technical options for the advanced liquid metal reactor

Technical Options for the Advanced LiquidMetal Reactor

May 1994

OTA-BP-ENV-126NTIS order #PB94-173994

GPO stock #052-003-01370-3

Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, TechnicalOptions for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor---Background Paper, OTA-BP-ENV-126(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1994).

—.—— --

Foreword

1n this post-Cold War era, scientists and engineers have focusedmuch research on the development of technologies to address thelegacy of the nuclear arms race. One of the more intractable prob-lems currently is how to dispose of excess plutonium from retired

nuclear weapons and how to manage radioactive plutonium waste. TheOffice of Technology Assessment covered this issue in its 1993 assess-ment Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear Materials. TheHouse Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Energyand Power, asked OTA to expand the technical analysis of the advancedliquid metal reactor (ALMR).

This background paper discusses the history and status of the ALMRresearch program. It presents applications of this technology to the plu-tonium disposition problem and the possible advantages and disadvan-tages of its future development and deployment. It also discusses relatedissues such as waste management and concerns about proliferation ofplutonium material.

With regard to its application to the plutonium disposition problem,ALMR technology will require a decade or more of research and testingbefore the performance of a complete system could be ensured. Eventhough complete elimination of the plutonium isotope within the reactoris theoretically achievable with this technology, other aspects of full-scale deployment must be considered in setting goals and objectives for adevelopment program.

OTA appreciates the assistance and support it received for this effortfrom many contributors and reviewers, including the Argonne NationalLaboratory, the General Electric Company, the Department of Energy,other independent research organizations and public interest groups, andmany individuals. They provided OTA with valuable information criti-cal to the completion of this paper and important insights about its tech-n ical evaluations and projections. OTA, however, remains solel y respon-sible for the contents of this report.

&Q@=----ROGER C. HERDMANDirector

. . .Ill

Reviewers

John F. AhearneSigma Xi, The Scientific Research

Society

Anna AurilioU.S. PIRG

Matthew BunnNational Academy of Sciences

Tom ClementsGreenpeace Plutonium Campaign

Tom CochranNatural Resources Defense

Council

Paul CunninghamLos Alamos National Laboratory

William H. HannumArgonne National Laboratory

Mark HoltCongressional Research Service

James J. LaidlerArgonne National Laboratory

Terry LashU.S. Department of Energy

William W.-L. LeeEnvironmental Evaluation Group

Paul LeventhalNuclear Control Institute

Arjun MakhijaniInstitute for Energy and

Environmental Research

Jon MedaliaCongressional Research Service

Marvin MillerDepartment of Nuclear

Engineering

Robert H. NeillEnvironmental Evaluation Group

Ronald OmbergWestinghouse Hanford Co.

Thomas PigfordUniversity of California, Berkeley

Larry RamspottLawrence Livermore National

Laboratory

William G. SutcliffeLawrence Liverrnore National

Laboratory

Marion L. ThompsonGE Nuclear Energy Corp.

Raymond G. WymerConsultant

Joe YoungbloodU.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Note: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. The reviewers

do not. however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this background paper. OTA assumes full responsibility for the back-ground paper and the accuracy of its contents.

iv

Clyde Behney PETER A. JOHNSONAssistant Director Project DirectorHealth, Education, and the

Environment Mark BrownPrincipal Analyst

Robert NiblockEnvironment Program Director

CONTRIBUTORSPaul Carroll

Kathryn CoxLois Joellenbeck

——

Preject Staff

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Kathleen BeilOffice Administrator

Nellie HammondAdministrative Secretary

Kimberly HolmlundAdministrative Secretary

Sharon KnarvikSecretary

Jene LewisAdministrative Secretary

c ontents

1

2

3

4

Introduction and Summary 1Focus of OTA’s Analysis 2Summary of ALMR Evaluation 3= Disposing of Weapons Plutonium 3● Processing Spent Rcactor Fuel 4■ Processing Other Radioactive Wastes 4= Risks and Benefits in Terms of Plutonium

Proliferation 4Conclusion 5

History of Liquid Metal Reactors in theUnited States 7The Present ALMR/IFR Concept 8■ Goals of the ALMR/IFR Program 9= Previous Analyses of the ALMR/IFR Concept 11

Description of the ALMR/lFR Program 13Future Full-Scale Commercial Development 15■ The ALMR/IFR Fuel Reprocessing System 17■ LWR Spent Fuel Reprocessing System 24

Evaluation of the ALMR/lFR Technology 27Disposing of Weapons Plutonium 28Nuclear Waste Management 30■ Processing Spent Reactor Fuel 30■ Processing Other Radioactive Wastes 32Proliferation Risks and Benefits 32= Concerns About Plutonium Breeding 32■ Concerns About Weapons-Usable Plutonium 33Role of Nuclear Safeguards 36Political Barriers 37Beyond the Spent Fuel Standard for Proliferation

Resistance 39

APPENDIX

A Abbreviations and Glossary 41

References 45

I

Introductionand

Summary 1n September 1993, the Office of Technology Assessment(OTA) published Dismantling the Bomb and Managing theNuclear Materials, a report on the technical and policy is-sues involved in dismantling nuclear warheads in the United

States and Russia as well as the long-term care of the materialsextracted from these warheads. OTA concluded, and several otherrecent reports have confirmed (48, 27, 37), that disposing of plu-tonium from warheads is one of the more intractable problemsthat remain as a legacy of the Cold War nuclear arms race. In addi -t ion, the OTA report stressed the need to formulate national polic ygoals on plutonium control and disposition prior to adopting ma-jor technical paths. ’

Although few readily available methods, other than long-termstorage, currently exist for plutonium disposal, many proposalshave been put forward to develop. adapt, or apply new advancedtechnologies for this purpose. One such technology that has beenproposed is the so-called advanced liquid metal reactor/integralfast reactor (ALMR/IFR, or ALMR system). OTA reviewed themerits of this system briefly in its dismantlement report. The De-partment of Energy (DOE) has been supporting a research pro-gram to develop this system for many years. Basic research on liq-

uid metal reactor systems began more than four decades ago. Thework supported by DOE’s Office of Nuclear Energy in the 1970sand 1980s was part of a major effort to develop breeder reactorsthat would produce plutonium and power at the same time. More

| 1

2 | Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

recently, the developers of this technology haveclaimed that essentially the same concept could beused to consume plutonium and meet such goalsas disposing of surplus plutonium from nuclearwarheads.

This paper evaluates the ALMR program, itscurrent status and potential for plutonium dispos-al, and certain key questions that have been raisedabout what benefits or risks this technology mayoffer if it is fully developed and deployed in the fu-ture. The program itself has a long and compli-cated history. The technology for plutonium dis-posal would include a nuclear reactor, a fuelmanufacturing and reprocessing system, andmany ancillary components. Some of these com-ponents are already developed, while others are inthe early testing phase or have not yet been de-signed. In general, the overall technology is still inthe research stage, and many claims about its po-tential are based on assumptions about the suc-cessful outcome of future development and test-ing work.

Since the ALMR system has been promoted fora variety of purposes, the features and subsystemsof the total project have necessarily changed to fiteach purpose. Therefore, any analysis of the ad-vantages or disadvantages of this technologyshould be made separately for each purpose pro-posed. OTA has attempted to conduct this evalua-tion in such a way as to limit its analyses primarilyto the newly proposed objectives, without makingjudgments about the future of nuclear power ingeneral.

During FY 1992 and 1993, DOE supported theALMR research program at a level of approxi-mately $40 million to $43 million annually. Thesefunds were allocated to the Argonne NationalLaboratory, which received almost 80 percent ofthe budget, and to the General Electric Company(GE), which received about 20 percent. Argonnehas conducted this work at its laboratory and re-search offices in Chicago, as well as at its test fa-cility known as "Argonne West,” which is locatedin the Idaho National Energy Laboratory. Recent-ly, Argonne’s work focused on the development ofthe reactor fuel reprocessing portion of the totalsystem, which is one of the important and neces-

sary components for the plutonium disposal ap-plication. GE efforts, however, have focused on atotal commercial power generating system that isnot closely related to the key development needsfor plutonium disposition applications.

In 1993, Congress debated whether continuedfunding for this program could be justified. Issueswere raised about the most appropriate goals forthe program and whether there was sufficient jus-tification for funding the program at various lev-els. The final FY 1994 appropriation for the pro-gram was about $30 million. In the President’s FY1995 budget as submitted to Congress in January1994, the Administration proposed to cut almost$100 million from Nuclear Energy research anddevelopment (R&D) programs in general and toterminate the ALMR project.

FOCUS OF OTA’S ANALYSISThis paper, which presents OTA’s evaluation ofthe ALMR project, first reviews the history ofgovernment programs and recent program goalsfor developing 1 liquid metal fast reactors, and thenfocuses on four key questions that have beenposed about the technology’s potential for specificpurposes:

1.

2.

3.

4.

What is the potential for this technology in dis-posing of surplus weapons plutonium?What is its potential for processing spent fuelfrom light-water reactors and for destroyingplutonium and other actinides?What is its potential for processing other radio-active wastes that are currently stored undermarginal conditions?What risks and benefits, in terms of plutoniumproliferation, might be associated with large-scale deployment of this technology in the fu-ture?

Throughout the history of this program, the de-velopment of an advanced reactor system forlarge-scale nuclear power generation has consis-tently been an overriding goal. However, that goalhas not been put forth as primary in recent pro-gram justifications. As such, this OTA paper doesnot address the role of advanced reactors in futureenergy supply scenarios, the risks and benefits of

Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 3

nuclear power in general, or the advantages or dis-advantages of this particular technology in termsof the future of nuclear power.2

SUMMARY OF ALMR EVALUATIONOTA’s analysis shows that the DOE ALMR proj-ect is clearly in the research phase and, as such,cannot provide conclusive results regarding itspotential for newly identified uses other than pow-er production. The following summarizes OTA’sanalysis.

I Disposing of Weapons PlutoniumALMR technology is one of several advancedreactor or converter systems that theoreticallycould convert substantial portions of a givenamount of plutonium to other fission products byprocessing the materials through the system re-peatedly over a long period. In one hypotheticalsystem, for example, after fissioning, fuel wouldbe removed from each reactor and reprocessedapproximate] y every 2 years for a total of 50 yearsin order to destroy about two-thirds of the totalplutonium material fed into the system. To deploya working system that will perform effective y andefficiently would require a great deal more re-search and testing of several key components, aswell as of the total system. Therefore, it is impor-tant to make sure that there is a clear and pressingneed for such a capability and that the cost andtime required to implement it are justified.

Plutonium isotopes can potentially be elimi-nated completely within the reactor of a futureALMR systems Thus, according to ALMR sup-porters, it should be favored over options thatwould simply produce a material with difficult-to-extract plutonium still in it. This distinction, how-

ever, becomes less important when one considersthe fact that plutonium exists in all spent reactorfuel currently stored worldwide. Also, eventhough its percentage is small, the total quantity ofplutonium now contained in all spent reactor fuelis much larger than the current stockpile of pluto-nium extracted from weapons. This fact has ledsome researchers to take the position that it ismore important to put weapons plutonium into aform that is as proliferation-resistant as spent fuelas soon as possible, than it is to wait (perhapsmany decades) to prove the effectiveness of a sys-tem such as the ALMR, which may be able toeliminate it.

The Department of Energy and other responsi-ble agencies are currently developing policies andstrategies with regard to the disposition of weap-ons plutonium. These policies will probably put ahigh priority on methods that can be implementedquickly to control weapons-usable material andmake it more resistant to proliferation. Most poli-cymakers recognize the urgency of dealing withmaterials that are now in the former Soviet Unionand would also put a high priority on methods thatcould be implemented quickly there.

Given the above priorities, the ALMR technol-ogy would be less appropriate for plutonium dis-position than more near-term technologies thatwould not require as long a development time(such as mixing with high-level waste and vitrifi-cation or fissioning in existing light-water reac-tors). However, if a policy is adopted at some fu-ture date that favors complete elimination ofplutonium in all forms, ALMR technology has thepotential to be one of several options that could beevaluated after more development work has beendone. 4

2 Ftw an fwerall assessment of the relative rmmts of this and other nuclear rcact(~r technt)l(~gics for future cnergj supply, see U.S. Congess,Office of Tcchmdogy Assessment, fi.’nerg~ Te[hno/o,q.y L“hoIce.$: Shq~Irrg Our Fufurc, OTA-E-493 (Wash lngt(m, DC” U.S. Government PrintingOffice, July 1991 ).

3 It sh(mld he noted, however, that current ALMR reacli)r designs must always maintain some amount of plut(m]unl w]lhln [he reactor core In

order to function and that this material w III remain even after many decades of (~perati(m.

4 The other elirninatmn options, advanced reactors and converters, arc discussed tn rcfcrcnccs 27 :ind 48.

Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

Processing Spent Reactor FuelCurrent difficulties with progress toward an un-derground repository for spent fuel from commer-cial nuclear reactors have led proponents of theALMR to suggest that this technology could beused to process spent fuel and thus make it moresuitable for repository disposal. With technicaladditions for handling spent fuel, ALMR technol-ogy could potential y reprocess the spent fuel rodsand, over many cycles, transform the actinides(uranium plus elements with higher atomicweights) to other materials. If all actinides wereremoved, proponents claim that the remainingwaste would have to be isolated and contained forno more than a few centuries because the actinidesare elements with very long half-lives that requirerepository integrity for tens of thousands of yearsor longer.

The above claims of complete actinide removaland transformation, however, are somewhat un-certain at the current stage of ALMR develop-ment. Less work has been accomplished on thisaspect of the technology than on most other as-pects. Also, although actinide removal is theoreti-cally feasible, in practice it would add many morefission products to the waste stream. Some ofthese products also have long half-lives (equiva-lent to or greater than plutonium). Until morecomplete design analysis and testing work isdone, it is not clear whether ALMR technologycan offer much of an advantage, if any, to the com-mercial nuclear waste management dilemma. Inaddition, problems in establishing a nuclear wasterepository may not be solved with purely techni-cal approaches. A long history of public policyand regulatory issues related to repository plan-ning and siting has dominated technical issues inthe past and will probably continue to do so in thefuture.

Another proposed advantage of actinide (par-ticularly plutonium) removal from spent fuel isthat material suitable for weapons would thus bedestroyed. Since the plutonium present in smallquantities in all reactor spent fuel does presentsome level of proliferation risk, removing it couldalter that risk. Recent studies have discussed the

risk and approaches to managing it (26, 27).Whether ALMR technology has a place in non-proliferation strategies with regard to the process-ing of spent fuel will depend on comparisons withother approaches and will need to be evaluated inan international context because all countries withnuclear reactors have some spent fuel that requiresmanagement.

| Processing Other Radioactive WastesThe ALMR has also been proposed for processingcertain radioactive wastes that cannot be stored ortreated safely with any existing technologies. Inparticular, DOE has a large inventory of specialspent fuel assemblies, some of which are storedunder marginal conditions and require treatmentor packaging to ensure adequate protection for thefuture. Parts of the ALMR technology may besuitable for processing such wastes, but moreanalysis will be needed to match the existing prob-lems with the capabilities of the system. Very littleresearch on this application has been conducted todate.

Another issue that requires further explorationand development is the question of what addition-al types and volumes of wastes from a totalALMR system may be generated that will needtreatment, storage, and disposal, On the one hand,it may be possible with careful and efficient de-sign to minimize waste. On the other hand, eachstep of a complex process can create its own wastestream. While an overall goal of the ALMR sys-tem is to eliminate long-lived radioactive acti-n ides from the waste stream, new fission-productsand wastes will be generated. A more completedetermination of the wastes streams produced bythis technology must await the results of proto-type testing.

| Risks and Benefits in Terms ofPlutonium Proliferation

Developers of the ALMR technology haveworked to create technical barriers to prevent thediversion of weapons material that would be pres-ent within the reactor and the fuel reprocessingsystems. However, critics of the program continue

Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 5

to stress that any technology that concentrates andseparates plutonium would be a proliferation con-cern because it could be modified, once devel-oped, for weapons purposes. Although technicalbarriers incorporated in the ALMR design mayprevent material diversion when adequate inspec-tion systems and controls are in place, they maynot suffice to deter a state or a group that did nothonor safeguard agreements, Most experts agreethat any separated plutonium from reactors couldbe used to produce weapons. Whether or not theALMR technology is proliferation-resistant thusdepends more on its deployment, control and suc-cess of outside inspection, than on the technologyitself.

If the ALMR technology were developed andthen exported to a number of other countries, theUnited States should be concerned about adequatecontrol of plutonium to prevent its diversion forweapons. Even if the system were designed to be aplutonium consumer, it would not be mechanical-1 y difficult for an owner with technical expertise toconvert it to a “breeder” (plutonium producer).The difficulty of converting the ALMR systemfrom a ‘“burner” to a “breeder” is related to thestage of its development and whether the conver-sion possibility was a factor in the initial design ofa reactor. Since the technology is currently in theR&D stage, one could easily complete a specificdesign to fit requirements for either an easy or adifficult conversion. Nevertheless it would be dif-ficult or impossible to design a reactor core thatcould be guaranteed to not work as a plutoniumbreeder. In addition, the ALMR technology hascertain components such as a hot cell that could beused to support other equipment to concentrate,

separate, and purify plutonium. Technical sys-tems could be built, and inspection proceduresadopted, to monitor operations and protect againstproliferators, but the technology itself could notbe a guarantee against misuse.

Compared with other older technologies thathave been used to reprocess spent reactor fuel andto separate plutonium,s the ALMR system mayoffer more proliferation advantages because oftechnical barriers that could be designed into thesystem. However, these possible advantages mustbe weighed against the risks of widely deployingsystems that could be later modified if the ownershad the proper technical capability and weapons-building motives.

CONCLUSIONIn summary, ALMR technology will not be avail-able for application to plutonium disposition formany years. Substantial research, development.and testing work is needed to demonstrate the per-formance of specific portions of the total systemnecessary for fuel reprocessing and waste han-dling. Even though ALMR technology has poten-tially beneficial features such as the elimination ofplutonium isotopes, concerns about possible pro-liferation problems still have to be resolved.Whether the development of this technologyshould be pursued also needs to be considered inthe context of plutonium disposition policy objec-tives as well as overall energy policy. Any subse-quent development work on ALMR technologywould benefit from clearly stated policy goals andspecific objectives by which to measure future ac-complishments.

$ Such as the PURE.X sy stem, w hlch IS a chemical scparat]on prtxxss conlnl{)nl) used in prcducing w cap(~ns materials and m strew conm]cr-

c ial t)pcrall[ ms I n France and the Un]td K lngd(m~.

History ofLiquid Metal

Reactorsin the

United States 2

Today, U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors are basedon a design known as the light-water reactor (LWR). Inthis design, uranium oxide-based nuclear fuel is used onceand then prepared for disposal. Although not commercial-

ized in this country, other reactor designs continue to be exploredand developed. One such design is a liquid metal reactor (LMR).This design uses metal fuel that is reprocessed after each use cycleand then fed back into the reactor as new fuel. Reprocessing is achemical and physical process whereby new fuel is separatedfrom the waste products. The LMR reactor was origin all y devel-oped as a “breeder reactor” to produce excess plutonium duringits operation. Breeder operation implies that the reactor and fuelreprocessing system can produce more nuclear fuel than the reac-tor consumes.

The liquid metal reactor concept has been under developmentin the United States since the 1950s. The first nuclear reactor everto produce electricity y, the experimental breeder reactor (EBR-I) atArgonne West in Idaho that began operation in 1951, was such asystem (3, 15). The Clinch River Breeder Demonstration reactorwas an LMR breeder design intended to demonstrate the concepton a large scale. It was designed to use a nuclear fuel reprocessingtechnology known as PUREX1 for converting its spent fuel intonew nuclear fuel. The Clinch River project was terminated byCongress in 1983 because of concerns about its risks in terms of

I me pUREX process ~,as orlglnal]Y, deve]oped in the 1940s to separate plul(mlum for

w capons prtxluctitm, The process in which spent fuel IS diss(~lvcxi, and plut(~n]um and (~th-cr materials arc separa[d from wastes, can also h> used [() produce plutimlunl ft~r nuclearfuel.

8 I Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

Argonne National Laboratory West. A number of nuclear testfacilities are located at this site, including the EBR II nuclearreactor (the domed structure in the center), and its fuelrecycling facility (in front and to the right of the EBR //)

nuclear weapons proliferation, its effects on theenvironment, and its economics compared withcompeting reactor designs.

The current advanced liquid metal reactor/inte-gral fast reactor (ALMR/IFR) concept, begun in1984, grew out of these earlier programs. In thelast decade, this development program workedwith an experimental LMR breeder reactor EBR-11 at Argonne West to conduct safety tests, includ-ing simulated accidents involving loss of coolantflow; to test experimental ALMR/IFR nuclearfuels; and to develop a new type of nuclear fuel re-processing known as pyroprocessing.

Reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to recoverplutonium and other nuclear materials for makingnew fuel is inherent to breeder reactors. Breederreactor operation uses some form of spent fuel re-processing to separate new nuclear fuel fromwaste nuclear fission products. Various nuclearfuel reprocessing technologies have been devel-oped. PUREX reprocessing was pursued in thefirst decades of breeder power reactor develop-ment. PUREX reprocessing of commercial nu-

clear reactor spent fuel produces a “civilian” gradeof plutonium that can nevertheless be used tomake nuclear bombs.2 During the 1970s theUnited States abandoned commercial PUREXplutonium reprocessing plans after a long debateover the merits and risks of developing a commer-cial plutonium-based nuclear power industry. Thedebate centered on several issues, including theenvironmental risks associated with the proposednuclear fuel reprocessing cycles and expansion ofthe industry; the economics of plutonium reproc-essing and fuel recycle; and the potential impactsof an expanded plutonium economy on interna-tional security with respect to nuclear weaponsproliferation. The debate became part of the 1976presidential campaign agenda, and in April 1977the Carter Administration called for an indefinitedeferral of U.S. programs aimed at commercial-ization of the plutonium fuel cycle, includingspent fuel reprocessing (8, 9).

THE PRESENT ALMR/lFR CONCEPTResearchers at Argonne National Laboratory andGeneral Electric (GE), who together are develop-ing the present ALMR/IFR concept, have at-tempted to address the earlier objections to LMRbreeder reactor reprocessing systems. Some po-tential advantages claimed for the present ALMR/IFR concept include the ability to:■

■

■

supply a significant portion of future world-wide energy needs, through wide deploymenteventually as a plutonium breeder reactor fuelreprocessing system;eliminate U.S. and Russian surplus militaryplutonium while producing electricity;provide superior nuclear proliferation resis-tance and acceptable nuclear material safe-guards, compared with the standard plutoniumfuel reprocessing and separation technology(PUREX), thereby allowing export (with safe-guards) to other nations:

2CiviImn and military ft~m]s t~f plutonium differ merel y in the cxmctmtrati(m t)f the plultmium isotope plut(miun-239. Military-grade nlatc-rial h:is n]t)rc than 90 percent pluttmlum-239 and civilian grade less than 90 percent. Many cxmsider this diffcmmce to have little slgnitkance interms of mahmg a nuclear btm]b.

Chapter 2 History of Liquid Metal Reactors in the United States | 9

m

■

reprocess its own spent nuclear fuel. and thatfrom other types of nuclear reactors, into newfuel, possibly extending the cupacity or accept-ability of geologic repositories and easing rele-vant repository licensing and safety concernsby eliminat ing some of the long-l ived radionu-cli des: andoperate more safely than existing LWR systemsdue to fundamental physical and design differ-ences.

These claims have not been fully demonstratedor proven at the current stage of development ofthis technology. However, they are used to justifycontinuing development because, if they weredemonstratrated, they would offer considerablebenefits.

| Goals of the ALMR/lFR ProgramThe emphasis of the ALM R/IFR and its predeces-sor research and developmen( programs has beenadjusted in response to certain domestic and in-ternational political developments. As originallyconceived of four decades ago. LMR technologymeant a plutonium breeder nuclear reactor (pro-ducing more plutonium fuel than it consumed) us-ing PUREX nuclear fuel reprocessing for the pro-duction of electricity. After the United Statesabandoned the commercial izat ion of breeder reac-tors and PUREX reprocessing in the 1970s be-cause of concerns about plutonium proliferation,environmental impacts, and costs, ALMR/IFRdevelopers conceived of a new fuel reprocessingtechnology claimed to involve less proliferationrisk than the earlier PUREX technology. Never-theless, electricity production remained the pri-mary goal for justifying the program. During thelast 5 years, however. the ALMR/IFR concept be-gann to be promoted more as a method to reprocess

and transform spent nuclear fuel from commercialLWRs so as to make it more acceptable for dispos-al in geologic repositories, such as the still incom-plete Yucca Mountain repository in Nevada.3 Af-ter 1991, when arms reduction agreementsbetween the United States and the former SovietUnion appeared likely to produce significantquantities of surplus military plutonium, develop-ers of the ALMR/IFR concept emphasized its po-tential to eliminate this plutonium by consumingit as a nuclear fuel to make electricity.

Most recently, ALMR/IFR developers haveagain refocused on the potential of the technologyto eliminate plutonium (and other actinides) inspent nuclear fuel by reprocessing it into newALMR/IFR fuel (and waste fission products).However, this time the rationale is not so muchthat it would help the geologic repository pro-gram, but rather that as long as plutonium existseven in spent nuclear fuel, it remains a potentialnuclear weapons proliferation risk. The ALMW/IFR concept, developers argue, might eliminatethat risk. The technology was renamed the“ALMR actinide recycle system” to reflect thischange of emphasis.

One proposal for the ALMR/IFR specificallyexamined in the recent Office of Technology As-sessment (OTA ) report Dismantling the Bomb and

Managing the Nuclear Materials was its use forthe disposition of surplus military plutonium. Itsdesigners have promoted it as a means to trans-form surplus weapons plutonium into fissionproducts that could never be turned back into a nu-clear bomb. The OTA report concluded that al-though the ALMR/IFR system was designed as aplutonium producing breeder reactor it could beoperated as a net plutonium consumer. However,some limitations of the ALMR/IFR concept for


Electricity was first generated with the EBR 1 (ExperimentalBreeder Reactor 1) in 1951 Research with this system was inpart the basis of the EBR II and the current ALMR/IFR design.

plutonium disposal noted in the OTA report in-clude the following:4

●

●

■

It would require many cycles of plutonium re-processing over many decades to completelyfission and destroy a significant portion of sur-plus military plutonium, compared with otherpossibly more rapid disposal methods such asvitrification.5

The plutonium reprocessing required for com-plete destruction of surplus military plutoniumis a transformation and not a disposal method.It would change one type of waste (plutonium)into another type of waste (highly radioactivefission products) that would still require treat-ment and disposal in facilities that are not yetavailable in the United States (a problem in factwith any radioactive waste disposal concept).The licensing and change in national policy in-volved in the act of deploying plutonium-

9

m

fueled nuclear power reactors with plutoniumreprocessing could be expected to be difficultin the United States, which abandoned thistechnology in the mid-1970s because of eco-nomic and proliferation concerns.It would not be economical to develop such areactor system solely for disposal of surplusmilitary plutonium. Selection of this optioncould make sense only as part of a larger nation-al decision to turn to a plutonium breeding/re-processing nuclear energy program.Developers of the ALMR/IFR concept envisionmany facilities operating as breeder reactorsdeployed in the21 st century as the next genera-tion of U.S. nuclear power reactors. In this sce-nario, the amount of plutonium available fromdismantled nuclear warheads would be rela-tively minor compared with the amount of plu-tonium that would be cycled through thesereactors.

Selective emphasis on a single capability orfunction of the ALMR/IFR concept, while ignor-ing its other features, has made it difficult forthose not intimately involved to evaluate, criti-cize, or even understand the program. Therefore,for the purpose of the present study, the ALMR/IFR system is looked at from the broadest per-spective. It is evaluated as a system containing anuclear reactor capable of operating as a pluto-nium breeder, a nuclear fuel reprocessing and fab-rication (pyroprocessing) system, a nuclear wastehandling system, and a system for reprocessingexisting spent fuel from conventional U.S. com-mercial LWR into new ALMR/IFR nuclear fuel.

In addition, the present study looks at the time-liness of the ALMR/IFR technology. That is, giv-en the early development status of the program,

~For a nlorc ~onlp]e(e ~xp]ana(ion of” these Findings, see U.S. C(mgrcss, office of Technt)logy Assessment, [)lsnum!/I’nx lk ~on~~ fJn~~an-

(JgIn,q Ihe NII(lcar MaferIa/s (Washingttm, DC. U .S. Gtnw-nment Print]ng Ofik, 1993). Some of the advantages claimed by the (ievclt)pers arelisted (m the following” p:~gm.

5ALM~] ~ Pronloters” ~)ln[ OUI tha( the [echn~)logy c(dd provide more rapid disposition by using the fueI made fron~ wea~)ns PIu(onium

for a very short period and removing it for storage and subsequent c(m~ple[e burning in the future. The sh(mt fuel use W(NJM “spike’” the materialby making it radioactive, alth(wgh less radioactive than the fully used up fuel. This strategy w(mld also be appl icable to w reactor-based dis-p)siti(m; for example, after c(mversi(m I(J MOX (mixed uranium and plut(mium oxide) the fuel could be used briefly in already available c(m-vtmti(mal reactors to achieve Ihc ““splhed” fuel effect.

Chapter | 2 History of Liquid Metal Reactors in the United States | 11

what long-range problems in energy production orwaste handling might it be appropriate for theALMR/IFR technology to address?

| Previous Analyses of theALMR/lFR Concept

A number of studies have examined the use of nu-clear reactors, including the ALMR/IFR, to dis-pose of plutonium from dismantled U.S. and for-mer Soviet Union nuclear weapons or from spentnuclear fuel. These studies were carried out by theOffice of Technology Assessment, the NationalResearch Council Committee on International Se-curity and Arms Control, the General AccountingOffice, the RAND Corporation, and the Depart-ment of Energy (27, 37, 46, 48, 50), Althougheach study approached the issue from a uniqueperspective, they reached many similar conclu-sions.

All concluded that long-term plutonium dis-position will be lengthy, complex, and costly. Inaddition, short-term plutonium storage will be re-quired regardless of the ultimate disposition op-tion selected. The most available long-term op-tions are either conversion to mixed-oxide fuel foruse in existing, proven, light-water reactor de-signs without nuclear fuel reprocessing, or dispos-al as waste, for example through vitrification. Anydisposition option will stretch over decades and islikely to involve costs rather than net economicbenefits. Although all options involve some unre-solved issues and risks of uncertain magnitude,these studies concluded that the development ofadvanced reactors for plutonium dispositionwould involve the highest costs and greatest un-certainties.

I

Descriptionof the

ALMR/IFRProgram 3

The Department of Energy (DOE) has been funding the de-velopment of an advanced liquid metal reactor under aprogram within the Office of Nuclear Energy. Recentbudgets for this program were between $40 million and

$43 million per year for FY 1992 and 1993, and $30 million forFY 1994. Most of the budget has been directed toward researchwork at the Argonne National Laboratory. During FY 1992 and1993. some $10 million per year was directed toward research atthe General Electric Company (GE).

The current DOE concept of the advanced liquid metal reactor/integral fast reactor (A LMR/IFR) system includes a liquid metal-cooled nuclear reactor and associated nuclear fuel reprocessing,manufacturing. and waste processing facilities. The system com-bines many discrete components operating together at a singlesite. The complete system can be divided into three major parts:1.2.

3. .

an advanced li quid metal reactor.a fuel reprocessing system for transforming ALMR spent fuelinto new fuel and processing its radioactive waste fox- disposal,andalight-water reactor (LWR) spent fuel reprocessing system for—the recovery of plutonium, uranium, and related act in ides fromthe spent fuel from conventional U.S. nuclear reactors to makenew ALMR/IFR nuclear fuel.

Figure 3-1 illustrates these major components and shows thestage of development for each. For example, the current reactorpart of the test system is a prototype that has been operating in var-ious tests for more than 30 years. Many of the fuel reprocessingcomponents. such as the electrorefiner, have been tested but haveyet to be tested as a prototype system. Many of the waste andspent fuel processing components are still in the design stage.

I 13


m r “ - - - - ” - - - - - - - - ”s Nuclear safeguards system ‘m

.,,,:, ,,, , ,,,.., ,.,, ,,, ,:,: ,:.,.., . .s., . . .

Plutonium, uranium, and: other materials transformed

to metal forms. ,..,,....:. .,,,:, . . , .

Radioactivewastes

I

Plutonium,uranium,otheractinides,and someradioactivefissionproducts

Spent reactor fuel

/r - m - - m m , w ~, Fuel pin chopper r- = - - - - - - - -

f

Chopped upfuel pins

vWaste fissionproducts incadmium

Waste fissionproducts mmolten salt

\ lI ““““

TEBR41

JExperimental

breederreactor

w - - - D-Plutonium, uranium, otheractinides, and someresidual radioactive fissionproducts in cadmium

.,,,.,,,:,,,. .,..:.

1 Pyrocontactors treat ~waste molten salt for ‘~

recycle:.:.

l \

.: Fission‘~. Fission products

,,,.,., .., ..:. . . . . . . . . . .products,:: metal alloy ‘ (CS-135 and

encapsulation ~ 1-129) in!.. ,. ,, .., .,,.,., ..: ..,.:,. ,..., ..:.,:.

b Primary ALMR/lFR me/ten sa/t

3 metal matrixSolidified

pr&iucts,,:,,.,. . . . . . . . . . . . . .,.,, .,, ,,.,.,., ,,,:., .,.,.

fission. . . . . . . . . . . ..,, ,,,,,. W.,,,+, .+:bx..’>+,:+:<.<. . . . . . . ..:.: : product sa/ts

/

Fission products inGeologic repository \ inc/uding solid matrix

::. required for fission ‘~ CS-135 and:::.

Droducts /-129.. . . ,. .: : . : ::....... . . . .

—

Recycled reactorfuel as new pins

\F - - - - - - ” - - Q~ Fuel pin processor t

1uranium, otheractinides, somere.wdual highlyradioactive fissionproducts, as ameta/ ingot

--- m - - -

B C a t h o d e s8s processor ‘------t

Prototype status

G

Prototyp= fully tested

and installed

r-.-~ = Under developI 8 ment, desi n8 B Ylaboratory ested,---wa if tested in hot

cell then notwith actual fuelmaterial

Still in design/:x.,. .,.. :.,. ,., ,. +.:. concept stage,.:, = l abora to ry.::

;:: .> demonstration.::,., ,.,.,,.: but no prototype

NOTE The system would involve many interlinked components, including a nuclear reactor and facilities for fuel reprocessing and fabrication, for

reprocessing conventional reactor spent fuel into new ALMR/IFR fuel, and for handling the resulting nuclear wastes

SOURCE Argonne National [Laboratory

Chapter 3 Description of the ALMR/lFR Program | 15

Argonne National Laboratory and GE are part-ners in research and development for the ALMR/IFR program. Argonne has taken the lead in devel-oping the ALMR metal fuel reprocessingtechnology, while GE is focusing on developingthe full-scale nuclear reactor. At present, the30-year-old Experimental Breeder Reactor II(EBR-II) at Argonne West is serving as a proto-type reactor for testing ALMR/IFR nuclear fuels(43). However, since the EBR-II is scheduled tobe decommissioned at the end of 1994, its role inALMR/IFR prototype development will be end-ing. DOE partly funds the GE reactor design proj-ect—at about $10 million per year over the lastfew years (43). GE also takes an active role in theALMR/IFR fuel reprocessing development, viaregular-meetings and consultation with ArgonneNational Laboratory researchers.

Figure 3-2 shows the 5-year schedule an-nounced by DOE in 1991 for the development of aprototype ALMR/IFR at Argonne West(51 ). Thetotal costs (shown by year and including nongov-ernmental contributions) over 5 years were pro-jected at the time as $976.4 million.

Although the exact dates will change as workproceeds, the status of development of each com-ponent shown in figure 3-1 and the scheduleshown in figure 3-2 illustrate that substantial de-velopmental work remains to be done, and manyof the individual components are in only the con-cept or early prototype_stage. Some componentshave been demonstrated in the laboratory, but pro-totypes have not yet been constructed or tested.Thus any description of the ALMR/IFR systemmust be based partially on plans, rather than on ac-tual hardware. This description also will have tobe revised as the system is designed and devel-oped. The schedule shown in figure 3-2 is for aprototype facility only (which was planned to beconstructed at Argonne West), not for full com-mercialization of the technology. Although thisschedule is already out of date, it serves as a gener-al indication of the amount of development workahead. It will require revision, for example, afterthe recent decision to suspend development of thenuclear reactor portion of the program and con-

The EBR-II and fuel processing facility at Argonne West areprototype scale facilities. The reactor portion (left) has been inoperation for several decades.

centrate only on development of the prototypefuel reprocessing system (3).

FUTURE FULL-SCALE COMMERCIALDEVELOPMENTIf the planned research and development work,followed by completion of a prototype, is com-pleted by Argonne and GE, full-scale commercialdevelopment using part or all of this fuel cyclemay be carried out by a private sector multiorga-nization team. Using this assumption, GE has pro-jected the full-scale ALMR system as a 1.866-gi-gawatt electric ALMR/IFR modular design plantthat could include an ALMR/IFR metal fuel re-processing facility with a capacity of 22 metrictons per year. Alternative] y, a centrally located fa-cility with a capacity of 180 metric tons per yearmight support eight separate ALMR plants (44).The complete facility could also include a2,800-metric-ton-per-year LWR spent fuel proc-essing and conversion facility (12, 34, 42). High-level and low-level waste processing facilitieswould be colocated with the reactor and fuel re-processing facility. One reactor design proposedby GE would use a nuclear fuel breeding ratio of1.05 (i.e., for every pound of plutonium consumedduring a fuel cycle, 1.05 pounds of new plutoniumwould be produced) and would also have the abil-ity to operate at a range of ratios from 0.6 (thus

Project year

Project component

Advanced liquidmetei reactor

(ALMR) designand development

Metal fuel cycledesign and

development

LWR spent fuelrecycle design

and development

Yearly cost ($ million)

ALMRMetal fuel

LWR reprocessingNongovernment contribution

Total

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1996

I I I I I I 1Complete NRC Solicit detail Complete key

Start fuel test Safety Evaluation design proposals component testingprogram (8/93) Report (12/93) (9/95) (9/97)

v v v

I Base technology development phaseComlete R&D and obtain

Initiatefuelirradiation(2/93)

RFP for preliminary Start preliminary Submit preliminaty Complete preliminary preliminary designInitiate PEIS engineering design engineering design engineering certification design, initiate detailed approval from the NRC

(10/93) (4/94) (12/94) application to NRC (9/96) design (12/96) (12/98)v v v v

Demonstate the reactor powerplantInitiaterecycle Complete ALMRtesting pyroprocess Evaluate fuel licensing data(4/93) development (8/96) cycle (9/97) base (9/98)

v v v vMetal fuel cycle demonstration phasa Prototype facility

A A A AComplete fuel Complete fuel Initiate prototype Preliminary waste

safety overpower specifications facility design qualificationtests (6/96) (9/96) (1/98) report (9/98)

Select processtesting flow Initiate pilot-scale Initiate pilot-scale constructionsheet (3/93) design activity (10/93) (12/95)

Begin pilot-scaleoperation (1/98)

v v v v

|I Simulated fuel development phase Scale=upA A

Initiate 20-kg Evaluate technical andprocessing test (7/93) economical feasibility (12/95)

Initiate prototypeBegin design Modify facility for a Initiate facility facility designactivities (1 1/94) 1&kg test (12/95) operation (1/98) (12/98)

v vLWR spent fuel reprocessing demonstration (10-to 20-kg soate)

I I [ I I I 1

8.8 31.5 47.7 101.0 151.026.4 32.6

137.053.7 56.9 60.1

6.5 18.562.2

19.5 30.0 30.09.5 12.0

30.013.5 10.0 15.0 13.0

51.2 94.6 134.4 197.9 256.1 242.2

NOTE Although it IS out of date the schedule shows the amount of developmental work that remains undone Any analysis of the ALMR/IFR system WiII require revision as the system IS designed

developed, and deployedKEY NRC = Nuclear Regulatory Commmission PEIS = programmatic environmental impact statement RFP - request for proposals

SOURCE U S Department of Energy, 5-Year Plan, 1993

Chapter 3 Description of the ALMR/lFR Program I 17

consuming plutonium) to 1.23 (thus breeding plu-tonium) (34).

As of the end of 1993, GE projected schedulewas as follows” (34):■

■

●

■

by 1996, complete technical feasibility and eco-nomic potential studies, as well as key featurestest and qualification phases;by 1999, complete both a concept demonstra-tion and metal fuel qualification, and a compo-nents and subsystems test phase;by 2010, complete design certification; andafter 2010, begin commercial deployment.

GE also projected that reprocessing LWR spentfuel could provide a source of startup plutoniumfuel necessary for commercial-scale deployment(34, 42). The low-enriched uranium that will be si-multaneously recovered from the reprocessedLWR fuel might either be put back into existingLWRs or into recycled AL MR/IFR fuel as a fertilematerial for breeder operation, or be disposed of asactinide waste in a repository. As an alternativeapproach, GE projected the full-scale AL MR/IFRsystem also to be capable of using a more conven-tional mixed uranium-plutonium oxide fuel(MOX) without electrorefiner reprocessing (42,45).1

The commercial full-scale ALMR as con-ceived of by GE is a breeder-capable nuclear reac-tor that uses liquid sodium as a coolant, and a met-al nuclear fuel containing plutonium and uranium.The full-scale GE ALMR design is projected to bea bank of up to six modular reactors, each generat-ing 311 megawatts of electricity (each approxi-mately 16 times larger than the EBR-II prototype)(34). With nuclear fuel reprocessing the systemwould be capable of operating as a breeder reactor(making more plutonium than consumed). This

design has not yet been built. By comparison, con-ventional LWRs used for commercial power gen-eration today in the United States are watercooled, use uranium oxide nuclear fuel, and do notreprocess their spent fuel.

The ALMR/IFR system has generally beenpresented as easily convertible between pluto-nium breeding and burning. The full-scale ALMRsystem envisioned by GE is designed specificallyto be converted easily between breeding and non-breeding operation (42). According to its design-ers, “[b]y straightforward adjustments in fuelcomposition and arrangement, the system can bereadily adjusted to meet any overall fissile de-mand scenario, from being a rapid consumer offissile material (conversion ratio as low as about0.6) to a net producer (breeding ratio as high asabout 1.3)”2 (14). Figure 3-3 shows across sectionof the arrangement of fuel elements in a full-scaleALMR reactor in the breeding and nonbreedingconfigurate ion. As can be seen, both configurate ionsuse the same total number of elements in the reac-tor core. Only the arrangement of fuel, the fueltype, and the presence or absence of fertile materi-al (for breeding) are different (21).

| The ALMR/lFR Fuel ReprocessingSystem

The ALMR/IFR fuel reprocessing system as cur-rently envisioned by Argonne researchers will bea complex of equipment for handling spent fuel,chopping up the fuel elements, reprocessing toseparate actinides from fission products, convert-ing into new reactor fuel elements, inspecting andquality control, and handling and processing ra-dioactive waste for disposal. Because of the in-tense radiation of spent fuel, reprocessed fuel, and

‘ Cfmvcnt]tmal LWRS fueled with uranium ox ide w ill transfoml some of the uraniun]-238 (the bulk (}f the fuel material) c(mtained in the fuelInt{) plut(~nlun~ as the fuel IS irrachated in the reactor. This is the source of the appr(~~ irna[cly 1 percent plumnium cfmtained in LWR spent fuel.The dlffcrcncc IS that In LL?’R reachws the plutonlun] is ~ In the spent fuel for ciisp)sal. Breeder reactor operati~m requires that the spent fuel be

repr(k-essed to rcc~ ~v~r [he plutonlunl.

2 At the end of each cycle of fuel fi~sl(mul in [hc reactor (appr(~ximatcly 18 months to 2 years), a c(mversi(m ratio of 0.6 means that about 60percent of the tmglnal am(wnt of pluttmlum In the fuel would rcmain. whllc a conversion” ratio of 1.3 means that about 130 percent of the originalamount ot plut(mlunl w(mld be present.


Breeder-configured core

c).“ .”.“.” .”.”

“.”.

Breeder blankets (radial andinternal material for breeding newplutonium)

Nuclear fuel (driver for breeder

configuration, low and high enriched

for nonbreeder configuration)

—

Nonbreeder-configured core

Core shielding

o Reflector

● Other (control, shutdown,and gas expansion modules)

SOURCE Magee (GE), 1993

waste from the reprocessing of spent fuel, all ofthese operations would have to be carried out in aremotely operated hot cell.

Remotely Operated Hot CellThe hot cell is an enclosed area surrounded byheavy shielding to protect workers against the in-tense radioactivity present from the fission prod-ucts in spent and new reprocessed ALMR/IFR nu-clear fuel. In addition, because of the extremechemical reactivity with air or water of ALMW/IFR fuel materials and processing chemicals,processing is done in an inert atmosphere (the cur-rent prototype uses dry argon gas). Even new re-cycled ALMR/IFR fuel after reprocessing willcontain sufficient amounts of highly radioactivefission products to require heavy shielding and re-mote manipulation by robotics or remotely oper-

ated manipulators. For radiation protection, a hotcell has walls made of several feet of concrete and4-foot-thick special radiation-shielding glass win-dows for viewing. All operations would be donewith remote manipulators or by automation. Afterstartup with radioactive materials, no humanwould enter the hot cell.

Argonne researchers are in the process of trans-forming an existing hot cell facility at ArgonneWest for this purpose. The hot cell was originallybuilt as part of the demonstration of an earlier ver-sion of the current design, with the EBR-II as partof a breeder reactor system integrated with onsitemolten salt metallic fuel reprocessing from 1964to 1969 (12, 31). It consists of two hot cells, onewith an air and the other with an argon atmos-phere, and a passageway connecting them to theEBR-II reactor building for transfer of spent fuel


-._—_————FUEL

EBR -II REACTOR VESSEL

SUBASSEMBLY ASSEMBLY DISMANTLING

AND REMANUFACTURE [ AIR CELL

..

‘t

TRANSFER CORRIDOR‘ = - - ’ =~ . ~ -~ v ’

—— —

FUEL ELEMENT REPROCESSING AND FABRICATION ( ARGON CELL)

Diagram showing plans for converting the existing EBR II and Fuel Cycle Facility to an ALMRIIFR prototype system The systemwould contain the nuclear reactor (EBR II on the Ieft) and the fuel reprocessing facility (rfght).

containers. Argonne researchers expect that theALMR/IFR demonstration equipment to beconstructed and installed in the hot cell will be of ascale appropriate for a full commercial-sizeALMR/IFR installation.

Electrorefiner Fuel ReprocessorThe electrorefiner, now under development at Ar-gonne West, would be used to dissolve, reprocess,and divide spent fuel from the reactor into newfuel material and spent fuel fission products (seebox 3-1 ). With some process modifications, theelectrorefiner might also be used to reprocessspent fuel from existing commercial U.S. light-water reactors, Irradiated fertile (breeding) ele-ments from an ALMR breeder configurationwould be similarly processed using this equip-

ment ( 14). Because of the intense radioactivity ofthe fission products, the electrorefiner must alsobe operated remotely in the hot cell.

The electrorefiner is a key part of the ALMR/IFR nuclear fuel reprocessing cycle, but it is stillin the early stages of development. A full-scaleprototype electrorefiner is being readied for test-ing with remote operation, before installation inthe hot cell at Argonne West. This installation isexpected to be completed in 1994(31). This proto-type has yet to be tested with actual spent fuel ma-terial, although a similar unit has been tested withunirradiated fuel (17). The fuel element chopperfor chopping the spent fuel pins has been installedin the hot cell for testing. The first test will be aqualification step that involves chopping metallicsodium-filled dummy fuel elements.


The electrorefiner will be at the heart of both the ALMR/IFR fuel reprocessing technology and the possible

reprocessing of spent light water reactor (LWR) fuel into new ALMR/lFR fuel. It WIII be a vat heated to 500°C

(about 930°F), filled with molten mixture of lithium and potassium chloride electrolyte that contains both cath-

ode and anode electrodes, resting above a liquid cadmium phase (see ftgure 3-4). The fuel IS mechanical ly

chopped up, placed in the anode basket, and then broken up through electrochemical action to allow the pluto-

nium, uranium, and other actinides, along with some fission products, to be dissolved in the molten salt. The

chopped stainless -steel fuel cladding is not dissolved but IS left behind in the anode basket (16). Other materi-

als from the chopped spent fuel that are less soluble in molten salt simply fall into the molten cadmium phase

located below the molten salt phase. Selective distribution to the molten salt, rather than the liquid cadmium,

results in the upper phase containing most of the highly electropositive fission products, including alkali metals

such as cesium, alkaline earths such asstrontium, and some rare earths (Ianthanides) (figure 3-4) Noble metal

fission products, including ruthenium, rhodium, molybdenum, palladium, technetium, and zirconium, and more

rare earth (Ianthanide) fission products along with zirconium from the fuel alloy move to the lower cadmium pool

(14).

After the spent fuel is electrochemically dissolved, passage of an electric current through the iron electrode

causes the bulk of the uranium dissolved in the molten salt electrolyte from the spent fuel to become deposited

as a metal on the iron cathode. ALMR/IFR designers hope to recycle this uranium to make new reactor core or

fertile material (breeding) elements, Next, the plutonium, remainder of the uranium, and other actinides such as

neptunium, americium, and curium from the dissolved chopped fuel are transported electrochemically to asec-

ond, smaller liquid cadmium pool cathode contained in a ceramic crucible immersed in the electrorefiner mol-

ten salt (14). Some rare earth (Ianthanide) fission products also inevitably end up codeposited with the acti-

nides in this cadmium cathode, Both the salt and the cadmium phases would accumulate highly radioactive

fission products and would require periodic processing to remove these waste products for disposal.

An electrorefiner large enough to support fuel reprocessing for a commercial-scale reactor such as the full-

scale ALMR concept would be about 1 meter in diameter and would contain 1,000 kg of cadmium and 500 kg of

salt (14). Argonne researchers expect that fuel reprocessing wiII be done in batches containing about 10 kg of

uranium and 3 to 5 kg of fissile materials (mostly plutonium) (13).

To adapt the electrorefiner processor LWR spent fuel reprocessing, the LWR spent fuel, which IS composed

of the oxides rather than the metallic forms of uranium, plutonium, other actinides, and fission products, must

first be chemically reduced to the metal (16), This reduction can be accomplished by treating the chopped LWR

spent fuel with Iithium metal m the molten salt solution (28). After conversion to the metal form, the material

would be collected from the bottom of the molten salt bath and transferred to the anode basket of the electrore-

finer, where spent ALMR/lFR fuel IS Introduced as described above, There it too could be processed into new

fuel

The Cathode ProcessorOne of the key steps in the electrorefiner involvesconcentrating actinides collected at the liquid cad-mium cathode (see figure 3-4). After processing,most of the actinides, including plutonium anduranium, along with some fission products, willbe deposited in a molten cadmium pool containedin the liquid cadmium cathode. This cadmiumpool will then be transferred to another piece of

equipment called the cathode processor. Afterevaporation of the cadmium (which will be re-cycled), the plutonium, uranium, other actinides,and remaining rare earth (lanthanide) fission prod-ucts will be recovered as a metal ingot at the bot-tom of the cathode processor.

This ingot will contain up to 70 percent pluto-nium and 30 percent uranium and other actinides,as well as a minor amount of rare earth (lantha-

Chapter 3 Description of the ALMR/IFR Program

Solid iron Liquid cadmiumAnode basket cathode cathode

\I

\ / Molten salt

I I 500 oC (930 oF)

\

NOTE The electrorefiner would reprocess spent ALMR/IFR metal fuelinto new fuel and highly radioactive waste fission products in a hot cell

The operations described here have not yet been conducted with actu-al spent nuclear fuel A similar but physically separate system IS envi-sioned for reprocessing LWR spent fuel Into new ALMR/IFR fuel

SOURCE Argonne National Laboratory

nide) fission products. Although the lanthanidescontribute less than 1 percent of the mass, alongwith certain more radioactive actinide isotopes,they generate the hazardous radioactivity respon-sible for what the developers consider the "self-

Notes on figure 3-41

2

3

4

5

6

7

Spent metal fuel from an ALMR containing plutonium, uranium,

21

and

other actinides, and highly radioactive fission products, IS mechani-

cally chopped up and placed in the anode basket Chopped fuelIS broken up electrochemically and its nuclear components are dis-

solved in the molten salt, Ieaving behind the old fuel cladding

The plutonium, uranium, and other actinides, and most of the highly

electropositive fission products, are dissolved electrochemically in

the molten salt This includes alkali metals such as cesium, alkaline

earths including strontium, and some rare earths (Ianthanides)Noble metal fission products including ruthenium, rhodium, molyb-

denum, palladium, technetium, and zirconium are not transportedelectrochemically but settle as metal particulates m the molten cad-mium pool at the bottom of the electrorefiner The cadmium pool ac-

cumulates radioactive waste fission productsPassing an electric current through the electrodes causes the bulk

of the dissolved uranium to become deposited as metal on the iron

cathodeThe plutonium, remaining uranium, and other actinides, and some

rare earth fission on products, are transported electrochemically fromthe molten salt to a cadmium cathode, made of a smaller cadmiumpool in a ceramic crucible The material in the cadmium cathode IS

as high as 70 percent plutonium and 30 percent uranium and otheractinides, and less than 1 percent rare earth fission products Otherhighly radioactive waste fission products accumulate in the moltensaltAfter reprocessing and separation are complete, the molten cad-

mium from the cadmium cathode IS transferred to the cathode pro-

cessor where cadmium IS removed, Ieaving a metallicing got that willbe made into new ALMR fuelFission products from reprocessed fuel accumulate in the molten

salt and cadmium Periodically these must be removed, and thewaste materials processed, producing a highly radioactive wasteform for disposal

protecting” proliferation resistance of the final re-cycled fuel product.3 A significant amount of thetotal radioactivity of the final product from thecathode processor and of the radioactive decayheat comes from the minor transuranic isotopesthat are retained through the separation process( 17). One estimate is that without further purifica-tion this material would be about 10,000 timesmore radioactive than a similar product from con-ventional PUREX reprocessing (56). This radio-activity also means that the cathode processormust be placed in the remotely operated hot cell.The device is currently undergoing tests for re-

3 Se/ f-pro [ectlng Pro/if era(fon” r~$ls(ance or;glna]]y referred to the intense radioactivity due to the fission pr(tiucts in spent nuclear fuel that

makes II lethal to handle with[wt extensive prt)tecti(m. This radi(mciivity “pn~tects” the material from theft or diversi(m. The amount of fissionproducts In ALMR IFR reprocessed fuel is significantly lt)wer than In LWR spent fuel and provides less self-protecting radiati(m. For this rea-s(m, radioactivlt y from the residual ac(inides bcc(mm more in~~)rtant for the self-protecting aspect of ALMR/IFR reprocessed fuel c(mlparedwith LWR spent fuel ( 17).


A prototype device for casting new fuel elements IS currently Installed in the Argonne West hot cell, It con-

sists of a series of units for converting the metal ingot from the cathode processor into new fuel pros. The fuel pin

injection casting machine IS similar to existing equipment used with the experimental breeder reactor (EBR - II),

except that it IS designed to be operated remotely in the hot cell. After the metal ingot has been melted in a

furnace, its composition IS Intended to be adjusted by adding zirconium and uranium in proportions appropri-

ate for new ALMR/IFR fuel. Next, the metal IS cast into new fuel pins in precision quartz molds that resemble long

drinking straws (54) After inspection, the newly cast fuel IS loaded into stainless-steel cladding along with

sodium metal and an inert atmosphere to make anew fuel pin. Volatilization of the radioactive actinide element

americium during casting may be a problem, In one experiment casting fuel pins with minor actinides, approxi-

mately 40 percent of the americium charge was lost during casting due in part to evaporation (54). CurrentIy, the

quartz molds are broken off after casting and create a waste material. Argonne West researchers have done

some experiments on replacing the quartz with direct casting into azirconium sheath that could be inserted into

conventional stainless-steel cladding.

Argonne researchers have not yet tested actual recycled ALMR/lFR fuel in this system. The pin casting fur-

nace has been installed in the Argonne West hot cell, and some experiments in casting depleted uranium have

been completed. Experiments are planned for 1994 to fabricate experimental uranium-plutonlum-zlrconwm

(ternary) fuel elements (31). As part of the research on fuel design, a full-scale ALMR prototype fuel containing

uranium, plutonium, and zirconium has been Irradiated to high degrees of fuel burn up (fissioning of total fission-

able materials) in the EBR-II (54). ALMR/IFR fuel from recycled light water reactor spent fuel will contain about

20 percent plutonium and 10 percent zirconium, along with 70 percent uranium (mostly U-238) (54).

As part of the equipment required for fabricating new fuel pins for the EBR - I I, a “welder/settler” IS also being

tested Argonne expects to transfer it to the hot cell so it will be available in 1994. A “vertical assembler/disas-

sembler’” for fuel pin fabrication IS being tested as well and will be installed in the hot cell when available. A “fuel

element inspection x-ray system” IS also under development.

mote operation and is expected to be installed inthe Argonne West hot cell in 1994 (31).

After the metal ingot material is removed fromthe cathode processor, it is transferred to a fuel pincasting furnace and then to a fuel pin processor.The function of these parts is to produce new fuelrods from the processed material that will then berecycled to the reactor, to complete the entire fuelreprocessing step. Box 3-2 describes the specificoperations envisaged for the casting furnace andthe status of its development.

ALMR/lFR High-Level Nuclear WasteTreatment ProcessesDuring the electrorefining reprocessing of spentfuel, fission products and other materials will ac-cumulate in the molten salt and the bottom liquidcadmium pool (figure 3-4). Eventually, these

waste products will generate excessive heat andcause unacceptable contamination (by the accu-mulating rare earth fission products) of the reproc-essed nuclear fuel deposited in the liquid cad-mium cathode (16). Argonne researchers expectthat a salt load might be used for several dozen fuelreprocessing cycles before requiring treatment.The intense radioactivity from the fission prod-ucts means that all waste treatment will have to beperformed in the remotely operated hot cell. Wasterecovered from the molten salt and cadmiumwould have to be disposed as high-level radioac-tive waste in some suitable repository. Box 3-3 de-scribes the steps involved in waste treatment andthe development status of this subsystem.

It will also be necessary for the ALMR/IFRwaste processing technology to meet current andproposed high-level waste packaging and storage

.


Reprocessing ALMR/IFR spent fuel will separate highly radioactive fission products that must be processed

for eventual disposal The molten salt containing waste fission products and small amounts of actinides from

the electrorefiner would be transferred into a processing device called a pyrocontactor There it will be treated

with a uranium-cadmium alloy to reduce the residual transuranic chlorides to their metal forms (1 6) This would

recover residual plutonium, uranium, and other actinides (which are returned to the electrorefiner) from the mol-

ten salt Next, the molten salt would be treated with Iithilum in molten cadmium to remove the rare earth fission

products in a Iiquid cadmium phase that would be combined with the Iiquid cadmium waste stream coming

from the electrorefiner (figure 3-4)

fission products still remaining in the molten salt will require further treatment to remove them Argonne

researchers have performed preliminary experiments with nonradioactive fission product analogues, 1 show-

ing how fission products remaining in the salt—lncluding cesium, strontium, rare earths, and Io-

dine 129—might be recovered by passing the molten salt through a zeolite (mineral)-based ion exchange col-

umn Two possible final waste forms (for placement in a geological repository) are under development one IS a

bonded zeolite” in which zeolite IS permeated with a Iow-melting glass for mechnical strength and leach/d lf -

fusion resistance the second is a sodalite mineral structure formed by pyrolysis of a blended zeolite material If

the development of this technology IS successful, the purified molten salt could be recycled back to the electro-

reflner

Flsslon products in the molten cadmium pool from the electrorefiner, including the transition metal fission

products technetium, ruthenium, rhodium, and zirconium, after reduction to their metal forms, are expected to

be placed in a stainless-steel matrix and cast into a metal ingot waste form, by using the remaining nuclear fuel

cladding hulls as a source of stainless steel If the development of this technology IS successful, cadmium

would also be recycled to the electrorefiner

None of these processes has been tested with actual ALMR/lFR recycled fuel A single-stage pyrocontactor

has been tested in a glove box, and initial flow tests with salt and cadmium have been conducted (16) A multi-

stage pyrocontactor test apparatus (seven or eight stages will be required to meet target actinide recovery) IS

under design Some experiments reducing rare earth salts to their metallic forms with Iithium in Iiquid cadmium

have been completed, as well as the demonstration of the use of centrifugal pumps for the transfer of salt and

cadmium between process vessels Argonne researchers are currently investigating the use of pumped filtra-

tion units for the removal of insoluble such as U02 (uranium oxide) from the process, the filters will then be sent

to the metal waste stream (16)

I For example the Iodine Isotope I- 129 IS a tox[c radioactive flsslon product whereas another Isotope I -127 IS a naturally occurringnonradloact[ve form of lodlne As an analog of the more toxic I-129, 1-127 has physical properties that are very slmllar to I- 129 and

can be used more safely 10 test chemical process development

methods. Although experience with actual reproc-essed spent fuel is lacking, salt waste generatedfrom recycling spent ALMR/IFR fuel by theseprocesses can be expected to be quite differentfrom PUREX aqueous waste and will require thedevelopment of special treatment processes (56).Argonne researchers have experimented with var-ious salt waste forms ( 17). However, if currentplans for developing salt waste treatment are not

successful, recovery and recycling of some typesof waste materials may conceivably require proc-esses that would generate aqueous waste forms(56). Experience suggests that several kinds ofwater-based separation processes could be used torecover some wastes that do not lend themselvesto nonaqueous treatment (56). As another option,Argonne researchers are also considering the pos--

sibility of vitrifying ALMR/IFR waste ( 17).


| LWR Spent Fuel Reprocessing SystemArgonne researchers are beginning to designequipment for reprocessing existing and futurespent LWR fuel from U.S. commercial nuclearreactors to recover the actinides, including pluto-nium and uranium, for making new ALMR/IFRfuel. Recently, this feature has become a centralgoal of their research program and has been re-named the "ALMR actinide recycle system” to re-flect this shift (35). The overall plan is thatALMR/IFR technology might be used to removethe plutonium, uranium, and other actinides in ex-isting commercial reactor spent nuclear fuel bytransforming them into radioactive fission prod-ucts. Promoters of this idea think that this maybe amore acceptable waste form for repository dispos-al. In principle, over a period of centuries—withrepeated reprocessing in many ALMR/IFR sys-tems deployed around the world—much of the ex-isting world’s inventory of plutonium and otheractinides in spent fuel could be transformed. Ofcourse, in the process, quantities of plutoniumwould be contained in ALMR/IFR reactors or fuelreprocessing plants.

Argonne researchers hope to make the LWRprocess compatible with the electrorefiner de-signed for reprocessing spent ALMR fuel by us-ing the same temperatures, reagents (salts), andwaste forms and treatments. Plutonium and othertransuranic actinides will be recovered for ALMRfuel, while uranium may be recycled for ALMR orLWR use, or disposed of (16). As with spentALMR/IFR fuel, the reprocessing of spent LWRfuel inventories will require shielded hot cell faci-lities for handling the spent fuel, recovering acti-nide elements, and processing the resulting radio-active wastes, which will include highlyradioactive fission products.

Officials at DOE and Argonne indicate that theresearch and development of the LWR spent fuelreprocessing system lags significantly behind thatof other components of the ALMR/IFR fuel cyclesystem ( 11, 28) (figure 3-2). Others add that theuse of electrorefiner technology for the conver-sion of spent LWR oxide fuel into new metal fuelmay be very difficult. “The fact that LWR fuel is

oxide and the [Argonne] conceptual process is anonaqueous process requiring conversion of all ofthe oxide fuel material to metal poses process de-velopment problems that may not be easilysolved” (56). According to Argonne researchersthe process chemistry has been selected. The nextstep would be the design of a prototype system.During 1993, an experiment was conducted byArgonne using materials that resemble LWR fuel(without fission products), and a small quantity(20 kilograms) was transformed from the oxide tothe metal (16). According to current plans, build-ing a prototype of this system for demonstrationpurposes with actual irradiated fuel may be com-pleted by FY 1997 (see figure 3-2).

Uranium is the most abundant material in LWRspent fuel. If it is to be eliminated by this process(i.e., completely converted to fission products), itwould first have to be transmuted into plutonium,then reprocessed into new fuel, and finally fis-sioned in the nuclear reactor. This would requirebreeder operation and the production of pluto-nium over many decades before actinide elimina-tion might be completed. It would also result inthe wide deployment of ALMR/IFR nuclear reac-tor systems that would both require additionalplutonium for continued operation, if for examplethey were to continue to generate electricity, andbe capable of breeding more plutonium. Thus, thenet effect may not be to decrease the world pluto-nium inventory, because plutonium would be con-tained in recycled nuclear fuel in ALMR/IFR sys-tems spread around the world. These systemswould also provide facilities and equipment thatcould be modified for small-scale plutonium puri-fication, described later. Thus, from a long-termstandpoint it is not clear whether large-scaleALMR deployment would be preferable to a planthat would place existing spent fuel in geologic re-positories, should they become available (30).

Waste Management IssuesThe potential impact of actinide removal on thelong-term management of spent nuclear fuel hasbeen the subject of a number of analyses. Some ar-


gue that the difficulty of developing geologic re-positories cannot be reduced by merely makingtechnical modifications to the waste because is-sues of siting, fairness, scientific uncertainty, andpublic trust override technical barriers ( 18). In anyevent, use of the AL MR/IFR technology for “acti-nide recycling’* of LWR spent fuel would in effecttransform actinides into highly radioactive fissionproducts that would have to be treated and dis-posed of in some suitable repository.

Argonne researchers expect that the most prob-lematic waste fission products, such as iodine andcesium isotopes (because of their very long half-lives and water leaching potential), would be en-capsulated in a mineralized form similar to a vitri-fied glass log for disposal in a geologic repository.Other fission products including technetium,strontium, zirconium, and carbon isotopes mightbe encapsulated in a metal ingot form. The re-searchers hope that these waste forms might proveto have equal or even greater groundwater-leach-ing resistance than the original LWR fuel rods ( 17,28). It has been difficult for repository designersto prove the engineering reliability of safe spentfuel storage over man y centuries, and it is not clearthat the new waste forms proposed by Argonne re-searchers will be any easier to evaluate.

Argonne researchers also think that by remov-ing actinides from the LWR spent fuel, the wasteswill be made more readily acceptable to the U.S.public for repository disposal. In part this is be-cause the greatest amount of long-term radioact iv-ity is due to the actinides in the spent fuel, al-though some fission products are also long-lived.Others conclude that the impact on public accep-tance will be minimal because although actinidescontribute the majority of the total long-term ra-dioactivity in spent fuel, they are much less watersoluble than the fission products. Thus long-termleakage risks from a geologic repository comemore from long-l ived, water-soluble fission prod-ucts such as technetium-99 (half-life 210,000years) and iodine- 129 (half-life 17 million years)than from actinides (5, 19, 46).

DOE officials are also quick to point out thatthey consider all such exposure risks from reposi-tories, including leakage, to be extremely low(46). Some environmentalists argue that a lowerenvironmental impact would result if all materialscontained in spent fuel remained in the spent fuelrods they are presently in, and that any reprocess-ing will inevitably increase the risks of environ-mental releases due to increased handling andtransportation during reprocessing (28).

Evaluation ofthe ALMR/IFR

Technology 4

The advanced liquid metal reactor/integral fast reactor(ALMR/IFR) project within the Department of Energy(DOE) is currently a research project, and the key compo-nents necessary for proposed future applications which

are reviewed in this chapter, require considerable developmentand testing. As described in chapter 3, many of these key compo-nents are still under development, at the concept stage, or still be-ing tested. For example, studies are just beginning on the behav-ior of reprocessed ALMR/IFR nuclear fuel over its lifetime andmay require as long as 5 years for completion. ] In addition, theexisting experimental breeder reactor (EBR-II), which is part ofthe test complex, is now scheduled to be shut down at the end of1994. Fuel behavior studies are needed for each of the variety offuel types proposed for the ALMR/IFR system, including thosebased on reprocessed spent light-water reactor (LWR) fuel, re-cycled ALMR/IFR fuel, and surplus weapons-grade plutonium.It is not clear how these studies will proceed without the EBR-II.

Many components of the ALMR/IFR fuel reprocessing and re-cycling system have been demonstrated on a bench scale. How-ever, most have yet to be tested as prototypes or at a full produc-tion scale, or to be integrated into a complete operating system. Inaddition, the waste disposal technology for the system is still in anearly research stage. Only after such research, development, andprototype work is complete could a commercial-scale ALMR/IFR system be deployed. Because of the nature of any researchproject in which both problems and opportunities have yet to be

| 27

28 | Technical Options for the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor

discovered, it is difficult to evaluate the suitabilityand potential of the proposed system for any spe-cific goal. Such a research project will change andadapt in response to data gathered during its devel-opment. Thus, the Office of Technology Assess-ment (OTA) analysis therefore reflects that uncer-tainty. It also reflects the fact that all recenttechnical data available on this project have beendeveloped by DOE contractors-Argonne Na-tional Laboratory and the General Electric Com-pany (GE).

DISPOSING OF WEAPONS PLUTONIUMALMR/IFR technology has been proposed as anoption for eliminating surplus military plutoniumin both the United States and the former SovietUnion by converting and using it as nuclear fuel.Theoretically, with enough multiple fuel reproc-essing cycles through an ALMR/IFR system,virtually all plutonium isotopes in the originalweapons material and in reprocessed fuel could beconverted into fission products. However, as dis-cussed in chapter 3 and supported by previousstudies, this technology would take more than adecade of research to build, require severalhundred million dollars in research expenditures,and face uncertain outcomes (27, 37, 46, 48). Tospeed up the process, promoters of the technologyhave proposed that the surplus plutonium couldinitially be "deweaponized” by blending it withfission products (to make it too radioactive to han-dle outside a hot cell) and later returned to anALMR (when one is developed) for complete fis-sioning (53). Such an approach may be feasible,but it is not unique to ALMR technology.

A consideration pointed out by the NationalAcademy of Sciences (NAS) and others is that itmay be inappropriate to wait for the possible de-velopment of the ALMR/IFR system before deal-ing with the problem of Russian plutonium nowcoming from warhead dismantlement. Many ex-perts agree that the existence and status of that plu-tonium represent a “clear and present danger,” andthat advanced reactor concepts such as theALMR/IFR are too far from realization to be con-sidered useful disposition options for this material

(27, 48). Given the status of development of theALMR/IFR system, it will not be operational fordecades. If current plans and budgets are fol-lowed, a prototype system scheduled by Argonneand GE researchers could begin operation about2005. When the time necessary for technical, en-vironmental, safety, and siting evaluations is con-sidered, substantial ALMR/IFR capacity is un-likely to be available until about 2015 at theearliest.

If disposition of plutonium is urgent, othermore immediately available and technically ma-ture options, such as conversion into mixed-oxide(MOX) fuel and burning in existing nuclear reac-tors or vitrification, should be viewed as near-termpreferred choices. Even if it were completed andperformed as specified, the ALMR/IFR systemrequires substantial time for the elimination oflarge amounts of plutonium. In a maximized burn-er configuration (operating to burn the most pluto-nium possible), a full-sized commercial-scale1 -gigawatt ALMR/IFR installation could destroy(by fissioning) only about 0.4 metric ton of pluto-nium per year (42, 45).

The use of ALMR technology for the completedestruction of surplus weapons plutonium wouldprobably not be feasible as a stand-alone missionfor this technology. It would have to be coupledwith some other plutonium fuel source in additionto surplus weapons plutonium (e.g., material re-covered from LWR spent fuel), because a mini-mum amount of plutonium must always be pres-ent in the ALMR for the reactor to function. Forexample, a hypothetical full-scale ALMR wouldrequire an initial plutonium fuel load on the orderof 15 tons to begin operation. In the burner mode,after a fuel load was used up in approximately 2years, it would be removed, and the remainingplutonium would be recovered during reproces-sing to make new ALMR fuel. Only about 0.4 tonsof new plutonium would have to be added per yearto make up the reactor core load.

In other words, about 15 tons of weapons pluto-nium would be needed to initially load the reactor,but only about 0.4 tons would be transformed tofission products each year, and this would have to

Chapter 4 Evaluation of the ALMR/lFR Technology | 29

be replaced for continued reactor operation. Whenno more weapons plutonium was available asmakeup fuel, slightly less than 15 tons of pluto-nium would remain in the reactor core. Thus, if theabove-mentioned 1 -gigawatt reactor operated toconsume plutonium for as many as 50 years itcould destroy about 20 tons of plutonium, butwould require about 35 tons to operate, leavingabout 15 tons of plutonium in the system at the endof the 50 years. Under these conditions, onlyabout 60 percent of the 35 tons of plutonium re-quired for reactor operation would be destroyed.Further reactor operation to fission the remaining15 tons would require a new source of plutoniumother than dismantled weapons.

Another issue related to estimating the time todeployment is licensing and siting. If the ALMRwere licensed in the manner of other civilian nu-clear facilities, the process must be expected to re-quire several years. Argonne and GE expect thatlicensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC) would be possible, and they have sub-mitted a preapplication review to NRC that is nowcomplete (44). The NRC review concluded thatthe concept is licensable, specifically includingseismic isolation, fuel integrity, and emergencyshutdown aspects ( 12, 44). This was a preapplica-tion review, and further licensing could be subjectto future questions and debate. If the ALMR weredeployed by the private sector, licensing couldelicit public concerns about plutonium reactors ingeneral. An alternative licensing process would beto carry out operations at government sites in Rus-sia and the United States to avoid the debate aboutproliferation issues that the use of multipleALMR/IFRs would entail (53). Some believe thata very lengthy public debate about licensing andsiting can be avoided if the only intention is to li-cense several reactors at government sites operat-ing with surplus weapons plutonium (27).

Plutonium storage could also bean issue if a de-cision is made to wait until the ALMR/IFRtechnology is developed before surplus weaponsplutonium is processed. In that case, today’s sur-plus plutonium may have to be stored for decadeswhile ALMR technology is designed, tested,scaled up, deployed, and licensed. Some believe

that the use of breeder reactors such as the ALMWIFR will make economic sense as a means ofmeeting future U.S. energy needs, and thereforethe United States should store its military pluto-nium for this eventuality. Others point out thatplutonium-fueled fast breeder reactors will not beeconomically competitive with current reactorsfor probably a century (37, 46). Plutonium couldbecome an economic energy source only if ura-nium becomes much more expensive or theworld’s uranium resources become scarce. Mostexperts agree that, at present, the cost of fabricat-ing and safeguarding plutonium fuels makes it un-competitive with cheap and widely available low-enriched uranium fuels (27).

In a recent report, the National Academy ofSciences concludes that advanced reactor designswill not be available for plutonium disposition formany decades, and thus it makes little economicsense to store existing plutonium against thiseventuality, especially when there are much morenear-term disposition methods available (27).NAS also concludes that current decisions aboutdisposition options for surplus weapons pluto-nium should not be used to drive decisions aboutfuture options for nuclear power in the UnitedStates. The amount of weapons plutonium likelyto be surplus is small on the scale of global nuclearpower use and is not a large factor in the future ofcivilian nuclear power (27). Another issue is thatwhatever economic value plutonium might havein the future must be considered in light of the se-curity risks it may present. There is also a dangerthat long-term storage of military weapons pluto-nium awaiting a disposition technology may sendthe wrong political signal to the rest of the worldabout U.S. plutonium management goals.

Finally, the selection of any disposition optionmust await formulation of an overall nationalpolicy for managing plutonium and other nuclearmaterials from dismantled weapons that states thekey, relevant criteria (48). Meanwhile, certain fea-tures of the ALMR/IFR concept-its potential ca-pacity to protect plutonium from proliferation andits development status-can be used by policy-makers to compare and evaluate it against otherplutonium management options. A careful assess-


ALMR researchers claim that the removal of acti-nides from spent fuel (for recycling into ALMRfuel) would reduce the duration of radiological

Spent fuel nuclide Half-life (years) toxicity of such waste from millions of years tohundreds of years because a large portion of the

Technetium-99 (fission product) 210,000 long-lived radioactive isotopes would be removedlodine-129 (fission product) 17,200,000 (12).Cesium-135 (fission product) 2,000,000 Others have disputed some of these claims,Uranium-234 (actinide) 248,000 based on calculations of the impact of actinide re-Plutonium-239 (actinide) 24,360 moval on key geologic repository parameters.Americium-241 (actinide) 458 Also, its developers claim that the ALMR/IFR

might be able to eliminate a variety of problematicSOURCE Handbook o/ Chemistry and Physics, 48th Ed (Cleveland, -

. .

OH The Chemical Rubber Company, 1967)nuclear wastes, converting the actinides they con-tain into fission products. Others counter that acti-

ment, independent of all reactor vendors and pro-ponents of certain technologies, would be benefi-cial. Such an assessment might consider whichcriteria are most important in both the UnitedStates and the former Soviet Union, and evaluatethe technology options against those criteria. Re-cent studies cited above could be used as a startingpoint for such an assessment.

NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENTWaste volume and characteristics are importantfactors in assessing potential applications of theALMR/IFR concept. Because this concept is stillin research and development stages, and has notbeen tested with actual spent ALMR/IFR fuel, itspotential impact on waste reduction must be pro-jected from available data. Nevertheless, develop-ers of the ALMR/IFR cite some anticipated ad-vantages of the system based on its minimizationof waste.

I Processing Spent Reactor FuelDevelopers of the ALMR/IFR claim it may bepossible to remove (by repeated reprocessing overtime) the actinides from LWR spent fuel, includ-

nide removal would offer few if any significantadvantages for disposal in a geologic repositorybecause some of the fission product nuclides ofgreatest concern in scenarios such as groundwaterleaching actually have longer half-lives than theradioactive actinides. The concern about a wastecannot end after hundreds of years even if all theactinides are removed when the remaining wastecontains radioactive fission products such as tech-netium-99, iodine-1 29, and cesium-135 with thehalf-lives between 213,000 and 15.7 million years(table 4-1) (5, 18, 19).

A final advantage of actinides removal (includ-ing plutonium) from spent fuel is to eliminate con-cerns about leaving plutonium in a repository thatmight be mined sometime in the future for the pur-pose of making weapons. This is a legitimatepoint that should be considered more broadly inthe context of future proliferation potential.

In the proposed operation of the ALMR/IFRactinide recycle concept, the actinides separatedfrom spent fuel would be converted into new fis-sion products, that require disposal. Thus, thissystem does not eliminate the need for a nuclearwaste repository, nor can it be considered a short-term solution to the U.S. spent fuel disposal prob-

ing plutonium and uranium, leaving only the gen- lem. Also, unless the deployed ALMR/IFRs wereerally shorter-lived (but initially very radioactive) permanently shut down and decommissioned atfission products, which would then be packaged the end of this mission, they might continue to befor geologic repository disposal. However, the po- used as breeder reactors for electricity production.tential impact of ALMR processing on geologic In that case they would continue to produce radio-repositories for spent nuclear fuel is far from clear. active fission products that would require dispos-


al. Numerous other technical quesproposals to eliminate plutonium

ions relating ton spent fuel by

using various technologies are currently beingevaluated by the National Academy of SciencesPanel on Separations Technology and Transmuta-tion Systems (STATS panel).2

Processing all U.S. spent reactor fuel to removeactinides is likely to be very slow and require de-cades to significantly reduce the actinide contentof existing LWR spent fuel (26, 27, 46). With a na-tional deployment schedule. ALMR/IFR technol-ogy might permanently destroy a significant por-tion of U.S. spent fuel after 60 to 90 years (3).Another estimate is that it would take 20 ALMR/IFR facilities 100 years or more to destroy 90 per-cent of the LWR actinide waste inventory pro-jected to exist in 2010 (26,). Each reprocessingcycle of LWR spent fuel in the ALMR/IFR systemwould transform and remove only a small propor-tion of the total actinides originally contained inLWR spent fuel, so that a great number of reproc-essing steps would be required to transform all ofthe actinides. LWR spent fuel contains only about1 percent plutonium, with the remainder beingmostly uranium, much smaller amounts of otheractinides, and fission products. Separating theplutonium would leave the vast majority of theLWR spent fuel material, mostly uranium-238,which would still require disposition. One pro-posal is to convert this surplus uranium-238 bybreeding it into new plutonium fuel in the ALMR/IFR. During the course of this operation, muchmore plutonium would be generated than waspresent in the original LWR spent fuel.

In terms of the potential regulatory impact of anactinide recycling program. one study concludedthat because of Environmental Protection Agencyand NRC rules, acinide recycling would not makelicensing of a repository significantly easier. Astudy on the potential of ALMR actinide recycling(and several other reprocessing/disposal technol-ogies) for handling spent nuclear fuel concludedthat the concept was flawed on both technical and

poitical grounds. and that ALMR actinide recycl-ing was neither an alternative to the current geo-logic disposal program nor essential to its success(36). In fact, the conclusion reached was that pur-suit of such a program would require a major re-structuring of the U.S. geologic repository effortbecause the waste forms generated would be sodifferent (36). The study pointed out that even ifthe efficiency of spent fuel actinide recoveryclaimed by proponents were feasible on an indus-trial scale. it would solve the wrong problem.Many of the risks of a long-term geologic reposi-tory come not from the actinides contained inspent fuel but rather from long-lived soluble fis-sion products that might leach from a repositoryinto groundwater, which would not be eliminatedby the ALMR/IFR system. In addition. the abso-lute radioactivity risk from a repository is alreadyvery low, and actinides do not contribute signifi-cantly to that risk.

Further, some argue that actinide recyclingwould aggravate rather than reduce public con-cerns by requiring the siting and operation of nu-merous reactors, as well as reprocessing and fuelfabrication facilities; by reviving the concernsover nuclear proliferation; by generating new anddifferent waste streams: and by requiring centu-ries of reliable institutional control over power-producing, reprocessing, and storage facilities.Removing the actinides from radioactive waste isunlikely to have a significant impact on public an-tipathy to geologic disposal (23. 46).

It appears that actinide recycling is unlikely toreduce the difficulty of managing the overallwaste stream from nuclear power reactor opera-tions. In fact, the opposite is possible. New licens-ing. the operation of reprocessing facilities, trans-portation between the present locations of LWRspent fuel and reprocessing facilities, and man-agement of ancillary waste streams would all berequired. Finally. if the ALMR/IFR becomes awidely deployed technology for electricity gen-eration, as envisioned by its developers, the net

2ThIS rcpmt IS schccluld for rcleiiw In July 1994.


impact in the long term would be to increase therepository capacity required for the disposal of fis-sion product wastes created by the technology.

I Processing Other Radioactive WastesAccording to Argonne researchers, the sametechnology that might convert LWR spent fuelinto ALMR/IFR fuel would in principle be appli-cable to the processing of other types of nuclearwaste materials. These would include DOE-owned spent fuel, surplus weapons plutonium,and scrap from plutonium processing operations( 16). According to a recent DOE report, the prob-lem of dealing with a large number of old and dis-integrating fuel elements from its past operationsis reaching critical proportions (52).

Since the ALMR/IFR technology will not beavailable soon, it may not be appropriate to con-sider its application for the most pressing and im-mediate waste disposal needs outlined by theDOE Spent Fuel Working Group. Nevertheless,some method for improved safe storage of thiswaste is urgently needed. And if parts of theALMR technology could be developed for treat-ing and packaging this material or similar wastefurther, investigation might be useful.

In summary, the ability of ALMR/IFR technol-ogy to reprocess LWR spent fuel into ALMR fuelhas yet to be demonstrated, and significant techni-cal problems remain, one possible application isfor long-term management of radioactive wastesthat do not require immediate attention. Becauseof the preliminary nature of research on theALMR/IFR concept, characterizing its potentialimpact on a geologic repository for nuclear wastein terms of waste volume, longevity in a reposito-ry, or long-term risk factors, is difficult. Thus, it isalso difficult to make comparisons with muchmore developed processes, such as direct disposalof spent fuel in geologic repositories or high-levelwaste vitrification.3 Furthermore, any spent fuelreprocessing option must be evaluated in the larg-

er context of establishing a U.S. plutonium re-processing policy or of reviewing internationalpolicies regarding nonproliferation.

PROLIFERATION RISKS AND BENEFITSI Concerns About Plutonium BreedingAlthough some recent proposals for the future ofthe ALMR/IFR concept have focused more on itsability to transform and irreversibly use up pluto-nium, even its developers acknowledge that it is“uncontested that the IFR can be configured as anet producer of plutonium” ( 13). In principle, anynuclear reactor could be operated as a breeder(producing new plutonium). However, as men-tioned earlier, the ALMR/IFR system originatedas a reactor capable of reprocessing its own spentfuel and breeding more plutonium (42). In fact,liquid metal reactor (LMR) technology has al-ways been associated with breeder reprocessingtechnology. The first reactor ever to produce elec-tricity, which began operation in 1951, was a liq-uid metal cooled-breeder reactor design. In Sep-tember 1993, ALMR/IFR developers emphasizedthe possible long-term energy advantages of theconcept as a breeder reactor design (4). GE repre-sentatives described the flexibility of convertingtheir full-scale reactor design from burner tobreeder operation in a November 1993 status re-port to DOE (21, 34).

Thus, for the purpose of evaluating the poten-tial impact of the ALMR/IFR on nuclear prolifera-tion risks, it must be considered a breeder-capablereactor system. Even though this system might becapable of operating in a way that uses up pluto-nium from sources such as dismantled weapons, ifproperly modified it could also be used to breedmore plutonium. Most proponents of the technol-ogy believe that its long-term mission will prob-ably always be as part of an integrated system inwhich plutonium fuel and reprocessing make sig-nificant contribution to U.S. and world energyneeds.


If reactor design allowed sufficient room, a“breeder blanket" of fertile uranium-238 could beretrofitted around the reactor core that, when irra-diated, could produce plutonium with a relativelylow buildup of undesirable (from a weapo n s

m a n u f a c t u r i n g s t a n d p o i n t ) p l u t o n i u m i s o t o p e s .4

Breeder blankets have also been used to produceweapons-grtidc plutonium in LWRs. Some arguethat the ALMR could be designed to allow noroom for such a blanket of breeding materialaround the retie’ t o r core. I n this case, however, al-though less efficient it would still be possible tobreed plutonium by placing fertile material at ei-ther end of the fuel rods.

However, the designs recent] y described by GEdo not require any extra room in the reactor core.They are designed to be flexibly convertible frombreeding to consuming by simply altering the ar-rangement of a fixed number of reactor elements(for example, see figure 3-3). Thus, operatirrg anALMR/IFR system to breed plutonium wouldprobab]y not be difficult. It would, however, bedifficult to design an ALMR reactor core thatcould not be converted to breeder operation givensufficient motivation and ability on the part of thereactor’s owner. Any reactor could theoreticallybe converted to breeder operation. so the impor-tant proliferation concerns may be the access to aheavily shielded hot cell and fuel reprocessingequipment. along with access to a spent fuelsource (e.g, the ALMR/IFR ).

Although acknowledging that the ALMR/IFRis a breeder reactor system. its developers never-theless claim that it has distinct proliferation ad-vantages compared with curlier breeder/reproc-essing systems such as the Clinch River BreederDemonstration project that ended in 1983. Themajor difference between the two programs is thesubstitution of pyroprocessing for PUREX nu-clear fuel reprocessing. The promoters of this con-cept believe that a switch to pyroprocessing by na-

tions currently using PUREX reprocessing,including Japan, France, England. and North Ko-rea, would represent a major step in nonprolifera-tion. Others point out that it is difficult to justifythe U.S. funding development of possiblePUREX reprocessing substitutes for nations thatclearly have not agreed to adopt them should theyever become available (27 ).

I Concerns About Weapons-UsablePlutonium

How does pyroprocessing differ from PUREX re-processing in terms of inherent nuclear prolifera-tion risks? One of the larger proliferation barriersclaimed for ALMR/IFR reprocessed fuel is thepresence of residual fission products and actinidesthat are highly radioactive. The irradiated fuelfrom an ALMR/IFR recycling facility could con-sist of up to 70 percent plutonium and 30 percenturanium and other actinides, along with smallamounts of highly radioactive fission products.This radioactivity would make the material diffi-cult to work with and require that all operations becarried out by using a heavily shielded remotelyoperated hot cell. Presumably it would be difficultto fabricate weapons components under suchconditions with this material. Plutonium fromPUREX reprocessing does not contain these fis-sion products and thus can be used directly to fab-ricate weapons components. On the other hand,fuel from the ALMR/IFR cycle would be a prefer-able starting material for converting to weaponsmaterial compared with ordinary spent nuclearfuel from a conventional LWR because it containsa much higher concentration of plutonium (70percent versus 1 percent) and significantly lowerquantities of radioactive fission products. A largefraction (but not all) of the fission products wouldbe removed by the pyroprocess. Thus, to obtainenough plutonium for a bomb it would be much


easier to handle and process some tens of poundsof reprocessed ALMR fuel than almost a ton ofspent LWR fuel.

The developers of this technology point to sev-eral factors as obstacles to the use of ALMR/IFRreprocessed material for fabricating weapons.These are the reduction of the plutonium con-centration by the presence of uranium and othercompounds, the presence of plutonium isotopesother than plutonium-239, and the high radioac-tivity of contaminating compounds that makeshandling more difficult. None of these, however,is a particularly impenetrable proliferation barrier.Reducing the plutonium concentration, (e.g., be-cause of the presence of 30 percent uranium in thereprocessed material) does not itself make the plu-tonium unusable in terms of weapons. For exam-ple, diluting plutonium-239 with 50 percent non-fissile uranium-238 would increase the amount ofmaterial required to make a weapon by only abouta factor of four (40).

The isotopic composition of reprocessedALMR/IFR is also not an insurmountablebarrier to proliferation. Plutonium is produced bythe same process in both military plutonium pro-duction reactors and civilian nuclear power reac-tors. However, military reactors were operateddifferently to produce a plutonium containingmostly the single plutonium-239 isotope, which isconsidered the most desirable isotope for bombproduction. Nevertheless, plutonium obtainedfrom any spent nuclear fuel source can be used tomake a nuclear bomb; therefore, no distinctionshould be made between weapons and civilianreactor-grade plutonium from the standpoint ofnuclear proliferation (27, 37, 40).

The plutonium from ALMR recycled fuelwould have an isotopic composition similar tothat obtained from other spent nuclear fuel

sources. Whereas this might make it less thanideal for weapons production, it would still be ad-equate for unsophisticated nuclear bomb designs.In fact, the U.S. government detonated a nucleardevice in 1962 using low-grade plutonium typicalof that produced by civilian powerplants (10, 37).The bomb design used in the 1945 Trinity testcould in principle contain civilian reactor-gradeplutonium of any degree of burnup and isotopecomposition, and still provide nuclear yields inthe multikiloton range (22). Using civilian powerreactor-grade plutonium in the 1945 design wouldincrease the probability that the yield would be re-duced. However, it would not greatly change thevalue of the “fizzle” (lowest expected) yield,which although smaller than the nominal yieldwould nevertheless create quite damaging nuclearexplosion (22, 40). Thus, although civilian powerreactor-grade plutonium would be harder to workwith for making bombs, the drawbacks are not se-rious and nuclear proliferators might not be de-terred simply because the only accessible bombmaterial was less than perfect.

The plutonium recovered from spent ALMRfuel would also be contaminated by heat-generat-ing plutonium-238, but this too would not presentan insurmountable proliferation barrier. 5 In anycase, the plutonium recovered from the ALMR byoperating it as a breeder would be relatively free ofplutonium-238.

On the other hand, some processing wouldprobably be required to remove these residual fis-sion products from ALMR/IFR reprocessed nu-clear fuel. Currently available methods for remov-ing the residual fission products in ALMR/IFRspent fuel could be performed in the hot cell (al-though they might interrupt normal operation andbe detectable with any inspection regime); these

Sme dc[al]s ,)f how, heat ~)tltput frorrl P]utoniunl UStXI in warheads would affect its design and (Jperati(m are not available publicly. me ‘AS

repwt ctmcluded that the heat generated by plut(miunl-238 and plutonium-240 would require careful management for weapons design, includ-ing [he use of ~hanne]s t. c(}nduct it frt)nl the plu[on]um through [k surrounding explosive, (jr delaying assembly of the device until a few

mmutes bef~~re use (27). Similarly, [he radiatitm from an~erictun}-241 in ALMR/l FR reprocessed fuel would require that rmwe shielding be usedbut is not an msurn](wntable obstacle (27). Only plutonium composed of more than 80 percent plutoniun~-238 is exempted from InternationalAt(mlic Energy Agency safeguards; any t)thcr isot(~pe conlp)sition must be considered usable for making a bomb (37).


would provide usable, if not optimal material. forweapons purposes. Thus, access to the hot cellassociated with ALMR/IFR technology, and withits ability to handle highly radioactive materialssafely (which is not a feature of conventionalLWR systems), may be a key proliferation issue.Proponents claim that the purification of ALMR/IFR reprocessed material would require eitherconstruction of or access to a PUREX reprocess-ing facility. others point out that there are signifi-cantly simpler methods for removing fissionproducts, such as a commonly used industrialprocess known as aqueous ion exchange (6, 56).Los Alamos National Laboratory has routinelyused aqueous ion exchange to separate radioactivefission products from plutonium. The equipmentand materials used in this process are commonlyavailable for other types of industrial separationand purification (49). Such an operation would re-quire the type of heavy shielding offered by thehot cell of an ALMR/IFR system. 6

Other processes available within the ALMR/IFR system might also be modified to producematerial suitable for making a nuclear weapon.ALMR/IFR designers expect to be able to removethe fission product wastes that would accumulatein the molten salt bath of an operating electrorefin -er by using zeolite ion exchange, with the moltensalt as a solvent. Analogous aqueous ion exchangeprocesses have been used routinely to separateplutonium from other actinides and fission prod-ucts, Since the same physical processes would beinvolved in molten salt-zeolite ion exchange, giv-en sufficient motivation, one might be able tomodify the process in order to remove fissionproducts, and generate a material that could beconverted into bomb components, with only aglove box for shielding. Similarly, although the~conditions are substantially different, pyroproc-essing (electrorefining)-type procedures havebeen developed by Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory for separating the actinide americiumfrom recycled weapons plutonium ( 1). However,while the ALMR/IFR process and equipmentmight be modified to achieve such a separationwith recycled fuel, any such modifications wouldprobably be very difficult to conceal from a cred-ible outside inspection regime.

Thus, in providing both the necessary startingmaterial (ALMR/IFR recycled fuel) and the nec-essary facilities (hot cell and related reprocessingequipment), the ALMR/IFR system could be con-sidered a source of weapons-usable nuclear mate-rial. Whereas it would probably be easier to gener-ate weapons plutonium from a PUREX facility ifone were available, but for a determined and capa-ble proliferator, access to an ALMR/IFR facility islikely to serve such purposes.

An independent assessment of the proliferationpotential and international implications of the in-tegral fast breeder reactor, prepared by Martin Ma-rietta for DOE and the Department of State in1992 (the Wymer report), concluded that the di-version and further purification of plutonium byusing the facilities available in the ALMR/IFRprocessing and recycle facility would be possible(56). The report also noted that the modificationsrequired for these scenarios would be readily de-tectable with any reasonable inspection regimeand that therefore proliferation scenarios involv-ing treaty abrogation were the greater concern. Inother words, any diversion of nuclear materialsfrom the ALMR/IFR would be difficult to carryout clandestinely if an inspection regime were inplace (24).

The Wymer report outlined several possibleproliferation scenarios in which ALMR/IFRequipment could be modified to produce weaponsmaterial, including the following (56):

■ The normal recycled ALNR/IFR fuel productcould be reprocessed through multiple elcctro-


refiner cycles to remove the rare earth fissionproducts and reduce the radioativity of the ma-terial, thereby making it easier to manipulate.

- Multiple batches of fuel might be processed byusing only the iron cathode electrode to removeuranium and allow the plutonium to accumu-late in the molten salt phase (see figure 3-4).This could generate a material with a pluto-nium-to-uranium ratio as high as nine, afterelectrochemical transport to the liquid cad-mium cathode, although other actinides andrare earths would also be present.

■ The reactor could be run in the breeder configu-ration with reprocessing of the irradiated fertile(breeding) material. For a more preferablegrade (containing a higher proportion of theplutonium-239 isotope) of plutonium, it wouldbe desirable to schedule blanket assemblies forreprocessing when the electrorefiner salt hadjust been replaced and was free of contami-nants. Such plutonium would still be contami-nated with fission products but, under certainconditions. could deposit a material having aplutonium-to-uranium ratio of one. Multiplebatches of blanket fuel might have to be proc-essed before the better grade of plutoniumcould be removed from the liquid cadmium( 1 7).

According to this analysis, the proliferation re-sistance of ALMR/IFR technology is more a func-tion of the adequacy of nuclear materials safe-guards than of the technology itself. If a nationpossessing an ALMR/IFR system chose to aban-doned safeguards (e.g., by reneging on previoussafeguards agreements ), the technology alonewould probably offer few proliferation barriers.

The Wymer study also considered the question:If it was willing to renounce international inspec-tion, would a nation that had access to an ALMR/IFR system have an advantage in proliferation.compared with a nation that did not have access tosuch a facility’? The study determined that havingan ALMR/IFR facility would clearly provide apotential proliferating: nation several advantages.including a spent fuel receiving area and facilitiesfor preparing the fuel for dissolution (56). Having

an ALMR/IFR facility would be much more valu-able to a potential proliferator that had no other ex-isting reprocessing facilities. A nation that aban-doned nonproliferation regimes and had existingPUREX facilities might see less proliferation ad-vantage in having an ALMR/IFR facility.

If, instead of processing spent fuel, the ALMRsystem were used to reprocess irradiated fertile(breeding) material in the electrorefiner, the re-sulting plutonium would be a superior material,with an nearly ideal isotope composition for nu-clear weapons manufacture (56). It would be supe-rior even to plutonium obtained by PUREX re-processing of conventional LWR spent fuelbecause of its higher plutonium-239 content.When it operates as a breeder, the plutonium avail-able from the ALMR/IFR under normal operationwill be weapons grade, whereas commercialLWRS always produce a much lower-grade pluto-nium unless they are shut down and refueled muchmore frequently than required for economical op-eration (49).

Developers of the ALMR/IFR technology indi-cate that it is an "uncontested fact that it would betechnically possible to make nuclear explosivesfrom material extracted in some (unspecified)fashion from an IFR process stream” ( 13). Otherreports have come to similar conclusions. Eventhough the ALMR reduces certain proliferationrisks when operated with proper safeguards, pos-sess ion of such a facilitywould bring with it someof the technology needed to produce weapons plu-tonium as well (27).

ROLE OF NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDSPart of the ALMR/IFR research program is a proj-ect to develop suitable nuclear material safeguardsand monitoring and control systems. One studysuggests that ALMR/IFR fuel recycling wouldhave some features that require the developmentof unique safeguards and inspection systems (56).Others feel that the notion that plutonium in non-nuclear weapons countries can be made safe by theuse of safeguards is misleading. That is, full-scalereprocessing and breeder development would in-volve such a large amount of separated plutonium


instns[ version would political and other pressures to prevent a proli fer-

be difficult or impossible (37).According to the Wymer report, a safeguards

regime for the ALMR/IFR system would have to

be very different from that for a PUREX facility.(In fact, even safeguards for large-scale PUREX-type reprocessing plants remain to be proven inactual operation.) Conventional safeguards sys-tems for PUREX rely heavily on materials controland accounting techniques in which representa-tive samples of key, homogeneous solutions aretaken during plant operation. Chemical analysesof these samples give an accurate and precise pic-ture of the movement of materials through thePUREX reprocessing system. Such an approachmay be less applicable to the ALMR/IFR systembecause of the lack of homogeneity of molten saltsolutions used in pyroprocessing and at other keypoints during operation. In the clectrorefiningprocess. for example, plutonium (along with otheractinides) may actually precipitate from solution.leading to misleadingly low measurements (24).Safeguarding the ALMR/IFR system wouldtherefore have to rely more on containment andsurveillance methods. Similar methods have beendeveloped as proliferation control techniques atsites such us Sandia National Laboratories (24).The development of adequate safeguards for theALMR/IFR system may be an essential require-ment to allow its future development and deploy-ment (24). However, International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA ) inspection would always requireactual hands-on monitoring of a facility.

According to one analysis, if nonnuclear coun-tries obtain full-scale reprocessing plants andbreeder reactors, even full safeguards may notprovide timely warning if a country should decideto abrogate its safeguards agreements (37). Thus,no safeguards scheme. including any IAEA pro-gram, could be effective if such sensitive materi-

als and facilities became widely available in na-tions that are current I y nonnuclear weapons states.This is because the possession of such facilitieswould allow a nation to build nuclear weapons tooquickly for adequate international response. Ayear hasbeen estimateded as the time necessary forthe United States and others to amass sufficient

ating country from making a bomb. The only ac-ceptable approach, therefore, may be for nonnu-clear countries to completely forego nuclearreprocessing. Then, if a country seized spent fuel.it would still need 1 1/2 to 2 years to build the nec-essary reprocessing facility to extract the pluto-nium—time enough in them-y for the rest of theworld to take heed and respond.

Supporters suggest that a key difference be-tween ALMR/IFR technology and PUREX pluto-nium separation is that. in principle, the formerwould keep the entire cycle (fuel reactor burning,spent fuel reprocessing, fuel fabrication, andwaste processing) at a single site. If adopted. thiswould elminate proliferation concerns stemming

from the shipment of separated plutonium andspent fuel. Thus the configuration of the completesystem. rather than the technology itself. may of-fer a proliferation resistance advantage comparedwith PUREX reprocessing. In countries currentlyde~cloping PUREX reprocessing for plutoniumfuel recycling, such as France and Japan, spentfuel is transported to central facilities and reproc-essed fuel must be transported back to the reac-tors. On the other hand. the United States prescnt-Iy curries out no reprocessing. If the United Statesbegins reprocessing. there may be no technicalreason why reprocessing facilities includingPUREX could not be colocated with a nuclearreactor, if this were determined to be an importantfeature. In addition, GE acknowledges that it maybe politicall y difficult to colocate reprocessing fa-cilities at new nuclear reactors, and it is consider-ing the possibility of a central reprocessing facil-ity that could serve many reactors at differentlocutions (43). Therefore the collocation advan-tage may be an equally infeasible option for eitherIFR or PUREX reprocessing.

POLITICAL BARRIERSSeparate from the issue of whether the ALMR/IFR system could provide sufficient tcchni(w[barriers to proliferation is the question of the pro-gram's impact on political barriers to prlifera-5tion. In particular. how much might a United


States decision to reprocess and bum plutoniuminfluence the plutonium management policies ofother countries? Since the late 1970s the UnitedStates has chosen not to carry out plutonium re-processing for both economic and political rea-sons. In a September 27, 1993, policy statementthe Clinton Administration reaffirmed this by an-nouncing a nonproliferation initiative, which in-cludes a proposal for a global convention banningproduction of fissile material (e.g., plutonium) forweapons, a voluntary offer to put U.S. excess fis-sile materials under IAEA safeguards, and a rec-ognition that plutonium disposition is an impor-tant nonproliferation problem requiringinternational attention (55). Subsequently, Presi-dent Bill Clinton and Russian President BorisYeltsin, during their meeting in Moscow on Janu-ary 14, 1994, agreed to cooperate with each otherand other states in measures designed to preventthe accumulation of excessive stocks of fissilematerials and to reduce such stocks overtime (3 3).They agreed to establish a joint working group toconsider steps to ensure that these materials wouldnot be used again for nuclear weapons.

Many are concerned that a U.S. emphasis onALMR/IFR development, with its inherent re-liance on nuclear fuel reprocessing, could under-mine this policy and stimulate other nations to un-dertake plutonium reprocessing programs. In hisSeptember 1993 statement, President Clinton saidthat although the United States will not interferewith reprocessing in Japan or Europe, “the UnitedStates does not encourage the civil use of pluto-nium and, accordingly, does not itself engage inplutonium reprocessing for either nuclear poweror nuclear explosive purposes” (55). If the UnitedStates breaks this long-standing norm by proceed-ing with the development of plutonium reprocess-ing technologies, other nations might be encour-aged to consider LWR fuel without necessarilylimiting the types of technologies used.

The example set by the United States in any de-cision about reprocessing for commercial reactorsis likely to prove an important influence on the be-havior of other countries and should be carefullyconsidered. Setting an example for other nationshas long been a primary argument for not support-

ing U.S. breeder reactor development. The NASand others have warned that U.S. policy on pluto-nium disposition must take into account the sig-nals sent by the choice of a particular dispositionmethod (27). For example, if the United Statestreated its weapons plutonium as a waste to be dis-posed of, this could set an important example in itsdesire to discourage the use of plutonium reproc-essing.

In summary, any nuclear technology carrieswith it some proliferation risks. These risks mightbe minimized by using inspection and safeguardsregimes. However, the effectiveness of these mea-sures is based more on political and internationalnorms than on purely technical barriers. If theALMR/IFR reprocessing technology were ex-ported, the United States could not guarantee itsability to impose and enforce enduring and reli-able technical barriers on other nations.

If the proliferation resistance of ALMR/IFRtechnology is judged from a purely technicalviewpoint, its reprocessing facilities and nuclearreactor could clearly be adapted to breeder opera-tion for producing plutonium. In addition, thetechnology carries with it several issues of generalproliferation concern beyond whether it is de-signed as a breeder or a burner of plutonium. In it-self, the use of reprocessing and its collocationwith hot cell facilities provide some opportunityfor plutonium concentration and the acquisition ofplutonium for weapons. Although the ALMR/IFR system might prove more difficult to misusefor weapons production than a PUREX facilit y, itsoperation would produce a much more concen-trated form of plutonium compared with spentLWR fuel, and would provide a facility (hot cell)and a technology for handling and reprocessingspent fuel into a weapons-usable form. Thus, froma purely technical viewpoint, if ALMR/IFR re-placed or were developed as an alternative toPUREX-based reprocessing, it might be an incre-mental improvement nonproliferation. If it re-placed the conventional LWR reactor with a once-through fuel cycle followed by direct disposal,then it could increase the risk of proliferation.


BEYOND THE SPENT FUEL STANDARDFOR PROLIFERATION RESISTANCEALMR/IFR promoters have focused attention onthe fact that any plutonium contained in LWRspent fuel is a legitimate nuclear weapons prolifer-ation concern. They and many others, includingthe recent NAS study on plutonium disposition,point out that there are large quantities of pluto-nium in low concentrations tied up in spent nu-clear fuel in various nations around the world.7 Al-though pure plutonium from dismantled nuclearweapons in the former Soviet Union is recognizedas the immediate "clear and present danger” (27),the plutonium contained in spent fuel, as well asplutonium already separated from spent fuel, alsorepresents a significant nuclear proliferation risk(30).8 Since the plutonium obtainable from spentfuel can be used for making a nuclear bomb, theissue of the fate of this material must be addressedby all nations. The proposal to eliminate pluto-nium in spent nuclear fuel by using varioustechnologies is currently being evaluated by theso-called STATS panel of the National Academyof Sciences, discussed earlier.9

In the past spent nuclear fuel was consideredthe benchmark for proliferation resistance be-cause of its lethal “self-protecting” radioactivity.Although it contains weapons-usable plutonium,the spent fuel from a reactor is normally so highl yradioactive due to the presence of fission productsthat it cannot be handled or processed by a poten-tial proliferator without complex specitil equip-ment and heavy shielding such as available in thenuclear weapons complexes of the United Statesor former Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, over the long term, mtiny expertsagree that the unseparated plutonium in spent fuelmust be considered a proliferation risk (27, 37,46). The chemistry for separating plutonium fromspent fuel is described in the open literature, andthe essential technologies are available on theopen market (49). Although commercial-scaleseparation is difficult and costly, a potential pro-liferator could use a much simpler and less costlyfacility to extract enough material for a few weap-ons. The plutonium contained in a truckload ofspent fuel rods from a typical power reactor isenough for one or more bombs (27). Moreover,the intense radioactivity that initially makes nu-clear spent fuel self-protecting declines after somedecades. For example, after 100 years, spent nu-clear fuel of typical burnup would decay to lessthan 100 rads per hour at 1 meter, which is theminimum radioactivity level considered suffi-ciently self-protecting by the NRC and IAEA torequire less safeguarding (27). The unavoidableconclusion is that any plutonium, whether mili-tary or civilian, of any form and isotopic composi-tion could be considered a proliferation risk overthe long term.

Some solutions for plutonium safeguarding(including use of the ALMR/IFR) are directed atthe idea of totally eliminating all the world’s plu-tonium. Promoters of this solution argue that thebest action for nuclear nonproliferation would beif all nations agreed to eliminate all plutonium andplutonium manufacture. However, this would re-quire that all nations of the world agree to disposeof plutonium in all its forms, including surplusmilitary as well as spent fuel and civilian sepa-


rated plutonium (30). Some countries such as theUnited Kingdom, Japan, and France have made iasubstantial financial commitment to the commer-cial use of plutonium and might not be willing toaccept this (37). The NAS concluded that this op-tion could not be available for at least the next 50years, although it may nevertheless be worthwhileto continue its development for future needs (30).

The NAS also made the point that it would befutile to develop a plutonium disposition processthat made surplus military plutonium more prolif-eration-resistant than the much larger and growingquantity of civilian plutonium contained in spentfuel from commercial reactors. The spent fuelstandard for proliferation resistance should beconsidered adequate for the nonproliferationbenchmark unless methods are developed thatalso address the plutonium contained in LWRspent fuel (27). The corollary is that if a disposi-tion method cannot achieve the spent fuel stan-dard for military plutonium in a few decades, withlow to moderate security risks along the way, itshould not be considered (30).

The NAS also warned that it is far from clearthat the best long-term nonproliferation solutionfor all the world’s plutonium is total eliminationby fissioning. Some type of geologic disposalmethod may be superior (27). The enormous costsof eliminating the entire global inventory of pluto-nium cannot be justified if options such as geolog-ic disposal can provide acceptable nonprolifera-

tion risks. 10 Some elimination options involvingrepeated plutonium reprocessing and reuse mayeven have greater proliferation risks than to dis-posal in geologic repositories (27). Nevertheless,the major stumbling block will be that the elimi-nation of plutonium would require a world con-sensus, which is clearly lacking today. It is impor-tant that this issue not be confused with the moreclear and present danger of surplus military pluto -nium. A clear distinction must be made betweenthe issue of dealing with the plutonium supplyworldwide (by elimination or repository storage)and the issue of securing weapons plutonium.However, dealing with the current weapons pluto-nium disposition issue may serve to focus atten-tion on long-term plutonium disposition and pro-vide new options to that objective.

Finally, any international decision to eliminatethe world’s plutonium supply, including that inspent fuel, must be made against the backgroundof international policy regarding the future of nu-clear energy. In other words, it might be futile toadopt policies to eliminate all plutonium if theworld continues to maintain or even increase thenumber of nuclear power facilities that producemore plutonium (in spent fuel). In this light, thedeployment of a large number of ALMR systemsfor the purpose of eliminating plutonium in spentfuel might actually increase the total amount ofplutonium in the form of recycling ALMR/IFRfuel inventories.

I ~c NAS ~eP)ti ~onc]ucje~ [ha[ an! ~w.nl fuc] rcpr(K.e$51ng (Jptlfjn w (WId C(MI in the tens to hundreds of bill ion d(dlars ~d require kades

to cxmturics to develop fully.

ABBREVIATIONSALMR advanced 1iquid metal reactorDOE Department of EnergyEBR-I, EBR-II experimental breeder reactors

I and IIGAO General Accounting OfficeGE General Electric CompanyHEU highly enriched uranium

IAEA International Atomic EnergyAgency

IFR integral fast reactorLMR liquid metal reactorLWR light-water reactorMOX mixed oxideNAS National Academy of

SciencesNRC Nuclear Regulatory

CommissionPEIS programmatic environmental

impact statementRFP request for proposalSTATS NAS Panel on Separations

Technology and Transmuta-tion Systems

Appendix A:Abbreviations

andGlossary A

GLOSSARYActinidesA group of the heaviest elements, beginning withactinium (atomic number 89), and including ura-nium and plutonium.

ALMR systemAs used in this report, “ALMR system” refers to,and is interchangeable with, the integral fast reac-tor with its associated reprocessing, hot cell, andwaste treatment facilities.

Bench scaleAn experimental process (or experimental equip-ment), generally used in a laboratory. Bench-scaleactivities represent the earliest stages of develop-ing a new process and the smallest scale of equip-ment that is useful in examining a process.

BreederA nuclear reactor designed or operated in such amanner that the net amount of plutonium remain-ing in the reactor core and associated componentsafter irradiation is greater than that contained inthe original fuel elements.

I 41


BurnerA nuclear reactor designed or operated in such amanner that the net amount of plutonium remain-ing in the reactor core and associated componentsafter irradiation is less than that contained in theoriginal fuel elements.

CladdingA metal (usually stainless steel or zirconium) lay-er that surrounds nuclear fuel elements. This pro-tective covering serves to contain the fuel ele-ments and acts as a first-level container for fuelrods when stored as waste.

ElectrorefinerAs used in this report, electorefiner refers to theapparatus comprised of a cathode, anode, liquidcadmium, and other components operated in a hotcell to reprocess ALMR/IFR spent fuel. It is pos-sible that the components could be modified to al-low for the reprocessing of spent LWR fuel aswell.

Fission productsAtoms created when a heavier element, such asuranium, decays into lighter elements such as io-dine or strontium. Some of the uranium and pluto-nium in nuclear reactor fuel undergoes fissioningafter combining with neutrons in the reactor core,with the corresponding release of energy and moreneutrons. Most fission products created in a reac-tor are radioactive.

Fuel cycleA generic term used to describe the series of stepsthat nuclear reactor fuel systems may take, frommining and milling of uranium, through enrich-ment, fuel element fabrication, and irradiation.Fuel cycles are generally considered either “open”or “closed.” An example of an open cycle wouldbe conventional light-water reactors in the UnitedStates that use uranium fuel, irradiate it in a reac-tor, and then dispose of spent fuel as waste. Aclosed cycle might be a plutonium-based fuelcycle that separates and reuses the plutonium con-tained in the initial spent fuel for additional cyclesof irradiation.

Glove boxAn enclosed unit equipped with gloves throughwhich a technician can manipulate and process ra-dioactive materials. Glove boxes provide protec-tion from the least penetrating form of radiation,alpha radiation, as well as prevent unintended oraccidental inhalation of dust and/or particulatematerial. They do not offer protection againsthighly radioactive materials, such as spent fuel,that emit more penetrating gamma and beta radi-ation.

Hot cellAn enclosed structure designed to allow safe op-erations with the most intensely radioactive nu-clear materials. Hot cells are characterized byheavy concrete or metal shielding and speciallydesigned radiation-shielding windows. Opera-tions of highly radioactive materials inside the hotcell are done by remote robotic manipulation.Once radioactive materials are used in a hot cell nohuman can enter the enclosure.

Integral fast reactorAs used in this report, integral fast reactor refers tothe entire advanced liquid metal reactor system,with its associated reprocessing and waste treat-ment facilities. IFR is synonymous with “ALMRsystem.”

MOX fuelMixed-oxide fuel, a nuclear reactor fuel consist-ing of a mixture of uranium and plutonium oxides.

PlutoniumA human-made element produced when uraniumis irradiated in a reactor.

Prototype scaleThe step in the development of a new process thatfollows bench scale, used to conduct tests and ob-tain information that may be extrapolated to full-scale deployment.

PUREX reprocessingA water-based chemical process used to separateplutonium, uranium, and other elements and fis-

Appendix A Abbreviations and Glossary | i43

sion products, from spent reactor fuel. It was orig-inal l y developed to separate plutonium for nuclearweapons.

PyroprocessingA nonaqueous process used to separate pluto-nium, and other elements, from spent nuclear fuel.Pyroprocessing is an alternative to, and distinctlydifferent from, the PUREX process. It is a high-temperature, electrochemical procedure.

ReprocessingA general term to describe the treatment used toseparate plutonium and uranium from the fissionand other byproducts contained in spent fuel.PUREX and pyroprocessing represent two differ-ent reprocessing technologies.

Spent fuelFuel elements that are removed from a reactor af-ter their nuclear composition has been changed byirradiation to the extent that the fuel can no longersustain reactor operation through fission reac-tions.

TransmutationThe transformation of one atom into another byany one of a variety of means-fissioning, neutronbombardment in an accelerator, and so forth.

TransuranicsElements, including plutonium, with an atomicnumber higher than that of uranium (92). Virtuallyall transuranic elements are human-made and ra-dioactive.

UraniumA naturally occurring radioactive element. Natu-ral uranium is comprised of approximately 99.3percent uranium-238. and about 0.7 percent ura-nium-235, a fissionable isotope. Different“grades” of uranium exist, based on the relativecontent of uranium-235.

VitrificationA waste management process that immobilizes ra-dioactive material by encapsulating it under hightemperature into a glasslike solid, sometimes withother waste forms.

R eferences

1.

7k.

3

4

5. .

6.

Abey, Albert E., “An Analysls of Plt Produc-tion Fticil i ties for the Future Nuclear WeaponComplex,” Encr,g> & T(~(hnolog~* Re\’ie\~.published by Lawrence Liverrnore Laborato-ry, January/February 1992, pp. 31-39.Bro]in, E. C., Acting Director. Office of Nu-clear Energy, U.S. Department of Energy,statement before the Senate Committee onEnergy tind Natural Resources, U.S. Senate,Aug. 5, 1993.Brolin, E. C., Acting Director, Office of Nu-clear Energy, U.S. Department of Energy.briefing to the Office of Technology Assess-ment, october” 1993.Chang, Ymm 1., General Manager, IFR pro-gram, Argonne National Laboratory, ‘bLong-Term and New--Term Implications of the Inte-gra] Fas[ Reactor Concept,’” presentation N amee~i ng. Ni((lt’ur (I.S a Large .’$((~le Global En-(’I-,s?’ Opti(J[+Th(~ T(’(hni (’ai (In{! Institl(tionalR(~q14il-[)?16~tlt5 , sponsored by Oak Ridge Na-tional Laboratory, oak Ridge, TN, Sept.28-30, 1993.Choi. Jor-Shan, “’A Comparison of Radionu-c I ide Inventories Between the Direct- Dispos-UI and the Actin ide-Burning Cycles,” Pro-( “(~c(iin,g.~ of’ the Third [internationalCon f2rt~ncr on High LQIYel W(ist(] Manage -nl.etlt, \’ol . 2, Apr . 12-16, 1992, pp.1381-1386.Cunningham. Paul T., Program Director, Nu-clear Materials and Reconfiguration Technol-ogy pro~rams, LOS Alamos National Lubor:l-

torv, pc~sonal communication, J:muav 1994.

7. Delene, Jerry, b’Urtinium Resources and Ura-nium Availability and Economics and Com-petitiveness,” presentation at a meeting, N14-clcar a.Y a L a r g e S(.ale Global EnergyOptio~+The T&chnical and institutional Re-quirements. sponsored by Oak Ridge Nation-al Laboratory. Oak Ridge, TN, Sept. 28-30,I 993.

8. Electric Power Research Institute, An(il~’cingthe ReI~r(~(.t~.~.\-irl(g Decision: Plutonium Re -(yclc an(i Nuclear Pro l i f e ra t ion . NP-93 1(Palo Alto, CA: EPRI. November 1978).

9. Feiveson, Harold A., et al., “’Fission Power:An Evolutionary Approach,” Scienc-e, vol.203, 1979, pp. 330-337.

10. Gillette, Robert, “Impure Plutonium Used in’62 A-Test,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 16.1977.

11. Hannum, William H., Research ProgramManager, ES& H/’QA Officer. EngineeringResearch, Argonne National Laboratory, Ar-gonne, IL, persona] communication. Oct. 22,1993.

12. Hannum, William H., Research ProgramManager, ES&H/QA Officer, EngineeringResearch. Argonne National Laboratory.““Overview of ALMR/IFR Program.” presen-tation to the Office of Technology Assess-ment, Argonne West, November 1993.

13. Hannum, William H., Research ProgramManager, ES&H/QA Officer, EngineeringResearch, Argonne National Laboratory, Ar-gonne, IL. written comments, Feb. 8, 1994.

I 45


14. Hannum, W. H., J.E. Battles, T.R. Johnson,and C.C. McPheeters, “Actinide Consump-tion: Nuclear Resource Conservation WithoutBreeding,” paper presented at The 1991American Power Conference, Chicago, IL,Apr. 24-26, 1991.

15. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,INEL New’s (Washington, DC: U.S. Gover-nment Printing Office, May 1989), pp.693-329.

16. Laidler, James J., Argonne National Labora-tory, “Actinide Recycle Technology: Pyro-process Waste Management”; “Actinide Re-cycle Technology: Commercial LWR andOther DOE-Owned Spent Fuels”; b’ActinideRecycle Technology: Development of theIFR Pyroprocess”; presentat ions to the Officeof Technology Assessment at Argonne West,November 1993.

17. Laidler, James J., Argonne National Labora-tory, written comments, Feb. 7, 1994.

18. Lee, William, EEG, Albuquerque, NM, writ-ten comments, Feb. 7, 1994.

19. Lee, William W.-L., and Jor-Shan Choi, “Re-leases from Exotic Waste Packages fromPartitioning and Transmutation,” Proceed-ings of the Third International Conference onHigh Level Waste Management, vol. 2, Apr.12-16, 1992, pp. 1387-1396.

20. Leventhal, Paul, Nuclear Control Institute,personal communication, meeting with theOffice of Technology Assessment, Mar. 3,1992.

21. Magee, P. M., General Electric, “ReferencePlant Systern/Configuration-Reac torCore,” paper presented at the Technical Z?e-~)iew of the ALA4R Program, Rockville, MD,NOV. 29-30, 1993.

22. Mark, J. Carson, Reactor-Grade Plutonium’sExplosive Properties (Washington, DC: Nu-clear Control Institute, August 1990).

23. McCabe, Amy S., and Colglazier, E. William“bPublic Acceptance Issues,” presented to theNational Research Council Symposium onSeparations Technology and Trunsrnutution

Systems (STATS), Washington, DC, Jan.13-14, 1992.

24. Miller, Marvin, Department of Nuclear Engi-neering, Massachusetts Institute of Technolo-gy, Cambridge, MA, personal communica-tion, Nov. 23, 1993.

25. Miller, Marvin, Panel Discussion on Prolifer-ation, presentation at a meeting, Nucleur as aLarge Scale Global Energy Optio~TheTechnical and Institutional Requirements,sponsored by Oak Ridge National Laboratory,Oak Ridge, TN, Sept. 28-30, 1993.

26. National Academy of Sciences, National Re-search Council, Interim Report of the Panelon Separations Technology and Transnluta -tion Systems (Washington, DC: NationalAcademy Press, May 1992).

27. National Academy of Sciences, National Re-search Council, Committee on InternationalSecurity and Arms Control, Management andDisposition of E.rcess Weapons Plutonium(Washington, DC: National Academy Press,1994) (republication copy).

28. Nu]ton, John David, Deputy Director for Ci-vilian Reactor Development, Office of Nu-clear Energy, U.S. Department of Energy, per-sonal communication, Oct. 4, 1993.

29. O’Leary, Hazel R., Secretary of Energy, mem-orandum, “Department Wide Initiative forControl and Disposition of Surplus FissileMaterials,” Washington, DC, Jan. 24, 1994.

30. Panofsky, Wolfgang, Catherine Kelleher,Spurgeon Keeny, and Matthew Bunn, Nation-al Academy of Sciences Committee on In-ternational Security and Arms Control, Brief-ing on Management and Disposition ofExcess Weapons Plutonium, Washington,DC, Feb. 17, 1994.

31. Phipps, Robert D., Argonne National Labora-tory, “Fuel Cycle Facil it y,” presentation to theOffice of Technology Assessment, ArgonneWest, November 1993.

32. PooI, Thomas, Vice President, NUEXCO,“Uranium Availability Constraints,” presen-tation at meeting, Nuclear as a Large Scale

References 147

Global Energy Option-The Technical andInstitutional Requirements, sponsored byOak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge,TN, Sept. 28-30, 1993.

33. President of the Russian Federation and thePresident of the United States of America,joint statement on “Non-Proliferation ofWeapons of Mass Destruction and the Meansof their Deli very,” The White House Office ofthe Press Secretary (no date).

34. Quinn, James E., General Electric, “U.S.ALMR Actinide Recycle Program,” pres-ented at the Technical Review, of the ALMRProgram, Rockville, MD, Nov. 29-30, 1993.

35. Quinn, James E., General Electric, remarks ata meeting at the Office of Technology Assess-ment, Feb. 10, 1994.

36. Ramspot(, Lawrence D., Jor-Shan Choi, Wil-1 iam Halsey, Alan Pastemak, Thomas Cotton,John Bums, Amy McCabe, William Colglazi-er, and William W.-L. Lee, Lawrence Liver-more National Laboratory, “Impacts of NewDevelopments in Partitioning and Transmuta-tion on the Disposal of High-Level NuclearWaste in a Mined Geologic Repository,”UCRL ID-10923, March 1992.

37. RAND National Defense Research Institute,Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Limit-ing the Spread of Weupon - Usable Fissile Ma-terials, prepared by Brian G. Chow and Ken-neth A. Solomon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND,1 993), 102 pp.

38. Sacke((, J. I., Argonne National Laboratory,“Overview of ANL-W Facilities,” presenta-tion to the Office of Technology Assessment,Argonne West, November 1993.

39. Sanger, David E., “Japan, Bowing to Pres-sure, Defers Plutonium Project,” The Ne\t’York Times, Feb. 22, 1994, p. A2.

40. Selden, Robert W., Los Alarnos National Lab-oratory, ‘bReactor Plutonium and Nuclear Ex-plosives,” briefing prepared for presentationto International Atomic Energy Agency rep-resentatives, November 1976,

41. Taylor, J. J., and E. Rodwell, Electric PowerResearch Institute, “Disposal of Fissionable

Material from Dismantled Nuclear Weap-ons,” unpublished paper, May 1992.

42. Thompson, Marion L., General Electric Com-pany, “The Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor(ALMR)/Fuel Cycle,” presented to the Na-tional Research Council Symposium on Sepa-rations Technology and Transmutation Sys-tems (STATS), Washington, DC, Jan. 13-14,1992.

43. Thompson, Marion L., General Electric Com-pany, personal communication, Jan. 12, 1994.

44. Thompson, Marion L., General Electric Com-pany, written comments, Feb. 7, 1994.

45. U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Ser-vice, Integral Fast Reactor: The Debate OverContinued Development, by Mark HoIt, CRSReport 93-822 ENR (Washington, DC: U.S.Government Printing Office, Sept. 16, 1993).

46. U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office,Nuclear Science4eveloping Technology ToReduce Radioactive Waste May Take Decadesand Be Costly, GAOIRCED-94- 16 ( Washing-ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,December 1993).

47. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-ment, Energy Technology Choices: ShapingOur Future, OTA-E-493 (Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991 ).

48. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-ment, Dismantling the Bomb and Managingthe Nuclear Materials, OTA-O-572 (Wash-ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Of-fice, September 1993).

49. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-ment, Technologies Underlying Weapons ofMass Destruction, BP-ISC-1 15 (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, De-cember 1993).

50. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of NuclearEnergy, Plutonium Disposition Study, Techni-cal Revie}t’ Committee Report (Washington,DC: July 2, 1993), vols. 1 and 2.

51. U.S. Department of Energy, Office of NuclearEnergy, Advanced Reactor and DevelopmentProgran~.~—5- Year Plan To Meet EnergyPolicy Act of 1992 Requirements, draft, Feb-


ruary 1993 (every paged stamped, “Does notreflect current Administration policy”).

52. U.S. Department of Energy, Spent Fuel Work-ing Group Report, Inventory and Storage ofthe Department’s Spent Nuclear Fuel andOther Reactor Irradiated Nuclear Materialsand Their Environmental, Safety and HealthVulnerabilities (Washington, DC: November1993), vol. 1.

53. Wade, David C., Argonne National Laborato-ry, “Warhead Pu Burning Issues and UniqueIFR Suitability for the Mission,” presenta-t ions to the Office of Technology Assessment,Argonne West, November 1993.

54. Walters, L. C., “Progress and Status of FuelsDevelopment,” presentation to the Office ofTechnology Assessment, Argonne West, No-vember 1993.

55. White House, Office of the Press Secretary,Fact Sheet, “Nonproliferation and Export

Control Policy,” Washington, DC, Sept. 27,1993.

56. Wymer, R. G., H.D. Bengelsdorf, G.R. Chop-pin, M.S. Coops, J. Guon, K.K.S. Pillay, andJ.D. Williams, An Assessment of the Prolifer-ation Potential and International Implica-tions of the Integral Fast Breeder Reactor,prepared by Martin Marietta InternationalTechnology Programs Division for U.S. De-partment of Energy and U.S. Department ofState (Oak Ridge, TN: May 1992), 89 pp.

57. Youngblood, B. J., ● *A Regulatory Perspectiveon the Potential Impact of Separation andTransmutation on Radioactive Waste Man-agement/Disposal ,“ presentation to the Na-tional Research Council Symposium on Sepa-rations Technology and TransmutationSystems (STATS), Washington, DC, Jan. 14,1992.

* U S Government Printing OftIce’ 1994-301-804 (1 7405)

technical options for the advanced liquid metal reactor

Documents