarcane planters planting and milling their sugarcane in different mill districts of Negros Occidental, were allowed to intervene by the Court, since they have common cause with petitioners and respondents having interposed no objection to their intervention. Subsequently, on January 14,1988, the National Federation of Sugar Planters (NFSP) also moved to intervene, which the Court allowed on February 16,1988.Petitioners and Intervenors have come to this Court praying for a Writ of mandamus commanding respondents:TO IMPLEMENT AND ACCOMPLISH THE PRIVATIZATION OF REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK BY THE TRANSFER AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE SHARES OF STOCK IN THE SAID BANK; NOW HELD BY AND STILL CARRIED IN THE NAME OF THE PHILIPPINE SUGAR COMMISSION, TO THE SUGAR PRODUCERS, PLANTERS AND MILLERS, WHO ARE THE TRUE BENEFICIAL OWNERS OF THE 761,416 COMMON SHARES VALUED AT P36,548.000.00, AND 53,005,045 PREFERRED SHARES (A, B & C) WITH A TOTAL PAR VALUE OF P254,424,224.72, OR A TOTAL INVESTMENT OF P290,972,224.72, THE SAID INVESTMENT HAVING BEEN FUNDED BY THE DEDUCTION OF Pl.00 PER PICUL FROM SUGAR PROCEEDS OF THE SUGAR PRODUCERS COMMENCING THE YEAR 1978-79 UNTIL THE PRESENT AS STABILIZATION FUND PURSUANT TO P.D. # 388.Respondent Bank does not take issue with either petitioners or its correspondents as it has no beneficial or equitable interest that may be affected by the ruling in this Petition, but welcomes the filing of the Petition since it will settle finally the issue of legal ownership of the questioned shares of stock.Respondents PHILSUCOM and SRA, for their part, squarely traverse the petition arguing that no trust results from Section 7 of P.D. No. 388; that the stabilization fees collected are considered government funds under the Government Auditing Code; that the transfer of shares of stock from PHILSUCOM to the sugar producers would be irregular, if not illegal; and that this suit is barred by laches.The Solicitor General aptly summarizes the basic issues thus: (1) whether the stabilization fees collected from sugar planters and millers pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. No. 388 are funds in trust for them, or public funds; and (2) whether shares of stock in respondent Bank paid for with said stabilization fees belong to the PHILSUCOM or to the different sugar planters and millers from whom the fees were collected or levied.P. D. No. 388, promulgated on February 2,1974, which created the PHILSUCOM, provided for the collection of a Stabilization Fund as follows:SEC. 7. Capitalization, Special Fund of the Commission, Development and Stabilization Fund. There is hereby established a fund for the commission for the purpose of financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign marketto beadministeredintrustby the Commission and deposited in the Philippine National Bank derived in the manner herein below cited from the following sources:a. Stabilization fund shall be collected as provided for in the various provisions of this Decree.b. Stabilization fees shall be collected from planters and millers in the amount of Two (P2.00) Pesos for every picul produced and milled for a period of five years from the approval of this Decree and One (Pl.00) Peso for every picul produced and milled every year thereafter.Provided: That fifty (P0.50) centavos per picul of the amount levied on planters, millers and traders under Section 4(c) of this Decree will be used for the payment of salaries and wages of personnel, fringe benefits and allowances of officers and employees for the purpose of accomplishing and employees for the purpose of accomplishing the efficient performance of the duties of the Commission.Provided, further: That said amount shall constitute a lien on the sugar quedan and/or warehouse receipts and shall be paid immediately by the planters and mill companies, sugar centrals and refineries to the Commission. (paragraphing and bold supplied).Section 7 of P.D. No. 388 does provide that the stabilization fees collected "shall be administered in trust by the Commission." However, while the element of an intent to create a trust is present, a resulting trust in favor of the sugar producers, millers and planters cannot be said to have ensued because the presumptive intention of the parties is not reasonably ascertainable from the language of the statute itself.The doctrine of resulting trusts is founded on the presumed intention of the parties; and as a general rule, it arises where, and only where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time of the transaction out of which it is sought to be established (89 C.J.S. 947).No implied trust in favor of the sugar producers either can be deduced from the imposition of the levy. "The essential Idea of an implied trust involves a certain antagonism between the cestui que trust and the trustee even when the trust has not arisen out of fraud nor out of any transaction of a fraudulent or immoral character (65 CJ 222). It is not clearly shown from the statute itself that the PHILSUCOM imposed on itself the obligation of holding the stabilization fund for the benefit of the sugar producers. It must be categorically demonstrated that the very administrative agency which is the source of such regulation would place a burden on itself (Batchelder v. Central Bank of the Philippines,L-25071, July 29,1972,46 SCRA 102, citing People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 [1954]).Neither can petitioners place reliance on the history of respondents Bank. They recite that at the beginning, the Bank was owned by the Roman-Rojas Group. Because it underwent difficulties early in the year 1978, Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto, then Chairman of the PHILSUCOM, submitted a proposal to the Central Bank for the rehabilitation of the Bank. The Central Bank acted favorably on the proposal at the meeting of the Monetary Board on March 31, 1978 subject to the infusion of fresh capital by the Benedicto Group. Petitioners maintain that this infusion of fresh capital was accomplished, not by any capital investment by Mr. Benedicto, but by PHILSUCOM, which set aside the proceeds of the P1.00 per picul stabilization fund to pay for its subscription in shares of stock of respondent Bank. It is petitioners' submission that all shares were placed in PHILSUCOM's name only out of convenience and necessity and that they are the true and beneficial owners thereof.In point of fact, we cannot see our way clear to upholding petitioners' position that the investment of the proceeds from the stabilization fund in subscriptions to the capital stock of the Bank were being made for and on their behalf. That could have been clarified by the Trust Agreement, dated May 28, 1986, entered into between PHILSUCOM, as "Trustor" acting through Mr. Fred J. Elizalde as Officer-in-Charge, and respondent RPB- Trust Department' as "Trustee," acknowledging that PHILSUCOM holds said shares for and in behalf of the sugar producers," the latter "being the true and beneficial owners thereof." The Agreement, however, did not get off the ground because it failed to receive the approval of the PHILSUCOM Board of Commissioners as required in the Agreement itself.The SRA, which succeeded PHILSUCOM, neither approved the Agreement because of the adverse opinion of the SRA, Resident Auditor, dated June 25,1986, which was aimed by the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, on January 26,1987.On February 19, 1987, the SRA, resolved to revoke the Trust Agreement "in the light of the ruling of the Commission on Audit that the aforementioned Agreement is of doubtful validity."From the legal standpoint, we find basis for the opinion of the Commission on Audit reading:That the government, PHILSUCOM or its successor-in-interest, Sugar Regulatory Administration, in particular, owns and stocks. While it is true that the collected stabilization fees were set aside by PHILSUCOM to pay its subscription to RPB, it did not collect said fees for the account of the sugar producers. That stabilization fees are charges/levies on sugar produced and milled which accrued to PHILSUCOM under PD 338, as amended. ...The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power of the State to impose for the promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz vs. Araneta,98 Phil. 148). They constitute sugar liens (Sec. 7[b], P.D. No. 388). The collections made accrue to a "Special Fund," a "Development and Stabilization Fund," almost Identical to the "Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund" created under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 567.1The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State (Lutz vs. Araneta, supra.).The protection of a large industry constituting one of the great sources of the state's wealth and therefore directly or indirectly affecting the welfare of so great a portion of the population of the State is affected to such an extent by public interests as to be within the police power of the sovereign. (Johnson vs. State ex rel. Marey, 128 So. 857, cited in Lutz vs. Araneta,supra).The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters and producers for a special purpose that of "financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign market the fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even though they are held for a special purpose (Lawrence vs. American Surety Co., 263 Mich 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am. Jur. Sec. 2, p. 718). Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the statute, "administered in trust' for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, is to be transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is the essence of the trust intended (See 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29(3), lifted from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(l]).2The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special fund is emphasized by the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out only in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29[1],1973 Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 18[l]).That the fees were collected from sugar producers, planters and millers, and that the funds were channeled to the purchase of shares of stock in respondent Bank do not convert the funds into a trust fired for their benefit nor make them the beneficial owners of the shares so purchased. It is but rational that the fees be collected from them since it is also they who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. The investment in shares of respondent Bank is not alien to the purpose intended because of the Bank's character as a commodity bank for sugar conceived for the industry's growth and development. Furthermore, of note is the fact that one-half, (1/2) or PO.50 per picul, of the amount levied under P.D. No. 388 is to be utilized for the "payment of salaries and wages of personnel, fringe benefits and allowances of officers and employees of PHILSUCOM" thereby immediately negating the claim that the entire amount levied is in trust for sugar, producers, planters and millers.To rule in petitioners' favor would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, "and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market," including the foreign market the industry being of vital importance to the country's economy and to national interest.WHEREFORE, the Writ of mandamus is denied and the Petition hereby dismissed. No costs.This Decision is immediately executory.SO ORDERED.Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.Fernan, J., took no part.

HON. RAMON D. BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila; ROMAN G. GARGANTIEL, as Secretary to the Mayor; THE MARKET ADMINISTRATOR; and THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA,petitioners,vs.HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXX and the FEDERATION OF MANILA MARKET VENDORS, INC.,respondents.The chief question to be decided in this case is what law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter (R.A. 409, as amended), which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), which only demands publication after approval.On June 12, 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, "AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." The petitioner City Mayor, Ramon D. Bagatsing, approved the ordinance on June 15, 1974.On February 17, 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced Civil Case 96787 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by respondent Judge, seeking the declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 for the reason that (a) the publication requirement under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila has not been complied with; (b) the Market Committee was not given any participation in the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned by Republic Act 6039; (c) Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act has been violated; and (d) the ordinance would violate Presidential Decree No. 7 of September 30, 1972 prescribing the collection of fees and charges on livestock and animal products.Resolving the accompanying prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge issued an order on March 11, 1975, denying the plea for failure of the respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. to exhaust the administrative remedies outlined in the Local Tax Code.After due hearing on the merits, respondent Judge rendered its decision on August 29, 1975, declaring the nullity of Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of publication under the Revised City Charter. Respondent Judge ruled:There is, therefore, no question that the ordinance in question was not published at all in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the City of Manila before its enactment. Neither was it published in the same manner after approval, although it was posted in the legislative hall and in all city public markets and city public libraries. There being no compliance with the mandatory requirement of publication before and after approval, the ordinance in question is invalid and, therefore, null and void.Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the adverse decision, stressing that (a) only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax Code; and (b) private respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before instituting an action in court.On September 26, 1975, respondent Judge denied the motion.Forthwith, petitioners brought the matter to Us through the present petition for review on certiorari.We find the petition impressed with merits.1. Thenexusof the present controversy is the apparent conflict between the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Tax Code on the manner of publishing a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila. For, while Section 17 of the Revised Charter provides:Each proposed ordinanceshall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, and shall not be discussed or enacted by the Board until after the third day following such publication. * * *Each approved ordinance* * * shall be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, within ten days after its approval; and shall take effect and be in force on and after the twentieth day following its publication, if no date is fixed in the ordinance.Section 43 of the Local Tax Code directs:Within ten days aftertheir approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrioordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other chargesshall be published for three consecutive days in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government, or posted in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. In either case, copies of all provincial, city, municipal and barrio ordinances shall be furnished the treasurers of the respective component and mother units of a local government for dissemination.In other words, while the Revised Charter of the City of Manila requires publicationbeforethe enactment of the ordinanceand afterthe approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city, the Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication after the approval of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting the ordinance in the local legislative hall or premises and in two other conspicuous places within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government. Petitioners' compliance with the Local Tax Code rather than with the Revised Charter of the City spawned this litigation.There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is aspecial actsince it relates only to the City of Manila, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments. Blackstone defines general law as a universal rule affecting the entire community and special law as one relating to particular persons or things of a class.1And the rule commonly said is that a prior special law is not ordinarily repealed by a subsequent general law. The fact that one is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception of the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.2However, the rule readily yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general, which the general statute treats inparticular. The exactly is the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of "ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope thereof,whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of "ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls. Here, as always, a general provision must give way to a particular provision.3Special provision governs.4This is especially true where the law containing the particular provision was enacted later than the one containing the general provision. The City Charter of Manila was promulgated on June 18, 1949 as against the Local Tax Code which was decreed on June 1, 1973. The law-making power cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems upon the same subject, or to leave in force provisions of a prior law by which the new will of the legislating power may be thwarted and overthrown. Such a result would render legislation a useless and Idle ceremony, and subject the law to the reproach of uncertainty and unintelligibility.5The case ofCity of Manila v. Teotico6is opposite. In that case, Teotico sued the City of Manila for damages arising from the injuries he suffered when he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. The City of Manila denied liability on the basis of the City Charter (R.A. 409) exempting the City of Manila from any liability for damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of the city officers to enforce the provisions of the charter or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of the City Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of the charter or of any other law or ordinance. Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code makes cities liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any persons by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. On review, the Court held the Civil Code controlling. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, the Revised City Charter is a special law and the subject matter of the two laws, the Revised City Charter establishes ageneral ruleof liability arising from negligence in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas the Civil Code constitutes a particularprescriptionfor liability due to defective streets in particular. In the same manner, the Revised Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the publication of "ordinance"in general, while the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the publication of "ordinance levying or imposing taxes fees or other chargesin particular.In fact, there is no rule which prohibits the repeal even by implication of a special or specific act by a general or broad one.7A charter provision may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter notwithstanding any particular charter provision.8A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state.9A chartered city is not an independent sovereignty. The state remains supreme in all matters not purely local. Otherwise stated, a charter must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state, it is to have read into it that general law which governs the municipal corporation and which the corporation cannot set aside but to which it must yield. When a city adopts a charter, it in effect adopts as part of its charter general law of such character.102. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is strongly asserted by petitioners as having been violated by private respondent in bringing a direct suit in court. This is because Section 47 of the Local Tax Code provides that any question or issue raised against the legality of any tax ordinance, or portion thereof, shall be referred for opinion to the city fiscal in the case of tax ordinance of a city. The opinion of the city fiscal is appealable to the Secretary of Justice, whose decision shall be final and executory unless contested before a competent court within thirty (30) days. But, the petition below plainly shows that the controversy between the parties is deeply rooted in a pure question of law: whether it is the Revised Charter of the City of Manila or the Local Tax Code that should govern the publication of the tax ordinance. In other words, the dispute is sharply focused on the applicability of the Revised City Charter or the Local Tax Code on the point at issue, and not on the legality of the imposition of the tax. Exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to judicial bodies is not an absolute rule. It admits of exceptions. Where the question litigated upon is purely a legal one, the rule does not apply.11The principle may also be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage.123. It is maintained by private respondent that the subject ordinance is not a "tax ordinance," because the imposition of rentals, permit fees, tolls and other fees is not strictly a taxing power but a revenue-raising function, so that the procedure for publication under the Local Tax Code finds no application. The pretense bears its own marks of fallacy. Precisely, the raising of revenues is the principal object of taxation. Under Section 5, Article XI of the New Constitution, "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such provisions as may be provided by law."13And one of those sources of revenue is what the Local Tax Code points to in particular: "Local governments may collect fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of public markets and premises * * *."14They can provide for and regulate market stands, stalls and privileges, and, also, the sale, lease or occupancy thereof. They can license, or permit the use of, lease, sell or otherwise dispose of stands, stalls or marketing privileges.15It is a feeble attempt to argue that the ordinance violates Presidential Decree No. 7, dated September 30, 1972, insofar as it affects livestock and animal products, because the said decree prescribes the collection of other fees and charges thereon "with the exception of ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection fees, as well as the delivery, stockyard and slaughter fees as may be authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources."16Clearly, even the exception clause of the decree itself permits the collection of the proper fees for livestock. And the Local Tax Code (P.D. 231, July 1, 1973) authorizes in its Section 31: "Local governments may collect fees for the slaughter of animals and the use of corrals * * * "4. The non-participation of the Market Committee in the enactment of Ordinance No. 7522 supposedly in accordance with Republic Act No. 6039, an amendment to the City Charter of Manila, providing that "the market committee shall formulate, recommend and adopt,subject to the ratification of the municipal board, and approval of the mayor, policies and rules or regulation repealing or maneding existing provisions of the market code" does not infect the ordinance with any germ of invalidity.17The function of the committee is purely recommendatory as the underscored phrase suggests, its recommendation is without binding effect on the Municipal Board and the City Mayor. Its prior acquiescence of an intended or proposed city ordinance is not a condition sine qua non before the Municipal Board could enact such ordinance. The native power of the Municipal Board to legislate remains undisturbed even in the slightest degree. It can move in its own initiative and the Market Committee cannot demur. At most, the Market Committee may serve as a legislative aide of the Municipal Board in the enactment of city ordinances affecting the city markets or, in plain words, in the gathering of the necessary data, studies and the collection of consensus for the proposal of ordinances regarding city markets. Much less could it be said that Republic Act 6039 intended to delegate to the Market Committee the adoption of regulatory measures for the operation and administration of the city markets.Potestas delegata non delegare potest.5. Private respondent bewails that the market stall fees imposed in the disputed ordinance are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic Integrated Corporation since the collection of said fees had been let by the City of Manila to the said corporation in a "Management and Operating Contract." The assumption is of course saddled on erroneous premise. The fees collected do not go direct to the private coffers of the corporation. Ordinance No. 7522 was not made for the corporation but for the purpose of raising revenues for the city. That is the object it serves. The entrusting of the collection of the fees does not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency through which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in applying it. The people may be taxed for a public purpose, although it be under the direction of an individual or private corporation.18Nor can the ordinance be stricken down as violative of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because the increased rates of market stall fees as levied by the ordinance will necessarily inure to the unwarranted benefit and advantage of the corporation.19We are concerned only with the issue whether the ordinance in question is intra vires. Once determined in the affirmative, the measure may not be invalidated because of consequences that may arise from its enforcement.20ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the court below is hereby reversed and set aside. Ordinance No. 7522 of the City of Manila, dated June 15, 1975, is hereby held to have been validly enacted. No. costs.SO ORDERED.Castro, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.Teehankee, J., reserves his vote.

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners,vs.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR),respondent.H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.

PARAS,J.:A TV ad proudly announces:"The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming."But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7,Rollo)In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21,Rollo).The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives:(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez,supra).InVictoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the . . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W.2nd534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W.2nd660, 663; 59 SCRA 66;see alsoe.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition.Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta,supra)It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."(2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445).(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation.PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government.The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed thatno state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied)Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland,supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it.(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other chargessubject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied)The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio."Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be anintra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be animperiuminimperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.Asgamblingis usually anoffense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact,ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied)Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82,Rollo).We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)The equal protection clause of the 14thAmendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651).Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be.1wphi1Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony)It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec,supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.As this Court held inCitizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the President and the Congress.Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling.Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED.

MANILA RACE HORSE TRAINERS ASSOCIATION, INC., and JUAN T. SORDAN vs. MANUEL DE LA FUENTE G.R. No. L-2947 January 11, 1951This action was instituted for a declaratory relief by the Manila Race Horses Trainers Association, Inc., a non-stock corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, who allege that they are owners of boarding stables for race horses and that their rights as such are affected by Ordinance No. 3065 of the City of Manila approved on July 1, 1947.1They made the Mayor of Manila defendant and prayed that said ordinance be declared invalid as violative of the Philippine Constitution.The case was submitted on the pleadings, and the decision was that the ordinance in question "is constitutional and valid and has been enacted in accordance with the powers of the Municipal Board granted by the Charter of the City of Manila."On appeal, the plaintiffs as appellants make three assignments of error, the first two of which are discussed jointly in their brief under two separate topics.First, it is maintained that the ordinance under consideration is a tax on race horses as distinct from boarding stables. It is argued that by section 2 the basis of the license fees "is the number of race horses kept or maintained in the boarding stables to be paid by the maintainers at the rate of P10.00 a year for each race horse;" that "the fee is increased correspondingly P10 for each additional race horse maintained or fed in the stable;" and that "by the same token, an empty stable for race horse pays no license fee at all."The spirit, rather than the letter, of an ordinance determines the construction thereof, and the court looks less to its words and more to the context, subject matter, consequence and effect. Accordingly, what is within the spirit is within the ordinance although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is in the letter, although not within the spirit, is not within the ordinance. (62 C. J. S., 845.) From the context of Ordinance No. 3065, the intent to tax or license stables and not horses is clearly manifest. The tax is assessed not on the owners of the horses but on the owners of the stables, as counsel admit in their brief, although there is nothing, of course, to stop stable owners from shifting the tax to the horse owners in the form of increased rents or fees, which is generally the case.It is also plain from the text of the whole ordinance that the number of horses is used in the assessment purely as a method of fixing an equitable and practical distribution of the burden imposed by the measure. Far from being obnoxious, the method is fair and just. It is but fair and just that for a boarding stable where only one horse is maintained proportionately less amount should be exacted than for a stable where more horses are kept and from which greater income is derived.We do not share plaintiff's opinion, apropos the second proposition, that the ordinance in question is discriminatory and savors of class legislation. In taxing only boarding stables for race horses, we do not believe that the ordinance, makes arbitrary classification. In the case ofEastern Theatrical Co. Inc., vs. Alfonso, 46 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 11, p. 303,*it was said there is equality and uniformity in taxation if all articles or kinds of property of the same class are taxed at the same rate. Thus, it was held in that case, that "the fact that some places of amusement are not taxed while others, such as cinematographs, theaters, vaudeville companies, theatrical shows, and boxing exhibitions and other kinds of amusements or places of amusement are taxed, is not argument at all against the equality and uniformity of tax imposition." Applying this criterion to the present case, there would be discrimination if some boarding stables of the same class used for the same number of horses were not taxed or were made to pay less or more than others.From the viewpoint of economics and public policy the taxing of boarding stables for race horses to the exclusion of boarding stables for horses dedicated to other purposes is not indefensible. The owners of boarding stables for race horses and, for that matter, the race horse owners themselves, who in the scheme of shifting may carry the taxation burden, are a class by themselves and appropriately taxed where owners of other kinds of horses are taxed less or not at all, considering that equity in taxation is generally conceived in terms of ability to pay in relation to the benefits received by the taxpayer and by the public from the business or property taxed. Race horses are devoted to gambling if legalized, their owners derive fat income and the public hardly any profit from horse racing, and this business demands relatively heavy police supervision. Taking everything into account, the differentiation against which the plaintiffs complain conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discrimatory within the meaning of the Constitution.One ground of attack in the court below on the constitutionality of the ordinance variance between the title and the subject matter apparently has been abandoned. In its place a new question is brought up on the appeal in the third and last assignment of error. It is now contended, for the first time, that "the Municipal Board of Manila (is) without power to enact ordinance taxing private stables for race horses," and that the lower court erred in not so declaring. This assignment of error has reference to Class B or the second sub-paragraph of section 1 of the ordinance.Not having been raised in the pleading, this question was properly ignored, not to say that even it had been raised it would not have been available as basis for a declaration of nullity of the ordinance. The clause of the ordinance taxing or licensing boarding stables for race horses does not prejudice the plaintiffs in any material way, and it is well settled that a person who is not adversely affected by a licensing ordinance may not attack its validity. Stated differently, he may not complain that a licensing ordinance is invalid as against a class other than that to which he belongs. (62 C. J. S.830, 831.) By analogy, where a municipal ordinance is valid in some of its parts and invalid as to others and the valid parts are separable from the invalid ones in which latter case the valid provisions stand as operative the plaintiff may contest the validity of the provisions that injure his interest but not those that do not.We are of the opinion that the trial court committed no error and the judgment is affirmed with costs against the plaintiff-appellants.CREBA vs COMMISSIONERThe value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.These are various suits forcertiorariand prohibition, challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court, as follows:I. Procedural Issues:A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution?B. Does it violate Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution?C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?II. Substantive Issues:A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights (Art. III)?1. 12. 43. 54. 10B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the Constitution?1. Art. VI, 28(1)2. Art. VI, 28(3)These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As will presently be explained not all of these questions are judicially cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other departments of the government are equally charged with the enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to them.I. PROCEDURAL ISSUESThe contention of petitioners is that in enacting Republic Act No. 7716, or the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, Congress violated the Constitution because, although H. No. 11197 had originated in the House of Representatives, it was not passed by the Senate but was simply consolidated with the Senate version (S. No. 1630) in the Conference Committee to produce the bill which the President signed into law. The following provisions of the Constitution are cited in support of the proposition that because Republic Act No. 7716 was passed in this manner, it did not originate in the House of Representatives and it has not thereby become a law:Art. VI, 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.Id., 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and theyeasandnaysentered in the Journal.It appears that on various dates between July 22, 1992 and August 31, 1993, several bills1were introduced in the House of Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197, entitledAN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112, 115 AND 116 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237 AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113 AND 114 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDEDThe bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was approved by the House of Representatives after third and final reading.It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by that body to its Committee on Ways and Means.On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report recommending approval of S. No. 1630, entitledAN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING SECTIONS 113, 114 and 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESIt was stated that the bill was being submitted "in substitution of Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197."On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill (S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the bill and approved it on second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the bill on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members, with one abstention.H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then referred to a conference committee which, after meeting four times (April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that "House Bill No. 11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees."The Conference Committee bill, entitled "AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," was thereafter approved by the House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716 was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on May 28, 1994, it took effect, although its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time for the registration of business entities. It would have been enforced on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court, by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary restraining order on June 30, 1994.First. Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that although Art. VI, SS 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution,2it is notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No. 11197.This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the Senate's power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power3and thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of "a Senate and a House of Representatives."4The exercise of the treaty-ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. The possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate5has never been thought of as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.In the United States, the validity of a provision ( 37) imposing anad valoremtax based on the weight of vessels, which the U.S. Senate had inserted in the Tariff Act of 1909, was upheld against the claim that the provision was a revenue bill which originated in the Senate in contravention of Art. I, 7 of the U.S. Constitution.6Nor is the power to amend limited to adding a provision or two in a revenue bill emanating from the House. The U.S. Senate has gone so far as changing the whole of bills following the enacting clause and substituting its own versions. In 1883, for example, it struck out everything after the enacting clause of a tariff bill and wrote in its place its own measure, and the House subsequently accepted the amendment. The U.S. Senate likewise added 847 amendments to what later became the Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909; it dictated the schedules of the Tariff Act of 1921; it rewrote an extensive tax revision bill in the same year and recast most of the tariff bill of 1922.7Given, then, the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House.It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to "take [H. No. 11197] into consideration" in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same subject.Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The Court cannot, therefore, understand the alarm expressed over the fact that on March 1, 1993, eight months before the House passed H. No. 11197, S. No. 1129 had been filed in the Senate. After all it does not appear that the Senate ever considered it. It was only after the Senate had received H. No. 11197 on November 23, 1993 that the process of legislation in respect of it began with the referral to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means of H. No. 11197 and the submission by the Committee on February 7, 1994 of S. No. 1630. For that matter, if the question were simply the priority in the time of filing of bills, the fact is that it was in the House that a bill (H. No. 253) to amend the VAT law was first filed on July 22, 1992. Several other bills had been filed in the House before S. No. 1129 was filed in the Senate, and H. No. 11197 was only a substitute of those earlier bills.Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as required by the Constitution8because the second and third readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February 24, 19949and again on March 22, 1994,10the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency session.11That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. For example, the bill defining thecertiorarijurisdiction of this Court which, in consolidation with the Senate version, became Republic Act No. 5440, was passed on second and third readings in the House of Representatives on the same day (May 14, 1968) after the bill had been certified by the President as urgent.12There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on separate days, also.It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition stated in the certification of a "growing budget deficit" not being an unusual condition in this country.It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senate accepted the President's certification. Should such certification be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation?The sufficiency of the factual basis of the suspension of the writ ofhabeas corpusor declaration of martial law under Art. VII, 18, or the existence of a national emergency justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art. VI, 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different standard of review.Petitioners also invite attention to the fact that the President certified S. No. 1630 and not H. No. 11197. That is because S. No. 1630 was what the Senate was considering. When the matter was before the House, the President likewise certified H. No. 9210 the pending in the House.Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by the Conference Committee. Much is made of the fact that in the last two days of its session on April 21 and 25, 1994 the Committee met behind closed doors. We are not told, however, whether the provisions were not the result of the give and take that often mark the proceedings of conference committees.Nor is there anything unusual or extraordinary about the fact that the Conference Committee met in executive sessions. Often the only way to reach agreement on conflicting provisions is to meet behind closed doors, with only the conferees present. Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made. The Court is not about to take the suggestion of a cabal or sinister motive attributed to the conferees on the basis solely of their "secret meetings" on April 21 and 25, 1994, nor read anything into the incomplete remarks of the members, marked in the transcript of stenographic notes by ellipses. The incomplete sentences are probably due to the stenographer's own limitations or to the incoherence that sometimes characterize conversations. William Safire noted some such lapses in recorded talks even by recent past Presidents of the United States.In any event, in the United States conference committees had been customarily held in executive sessions with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance.13Only in November 1975 was a new rule adopted requiring open sessions. Even then a majority of either chamber's conferees may vote in public to close the meetings.14As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference Committee, it has been explained:Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not expected to make any material change in the measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . . .15The result is a third version, which is considered an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," the only requirement for which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.16Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill.17If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.18Nonetheless, it is argued that under the respective Rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives a conference committee can only act on the differing provisions of a Senate bill and a House bill, and that contrary to these Rules the Conference Committee inserted provisions not found in the bills submitted to it. The following provisions are cited in support of this contention:Rules of the SenateRule XII: 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution,thedifferences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houseswhi