tcm abct breakout session 2018 ausa chattahoochee … · dense urban areas cyber attacks jamming...

2018 AUSA CV and MCoE Industry Day

TCM ABCT Breakout Session2018 AUSA Chattahoochee Valley/Fort Benning and

MCoE Industry Day11-12 April 2018

LTC Darrell O’SteenDirector, TRADOC Capability Manager

Armored Brigade Combat Team and Reconnaissance

30TH ABCTNC

1ST ABCT34TH ID MN

116TH ABCTMT, OR, ID

155TH ABCTMS

278TH ACRTN

5 ARNG ABCTs

Legend:

SEP/A3

AIM/ODS -SA

A3(Engineers )

ODS-SA(Engineers )

ODS-E(Engineers )

10 Active ABCTs

ABCT Formations FY18

ARMY PREPOSITIONED STOCK

RC APS TNG10 + 5 + 3 + 1 = AC

19ABCTs

1st ADFBTX

2nd

3rd IDFSGA

1st

4th IDFCCO3rd

1st CDFHTX

1st

1ST IDFRKS1st

1ST IDFRKS2nd

1st CDFHTX

2nd

1st CDFHTX

3rd

1st ADFBTX 3rd

APS4NEA

APS5SWA

KEASKorea

TRAINING

1-221 ARNTC

7TH

JMRCGrafenwoehr

11thACRNTC

X (-)

APS2EUR

3/103 CABto

278th ACR

1-118TH IN (SC)2-137TH IN (KS)

1-145TH AR (OH)

ARNG Tactical CABs have aligned with Parent Units

TRAINING CENTERS

3rd IDFSGA

2nd

Fort Benning, Home of the MCoE

Maneuver Center of Excellence - Team of Soldiers, Families, and Civilians from the Best Army in the World!

TCM-ABCT Industry Day

Help the ABCT realize the Army Functional Concept for Movement and Maneuver (AFC-MM)

- Conduct cooperative engagement – between Combat Vehicles, between Mounted and Dismounted elements, and between Air and Ground elements, manned and unmanned

- Alternative fuels/Improved energy efficiency -powertrains and electrical power

- Conduct Direct Fire Beyond Line-of-Sight engagements

- Wireless comms between crew/maintainers/dismounts

- Increased protection at reduced weight

- Increased SA

- Crew 360-degree SA

- Increased Driver Awareness capabilities

- Vehicle Protection Suite (VPS) for legacy platforms

- Improve Reliability and Sustainability to support semi-independent operations for up to 7 days

Existing ABCT Challenges IRT AFC-MM:- Assured/effective communications across increased

distances- High logistical demand - Seeing ourselves in all domains (Space, Cyber)- Training in a Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

(CEMA) and Electronic Warfare (EW) environment



Line of Sight

LOS is direct fire used by assaulting elements as they conduct fire and movement to close with and destroy an enemy. • The target in a LOS engagement is not masked from the firing platform or

Soldier; the sensor and shooter are the same. • Direct Fire (LOS) has the advantage of point and shoot immediacy against targets

that can be directly seen or sensed from the combat platform. • The masking effects of terrain limit both the range and fields of fire available for

LOS engagements.

OrganicGround Sensor

OrganicSensor on platform

Line of Sight

Accessible AirSensor

Organic AirSensor

Line of Sight (LOS)



Beyond Line of Sight

BLOS is a direct fire engagement that extends the range of the traditional direct fire LOS capability. This opens up fields of fire previously denied to elements due to intervening terrain, adverse weather affecting LOS engagement or range to the target. • BLOS fires enable stand-off engagements at extended ranges, enhancing survivability

as platforms remain outside the enemy’s lethality envelope. • The primary defeat location shifts from engagement areas within the line of sight of

the fighting teams to terrain compartments beyond their line of sight, where the enemy’s LOS weapons cannot respond.

• The intervening terrain, once an inhibitor to an engagement, now provides protection to the BLOS system as it engages a target.

OrganicGround Sensor

Organic AirSensor Accessible Air

Sensor

Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS)



Cooperative Engagement

A Cooperative Engagement is a collaborative attack on a target by two or more platforms in which the sensor and the shooter are not resident on the same platform or echelon within the BCT formation. • Two different crews or units, working together using targetable data fed into the

network by organic or networked sensors, and then sent to the weapon system.• Cooperative Engagement permits mutual support between platoon, company/troop,

and battalion/squadron elements, both mounted and dismounted, operating on dispersed axes or when the sensing platform’s ability to engage the target is limited by a restricted field of view, visibility, terrain or obstacles.

• Networked, sensor-to-shooter relationships begin at the squad and platoon level.

OrganicSensor

OrganicSensor

AccessibleSensor

Cooperative Engagement (BLOS)



Denied, Degraded, Disrupted Space Operational Environment (D3SOE)

D3SOE Impacts



Loss of SATCOM and GPS Mitigation

SATCOM Provides: BLOS voice and data communicationsSATCOM Disruption Mitigation: • Train opertors/trouble shoot• Understand threat (S2 IPB)Develop PACE Plan• P – SATCOM• A – FM (UHF)• C – JCR (BFT• E – Iridium/Cell Phones

GPS Provides: satellite base position, navigation and timing to both military and civilian users. GPS Disruption Mitigation: SATCOM Disruption Mitigation: • Understand threat (S2 IPB)• Encrypt GPS receivers (e.g. DAGR)• Block the jamming signal (jammers are LOS)• Maintain skill in traditional navigation methodsDevelop PACE Plan• P – DAGR• A – FBCB2 (JBC-P or JBC-LOG)• C – Map and Compass• E – Terrain Association (with and without map)



Operating Environment

Our adversaries have studied our way of war and adapted by investing in capabilities and developing concepts to gain advantages over us across the domains of air, land, sea, space and cyberspace…

All domains are in play (Maritime, Land, Air, Cyber/EMS, Space)

Enemy has “home field” advantage (A2/AD)

Irregular forces/”Little Green Men”/Proxies (Hybrid)

Enemy is “in the network”/Communications Disruption (Cyberspace)

Long Range Fires/UAS and UGV (Lethality)

Troop density reduced (Dispersion of Forces)

Changes in the character of war…

21st Century Battlefield = Information Manipulation

Robotics

Transregional Threats Dense Urban

Areas Cyber Attacks Unmanned VehiclesJammingArtificial Intelligence Terrorist & Criminal

Organizations

RUSSIA CHINA

SYRIA

N. KOREA

CONTESTED DOMAINSLETHAL BATTLEFIELDS

COMPLEX ENVIRONMENT CHALLENGED DETERRENCE

Space Anti-Ship Long Range Fires Robotics UAS/SWARMS Air & Missile Defense

Threat Investment in Future Technologies

CYBER/EW



Implications of the Operating Environment

Current positioning of forces means we’ll always fight an “away game” against an adversary forces designed to deny access to terrain, contest all domains, and fight Hybrid warfare…

Air & Missile Defense

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Complex

Anti-Ship

Long Range Fires

UAS/SWARMS

Long Range and Massed Fires Complex

Robotics

Air and Land Forces (Combined Arms) + HYBRID Warfare

Cyber/EWAviation

ArmorSpace

CYBER/EW

Strategic Narrative & Information Operations

Media

Deploy early, preposition or face contested entry (Readiness)

Penetrate Threat Standoff (A2/AD)

Cover more ground with fewer forces (Dispersed/Distributed)

Fight opposed in all domains (Think, access and employ capabilities)

Operate without air superiority (Enable other domains from land)

Operate in austere and dispersed environments (Self-sufficient)

Army Forces Must…

Current Army Foundation Capabilities Through 2040

Airborne Apache Stryker Paladin & MLRS Bradley Abrams Air Assault

LAYERED STANDOFF GAINING ACCESS ENABLING OTHER DOMAINS SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS



Components of the Solution

Components

Conduct Cross-Domain Maneuver: Create synergy with capabilities employed across all domains to increase relative combat power, pose enemies with multiple dilemmas, and defeat or destroy enemy forces.

Operate Semi-independently: BCTs possess sufficient mobility, firepower, protection, intelligence, mission command, and sustainment capabilities necessary to conduct cross-domain maneuver while dispersed at extended distances, and for ample duration.

Integrate Reconnaissance and Security Operations: Combine organic and joint capabilities at all command echelons across all domains with reconnaissance and security operations over wide areas to reduce enemy options and protect the force.

Make Mission Command Real: Empower subordinate leaders to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative consistent with the commander’s intent regardless of the condition of the mission command network or other cross-domain enablers.

EAB: Manage campaigns and transitions; integrate reconnaissance and security operations; create shared understanding; synchronize operations and shape OE for BCTs; organize sustainment operations; and organize theater level consolidation of gains activities to create sustainable outcomes consistent with national objectives.

As part of the Joint Force, Army forces deploy and transition rapidly to cross-domain maneuver with

combined arms teams that operate semi-independently to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; defeat

enemy forces; and achieve operational objectives.

Cross-Domain Synergy

11

4

DISPERSED/DISTRIBUTED OPERATIONS INTERRUPTED COMMUNICATIONS HYPERACTIVE BATTLESPACE NON-CONTIGUOUS



Cross-Domain Maneuver

5

Multi-Domain

Operations

CROSS-DOMAIN SYNERGY

The optimization of capabilities across all

domains that produce a total effect that is greater than the sum of actions in

each domain =

OVERMATCH

Visualize the Domains in Time and Space



Maneuver Evolution

PH 0 PH I PH II PH III PH IVCompetition Conflict

PH VCompetition

CURRENT OE

“…future Joint Forces will leverage better integration to improve cross-domain synergy - the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities across domains, time, and space…our ability to project force across domains generates our decisive advantage.”

American Revolutionary

War

1775

1939

World War II

Desert Storm

1991Integration of Domains over time

20--

Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2012, page 7).

Domain Expansion (Evolution) Time-Space Expansion (What is “new”)

EXPANDED BATTLEFIELD EXPANDED DIMENSIONS EXPANDED TIME SMALLER ARMIES

WWI

WW II

DESERT STORM

The expansion of time, space, and domains in warfare requires US Forces to operate in a state of competition prior to armed conflict…and remain in competition following conflict.


14

8-10 Oct AUSA National

11 April Industry Day at Ironworks Facility

11 May Industry Quad Charts due to CDID

1 Jun CDD S&T compilation/analysis of Submissions - distributed

within MCoE

10 Aug All submit tier recommendations – company notifications

(Tier 2,3 and 4. Schedule briefings)

20 Aug Tier 1 list recommendations to CDID Director

24 Aug Tier 1 and 5 Industries notified of tiering results

22 Aug Tier 1 recommended list to DCGs and CG MCoE

10 April Industry Day Rehearsal at Ironworks Facility

(MCoE CDID)

10 April 2019 Industry Day

12 April Industry Day Supplemental meetings with Industry

5 April Industry Day Morning Briefings submitted to CDD for consolidation (CG, CDID Dir, CFT Dirs, AUSA)

13 April Industry Day Participants submit final slides to CDD for transfer to AUSA

Industry Day 2018 Timeline


Quad Chart Timeline

CV/FB AUSA Industry Day 11-12 April 18

Quad Charts due to MCoE NLT 11 May 18

Email: [email protected]

Quad Chart Tier Ranking complete 10 August 18

Industry notified of Quad Tier Ranking NLT 24 August 18

AUSA Annual Meeting and Exposition 8-10 October 18

15

mailto:[email protected]


• Tier I: Outbrief to the MCoE CG at AUSA National Conference

• Tier II: Outbrief to the Division Director

• Tier III: Outbrief to the Requirement Branch Chief

• Tier IV: This is our requirement area, but does not meet our

required capability set

• Tier V: This is not our requirement area; POC to alternate

Center of Excellence provided

• Tier Definition: The briefing path selected to best facilitate

communication with the MCOE

Quad Chart Tiers

16


Army Modernization Priorities"CSA Strategic Priorities"

Cross Walk

Overmatch in Soldier and

Team Performance

Robotic and Autonomous

Systems

Future Vertical Lift

Mission Command, Cyber, and

EW Capabilities

Advanced Protection

Combat Vehicles

Cross-Domain Fires

Big 6 + 1 “OVRMACX”

FFDS Organizational

Changes

Enhance Current

Force Readiness

Restore Enabler

Capacity

Fundamentally

Sound Formations

Invest for Future

Force Capabilities


Combat Vehicle Modernization Strategy ExecutionProblem. How must the Army develop and field combat vehicles in the future operational environment (OE) while optimizing near-term readiness?

Central idea. The Army develops and fields combat vehicles to meet the needs of Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) executing future maneuver concepts by mapping combat modernization to functional concepts, prioritizing resources and analyzing trades, employing non-traditional acquisition strategies and opportunities to accelerate programs, and providing senior leaders options when necessary to reprioritize.

Aim point. An executable strategy that is formation-focused and leads to meeting the

requirements in the Maneuver Force Modernization Strategy (MFMS) and Army Functional

Concept for Movement and Maneuver (AFC-MM), specifically a BCT with the capacity and

capability to operate semi-independently.

Risks, challenges, & opportunities.

• On present course, Army will not be sufficiently modernized for future threat• Enhancements to aging fleet near culmination• Fiscal constraints require tough decisions and choices• Cost and weight factors limit attributes on protection, lethality, and mobility• Army must minimize modernization risk across the near, mid, and far-term• S&T research must focus on critical enabling technologies

18CVMS-E is a living document - a running estimate - reality is always evolving


Focus Areas

• Directed Energy / Energetics

• Power Generation and Management

• Integrated Vehicle Protection Suite

• Advanced Armor

• Maneuver Robotics and Autonomous Systems (MRAS)

Combat actions occur in all domains quickly and often times simultaneously

Communications become degraded for extended periods of time

Battlefield frameworks and operations assume more nonlinear constructs

Decision making is either decentralized to allow for rapid adaptation to changes in the OE or opportunities are lost

19

Big 4 + 1

Cross Domain Dominance

“Collectors and Effectors”

• Beyond Traditional CV Considerations

• Mobility• Lethality• Protection

• Cyber

• SpaceGround

• Electromagnetic Spectrum

EMS

tcm abct breakout session 2018 ausa chattahoochee … · dense urban areas cyber attacks jamming...

Documents