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Winter 2016 Issue 331

INSIDEEUROPEAN ARRANGEMENTS

NEW SMS REGULATIONS

ELMS: A TOOL FOR ENGINEERS

TECH

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3TECHLOG WINTER 2016

5 Editorial

6 European arrangements

7 Winning for Members

8 Release of maintenance

11 New SMS Regulation

12 Blackbird world record

14 Word from down under

18 Human error

24 A tool for engineers

26 Short reports

30 Association Notices

Objects of the AssociationTo promote the Professional Status of Association Members.

To represent Members in their workplaces.

To represent Members of the Association within the Industry.

To strive to improve the standards of safety in all aspects ofaircraft maintenance and operation.

The ALAE welcomes contributions to ‘The Tech Log’, butreserves the right to amend them where necessary. Allcontributions, whether they bear the names, initials orpseudonyms, are accepted on the understanding that the authoris responsible for the opinions expressed and that they do notnecessarily reflect or comply with those of the publisher oreditor. Although every care is taken, the publisher and editorcannot be held responsible for loss or damage to materialsubmitted. Whilst every care is taken to ensure contents areaccurate, the publisher and editor assume no responsibility forany effects arising from errors or omissions. Acceptance ofmaterial is not a guarantee of publication in any particular issue,since space is at a premium.

For more information on the following, please contact the Office Administrator: ALAE/Prospect, Flaxman House, Gogmore Lane, Chertsey, Surrey KT16 9JSTelephone: 01932 577007 Fax: 01932 565239Email: [email protected] Website: www.alae.org

When ALAE members call the telephone number above theywill be passed forward to the dedicated officer for their particulararea as per the breakdown previously advised to EC members.

Please inform the registered office above of any change ofdetails, address, telephone number, etc as soon as possible toensure you continue to receive your copy of ‘Tech Log’.e-mail: [email protected]

‘Tech Log’ is published by MYPEC0113 257 9646 www.mypec.co.uk

Photography by Barry Swannwww.barryswannphotography.comand Garfield Moreton Photographygarfieldmoretonphotography.zenfolio.com

CONTENTS

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5

As a direct result of an open letter sent to EASA by AEI, the agency

created a document, (the full version is published in this edition of Tech

Log), explaining the position of EASA on the relationship between

aircraft maintenance, accountability of the licensed aircraft engineer and

the certificate of release to service. The meaning of this document was

presented by EASA to European NAAs during a EASA standardisation

meeting. However, when these NAAs have been challenged to

implement the rule as intended, some have replied with the comment

‘this is EASAs understanding of the regulation, not ours’. It can be

demonstrated that after more than one year of EASA agreeing with

evidence that NAAs are not operating within the ‘standardised process’

but rather continue to operate in a national, pre-EASA legacy mode. The

problem to the flying public is that regulation created to reduce risks is

being ignored and EASA have no power to do anything about it.

This is disturbing as many years ago, when it became evident to the

European Union that the approach adopted by the then JAA would not

bring the necessary safety benefits to aviation, (the JAA was operating

like a ‘coffee club’ with rules that were not binding and no power to

implement and standardise), the resolution ‘sold’ to the UK Government

to resolve this was the creation of an all encompassing agency, established

by international treaty and given legal powers to impose the standards it

adopts, namely EASA.

It was published that the new European Aviation Safety Agency, would

have the necessary ‘teeth’ to ensure the agreed safety enhancing regulation

would be implemented in a standard approach by all members.

Unfortunately, it can be demonstrated that this is not the case. Indeed

the European Union and individual member state governments have left

EASA almost toothless as one cannot rely on the cumbersome and

ineffective infringement process currently in place. EASA has come of

age and is beginning to function as intended in terms of raising safety

related audit findings as part of the standardisation process. However, if

the NAA involved refuses to play ball, the situation is then passed on to

the politicians in Brussels and important safety issues become political.

The problem with this the time span involved. It can take literally years

for Brussels to complete the so-called infringement process thereby

forcing an NAA to comply. We believe this undermines not only EASA

but also those NAA’s within Europe that want to do it right. An arguable

position would be that the result is a net increase in risk for safety in

engineering and maintenance across Europe.

A broadcast earlier this year (2016) made by Sir Francis Jacobs

(Professor of European Law at the University of London and Director of

the Centre of European Law for King’s College London School of Law)

indicates how far from a safe workable solution we actually are, Sir

Francis stated: “If the European Union is to work at all, then European

Union Law has to prevail over the law of the member states. If there

were twenty eight member states each taking a different view of what

European Union law should mean then it would be impossible for the

European Union to function”.

In summary, it appears the agency created to deliver the ‘highest

common standard in aviation safety’ has not actually been provided with

the necessary powers, despite its best intentions, to deliver.

In this edition of Tech Log I have included an extract of a UK

Government document published in December 1999. This document

promoted the creation of EASA to the UK Parliament. You are welcome

to judge for yourselves if the promise of a common understanding and

implementation of aviation rules related to engineering has been or can

be delivered by EASA in its current form.

Jon Harris – [email protected]

EDITORIAL

Despite relationship building, clarification of regulation, andagreements during the regular meetings with EASA seniormanagement, it would appear that the agency is not actually legallyable to standardise the regulation to the level where all memberstates are implementing the rules as intended.

TECHLOG WINTER 2016

We view both the existing Joint Aviation Authorities

and the proposed European Aviation Safety authority

with some concern. The United Kingdoms aviation

industry has a proud safety record and very high

standards of regulation: both have at least the potential

to be undermined by membership of these

organisations. Accordingly we recommend that the

Government should clarify whether the European

Aviation Safety Authority would have legal power to

impose the standards it proposes, and the Government

should seek an undertaking before joining the Authority

that the safety standards of the United Kingdom will

not be adversely affected (paragraph 35).

It has been long recognised that the international

nature of the aerospace and aviation industries calls for

an international approach to safety regulation, both at

global level through the International Civil Aviation

Organisation (ICAO) and, for some thirty years now, at

European level through the Joint Aviation Authorities

( JAA). More recently, competence for many aspects of

aviation safety has transferred from national authorities

to the European Community by virtue of the

incorporation of Joint Aviation Requirements into

European law. The Civil Aviation Authority has always

played a leading role in developing harmonised

European standards in the JAA. Accident rates in

Europe are among the lowest in the world, and there is

no evidence that harmonisation of standards has in any

way reduced levels of safety in the UK.

However, the JAAs lack of legal status handicaps its

effective operation. National variations in some

standards remain, while unevenness in the

implementation of common standards raises doubts

about the quality of safety regulation in some countries.

Cumbersome committee structures, and the need to

achieve consensus, delay decision-taking. For these

reasons all EU Member States, along with all significant

EU aviation industry interests, support the creation of a

new, powerful pan-European Aviation Safety Authority

(EASA). It is planned to establish EASA by

international treaty, and to give it legal powers to

impose the standards it adopts. The UK is playing a

leading role in the developing the terms of the draft

treaty, in order to ensure that UK safety standards will

not be adversely affected. National safety authorities will

retain powers to react immediately to any safety

problem becoming apparent at short notice. UK

ratification of any future Treaty establishing EASA will

be subject to Parliamentary scrutiny.

A strong EASA which attracts the highest calibre of

staff will ensure high, uniform safety standards

throughout Europe and, simultaneously, remove barriers

to UK companies trading competitively. The concept of

aviation safety regulation at European level is now well

entrenched, and the Government firmly believes that

the potential advantages of a powerful EASA far

outweigh any possible drawbacks of the UK being

unable to act unilaterally.

EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONALARRANGEMENTS

Government response to the July 1999report by Environment, Transport andRegional Affairs Select Committee. Published: 8 December 1999 Added: 8 December 1999Modified: 21 September 21 2004

It has been long

recognisedthat the

internationalnature of the

aerospaceand aviation

industriescalls for an

internationalapproach to safety

regulation.

TECHLOG WINTER 20166

NEWS BITES

You will have seen that the union had to be incredibly

steadfast in pursuing this case given the approach of

British Airways to challenge the claim at every stage,

including the Employment Appeals Tribunal. Indeed,

BA were not only prepared to throw seemingly endless

resources at fighting the member’s claim, but also could

have sought to have the considerable costs of the case

levied against the union if the claim was overturned.

This approach by employers shows the necessity of

trade union membership in the airline industry.

Without the support of Prospect and the resources

available to the union, employees could be facing

financial ruin if they seek to challenge unfair decisions

by their employer. However, membership of Prospect

will guarantee that if your case is supported by the

union then you will not have to bear the costs of

pursuing it.

As well as winning a landmark case against British

Airways your ALAE branch of Prospect has also

secured numerous compensation agreements for

members who have pursued claims but settled them

outside of the tribunal. Confidentiality agreements

preclude the union from giving full details of these

agreements, but they include significant compensation

in the following cases:

• A sex discrimination claim against a major airline.

• A group claim for unfair selection for redundancy.

• Recovery of £12,000 of wages that had been withheld

by an overseas airline.

In all these cases significant costs were involved in

supporting these claims. These were all met by Prospect

and 100% of compensation was retained by members.

Finally, in addition to all the work we carry out on

behalf of individual members, Prospect continue to

pursue opportunities to organise members and gain

recognition for collective bargaining. Recently the

union has been successful in doubling the size of our

representation in Bond Helicopters and will be looking

to secure a recognition agreement in this area.

John Ferrett, Prospect

Members will be aware of the union’s recent successfulEmployment Tribunal claim on behalf of a licensedengineer working for British Airways.

PROSPECT – WINNINGFOR MEMBERS


EASA POLICY ON CERTIFICATES OF FOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE ANDOF MAINTENANCE ORGANISATIONS

These provisions are currently being reviewed as part of two

rulemaking tasks:

• RMT.0217 (M.029) ‘CAMO and Part-145 responsibilities’.

• RMT.0097 (145.024) ‘Functions and responsibilities of B1 and B2

support staff ’.

These tasks have led so far to the publication of NPA 2014-27 and

NPA 2014-11 respectively, proposing certain changes to the rules and

to the AMC/GM material, which still have to be further reviewed

based on the feedback of the external consultation. Furthermore, even

if eventually the Agency would issue an Opinion, the proposed

changes would still be a long way from being applicable and could be

even subject to change since the Opinion would have to go through

the corresponding comitology process with the Member States before

being adopted by the Commission.

The purpose of this paper is to summarise the applicable current

requirements and describe the intent of those requirements as

interpreted by the European Aviation Safety Agency (the Agency).

1. Continuing airworthiness responsibilities, including maintenanceThe continuing airworthiness responsibilities are described in detail

in Part-M, point M.A.201. This point introduces different provisions

depending on the aircraft category (large and other than large

aircraft) and type of operations (commercial air transport, other

commercial operations and private operations)

However, all these provisions have two aspects in common:

• the owner/operator (or contracted CAMO, if existing) is

responsible for all activities aimed to determine the airworthiness

status of the aircraft and to appropriately plan and coordinate

maintenance, and

• the contracted maintenance organisation or, when permitted by the

rule, the independent certifying staff, are responsible for adequately

performing and certifying the maintenance ordered by the

owner/operator/CAMO.

In the particular case of aircraft involved in Commercial Air

Transport, according to M.A.201(h), the operator is responsible for

the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft it operates and shall be

approved as a CAMO.

According to M.A.708(b), these responsibilities include, among

other aspects, ensuring that all maintenance requirements

(Airworthiness Directives, maintenance programme requirements,

defect rectification, etc) are complied with and released by approved

Part-145 maintenance organisations.

This means that the operator (CAMO) is responsible for planning

and ordering all required maintenance and for verifying that all the

ordered maintenance has been released to service by the approved

Part-145 organisation.

However, the operator is not responsible for the actual performance

of maintenance, which is the responsibility of the Part-145

organisation issuing the CRS (Certificate of Release to Service).

Important aspects to be considered are the following:

• The operator (CAMO) cannot issue Certificates of Release to

Service (CRS) following maintenance. The CRS has to be issued

always by certifying staff of the Part-145 organisation.

• When maintenance is performed and released by the Part-145

organisation, the operator must have procedures to verify that all

the maintenance ordered to that organisation has been released to

service by the approved Part-145 organisation. However, in order to

perform this verification the operator (CAMO) is not required to

use certifying staff.

• Since the CRS only certifies that the maintenance ordered by the

operator (CAMO) has been performed and released in accordance

with Part-145, it does not guarantee that all the continuing

airworthiness requirements are met (there may be some missing

maintenance that has not been ordered by the operator). This is the

responsibility of the operator (CAMO).

• Consequently, the operator (CAMO) must have procedures to

ensure that a flight does not take place unless all the continuing

airworthiness requirements are met. This could be met, for example,

by a procedure where the operator (CAMO) receives a

communication from the maintenance organisation and the

operator (CAMO) notifies to the commander that there is no

other maintenance due. However, other procedures are possible,

for example, delegating to the Part-145 the notification to

the commander.

8 TECHLOG WINTER 2016

The provisions contained in Regulation (EU) No 1321/2014 related tothe release of maintenance, as well as those related to the functionsand responsibilities of CAMOs and maintenance organisations, havevery frequently raised questions and different interpretations.

• The CRS issued by the Part-145 organisation has to go always on

board the aircraft as part of the Technical Log System, together

with all the information related to rectification of defects, deferral

of maintenance actions, etc. This information has to be always

available to the commander (refer to M.A.306 and AMC

M.A.306(a)), who is the ultimate responsible for accepting the

aircraft before a flight takes place.

• The Technical Log System must also contain a maintenance

statement issued by the operator (CAMO) providing the status of

which scheduled and out of phase maintenance is next due.

However, this maintenance statement does not need to be on board

if the operator (CAMO) has alternate procedures acceptable for the

competent authority in order to control the next maintenance due

[refer to M.A.306 and AMC M.A.306(a)].

• This maintenance statement, if placed on board the aircraft, does

not supersede the obligation to have the Part-145 CRS on board

and available to the commander.

2. Certification of maintenancePoint 145.A.50(a) states the following:

“A certificate of release to service shall be issued by appropriately

authorised certifying staff on behalf of the organisation when it has

been verified that all maintenance ordered has been properly carried

out by the organisation in accordance with the procedures specified

in point 145.A.70, taking into account the availability and use of the

maintenance data specified in point 145.A.45 and that there are no

non-compliances which are known to endanger flight safety.”

In addition, point 145.A.50(b) states that:

“A certificate of release to service shall be issued before flight at the

completion of any maintenance.”

The wording of the requirements above has very often raised

different interpretations. In the following paragraphs we are going to

present the position of the Agency.

3. How many CRS can or should be issuedPoint 145.A.50(b) requires a CRS to be issued before flight at the

completion of ‘any maintenance’.

The position of the Agency is that the words ‘any maintenance’ can

be interpreted in different ways, such as:

• any maintenance task

• any combination of maintenance tasks

• any maintenance event

As a result of this, it is also the position of the Agency

that the current regulation allows different systems of release

to service, such as:

• Several certificates of release to service are issued, each one of them

covering a single maintenance task.

• Several certificates of release to service are issued, each one of them

covering a certain group of tasks.

• A single certificate of release to service is issued covering all the

maintenance included in a maintenance event.

The Agency would also like to point out that regardless of which

release system is used, the release to service procedure implemented

by the maintenance organisation should be adequate to the type of

organisation, complexity, scope of work, etc, and has to ensure

compliance with 145.A.50. This means, among other aspects, that:

• A CRS must identify clearly the work performed and, if applicable,

any incomplete work and the corresponding limitations.

• A CRS can only be issued by certifying staff holding certification

privileges for all the maintenance tasks covered by the release

statement.

• In the case of base maintenance the CRS must be issued by

category C certifying staff.

• The release to service procedures must ensure that all the

maintenance actions have been properly coordinated, and the

release to service is issued within a reasonable timeframe after the

actual performance of the tasks.

In addition, it is important to stress that a release to service,

whether it is single or multiple, does not necessarily mean that the

aircraft is airworthy and ready for flight. A release to service is just a

release after the performance of maintenance and its issuance is the

responsibility of the maintenance organisation. However, the

responsibility for defining the airworthiness status of the aircraft is

the responsibility of the CAMO/operator.

4. What does it mean that ‘there are no non-complianceswhich are known to endanger flight safety’The intent of this requirement is to cover those cases where the

maintenance organisation, during the performance of the

maintenance ordered by the operator, discovers a non-compliance

which endangers flight safety. However, it is not the intent to require

the maintenance organisation to find or become responsible for

hidden non-compliances which are not expected to be discovered

during the ordered maintenance.

Certain questions have been raised as to whether this includes also

those situations where, after performing the maintenance ordered by

the operator, the aircraft is left in a non-airworthy configuration.

This could be the case, for example, where the maintenance

RELEASE TO SERVICE ASSOCIATED RESPONSIBILITIESAND CAMOS (17 December 2015)


organisation removes an engine for preservation (without installing

a new one), or where the organisation performs an NDT inspection

and finds a crack outside limits. This has raised questions as to

whether in these cases a CRS can be issued for the maintenance

performed.

The position of the Agency is that all the cases mentioned above

(including those of non-compliances affecting flight safety discovered

during maintenance), can be properly addressed by using the

provisions contained in 145.A.50(c) and (e). Based on those

provisions, it is possible to release the maintenance performed, as

long as the incomplete maintenance is properly identified and

communicated to the operator (and possibly to the competent

authority if a disagreement with the operator exists).

5. What does it mean ‘appropriately authorisedcertifying staff’This means that in order to issue a CRS the certifying staff have to be

formally authorised by the maintenance organisation to do so.

The word ‘appropriately’ means that the person can only be

authorised when the organisation has verified compliance with all the

applicable qualification requirements, only for the scope of work

applicable to that qualification (in the case of Part-145 organisations,

please refer to 145.A.30, 145.A.35) and always within the privileges

granted by the Part-66 licence held by the person (refer to 66.A.20).

This means that, for example, in the case of a line maintenance event

which includes a daily check + some single running tasks + requested

defect rectification entered in the Technical Log by the crew, if such

event includes tasks within the scope of B1 and B2 privileges

(mechanical tasks and avionic tasks), then a single release to service can

only be issued if the person issuing it holds both the B1 and B2

licences. It is not possible for a B1 certifying staff (or for a B2

certifying staff ) to issue a single release to service covering the full

maintenance event. The other option is to have a B1 certifying staff

issuing a release to service for the mechanical tasks and a B2 certifying

staff issuing a release to service for the avionics tasks, which would

become a multiple release system.

6. What does it mean ‘when it has been verified that allmaintenance ordered has been properly carried out’This doesn’t necessarily mean that certifying staff have to perform or

supervise the whole process of every task, but the necessity of assessing

the complexity of each task, making sure that they have been assigned

to personnel authorised to sign-off to the corresponding level,

coordinating the different tasks, supporting that personnel in case of

any mistakes or unexpected difficulties and verifying that the job has

been completed and signed-off properly.

As a consequence, this is not just an administrative task which can be

performed from a remote location or without having been involved at

all. Certifying staff have the last call on the amount of involvement

they would like to perform in order to be satisfied that the

maintenance can be properly released, and this level of involvement

cannot be predefined or limited by the organisation’s procedures.

7. In the case of base maintenance, what are thefunctions and responsibilities of ‘support staff’The qualification criteria for certifying staff and support staff are

identical as both:

• must have a Part-66 licence with the corresponding type ratings

• must have the same recent experience and continuation training

• must have training in human factors and company procedures; and

• are subject to the same competence assessment

The only difference is that in the base maintenance environment

there is an additional function, the category C certifying staff.

However, this function is more administrative due to the more

complex environment.

Regarding the level of involvement of the support staff,

145.A.30(h) states that ‘B1 and B2 support staff shall ensure that all

relevant tasks or inspections have been carried out to the required

standard before the category C certifying staff issues the certificate of

release to service’.

This requirement is of a similar nature to the one contained in

145.A.50(a), where certifying staff are required to ensure that ‘it has

been verified that all maintenance ordered has been properly carried

out’. As a consequence, the level of involvement expected from the

support staff follows the same principles as indicated in Section 6

above for certifying staff.

8. What is the function of personnel authorised to ‘sign-off’AMC 145.A.65(B)(3)3 states that, in order to prevent omissions,

every task or group of tasks should be signed-off by formally

authorised personnel after its completion. It also states that a ‘sign-

off ’ is different from a ‘release to service’.

Furthermore, this AMC states that work by ‘unauthorised

personnel’ (temporary staff, trainee..) should be checked by

‘authorised personnel’ before they sign-off. ‘They’ means ‘authorised

personnel’ (formally authorised to sign-off ).

This concept of personnel authorised to sign-off is in line with the

provisions related to the assessment of mechanics contained in AMC

145.A.30(e)(3). This assessment should guarantee that ‘mechanics

shall be able to carry out tasks to any standard specified in the

maintenance data, and will notify supervisors of mistakes requiring

rectification to re-establish required maintenance standards’.

Nevertheless, holding a ‘sign off ’ authorisation doesn’t mean that

the authorised person can sign-off all tasks. It means that he/she can

sign-off tasks up to the authorised level, depending on the training

and experience held, and in accordance with a procedure described in

the MOE. Furthermore, even if this person is qualified and able to

carry out the task to the required standard, this does not mean that

certifying staff and support staff are not needed. The presence of

certifying staff and support staff is an additional safety barrier and,

as explained in Sections 6 and 7 above, has the function of

co-ordinating the different tasks, supporting those mechanics in case

of any mistakes or unexpected difficulties and verifying that the job

has been completed and signed-off properly.



SMS – NEW REGULATION Since November 2015 Regulation (EU) NO 376/2014 hasbeen mandatory in our industry. We all know it as SMSor Safety Management Systems. The ALAE branch of Prospect have a particular interest

in this new Regulation and how it will affect the

working lives of our Members. If you are involved in the

maintenance and operation of Civil Aircraft your

company should, by now, have in place an SMS system

and you should have been told about it and trained on

it. It should now be in use across our industry, we

should all be using our company SMS reporting systems

to report safety related incidents.

Safety Management Systems are not new to all of us,

many companies have had similar systems for years and

some have used such systems at various levels including

of course the UK CAA MOR system to good effect but

what about company based SMS?

ALAE branch have been aware of some problems with

the SMS systems in use out there, one of the most

contentious area is when individuals are the subject of

disciplinary action by their employer following an

incident involving Aircraft Safety. The primary objective

of SMS is to prevent and reduce errors occurring in Civil

Aviation and the fundamental bedrock of such reporting

systems is the promotion of Just Culture and open honest

reporting by those of us ‘at the coal face’, easy words to

write but how is this being dealt with in the real world?

When you look at the ideas and procedures in company

SMS Manuals it all seems to make sense, for example the

idea of ‘substitution’ in other words when an incident

occurs could another person given the same set of

circumstances, similar experience, similar qualifications,

similar time of day or night, similar pressures etc., make

the same errors the original person did? If the answer is

‘yes’ then it becomes a blameless error, simple or so you

would think, the person who made the error cannot be

punished for his mistake as the error would have likely

happened to anyone in the same place at the same time,

it’s just that he happened to be the one left standing

when the music stopped. Would you expect your

company to behave correctly in these circumstances?

Another area of interest is when people ‘cut corners’ to

get the job done, most SMS Manuals will talk about this

issue and the interesting thing about this is that most will

say the company will not support ‘corner cutting’ for

whatever reason, now obviously what springs to mind

here is the unacceptable behaviour associated with the

rushing of a job or missing out steps within a task to get

away off shift quicker but what about the person who

thinks by ‘cutting a corner’ he can get the aircraft back

in the air quicker? Where does he stand when it goes

wrong? He might have done the job like that with all

the best intentions in the world but if it goes wrong

his companies SMS Manuals will tell him he is on his

own and will, most likely, be in big trouble. Does your

Employer ever accept ‘corner cutting’ to get the

job done?

Does your company’s HR Department know that

SMS, and the correct use of it, is now laid in Regulatory

stone? Do they know much if anything about SMS? If

you found yourself in a disciplinary hearing over a safety

related incident would you feel confident they would

have studied in depth and understood the SMS reports

relating to your incident and others like it? Would they

be able to comprehend and agree that you failed the

‘substitution’ test back in those reports? Have they

ensured themselves that your SMS investigation was

carried out totally independently and without any bias?

Would they be able to demonstrate that you deserve to

be sitting there as you fall outside all of the ‘blameless

error’ criteria? Would you be able to put hand on heart

and say that you deserved to be sitting in that hearing

due to a top class SMS investigation being carried out

and you’re going take what they throw at you? ALAE

believes many companies struggle with this ‘link’ from

SMS procedures to HR procedures which can lead to

individuals being disciplined when clearly under SMS

style philosophies they should not have been.

SMS may indeed prove to be a life or perhaps a career

saver for some of us when mistakes are made and in the

main ALAE branch of Prospect wholly endorses its use

in Civil Aviation Engineering however it’s the way in

which companies deal with it and its repercussions that

worries us. ALAE is interested in hearing from those

Members who have had experiences with SMS issues,

good and bad, and would ask that you contact us. All

information will be treated confidentially of course.

ALAE intend to update the UK CAA with feedback

from our Members over the coming months in order

to measure the effectivity of it as a safety management

system.


SON OF SR71

Lockheed Martin’s ‘Skunk Works’®

engineers are developing a hypersonicaircraft that will go twice the speed ofthe SR-71. It’s called the SR-72.


But those world records may not stay unbroken

for long. That’s because today, at the birthplace of the

Blackbird – Lockheed Martin’s ‘Skunk Works®’

engineers are developing a hypersonic aircraft that will

go twice the speed of the SR-71. It’s called the SR-72.

Son of the BlackbirdThe SR-71 was developed using 20th century

technology. It was envisioned with slide rules and

paper. It wasn’t managed by millions of lines of

software code. And it wasn’t powered by computer

chips. All that changes with the SR-72.

Envisioned as an unmanned aircraft, the SR-72

would fly at speeds up to Mach 6, or six times the

speed of sound. At this speed, the aircraft would be so

fast, an adversary would have no time to react or hide.

“Hypersonic aircraft, coupled with hypersonic

missiles, could penetrate denied airspace and strike at

nearly any location across a continent in less than an

hour,” said Brad Leland, Lockheed Martin program

manager, Hypersonics. “Speed is the next aviation

advancement to counter emerging threats in the next

several decades. The technology would be a game-

changer in theatre, similar to how stealth is changing

the battlespace today.”

A hypersonic plane does not have to be an expensive,

distant possibility. In fact, an SR-72 could be

operational by 2030. For the past several years,

Lockheed Martin Skunk Works® has been working

with Aerojet Rocketdyne to develop a method to

integrate an off-the-shelf turbine with a supersonic

combustion ramjet air breathing jet engine to power

the aircraft from standstill to Mach 6. The result is

the SR-72 that Aviation Week has dubbed ‘son of

Blackbird’, and integrated engine and airframe that is

optimised at the system level for high performance

and affordability.

Hypersonic Research and DevelopmentSR-72 is not the first hypersonic Skunk Works®

aircraft. In partnership with the Defense Advanced

Research Projects Agency, engineers developed the

rocket-launched Falcon Hypersonic Technology Vehicle

2 (HTV-2). The HTV-2 research and development

project was designed to collect data on three technical

challenges of hypersonic flight: aerodynamics;

aerothermal effects; and guidance, navigation

and control.

The SR-72’s design incorporates lessons learned from

the HTV-2, which flew to a top speed of Mach 20, or

13,000 mph, with a surface temperature of 3500F.

A hypersonic aircraft will be a game changer.

In 1976, US Air Force SR-71 Blackbird crews flew fromNew York to London in less than two hours, reachingspeeds exceeding Mach 3 and setting world records thathave held up for nearly four decades.

Photos by Lockheed Martin

14

THE WORD FROMDOWN UNDER


The CRS issue which was recently clearlyspelled out by EASA in conjunction withAircraft Engineers International (AEI) hasbeen a fantastic assistance to us inAustralia as it gave precise instruction asto its requirements, something which hadbeen seriously lacking for a long time.

This put our own regulator in thespotlight as to how return to serviceshould actually work and enabled theALAEA to retain its proactive stance onaircraft airworthiness.


In a recent meeting with Alan Joyce, CEO of Qantas,

Steve Purvinas (Federal Secretary ALAEA) and I

presented our serious issues directly to Alan and his upper

echelon. Offering evidence of increasing maintenance

errors, aircraft delays and injuries due to fatigue,

understaffing, time pressure and management bullying

resulting in a commitment for action and a request for

further evidence to support this dangerous trend as always

the proof will be in the pudding. The upcoming Boeing

787-900 introduction was vigorously discussed resulting

in a committee to be formed between the ALAEA and

Qantas to make sure all the ducks are in a row for the

new birds arrival and our members are duly looked after.

With the agreement of the last Qantas enterprise

agreement (EA) we entered into an enforced leave burn

program to enable the retention of over 70 jobs within

Qantas Engineering. This has become a contentious issue

as engineering management has manipulated the

workload figures to increase the onus on each employee

thus making for very lively meetings culminating with the

presentation of our stated position directly to the CEO.

As I said earlier the proof will be in the pudding but if

you don’t seize your opportunities you’ll never know if

you’ve explored every option.

Finally, this coming April fifty teams of aircraft

maintenance engineers, mechanics, students and

technicians from around the world will gather in Dallas,

Texas for the 2016 Aerospace Maintenance Competition

(AMC) or as we call it Down Under the ‘L.A.M.E

Olympics’. This is truly a once in a lifetime experience

that once experienced you will never forget, and having

achieved silver three times in six years of competing

TEAM ALAEA will be looking to grab that elusive gold

medal in division and first place overall. The invitation to

compete is open to all aircraft engineers, mechanics,

students and technicians everywhere, get a team together,

register, practice, come join your brothers and sisters in

aviation and compete.

www.aerospacemaintenancecompetition.com/ is where

to start.

Airworthiness first, Safety always.

Paul Cousins, President, ALAEA


“Oh my God. I told those guys at safety that it was dangerous and

one day we would lose concentration and pay for it. I already told

those guys at safety that it was very dangerous! We are human and

this can happen to us. This curve is inhuman!”

These are the distressed words of the injured train driver moments

after the train derailment in Santiago de Compostela, northern

Spain on 25 July 2013. The driver can be heard pleading in sorrow,

hoping for the safety of the passengers, “I have turned over. My

God, my God, the poor passengers. I hope no-one is dead. I hope. I

hope.” Seventy-nine people died.

In the aftermath of the accident, initial investigations ruled out

mechanical or technical failure, sabotage and terrorism. That

appeared to leave only two possible explanations – ‘human error’ or

‘recklessness’, or both. When society demands someone to blame,

the difference – whatever it might be – can seem trivial. What

followed was a display of our instinct to find a simple explanation

and someone to blame. Soon, the explanation and the blame pointed

to the driver. The Galicia Regional Government President, Alberto

Nunez Feijoo stated that “The driver has acknowledged his

mistake”. Meanwhile, Jorge Fernandez Diaz, Spain’s Interior

Minister, said that there “were reasonable grounds to think he may

have a potential liability” and confirmed he could face multiple

charges for reckless manslaughter. While safety investigations are

ongoing, the driver faces preliminary charges of 79 counts of

homicide by professional recklessness and numerous counts of

bodily harm.

Several claims appeared about the driver in the media, often

without relevant context. It was reported that the driver ‘admitted

speeding’ on the occasion of the crash [1]. It is known that the train

was travelling at twice the speed limit on the curve and that just

before the crash, the train’s black boxes showed that the train was

travelling at 192kph moments before the crash. The speed limit on

the curve was 80kph. The implication was that the speeding was

reckless. The media pounced onto an old Facebook post reportedly

by the driver, over a year ago, of the speeds at which his trains would

travel. One post, reported by Spanish media and attributed to the

driver, stated: “It would be amazing to go alongside police and

overtake them and trigger off the speed camera”, accompanied by a

photo of a train’s speedometer at 200km/h (124mph). This may be

an unwise social media post, but such speeds are normal and fully

permitted on the high-speed line sections.

However, there appears to be no evidence that the ‘speeding’

involved conscious disregard for, or indifference to, the dangers of

the situation or for the consequences of his actions. This would have

been an extreme act. Rather, it seems that the driver was unaware of

the context. This hypotheses invoked ‘human error’ explanations,

though carelessness was implied. It was reported that the driver

himself told the judge that he was distracted and suffered a ‘lapse of

concentration’ as he approached the curve [2]. Just minutes before

the derailment, the driver received a call on his work phone. The

ticket inspector told El Pais that he had called the driver to instruct

him to enter an upcoming station at a platform close to the station

building to facilitate the exit of a family with children. The call

lasted nearly two minutes; a long time when you are travelling at

192km/h. Renfe employees are not allowed to use phones except in

case of emergency, but ticket inspectors have no access to the train

cab. The driver told the court he lost a sense of where the train was

during the call, and believed he was on a different section of the

track. It was also reported that the ‘driver got warnings before crash’

[3], having received three warning signals. By the time he had

engaged the train’s brakes, it was too late.

As is common in accidents and incidents, frontline staff,

immediately blame themselves, which does not mean they are to

blame. Spanish press stated that immediately after the derailment,

the driver allegedly said to officials at the railway station 3km from

the crash “I ****** up, I want to die. So many people dead, so many

people dead” [4].

In this case, the justice system will now need to determine if the

driver’s actions crossed the line into ‘recklessness’. It is another issue

as to whether or how justice will be served. But one only needs to

look into the context of this accident to see that ‘human error’ or

synonyms such as ‘lapse of concentration’ or even ‘carelessness’ do

not seem reasonable to explain this terrible event. And if that is all it

takes for such an outcome, then it could surely happen again. The

‘human error’ explanation does not seem to serve safety, so what

does it serve? Perhaps it partly serves society’s need for simple

explanations and someone to blame, while absolving society itself for

its demands.

Human error or an inhuman system?Shortly before the train crashed, according to reports, the Spanish

train had passed from a computer-controlled area of the track to a

zone that requires the driver to take control of braking and

deceleration. Furthermore, there was no automatic braking system

on the curve in question. The European Rail Traffic Management

System automatic braking program was installed on most of the

THE USE AND ABUSEOF HUMAN ERROR

high-speed track but stopped three miles south of where the crash

occurred. This placed responsibility on the driver significantly to

reduce speed at a crucial time. The sharp bend was known to be

‘dangerous’ and has previously been subject to debates and warnings.

According to Spanish journalist Miguel-Anxo Murado: “There were

arguments for having that section of the route remade completely,

but Galicia’s particular land tenure regime makes expropriations an

administrative nightmare. So the bend was left as it was, and speed

was limited there to 80km/h”. The driver’s recorded phone call

indicated that he knew this and had foretold such an accident in a

warning to the company’s safety specialists: “I already told those guys

at safety that it was very dangerous. We are human and this can

happen to us. This curve is inhuman”. The judge is now reportedly

expanding the preliminary charges to include numerous top officials

of the state railway infrastructure company, Adif, including rail

safety senior officials, for alleged negligence [5].

Reminiscent of the Chernobyl inquiry, a small number of media

reports broadened the focus to what might be called reckless

expansion in society more generally: “I can’t help feeling that, at

some profound or superficial moral level, we also played our part in

the tragedy as a society; that this was the last, most tragic episode of

a decade of oversized dreams, fast money and fast trains”, said

journalist Miguel-Anxo Murado [6]. If this stretches the argument,

it at least gives a counterbalance to the ‘human error’ or ‘recklessness’

explanations of this tragic event.

The psychology of error / The error of psychologyThere are thousands of pages of research in the psychology and

human factors literature on the issues mentioned so far. The

‘reversion to manual’ problem has been studied extensively in the

context of automation and manual operation. The distracting effects

of phone calls – hands free or not – are well-documented.

‘Multitasking’ is known to have devastating effects on performance,

yet conflicts between safety and efficiency goals often demand that

we switch from one task to another in a given timeframe. There are

thousands of articles on situation awareness along with many books.

The same is true of safety culture, including how organisations

respond to safety concerns.

But ‘human error’ has been a fascination of psychologists for over a

hundred years. Psychology is a scientific discipline concerned the

mind and behaviour, and therefore tends to have an individual or

social focus. For decades, human mishaps have been dissected and



further dissected into multiple categories in the scientific literature.

Well-known names including James Reason and Don Norman were

early pioneers of the study of error, and developed psychological

explanations for slips and lapses via individual diary and laboratory

studies (Reason, 1979 [7]; Norman, 1981 [8]). Mistakes were

subsequently studied, and ‘violations’ followed (see Reason’s

landmark ‘Human Error’, 1990 [9]). Human factors (or

ergonomics), meanwhile, is a design discipline concerned with

interactions in socio-technical systems. Knowledge concerning

people and complex safety-critical systems has been applied to real

systems in most industries to avoid, reduce or mitigate human error.

Indeed, the popularisation of the term ‘human error’ has provided

perhaps the biggest spur to the development of human factors in

safety-related industries – with a downside. When something goes

wrong, complexity is reduced to this simple, pernicious, term.

‘Human error’ has become a shapeshifting persona that can morph

into an explanation of almost any unwanted event. It is now almost

guaranteed to be found in news stories pertaining to major

accidents. Interestingly, some reports specify that human error was

not the cause. The reverse implication being that human error would

otherwise have been the cause (eg ‘Paris train crash: human error not

to blame’, Telegraph, 13/07/13). Since the term suffices as

explanation, little or no mention of findings in psychology or human

factors, including the context and conditions of performance,

is required.

This is very unsatisfactory to many psychologists; the implication

in research and practice was that human error is ‘normal’ – it is part

of who we are. Similarly, it is very unsatisfactory to many human

factors specialists who try to predict design for error. But in the

context of safety and in justice, ‘human error’ has been taken to

mean something different – a deviation from normal, from rules,

procedures, regulations and laws.

The demise of errorDespite decades of research, there has been little agreement on the

precise meaning of the term, and more recently whether it has any

real meaning at all. While the term may have some value in simple

systems and situations, there are problems with the use of the term

in complex systems such as ATC. These are now well documented

in the literature. While ‘human error’ is still the explanation of

choice for accidents, the term itself fell into disrepute among some

thinkers more than a decade ago [10, 11].

After being fascinated by the concept of human error since

encountering it while studying psychology in the early 1990s, I

gradually and reluctantly accepted these arguments in the first few

years of the 2000s. Reading the works of Erik Hollnagel, Sidney

Dekker, David Woods, Rene Amalberti and others, I grew

increasingly uncomfortable with the concept and term. This

inconveniently coincided with the final stages of a PhD in human

error in air traffic control. My own realisation finally crystallised

when reviewing Erik Hollnagel’s book ‘Barriers and accidents

prevention’ in 2004 [12]. I committed to abandoning the term. My

own reasons followed the arguments of those mentioned above

(presented to the Safety and Reliability Society in 2006).

• ‘Human error’ is a often a post hoc social judgement. ‘Human

error’ is one of few things that often cannot be defined

unambiguously in advance of it happening.

• ‘Human error’ requires a standard. To know that something is an

error, it must be possible to describe a non-error. This can be

surprisingly difficult, partly because there are so many ‘it depends’.

In the context of complex interacting systems such as ATC, there

are many ways to get an acceptable result.

• ‘Human error’ points to individuals in a complex system. In

complex systems, system behaviour is driven fundamentally by the

goals of the system and the system structure. People provide the

flexibility to make it work.

• ‘Human error’ stigmatises actions that could have been heroic in

slightly different circumstances. What are described as heroic

actions could often have been described as tragic errors if the

circumstances were only slightly different. The consequences of

heroic actions are not known in advance.

• Underlying processes of ‘human error’ are often vital for task

performance. In the context of error, we often refer to

psychological activity involved in perception, memory, decision

making or action. Taking one example, without expectation, radio-

telephony would be very inefficient. Occasionally, one may hear

what one expects instead of what is said, but this must be set

against improved efficiency during thousands of other occasions.

• ‘Human error’ is an inevitable by-product of the pursuit of

successful performance in a variable world. The context and

conditions of performance are often vague, shifting and

suboptimal. The ability to adapt and compensate comes at a cost.

Still, the term ‘human error’ is used frequently in human factors

and psychology, and practitioners reside in several camps. The first

camp continues to use the term with ‘good intent’ and add caveats

that human error is normal and we need to talk about it in order to

learn from it. But in doing so, they risk sounding like Humpty

Dumpty in Lewis Carroll’s ‘Through the Looking Glass’ (‘When I

use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it

means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’).

A related second camp appears reluctantly to use the term for

convenience but at the same time rejects the simplistic concept and

argues that the term refers to a symptom of deeper organisational

troubles. A third camp has abandoned the use of the term, except

reflexively, to refer to the term itself. This latter camp perhaps

recognises that the term itself is damaging. Personally, I have moved

from camp one, through camp two, and finally to camp three. While


psychology and human factors did not intend some of the simplistic

meanings ascribed to the term, the genie is out of the bottle.

Words shape worldsDoes it all matter, if we still use the term ‘human error’ when we

know what we mean? Do we risk falling onto a euphemism

treadmill, skipping from one term to the next? [13] The argument

presented here is that it does matter. Our language affects the way

we view the world and how we approach problems. Even if we

know what we mean when we talk about ‘human error’, and even if

it does seem to fit our everyday slip-ups and blunders in life, the

term reinforces unwanted connotations, especially when we are

talking about high-hazard systems. While we cannot put the genie

of human error back in the bottle, we can use a new vocabulary to

create a new understanding.

Left with a ‘human error’-shaped hole in my vocabulary several

years ago, I found an alternative concept thanks to Erik Hollnagel:

performance variability. This is not simply a replacement term or a

euphemism, but a new way of thinking that acknowledges how

systems really work. Performance variability, both at an individual

level and at a system or organisational level, is both normal and

necessary, and it is mostly deliberate. What controllers actually do

varies, because it has to. We have to make efficiency-thoroughness

trade-offs, as well as other tradeoffs. This flexibility is why humans

are required to do the job. Also, people naturally have different

preferred styles of working and there are several ways to do the

same job. There is of course some leftover unwanted variability –

you can’t have without the other. But without performance

variability, success would not be possible. It is not the aim of this

article to explain this in more detail, but the reader is encouraged

to explore this further (see Hollnagel, 2009).

More generally, if we wish to understand how systems really

work, and improve how they work, we need to enrich our

vocabulary with systems concepts – and use them in preference of

simplistic terms that don’t help explain how systems actually

function. This is not to say that people are not responsible for their

actions – of course they are. What is relevant is the difference

between normal variability in human performance, and what

we define as recklessness. Labelling either as ‘human error’ is

not helpful.

Folks, it’s time to evolve ideas‘Human error’ has long outlived its usefulness in human factors,

safety and justice. We can’t expect society to change the way it

thinks and talks about systems and safety if we continue in the same

old way. It’s time to evolve ideas and think in systems, but for that to

happen, our language must change. Overcoming ‘human error’ in

our language is the first hurdle.

Steven Shorrock

Further reading• Dekker, S.W.A., (2006). The field guide to

understanding human error. Ashgate.

• Hollnagel, E. (2009). The ETTO principle: Efficiency-

thoroughness trade-off. Ashgate.

• Meadows, D. (2009). Thinking in systems. Routledge.

[1] Spain train crash driver admits speeding in emergency

call recording, Telegraph, 06/09/13

[2] Spain train crash: Driver told judge he was

‘distracted’, Telegraph, 06/09/13

[3] Spanish train wreck driver got warnings before crash,

Reuters, 02/08/13

[4] ‘Reckless’ Train Crash Driver Held By Police, Sky

News, 26/07/13

[5] Train crash judge summons track safety managers,

Leader, 10/09/13

[6] Spain train crash: human error over decades, not just

seconds, Guardian, 25/07/13

[7] Reason, J. (1979). Actions not as planned: The price

of automatization. In G. Underwood & R. Stevens

(Eds.), Aspects of consciousness: Vol. 1. Psychological

issues. London:Wiley.

[8] Norman, D.A. (1981). Categorization of action slips.

Psychological Review, 88, 1-15.

[9] Reason, J. (1990). Human error. Cambridge

University Press.

[10] Hollnagel, E. and Amalberti, R. (2001). The

Emperor’s New Clothes, or whatever happened to

‘human error’? Invited keynote presentation at 4th

International Workshop on Human Error, Safety

and System Development. Linköping, June 11–12,

2001.

[11] Dekker, S.W.A., (2006). The field guide to

understanding human error. Ashgate.

[12] Hollnagel, E. (2004). Barriers and accidents

prevention. Ashgate.

[13] This risk, and the comparison with terms for

disability, was pointed out to me by a human factors

colleague, which prompted this article.

Post adapted from: ‘Human error’: The handicap of

human factors, safety and justice

http://humanisticsystems.com/2013/09/21/human-

error-the-handicap-of-human-factors-safety-and-justice/

“Aviation in itself is not inherentlydangerous. But to an even greaterdegree than the sea, it is terriblyunforgiving of any carelessness,incapacity or neglect.”

Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group,London. c. early 1930’s

“Corporate culture has a very realinfluence on the attitudes andperformance of the people within anorganization there is no question in my mind that management decisionsand actions, or more frequently,indecision’s and inaction’s, causeaccidents.”

John Lauber, NTSB

“Complacency or a false sense ofsecurity should not be allowed todevelop as a result of long periodswithout an accident or seriousincident. An organisation with a good safety record is not necessarily a safe organisation.”

International Civil Aviation Organization,

Accident Prevention Manual, 1984

“Flying is so many parts skill, so manyparts planning, so many partsmaintenance, and so many parts luck.The trick is to reduce the luck byincreasing the others.”

David L. Baker

“In less than 70 hours, threeastronauts will be launched on theflight of Apollo 8 from the CapeKennedy Space Center on aresearch journey to circle the moon.This will involve known risks ofgreat magnitude and probable riskswhich have not been foreseen.Apollo 8 has 5,600,000 parts and 1.5million systems, subsystems andassemblies. With 99.9 per centreliability, we could expect 5,600defects. Hence the striving forperfection and the use ofredundancy which characterise theApollo program.”

Jerome Lederer, Director of Manned Space Flight Safety,NASA. First paragraph of Risk Speculations of the Apollo

Project, a paper presented at the Wings Club, New York, 18 December 1968.



As a licensed aircraft engineer, you are operating at the

pinnacle of this technically advanced industry; you are

responsible for the meticulous maintenance of the global

fleet. The challenges you face are both great and

numerous. Balancing commercial expectations against

quality can be a difficult task, particularly in such a

turbulent and highly regulated sector.

The Electronic Logbook Management System (patent

pending) is a competence management system that has

been developed by UK based, ELMS Aviation Ltd. The

company have developed a secure, cloud-based

application to help improve safety, compliance, cost and

reputation in engineering and maintenance.

The application provides a state of the art tool that

can aid you in your role as a licensed engineer, and as a

supervisor of maintenance personnel.

The ELMS solution utilises a comprehensive range

of data to provide a clear picture of competence that

is consistent with EASA Part M, Part 145 and

Part 66 regulations.

Recent regulatory updates have increased the need for

accurate measurement and evidencing of engineer

competence. ELMS addresses this need, providing a

simple tool to enable you to demonstrate your

competence to an organisation not only in terms of

training and qualifications but also through validated

experience records.

The application allows you to build a complete record

of your experience, training, qualifications and

employment history, and then share it with current and

future employers. This data is securely stored in the

cloud and you can access it using any internet enabled

device, wherever you are in the world. Data security is a

priority for ELMS. As an ELMS user you have

complete control over who can see your profile. You

have the power to initiate or accept ‘Handshake and

ELMS: A TOOL FOR

The aviation and aerospace industry is responsible for providingsupport to shipping and freight, emergency services, global militaryoperations and the safe passage of millions of passengers everymonth. As such safety and compliance are of paramount importance.


High-5’ connections from other users who want to see

your profile or experience. Once a connection has been

created the organisation will be able to view, evaluate

and report on your competence data.

Remote access to your data and documentation

reduces the volume of documentation that you have to

carry around and provides automated notification of any

impending certificate expiries. Simply sharing your

profile with an ELMS enabled organisation will give

their quality department access to all of the information

they need.

One of the most unique features of the ELMS

application is the Experience Record. This feature

provides you with a digital logbook that can be

populated with validated task records and enable real-

time on demand evaluations of specific task based

competence, general competence and recency, in

accordance with Part 145 and Part 66 regulations.

The Experience Record reduces the need for paper

based logbooks and task records to be scanned and

forwarded to the relevant parties to demonstrate

recency. This will make the process of issuing and

renewal of Company Authorisations far simpler.

If you are acting in a supervisory, management or

quality role within an ELMS registered organisation

you will be able to view the records of your

organisation’s connected users. This will allow you to

evaluate competence and allocate tasks with confidence.

You will know with certainty whether personnel have

appropriate training, experience and qualifications to

carry out the task.

ELMS has been launched in the UK and is currently

being rolled out at airline and MRO facilities across the

UK. To find out more about the Electronic Logbook

Management System, visit their website at

www.elmsaviation.co.uk

ENGINEERS

SHORT REPORTS

26

SOUTHWEST WILL PAY$2.8M TO SETTLE SAFETYALLEGATIONS LAWSUIT

Bombardier stated ‘this is an historic moment’

as its CSeries passenger jet gained clearance to

enter commercial service.

Transport Canada issued Certification of the

CS100 after 3,000 hours of test flying.

Bombardier manufacture the wings for the

new aircraft in Belfast, supporting 800 jobs.

Swiss International Air Lines will perform the

first passenger early next year.

The CSeries project has been troubled by

delays and firm orders have been stalled at 243

since late 2014. The aircraft variants will seat

between 110 to 150.

Bombardier have been placed under huge

financial strain due to this program prompting

a bail-out from the provincial government in

Quebec earlier this year.

BOMBARDIERCSERIESAIRCRAFT GETSAPPROVAL TO ENTERCOMMERCIALSERVICE

TECHLOG WINTER 2016

Southwest Airlines is to pay USD$2.8 million to settle a lawsuit concerning

allegations that it violated US Federal Aviation Administration safety regulations.

The Justice Department said in a statement: “This settlement includes operational

changes by Southwest designed to manage its oversight of third parties performing

maintenance on Southwest aircraft”. The statement continued and said: “In addition to

the penalty, Southwest has agreed to pay up to USD$5.5 million in deferred civil

penalties if it does not implement the settlement agreement”.

BOEING DELIVERS RECORDNUMBER OF AIRCRAFT IN2015 BUT OUTLOOK FOR 2016 DISAPPOINTSBoeing is still the world’s biggest aircraft manufacturer after delivering a record 762

planes in 2015.

The figure exceeds Boeing’s forecast to deliver between 755 and 760 aircraft.

Despite Boeing’s record deliveries, new orders have fallen and Boeing have

announced it expects to deliver 740 to 745 planes in 2016, down from 762 in 2015.


SHORT REPORTS

It is your duty and responsibility as a professional

AMT to be assertive and just say ‘NO’ when you

have concerns. If you are familiar with the 12

main causes of maintenance human factor errors

called the Dirty Dozen, you will recall Lack of

Assertiveness is one of them. The job you do

requires that you must be assertive. A good safety

culture starts from within.

Remember this - whether someone else is

assigning the work or it is self imposed, if your

conscience or ‘gut’ feeling tells you that you are

about to do something you sense is wrong, then

STOP. Reassess, communicate, discuss, inquire,

verify, or validate before going any further. If you

do this when you get that ‘gut message’ you will

be performing at the highest standards of conduct

and moral judgment. This is what professionals

like you do. Isn’t this what you expect an auto

mechanic to do when he is overhauling the brakes

on your teenage daughter’s car?

The FAA Safety Team (FAASTeam) is

committed to helping you achieve the highest

level of safety by providing ‘tools’ and resources to

enhance your knowledge and proficiency. For

more information on maintenance safety, go to

http://faasafety.gov/AMT/pub/mh.aspx

Were you ever given a maintenance task you felt you couldn’t do by

the book because you didn’t have the required tools, supplies, or test

equipment? Odds are that you used some kind of unwritten

‘alternate’ method or ‘work-around’ in order to get the task done.

We technicians can come up with impressive and innovative ways

to get the job done. We often can develop unwritten alternate

procedures in order to accomplish that impossible task. But that’s

not the way we are supposed to work. You must not deviate from a

maintenance procedure, unless you first obtain authorisation to do

so. The authorisation should be in writing and come from an

approved or authorised source.

Maintenance manual procedures are developed by the

manufacturer and accepted or approved by the FAA. These

procedures, when properly accomplished, ensure the aircraft will

continue to operate within its designed safety margins. If you deviate

from these procedures without an accepted or approved alternate

procedure, you made the wrong decision. You committed a human

error and this compromises safety – and you’re liable. Your actions

affect the public confidence in our profession. Be aware that your

mistakes can jeopardise the reputation of each and every

maintenance professional.

So, be safety conscious when performing maintenance and only

use written instructions that are authored by an approved or

authorised source.

The FAA Safety Team (FAASTeam) is committed to helping you

achieve the highest level of safety by providing ‘tools’ and resources

to enhance your knowledge and proficiency. For more information

on maintenance safety, go to http://faasafety.gov/AMT/pub/mh.aspx

FAASTEAM MAINTENANCE SAFETY TIPBy Western-Pacific FAASTeam

JUST SAY ‘NO’

MAINTENANCEPROCEDURESFAASTEAM MAINTENANCE SAFETY TIPBy Western-Pacific FAASTeam

SHORT REPORTS


that for one reason or another do not make it

into the public domain by becoming

an accident.

Aviation has learnt many

lessons from accidents

and incidents over the past

100 years or so. The result

of which being a firm

understanding of the

physics, dynamics and risks

associated with flying. Add to

the mix the constant

improvement in

technology and

training, the

high level of

regulatory oversight and

one has an incredibly safe form of

transport. With air travel expected to

increase significantly in the next decade, keeping

aviation safe will become even more challenging.

Therefore regulators the world over are now placing more

emphasis on the safety performance of an organisation rather than

simply checking for procedural compliance with regulations. The

difficulty though is ensuring the performance data collected is accurate

and does indeed present a true view of the organisation being audited.

This obviously requires resources at a time when regulatory budgets are

being reduced. The current fixation on cost cutting (under the guise of

efficiency) is akin to the regulator having all its teeth removed and so is

With commercial airline accident ratesbeing the lowest ever in 2015, theaviation industry could be forgiven forallowing itself a huge pat on the back.

CAN AVIATIONBECOME SAFER?

Yet there is a paradox. A lack of accidents can often negatively influence

our safety thinking by instilling an overinflated sense of security.

Behind the glamour, aviation is a tremendously competitive business

continuously seeking ways to lower costs. Perfectly acceptable as long

as aviation doesn’t draw the wrong conclusions from the latest safety

figures. Many will be aware of the headline statistic but much

fewer will be aware there still remains many incidents

left with no bite. Within Europe this problem is exacerbated in

that national regulators are still trying to find the right balance in

order to address the impact of EASA (European Aviation Safety

Agency) and EU legislation coming into existence.

The aviation industry is currently evolving much more quickly than

the regulatory world. Consequently there is a need to ensure regulations

and oversight remain fit for purpose otherwise regulators would

continue applying outdated inspection philosophies. In engineering

and maintenance terms this could reduce safety levels as airlines are

constantly seeking the lowest price contract forcing maintenance

organisations to deliver to a set price rather than a set standard.

Airlines will be buoyed by the latest statistics. Yet for Licensed

Engineers maintaining aircraft, this will undoubtedly manifest

itself as a lack of consistency from airlines in their commitment to

actually do what is expected in terms of safety; particularly if there is

a cost attached.

The task is to ensure airlines do not lose sight of what is important.

Despite all the safety improvements over the past 100 years or so, the

smallest mistake can still have catastrophic consequences. Therefore

the challenge facing aviation is to continue to improve its safety culture

in order to eliminate accidents and reduce incidents. After all, safe

flying is good for business.

Airbus reported a new record in the number of planes

delivered in 2015.

The company delivered 635 aircraft last year; Boeing

delivered 762 aircraft to maintain its position as the

biggest aircraft manufacturer.

However, Airbus has reported 1,036 orders, compared

with Boeings 768 and hopes to deliver more than 650

aircraft this year to close the gap.

AIRBUS DELIVERRECORD NUMBER OFAIRCRAFT IN 2015

Boeing is to cut production of its 747-8 jumbo jet in September from twelve aircraft

to six.

Four-engined aircraft are being overtaken in popularity due to the fuel efficiency

and reduced maintenance costs offered by twin-engined aircraft.

Richard Aboulafia, an aerospace analyst from the Teal Group is reported to have

said that: “Basically, the 747 line is slowly dying,” he continued. “Boeing can’t kill it

right away, even if that makes economic sense, because they need to build the last

few planes for the US Air Force presidential replacement aircraft program in a year

or two.”

BOEING TO HALVE JUMBO JETPRODUCTION

SHORT REPORTS

TECHLOG WINTER 2016

Federal Aviation Administration reported Boeing violations included

production quality problems and a failure to meet a deadline to provide

fuel tank safety instructions to airlines. This resulted in Boeing being

fined and must pay a $12m (£8m) for ‘multiple pending and potential

enforcement cases’, the US air regulator said.

Boeing has agreed take action to improve and to pay the $12m fine.

The FAA said: “It does not allege that these issues created unsafe

conditions”. However, US Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx

said: “It is imperative that everyone complies with our aviation system’s

high safety standards. This agreement is an important step toward

ensuring that Boeing fully meets all applicable compliance standards

going forward.”

The other violation was Boeing’s delay in addressing incorrectly

shaped fasteners used on airliners.

BOEINGFINED $12M FOR‘MULTIPLE’ISSUES

29

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the address label of your latest ‘Profile’ magazine. If you

should encounter any problems registering then please

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spending a few minutes in the Prospect Members’ only

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on the additional services now available as a result of

the merger.

FREE WILL WRITING Prospect offers a free willing writing service to its

members in partnership with Slater & Gordon

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Prospect Members’ only area and you will find out more

under the legal services menu (www.prospect.org.uk).

LEGAL COVER Prospect’s LegalLine telephone number is

0800 328 7987 for all issues other than employment.

Employment issues are dealt with through your

Prospect full-time officer, John Ferrett

([email protected]).

PERSONAL DATAPlease help us to help you by ensuring your personal

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to date. With e-mail communication offering quick and

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Please take a couple of minutes to confirm that our

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ASSOCIATION NOTICES

PROSPECT — THE VOICE OFTHOUSANDSProspect is a trade union with over 115,000 members

employed as specialists in defence, science and

technology, heritage, energy, agriculture, environment,

aviation and transport sectors. Prospect is run and

funded by members and exists to benefit their interests

in a variety of ways. Prospect negotiates terms and

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commercial services to members.

Membership can be confidential if you wish, and you

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support or representation; but neither did any of the

numerous members the union advises and represents in

difficulty each year!

Prospect are running a ‘Member recruit Member’

incentive and for every new member recruited there is a

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line at the following link:

http://www.prospect.org.uk/becoming_a_member_or_re

p/member_get_member?_ts=50209

MEMBER’S INFORMATION PAGE


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