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G.R. No. L-17725 February 28, 1962

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.MAMBULAO LUMBER COMPANY, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Arthur Tordesillas for defendants-appellants.

BARRERA, J. :

From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila (in Civil Case No. 34100) ordering it to pay to plaintiff Republic of the Philippinesthe sum of P4,802.37 with 6% interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid, plus costs, defendant MambulaoLumber Company interposed the present appeal.1

The facts of the case are briefly stated in the decision of the trial court, to wit: .

The facts of this case are not contested and may be briefly summarized as follows: (a) under the first cause of action, for forestcharges covering the period from September 10, 1952 to May 24, 1953, defendants admitted that they have a liability of P587.37,which liability is covered by a bond executed by defendant General Insurance & Surety Corporation for Mambulao LumberCompany, jointly and severally in character, on July 29, 1953, in favor of herein plaintiff; (b) under the second cause of action,both defendants admitted a joint and several liability in favor of plaintiff in the sum of P296.70, also covered by a bond datedNovember 27, 1953; and (c) under the third cause of action, both defendants admitted a joint and several liability in favor of

plaintiff for P3,928.30, also covered by a bond dated July 20, 1954. These three liabilities aggregate to P4,802.37. If the liability ofdefendants in favor of plaintiff in the amount already mentioned is admitted, then what is the defense interposed by thedefendants? The defense presented by the defendants is quite unusual in more ways than one. It appears from Exh. 3 that fromJuly 31, 1948 to December 29, 1956, defendant Mambulao Lumber Company paid to the Republic of the Philippines P8,200.52 for'reforestation charges' and for the period commencing from April 30, 1947 to June 24, 1948, said defendant paid P927.08 to theRepublic of the Philippines for 'reforestation charges'. These reforestation were paid to the plaintiff in pursuance of Section 1 ofRepublic Act 115 which provides that there shall be collected, in addition to the regular forest charges provided under Section 264of Commonwealth Act 466 known as the National Internal Revenue Code, the amount of P0.50 on each cubic meter of timber...cut out and removed from any public forest for commercial purposes. The amount collected shall be expended by the director offorestry, with the approval of the secretary of agriculture and commerce, for reforestation and afforestation of watersheds,denuded areas ... and other public forest lands, which upon investigation, are found needing reforestation or afforestation .... Thetotal amount of the reforestation charges paid by Mambulao Lumber Company is P9,127.50, and it is the contention of thedefendant Mambulao Lumber Company that since the Republic of the Philippines has not made use of those reforestationcharges collected from it for reforesting the denuded area of the land covered by its license, the Republic of the Philippines shouldrefund said amount, or, if it cannot be refunded, at least it should be compensated with what Mambulao Lumber Company owedthe Republic of the Philippines for reforestation charges. In line with this thought, defendant Mambulao Lumber Company wrotethe director of forestry, on February 21, 1957 letter Exh. 1, in paragraph 4 of which said defendant requested "that our accountwith your bureau be credited with all the reforestation charges that you have imposed on us from July 1, 1947 to June 14, 1956,amounting to around P2,988.62 ...". This letter of defendant Mambulao Lumber Company was answered by the director of forestryon March 12, 1957, marked Exh. 2, in which the director of forestry quoted an opinion of the secretary of justice, to the effect thathe has no discretion to extend the time for paying the reforestation charges and also explained why not all denuded areas arebeing reforested.

The only issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether the sum of P9,127.50 paid by defendant-appellant company to plaintiff-appellee asreforestation charges from 1947 to 1956 may be set off or applied to the payment of the sum of P4,802.37 as forest charges due and owingfrom appellant to appellee. It is appellant's contention that said sum of P9,127.50, not having been used in the reforestation of the areacovered by its license, the same is refundable to it or may be applied in compensation of said sum of P4,802.37 due from it as forestcharges.1wph1.t

We find appellant's claim devoid of any merit. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 115, provides:

SECTION 1. There shall be collected, in addition to the regular forest charges provided for under Section two hundred and sixty-four of Commonwealth Act Numbered Four Hundred Sixty-six, known as the National Internal Revenue Code, the amount of fifty

centavos on each cubic meter of timber for the first and second groups and forty centavos for the third and fourth groups cut outand removed from any public forest for commercial purposes. The amount collected shall be expended by the Director of Forestry,with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (commerce), for reforestation and afforestation ofwatersheds, denuded areas and cogon and open lands within forest reserves, communal forest, national parks, timber lands, sanddunes, and other public forest lands, which upon investigation, are found needing reforestation or afforestation, or needing to beunder forest cover for the growing of economic trees for timber, tanning, oils, gums, and other minor forest products or medicinalplants, or for watersheds protection, or for prevention of erosion and floods and preparation of necessary plans and estimate ofcosts and for reconnaisance survey of public forest lands and for such other expenses as may be deemed necessary for theproper carrying out of the purposes of this Act.

All revenues collected by virtue of, and pursuant to, the provisions of the preceding paragraph and from the sale of barks, medicalplants and other products derived from plantations as herein provided shall constitute a fund to be known as Reforestation Fund,

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to be expended exclusively in carrying out the purposes provided for under this Act. All provincial or city treasurers and theirdeputies shall act as agents of the Director of Forestry for the collection of the revenues or incomes derived from the provisions ofthis Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under this provision, it seems quite clear that the amount collected as reforestation charges from a timber licenses or concessionaire shallconstitute a fund to be known as the Reforestation Fund, and that the same shall be expended by the Director of Forestry, with the approvalof the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for the reforestation or afforestation, among others, of denuded areas which, uponinvestigation, are found to be needing reforestation or afforestation. Note that there is nothing in the law which requires that the amount

collected as reforestation charges should be used exclusively for the reforestation of the area covered by the license of a licensee orconcessionaire, and that if not so used, the same should be refunded to him. Observe too, that the licensee's area may or may not bereforested at all, depending on whether the investigation thereof by the Director of Forestry shows that said area needs reforestation. Theconclusion seems to be that the amount paid by a licensee as reforestation charges is in the nature of a tax which forms a part of theReforestation Fund, payable by him irrespective of whether the area covered by his license is reforested or not. Said fund, as the lawexpressly provides, shall be expended in carrying out the purposes provided for thereunder, namely, the reforestation or afforestation, amongothers, of denuded areas needing reforestation or afforestation.

Appellant maintains that the principle of a compensation in Article 1278 of the new Civil Code2 is applicable, such that the sum of P9,127.50paid by it as reforestation charges may compensate its indebtedness to appellee in the sum of P4,802.37 as forest charges. But in the viewwe take of this case, appellant and appellee are not mutually creditors and debtors of each other. Consequently, the law on compensation isinapplicable. On this point, the trial court correctly observed: .

Under Article 1278, NCC, compensation should take place when two persons in their own right are creditors and debtors of eachother. With respect to the forest charges which the defendant Mambulao Lumber Company has paid to the government, they arein the coffers of the government as taxes collected, and the government does not owe anything, crystal clear that the Republic ofthe Philippines and the Mambulao Lumber Company are not creditors and debtors of each other, because compensation refers to

mutual debts. ..

And the weight of authority is to the effect that internal revenue taxes, such as the forest charges in question, can be the subject of set-off orcompensation.

A claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off under the statutes of set-off, whichare construed uniformly, in the light of public policy, to exclude the remedy in an action or any indebtedness of the state ormunicipality to one who is liable to the state or municipality for taxes. Neither are they a proper subject of recoupment since theydo not arise out of the contract or transaction sued on. ... (80 C.J.S. 73-74. ) .

The general rule, based on grounds of public policy is well-settled that no set-off is admissible against demands for taxes leviedfor general or local governmental purposes. The reason on which the general rule is based, is that taxes are not in the nature ofcontracts between the party and party but grow out of a duty to, and are the positive acts of the government, to the making andenforcing of which, the personal consent of individual taxpayers is not required. ... If the taxpayer can properly refuse to pay histax when called upon by the Collector, because he has a claim against the governmental body which is not included in the taxlevy, it is plain that some legitimate and necessary expenditure must be curtailed. If the taxpayer's claim is disputed, the collectionof the tax must await and abide the result of a lawsuit, and meanwhile the financial affairs of the government will be thrown intogreat confusion. (47 Am. Jur. 766-767.)

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court appealed from is hereby affirmed in all respects, with costs against the defendant-appellant. Soordered.

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G.R. No. L-18994 June 29, 1963

MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner,vs.HON. LORENZO C. GARLITOS, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte,and SIMEONA K. PRICE, as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Walter Scott Price, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General and Atty. G. H. Mantolino for petitioner.Benedicto and Martinez for respondents.

LABRADOR, J. :

This is a petition forcertiorariand mandamus against the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ron. Lorenzo C. Garlitos, presiding,seeking to annul certain orders of the court and for an order in this Court directing the respondent court below to execute the judgment infavor of the Government against the estate of Walter Scott Price for internal revenue taxes.

It appears that in Melecio R. Domingo vs. Hon. Judge S. C. Moscoso, G.R. No. L-14674, January 30, 1960, this Court declared as final andexecutory the order for the payment by the estate of the estate and inheritance taxes, charges and penalties, amounting to P40,058.55,issued by the Court of First Instance of Leyte in, special proceedings No. 14 entitled "In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late WalterScott Price." In order to enforce the claims against the estate the fiscal presented a petition dated June 21, 1961, to the court below for theexecution of the judgment. The petition was, however, denied by the court which held that the execution is not justifiable as the Governmentis indebted to the estate under administration in the amount of P262,200. The orders of the court below dated August 20, 1960 andSeptember 28, 1960, respectively, are as follows:

Atty. Benedicto submitted a copy of the contract between Mrs. Simeona K. Price, Administratrix of the estate of her late husbandWalter Scott Price and Director Zoilo Castrillo of the Bureau of Lands dated September 19, 1956 and acknowledged before NotaryPublic Salvador V. Esguerra, legal adviser in Malacaang to Executive Secretary De Leon dated December 14, 1956, the note ofHis Excellency, Pres. Carlos P. Garcia, to Director Castrillo dated August 2, 1958, directing the latter to pay to Mrs. Price the sumofP368,140.00, and an extract of page 765 of Republic Act No. 2700 appropriating the sum of P262.200.00 for the payment to theLeyte Cadastral Survey, Inc., represented by the administratrix Simeona K. Price, as directed in the above note of the President.Considering these facts, the Court orders that the payment of inheritance taxes in the sum of P40,058.55 due the Collector ofInternal Revenue as ordered paid by this Court on July 5, 1960 in accordance with the order of the Supreme Court promulgatedJuly 30, 1960 in G.R. No. L-14674, be deducted from the amount of P262,200.00 due and payable to the Administratrix SimeonaK. Price, in this estate, the balance to be paid by the Government to her without further delay. (Order of August 20, 1960)

The Court has nothing further to add to its order dated August 20, 1960 and it orders that the payment of the claim of the Collectorof Internal Revenue be deferred until the Government shall have paid its accounts to the administratrix herein amounting toP262,200.00. It may not be amiss to repeat that it is only fair for the Government, as a debtor, to its accounts to its citizens-creditors before it can insist in the prompt payment of the latter's account to it, specially taking into consideration that the amountdue to the Government draws interests while the credit due to the present state does not accrue any interest. (Order of September

28, 1960)

The petition to set aside the above orders of the court below and for the execution of the claim of the Government against the estate must bedenied for lack of merit. The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person, as aninheritance tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay theamount thereof. To such effect is the decision of this Court in Aldamiz vs. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro , G.R. No. L-2360,Dec. 29, 1949, thus:

. . . a writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and expenses ofadministration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property ofthe deceased and all debts or expenses of administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs legatees and devisees residingin the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to bemade, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with.1wph1.t

Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their respective portions in theestate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later ascertained that there are such

debts and expenses to be paid, in which case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, afterhearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, andmayissue execution if circumstances require" (Rule 89, section 6; see also Rule 74, Section 4; Emphasis supplied.) And this is notthe instant case.

The legal basis for such a procedure is the fact that in the testate or intestate proceedings to settle the estate of a deceased person, theproperties belonging to the estate are under the jurisdiction of the court and such jurisdiction continues until said properties have beendistributed among the heirs entitled thereto. During the pendency of the proceedings all the estate is in custodia legis and the properprocedure is not to allow the sheriff, in case of the court judgment, to seize the properties but to ask the court for an order to require theadministrator to pay the amount due from the estate and required to be paid.

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Another ground for denying the petition of the provincial fiscal is the fact that the court having jurisdiction of the estate had found that theclaim of the estate against the Government has been recognized and an amount of P262,200 has already been appropriated for the purposeby a corresponding law (Rep. Act No. 2700). Under the above circumstances, both the claim of the Government for inheritance taxes and theclaim of the intestate for services rendered have already become overdue and demandable is well as fully liquidated. Compensation,therefore, takes place by operation of law, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1279 and 1290 of the Civil Code, and both debts areextinguished to the concurrent amount, thus:

ART. 1200. When all the requisites mentioned in article 1279 are present, compensation takes effect by operation of law, and

extinguished both debts to the concurrent amount, eventhough the creditors and debtors are not aware of the compensation.

It is clear, therefore, that the petitioner has no clear right to execute the judgment for taxes against the estate of the deceased Walter ScottPrice. Furthermore, the petition forcertiorariand mandamus is not the proper remedy for the petitioner. Appeal is the remedy.

The petition is, therefore, dismissed, without costs.

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G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CAYAT, defendant-appellant.

Sinai Hamada y Cario for appellant.Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.

MORAN, J. :

Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, wassentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed against him:

That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdictionof this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicatingliquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves tomake prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.

Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty tothe charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime

charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is nowbefore this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:

SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning ofthe Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale,beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribeshave been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shallbe the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township governmentto seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishablefor each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in thediscretion of the court.

The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:

(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;

(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.

(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.

Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less civilized elements of theFilipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or lesscapable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposesthus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but alwayswith conscience and humanity.

As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws

of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of accordingthem the "spiritual and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Governmentas a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord themthe "the moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of theGovernor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American period. President McKinleyin his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900, said:

In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress inpermitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many ofthose tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform.Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference,constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.

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Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those practicable means ofbringing about their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting themalone or guiding them in the path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord withhumanity and with the national conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network ofhighways and communications; the benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right of suffrage. Andto complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them theblessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in thislight that the Act must be understood and applied.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is notviolated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all membersof the same class. (Borgnis vs.Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. ProvincialBoard of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. Itis not based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "Theterm 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the PhilippineIslands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board ofMindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with theirChristian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent

spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribeshave been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in andamong the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free useof highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of thegovernment to raise their standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as thoseconditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are"impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process andthat hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.

Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation againsta certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seizeand forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is v iolative of thedue process of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process oflaw, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrativeofficials in applying a law to particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubi vs. Provincial Board ofMindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of thelegislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regularmethods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling SuFan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's propertymay be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in v iolation of law may be confiscated(U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439,442).

Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and leastlimitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law ofoverruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase theindustries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbiervs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exerciseof the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must beupheld.

Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to theirmoral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimatepurpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.

The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus faradopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of thoseprivileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality ineducation, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefitsof their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifyingthat the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney

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impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter offact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participationin the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification topeople of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matterwhich rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, thiscourt can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist,the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which thiscourt has no authority to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justificationstill exists in the all-comprehending principle ofsalus populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the

discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for itsdiscontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members mustyield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.