taylor, domino effect

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Symposium: Deconstructing Theologyymposium: Deconstructing Theologythe nations is now neither inside nor outside. "On this mountain theLord of Hosts will prepare a rich banquet for all the peoples.. .andswallow up the veil that shrouds all the people, the pall thrown overall the nations; He will swallow up death forever." (Isa. 25:6-7). Deathis the boundary that separates interior from exterior, absence frompresence. But death too is a veil ("a hedge of lilies") to be penetratedand broken. The overcoming of death in a fully immanent a/theologyis Isaianic peace, an end to violence, as well as the nomadic crossingover of nations, identity-in-difference. This vision is expressed in arelatively little known fiction by an East Texas writer in which EastTexas becomes a new Jerusalem and a strange phoenix-like bird, theroad runner, God's prophet: "A tear ... holds within it, like the eye ofa bird, what world made it gather and form and fall. ... So men andwomen carry countries in them and, falling, the country in their breastfalls in them. Surely the world is grass. ... That was his call over theprairies and over the mesa, over sage and chemisa and broomgrass"(William Goyen).A cruciform theology could also cross over to a differentlydeconstructive Buddhist textuality expressing liminality and differ-ance, to the deconstruction of self in Nagasena, emptiness inNagarjuna, signification as difference in Dignaga, the unfreezing oftime as being in D6gen. ERRING is an entering wedge in the alwaysalready ongoing theological enterprise that can never be brought toclosure.

Edith WyschogrodQueens College of the City University of New YorkV. MASKING:DOMINO EFFECT

... if one wishes to deceive a man, what one presents to him isthe painting of a veil, that is to say, something that incites himto ask what is behind it.Jacques Lacan

'You know quite well,' I said slowly, 'that, as far as I'mconcerned, there's no longer any difference between a maskand a cassock. There isn't anything you've said to me fora longtime that hasn't seemed a sham ...

Georges BatailleFour texts-each approaching yet another text from a differentangle, each opening the missing text in a different way. The questionis how to think and rethink in the midst of this fourfold-or, perhaps,how, with Heidegger and others, to think the midst of this fourfold. To

the nations is now neither inside nor outside. "On this mountain theLord of Hosts will prepare a rich banquet for all the peoples.. .andswallow up the veil that shrouds all the people, the pall thrown overall the nations; He will swallow up death forever." (Isa. 25:6-7). Deathis the boundary that separates interior from exterior, absence frompresence. But death too is a veil ("a hedge of lilies") to be penetratedand broken. The overcoming of death in a fully immanent a/theologyis Isaianic peace, an end to violence, as well as the nomadic crossingover of nations, identity-in-difference. This vision is expressed in arelatively little known fiction by an East Texas writer in which EastTexas becomes a new Jerusalem and a strange phoenix-like bird, theroad runner, God's prophet: "A tear ... holds within it, like the eye ofa bird, what world made it gather and form and fall. ... So men andwomen carry countries in them and, falling, the country in their breastfalls in them. Surely the world is grass. ... That was his call over theprairies and over the mesa, over sage and chemisa and broomgrass"(William Goyen).A cruciform theology could also cross over to a differentlydeconstructive Buddhist textuality expressing liminality and differ-ance, to the deconstruction of self in Nagasena, emptiness inNagarjuna, signification as difference in Dignaga, the unfreezing oftime as being in D6gen. ERRING is an entering wedge in the alwaysalready ongoing theological enterprise that can never be brought toclosure.

Edith WyschogrodQueens College of the City University of New YorkV. MASKING:DOMINO EFFECT

... if one wishes to deceive a man, what one presents to him isthe painting of a veil, that is to say, something that incites himto ask what is behind it.Jacques Lacan

'You know quite well,' I said slowly, 'that, as far as I'mconcerned, there's no longer any difference between a maskand a cassock. There isn't anything you've said to me fora longtime that hasn't seemed a sham ...

Georges BatailleFour texts-each approaching yet another text from a differentangle, each opening the missing text in a different way. The questionis how to think and rethink in the midst of this fourfold-or, perhaps,how, with Heidegger and others, to think the midst of this fourfold. To

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Journal of the American Academy of Religionglimpse the opening of the fourfold might be what it means to beginerring.I deeply appreciate the careful and thoughtful responses ofProfessors Altizer, Lingis, Prabhu, and Wyschogrod. As EdithWyschogrod points out, Erring "invites further elaboration, a furtherspinning of texts in a library without end." These additional spinningsturn and return the book to me in new and unexpected ways. Such isthe estrangement of writing. It is not easy to add another twist to whathas (always) already been written. Such is the dilemma of writing.Where to begin, to begin yet again? To try to think (in) the midstof this fourfold, I begin with something that none of the texts contains:a certain textual supplement. Alphonso Lingis's essay arrived with aphotograph attached to it. Actually the photo was something like apost card, for its back bore a brief inscription: "here is a smallresponse to your book." Since I have always been impressed byLingis's excessive insight, I was reluctant to dismiss his playfulmessage as inconsequential, though clearly it was not central to themain line of his argument. How, I wondered, might a photograph of anuncanny mask be a response to Erring? As my puzzlement grew, Ipicked up another tentacle of our telecommunications network andphoned Lingis to ask him more about the mask. All he could (orwould) tell me was that the mask is from Bali. He insisted he could notremember exactly where the mask had come from or when he hadacquired it. With this much but no more information, my imaginationwas left to wander from association to association. After passingthrough Clifford Geertz's influential analysis of the "masked dance"of Rangda and Barong, I finally arrived at Lingis's account of "TheRangda" in his remarkable book, Excesses: Eros and Culture.For human beings never dance in Balinese dances; they arerepresented only as a pair of clowns who turn up from time totime to translate into vulgarlanguage the sacred Kawilanguagethe gods speak. The dramaproceeds to metamorphoses,demoninto priest into seductress into ape into queen into hog, asthough we are in some Nietzschean world where behind everymask there are only more masks . . . Whatresolution could bepossible? Rangda dances her screaming curses; she is not

vanquished, in the courtyard of the temple of Death thosenights, or anywhere else in Bali or in life. (78-79)Like Geertz, Lingis stresses that the contest between Rangda andBarong is inconclusive; it is a draw. The fascination of the drama liesin neither one nor the other of the binary opposites, but in theirceaseless interplay. The ritual marks and remarks "the eternal return"of a play that promises no final act, no resolution, no conclusion. Themasks, in other words, mask a margin, a limen, that can never be

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Symposium: Deconstructing Theologyunmasked, "as though we are in some Nietzschean world wherebehind every mask there are only more masks."This "masked dance" stands in tension with the drama of thewestern ontotheological tradition. From Plato to Hegel, philosophyhas been preoccupied with unmasking. How, asks the philosopher,can one penetrate masks and see the true behind the false, the realbehind the apparent, the raw behind the cooked? When and where,asks the theologian, did, does, or will revelation come? The climax,which is not to say the end, of this dramais Hegel's speculative (andspecular) philosophy. More specifically, the closure of (the) westernphilosophical vision arriveswhen consciousness becomes transparentto itself in perfect self-consciousness. In the Phenomenology ofSpirit, Hegel describes this moment as an unmasking in which the"curtain[Vorhang]"separating subjectivity and objectivity falls.Hegelian philosophy poses the question of what and how to thinkafter or beyond the advent of absolute knowledge. Kierkegaardwasthe firstto recognize the implications of the closure of the System. Hispseudonyms can be understood as various masks through which hedevises ironic and humorousstyles of writing intended to unravel theweb of philosophy and the fabric of Hegel's text. Kierkegaard'swriterly strategies return in curious ways in the struggle of manycontemporary "philosophers" and literary critics to think "beyondabsolute knowledge." Derrida, for example, echoes Kierkegaard'squestioning of the gaze of the philosopher and the insight of philos-ophy when, commenting on Nietzsche's interpretation of truth, hecontends that in the void remaining after the death of God, veils veilveils and masks maskmasks. If unmaskingis impossible, revelation isreveilation. Such ceaseless masking has a domino effect on muchwestern philosophy and theology. One afteranother,central conceptsand dominant notions-God, self, history, book . . .-tumble. As en-tanglement in a very different world once led us to suspect (thoughthis suspicion now seems sadly, perhaps dangerously, faded), thisdomino effect carries serious consequences for all of western societyand culture. The peculiarity of closure, however, is that it harbors acertain opening. Beyond, or even "within,"the closure of the westernontotheological traditionthere might lie an opening to and of the East.One way to trace this opening is to ask what else lurks between un-settling masks.In the struggle to think "beyond absolute knowledge,"Kierkegaard anticipates and Derrida returns to what Heidegger de-scribes as "the task of thinking" at "the end of philosophy." Thethinker, Heidegger maintains, must try to think what philosophy leftunthought. According to Heidegger, "What characterizes metaphysi-cal thinking which grounds the ground for being is the fact that

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Journal of the American Academy of Religionmetaphysical thinking departs from what is present in its presence,and thus represents it in terms of its groundas something grounded."But metaphysics, or the ontotheological tradition,"does not ask aboutBeing as Being, thatis, does not raise the question of how there can bepresence as such" (56, 70). The task of thinking is to think theunthought of philosophy that answers the question of how there canbe presence as such. Heidegger defines this unthought as "thedifference between Being and beings," or, more concisely, "differ-ence as difference." This difference should not be confused with thepresence of any specific difference. Heideggerian Differenz, which isthe condition of the possibility of all presence and every present, isnot a presence, and, hence, can never be properly present. Yet neitheris it simply absent. What philosophy has not thought (because itcannot think such an "unheard-of' thought without ceasing to bephilosophy) is what lies between presence and absence, identity anddifference, and being and nonbeing. Neither representable in normasterableby traditionalphilosophical and theological reflection, thismargin inscribes "the Open" that lies in the midst of "the fourfold"comprised of "earth and sky, divinities and mortals." Like theto-and-fro of masked dancers, this difference cannot be thoughtproperly. To think difference as difference, Heidegger insists, is tothink "erringly."Heidegger's critique of the culmination of western ontotheologyin the modern philosophy of the subject and the extension of thisphilosophy in modern technology creates a seminal opening for thepostmodern imagination. Thinkers after Heidegger think after a dif-ferent difference in a repeated effort to think otherness otherwise.This Nachdenken has issued in a series of displacements of andsupplements to Heidegger's Differenz: Merleau-Ponty's "flesh,"Sartre's "gaze of the other," Lacan's "discourse of the Other,"Levinas's "infinite," Foucault's "madness," Kristeva'sand Irigaray's"woman," Deleuze's and Guattari's"rhizome," Bataille's "excess,"Blanchot's "proximate,"Beckett's "unnamable,"Serres's "parasite,"and Derrida's"diff rance, "writing,""pharmakon,""tympan,""sup-plement," "remainder," etc. In straining to hear these echoes ofKierkegaard'sAbsolute Paradox,the constant temptation is to reduceundecidable differences to complementary pairs or dialectical oppo-sites. Neither a difference nor indifferent, supplements to Differenzinscribe a margin that "is" something like a "hymen" interruptingevery proposed copulation. Along this border the unending interplayof differences insinuates an alterity that simultaneously makes possi-ble and subverts the stable couples grounding most western thought,society, and culture.As Lingis observes, this alterity is irreducibly "exterior." This

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Symposium: Deconstructing Theology"exteriority," or to use Blanchot's rather than Levinas's term "ledehors," is elusive, if not evasive. Alterity is an outside that is"inside" disrupting all inwardness and dislocating every identity. Toinsist that exteriority hollows all interiority as if from "within" is notto maintain, with Altizer, that "all of the contraries or opposites of ourWestern tradition pass into each other, and do so by virtue of thepresence of the God who is absent, and who IS in His IS NOTNESS."My difference with Altizer on this important point is slight, thoughradical. The subversion of opposites does not entail the collapse ofdifferences or the reconcilation of identity and difference in anHegelian identity-in-difference. The implicit invocation of Blake is,therefore, misplaced unless, of course, Blake is reinterpreted againstAltizer. If, as Altizer maintains, Erring is an apocalyptic book (and, asone of its readers, I doubt that it is), the apocalypse it implies isforever deferred. This deferral is, in effect, indistinguishable from thetotal absence of apocalypse. While for Altizer the death of God is thecondition of the possibility of the parousia, I would insist that thedeath of God is the condition of the impossibility of parousia. From anerrant perspective, apocalyptic thinking is but another (perhaps final)variation of unmasking thought. By refusing to entertain the impossi-ble or to reflect upon the impossibility of thinking, apolcalypticthought becomes both unthinkable and impossible.The delay of the parousia-a deferral that might also be describedin Merleau-Ponty's terms as "the non-lapsability of the lapsability oftime"-rends every whole and tears every totality. As Kierkegaardnever tires of stressing, there is no "Archimedean point" from whichto view things whole. All visions of the whole and appeals to totalitypresuppose an implicit or explicit completion that is called intoquestion by the lapse of time. Following Heidegger's interpretation ofthe relation of Being and time and Alexandre Kojeve's influentialrereading of Hegel, thinkers like Merleau-Ponty, Lacan, Bataille,Levinas, Blanchot, and Derrida insist that the temporality of experi-ence subverts any imagined whole and undercuts every system andall systematic thinking. For people who have suffered the horrors oftotalitarianism in the form of fascism and Stalinism, there is animportant political dimension to this issue. In this context, however, Iwant to underscore the philosophical implications of this critique ofholistic and totalistic thinking.Prabhu presents his misgivings about deconstruction in terms of avision of a whole which, though suggested by his numerous refer-ences to Hegel, only becomes explicit in the penultimate paragraph ofhis paper. Here he states that the view he wants to "defend is that ofthe Real being fully in the Whole, to which we humans have onlyindirect access and fully in each of the moments of the Whole, to

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Journalof the American Academy of Religionwhich our access is direct." A somewhat superficial, albeit wide-spread, view of Derrida's perspective plagues Prabhu's argument.The now standard criticisms of deconstruction forbeing nihilistic andarbitraryareparadedyet again. Like so manyother opponents, Prabhudoes not seem to have examined Derrida's texts with enough care tobe familiarwith the Derridean critique of precisely the position thatPrabhu proposes. To illustrate this point, I cite but one exampleamong many. Expressing reservations about the Nietzschean-Der-ridean view of truth elaborated in Erring, Prabhu writes: "Justbecause truth 'is never totally present,' does not mean it is not presentat all, even if it is never totally present." Quite clearly this claim restsupon a part-whole model. Though we do not know the whole truth,what we do know is partlytrue. Since partinheres in whole and wholein part, partial knowledge is secure. Butpartand whole constitute oneof the couples overturned in deconstructive analysis. To be persua-sive, a critique of deconstruction based upon an appeal to the wholewould have to demonstrate how to fill the lapses and plug the holesexposed by deconstruction. Prabhu makes no effort to provide such aresponse. I suspect this lapse is not accidental.

These remarkscarryimplications that are relevant to two impor-tant points that Lingis raises. As I have stated, Lingis recognizes thedisruption caused by the irreducible exteriority of alterity. In thispaper, however, he does not indicate the consequences of thisexteriority for his own view of being-itself and the self-in-itself.While at opposite ends of the ontological spectrum, the notions ofbeing-itself and the self-in-itself presuppose a common interpreta-tion of being that post-Heideggerian thought calls into question.Developing the insights of the early Heidegger, Lingis argues that"the being with which I exist is being-universal and undividedbeing, that with which all that is is." Elsewhere he goes so far as tomaintain that "utter exteriority"is "the utterly indifferentiated noth-ingness." Over against Lingis, I would argue that while alterity is nothing, it is neither undivided being nor indifferent nothing. Thealternation or oscillation implied in the word "alterity" fissuresuniversal and undivided being and disrupts every form of indiffer-ence.

At the other end of the ontological spectrum, alterity dislocatesevery thing-/self-in-itself. Within the eternally recurringplay of thedivine milieu, there is no thing-in-itself. Since exteriority is alwaysalready "interior,"the subject is never simply "in itself." The doubleenvelopment of inside and outside displays what Derrida, followingMerleau-Ponty and Bataille, labels "invagination."When everythingis inside-out and outside-in, subjectivity proper disappears.Merleau-Ponty describes the structure of invagination as the inter-

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Symposium: Deconstructing Theologytwining [l'entrelacs] of a chiasmus that marks the marginbetween thevisible and the invisible, being and nonbeing, and presence andabsence. If this chiasmic structure replaces the more traditionalunderstanding of the opposition between subject and object[Gegen-stand], Lingis's assertion that the selfs "existence 'in itself,'backed up against itself, must be conceived positively" becomesquestionable.This point can be made differently by suggesting that the self, aswell as everything else, is empty. Each of the respondents emphasizesways in which deconstructive a/theology opens avenues of communi-cation between and among various religious traditions.As Altizer andPrabhunote, one of the richest points of contact can be found in theintersection of a deconstructed Christianity and Buddhism. Morespecifically, certain aspects of Derridean deconstruction bear a signif-icant similarityto the formof MadhyamakaBuddhism, or "the MiddleWay," developed by Nagarjuna.Nargarjuna'sattackon the entitativetheory of existence (bhdva) by means of the notion of emptiness(sunyatd) closely resembles Derrida's criticism of the principle ofidentity through the notion of differance. Furthermore, if viewed interms of "co-dependent origination" (pratitya samutpada), sunyatdapproaches "the non-original origin" that I have reinterpreted interms of the divine milieu. Within this milieu, the erasure of theself-in-itself recalls the dissolution of illusory svabhdva. I suspect theintertwining of these two positions is considerably more intricate thanI have indicated. For example, it might be possible to establish aproductive comparison between the textual strategies of deconstruc-tion and those deployed in some Buddhist texts. Inasmuch asdeconstructive critics subscribe to a performativeview of language, itmight not be unreasonable to expect similarities between the practiceof deconstruction and certain Buddhist meditative and ritual prac-tices. If silence is not the simple opposite of speech any more thanwriting is the mere binaryopposite of speaking, the practice of writingcould be seen as a form of meditation and the practice of meditation asa form of writing. Further elaboration of a comparison between twosuch contrasting points of view must await the careful attention ofscholars who are trained in the different traditions.

It would, in my judgment, be a mistake not to extend suchcomparative analysis to competing strands in the western religioustradition. As Edith Wyschogrod argues persuasively, deconstruction isrelated to the Jewish tradition in complex ways. The link betweenJudaism and deconstruction is more obvious than the interplay be-tween Buddhism and deconstruction. Derrida draws not only on hisown Jewish background but also on the works of major twenti-eth-century Jewish writers like Freud, Husserl, Levinas, and Jabes.

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Journal of the American Academy of ReligionThe most intriguing point of contact between deconstruction and theJewish tradition seems to be Lurianic Kabbalism.When post-struc-turalism and Kabbalismare read with and against each other, each istransformed in interesting ways. If deconstruction is placed in thiscontext, new possibilities for dialogue between Judaism and Christi-anity emerge. Within the bounds of this exchange, The New no longerseems quite so new and The Old no longer seems quite so old.With the recognition of the intersection of the preoccupations ofmany deconstructive writers and concerns that dominate eastern andwestern religious traditions, it becomes necessary to reexamine thecommon charge that deconstruction is apolitical or quietistic, at best,and nihilistic, at worst. There is an undeniably nihilistic side todeconstruction. Students of religion, however, should realize thatnihilism is a complex phenomenon. The nihilism of deconstructionmore closely resembles Christian selflessness, Jewish exile, andBuddhist emptiness than any simple libertinism or antinomianism. InErring I have tried to emphasize the socio-ethical dimensions ofdeconstructive a/theology by exploring the notions of dispossession,impropriety, expropriation, communication, compassion, spending,sacrifice, death, desire, delight, errancy, and carnality. To rethinkhumanexperience in these terms requires a reconsiderationof most ofthe principles that guide contemporary social, political, and ethicaldebates. Though bearing considerable socio-ethical relevance,deconstructive analysis can never provide a firm foundation forthought or action. Deconstruction is steadfastlynon-foundational and,hence, is relentlessly critical. Rather than legitimating quietism, suchcriticism leads to a perpetual restlessness that issues in endlesstransformation.Recalling Nietzsche's eternal recurrence, this con-stantly transformative process knows neither arche nor telos. Theiconoclasm of radical criticism makes erring endless.In the absence of firmfoundations,clear origins, and certain ends,the world becomes an undecidable and irresolvable play of masks.Like the ceaseless rhythmof masked Balinese dancers, we erralong amarginthat can never be known properly.At this threshold, masking,rather than unmasking, might have more to do with religion than wegenerally realize. Is it an accident that, in addition to being a piece ina game, a domino is a hooded robe worn with an eye mask at amasquerade as well as a hooded cape worn by clergymen?For nearly two decades, I have been alternating betweenKierkegaardand Hegel-oscillating from one to the other and backagain. Eventually it became clear to me that this errant courserepeated the rhythmof much twentieth-century theology. The longerI wavered, the less satisfactory became the opposing extremes. Byrereading Kierkegaardand Hegel throughNietzsche and Derrida, the

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Symposium: Deconstructing Theologymean, the middle, the milieu itself became not only fascinating butactually compelling. Altizer sees this clearly when he writes: "Henceit is Taylor's project to create an A/theology by way of a synthesis ofHegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, even if he thereby employs thecontemporary deconstructionist language of Derrida." The time andspace of erring are opened by the domino effect of Hegel's acknowl-edgment of the death of God, Kierkegaard's claim that Christendom isat its end, Nietzsche's announcement of Dionysus (whose other nameis the Anti-Christ or Bacchus), and Derrida's recognition of the closureof the book. In erring, I am doing nothing other than struggling tothink the domino effect of masking by thinking the unthinkableoscillation of alterity and the impossible alterity of oscillation. Oscil-lation, after all, derives from the Latin word oscillum, which means aswing and originally referred a mask of Bacchus that hung from a treein a vineyard to sway in the wind.Five texts-each approaching yet another text from a differentangle, each opening the missing text in a different way. Thoughending, these words are not final, for there is no last word.

'I must explain things clearly to you,' I said. 'Up to the lastmoment, I'm going to be tempted to add one word to what hasbeen said. But why would one word be the last? The last wordis no longer a word, and yet it is not the beginning of anythingelse. I ask you to remember this, so you'll understand whatyou're seeing: the last word cannotbe a word, nor the absenceof words, nor anything else but a word. (Blanchot,52-53)

Mark C. TaylorWilliams CollegeREFERENCES

Altizer, Thomas J. J., et. al.1982 Deconstruction and Theology. New York:Crossroad.Blanchot, Maurice1985 Vicious Circles. Trans. by P. Auster. Barrytown, NewYork:Station Hill Press.Bonhoeffer, DietrichLetters and Papers from Prison. London: SCM Press,Ltd.Derrida, Jacques1981 Positions. Trans. by Alan Bass. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.

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Journal of the American Academy of ReligionDupre, Louis1976Habermas,Jurgen1981

Hegel, G. W. F.1895 [1974]

1956

Heidegger, Martin1972

Lingis, Alphonso1983

Magliola, Robert1982

Nietzsche, F.1954

Rorty,R.1984

Said, Edward1983

Taylor, Mark C.1975

Transcendent Selfhood. New York:Seabury Press.

"Modernity versus Postmodernity." New German Cri-tique 22 (Winter):3-14.

Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Trans. by E. B.Speirs and J. B. Sanderson.New York:Humanities Press.

Review of Goeschel's Aphorismen ueber Nichtwissenund absolutes Wissen. In Berliner Schriften, 1818-1831.Ed. by S. Hoffmeister.Hamburg:F. Meiner.

"The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking." InOn Being and Time. Trans. By J. Stambaugh.New York:Harperand Row.Excesses: Eros and Culture. Albany: State University ofNew YorkPress.

Derrida on the Mend. LaFayette, Indiana: Purdue Uni-versity Press.

Thus Spake Zarathustra. Trans. by W. Kaufmann.NewYork:Viking Press.

"Signposts Along the Way that Reason Went." LondonReview of Books 6/3 (February):5-6.

The World, the Text, the Critic. Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press.

Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study ofTime and Self. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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1980

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Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel and Kierkegaard. Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress.

Erring,A PostmodernA/theology. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.

On the Boundary: An Autobiographical Sketch. NewYork:Charles Scribner'sSons.

Tropics of Discourse. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Univer-sity Press.

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