technological development in japan; a case study; case studies on

Technological development

in Japan A case study\ prepared by the

Japanese National Commission for Unesco,

Unesco Paris 1971

I Case studies on technological development

Published in 1971 by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Place de Fontenoy, 75 Paris-7e Printed by Imprimerie S.A. GEDIT, Tournai.

0 Unesco 1971 Printed in Belgium SC.p/D.72/A

Preface

The General Conference of Unesco at its fourteenth session, in 1966, authorized the Director-General to continue to assist Member States in establishing the general conditions favourable to technological development and to disseminate information on the principles and requirements of such development. In implementation of this resolution, it was decided to make case studies in countries which have experienced technological development relatively recently, with the object of identifying key factors that contributed to it.

The present study of Technological Development in Japan is the first of these case studies. The transformation of Japan from a State of almost complete dependence on agriculture to a leading position among the worlà's technologically most- advanced countries has been accomplished in just a hundred years and included some phases of spectacularly rapid development. In reaching this high economic and technological level, Japan had to face many difficulties found in other developing countries-high population density, limited natural resources, fixed traditions, inadequate educational facilities, and isolation from the rest of the world. Japan's success in dealing with these problems may provide valuable lessons for others.

Responsibility for the preparation of the study was entrusted to the Japanese National Commission for Unesco. It appointed a working group of Japanese scholars and officials, which prepared a first report. (The names of the working group members are listed in the Appendix.)

At the next stage, a Unesco Consultant visited Japan to

complete the study in collaboration with a Japanese member of the original working group. The present text is wholly derived from the study elaborated during these two stages.

The study is not confined to technology in a narrow sense. After a preliminary chapter describing the historical background to Japan’s industrial development since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, it deals successively with the development of industrial technology, various aspects of Japanese national policy affecting development, the influence of economic conditions, the training and deployment of manpower, and with questions of management and leadership, including a short examination of Japanese national character.

Notes and literature background references make it possible to follow up different aspects of the study in greater detail. Statistical tables illustrating the trends of various significant parameters are designed to complete the text and to facilitate appraisal of the comparative importance of different factors in stimuiating Japan’s technological development.

Opinions expressed in the study are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with the views of Unesco.

Contents

I Industrial development in Japan: the historical background

General survey The dawn of modernization : late Tokugawa and Meiji

The foundations of modern industry The industrial revolution achieves maturity The Japanese economy between the two World Wars The period of recovery and high growth Special features of Japanese industrialization

Restoration era

2 The development of industrial technology in Japan

Industrial technology to the end of the nineteenth century Industrial technology in the early twentieth century Technological development in the pre-Second-World-War years Technological recovery after 1950 Quantitative assessment of the development of industrial

Bibliography technology

3 National policies affecting technological development

Industrial policies Policies for science and technology Policies for the promotion of research

9

9

14 18

24 26 28

20

33

34 38 40 42

44 50

52 59 67

4 Economic conditions and technological development

The rate of technological development Economic conditions favourable to technological innovation Special economic factors affecting Japan’s technological

development

5 Training and employment of manpower for technology

Educational trends and manpower resources Economic growth and vocational education in Japan Occupational mobility and employment of factory workers Deployment and mobility of technologists

6 Management and leadership in industry

Management and industrial development Character and role of enterprise leaders Japanese attitudes and national character Bibliography

76

76 79

93

100

101 III 120

127

133

133 142 148 153

Appendix Members of working group and drafhg group 155

I

Industrial development in Japan: the historical background

General survey

The Meiji Restoration of 1868 marked a first critical point in Japan’s industrialization. A second critical point was reached in 1950, after the disaster of the Second World War, since when Japan has exhibited a remarkable capacity for economic growth far surpassing international standards. At both of these critical points in her history, Japan was able to attain economic salvation through the process of industrialization.

Past studies-by both Japanese and foreigners-of Japan’s industrialization and modernization have attached major significance to one of the three basic analytic views summarized below: The view emphasizing the function of the élite. According to

this view, those who played a leading role in this process of modernization and industrialization, which beganin the closing years of the Tokugawa Shogunate and continued through the Meiji Restoration, came from the lower echelons of the bushi (samurai) or warrior class, who burst through social and political barriers of the traditional society of the Tokugawa era.l

I I

I There are two main alternative explanations for the success of the Meiji Restoration: one attributes that success to a small number of loyalist and other dite leaders of late Tokugawa; the other places great emphasis on the energy of the masses, and cites their steady social, economic and political advances in the years prior to the Restoration. In addition to a huge volume of Japanese literature available on both theses, the following references in English may be mentioned for their emphasis on the former approach: Bernard

IO Industrial development in Japan : the historical background

The view emphasizing the importance of cultural continuity. According to this view, a substantial part of the foundation for the successful modernization and industrialization which began with theMeiji era already existed during the Tokugawa period, since in Japan’s traditional society there existed latent social factors whichcould adapt themselves and give structure and encouragement to the subsequent modernization.’

The view emphasizing the importance of capital accumulation. According to this view, it was primarily by virtue of the technological development and capital accumulation attained in the 1930s that the economic chaos of 1945 could be over- come and a high rate of economic growth attained during and after the 1g5os.~

These analyses and evaluations are based on different approaches and sets of values; thus, the third type of analysis makes an economic approach, while the first and second do not. There are, of course, also a number of studies that combine elements of all three approaches, though one approach normally predominates.

The present study employs an interdisciplinary approach to Japan’s industrialization, particularly stressing the significance of her technological progress for economic development. A long- term analysis of the factors and structure contributing to Japan’s industrialization is made by following the detailed course of technological and economic development since the Meiji Resto- ratioas

One way of foilowing the long-term progression towards industrialization is in terms of Gross National Product (GNP). Examination of the figures for the periods preceding 1942 and

I

S. Silberman, Ministers of Modernization, .??lite Mobility in the Me@ Restoration, 1868-1873, Tucson, Ariz., University of Arizona Press, 19643 Albert M. Craig, Choshu in the Megi Restoration, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1961.

For example, R. P. Dore’ Education in Tokugawa Japan, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1964.

It is discerned in much research in economic science. Pursuit of the factors that contributed to industrialization and

to technical developments provides the major theme in this study. More elaborate analyses are given from Chapter 3 onwards.

I

2 3

Industrial development in Japan : the historical background

II

TABLE I. Average annuai growth rate of GNP during alternate phases of the long-term fluctuation

Percentage periodl Percentage growth rates growth rate* Period’

1885(T)-1898(P) 4.33 I93 I(T)- 1939(P)* 6.00

1905m- 19 I9P) 4.21 I 954(T)*- 196 I (P) 10.86 1919(P)-I93I(T) 3.56 196IP)-1964 8.86

‘The moving average values of GNP are for seven-year periods pre-war and for five-year periods post-war, except for dates marked *, where the averages are for three years. Computations are at constant value, the base period is 1934-36. Pre-war figures are based on data in the unpublished ‘Growth Project’ compiled by the Hitotsubashi University’s Economic Research Institute, post-war figures are based on new &ta published by the government.

2. Growth rate was computed as the average of the moving two-year averages in each period listed, except that for 1961-64 the figure is a projec- tion of the annual raw value (with 1960 as the base year).

Source. Miyohei Shinowara and Shosaburo Fujino, Economic Growth in Japan, p. 8, Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbun.

I89fJ(P)-I905(T) 2.27 1939P)*-1954(T)* 0.52

I. P = peak of cycle; T = trough of cycle.

following 1946 shows clearly a not unexpected major dislocation in the GNP growth curve between those two dates; and in fact it was not until 1954 that the recovery to the pre-Second-World- War peak of 1939 was attained. Since then, as is well known, the rate of Japan’s economic growth has been phenomenal.

Table I shows the growth rates during the half-cycles (major peak-trough-peak periods) of the long-term fluctuation pattern of economic growth. The four periods of 1885-98, 1905-19, 1931-38 and 1954-61 correspond to the expansion haif-cycles of the long-term fluctuation. With these statistically signifcant ,economic periods we may consider that of the Meiji Restoration which initiated Japan’s transformation from a traditional to a m o d e m society.1

Japan’s population, after remaining steady at some 30 million for about 150 years from the middle of the Tokugawa era, has been increasing throughout the period of the present study.

I cf. W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Table I, Chapter 4, and Section 4, Chapter 5, Cambridge University Press, 1960.

I2 Industrial development in Japan : the historical background

Early in the Meiji era (1872) it was estimated as just under 35 million, and by August, 1967 it overtopped the IOO million mark-a threefold increase in less than IOO years. So great an increase might well be called a 'population explosion'. However, the rate of increase from the 1870s through the early twentieth century was still rather gradual, with the greatest growth coming in the 1920s, followed by a slackening off in subsequent years.

Looking next at the distribution of the population by broad sectors of the economy, we see from Figure I that the population in the primary sector (including agriculture, forestry and fishery) underwent little change prior to the Second World War, remaining at 13 million, while that in the non-primary sector showed a gradual increase. Modern industry in the Meiji erawas still on a small scale, centring around the textile industry and

Primary industry (agriculture, forestry, fishery)

-. _. _._. Other industry (traditional)

__-__ - - Other industry (modern)

FIG. I. Sectoral distribution of working population (in millions), 1878-1939. (Source. Takahida Nakamura, ZOO Years of Japanese Economy, No. 2, 9 January 1968, Niho Keizai Shimbun.)


13

TABLE 2. Percentage long-term evolution of distribution of labour force ~.

Primary Secondary Material Tertiary Year industry industry production industry

(1) (II) (I + II) (III1 1878-82 82.3 5.6 87.9 12.1 1883-87 79.2 7.3 86.5 13.5 1888-92 76. I 8.9 85.0 15.0 1893-97 73.1 10.4 83.5 16.5 1898-1902 69.9 11.8 81.7 18.3 1903-07 66.5 13.2 79.7 20.3

63.0 14.8 1908-12

Ï918-22 54.9 17.1 72.6 28.0

77-8 __ - 22,~- __ _--- - --- -___. ~

I913:17 I - ” 59.2 I6.4 -- 75.6 244 -- 1923-27 1928-32 1933-37 1938-42 I950 I955 I 960 I965

52.0 50.5 47.7 -446 48.3 41.0 32.6 24.7

17.1 16.8 19.5 23-7 . .I._ 21.9 23.5 29.2 31.9

69. I 67.3 67.2 68.3 . .

70.2 64.5 61.8 56.6

30.9 32.7 32.8 .M-- 29.8 35.5 38.2 43.4

Source. Before 194: Shigeto Tsuru and Kazushi Okawa, AnaZysis of Japanese Economy, Vol. I, p. 99, Tokyo, Keiso Shobo, 1957. After 1950: Keizai Yoran, p. 281. Economic Planning Agency, 1966.

operated with unskilled female labour. The industrial labour force was small in proportion to the total population, even after taking into account such modern industries as railways, communications and finance, as well as some heavy industries, all of which employed male labour.

Since 1915, the working population engaged in modern industry has been increasing and the proportion working in the primary sector has correspondingly fallen, dropping below 60 per cent for the first time in 1917 (see Table 2). The decline of the proportion engaged in primary industries and the gradual increase of the population working in the other sectors suggest that, except for the eldest sons and daughters, who remained the mainstay of the farm villages, children from rural areas must have abandoned agriculture and moved to the cities.

More recentiy, this trend towards occupations in secondary

‘4 Industrial development in Japan : the historical background

and tertiary industry has reduced the proportion working in primary industry to below the 20 per cent mark.

Over the long term, no strong correlation can be observed between changes in the occupational distribution and the peaks of Japan’s economic growth. However, there were significant changes in both of these parameters during the two periods

The following brief survey of Japan’s industrial development distinguishes five main periods, namely: The period of drastic transformation immediately preceding and

following 1868, significant both for the transition from a traditional to a modern society and for the emergence of modern industrial technology.

1885-98-the period when the foundations of modem industry were laid, with private enterprise emerging through the gradual disposal of government-operated factories.

zgo5-1g-the period during which modern industry enlarged its scope and established itself fìrmly.

193 I-38-the period of fairly favourable international conditions preceding the Second World War, marking the shift of emphasis from light to heavy industry.

1g54-61-the period of industrial recovery from the damage suffered during the Second World War.

1905-19 and 1954-61.

The dawn of modernization: late Tokugawa and Meiji Restoration era

The history of the Japanese economy from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to the present day presents a picture of the development of capitalism. This development exhibits certain peculiarities, traceable to the influence of the following factors : (a) there was no spontaneous exploration of capitalistic production methods and manufacture, as seen in the advanced nations of Europe and the United States of America; (b) Japanese-style capitalism advanced rapidly; and (c) pre-capitalistic production methods and social relations survived into capitalist society.


Particularly signrficant in this connexion was the emergence from the feudal system, which came about under external pressure, and the reforms enforced by the government, creating a background for rapid industrial development.

The external pressure referred to was, of course, the pressure for the opening of Japanese ports to foreign trade. It was exerted on the Shogunate Government during the Tokugawa era by such advanced nations as Britain, Germany, the United States and Russia. Until then, Japan’s feudal system had been maintained by the Shogunate Central Government, and the feudal lords, who exercised local authority and were controlled by the Sho- gunate methods of paafication, intimidation and indirect taxa- ti0n.l The Shogunate and the local clans depended financially on the land tax: paid in kind by the farmers, who made up the majority of the people. But the development of commerce and industry after the eighteenth century had gradually raised the merchant classa to an economically superior position, while the finances of the Shogunate and clan governments had suffered decline. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the United States and the nations of Europe had already experienced an industrial revolution; their capitalism flourished, and they began to explore the markets of the Far East.

Heated arguments were exchanged in 1859 regarding the feasibility of opening the country to foreign nations after 220 years of seclusion. The loyalists of the Meiji Restoration, most of them lower-class (bushi samurai) , appreciated objectively

I The Tokugawa Shogunate Government adopted this policy as one measure to keep effective control over the clans and prevent them from becoming too affluent. One well-known method of indirect taxation was the system requiring feudal lords to reside in Edo (Tokyo) one year and at home the following year-a programme involving tremendous expense.

This tax was paid in kind, at a high rate fixed irrespective of changes in the actual yield of the harvest.

With the class distinction system during the Tokugawa era defined in the order of shi (warriors), no (farmers), ko (craftsmen) and sho (merchants), the mercantile class was officially placed below the farmers.

2

3

16 Industrial development in Japan : the historical background

the problems to be faced and actively supported the policy of opening Japan’s ports to foreign trade, not so much to solve various internal conflicts as to achieve contact with the civilization of the West European nations. They endeavoured, above ail, to enrich and strengthen the nation through the introduction of the new production methods, systems and civilization of Western Europe and the United States. In this sense the pressure of the foreign powers on Japan provided a powerful stimulus from the unknown, outside world.

The decay of the Tokugawa Shogunate was accompanied by the development of numerous new élites. Drastic reform of the political structure became possible. The new government adopted the policy of abolishing outdated practices such as ancient class distinctions, the restrictions on travel and professions and business monopolies by guilds. And in the financial and economic area, important reforms were carried out through the disposal of ‘stipends’ and the amendment of the land-tax system.

At the outset of the Meiji era, about 400,000 former samurai households-some 6 per cent of the total population-depended for their livelihood on Kuroku (stipends) provided by the government; the total of such stipends accounted for as much as 30 per cent of the regular expenditure of the central government. The new régime succeeded in establishing a new financial system which eliminated this burden by floating public bonds to produce the required funds.

Again, land tax during the Tokugawa period was paid in kind according to different rates set up by each clan. However, the tax system was reformed in 1873, and thereafter land tax was paid in money at a uniform rate throughout the country.

Thus the Meiji Restoration, prompted by the impact of the West, was accomplished by means of Japan’s subsequent industrialization and the establishment of a centralized government.

Measures for the advancement of science and technology were included among the economic policies promoted by the central government. However, there had already been consistent transplantation and cultivation of Western technology during the closing years of the late feudal (Tokugawa) and Meiji periods.


I7

This is reflected in the modern production formula adopted by the Shogunate and clan governments during the late Tokugawa era. T o meet their political and military needs, Western-swle military industries were created, including a gun foundry, shipbuilding yards and iron works. There were also attempts made in areas of technical improvement and machinery production by some of the industries initiated as ancillary to the military 0nes.l Examples of this last category include improvements in the spinning, coal-mining and ceramic industries.

The technological foundations of these Western-style industries were laid under the direct guidance of Europeans and Americans. However, strenuous efforts were also made by budding Japanese technologists in the clans who studied scientific books from the Netherlands-the sole West European nation which had been granted the privilege of trading with Japan during the days of national seclusion-in this way, they introduced West European technology and took charge of factory construction work.

The Western-style techniques adopted in the late Tokugawa era were taken over and enlarged by the Meiji Government, which established a ministry of technology in 1870, and launched a policy calling for increased production and industrial development. Encouragement was given by the construction of shipyards, steel mills and silk factories; by telecommunication projects; by laying railways, unifying the mining industry, and starting up the chemical industry (ceramics in particular).l The contemporary national slogans-‘increased production-industrial development’ and ‘enrich and strengthen the nationy-were converted into deeds by the development of industrial techniques designed to advance national integration and prosperity.

Measures for the establishment of a new currency system were also introduced early into the Meiji Government’s financial policy; it established the Mint Bureau, called in the old currency

I Regarding heavy industry during the early stages of Meiji, see Yoshi Ando, ‘The Formation of Heavy Industry’, in: Seiichi Tohata (ed.), The Modernization of Japan, Vol. I, Tokyo, 1966.

2

I8 Industrial development in Japan : the historical background

and issued new coins and paper money. At the same time a national bank was created in 1872, patterned after the national bank system of the United States. A specie conversion system was instituted at first, but bank-notes, tending to be readily exchanged with specie due to fluctuations in the parity of gold and silver, were not sufficiently circulated. The government then issued inconvertible paper currency in 1876, making it unnec- essary to maintain specie reserves equivalent to the amount of bank-notes issued. As a result, the number of national banks temporarily increased, to a total of 153 around the year 1880.

While modern techniques and related economic systems were introduced fairly rapidly, the modernization of other systems, particularly the political system, was relatively slow. Thus the establishment of a parliamentary system-one of the yardsticks by which at least one kind of political modernization may be measured-was postponed till 1890, while a new school system (1872) and a conscription system (1873) were some of the measures implemented without delay.

The foundations of modern industry'

In the newer industries, government-managed factories had by 1880 become much larger than those which were privately operated. In 1883. for instance, a total of 10,720 workers were employed at sixteen factories which had been placed under the direct authority of the finance, agriculture, commerce, navy, or war ministries. Only 706 of these workers were employed in (four) textile factories; the other 10,014 were in the heavy and chemical industries. On the other hand, in 1882, out of a total

I A great many studies, reports, books and articles have been published, both in Japanese and English, with analyses of the Japanese economy. Many studies of the Japanese economy, especially those made by foreign governments, maintain high academic standards, mainly because of joint research and frequent interchange among Japanese and foreign scholars. The following books were consulted with reference to the brief historical appraisal of the Japanese industry and economy (in addition to those mentioned in other footnotes to this


I9

of 61 ,025 workers employed in private enterprises, about three- fourths worked in textile factories and less than 20 per cent in mining and heavy-chemical industry. The private factories were mostly small-one employed only thirty workers.

After 1885, while the number of workers employed in government factories showed no marked change, there was a remarkable increase in the numbers employed by private enterprises. In the private textiles sector, in particular, the number of workers more than doubled during the six years between 1886 and 1891; the numbers in the spinning factories rose most sharply, from 1,877 in 1885 to 29,103 in 1892. In the foodstuffs industry numbers increased even faster, but the over-all scale was rather small. The rate of increase in the metallurgical and machine industries was smallest. Thus, in terms of the number of workers employed, the changes in the newer industries during this period were mainly characterized by the remarkable growth of private enterprises.

At the origin of this growth was the government’s policy of selling its factories to private concerns. In order to counter the first post-Restoration inflation, in the 1870s~ the deflationary measures of paper currency liquidation and financial readjustment were carried out between 1881 and 1885. Under the financial retrenchment policy, government-operated factories which failed to produce desired profits, despite the large amounts expended on their management, were disposed of to private groups. By 1890, twelve mines, four spinning factories, two shipyards, one cement factory and one glass factory had been thus sold off. These transfers were effected at extremely low prices, mostly to merchants with political ties-those businessmen who had main-

chapter): Shigeto Tsuru and Kazushi Ohkawa, Nihon Hekai no Bunseki [Analysis of Japanese Economy] Tokyo, Keiso Shobo, 1955, 2 Vols.; Hiromi Arisawa, Gendui Nihon Sangyo Koza [Lectures on Contemporary Japanese Industry], 8 Vols.; Mitsuhaya Kajinishi, Nihon Shihonshuzi Huttatsu-shi [History of Development of Capi- talism in Japan], Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1957, 2 Vols.; Hiromi Arisawa, Kazuo Yamaguchi et al., Nihon Sangyo Hyakunen-shi [One Hundred Year History of Japanese Industry], Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbun 1962.


tained special relations with the hanbatsu (clan clique) government ever since the Restoration. Thus started the development of the zaibatsu (financial clique), which later progressed by amassing capital in the 1890s.

During this period, the industry which showed the greatest growth was textiles. After 1885, the spinning industry acted as a catalyst for flourishing business conditions and the development of the railways. With the Sino- Japanese War of 1894-95, Japan ceased to be an importer and became an exporter of cotton yarns. The textile industry thus played a pioneering role in the process of Japan’s industrialization.’

The industrial revolution achieves maturity

During the first two decades of the twentieth century, Japanese industry and economy made great strides, adjusting without excessive difficulty to the situations following the Sino- Japanese War, the Russo- Japanese War, and the First World War. From 1905 to 1920, the number of corporations rose from 10,620 to 42,488 and production per worker in the secondary industries jumped from 188.8 to 755.6 yen. Other economic indicators pointed to a marked upward trend in over-all economic activity. During this period of less than twenty years, Japan’s industrial revolution moved into full swing. Technological know-how was thoroughly assimilated, industrial capital grew and developed into monopoly capital, and the movement of labour increased. These aspects are dealt with in detail in Chapter 4 below: here only some of the background phenomena are discussed.

After the Sino- Japanese War, major projects were launched with the object of achieving, for example, self-sufficiency in steel supplies, the expansion and improvement of national railways, the implementation of the marine transport and shipbuilding industries, and the enlargement and improvement of the com-

I Miyohei Shinowara and Shosaburo Fujino, Nihon no Keizai Seicho [Economic Growth in Japan], p. 19-28, Tokyo, Nihon Keizai Shimbun-Sha, 1968.


21

munications network. In order to implement these programmes, it was necessary to import large quantities of machinery and equipment from Europe and the United States. However, the sharp rise in import prices caused by the world-wide decline in the price of silver dealt a heavy blow to Japan, then on the silver standard; and as a result, the gold standard, whose adoption had been studied by an ad hac research committee set up by the government in 1892, was introduced in 1897. Japan thus joined the camp of capitalist nations of the world. In 1899, for the first time, Japan floated foreign bonds on the London market. Bonds to the value of over 1.5 billion1 yen were issued in 1904. In addition, the materialization in 1899 of the ‘amendment of the unequal treaties’ served to change Japan’s situation in relation to the international economy. Under this amendment foreigners’ extra-territorial rights and the concession system were abolished, thus putting an end to their privileged status in Japan. At the same time, however, they were permitted to engage in business activities within the country.

Accepting this opportunity, in 1899 an electrical equipment firm was started with investment from the Western Electric Cor- poration of the United States and in 1903 the Standard Oil Company moved into Japan. While the adoption of the gold standard and the revision of the unequal treaties paved the way for the participation of Japanese industry in international activities, it was not until 1911 that Japan’s tariff autonomy was fully recognized.

After the conditions which enabled the Japanese economy to advance into the international arena were attained-toward the end of the nineteenth century-her industrialization was accelerated through the importation of industrial products. Even before the First World War, by enabling Japan to export, these imports contributed (during the years 1895-1915) 29 per cent to the increase of her GNP, compared to 8 per cent for the preceding period from 1876 to 1894.

In cotton yarns, exports began to increase sharply after the

I Throughout the text the term ‘billion’ equals 1,000 million. ,


1890s, at which period imports passed their peak; at the same time exports of cotton fabrics also increased. In the machinery branches, however, it was not until the 1930s that exports became significant.

The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 spurred further industrial growth, providing all industries with large profits. Between the first half of 1915 and the first half of 1917, rates of profit increased about fourfold or even more in several leading industries. With such large profits to stimulate expansion, investment programmes swelled in 1919 to seventeen times their 1914 size (see Table 3). The waves of expansion now spread to branches other than the textile industry, which had consistently maintained a leading position in industrial development. In other words, the First World War provided the decisive momentum for the growth of the heavy and chemical industries.

In general, this period covering the first two decades of the twentieth century was marked by a widening gap between two broad groups of enterprises, characterized on the one hand by

TABLE 3. Industrial investment before and after the First World War

1914 1919 Growth index (in 1,000 yen) (in 1,000 yen) (1914 = 100)

Transport 50 480 412 625 817.4 Mining 16 685 289 430 1734.7 Electrical indus try 30 990 460 963 1487.5 Manufacturing 38 515 I 128 169 2 929.2 Spinning I 700 457 773 26 927.8 Banks 52 002 642 620 I 235.8

Insurance 9 400 76 800 817.0 Fishing 7 500 32 590 434.5

Commerce and others 43 525 765 080 1757.8

TOTAL 250 797 4 266 050

Growth index (average) I 701.0

Source. The Bank of Japan, Hundred- Year Stcatistics of the Japanese Economy, P. 350, 1966.


23

the rise of the zaibatsu (financial clique) and on the other by the mushrooming of medium and small enterprises.

The capitalists who laid the foundation of their business with the help of their political ties, from 1880 to 1890, completed the structure of their respective zaibatsu by the end of the First World War. They embarked on ventures in multilateral business management in the mining and manufacturing industries, banking, commerce, etc. Mitsubishi and Mitsui, for example, came to exercise a dominant power, as an integrated zaibatsu, over the whole industrial field. These two large zaibatsu steadily increased their business by organizing their commercial structure as follows : after laying a foundation under government protection, they entered various industrial fields and in due course formed family partnerships often based on marriage relations. Each enterprise under their control was made an independent corporation, while the original family partnership was retained as a pivotal unit for the supply of funds to each of these corporations, controlling them as a stock-holding company, but itself conducting no independent financial or trading activities.

At the same time, medium and small enterprises appeared in large numbers, encouraged by the government’s armaments expansion policy following the Sino- Japanese War. There were 321 of these smaller machine and appliance factories by 1903, with an average of forty-five employees per factory, i.e. larger than the average factory in the cotton industry. As one of its key industrial policies around the year 1910, the government endeavoured to help the development of these medium-sized enterprises by encouraging them to form co-operative associations, and by providing them with finance and technical guidance.

During the period spanning the First World War, the level of industrial output overtopped the agricultural production, which until then had consistently held the lead. Long-term analysis shows that the average annual rates of increase of the real output per worker in the agricultural and manufacturing industries during the period from 1905 to 1919 were 0.51 per cent and 5.68 per cent respectively, whereas earlier figures showed the average annual rate of increase of real agricultural yield to be


greater than that of industrial output during the years 1898- 1905.

While there was thus a marked shift of the balance as between expansion in the primary and secondary sectors, nevertheless the growth of the primary industries in the initial stage of industrialization contributed much to the progress of Japan by ensuring an adequate domestic food supply, by providing surplus farm products which could be turned into sources of investment in the secondary industries, and by continuing the traditional handicraft production of fabrics by the farmers, which provided useful stimulation for the development of the textile industry later on.

However, the growth of agricultural production in the initial stage of Japan’s industrialization did not result from any rationalization formula, but was simply the outcome of the diffusion of farming techniques developed by the more efficient of the agricultural producers scattered throughout Tokugawa Japan. Their methods were highly appreciated within their own clans, but there was little inter-clan exchange of information. In later stages, technical improvements were introduced by the Noji- Shikenjo (Agricultural Experiment Station) ; but large-scale practical utilization of the agricultural machines developed by industry and the expansion of farming acreage did not materialize substantially until after 1945.

The Japanese economy between the two World Wars

The average annual growth rate of the Japanese economy reached 6 per cent during 1931-38, the pre-Second-World-War peak. During the preceding period, from 1919 to 1931, the growth rate was 3.56 per cent, while for the subsequent period from 1938 to 1954 it was only 0.52 per cent. Though we shall deal here mainly with the developments between 1931 and 1938, it is thus clear that the Japanese economy experienced repeated upheavals over the whole inter-war period-internal disturbances such as that resulting from the earthquake in 1925, which destroyed


25

TABLE 4. Average annual rate of increase in industrial production

Branch of industry Percentage increase

1926-31 1931-36 1936-41 ~ _ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~

Steel 23 161 53 Machinery O 59 152 Chemicals 51 I39 38 Textiles 32 56 - 31 Average for manufacturing industry 12 65 46

some 300,000 dwellings, and disturbances from outside, such as the world economic depression which started in 1929.

Japan quickly recovered from the recession, and equipment investment rose sharply. This is shown by the large average annual rate of increase in industrial production during the 1931-36 period (see Table 4).

The established zaibatsu had by the second half of the 1920s brought the major industrial enterprises under their control. By 1928 Mitsui, for example, had under its control five direct affiliates, with forty-three subsidiary firms, in the trading, mining and financial sectors of the economy and at least nine affiliated companies in the paper-manufacturing, spinning, electrical, sugar-refining and chemical industries, with over thirty subsidiary companies. By the same year, Mitsubishi had ten direct affiliates, with more than thirty subsidiary concerns, in the shipbuilding, steel-manufacturing, mining, chemical, food-sniffs, trading and banking areas and several affiliated enterprises, with a total of twenty subsidiary firms, in the sea-transport, sugar- refining and banking fields.

Advances in heavy and chemical industry increased the demand for skilled labour. Big enterprises focused their efforts on intra-enterprise vocational training with a view to securing as many skilled workers as possible. In addition, they devised labour management systems designed to encourage the sense of loyalty of the employees. These measures, initiated in the 1920s,


included the ‘seniority-order wage system’ and the ‘system of lifelong employment’; they became deeply rooted in Japanese society during this period.

The period of recovery and high growth

After Japan’s defeat in the Second World War, its industry was in a state of ruin. In the economic and social chaos that prevailed, production activity was temporarily paralysed. As compared with the 1935-37 level, the mining and manufacturing production index plunged to a low of 8.7 per cent in August 1945. Aggra- vated inflation, a sudden increase of population resulting from the repatriation of nationals from overseas, and the disintegration of zaibatsus, were among the factors that pushed society out of control and drove the national economy to the verge of collapse.

Nevertheless, Japan’s GNP reverted to its pre-war level by 1954 and her average annual growth rate reached 10.86 per cent during the period from 1954 to 1961; by 1967, her GNP was third highest in the world. Japan’s economic progress since 1945 is distinguished by a period of recovery stimulated by the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, followed in 1952 by a period of high growth supported by technical innovations.

Before the Korean War, production in Japan was limited by the small size of the market; as soon as the war started, Japan was invited to supply military and industrial goods and it was these ‘special procurements’ that gave Japanese industry the boost it needed. During the one year from July 1950 to June 1951 , the special procurement orders totalled U.S. $350 million. Moreover, in the second half of 1950, exports to South-East Asia began to show a marked increase. The combined market effects of these two factors restored Japanese industry to its normal level of production activity. But further measures were needed to produce the later spectacular results.

The Japan Export-Import Bank, established in 1951, was the organ designed to finance long-term exports, the Japan Development Bank, founded in the same year, being designated

Industrial development in Japan: the historical background

27

for financing private equipment investment. During 1951-53, substantial expansion was realized in electricity resources, in the machine industry-mainly concentrated in shipbuilding and electrical machinery-and in the chemical industry, largely through the introduction of new techniques from the United States and other advanced nations. The reintegration of the old zaibatsu, previously split up under the Excessive Economic Power Deconcentration Law, was also planned at that period. Through these and other changes, the Japanese economy filled the vacuum created by the Second World War, and in 1953 overtopped its pre-war levels in mining and manufacturing production. Thus the foundation was laid for the subsequent full-fledged development of the heavy and chemical industries.

After 1955 the Japanese economy entered a period of extremely high expansion, with the annual growth rate of the machine and steel industries averaging 30 per cent and 20 per cent respectively (that of the textile industry meanwhile falling below IO per cent). An impressive expansion of durable consumer-goods production formed the background to this development. In the steel industry, there was large-scale rationalization of all production processes, as typified by the rolling process under the rationalization programme of 19th. In the electrical- energy industry, hydroelectric systems yielded predominance to thermoelectric ones, while petroleum took over from coal as the most important fuel. Steel mills, power stations, oil refineries and petrochemical complexes were enlarged or newly established, mainly along the Pacific coast zone. Giant petrochemical complexes were built up, making it economically sound to utilize direct transport of fluid raw materials through pipelines. The development and mass production of new light-electrical appliances during this period led to increased production of durable consumer goods for domestic sale, thus giving rise to a consumption revolution.

This industrial rationalization was of course effected largely through automation. The innovations in production resulted in a demand for managerial innovation also. Qualitative transfor- mations in the details of processes made obsolete skills previously


learned through apprenticeships and led to demands for new techniques based on fundamental scientific knowledge rather than simply on practical experience. The progress of automation did not necessarily lead to redundancy in the labour force, since new products were being developed at the same time, thus enlarging the scope of industrial activity. On the contrary, it became increasingly difficult for enterprises to recruit young workers at low wages, because of the sharp increase in the numbers proceeding to senior high schools, colleges and universities. The combination of these conditions made it extremely difficult to maintain the former Japanese style of labour administration based on seniority and lifetime employment. Thus, as an inevitable result of the technological innovations of this period, personnel policies based on principles of efficiency rather than seniority gained considerable ground in the sphere of management administration.

Special features of Japanese industrialization

The remarkable change that took place in the structure of the Japanese economy after 1905, with the shift of emphasis from traditional agriculture to western-type industry, was characterized by a rapid increase in the formation of fixed capital, together with increased flexibility of labour supplies, and the importation of technology.

Also relevant to the economic and technological development of the country were the facts that savings pm capita were maintained at a relatively high level; that in the formation of capital the government predominated ; and that structural changes in consumer habits came only gradually, while the growth of productive capacity and of exports was very rapid; most important, wages were kept low at all times.

Together with these economic elements, certain non-economic factors also had a powerful influence on the industrialization process, notably the advanced state of the educational system, the racial, linguistic and cultural homogeneity of the


29

population, and the firmly integrated social structure. All these combined into a national potentiality which, together with the ‘will for change’ of the people, contributed tremendous impetus to the social transformation at this peri0d.l

The principal environmental factors determining Japan’s industrial evolution were climate and geographical location. Thus, during her rapid transformation, Japan’s location assured her isolation from other countries, reinforcing her ‘closed-door’ policy and making possible a maturing of her culture and social structure entirely within the country.

Again, the rapid increase of Japan’s population at the outset of industrialization ensured both the necessary supply of labour and an expanding market. This remained an advantage even though over-population at times threatened to become a social problem.2

The feudal system of the Tokugawa Shogunate had produced many small quasi-autonomous units called han (clan) , who were constantly competing among themselves. The degree of autonomy and mutual isolation of the clans increased after the 1850s; they were later transformed into ken (prefectures) and served effectively for the internal difision of Western techniques transferred via the central government, though their intercommunication remained poor.

International relations affected Japan’s early industrialization phase sometimes positively and sometimes negatively, though the net effect was favourable.

Similarly, Japan’s racial homogeneity had a negative effect in creating a socio-psychological ‘distance’ from other races, compensated by a positive effect in reinforcing the bond of group consciousness. The common language also tended to repel foreign nilme and discourage communication with outsiders, but at the same time it assisted industrialization by facilitating communi-

I

2

E. E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic ‘Growth Begz’ns, 1962.

J. A. Schumpeter, Theorie der Wirtschaftlischen Entwicklutag, 1912. (Trans. by Redvers Opie, Theory of Economic Development, Harvard, 1934’ and Oxford University Press, 1961.)


cation inside the country. The fact that in Japan the whole population has the same colour and the same language has contributed substantially to accelerating and promoting the diffusion of science and technology.

In the sphere of social relations, the outstanding phenomenon is the long-standing and still persisting special relation between employer and employee. This is not restricted by kinship or lineage; a member of a group was, and still is protected by the group in proportion to his loyalty to the group, regardless of the kinship. It can safely be assumed that fixed, close social ties, moulded by this paternalistic system, which constituted a domi- nating factor in old Japan, provided the basis for the management systems that did so much to accelerate Japan’s industrialization.1

A final feature relevant to Japan’s industrialization process is the continuity of culture (in the anthropological sense). The uaditional culture did not easily accommodate Western modifications; nevertheless, Japan managed to preserve its own originality while selectively ‘ Japanizing’ Western culture, and quickly took on its present eclectic character corresponding to the new balance point.a

The environmental and socio-cultural features discussed above provide a useful basis for comparing Japan’s industrialization with that of other countries.

It is pointed out earlier that industrialization in Japan was initiated ‘from outside and from above’, and that in the process of lifting Japan’s economy from the nineteenth to the twentieth century ‘rises in the standard of living and the wage level lagged behind increases in production’. But can these be regarded as factors encountered only in Japan?

For purposes of comparison, Britain’s industrialization process may be regarded as fairly representative of the Western

cf. the following, as to typical examples : James G. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958.

The following are sociological and cultural anthropological studies in English concerning the ‘family partnership’ : Michio Nagai, Dozoku: A Preliminary Study of the Japanese Extended Family Group and Its Social and Economic Functions, Columbus, Ohio, Ohio State University, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, 1953.

I

2


Holders of political rights Real wages

I / -- Popuiafion

FIG. 2. Long-term evolution of population, production, wages and political suffrage in Japan.

Holders of political

w

FIG. 3. Long-term evolution of population, production, wages and political suffrage in Britain.

European countries. Figures 2 and 3 show the long-term evolution of population, production, wages and political suffrage in Japan and Britain respectively, from 1800 onwards. As can be seen from these figures,theuniversalization of voting rights lagged behind production in both countries, as also did real wages. The

rights

32 Industrial development in Japan: the historical background

gap between production, on the one hand, and wages and voting rights on the other, is in recent times wider for Japan than for Britain, mainly because the growth of production in Japan has been so rapid.l

I Jiro Sakamoto, 'A Reconsideration of Japanese Economy-A Study of International Comparison, Part I', The Hitotsubashi Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 5, November, 1961.

2

The development of industrial technology in Japan

Th e industrial development of Japan was treated in the preceding chapter from a broad historical point of view. The present chapter examines more particularly the development of her industrial technology and identifies factors which have contributed to this development. Before attempting to analyse the evolution of individual sectors, some of the general characteristics of Japan’s technological development are discussed.

The present analysis explores two different approaches. The first studies the interaction between industrial and technological development. Some branches of technology progressed through successive stages, for each of which a commercially practical application was found in industry; others failed to find practical applications in, or lagged behind, industrial development; predictably, this was noticeable in cases where contact between technological and industrial development was poor. Studies have been made to identify the causes of these fai1ures.l

The second approach investigates the channels through which the technology was propagated and the speed at which this took place. The source of a given technology (i.e. whether imported from abroad or developed locally ab initio), and the speed and pattern of its propagation, whether within a single industry or among many industries, together constitute an important frame of reference for this analysis.

I In this study, the term ’technology’ when used without quaìi- fication has a general connotation, while ‘industrial technology’ is used to indicate technology that has been profitably applied to the industrial production of goods.

.3


Industrial technology to the end of the nineteenth century1

The industrial technology of the early Meiji era (1868 onwards), having been almost wholly dependent on technology imported from Europe and North America, had little affrnty with contemporary indigenous production techniques. The technological dependence on foreign countries took the form not only of employing foreign engineers and craftsmen (see Table 5) and importing plant, machinery and industrial raw materials, but also of importing such elementary techniques as the making of bricks. This was found necessary on account of the lack of a technological tradition on which to draw for the development of modern industries. This imported industrial technology, having been transplanted to State-run factories with total disregard of its economic justifiability, found little direct application in the private sector of industry. There was nevertheless a substantial gain, since local employees working in these State-run factories acquired skill in operating various machines and transferred this skill to the private factories which were subsequently built. Thus the privately owned spinning mills built in the 1880s imported their machinery from England and other Western European countries but were operated by Japanese workers who had been trained under the direction of foreign technicians, in some cases to such a high level that they in turn were qualified to become instructors. In a similar fashion, large shipyards became training centres for shipbuilding engineers, and other technologies of foreign origin also were introduced and diffused into local industries in the latter 1880s.

Meanwhile, spinning machinery of the handicraft type was invented in 1876, independently of Westem-style spinning

I It must be admitted that to treat the entire latter half of the nineteenth century as a single period is not very precise. However, this time division is based on the fact that toward the end of the nineteenth century Japan began to extricate herself from complete dependence on imported technology and to develop her own industrial technology independently; since around 1915 this indigenous activity has accelerated.


35

TABLE 5. Foreign engineers and craftsmen employed in Japan, 1872-85

Engineers Craftsmen

Date Public Private Public Private

ployees ployees ployees ployees em- em- Total em- em- Total

1872 I873 I874 I875 1876 I877 1878 I879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885

- 16 44 75 163 169 237

I99 I37 215 215 234 181

212

127

257 280 333 315 355 323 302 I99 266 244 274 219

220 46 35 27 36 26 I3 7 9 6 8 6 8 8 -

- 9 9 7 I9 46 8

I3 II

IO I2 6 5 I4

46 44 36 43 45 59 I5 20 I9 18 IS I4 I3 I4

Source. Society for the Technological History of Japan, Nihon Kagaku- gayutsu-shi Taisei, Tsushi, Vol. I, p. 157.

techniques; it was welcomed by the small-scale spinning mills and achieved wide popularization in a relatively short time. How- ever, these manually operated machines were driven out of the market by the emergence of the large-scale power-driven spinning mills by about 1890. Although a few trial models were manufactured locally, they proved to be inferior to imported machines. Despite the development of the textile industry in the ensuing years, the demand for Japanese-made spinning machines did not immediately grow in proportion, and it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that a demand for domestically manufactured spinning machinery began to develop. This led to an anomalous situation in which development of the spinning industry preceded that of the spinning-machine industry.

In 1880, a blast furnace imported from England was erected at Kamaishi (Tohoku district) for producing pig-iron. Results


were disappointing at first, but by 1894 had outstripped traditional methods.

In 1901, an iron works employing continuous-operation pig- iron and steel-making plant was established in northern Kyushu (Yawata), and thus started the real development of large-scale production of iron and steel.

Foremost in the nineteenth century, particularly from the 1880s onwards, was the textile industry, and especially the spinning industry. Nevertheless, little technological progress within this sphere was made in Japan. Progress was more con- spicuous in shipbuilding and iron- and steel-making, as regards both the effective assimilation of foreign technology and the rational domestic technology which grew out of it. None the less the degree to which these two industries depended on foreign technology remained high, since their attempts to develop their own technology-initially by a process of adaptation-lacked the support of scientific knowledge and experience.

Other fields in which rapid technological progress was made during the nineteenth century included transport and communications. The rails and locomotives used on the nineteen-mile railway between Shinbashi (Tokyo) and Yokohama, constructed in 1872 under the direction of British engineers, were of British make; only the passenger coaches were built in Japan. The delivery of letters, which had until then been handled by mail- carriers, called hikyuku (literally, ‘flying legs’), was transformed into a modern postal service. Both the rail-transport system and the postal service in their initial stages of development were run by the government, but from around 1890 onwards the number of railways m by private enterprise increased. However, with the promulgation of the Railways Nationalization Act in 1906, these private railways were taken over by the government and mileage was greatly increased, as shown in Table 6. And as the railway system evolved, so also, as was to be expected, did the domestic manufacture of rolling-stock.

With the increase in post-office service routes, the telecommunication service expanded rapidly, and by 1885 most of the trunk-service routes were established, catering primarily to


37

TABLE 6. Evolution of the national railways system

Total length of railways

Year in operation (in km)

Total length of railways

Year in operation (in km)

62 I925 270 I935 95s I945

2 562 I955 9 268 1962

I

12 593 I7 138 19 620 20 093 20 516

I The figures for 1885 and 1895 do not include Hokkaido. Source. ‘Land Transportation and Communications’, History of the Develop- ment of Modern Industry in Japan, Research Institute for the History of Modern Industrial Development in Japan, Vol. XXIV, 1965, statistical table, p. 16-17.

administrative and military needs. Telephones were imported very soon after their invention by Bell in 1876. However, due to a protracted debate on the issue of civilian management of the telecommunication business, it was not until 1890 that the tele- phone was available for civilian use.

While transport and telecommunications technology was being imported thus early in its development abroad, Japan’s original industrial technology began to emerge from its stage of total dependence on foreign technology to one of partial independence. The two ways for domestic industry to achieve technological independence, within the limitations of national resources, were (a) to procure more of the prerequisites for industrial processes-i.e. technicians, raw materials, processed materials and production know-how; and (b) to construct machinery and installations through the use of Japanese technicians. Both approaches were used. However, the scientific self-reliance which constitutes the foundation of m o d e m industrial technology was not yet attained, nor really attempted. And even though independence in technological development was attained in certain sectors, the industrial application of this technology was not achieved, largely on account of the time-lag in the emergence and expansion of Japan’s markets.


38

Industrial technology in the early twentieth century

By the end of the nineteenth century, Western technology had begun to take root in Japan. But the temporary interruption of its inflow, and the expansion of markets for Japanese products, during the First World War impressed more strongly on Japanese industrial leaders the need to establish an independent technology, and at the same time brought about an increase in capital accumulation.

Fortunately there was already a burgeoning independent industrial pchnology in Japan. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 had contributed much to its development; the following are some of the inventions and discoveries that provided its basis : 1901 Discovery of adrenalin by Jokichi Takamine. 1905 Publication of a paper by Ariya Iguchi on a centrifugal

pump, leading to its commercial production in 1914. 1906 Production of a turret lathe. 1907 Application by Sakichi Toyota for a patent of invention

for an automatic power-loom. 1908 Start of industrial production of nitrogen from air. 1909 Production of Taka-diastase by Takamine. 1910 Invention of a treadle rotary-drum grain-threshing

machine. 1910 Discovery of oryzanin by Umetaro Suzuki. 191 I Completion of Ujigawa thermal power station

(12,000 kW). 1912 Success in the trial manufacture of a Takuma-type

water-tube boiler. O f those mentioned above, the centrifugal pump was the only product based on exclusively Japanese technology; however, the automatic power-loom and the water-tube boiler helped to check the influx of foreign products, and the industrial production of nitrogen from air constituted an epoch-making contribution to the development of the Japanese chemical industry.

One of the primary features of Japan’s technological develop-


39

ment in the years immediately following 1910 was the interaction and mutual stimulation between the various branches of industrial technology. Thus the technology of the armaments industry, particularly the construction of warships, stimulated the development of shipbuilding generally, the construction of large ships being made possible by the plentiful supply of steel; and this in turn accelerated technological developments in the field of machine tools and prime movers. Again, the production of calcium cyanamide in 1909 owes its industrialization to the availa- bility of hydroelectric power; for in Japan the technology of electrical-power generation was introduced before steam power had been widely popularized. As a result, the rate of electriíì- cation of factories had been relatively rapid since the very beginning of the twentieth century.

In the years around 1915, the technological base of the heavy- industry sector, which had somewhat lagged behind, was gradually built up. Original work was done on the planning of shipbuilding and the independent development of engine-making technology, culminating in the completion of a super-Dread- nought in the 1920s. During the Depression and international naval disarmament of the 1920s the shipbuilding industry stag- nated somewhat, but nevertheless achieved significant advances with the adoption of electric welding and the construction of diesel-powered passenger ships.

The progress made around 1915 in the heavy and chemical industries was spearheaded by chemical industrial technology, stimulated by the withdrawal of the Western European countries from Asian markets during the First World War; it was high- lighted by the following successful undertakings :

1915 commencement of production of soda by electrolysis. 1915 Commencement of production of bakelite. 1916 Commercial production of viscose rayon yarn. 1917 Industrialization of an ammonium soda process. 1919 Commencement of production of plate glass.

These independent technological developments were supported by government policies designed to encourage the chemical


industry by, for example, establishing a Chemical Research Laboratory and an Experimental Laboratory for Soda in 1914, administered by a Chemical Industry Research Council under the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, and further by enacting a Law to Encourage the Dyestuffs and Pharmaceutical Industries. But the expansion of research facilities in industry was not confined oniy to the government; it now began to gain increasing momentum among private enterprises as well.

The development of the various industrial branches demanded a high rate of electrification, which in turn encouraged the development of the electrical-power supply network and power-generating technology. During the 1920s, a number of thermal-power plants with a capacity of more than 50,000 k W were constructed. Moreover, unlike the hydroelectric power stations, which were located in mountainous areas, these plants were erected in the midst of the four largest industrial centres; their proximity had a strong effect on the subsequent conditions and location of power-consuming industries.

Stimulated by the technological developments in the chemical and electrical industries, the mining, spinning and weaving industries which had played such a leading role up to 1910 also continued their steady progress. However, the automotive and machine-tool industries at this stage lagged behind. Development was moreover unbalanced inasmuch as the technology of industries manufacturing a large variety of products in small quantities lagged behind that of the industries manufacturing a small variety of products in large quantities. In other words, mass production had been introduced, but had not yet penetrated throughout industry.

Technological development in the pre-Second-World-War years

The period comprising the late 1920s and the 1930s was strongly influenced by the emergence of war-oriented industry; technology became increasingly independent of foreign ideas and in-


creasingly diversified. During this period technological independence, already attained in heavy and chemical industries (including the automotive, machine-tool and light-metal industries), spread to industrial technology generally. Original Japanese research led to major technological achievements including, for example :

I 926 I927

1928 19-29

1931 I932

I934 I936

Invention of Yagi antenna. Initiation of research on the process of synthesizing carbide and acetylene, and the successful finalization of the process using purely domestic technology. Completion of a phototelegraphic apparatus. Development of the high-power diesel engine for large ships. Production of ammonium sulphate by a new process. Invention of a magnetic alloy and its commercial production. Completion of a chromate process. invention of extra-super-duralumin.

The strongly military orientation of industry at this period carried with it some contradictory elements. Thus the technology which was developed to meet the demands of the war industry had only limited applicability in other sectors. It is true that this emphasis on domestic production helped to check the influx of foreign products, but it did not create a favourable climate for the creation of original technology to be exported to other countries. Furthermore, with the encouragement of certain branches of technology of interest for the war industry came the tendency to neglect the development of technology useful for peace-time industry. As a consequence of this imbalance in the technological development of different branches of industry, many instances occurred where scientific research results took years to find their application in industrial technology. One such case was that of television. In 1937 a group of Japanese scientists tested a television system designed for broadcasting the Olympic sports, scheduled to be held in Tokyo in 1940. However, the project


had to be suspended because of the outbreak of the Second World War.

In an attempt to systematize research conducted by private scientists and engineers, and to co-ordinate administration relating to science and technology, an office of technology was established in 1941. However, the efforts made by this office were persistently frustrated by the interference of military officers, who insisted on instituting as a central programme of the office scientific and technological research in the field of aviation. Military officers were appointed to managerial positions in the various institutes newly established under the juridisction of the office, and the freedom of research of the scientists and engineers was greatly restricted. These examples illustrate possible ill effects which may be introduced by the militarization of industry.

Technological recovery after 1950

As a result of an increased demand for Japanese goods during the Korean conflict, Japanese industry recovered from the ruinous conditions of the post-Second-World-War years, and around 1955 overtopped the pre-war level of production.

This recovery was achieved through the expansion of such basic industries as iron and steel, electric power, shipbuilding and ammonium sulphate which had completely modernized their production facilities during the early 1950s; it was further con- solidated by the development of new industries such as synthetic chemicals, petrochemicals, household electrical appliances and transport equipment, which in many ways depended on the older industries. The rationalization of the basic industries was effected by modernizing the technology of rolled material in the iron and steel industry, by shifting the emphasis from hydroelectric power to large-scale thermal power, and by changing from coal to petroleum as fuel.

Developments made by Japanese engineers since 1955 in the field of semi-conductors have led to full-scale production of transistors and diodes, enabling the industry to supply large


43

quantities of electronic equipment. And thanks to technological developments in the manufacture of computers, measurement apparatus and industrial meters, the production of electronic apparatus for controlling machinery and installations has increased rapidly. Some manufacturers are now actively engaged in the domestic production of electronic computers.

The automotive industry embarked on mass production of passenger cars in the I~SOS, and is increasing its output year by year; its production of vehicles is now second only to that of the United States. Underlying all these achievements are the governmental policies promoting domestic industry. At the same time, the importation of foreign technology continued to be fully encouraged, and entered into every branch of industry. Table 7 shows that financial costs for the import of technology during 1965 amounted to five times the costs for 1956.

TABLE 7. Balance of payments for technological ‘know-how’ in Japan

Fiscal year Payments (A) Receipts (B) Ioo (in IOO million yen) (in IOO million yen) A

I956 I957 I958 I959 1960 1961 1961 I963 I964 I965

120.0 153.5 172.2 222.7 314.6 416.4 413.9 487.4 557.2 596.3

1.0 0.6 2.4 3.0 8.1

17.2 19.8 28.5 46.2

10.2

0.8 0.4 1.4 1.3 2.4 2.5 4.2 4.1 5.2 7.8

Source. Planning Bureau, Science and Technology Agency, Summary of Science and Technology, p. 265, 1967.

Table 7 shows how much Japan’s technological recovery owed to imported technology. At the same time, it will be recognized that large payments for imported technology cannot alone produce technological progress. Obviously, a certain mature technological base is necessary in order to assimilate the imported


technology and enable it to strike root in the native milieu. At the same time, the export of technology by Japan has made steady, if modest, gains. The governmental agencies in charge of the promotion of science-based technology and the managements of private enterprises are ali the time making serious efforts to achieve technological independence in the true sense of the word, and to ensure that the country is capable of meeting any eventuality which may arise from the impending ‘liberalization of technology’ on an international scale.

Quantitative assessment of the development of industrial technology

The foregoing brief survey of the history of industrial technology in Japan must now be supplemented by a quantitative examination.

As regards the important question of patents, in the early twentieth century grants to foreign applicants were much more numerous than those to Japanese applicants; this gap has however been closing since the Second World War.

The dependence of Japanese industry on imported technology has already been emphasized in the present study. Tables 8, g and IO (pages 46-49) present the situation quantitatively.

Table 8 indicates the dates when various science-based technological developments were for the first time introduced into, or independently developed in, Japan. Because of the lack of standards for classifying science and technology, and the multiplicity of explanatory items, certain classes have been omitted, thus rendering the table incomplete; however, no major classes have been omitted. Of the 417 cases of new technology reported in this table, only 67 (16 per cent) are attributed to Japanese inventions; this confirms the heavy dependence of Japanese industry on imported technology. And of the industrially appli- cable technology developed by the Japanese themselves, almost a half relates to the chemical industry.


45

Table g shows the time-lag between the first development or invention of a given foreign technology and its introduction to Japan. About 25 per cent of all science-based technology introduced into Japan was imported within ten years of its first development or invention. In transport, communications and the power industry the corresponding figure is 36 per cent; these are the areas in which the importation of foreign technology was quickest. In the metallurgical, mining and machine industries, the time-lag was greater.

The next question to be considered is the time-lag between the importation of a given technological innovation and its application in industry. Table IO shows that, of 251 foreign technological innovations imported by Japan, 75 per cent were put into operation immediately. After the Second World War, almost all of the foreign technology imported found immediate industrial application, whereas during the nineteenth century the proportion of imported technology put into immediate operation was low, about 26 per cent of the individual innovations during that period taking over ten years to find industrial application. These figures indicate that with the passing of the years, the technological foundation for the reception of new technology was being systematically strengthened.


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BIBLIOGRAPHY

HOSHINO, Yoshio. Gendui Nihon Gzjutsu-shi Guisetsu [An outline of the technological history of Japan]. Tokyo, Dai-Nippon Tohso Co., 1956.

SOCIETY OF HISTORY OF SCIENCE OF JAPAN, Nihon Kaguku Gzjutsu-shi Duikei, Tokyo, Daiichi Hoki Shuppan Co., 1964.

YAMAZAKI, Toshio. Gzjutsu-shi [History of technology]. Tokyo, Nihon Gendai-Shi Daikei, Nihon Keizai Shinpo-sha, 1961.

YUASA, Nitutqno. Gendui Kuguku-shi Nenpyo [Chronology of modem scientific technologies]. Tokyo, San’ichi Shobo, 1961.

3

National policies affecting technological development

The new government formed after the Meiji Restoration (1868) was faced with a situation that called for prompt implementation of policies for the centralization of power and for the active promotion of national prosperity and defence, which in turn entailed the building up of modern armaments and construction industries. The policies adopted by the new government were designed to meet these urgent requirements, and the slogan ‘increase of production and promotion of industries’ became the basic theme of the national economic policy. The implied need for close supervision and protection of the industries was recognized in the economic policy of the early Meiji Government, which was designed to foster and protect industries, with emphasis on government-run enterprises. The government itself took the initiative in introducing technology from advanced countries of the West, and actively introduced and protected new industries, thereby laying the foundations for the subsequent development of technology and industry.

During the ensuing years, the development of technology in Japan proceeded within the framework of such protectionist government policies, consistently aimed at giving the maximum favourable influence to the development of industry and technology. There was an unremitting sense of urgency to catch up with, and even surpass, the level of technology of advanced industrial nations. By around 1940, governmental policies for industrial development had matured to form an integrated and comprehensive system within which, by 1950, the policy for


scientific and technological development had established itself in its own right as one of the basic national policies.

At the same time there was consolidation and continuous expansion of the research institutes, which trace their origin to the government-run experiment stations of the early Meiji period and the modern educational network instituted by the School System of 1872. These institutes made great contributions not only to research but also to training in modern engineering and technology, Also, the technological advances helped enormously to accelerate the growth of the economy during the years following the Second World War, numerous advances in industrial technology being brought about by the policy of importing foreign technology, pursued under the 1950 'Law on the Intro- duction of Foreign Capital'.

Hence it can confidently be asserted that the development of technology in Japan was brought about under the guidance of national policies including industrial policies, policies for the development of science and technology, policies for the development of research in various fields and policies encouraging the introduction of foreign technology. These are described in turn below.

Industrial policies

Poli& fm increasing prodzcction and promoting industries

The Meiji Government recognized that the increase of production and the promotion of industries were essential for establishing a solid economic foundation for the construction of a modern State. The immediate target of its policies was the curtailment of imports and the promotion of exports, with greater emphasis on the former. With the opening of the country to foreign trade, foreign products poured into the domestic market, putting pressure on the domestic cotton-yarn industry as well as other industries, and causing a chronic deficit in the international balance of payments.

T o counter this trend, the introduction of modern industry


53

was urgently called for. However, in view of the dearth of private capital, nothing short of direct investment by the government could have accomplished the desired objectives. The government aimed, moreover, at encouraging the private sector to follow its example, Accordingly, it made direct investments covering the operations of its own factories, the construction of railways, the exploitation of mines and the management of experimental stations.

The Ministry of Engineering, created in 1870, was charged with the responsibility for encouraging the development of many industries and running the mines, railways and communications, and during the ensuing fifteen years it operated the government- owned factories and mines, many of them expropriated from the former Tokugawa Shogunate and the feudal lords. Between the years 1870 and 1885 a total of nearly 30 million yen was allocated to the ministry for these operations. In the textile industry, the government exerted an extraordinary effort in line with its policy to encourage domestic production. Tomioka Spinning, for instance, was established in 1872 by the government; it was equipped with spinning machines of French make and operated with techniques imported from the same country. The government also imported British spinning machines and established spinning mills at various localities.

Parallel with its promotion of these modern industries, the government made determined efforts to improve farming. Thus it established an agricultural experiment-station at Naito Shin- juku in 1872 and a seed-cultivation station at Mita in 1877, and also imported farming implements, seeds and seedlings from the United States, while at the same time it strove to enlarge the area of land under cultivation by encouraging reclamation and the exploitation of hinterlands.

In the field of transport and communications, the Meiji Government built railways, highways and ports; in order to finance these construction projects, it floated public bonds, to the amount of 12.50 million yen, for the first time in the history of Japan. In the field of marine transport also, the government in 1870 established a forwarding company of its own; subse-


quently it sold its steamships to the Mitsubishi Company and gave further strong encouragement to this private company in the form of large subsidies and outright grants.

In due course, all the government’s business undertakings, factories, mines and other industrial interests were handed over to private concerns. This disposal of the government-owned business interests has an important bearing on the development of Japan’s modern industry and technology.

The sponsoring of industrial fairs and exhibitions by the government constituted an important part of its policies for the increase of production and the promotion of industries. Partici- pation in the World Exhibition in Vienna in 1873 marked the first such venture after the Meiji Restoration. Encouragement for the dissemination of technological and scientific knowledge by means of industrial fairs, exhibitions, co-operatives and itin- erant agricultural instructors was stepped up with the establishment of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1881.

In this manner, the Meiji Government succeeded in introducing foreign industries and technology through the examples of its own direct activities. Although its accomplishments may have fallen short of its desired objectives, it undoubtedly played an important role in the modernization of private industries and technology.

Protective policy fur industry

T o cover its deficit financing and the requirements of the rapid execution of the policies for the increase of production and the promotion of industries, the Meiji Government issued new currency year after year, and this, together with the issue of bank-notes by National Banks all over the country, caused a vicious inflationary spiral. From 1878 onwards the difference in value between the silver coinage and the paper currency increased continually; prices and interest rates rose; and all these factors combined to increase the financial burden of the government. For all their zeal, the business undertakings established and operated by the government were unable to avoid running into


55

deficit; the loss incurred by the various government-run enterprises during the period 1877-85 reportedly amounted to 14.86 million yen.

It was in these circumstances that the government decided to reorganize the currency and to dispose of its business enterprises; this may be considered as the first turning point of the policies for the increase of production and the promotion of industries. During this period, coinciding with the disposal of government properties, private business developed a positive foothold and entrepreneurship which enabled it to take over the management of the newly acquired mines and factories. Soon afterwards, the Ministry of Engineering was abolished and its administration was taken over by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce.

However, the disposal of the government’s enterprises did not mean that the impetus for the increase of production and the promotion of industry had died out; on the contrary, it persisted through these vicissitudes. Thus, even after its enterprises had been transferred to private ownership, the government recognized their need for protection and maintained a vigilant surveil- lance over them. As they gained in self-reliance, however, the government gradually reduced intervention in their management and, after 1897, switched to a less direct and more modern type of protectionism. By early 1890, the spinning industry and several others had established themselves entirely with private capital.

Industry in Japan made epoch-making strides after the Sino- Japanese War (1894-95), and during the ensuing years until the Russo- Japanese War (1904-05) the slogan ‘increase of production and promotion of industries’ was replaced by that of ‘post-war management’, which embraced all spheres of national policy. Implicit in this slogan were stepped-up armaments, the development of education, and a well-defined industrial policy, one of whose manifestations was the series of war factories that emerged after the Sino- Japanese War. The expanding requirements for armaments led to large demands for strategic material of all kinds, including rolling-stock and ships. However, deciding that


the creation of heavy industries adequate to meet such large demands could not, and should not, be left to private capital, the government again undertook to invest in the heavy industries by way of direct ownership and management. The Yamata Iron Works, decreed in 1896 and established in 1901 by the government, was typical of such industries.

Direct intervention by the government was now restricted to heavy industries of a strategic nature, such as iron smelting and armaments, and those industrial sectors which had by then established themselves with private capital were not taken over. Desiring freedom of action, many private industries no longer wished to subject themselves to the rigid control of the government by borrowing financial capital from it. Nevertheless, the government extended its protection even to such private industries, in order to strengthen the State power and encourage domestic production. For example, the government did its best to provide private industry with long-term, low-interest loans by establishing various types of State-owned banking institutions; and in the field of external trade it attempted to foster and develop national industry and technology by instituting a protective tariff barrier in 1911. In that year also the government enacted the Factory Act, which is recognized as one of the first pieces of social legislation of Japan. However, because of the government’s priority goal of increasing production and pro- tecting industries, implementation of this Act was delayed for five years. Moreover, the provision prohibiting the employment of juvenile and female workers at nights was given a stay of fifteen years.

Rationalization policy for industry

Drastic changes in the industrial structure of Japan were effected by the policies of the Meiji Government. A landmark was reached in 1919, when the output ofindustry for the first time outstripped that of agriculture. The structural changes accelerated the attainment of self-sufficiency in technology, thereby consolidating the foundations of the modern industries.


57

During the First World War, when the introduction of foreign technology was abruptly suspended, the government made a determined effort to establish and realign State-run research laboratories serving manufacturing industries, and at the same time gave friendly consideration to the views and pro- posals of private scientists and engineers relative to the opening up of engineering institutes. However, despite this active interest in the research institutes, the government had yet to adopt a consistent and systematic policy for the development of technology; its policy in this field had hitherto been treated rather as subordinate to its educational, economic and industrial policies, and had not yet been accorded an identity of its own. Thus the main stage was reserved for the industrial and economic policies which were designed to establish a solid foundation for industrial capital so that it could adapt itself to the changing structure of industry.

In an effort to devise an effective industrial policy, the government enlisted the brains of academic and business circles to form research councils in various fields. The councils or boards appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce (and then by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry) included the Supreme Council of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry (1896), the Production Research Council ( I~IO), the Economic Research Council (1916), the Temporary National Economic Research Council (ISIS), the Council of Commerce and Industry (1927) and the Temporary Industrial Council. The first of these-the Council of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry-was associated with the deliberations leading to the Factory Act, and the Pro- duction Research Council was instrumental in recommending to the government in 1912 various measures designed to develop industries.

The activities of these councils helped to make the government’s industrial policies truly effective; they dealt with such questions as reduction of the price of industrial salt; development of hydroelectric-power generation; promotion of technical education; additions to the curriculum of engineering high schools of courses related to special industries; expansion and reinforce-


ment of State-run industrial experiment stations ; encouragement of the manufacture of machinery; the establishment of halls for industrial exhibitions; encouragement for inventions and the securing of industrial capital, including foreign capital, and the provision of long-term credits. Similarly, the Research Council of the Chemical Industry recommended measures for fostering the soda industry, and subsidies for the tar-refining industry and for the development of research in the electrochemical industry. It also advocated priority for the physical sciences along with the establishment of a chemical-research laboratory. Moved by their recommendations, the government established a Chemical and Physical Research Laboratory in 1917.

In the sphere of agriculture, the problem of the farming community’s financial situation and questions concerning the prices of farm products called for urgent solutions. This situation finally led, in 1925, to the breaking up of the Ministry of Agri- culture and Commerce into a Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and a separate Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The latter appointed the Council of Commerce and Industry, which was asked to propose concrete measures for development within its field. In response to this request, and influenced by the world-wide movement in the same direction, the council soon became a rich source of ideas for the rationalization of industries, and formulated measures for developing the key branches (including iron and steel, soda, dyestuffs and machine tools) and at the same time advocated a realignment and reinforcement of research institutes, as basic facilities for the development of industry. The Council on Resources also recommended measures for improving scientific research (1930).

The Temporary Industrial Council in I930 also submitted to the government recommendations for the rationalization of industry; these included control of enterprises, standardization and simplification of product specifications, encouragement of the use of domestic products, establishment of key industries, implementation of scientific management of business, realignment and reinforcement of research institutes, rationalization of the distribution system, improvements in the management

National policies affecting rechnological development

59

of primitive industries, and improvements in industrial financing.

A patent system was introduced to protect industrialists and to further the development of industry; after an initial period, its administration was entrusted to the Patent Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce in 1886. The direction of this administration was however governed more from the viewpoint of the legal protection of industrial properties rather than that of technological policies.

Policies for science and technology

Emergence of a science and technology structure

The ultimate objectives of the boards of inquiry and the various councils mentioned above had one thing in common: to consolidate the industrial base of the nation’s economy and to foster the competitive strength of its industry in international markets. However, the records of the deliberations of these bodies indicate that emphasis was laid on immediate targets rather than on ultimate objectives, and the problem which occupied their primary attention was how to cope with changing economic, as well as political situations.

The financial and monetary policies of the government in those years were marked with abrupt changes, accentuated by the lifting of the gold export embargo in 1930 and its reimposition in 1931. In the political field, both the national and international situation of Japan underwent bewildering changes in rapid suc- cession, with the political and economic systems operating on a semi-war footing, increasingly oriented towards national defence.

Along with the policy of industrial control, a series of policies aimed at mobilizing national resources for the attainment of self- sufficiency came to occupy the central stage. In conjunction with these, it became urgently necessary to establish a technological policy designed to increase production capacity and to develop technological innovations geared to locally available resources.


Whereas during the period following the First World War research activities had received only makeshift official encouragement, this situation was drastically changed by the enactment in 1931 of the Law on the Control of Major Industries, which aimed at accelerating the development of the heavy and chemical industries and tightening up the over-all pattern of the industrial structure through national control applied to individual industries. Under this new policy, emphasis was placed on the development of science and technology as an important component, and at the same time priority was accorded to various measures designed to accelerate research activities in these fields and to modernize plant facilities and installations.

The government followed these steps up in 1938 by instituting a Planning Board, which promoted policies for exploiting science-based technologies by drawing up a programme for the registration of scientists, engineers and auxiliary personnel for research and experiment institutes, formulating plans for the distribution of research materials and organizing a public body to assist the government in mobilizing scientists. In this way the scientific and technological research system was established on a war footing, as required by the Act of an All-out Mobilization of Research Personnel of 1939, under which the government ordered scientists and engineers to conduct research in such fields as it deemed necessary.

Reorganization of the science and technology administration

During the latter part of the 1930s and the early 1940s the government administration of science and technology was systematically strengthened. Thus, in 1941 the Planning Board drew up a Programme for the Establishment of a N e w Order for Science and Technology designed to rally the country’s research workers to consolidate the horizontal organization of scientific research for each individual subject; this merits attention because of its emphasis on co-ordination of scientific and technological research on a national scale. In this period, when access to foreign technology was completely cut off, Japan had no choice but to


61

develop her own technologies in every field of industry. The promotion of research under the unified leadership of the Na- tional Government contributed to the enhancement of the technological potential and prepared the way for industry to absorb and digest the advanced technologies to be imported later.

After the end of the Second World War, the research network and the administrative organization of science and technology, which had been geared to increasing the war potential, were completely overhauled and reorganized, on the one hand through an organizational reform in the field of basic science, and on the other hand by streamlining the administrative agencies concerned with industrial technologies. In 1948/49 the Science Council of Japan was created, as a representative organization of Japanese scientists under the aegis of the Prime Minister. At the same time, a co-ordinating Scientific Technical Administra- tive Committee (STAC) was established within the Cabinet; this body was later, in 1956, transformed into the Science and Technology Agency.

Concurrently with the organizational reform of their science structure, the government drew up an industrial policy, and as a preparatory step toward its implementation established an Office of Industrial Technology, charged with the administrative responsibility for strengthening scientific research activities relevant to industrial technology and for disseminating their results widely among the industries.

Thus the first round of reorganization of the scientific and technical administration was accomplished. With the attainment of economic self-sufficiency, and stimulated by the new wave of technological innovation that swept across the world following the Second World War and was reinforced by the Korean War, science-based technology was promoted with renewed vigour.

The atomic energy research and development project launched under the Basic Law on Atomic Energy enacted in 1955, and operated under the direction of the Atomic Energy Com- mission, was the first example of an organized attempt by the government at a large-scale development of technology in the modern sense of the word. The most recent development of this

62

I I I i I i i j ! I ! L. t-


kind was the establishment in 1968 of the Space Development Commission which has made space research an important branch of national science along with atomic energy.

In this manner, the policies for science and technology have become integrated with the major over-all policies of the government and have exerted a powerful influence on the development of the nation’s science and technology.

Japan’s organizational structure for the administration of scientific and technological activities is shown schematically in Figure 4.

Current policies for science and technology

In 1959 the Council for Science and Technology was established as an advisory body to the Prime Minister. The Council published in 1960 a document entitled Comprehensive Basic Policies for the Promotion of Science and Technology in the Next Ten Years, covering: the establishment of targets for scientific and technological development; the training of technicians, mainly for providing support to scientists and engineers; the expansion and consolidation of research activities ; increasing and streamlining information-gathering activities and promoting the international exchange and dissemination of science and technology; and improvements in the taxation and patent system in order to stimulate the development of science and technology. Thus, these policies cover not only administrative measures but also education in science and technology. It was proposed to increase the national investment in scientific and technological research, as a percentage of the GNP, from the then current figure of 0.94 per cent to 2 per cent.

Acting on the council’s recommendation, the government took a number of steps such as increasing the enrolment capaci- ties of scientific and engineering higher-education institutions with the result that the percentage of students enrolled in scientific and engineering studies in relation to the total number of students in higher education increased from about 25 per cent in 1960 to 30 per cent in 1966.


65

In a later report, entitled Views on Comprehensive and Basic Policies for the Development of Science and Technology, published in 1966, the council recommended that the volume of investment in research should be increased to 2.5 per cent of the GNP by 1970, and at the same time designated a number of priority research topics, including thirteen related to the development of science, 102 related to social and economic development, and six intended for research on an international basis.

A broad and well-balanced policy is clearly required to ensure that science and technology receive, in the appropriate proportions, the support they need to maintain Japan’s industrial position in the face of international competition. T o mitigate the country’s former lack of experience in the Iarge-scale development of technology, government support is still called for, in the form of direct participation in scientific and technological activities, indirect participation through subsidies and other assistance, and co-ordination. Major functions at present performed by the government include the consolidation of the promotion of exchanges of scient& and technological information, the training and recruitment of skilled labour, and the commissioning of certain projects. Joint research is being promoted by arranging finance for technological development, by the formation of research societies, by tax incentives, and by encouraging industrial applications of newly developed technology. The function of impartial co-ordination among various research groups has an important influence in preventing duplication of research, in enhancing the efficiency of research activities and in ensuring the effective utilization of resources.

In order to meet the enormous financial and organizational demands imposed by the so-called ‘national projects’ and ‘large- scale projects’-the former typified by the ‘big science’ atomic- energy and space-development projects, and the latter by the technological developments in the fields of electronic computers and magneto-hydrodynamic electric-power generation-these activities were institutionalized in 1966. The securing of funds for these types of development and the establishment of systematic co-operation between different branches of science and

5


technology have become the major objectives of the government’s recent scientific and technological policies.

Policies for the introduction of foreign technologies

If one facet of the national policy relating to science and technology were to be singled out for special appreciation, this should be the policy for the introduction of foreign technologies. The evolution of modern industries during the hundred years since the Meiji Restoration, and in particular the high rate of economic growth since the Second World War, owe their success above all to the modem installations that have been developed through the introduction of foreign technologies.

The door permitting the entry of foreign technologies was reopened in 1950, when the government enacted two laws dealing respectively with the introduction of foreign capital and with foreign exchange and trade control. These laws were designed to assist the post-war rehabilitation of the Japanese economy by encouraging the investment of foreign capital; safeguards were included in the form of stipulations that such foreign investments should contribute to the improvement of the international balance of payments, and the corresponding policy on foreign exchange involved control of the influx of foreign capital. Para- doxically, this restrictive aspect actually helped to attract foreign capital, and resulted in the selective importation of foreign technologies of such high quality as to warrant their cost in external payments. From 1957 onwards, moreover, substantial payments were received for technology exported.

Of the technology imported, some 80 per cent is related to the machinery and chemical industries. As a result, production in those industries increased markedly in the latter half of the 1950s. In 1960 the value of production derived from imported technology and allocated to domestic consumption equalled the total imports as calculated on the basis of the customs clearance. On the other hand, the export of goods produced by imported technology still remained at a comparatively low level, although increasing gradually. On balance, this means that imported tech-


67

nology has been instrumental in reducing imports, rather than contributing directly to an increase in exports. Further, the total sales of products derived directly from imported technology in early 1970 accounted for more than 30 per cent of the total sales of the entire industry of Japan, and about 20 per cent of the new products and technology developed during the years 1957-61 were based on imported technology. Since 1965, moreover, imported technology has also contributed increasingly to the production of plant, installations and consumer goods for export.

Whereas in 1955 more than 50 per cent of the technology imported had been developed before or during the Second World War, in the 1960s the greater part dated from after the war; thus the industrial processes used in Japan have been catching up with those of the advanced Western countries.

Though the importation of perfected foreign technology in the past obviated the risks and uncertainties inherent in the development of original technology, and has provided a rapid and effective method of enhancing the technological level of Japanese industries, now that Japanese technology has effectively reached the international level, the import of technology from other countries would be unwarranted except in very special circumstances. Moreover, Japan is being urged to throw open the door to the international market, hence the various restrictions still maintained on the free movement of technology, will, in principle have to be eased and eventually lifted altogether.

Policies for the promotion of research

Early administrative structure for scient@ and technological research

In the Meiji era, scientific and technological research agencies were systematically organized in the respective administrative agencies of the State, the creation of private organizations for scientific and technological research coming about only rather later.

When the Ministry of Industry was abolished in 1885,


various other ministries newly established under the Cabinet system had scientific and technological institutions attached to them; typical examples were the Statistics Bureau, attached directly to the Cabinet; the Imperial University and Tokyo Academy, attached to the Ministry of Education; and the Public Health Bureau, attached to the Ministry of H o m e Affairs. Diffi- culties were encountered in attempts to adjust the relations between different agencies by dividing them up or amalgamating them, and the inadequacies of the administrative structure produced harmful effects which were discerned only later; nevertheless, it is significant that the administrative structure was adjusted in the second half of the nineteenth century to bring scientific and technological research and education together under the appropriate administrative agencies. Even before these adjustments, however, a number of measures relating to scientific and technological activities had been taken to meet administrative logic. Thus, meteorological observations were brought under the Central Meteorological Observatory, created in I 875, and weather maps were published daily from 1883. The Printing Bureau, set up in 1871, was modernized in 1881 and its affiliation was moved from the Ministry of Finance to the Cabinet; in 1883 it started to print the OJ$ciuZ Gazette, a publication which proved useful for distributing reports on various administrative matters to interested circles. Japan’s Geographical Survey had originally been started by the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Military Affairs; under the structural reform of 1884, the task of map preparation was entrusted to the army.

Higher educatiun and research during the nineteenth century

From 1868 to about 1885, Japan had depended entirely on foreigners for scientific and academic guidance. Thus nearly all the teachers in the higher scientific and technological educational institutions were foreigners invited and employed by Japanese authorities. But as tirne went on, Japanese scholars who had studied abroad or had received scientific training under these foreign teachers, gradually replaced them and initiated their own


69

original courses of study. An early example of this new régime is represented by the Earthquake Prevention Research Council, established in 1892, all of whose personnel were Japanese.

Tokyo Imperial University, which had formed a nucleus of scientific studies, in 1893 adopted the ‘Chair’ system which is retained in the national universities up to the present time, but is now regarded by some as a factor hampering interdisciplinary studies. In those days, however, its institution represented a step forward toward the differentiation and specialization of academic studies. In 1886, prior to the institution of the ‘Chair’ system, a graduate school (two-year course) was set up in this university and a system aimed at training research workers was instituted. In 1885, for the first time in Japan, twenty-five doctorates were awarded, and with the addition of new types of doctorates under an amendment to the Academic Degree Ordinance in 1896 IOI new doctorates were awarded.

The Tokyo Academy, modelled on the Royal Society of Great Britain, was inaugurated in 1879, as a leading academic body; however, it could not immediately succeed in becoming a lively centre for academic exchanges since the specialized academic community had not yet emerged. Specialized scientific societies came to be established for individual fields at the close of the nineteenth century ; representative societies dealing with technology included the Japan Architectural Society (founded in 1897), the Great Japan Ceramic Industry Association (1891) the Shipbuilding Association (1897), the Japan Machinery Science Society (1897) and the Industrialization Academic Society (1898). The creation of these societies had now become possible as a result of the growing activities of the higher-education institutions in turning out trained specialists.

Research agencies in zhe m a of technological independence

The First World War marked a turning point when the research institutions of the central government’s administrative agencies were systematically reorganized to promote applied studies and accelerate industrial advancement.


The Industrial Laboratory, which was the establishment most directly connected with industrial development among the public technological research agencies , was created after the enforcement of the governmental system in 1900, and was in due course, on the recommendation of the Production Research Council (an advisory body set up in 1910 under the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce), entrusted with studies and official inspectorial activities relating to manufacturing processes. To these responsibilities the Machinery Industry Promotion Plan Research Committee, created during the First World War, added studies relating to the development of heavy and chemical industries.

Realizing the importance of orienting more research towards technological development to compensate for the cutting off of technology imports during the war the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, rather than simply expanding the Industrial Laboratory, set up a number of new industrial research institutes. These included the (temporary) Nitrogen Laboratory (1918)~ Osaka Industrial Laboratory (1918) the Textile Industry Labo- ratory (1918)~ the Porcelain Laboratory (1919) and the Monopoly Bureau’s Central Laboratory (1920). During the same period, the Ministry of Communications established the Ship Equipment Inspection Station in 1916, and transformed its Electro-Tech- nical Bureau into an independent agency as the Electro-Technical Laboratory. Again, the Physico-Chemical Research Institute was established in 1917 with a government subsidy and contributions from industrial circles, but its financial foundation was not really stable. Nevertheless a liberal atmosphere rarely encountered in universities, prevailed in the institute’s organization and operation; active interchange between the different research branches was encouraged, and the institute was managed under a basic policy calling for a careful selection of priority research projects to receive financial support and for an extension of joint research activities. As a consequence many of the studies accomplished earned high international esteem. On the technological side alone, the successful results included Masatoshi Ohkochi’s piston ring, Umetaro Suzuki’s synthetic sake (Japanese rice wine), Yosei


Suzuki’s ultramin (textile finishing agent), Kotaro Honda’s magnetic steel, etc. T w o Japanese Nobel Prize winners, moreover, were formerly members of the staff of this institute.

Besides these research agencies, institutes dealing with aviation and metals were set up in the Tokyo Imperial University and Tohoku Imperial University respectively around 1920. Thus a tradition was built up of attaching importance to basic studies. Since then, the practice of establishing research institutes in universities has been continued, and by 1968 there were about 200 institutes attached to national universities.

Financial support for science and technology

State financial support for research is obviously the most fundamental requirement for the promotion of the activities of scientists and technologists. Nevertheless, there had been no system for supporting State research prior to the creation of the ‘science subsidy’ system by the Ministry of Education in 1918. The introduction of this subsidy system was just one of the measures for promoting science and technology instituted during and after the First World War.

The annual amount of the subsidy was set initially at 145,000 yen, but within a few years was substantially reduced, standing at 73,000 yen in the late 1930s. However, in 1939 it was recognized that amounts of this order were insuiTiCient to maintain the publicly owned research institutions, and a new ‘science research fund‘ was created under the Ministry of Education with an initial annual amount of 3 million yen which was increased a hundredfold by the 1950s. The amount of the earlier ‘science subsidy’ was also raised from this time onwards, and the total amount of support was further augmented by a number of subsidies for special purposes, such as research facilities in private universities (1953). Substantial research support funds were moreover provided by other government departments besides the Ministry of Education, to various recipient agencies, thus further swelling the total.

Difficulties in distinguishing expenditure on research proper


20cuo - 10000 - 7000 -

JWO -

500 ~

from the ordinary administrative expenses of the research agencies make it impossible to estimate very closely the true trends in research expenditure. A broad international comparison of these trends can however be made from the graphs of Figure 5.

Percentage-wise, the gap between Japan and the United States was largest around 1955, with Japan’s expenditure being only about 0.025 of that of the United States. During the 1960s this gap narrowed somewhat, Japan’s expenditure being about 0.05 of that of the United States in 1963. Research spending in European countries also showed a rising curve similar to that for Japan.

A

Federal Republic

23600

a 404

4258

I , * 1954 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

FIG. 5. The trend of research expenditure in some advanced countries. (Unit = 100 million yen.) (Source. Planning Bureau, Science and Technology Agency, Science and Technology Survey, p. 250, 1967.)


73


Table II shows that while Japan compared quite well with other countries in 1963 as regards percentage of GNP devoted to research and number of research workers as a proportion of the population, it held the lowest position as regards average expenditure per individual research worker.

As regards the distribution of the research expenditure in Japan between the government and private sectors, Table 12 shows that the government share has recently been increasing, from 30 per cent of the total in 1960 to 35 per cent in 1966. This government share is, however, still very low compared with that in the United States and the most advanced European countries (see Table 13).

TABLE 12. Research expenditure in Japan, percentage distribution between government and private sectors

Year Government Private

1960 I965 1966

30 32 35

70 68 65

Source. Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister’s Office, Science and Technology Research Survey, p. 14, 1967 (mimeo.).

TABLE 13. Research expenditure in selected countries, percentage distribution between government and private sectors

Country Year Government Private

France I963 Germany (Fed. Rep.) I964 United Kingdom 1964-65 United States I963

69 64 60 65

31 36 40 35

Source. Statistics Bureau, Prime Minister’s Office, Science and Technology Research Survey, p. 14, 1967 (mimeo.).


75

In view of the above significant differences between the research expenditure habits of Japan and other countries, the question might well be asked, how is it that Japan’s industrialization has been so rapidly and successfully achieved? The answer is that, since early in the Meiji era, the major portion of the research effort has been devoted to the rapid assimilation and development of techniques introduced from overseas. Never- theless, if the conditions accompanying the introduction of technology from overseas become stricter, and if the international liberalization of technology continues, radical improvements will have to be made in the conditions for conducting research activities in Japan.

4

Economic conditions and technological development

The rate of technological development

Many factors have been suggested as responsible for the phe- nomenably fast-possibly the fastest ever-growth of the Japa- nese economy. In the present chapter w e focus attention on the positive influence which this rapid economic development has exerted on technological development.

In order to be able to assess this development in terms relevant to the present study, a suitable unit of measurement must be adopted which relates technological innovation quantitatively to economic concepts rather than to scientific advances; for a given input, the innovation-related increase of industrial output over a given period affords such a measure.

On the basis of the best available statistics, the rates of ‘technical developmenty1 in primary (agricultural) industry have been estimated as about 1.2 per cent and 3.9 per cent before and after the Second World War respectively, while the corresponding estimated rates for non-agricultural industry are I .8 per cent and 4. I per cent. Although only approximate, these figures bring out the difference between the pre-war and post-war situations. A similar sharp increase is seen on examining the rates of growth of the Japanese economy-about 4.5 per cent pre-war and about IO per cent after the war.

I ‘Technical development’ is here understood as corresponding to that part of the increase in production which is not due to the increase of labour or capital.

Economic conditions and technological development 77

As between different branches of industry, the rate of technical development is found to vary, with higher values in the innovation and mass-production oriented chemical and automobile branches, and lower values in the textile and general- machinery industries.

It would be useful to identify the factors responsible for the high rate of technological development in Japan after the Second World War. The fact that Japan was enabled to import technology from advanced countries, particularly the United States, has already been mentioned and is of crucial importance. As a result, technological innovation in post-war Japan might be regarded as doubled in volume, since it included technology developed in advanced countries before and during the war as well as after the war. Because of its access to these results obtained elsewhere, it was possible for Japan to dispense with certain research and experimental development stages, thus reducing both the costs and the time needed for achieving full industrialization and the systematization of her productive capacity.

Again, not only did Japan have the ability effectively to assimilate the introduced technology; she was also prepared to standardize and improve on it. Although Japan had not herself created much technology, the introduction of foreign innovations did not simply mean imitation; over the years, as a result of her high educational standards, she had developed the potentiality for assimilating technology introduced from outside, and incor- porating it in her own activities. As regards the number of research workers, Japan was already in 1955 on a level with European countries; by 1963 her total exceeded those of the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany together. Thus the level of accumulation of human resources was high compared with that of capital.

The competitive situation of the market in Japan also served as an incentive for technological development and innovation; the new technology was not monopolized, and the diffusion of technological information was very rapid.

Finally, the market was large and expanding rapidly. The


existence of a large domestic market based on a population of IOO million was clearly advantageous for developing new products and new production processes.

For the reasons mentioned above, technical development has progressed rapidly up to the present. Recently, however, the introduction of foreign technology-the first of the above factors-has gradually become more difficult. N o w that Japan has caught up with the advanced countries in technological standards, foreign countries can no longer be looked to as sources of new technology. Thus in order to maintain a high rate of technological development, it is now vital for Japan to strengthen its own potential and to create its own technology with ever- increasing independence.

While it is natural that the phenomenal rate of growth of Japanese industry should attract attention, it is important not to overlook technological developments and growth in the sphere of agriculture.

As in the case of industry, it is possible to deduce a figure for the ‘technical development’ by comparing ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ of the system over a number of years. In the sphere of agriculture the input comprises four components related respectively to labour, acreage, fixed capital and current expenses. Taking the level at year 1878 as IOO per cent, the input index in 1962 was 165 per cent while the production (output) index had risen twice as fast and stood at 324 per cent. While it could not be justified to attribute the whole of this improvement to technological development, it is certain that advances in fertilizers and plant breeding contributed substantially, since over the period considered the rice yield per acre more than doubled. While agricultural technology had already reached a fairly high standard before the Meiji Restoration, it must be recognized that the sixbsequent government efforts encouraged rapid development, coupled with a high degree of technological independence.

Investment, education and dissemination of information are the principal means by which the government promoted this development.

However, examination of the annual rate of agricultural


TABLE 14. Trend of agricultural production index in Japan, Formosa and Korea (1932-33 = 100)

Period Japan Formosa Korea

1908-12 1913-17 I 91 8-22 1923-27 1928-32 1933-37

43.8 61.6 88.8 48.6 74.9 92.7 55.6 85.5

98.9 90.6 93.8 93.1 72.2 88.7

102.3 106.3 110.8

Source. Isamu Yamada, Research on Agricultural Production Index.

technical development over a considerable period shows that a sharp change occurred around 1915; from 1880 up to that year the rate was 1.3 per cent, whereas from 1915 up to 1960 it averaged 0.2 per cent. A possible explanation for this enormous drop, apart from the incidence of the Second World War, is that the effect of the improvements due to plant breeding and the use of fertilizers had practically reached saturation point and hence levelled off. Over this same period, however, Japan directed much energy into the development of agriculture (particularly rice production) in its dominions of Formosa and Korea; in exchange for the agricultural technique exported to them, it imported rice. Table 14 shows the rates of increase of agricultural production in all three countries from 1908 to 1937.

Economic conditions favourable to technological innovation

Essential prerequisites for the achievement of a high level of technological development include favourable social conditions and appropriate government policies; the calibre of the people is also highly relevant. In this section some of the economic conditions in Japan leading to high rates of technological development are discussed, and in particular:


The rapid expansion of the market, encouraging the introduction

A high degree of capital accumulation as a basis for the appli-

The specific industrial structure of the so-called ‘dual economy’,

The ‘price elasticity’ contributing to the expansion of the market

The national policy of strengthening economic power in inter-

of new products.

cation of techniques.

facilitating the introduction of techniques.

for new products.

national competition.

The rapid expansion of the market

A high rate of expansion of the market has, over the long term, been associated with high rates of economic development and the promotional effect of the appearance of new industries and commodities.

Since 1880, the GNP has achieved a real growth rate of approximately 4.5 per cent. Moreover, the rate of industrialization during the same period was also very high, as shown by the rapid drop in the proportion of primary industry and of the number of workers in the primary sector.

Lacking natural resources, and hence depending on imports of raw materials, Japan urgently needed to industrialize and export in order to obtain foreign currency. With the rate of growth of exports exceeding that of over-all economic growth, the expansion of the export market has been a significant factor contributing to Japan’s technological progress.

The post-war rates of economic growth, which are even higher than those of the pre-war period, are characterized by an extremely high degree of capital accumulation (see Table 15).

Annual rate of increase of gross demand was 9.8 per cent from 1946 to 1955, and 9.7 per cent from 1956 to 1965. Personal consumption recorded the high rate of increase of 9.8 per cent from 1946 to 1955 and 8.6 per cent from 1956 to 1965, among the highest in the world. These high rates of growth in personal consumption can be traced to the following circumstances :

Economic conditions and technological development 8 I

T h e personal disposable income was growing rapidly as a result of the high rates of productivity.

From 1946 to 1955, there was an extra demand due to house- holders’ efforts to restore the pre-war standard of living.

From 1956 to 1965, the demand for new manufactured goods, especially for household electric appliances which appeared as a result of technological innovation, was quite high, and was accompanied by an improvement of income distribution aided by a number of reforms carried out after the war.

Private fixed investment increased even more rapidly; the annual rate of increase went up from 10.7 per cent in 1946-55 to 12.6 per cent in 1956-65. It is clear from the sharp rise in the rate of the contribution of private fixed investment to the increase of gross demand that the remarkable expansion of the home market in 1956-65 was due to the considerable extension of the market for capital goods owing to the increasing amount of investment in modern technological innovation and trade liberalization. Government capital formation also showed very high rates of increase, rising from 8.3 per cent over the years 1946-55 to 15.8 per cent in 1956-65.

The expansion of the home market was promoted partly by the increase in demand due to such factors as investment in plant and equipment, the revolution in consumption and the building-up of social overhead capital. At the same time, the

TABLE 15. Economic growth rates (as percentage)

Economic parameters Growth rates

1946-55 1956-65

Personal consumption Private fixed investment Government capital formation Government consumption Imports Gross demand

9.8 8.6 10.7 12.6 8.3 15.8 10.7 6.4 13.1 14.0 9.8 9.7

6


remarkable growth of exports during the past twenty years, attaining a volume of U.S.$IO billion in 1967, contributed to the formation of a more stabilized market. Although the post-war exports of Japan still concentrated on the cotton trade, machine, chemical and metal products started to play an important part in this sphere early in the period 1956-65. Moreover, the proportion contributed by new products to the total of exports has been increasing since the end of the Second World War; the post-war Japanese economy has been increasingly characterized by the leading part taken by heavy and chemical industry in exports. This is recognized as an effect of technological innovation in the heavy and chemical industry, but is also in its turn a factor promoting technological innovation.

Even apart from the rapid increase in demand, the mere existence of the large home market represented by the IOO million population has naturally worked favourably for the development of new products and manufacturing processes. Cultivation of such a market is clearly of tremendous value for the development of industry and technological innovation, as is brought out in the discussion below on the industrialization process in Japan after the First World War.

During the years 1919-29 the Japanese economy grew faster than that of other countries such as the United Kingdom and Germany, which were undergoing a process of reconstruction. The speed of Japan’s industrialization in that period was even faster than that of the development of the United States economy which did not suffer directly from the war. During this period, Japan made great advances, ranking with those of other advanced countries, in so-called ‘modern’ industries, such as chemical fertilizers, rayon, etc., as well as in ‘traditional’ industries such as textiles, coal, iron and steel. The expansion of the home market based on the development of the heavy-chemical industry was the culminating and the most important factor in Japan’s economic growth in this period, replacing the role of exports during war time (see Table 16).


TABLE 16. Japan’s rapid development in the ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ industries

Industry

Production index 1929 (taking 1913 = roo) Japan Orher industri-

alized countries

Traditional Shipbuilding Cotton goods Coal production Pig-iron production Steel production

252 83 I79 III 162 I 16 750 126

I I50 160

Modern Ammonium sulphate production 2 050 286 Oil production 73 411

424 Aluminium production - 892 Automobile production -

Rayon production 27 162 I 172 Source. Gendai Nippon Sangyo Koza, I (Lectures on the Modern Japanese Industries, I).

The accumulutim of capital Capital accumulation becomes an essential prerequisite if technology is to be utilized in such a way as to generate effective production facilities and raise productivity. The particular nature of capital accumulation in the Japanese economy is characterized by the following features: (a) the actual rate of accumulation has been very high; (b) a great contribution has been made by personal savings ; (c) the accumulated capital has been utilized directly in fields where it can help to increase productivity; and (d) certain specific aspects of the banking system.

The situation as regards savings in Japan is set forth in Table 17 which shows that the proportion of gross savings to GNP is 34 per cent-higher than in any other country. However, the depreciation allowance for capital and the net corporate savings-two significant components of the gross national savings-are not very different from those of other countries; this demonstrates that the high rates of personal savings have made a major contribution.


TABLE 17. Percentage composition of gross national savings in Japan and selected other countries, 1956-63l

Depreciation Net Net Net Gross Country allowance govern- corporate personal national

for capital ment savings savings savings, savings total

Japan II 7 5 I I 34

(Fed. Rep.) 9 7 2 9 27 Italy 9 3 France 9 3 3 5 20 United States IO 2 2 5 I8 United Kingdom 8 2 5 3 I7

Germany

24 - II -

I. Details do not in all cases add up to total savings, on account of ‘statistical discrepancies’.

O f the total savings, 14 per cent is allocated to machine equipment and IZ per cent to the construction of factories, etc., which is again higher than in any other country. Furthermore, the ratio of investment in inventories to the total savings is again high while that of housing investment is relatively low, thus confirming that savings have been invested in fields directly related to production.

It is thus amply evident that both the high rate of savings and their deployment in investments have tended greatly towards the development of technology.

As is well known, the relation between savings and capital accumulation is such that as the amount of savings increases the savings are allocated to capital formation; capital accumulation will not take place when the rate of savings is falling. Similarly, where there is a lack of investment demand, it is likely that there will be littie saving.

For her development activity, Japan needed an efficient banking system; she lost no time in her task of consolidating the financial system preparatory to embarking on the industrialization of the country.

Bank business was first introduced into Japan in 1869, and by 1901 the number of banks had reached 2,400, though the


majority of them were very small. The major stimulus for this rapid increase in the number of banks was provided by the government, which encouraged the warrior class to use the money bonds given to them in place of the fiefs previously conferred, for establishing banks. For this reason, banking was at first considered to be a business only for the warrior class. However, it was not long before banks for the use of the agricultural industry were established by landowners with trading capital. A large part of the available money was the banks’ own capital; deposit money represented less than half the total in 1884. Even early in 1900, loaned money always exceeded deposit money and it was common to borrow from the Bank of Japan. In a sense, in this early period, capital accumulation increased and currency was supplied in the process of creating credit through the Bank of Japan.

Chartered banks had an important role in the accumulation of capital and the development of modern industries in Japan around the turn of the century. The Central Bank was recognized as the pivotal institution in the commercial money market, while for the industrial money market chartered banks were established under the protection of the government, which held shares in them.

There were the factors that made high capital accumulation possible. On the other hand, each ‘Zaibatsu’ (big financial combine) which played a leading part in industrializing the nation formed an industrial system through the link between its own bank and the stock-holding companies. As the result of a period of depression, many medium and small banks established in the Meiji period disappeared, thus promoting the concentration of capital in the major banks. As the heavy chemical industry pursued its steady progress in the 1920s, the industrial money market began to be monopolized by the two chartered banks supported by the government and thirteen major banks owned by the Zaibatsu.

Although there have been some changes in the banking system since the Second World War due to the dissolution of the Zaibatsu and the detachment of the minor banks from the


larger ones with which they were amalgamated during the war, no changes have occurred as regards their role in the accumulation of capital. Japan’s high-level development has been made possible on the basis of severe competition among the banks in the creation of credit by over-lending and by the affiliation of industries to the main banks. At the same Ume, the role of the government in capital accumulation has been quite important, and until 1955 government fuds raised mainly through The Japan Development Bank played an important part in the industrial money market.

All the enterprises resorted to bank loans for raising funds instead of relying on the common capital market. Consequently, the financial situation of the management of these enterprises deteriorated rapidly in the process of high-level development. In the pre-war period, the percentage of the funds provided by bank loans and other credits was at most 40 per cent, but after the war it reached 70 per cent, and by 1965 this indebtedness had increased further up to 80 per cent.

However, while the banks were suffering from over-lending and the enterprises in turn from over-borrowing, the Japanese economy continued to grow without making efforts to reduce this over-dependency on the banks. The big companies felt that they could rely on the banks, and hence regarded bank loans as the indispensable means for high-level development ; moreover, the cost of financing is less by bank loan than by offering shares for subscription, when taxes are taken into account.

The high rates of capital accumulation throughout the hundred years since the beginning of the Meiji period, which can be attributed to the strong competitive spirit of the enterprises and the correspondingly high rates of personal savings, would not have been possible without the positive attitude of the banks and the support of the government.

Effective use of ‘dual economy’

The Japanese economy has in the past been characterized by its ‘dual structure’, in which the main feature is a large disparity as


regards both productivity and wages between the major business enterprises and the medium and small enterprises (see Table IS).

In the big companies, lifetime employment characterized by the seniority system has been established, while in the medium and small companies wages have inevitably been driven down by the pressure of excess manpower. Moreover, because of the lack of labour mobility, the disparity in wages tends to maintain itself.

There is no doubt that the economic structure of Japan has been built on the basis of this large disparity in wages. Medium and small enterprises tend to employ capital-saving methods such as reducing costs by cutting wages. Big enterprises, on the other hand, owing to the government’s policy of financial accom-

TABLE 18. W a g e and productivity indexes in industry in Japan, United Kingdom and United States : variation with size of enterprises (index for enterprises with 1,000 employees or over = 100)

Productivity indexes, Wage indexes value added

Number of employees Japan United United Japan United United

(1956) Kingdom States (1956) Kingdom States (1949) (1947) (1949) (1947)

1-3 (1-4) 4-9 (5-9)

2-49 (25-49

000-249)

(250-4991

1-19 (11-24)

5-99 100-199

200-499

500-999 1,000 and over

67 77

I O0

86 (88) 89 90 IO0 IO0

26 31 37 46

57

77 90 IO0

I. Figures in parentheses relate to number of employees shown in parentheses in the ñrst column. Source. For Japan: Kogyo Tokeihyo [Industrial Statistics], 1956. For United Kingdom and United States: Economic Planning Agency, Keizui Yorun IAn Economic Survey], 1959.


modation, have been able to introduce methods as advanced as anywhere in the world.

In this way the ‘dual structure’ has facilitated the accumulation of capital in big enterprises, which in turn has promoted Japan’s technological development. Some would argue that capital accumulation has been subject to more or less the same process in other industrialized countries. In Japan, however, the concentration of capital has been extremely intensive and the large disparity in productivity is attributable to the close connexion between the big enterprises and the financial institutions. Individual funds accumulated in commercial banks streamed into the big enterprises, as well as government funds. In the more advanced countries, business enterprises accumulated capital mainly from their profits. It was because the accumulation of capital was relatively easy for the big enterprises, owing to the indirect allocation methods of the banks, that the intensive accumulation of capital became possible in Japan, rather than on account of the above-mentioned over-all high rates of capital accumulation.

Around 1g55,60 per cent of the total private plant investment was made by 2,000 of these major enterprises with an aggregate capital of IO billion yen. Fifty-seven major companies between them received 48.7 per cent ofthe total amount of the funds made available by the banks; this illustrates the concentration of the bank loans to just a handful of the huge companies.

As a result of this unbalanced allocation of funds, many of the minor enterprises were unable to obtain the capital needed for plant investment for promoting technological innovation; even the more fortunate companies were using second-hand equipment. In 1955, the ratio of the fixed assets added by the purchase of second-hand equipment to the total increase on the fixed assets was 45 per cent in factories of nineteen workers or fewer, and even in those of up to IOO workers this ratio was 35 per cent.

Actually, the ‘dual economy’ effect has been disappearing rapidly since the early 1960s. The disparity in wages has been reduced and the modernization of medium and small enterprises


has started; technological innovations may henceforth be expected in these enterprises as well as in the large ones.

High price elasticity fm substitution

The rapid increase in the number of kinds of new products and the tremendous growth of new industries may be assumed to indicate the immaturity of the Japanese economy and a strong curiosity in Japanese people. The competitiveness of the Japa- nese market has given an impetus to technological progress, as is clearly shown by such examples as the substitution of ammonium sulphate for bean meal in the fertilizer industry and of rayon for raw silk in the textile industry.

The efforts of the Japanese agricultural industry to improve its low productivity provided a large and reliable market for the fertilizer industry. Fish meal had been the main fertilizer pur- chased since the Tokugawa period; after the Sino-Japanese War, however, the use of bean meal from Manchuria was introduced. When, during the First World War, imports were stopped, ammonium sulphate captured the mass market. The production of this more effective fertilizer assumed the leading position in the chemical industry; while the output in 1914 was 16,000 tons, it went right up to 266,000 tons in 1930. Even more important was the rapid development in the method of producing ammonium sulphate-that is, in switching over from the calcium- carbide process to the synthetic ammonia process. The consumption of the product increased at the same time as its price decreased relative to that of the earlier fertilizers. It was the steadily increasing demand for the material as a fertilizer that made mass production possible and facilitated the production developments. If the Japanese farmers had been too reactionary, the increase in the use of chemical fertilizers would not have taken place so easily, and if there had not been a reduction of the price as a result of the monopoly strengthening the ammonium sulphate industry, this expansion would not have been possible.

The ammonium sulphate industry in Japan started with the importation of the foreign product, which continued until 1910;


thereafter, the importation of production techniques established the present industry. Later, after 1950, the exportation of the domestic product began, and in the latest stage, the Japanese fertilizer industry started to export the technique for synthetic urea. Here we can see clearly the pattern of Japan’s technological progress : importation of foreign products-importation of techniques-the establishment of domestic industries-exportation of domestic products (first of all to her own dominions)-expor- ration of techniques.

The shift from raw silk to rayon in the pre-war period, and from natural to artificial fibres in the post-war period, are other examples. Production of raw silk increased by approximately 2,800 pounds a year from 1909; some three-fourths of the total was exported, the United States being the main trading country. Of the total exports in 1913, 30 per cent was raw silk and 6.2 per cent was silk fabrics, while cotton yarn and cotton fabrics accounted for only II per cent and 5.9 per cent respectively.

The Japanese cotton industry secured the Manchurian market, defeating American cotton, after the Russo-Japanese War, and extended its activities throughout South-East Asia after the recession of British and Dutch capital due to the First World War. On the other hand, raw silk, which had held the top position for exports, became increasingly dependent on American pw- chases. Unlike the cotton-spinning industry, the success of the raw-silk trade depended on United States prosperity: it did not need to import raw materials and was not under pressure to modernize its techniques to meet international competition. How- ever, in the confusion and reconstruction of the international market following the world-wide crisis of the early 1930s~ raw silk not only lost its leading position as a foreign-currency earner, but also found itself superseded by rayon, whose cost of production had been cut by half between 1926 and 1930, as a result of the introduction of highly developed techniques coupled with the payment of low wages.

The effective replacement of raw silk by rayon in Japan may be attributed to the high technical standard of the Japanese textile industry together with the use of a special technique of


mixing several different threads, which made the substitution of the artificial material relatively easy.

The development and introduction of synthetic fibre after the Second World War followed a similar course. Synthetic fibre has been the most important post-war technological innovation. Japan had developed her original synthetic fibre (vinylon) before the war, and this laid a foundation for rapid growth in the production of nylon and polyacrylic fibre in the post-war period. Although imported techniques were used, there was a firm technological and economic basis strengthened by protective policies. When the industry set about its full-scale industrialization in 1951, the government gave it favourable treatment as regards tax regulations and financial accommodation, and took the necessary steps for creating a market, such as the promotion of government and public demand and the decision to use synthetic fibres for fishing-nets in 1957. The target figure for vinylon, nylon and vinyl-chloride production (roo million pounds per annum) was almost achieved, and by the end of 1956, nylon production had attained 290 per cent of the estimated amount. Thereafter the industrialization of vinyl-chloride polyacrylic and polyester textiles made great progress, and these products began to pour on to the market in ever-increasing quantities.

National policy for improving international competitive strength

As a consequence of Japan’s poor natural resources, industrial development and a favourable international balance of payments have in the past been incompatible. In order to expand the economy, industry had to export. With the growth of productivity and the demand for greater strength in international competition, many industries which originally grew out of the competitive import market later became export industries.

W e describe below how the demand for strengthening Japan’s position in international competition helped to promote her technological development. Our analysis traces the steps by which the textile industry, which was the main contributor in the


establishment of Japanese capitalism, modernized its processing systems. This was accomplished in the face of an ever more intense competition to control the world-wide monopoly markets after the First World War.

There were two tasks that Japan had to carry out in the severe post-war economic environment: one was to secure the foreign and home markets corresponding to the raised post-war level of productivity; the other was to maintain the balance of payments while mastering the raw-materials problems. It was in these circumstances that the spinning industry set about its industrial rationalization.

The Japanese spinning industry was, on the one hand strug- gling to break into the sphere of British influence, while on the other hand it was being threatened by the pressure of the developing countries such as India and China. As regards the first of these problems, Japan kept her wage bill low by means of highly advanced weaving and dyeing techniques, and dealt with the latter problem by developing mass-production techniques for processing cotton from the yam to the piece. Thus the Japanese economy set the combination of highly advanced techniques and extremely low wages as a typical pattern of rationalization.

Production became automatic and continuous with the introduction of modernized spinning machinery and automatic weaving machines. Product quality improved greatly, with low variation in yam thickness and piece width; developments in the dyeing process also contributed improvements. On the basis of such technological progress, Japan became the leading exporter of cotton cloth, overtaking the United Kingdom in 1933.

Similarly, the development of the rayon industry was characterized by the effective combination of advanced techniques and low labour costs. On the basis of the technological progress in the types of yarn (viscose, cupro-ammonium, multifilament, delustered), its production ranked first in 1936, overtaking the United States and finally attaining 27 per cent of the total world output.

Productivity and wages in the cotton-spinning industry in selected countries, around 1932, are compared in Table 19.


TABLE 19. Wages and costs for spinning No. 20 count cotton yarn in selected countries around I932

Number of workers required up to he Processing costs per baie

(yen) spinning stage per (yen) 1,000 spindles

Weekly wages ‘Country per person

,China 3.7 8.9 11.8 Germany 13.0 4.5 25.4 India 5.5 15.0 34.4 Japan 5.8 6. I 13.2 United Kingdom 18.0 4.0 31.4 United States 35.0 3.4 49.6 Source. Toyo Keizui [Industrial Magazine].

Japan’s showing is unique in that her wage level is as low as that of India while her productivity is almost as high as that of the United Kingdom.

It was her sustained efforts to raise productivity that made it possible for Japan’s textile industry to reach this leading position in the world; her standing in the sphere of textiles showed no decline even at the height of the world economic crisis which so greatly disturbed the balance of the international market and intensified the struggle for its redivision and reorganization. These efforts also contributed substantially to the rapid progress of the heavy chemical industry by bringing in the foreign currency necessary for importing raw materials, by fully exploiting the results of economic rationalization and low exchange rates, and by removing the tariff barriers of the competing countries.

Special economic factors affecting Japan’s technological development

It is possible to distinguish four groups of special economic factors as having had a powerful effect on Japan’s technological %development. While all are strongly distinctive of Japanese conditions, they have not all necessarily had an accelerating effect. These four factors are: limited resources; low-wage labour; the


use of imported technology; and the influence of the relatively late start in industrialization. Their effects are discussed below.

T h e eflect of limited resources

As illustrative of the effect of limited resources on the progress of technology in Japan, the study of the development of the textile industry is particularly instructive.

By the latter part of the Tokugawa period, the importance of cotton in Japanese agriculture was second only to that of rice. Nevertheless when at the close of this feudal age Japan opened her doors to foreign trade, cheap cotton goods poured in; from the start of the Meiji era (1868) imports of cotton yarn and piece goods continued to increase, ultimately accounting for a third of the total value of imports. T o improve this situation it became essential to reorganize the domestic cotton industry.

The modern cotton industry in Japan was started in 1883 by the Osaka Spinning Company (now the Tokyo Spinning Company), using machinery imported from the United King- dom. The capacity of the spinning machines was 15,000 spools- very much higher than previously. Again, the modernized machinery was driven by steam power, in place of the water power used earlier, thereby making a ‘leap-frog’ advance of a type accessible to late-starting countries prepared to learn from those with industries already well established.

On account of the limited domestic resources, the industry was at first led to mix Chinese cotton with the home-produced variety, and thus evolved the ‘mixed-spun’ technology which became a special feature, serving a major function in Japan’s efforts to compete in the international market in the latter years of the Meiji era. At the beginning of this phase, imported cotton thread was cheaper than the home product, but the coarse quality of the imported material made it progressively unacceptable on the Japanese market, thus leading to the growth of the domestic industry.

Turning to another example-the electricity-supply industry-this started with the installation of electric lighting in Tokyo


by the Tokyo Electricity Company, established in 1886, using steam-driven generating plant imported from the United States. In the prosperous days following the Sino- Japanese War there was a rise in the price of coal-at that period the normal fuel-with a consequent rise in generating costs and charges. This naturally led the authorities to consider the alternative of hydroelectric generation, and a number of hydroelectric stations were constructed in the early 1900s. By the start of the Second World War there were 461 companies supplying electricity on the basis of hydroelectric generation and long-distance transmission, but using imported machinery ; their aggregate capital was almost 600 million yen, and the generate power was 459,000 k W .

In due course it was recognized that thermal-power plants could offer economic advantages in circumstances where the hydroelectric alternative involved long transmission distances. In addition to the convenience that the thermal generating plant can be erected in the area to be served, the cost and time of construction of these plants are low compared with those for hydroelectric stations. For these reasons, from about 1953 the emphasis on thermoelectric power generation was increased, and by 1961 the thermal system, using high-capacity plant, was in the lead, with generation based on water power filling a supplementary role. The coal industry nevertheless continued to present problems in the field of energy conversion; dependence on coal has however now decreased to 20 per cent, with a corresponding increase in the use of oil. It is, moreover, expected that conversion to the use of atomic energy will be quicker than in any other country.

A quite different picture is presented by the Japanese iron and steel industry, which developed rapidly after the war, with unlimited supplies of iron ore.

Development of satisfactory crushing and processing technologies and transportation methods was stimulated by the need to make the best use of imported materials. This contrasts with the situation in some advanced countries, where a superabun- dance of resources has tended to encourage the retention of obsolescent production methods.


The provision of low-cost labour

In order to be able to operate the comparatively advanced technology imported in the early stages of her industrial revolution, Japan needed a high-quality labour force. From the point of view of production at competitive prices, however, it was essential to keep labour costs low. Capitalist industrialists in the first decade of the Meiji era (i.e. from 1868) showed great skill in their handling of this dilemma. Technicians and skilled workers were given ‘crash‘ training courses to enable them to occupy administrative positions; modern management methods were combined with retention of a feudal pattern of social relations; large numbers of farm workers recruited for unskilled labour were virtually forced, by the existence of a high level of unemployment in farming, to accept low wages. Female and child labour especially were employed in large numbers and under harsh conditions.

Coming now to relatively modern times, the number of unemployed in Japan at the end of the Second World War was estimated at about I 3 million, including demobilized soldiers, repatriates and discharged munitions workers. Under the pressure of this huge mass of unemployment, many workers were prepared to accept extremely low wages, thus constituting the basis of the ‘dual economic structure’ of Japanese industry.

At the present time, the following comparisons may be drawn between the labour situation in Japan and in the industrialized Western countries : (a) the concentration of labour in small enterprises is relatively high; (b) wages and working conditions are scarcely comparable; and (c) different classes of labour in Japan are effectively closed to one another.

The incidence of these labour factors depends to a marked extent on the technological content of the particular industry; and these differences have helped to consolidate the ‘dual economic structure’, leaving the low-paid labour in the medium and small enterprises.


The use of imported technology

A domestic machinery industry is unlikely to develop unless and until industry as a whole has reached a certain level; prior to this stage the domestic demand for machinery will be insufficient to support the industry, and will necessarily have to be satisfied by imported machinery from more advanced countries.

Thus the development of the machine industry tends necessarily to lag behind compared with other industries.

From even before the Meiji Restoration (1868) to the end of the nineteenth century there was an enormous difference in the general level of industry between the Western nations and Japan (see Table 20). The extent of the industrialization was still small and the advanced countries were making vigorous export efforts.

TABLE 20. Industrial production in selected countries as percentage of world production, 1840-1900

C0unQ-y 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900

I 2 IO 9 8 7 - - France Germany 12 15 16 13 13 14 16

4 4 3 3 6 Japan Russia United Kingdom 45 39 36 32 28 22 18 United States II 15 17 23 28 31 31 Source. J. Kuczynski, Studien ZUT Geschichte des Kapitalismus, Berlin, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1957.

I - - - - L - - -

Accordingly, the Japanese market accommodated itself to foreign machines and construction methods. But at the same time Japan went ahead with capital accumulation and began production, at first of small, and later of large machinery, with the armaments industry as central, and the shipbuilding, vehicle and electric-machine industries grouped around it. The textile machine industry was not yet ready to stand on its own feet, since the large demand for production posed difficult problems both

7

YO CLUIIUIIIIL LUIIUILIUIIZi ¿uIU LcLillluiu~lLai UGVc1up"'c"L

economically and technologically. Table 21 shows the trends in imported and domestically manufactured textile machinery from

By the outbreak of the First World War, however, the Japa- nese machine industry had substantially achieved independence of the advanced countries. The undue emphasis on the shipbuilding and vehicle industries was ended, and over-all development followed rapidly.

I914 to 1928.

TABLE 21. Trends in imported and domestically manufactured textile machinery, 1914-28

Year Imports Domestic production (in thousand yen) (in thousand yen)

1914 6 256 1916 2 590 1919 15 560 1922 33 612 I924 14 294 1926 9 645 1928 11 330

879

21 914 II 481 I7 519 18 883 23 804

-

Since the Second World War the industry has been completely modernized; pre-war production levels were restored with the demobilization of the workers; equipment has been renewed and increased; foreign technology developed during the war has been introduced; and the market for both capital-goods machinery and consumer-goods machinery has expanded. Never- theless it is considered that in certain fields, such as industrial machinery, machine tools, forging and casting processes, Japa- nese technology still lags behind the West. Though the technological level is rising and production costs are falling, the effects of the former poor foundation are still felt. Even in some of the huge new enterprises there is backwardness, associated with insufficient specialization, complicated financial and management systems, and the 'dual economic structure'.

Advantages cmequent on late technological development

Since its establishment in the middle of the Meiji era, the electrical-equipment industry in Japan has experienced spectacular expansion at two particular stages-the first when it created a new market in materials for electrolysis and electric lighting, and the second when it advanced from electric-lighting equipment (i.e. consumer goods) to electric motors (i.e. production equipment). In the latter case there were special economic conditions associated with the technological development. In the I ~ ~ O S , electrical plant supplied about go per cent of the total primary energy horsepower, not only in large factories, but also in medium and small ones. Consumption of electricity increased continually even during the depression of 1929-32, with the demand for power for the factories and especially for urgently required electrification in medium and small enterprises. By emphasizing the need to rationalize production, the depression actually speeded up the electrification process. Thus the stage of steam power was substantially by-passed, providing an interesting example of an initial state of backwardness resulting in accelerated technological development.

5

Training and employment of manpower for technology

Human resources become valuable on the manpower market only after acquiring general and technological knowledge through education. Accordingly it should be possible to define the quantity and quality of panpower at any given time in terms of the amount of general and technological knowledge acquired. Simi- larly, we can regard the variations and displacements in the quantity and quality of manpower as results of the flow of general and technological knowledge. Quantitative increase of such knowledge is a prerequisite for a country’s economic growth and technological progress. W e can determine a more specific formula to measure that growth and progress by observing the educational dynamics, the qualitative and quantitative changes and shifts in general and technological knowledge.

Stocks of knowledge, as stored in human beings, are produced through : (a) systematic educational activities, i.e. mainly formal education; and (b) incidental education, the scope of which cannot be defined exactly. Meanwhile, the flow of knowledge is affected directly by the demand for educational services. This demand, in a word, dictates whether stocks of knowledge will increase or decrease. Thus the labour market becomes a major factor regulating the pace of economic growth.

The present chapter analyses in turn the following themes: The time evolution in the stocks of knowledge based on formal

education, particularly education conducted under the aegis of the Ministry of Education.

Within formal education, but without restriction to establishments under the Ministry of Education, the role of technological education and its bearing on technological progress.


IO1

Fluctuations of the labour force, with reference to changes in vocational structure and mobility and with emphasis on tendencies considered peculiar to Japan.

The training and deployment of highly skilled technicians. The type of manpower that has made the greatest contributions

to Japan’s industrialization.

Educational trends and manpower resources

According to the White Paper published by the Ministry of Education in 1962~ the total educational capital (defined as the accumulated cost of education) in Japan in 1960 was about twenty-three times the 1905 figure (see Table 22). Furthermore, the growth rate of educational capital exceeded that of both the labour force and the total physical capital. The contribution made by this educational capital towards increasing the national income consists, in the first place, in raising educational standards and increasing the proportion in the working population of those having an advanced education. For the period 1905-55, tentative computations of the profit-earning rate of educational capital-in other words, the extent to which education led to gains in income-yielded the estimate that this factor contributed about 25 per cent of the net increase in national income.2

Educational expenditure, which constitutes the major factor in educational capital, is effected mainly by the central and local governments. In order to obtain a clear idea of trends in the pattern of this expenditure-i.e. the distribution of the investment between the elementary, secondary and higher education levels, the ratio of educational investments to total government expenditure, the proportions in which educational costs are shared by, for example, government, private schools and the people-it is necessary to look at changes in the school system,

Ministry of Education, Japan, Japan’s Growth and Education, Educational Development in Relation to Socio economic Growth (trans- lated into English, 1963).

Ibid, p. 13-15. This trial calculation is based on the method

I

2 - of T. SChdZ.


TABLE 22. Trends in national income, labour force, physical capital and educational capital, 1905-60

National Total Total educational income' Labour force physical capital' capital'.' Year'

I905 1210 IOO 25.6 IOO 5.8 IOO 31 IO0 1910 I 559 129 26.2 102 8.0 138 47 152 1913 2045 169 26.4 103 8.6 148 59 188 1917 2035 168 26.6 104 8.5 147 73 236 1919 2761 228 26.6 104 10.1 174 81 260 1924 3 026 250 28.2 IIO 17.6 304 110 367 I930 4054 335 29.3 115 23.1 398 186 600 I935 5234 433 31.4 123 25.9 447 256 831 I955 7 I79 594 39.2 I53 21.7 374 538 1731 1960 II 822 979 43.7 171 39.8 686 711 2286

I. The years listed are those when surveys were carried out. 2. At 1960 prices. 3. Total educational capital = accumulated cost of education.

Source. Ministry of Education, Japan's Growth and Education, p. IO, 1963.

with particular attention to fluctuations in the social and economic demands on education.

Japan's present educational system was established under the 1872 Code of Education (Gakusei). Solid educational foundations had, however, already been laid during the Tokugawa era. The four main types of educational institutions then existing included Shogunal schools such as the Confucian Academy, established for educating the children of samurai under the direct command of the Shogunate Government; the Domain, or Fief schools which educated the samurai in each clan; the local schools, open to commoners ; and the temple schools, essentially for the education of commoners. Besides these four types of public educational institutions, there were also, during the nineteenth century, private academies with varied educational orientation and with students from many social levels.

As indicated in Table 23; enrolments at these different types Regarding the expansion of educational opportunity and the

change of content of education, the following books should be referred I


TABLE 23. School enrolments., late Tokugawa era

Type of school u p to I829 183e-53 1854-67

Temple schools 219 604 593 790 Domain schools 51 502 61 982 Local schools 9 752 14 695

96 798 Private academies 44 574 Shogunal schools -1

325 432 767 265

-1

I. No record available. 2. Rough estimate.

Source. Herbert Passin, Society and Education in Japan, p. 44, Publications, Teachers’ College, and East Asian Institute, University, I 96 5.

921 720 63 750 29 990 121 708 6 oooa

I I43 168

Bureau of Columbia

of establishments increased greatly during the late Tokugawa era, except at the Domain schools.

This substantial increase in school population and the resulting national increase in literacy produced a trend towards the abolition of the feudal system As shown in Table 24, literacy spread first among the merchant class in the big cities and the samurai who formed the political ruling class. Of extreme interest, however, is the fact that leaders in the farming villages were also almost all literate. W e see that Japan was not stagnating culturally even during the feudal period.

Again, while Japanese society during the late Tokugawa era was economically fluid, as pointed out in Chapter I, the class system, composed of Shi (warrior), na (farmer), Ka (crafsmen) and sho (merchants), was gradually breaking down. Very high enrolments at temple schools and the Co-education of children

to in addition to Passin’s mentioned in Table 23 : Michio Nagai, Nihon no Daiguku [Universities in Japan], Tokyo, Chuokoron-sha, 1965; Michitoshi Kiyohara, ‘Waga Kuni ni okeru Sangyo Gijutsu Kyoiku no Tenkai’ [Development of Technological Education in JapanJ, Sangyo Gijutsu Kyoiku Koza, Vol. I, Tokyo, Ishigyo Shuppan Co., 1958; Mamoru Sato, Totei Kyoiku no Kenkyu [Study on Education of Apprentices], Tokyo, Ochanomizu Shobo, I 962 ; Kyu-Kobudaigakko Shiryo Kanko Kai, Kyu-Kobudaigakko Shiryo [Historical Record of College of Technologyl, 1931; Hiroyasu Ogata, Seiyo Bunka Znyu no Hoto [Ways of Introduction of Western Cultures], Tokyo, Kodansha.


TABLE 24. Literacy rate of different social groups, early Meiji period’

Estimated Social group literacy rate

percentage of group

Samurai: M e n

Merchants in large cities (Figure for w o m e n probably somewhat higher than samurai group)

Merchants in smaller towns and rural areas

Artisan classes in large cities Artisan classes in smaller towns and

rural areas Village notables Village middle strata Lower peasant levels Peasants in more isolated areas

W o m e n Almost IOO

so 1

50-60 50-60

50-60

30-40 20 I

Size of group as percentage

of total population

7

3

2

87

I. There are, in the nature of the case, no precise figures on this subject, but fragmentary evidence does not seem inconsistent with the above interpretation. Data are culled from the 1886 and the 1890 annual reports of the Ministry of Education. However, the population estimates for the essentially urban types (mer-

chants and craftsmen) may be too low, considering that the three great cities of Edo, Osaka and Kyoto alone accounted for about 5 to 6 per cent of the total population, and that towns and cities may have run as high as 15 to 20 per cent altogether. It may be that many people were registered according to their family origin rather than according to their current class position.

Source. Irene B. Taeber, The Population of Japan, p. 26-8, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1958.

from different classes at the same local schools suggest that a cross-class social structure was already functioning in those days. It is not possible to conclude with certainty that it was the social changes, as evinced in the steady collapse of the class system, that gave birth to the demand for education, rather than that the diffusion of education stimulated social changes. It is clear, however, that the relaxation of the class system in the local schools was a reflection of social changes. W e know also that the Shogunal schools and a number of private academies played an important


role in promoting social reforms, through the study of Western science.

Because of the educational foundation already existing in the feudal Tokugawa era, the radical switch-over to a modern society under the Meiji Restoration did not involve a sharp discontinuity in the educational sphere; this is borne out by the fact that elementary-school enrolments around 1875 were about the same as around 1865.

Incidentally, the average person did not necessarily react positively to the government’s call for increased school enrolments under the 1872 Code of Education. T w o reasons for this were: (a) a normal inertial time-lag; and (b) resistance to the new plan because the cost of education was to be borne by the recipient. Still, after educational reforms were promulgated, enrolments at elementary schools went up steadily to 50 per cent in 1891 and go per cent in 1902 (see Figure 6).

%

1873 78 83 88 93 98 1903 O8 13

FIG. 6. School enrolments as percentage for compulsory attendance age group, 1873-1918. (Source. Ministry of Education, op. cit., p. 31.)


Meanwhile, enrolments at secondary schools increased at about the same pace as industrial production (Figure 7). The upward trend of higher education enrolments is a little gentler than that of secondary education.

FIG. 7. Trends in enrolment in institutions of elementary, secondary and higher education. I. Not including semi-secondary education. 2. By the Education Order of 1878, some sub-standard schools were excluded from the number of regular secondary schools. 3. Pupils of upper elementary schools were counted as secondary school enrolment. 4. 1935 = 100.


But the government’s efforts, from early Meiji days, to ensure the satisfactory training of the nation’s future leaders cannot be appreciated from the curves of Figure 7 alone.

Hgher education The fact that up to 1897 Tokyo University was the sole State- sponsored university indicates clearly how the emphasis in higher education was placed on training an élite minority. Tokyo Uni- versity traces its origin to the amalgation in 1869 of several Shogunal schools. In 1877, a college of law was added to the already affiliated colleges of medicine, science and literature. This addition responded to the strongly felt need to provide training for high-level administrators for the modernized government machinery. Although the colleges of technology‘ and agriculture, which had been established under the jurisdiction of the relevant ministries, were not annexed to Tokyo University until r886 and I 890, respectively, high-level training in technology and agriculture had actually been available since the early 1870s in those and other colleges.

While the ideology of the early Meiji leaders was derived exclusively from the samurai ethos,e the social background of those in power gradually became less exclusive, as shown in Table 25. In the 1870s, descendants of the former samurai class accounted for the highest percentage of students at Tokyo Uni- versity. After 1880 that percentage gradually declined, as the door to higher education was gradually opened to other classes? Imperial universities were established in Kyoto (1897), Tohoku (1go7), Kyushu (1910) and Nokkaido (1918). As late as 1946, however, there were only eighteen State and public universities, including junior colleges. It was, in fact, the private universities

I A detailed discussion of colleges of technology is presented under the heading ‘Economic growth and vocational education in Japan’, p. III.

2 See under the heading ‘The period of recovery and high growth’, p. 26.

3 In 1874, warriors constituted 5-6 per cent of the population.


TABLE 25. Tokyo University students in Meiji period: percentage distribution by social status‘

Year Nobles Ex-samurai Commoners

1878

1880 I881 1882 1883 1884 I885

I879 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.0 o. I o. I 0.2 0.2

3.9 77.7 73.6 51.8 49.1 52.9 50.2

51.7

25.5 21.8 25.5 48.2 50.8 47.0, 49.6 48.1

I. Figures from 1878 to 1880 are for the faculties of law, science and literature; figures from 1881 to 1885 include also the faculty of medicine.

and colleges that provided the increased opportunities for higher education in the mid-twentieth century.

Many of these private institutions were established late in the nineteenth century, although some traced their origin to the private academies which flourished in the closing days of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Some had natural-science and humanities faculties, but the majority laid the emphasis on law. This tendency reflected the belief then prevalent that to become a government official was to be assured of social success, and that a law degree was a tremendous help towards this goal. There was also desire to accommodate those who were critical of the Meiji oli- garchy and wished to study law with the object of establishing modern parliamentarianism.

The private higher education institutions of the nineteenth century fell into three main groups: (a) those subscribing to liberalism, as opposed to government control; (b) those established for the study of Japan’s traditional culture; and (c) those conforming to the government’s directives.l However, as Japan’s capitalist economy became functionally established during the

I This classification is based on: Michio Nagai, ‘Chishikijin no Seisan Rut0 [Production of Intellectuals], Kindui Nihon Shisoshi Koza, p. 216-19, Tokyo, Chikuma Shobo, 1959.


late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, society demanded professionals in greater numbers, and the private institutions changed in character to assume functions similar to those of the government-sponsored schools. The Uni- versity Code of 1918, which raised many public and private institutions to university status, resulted in enlarged enrolment in these During the ten-year period from 1915 to 1925, the total university student population increased from less than 35,000 to approximately go,ooo.

Even more rapid, however, was the increase in the number of university students after 1947. The upgrading of the old junior colleges to the status of universities partly accounted for this post-war increase. Again, with the tremendous growth of the economy after 1955, most of the private secondary educational institutions upgraded in 1964 under the new system to senior high schools (i.e. higher than the compulsory junior high schools) established colleges and universities of their own. By 1967, the number of universities and colleges had increased to 309, and that of junior colleges to 451. Total enrolments were 1,160,425 and 234,725 respectively.

In this manner, the emphasis in higher education shifted from research (up to I~IO), to professional training (from 1920 to 1946) and to mass education (since 1950).

Preoccupied with giving the general population an elementary education and with training an élite to hold the reins of power, the Meiji Restoration Government tended to neglect secondary education. The middle school, as a preparatory stage for advancement to the university, and the ‘normal school’, as the training ground for elementary-school teachers, were reorganized after 1880, while vocational secondary education began to develop only at the turn of the century, when Japan’s industrialization came into full swing.

Table 26 shows the numerical trends at different educational levels, over the period 1895-1960.

I Cf. Michio Nagai, Nihon no Daigaku [Universities in Japan], p. 45-54, Tokyo, Chuokoron-sha, 1965.

TABLE 26. Academic background of productive population, 1895-1960: absolute numbers and percentages (unit: 10,000 persons; figures in parentheses indicate percentages)

Year

I895

I935

I950

I 9604

Productive- No attend- Completed Completed age ance at elementary secondary

population' schoola school8 school8

GraduateZ from higher educational establish-

mentss

357 (15.6) I 0 1 5 (41.6) 2 447 (74.3) 3 I54 (82. I) 3 718 (78.5) 3 639 (65.9)

2 (0.1)

5 (0.2)

I. Productive-age population covered people in the 15-54 age bracket for 1895, 1905 and 1925, and those in the 15-59 age group after 1935. Sources are estimates made by the Institute of Population Problems of the Ministry of Welfare, until 1920, and the national census figures after 1920.

2. The numbers of those with 'no attendance at school' were obtained by deducting the total numbers of school graduates from the productive age population in each year.

3. The numbers completing elementary and secondary education and graduating from higher educational institutions were estimated by deducting the number of deaths-estimated according to the 'life-span table' of the Institute of Population Problems of the Ministry of Welfare-from the total numbers of school graduates for each year after 1873, as indicated in the Ministry of Education's Annual Bulletin.

4. The numbers for 1960 are all based on national census figures. Source. Statistical Research Institute, The Role of Education in the Process of Industrialization of Japan, p. 43, Tokyo, 1962 (mimeo.).

In 1940, normal schools became institutions of higher education. In 1947, compulsory education was extended to include grades 7, 8 and 9. At the same time, enrolment in the non-compulsory senior secondary schools increased explosively, in 1967 reaching 74.5 per cent of the eligible age group. The increase in senior high-school enrolment, however, affected mainly those disciplines which students had to study in order to

pass university entrance examinations. The increased high-school numbers raised a host of problems. Thus, there was little vocational education, and doubts were widely prevalent concerning the over-all quality of high-school education and the capabilities of the students completing the courses.

Economic growth and vocational education in Japan

Vocational education at the secondary level

Secondary education during the last half of the nineteenth century did not include systematic vocational education. Until promulgation of the Code of Vocational Education in 1899, this type of training was given in supplementary courses in the elementary schools. Furthermore, despite the official government emphasis on supplementary vocational training, the results were disappointing. The two main reasons for this were: (a) industry in Japan at that time comprised chiefly textile and other light industries, and little need was felt for workers with specialized vocational trailing; (b) the traditional apprenticeship system still prevailed, and industrial circles felt no particular need for people with previous vocational training.l Therefore, despite government attempts to institutionalize vocational, and especially technical education at the secondary level (as discussed later), little was accomplished.

Following a large increase of numbers in elementary schools in the I ~ ~ O S , enrolment in the secondary schools increased tremendously by more than 50 per cent during that decade. Voca- tional training this period was primarily in agricultural techniques. In the secondary industries the development was slower than in the primary and tertiary industries. On the other hand, although the number of agricultural schools increased from 56

Michitoshi Kiyohara, 'Waga Kuni ni okeru Sangyo Gijutsu Kyoiku no Tenkai' [Development of Technological Education in Japan], Sangyo Gijutsu Kyoiku Koza, Vol. I, p. 143, Tokyo, Ishigyo Shuppan Co., 1958.

I


to 339 between 1900 and 1930, there was, nevertheless, a shortage of personnel with agricultural training at the secondary level.1

The 1899 Vocational Education Code was enacted in response to demands by industrialists for skilled craftsmen. Mean- while, technical education at the secondary level was being institutionalized under the provisions of the Apprentice School Code of 1895, designed to replace the earlier irrational and unsystem- atic arrangements for training apprentices. Apprentice schools were already established in the centres of production of the traditional industries, mainly pottery, lacquerware and dyeing2 The main aims of the 1899 Code were, on the one hand, to consolidate those technological schools already existing in urban areas and, on the other, to reorganize apprentice schools of the rural areas within the structure of newly established apprentice schools in urban areas. Under this policy, technical secondary schools (technical high schools and apprentice schools) from the beginning of the twentieth century began to focus their attention on electricity, machinery and applied chemistry. Technical schools at the secondary level, geared to the modernization of Japanese industry, gradually shed their traditional character as apprentice schools and developed, quantitatively and qualitatively, into modern institutions. Their development was accelerated after the First World War, concurrently with the growth of the heavy and chemical industries.

Following educational reforms in 1947, technical education at the secondary-school level became an integral part of senior secondary education. Technical institutions, in other words, were non-compulsory, independent institutions (as opposed to those subordinate and preparatory to institutions of higher education). Many of these technical institutions, however, were forced to rely on pre-1940 facilities and methods of instruction; they were largely neglected as more and more attention was paid to secondary education in preparation for entering universities and colleges. At the same time, reflecting structural changes within the

Michitoshi Kiyohara, op. cit., p. 170. Mamoru Sato, Totei Ecyoiku no Kenkyu [Study on Education

I 2

of Apprentices], p. I 10-12, Tokyo, Ochanomizu Shobo, 1962.

Training and employment of manpower 113 for technology

economy and the diffusion of technological advances, the character of technical education has undergone significant changes, notably by the inclusion of courses in electronics, automatic control, aviation and industrial management,

The establishment of technological institutes in 1947 dra- matically symbolized the arrival of the modern technological era, involving the change from a multi-track to a comprehensive system and providing equal opportunity for high-school education to all those completing compulsory education and satis- fying high-school ability and aptitude requirements. (The same equality of opportunity exists for high-school ‘graduates’ proceeding to universities.) The institutes of technology combine three years of senior secondary education (high school) with two years of college education, to give students continuous specialized technological training. This system is designed, on the one hand, to alleviate the scarcity of college graduates with engineering degrees and, on the other, to meet the demands for personnel with technological competence higher than merely secondary- level technical education. Employers’ associations actively supported legislation for technological insti tutes, thereby expressing their deep concern for the needs of technological modernization. The main aim of this system, the training of medium-level technicians, is also important in that it serves to correct a certain wastefulness previously inherent in the education system.

ScientiJic and technological education at the higher level

In view of the importance of the subject for the development of technology in Japan, it is worth while to examine in some detail the evolution of higher education in science, on the one hand, and in engineering on the other.

The first point to note is the relative prominence of engineering. While the numbers of students in all scientific fields have increased tremendously since the Meiji Restoration, the increase in engineering has far outstripped that in other activities. Specifically, the number of students in higher engineering education rose from about 1,000 at the beginning of this century to

8

I 14 Training and employment of manpower for technology

over IOO,OOO in 1960. T o appreciate the factors which induced these increases it must be remembered that, under the circumstances prevailing in the early days of the Meiji government, the science and technology of Japan depended heavily on knowledge imported from European and North American countries. The employment of natural scientists and technicians from these countries was inevitable; their numbers reached a maximum around 1S8o. The contributions of these foreign specialists to science and engineering education were highly appreciated ; but at the same time, as pointed out for example in the prospectus of the Institute of Technology, it was recognized that Japan ‘should not rely indefinitely on foreign engineers and technicians, and that the Japanese themselves must acquire their own techno-

Tokyo University and other higher education institutions had a number of foreign instructors giving lectures in their own language, while at the same time Japanese travelled abroad to further their studies; most of the Japanese professors who eventually replaced the foreign ones in these universities had finished their higher education in Japan and had studied abroad for a few years. Of 439 students who studied abroad between 1875 and 1908, 60 per cent (259 students) majored in one of the natural sciences, thus far exceeding the number majoring in the humani ties.

By 1892, a total of 441 engineers graduated from Tokyo University and the Institute of Technology with degrees in civil engineering, mechanical engineering, shipbuilding, electrical engineering, architecture, applied chemistry, or mining and metal- lurgy. The Sino- Japanese War that followed shortly afterwards had a great impact not only on industrialization but also on education in Japan. The establishment of Kyoto Imperial University, which had long been pending, was realized in 1897, stimulated in no small measure by the Sino- Japanese War. By 1900, a total

Kyu-Kobudaigakko Shiryo Kanko Kai, Kyu-Kobuduigakko

Hiroyasu Ogata, Sayo Bunku Znyu no Hot0 [Ways of Intro-

logy’.l

I

2 Shiryo [Historical Record of College of Technologyl, 1931.

duction of Western Culturesl, Tokyo, Kodansha.


TABLE 27. Graduates from higher technological institutes

Number o€ graduates Institution Total

up to 1880 1881-89 189c-r9oo

Tokyo Imperial University 103 332 650 I o85 39 39 Kyoto Imperial University - -

Tokyo Institute of 140 615 755

Others Technology -

- I 62 162

TOTAL 103 472 1466 2041

- - I __ -

of 2,000 engineers had graduated from all the technological institutes (see Table 27).

The Code of Professional Schools promulgated in 1903 applied to all technical schools at higher level. By 1901, the technological high schools of Tokyo and Osaka had been expanded and reinforced as higher-level vocational training institutes, and by virtue of the 1903 Code only high-school ‘graduates’ could qualify for admission to these schools.

As regards junior colleges and professional schools, the trend in their numbers between 1900 and 1930 is shown in Figure 8.

After the medical, pharmaceutical and dental schools, the increase is the most marked for the industrial (engineering) colleges. Furthermore, the period covered in Figure 8, including as it does the years of the First World War, saw Japan’s GNP reach new heights, with rapid advances in the heavy and chemical industries. However, the period of steepest increase in the number of engineering colleges is that from 1920 to 1925. The significance of this is that a time-lag existed between the demand for specialized engineers and the institutionalization of technological training. But this provides only a partial explanation of the situation; for, of the twelve engineering colleges established between 1920 and 1925, only two were located in existing industrial centres. Most of the engineering colleges founded earlier were located by prefectural governments in prefectural capitals,

2i' 15

25

L + -e-.-.-.. /--

1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930

. . . Medicine, pharmaceutics, _. -._._._ Agriculture dentistry - Engineering _._._._. - Science

-.-...-.- Commerce -.-.-.-.- Shipping

FIG. 8. Trend in the number of junior colleges. (Source. Nihon Kuguku Gzjutsu-shi Daieki, Vol. 9, 1965, p. 275; compiled by the Society for the History of Science and Technology of Japan.)


with a view to developing their local industries (textiles, mining, etc.). As well as the courses directly related to the local industries, these local colleges included additional courses such as electrical and mechanical engineering. In the light of these facts, the increase in the number of colleges from 1920 to 1925 did not necessarily meet the specific requirements of their localities.

In the long m, however, it must be recognized that the establishment of these colleges at different localities contributed greatly to the industrialization of the economy. As discussed later, the benefit derived from the multiplicity of engineering colleges in local areas is that they facilitated the geographical distribution of engineers and helped to diffuse engineering technology widely.

The trend of enrolment increases in technological institutes is shown in Figure 9.

While the numbers in the medical, dental and pharmaceutical schools were highest until 1939, enrolment in engineering colleges took the lead from then until 1946. In 1940, the Scientific Development Council recommended that there should be an increase in the number of senior high-school ‘graduates’ to utilize the enrolment capacity of the increasing number of universities (see Figure IO) and thus more nearly satisfy the demand for specialists, which always exceeded the supp1y.l

At the same time, the popular demand for higher education actually surpassed the capacity of the education system despite the repeated reorganizations.

This unmet need for higher education became all the more acute in 1955, and the demand for access to higher technical institutions has increased even more since 1960, while the co- lossal expansion of Japan’s economy and the rapid progress of industrialization has more than maintained the strong demand for engineers and technicians.

Needess to say, however, a quantitative increase in scientific and technological manpower does not automatically result in the

I Nhon Kagaku Gijutsu-shi Gakkai, Nihon Kagaku Gijutsushi Daikei, Vol. IO, p. 185-6, 1966.

A

118

70

60

50

40

30

20

-i f 5 c 1( .- I ." c al a

s cn c

L

d æ

A

_.-.-.. _.-.-*a -

1925 1930 I5 1940 1945

40

30

10

Technology

Medicine, pharmaceutic, dentistry -

_._._._._ Agriculture _._._ ._._ Science

FIG. 9. Trend of student numbers in junior colleges. (Source. Ministry of Education, '70-Year History of Industrial Education', Annual Bulletin.)


maintenance of technology at a high level, nor in the development of new technology. While the achievements of Japanese industry since 1950 have been spectacular, they have been due more to the introduction and efficient utilization of imported high-level technology than to indigenous technology, though of course they would not have been possible without the indigenous technological potentiality and the ingenuity of the many Japanese engineers who had successfully assimilated the technologies imported from the advanced countries of Europe and North America. Now, as before, it is still a primary responsibility of the science and engineering faculties of Japanese universities to nurture and train scientists, engineers and technologists capable of opening up new and untrodden paths.

- Technology - Medicine -._._.-.- Science

_._._._._ Agriculture

/

-J /' ,_.-.

FIG. IO. Trend in the number of Chairs in Imperial universities. (Source. History of Development of Education System since Meiji Era; Materials on Modern Education System.)


Occupational mobility and employment of factory workers

The pattern of the employment in Japanese enterprises, which has operated without disturbance since before the Second World War, is characterized by the seniority system and the custom that employees are never discharged. What were the characteristics of the employment market and the peculiar labour mobility conditions that resulted in this particular pattern? These are the basic questions that must now be dealt with, in relation first to factory workers and then to technicians.

Employment and mobility of workers In the initial period of industrialization, factory workers were recruited from nearby farm villages. According to the social reforms following the Meiji Restoration, factory workers should have been drawn from all classes, including the former samurai (warriors), farmers, and traditional craftsmen. In the event, however, the majority of the Japanese popu1ation;l modern factories were often built in rural districts and many farmers lived in the vicinity of cities. On the other hand, since the technical skills of craftsmen in the Tokugawa era were seldom immediately appli- cable to modern techniques, nearly all the available workers in those early Meiji years were unskilled, although the need for skilled workers had already been felt in some of the government- run factories. T o meet the need for skilled workers, institutes were created in certain factories to give on-the-job training; it then became possible to reassign the upgraded employees within the factory.

Until around the end of the nineteenth century, there were three major categories of wage-earning workers : the metal workers in the machinery industry; the textile workers-mainly girls ; and the miners, regarded as forming the lowest class of society.2

I Around 1875, farmers accounted for about 80 per cent of Japan’s total population. 6

2 Mikio Sumiya, Nihon Chinrodo-shi Ron [Historical Argument on Japan’s Wages and Labour], Tokyo, Tokyo University Publishing Bureau, 1955.


I21

Female textile workers, and particularly the girls in the spinning mills, constituted the largest working force. They were recruited at first from the farm villages near the factory, by ‘recruiting squads’ established by the different companies ; but as the scale of affairs expanded, the labour market gradually grew to include remoter areas. With the expansion of the enterprises, the mobility of the workers increased; their migrations from the country-side often represented a form of escape,l and it was not unusual for the annual total of those leaving a given enterprise to exceed that of the new recruits. According to data from around 1900, the aggregate employment figures for fifteen spinning firms were as follows : I 3. I per cent of the workers left the company less than six months after joining, and only 23.6 per cent worked for the full term of the employment contract.z

Meanwhile, how did the skilled workers in the machinery factories and steel mills fare? During the nineteenth century there were many workers in the government-managed factories who, acquiring the technical skills taught there, moved to the newly established factories; they were called ‘migrant labourers’. The demand for skilled workers by these heavy industries grew at a phenomenal rate in the early part of the twentieth century, with the progress of mechanization and the development of technology. Every enterprise m e d to secure skilled workers by establishing its own training institute and by introducing a labour administration system designed to stem the outfiow of its working force. The Technological School of the Mitsubishi Nagasaki Shipyard (founded in 1898) and the Yawata Steel Mill’s Juvenile Factory Workers Training Institute (founded in 1910) are representative of this type of training institute. The number of

I

2

Wakizo Hosoi, Joko Ai-shi [Pathetic History of Factory Girls], p. 53-7, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1954 (first published in 1925).

Keizo Fujibayashi, ‘Meiji Nijunen-dai ni okeru waga Boseki- Rodosha no Ido-Gensho ni tsuite’ [On Mobility of Japan’s Spinning Industry Workers during 1887-971, in: Meiji Siryo Kenkyu Renrakukai (comp.), Mezji-Zenki no Rod0 Mondai, p. 169, supplementary Vol. I, Tokyo, Ochanomizu Shobo, 1960. Contracts for factory workers varied in duration depending on the

company; usually they were for a few years.


factories having such institutes continued to increase through the 1920s; the tendency to emphasize technological education was, however, much more marked in the government-run factories than in those under private management.

Other measures taken to diminish the outflow of workers included revision of the promotion system and the age limit, and the improvement of employees’ welfare provisions. Thus, more emphasis was laid on the further education of those who had merely completed their compulsory schooling, and especially on vocational education for women workers. Such educational activities came to be regarded as vital to labour administration po1icy.l

It has already been noted that until early in the twentieth century the supply of manpower was often insufficient; the recruitment of workers was a problem to be solved by each individual enterprise. Because of this, the labour market was, generally speaking, a closed one. The government’s labour administration remained a weak spot in its industrial policy, and in fact no nation-wide employment agency was established until 1923.~

The later evolution of the labour supply was strongly influenced by questions of interregional labour mobility and the structure of the labour market. A survey of the spinning industry in 1932, focused on this aspect, showed that while the farm villages still constituted the major source for the supply of workers, the latter mostly migrated before long to jobs in other areas.

As an inevitable consequence of these migrations of the workers, agriculture fell behind during the 1920s and 1930s; during this period productivity showed a much more marked growth in industry than in agriculture.

Other detailed studies show interesting features of this migration to the urban districts. Thus, during the later 1920s and

As to the historical progress of technical education within companies, see : Koichi Ishiwara, Nihon Gijutsu Kyoiku-sha’ Ron [Historical Argument on Japan’s Technological Education], Tokyo, San’ichi Shobo, 1962.

While the Employment Security Law was enacted only in 1921, employment exchange agencies had been at work even before that date.

I

2

Training and employment of manpower 123 for technology

early 1930s the phenomenon gradually changed from migration by a part of a household to that of a whole family. In most of the partial migrations it was second and third sons who emigrated. Again, the migration was related to the economic level of the farming household-the farmers in the lower-income bracket tended more strongly to move into the urban areas. Lastly, the type of job taken after migration was closely related to such factors as the school background and age. As might be expected, workers with a higher school education usually found jobs of higher grade and social status.l

After migration from the farm villages, the workers’ careers followed various patterns. A part of the picture is given by Table 28, which analyses the job changes of workers leaving spinning factories over the years 1923-36.

TABLE 28. Movements of discharged factory workers, 1923-36 (as percentages)

Back to Year To industry farming Others Unemployed

I923 I924 1925 1926 I927 1928 I929 I930 1931 1932 1933 1934 I935 1936

40.0 43.0 37.9 37.2 30.8 30.8 28.0 25.4 18.7 24.6 25.3 31.5 32.4 44.3

39.6 35.7 39.3 37.6 40.2 40.2 44.7 45.7 49.0 51.4 50.6 43.8 42.5 28.2

12.4 13.4 14.4 14.0 12.1 18.0 13.9 16.5 18.5 13.8 14.7 15.8 17.5 15.4

8.0 7.9 8.4

16.9

13.4 12.4 13.8

9.4 8.9 7.6

11.2

11.0

10.2

12.1

Source. Shunsaku Nishikawa, Inter-Regioml Labour Migration and Labour Market, Tokyo, Yuhikaku, p. 62, 1966.

I Shigeo Nojiri, Nomin Rison no Qissho-teki Kenkyyu [Corro- borative Study of Farmers’ Desertion of Villages], Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1934.


Over some periods, as many as 50 per cent of those who quit their jobs in factories reverted to farming, though not necessarily in their native villages; the initial village-to-city labour flow was followed by a smaller reverse flow from city-to-village. Thus a part of the Japanese labour force may be regarded as having found ‘temporary work away from home’. And while the outflow of the working force from the farm villages was accelerated due to the depressed state of the agricultural sector during the 1920s and 1930s~ the change in the industrial distribution of population was not very radical.

During the 1930s and up to 1945, when the nation had been subjected to war-time or quasi war-time conditions, the composition, deployment and transfers of the labour force had been tightly controlled by the State; generally speaking, the workers were directed by conscription and mobilization into the war industries. After the Second World War, the industrial distribution of the working population was characterized by a sharp decline in primary industries along with a steady increase in the secondary and tertiary industries, in line with the trends in other advanced nations.

The occupational pattern and mobility With changes in Japan’s industrial structure, the occupational pattern also became more complicated. At the beginning of the twentieth century, vocational specialization in Japanese society made itself more noticeable as the social functions of the various schools became differentiated.

Trends in occupational distribution from 1920 to 1955 are shown in Table 29, in which the different job categories of the national census are regrouped for simplification.

The occupational pattern in 1947, i.e. immediately after the end of the Second World War, was quite similar to that of 1920. In later years, however, there was a consistent decline in the proportion engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishery (classification c). At the same time, a gradual increase occurred in the proportion of those engaged in managerial, technological and


TABLE 29. Percentage trends in occupational distribution, 1920-55

Job classification1 1920 I930 I947 I950 I955

A 12.3 13.6 13.5 15.0 15.7 B 22.8 23.1 24.3 24.8 27.2 C 54.0 49.0 53.5 47.0 40.4

12.5 16.7 D 11.0 14.3 8.7 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

I. In this job classification, A includes specialized and technological occupations (census class I), managerial occupations (II), clerical jobs (III); B comprises mining and quarrying (VI), transport (VII), skilled workers, -production workers and unskilled workers not classified otherwise (VIII) ; C includes agriculture, forestry, fishery and related occupations (V); D includes marketing (IV) and servicing (IX). Occupations not classifiable as above are not included. Source. Toshio Kuroda, ‘Occupational Mobility of Population’, in : Hiromi Arisawa, Seiichi Tohata and Ichiro Wakayama (eds.), Lecture on Economic Independence, Vol. III, p. 81, Tokyo, Chuo Koron Co., 1960.

__ __ __ _ _ _ _

other white-collar jobs (classification A) as well as in the marketing and servicing fields (classification D).

These trends reflect the advance of urbanization and of the bureaucratization of various segments of society, and the increasing differentiation of the social structure in general. White-collar workers had already made their appearance in Japan in the administrative organization in the early Meiji years, and, with their number limited, their privileged status was ensured. Not until the phenomenal progress in industrialization, from the beginning of the twentieth century, was there a sharp increase in the white-collar population; this was obviously associated with the growth of higher education.

During the troubled years of recession following the First World War, and even more after 1929, the incidence of unemployment sent some of these white-collar workers back to manual activities. As a consequence, the ‘white-collar unions’ found a larger role to play in the trade-union movement around 1920, .and again, temporarily, during the chaotic period after the


Second World War. But in spite of these perturbations there has been a steady growth in the numbers of white-collar workers, corresponding with the increased numbers obtaining secondary and higher education.

A considerable degree of occupational mobility was of course essential to permit such a change in the occupational structure. According to a recent survey published in Tokyo, the extent of contemporary inter-generation mobility in Japan is indicated in Table 30.

The figure 42 for manual-worker fathers with non-manual -worker sons is rather high compared to the international standard. As against this upward mobility, the downward mobility from non-manual to manual jobs is appreciably lower at 17 per cent. From these figures it may be inferred that the Japanese people have effectively adapted themselves to the century-long industrial transformation. Japanese farmers are said generally to expect their children to leave farming and find non-manual jobs in the cities, and this attitude has undoubtedly contributed greatly to the industrialization of Japan.

At the same time it is relevant to study the frequency of job changes in the contemporary Japanese situation. According to the same work by Ken’ichi Tominaga, some 30 per cent of the total did not change jobs at all. When considered from the point of view that it is the practice in Japanese enterprises to employ

TABLE 30. Inter-generation mobility between manual and non-manual workers (as percentage)

Father Son

Manual Non-manual

Manual 83 I7 Non-manual 42 58

Source. Ken’ichi Tominaga, ‘Japanese Society and Occupational Mobility’, in : Tomoo Odaka (comp.), Technological Innovations and Human Problems, p. 288, Tokyo, Diamond Publishing Ltd., 1963.


personnel on a lifetime basis, this may not be regarded as very high; but it is nevertheless a substantial proportion.

As regards the job changes that were recorded, these did not involve a high proportion of movement from manual to non-manual occupations, compared with the inter-generation mobility.

While it may not be easy to say decisively whether the occupational mobility rate is high or not, there is no doubt that it has played some role, since Japan’s rapid industrialization process involved a great deal of labour mobility in its early stages. Occupational mobility in Japan has been influenced by the per- sistent efforts made by the enterprises to prevent worker movements, as part of the employment policy that has been followed since the beginning of the twentieth century and has been retained as an ideal even after the Second World War. Policy in this respect derives from the desire of managements to retain able staff and to ensure the supply of skilled workers in their own enterprises. This employment policy was originally fostered by the closed nature of the labour market long maintained in Japan, and by the peculiar conditions of the country.

It has now been recognized, in the light of changing world conditions, that continuance of this traditional manpower policy may have harmful results, and a certain relaxation of the former extreme immobility is becoming apparent. It is of course important, in introducing this desirable change, to ensure that those aspects of the earlier system which are still useful should not be rejected.

Deployment and mobility of technologists

W e must now examine the employment picture as regards technologists after their graduation, paying particular attention to the frequency and range of their subsequent movements. Our analysis covers graduate technologists from universities, from technology colleges and from the earlier higher technological schools, and distinguishes three major periods, namely : the early


Meiji years; from 1900 to 1935; and the post-Second-World- War period.

The employment of technologists at the start of industrialization

By rgoc-regarded as marking the close of the early industrial period-the number of graduates from the technology departments of the comparatively recently established higher-education institutions was just over 2,000. For all but some IOO of these, information is available regarding their first employment; this information is summarized in Table 30, which shows the distribution of these graduates among the different employment sectors, towards the end of the nineteenth century.

It will be seen that the proportion joining educational institutions gradually declined, while the proportions employed by the government and private-industry sectors increased, the latter to a marked degree. These trends are explained by the circumstance that private enterprise had been expanding since the take-over of the government factories between 1863 and

TABLE 31. Employment of technology graduates, 1883-1900

Employment sector Percentage of graduates

1883 1889 1892 1900

Educational institutions 24.2 13.2 10.2 8.8 Government agencies 59.0 34.1 39.9 39.0 Private industry 3.5 23.1 29.5 42.9 Self-employed 0.8 I .o 5.2 0.4 Others 12.5 28.6 15.2 8.9

TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

(Absolute numbers) 1259) (311) (383) (989) Source. Ikuo Amano, Training Formula and Employment Structure of Tech- nicians during Industrial Revolution Era, p. 165-6, Tokyo, 1965 (Study of educational sociology, No. 20). Figures for 1883 and 1889 computed from Kohgakkui-shi [Technological Academy Journal]. Figures for 1892 and 1900 based on the Tokyo Imperial University Calendar.


1889, while the increase in the number of posts in the educational and research institutions was very much less.

More detailed figures available for the year 1903 suggest that government agencies were then employing a larger proportion of the total number of technologists than indicated in Table 31, and that, moreover, about 30 per cent of these government- employed technologists were on administrative duties.

The Meiji Government’s industrial development policy stressed social investments in such spheres as roads, harbours, railways, etc. as well as modern management systems, and specialized technologists were used for supervising these activities.

Occupational mobility towards the close of the nineteenth century was investigated for a limited random sample consisting of 241 technologists. Of these, 58 per cent stayed more or less permanently with the organizations that engaged them immediately after their graduation from the universities; the remaining 42 per cent later switched tootherorganizations. Those who stayed were mostly in government agencies rather than in the educational research or industrial sectors. Classified by their major course of study in the university, machinery and construction- engineering graduates exhibited greatest occupational mobility, while those specializing in shipbuilding, mining and civil engineering tended to be more settled. The predominant direction of technologist job movements was from the government, education and research sectors towards private industry, thus emphasizing the growing role of the private sector in technological development at this period.

The manpower contribution of higher technological schools

During the second half of the nineteenth century, engineers (technologists) and skilled workers (technicians) were being trained at two dserent levels of secondary education and higher education. From about the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of engineering colleges called ‘higher technological schools’, were established or extended. These higher technological schools were originally designed to train middle-grade

9


technicians, but their graduates were generally treated by industry like university graduates; in other words, the records of major firms indicate that graduates of universities and higher technological schools received similar positions and salaries. The reasons for this were, first, that the supply of university-educated technologists did not increase fast enough for the progress of industrialization, and secondly, that the high quality of the students trained by these higher technological schools-notably those at Tokyo and Osaka (which were upgraded to become universities in 1929)-justified this raised status.

An analysis, covering the first part of the twentieth century, of the occupational distribution of graduates from seven higher technological schools, established in different regions, shows predictably that the numbers employed in the manufacturing industry are proportionately larger in the more industrialized areas; service industries claimed only a small proportion in all areas.

The analysis demonstrates, among other things, that the higher technological schools constituted an important source of supply for middle-grade technological schoolteachers.

Most of the technologists surveyed had already experienced their first regional migration in attending their chosen higher technological school. After graduating, fewer than 70 per cent found jobs in the same prefecture as the school.

The contributions made by these technological graduates to the development of the local areas surrounding the higher technological schools and the big industrial zones were very considerable.

Some marked differences were noted between the training and job distributions of these technologists and the university graduates. Thus, graduates from the higher technological schools were employed by the regional government agencies in preference to university graduates. Moreover, while the universities enrolled mainly ‘graduates’ of preparatory schools, the higher technological schools enrolled ‘graduates’ from the secondary technological schools who had already completed the middle-grade technical education, and were thus able to producetechnologists


of the calibre demanded during the era of full-fledged industrialization around 1905 and the growth of the heavy and chemical industries in the 1930s.

Employment of technologists after the Second World War The increase of higher-educational institutions for training technologists immediately after the Second World War was not as rapid as that of institutions in the field of social or cultural sciences. But the pace accelerated in the second half of the I ~ ~ O S , with a corresponding growth in the proportion of students majoring in natural science and technology in all the universities. Students majoring in technology had a great advantage in finding employment; during 1952-55, for example, the employment rate for graduates of technological departments averaged 8530 per cent, whereas that for graduates in the fields of cultural and social sciences ranged from as low as 56 per cent to 79 per cent.l Equally important, more than go per cent of the employed technological graduates were in occupations where they could make active use of their technological expertise; the employment market had remained open to technologists both qualitatively and quantitatively, throughout the economic fluctuations that followed the Second World War and continued until about 1955m2

Technological innovations since 1955 have raised the social position of technologists both inside and outside the industrial enterprises. This can be seen in the occupational distribution of graduates from technological departments : as shown in Table 32, 13.8 per cent of technology graduates had managerial work in addition to the 53.5 per cent in straight technological work and the 7.6 per cent doing specialized work. These proportions show up very satisfactorily against those for graduates from other

I

2

Research Section, Research Bureau, Ministry of Education, Daigaku to Syushoku [University and Employment], p. 173, 1957.

Research Section, Research Bureau, Ministry of Education, Shokuba ni okeru Gakureki Kosei [Distribution of School Background in Workshops], p. 63, 1954.


fields of study. Thus technological specialization had become a major road to the job category generally earning high social status.

The most recent trend is for an increasing participation of science graduates coinciding with the greater importance attached to research and development in industrial enterprises.

The annual rate of increase for science graduates employed in secondary industry is about 35 per cent, higher than for graduates from any other field of study. It is recognized nowadays that the development of new industrial techniques depends on technology in combination with fundamental science. The strong demand for science graduates reflects industry’s recognition of this need, and is in turn reflected in the higher social standing of the scientists.

TABLE 32. Percentage distribution of graduates from higher educational institutions by nature of work

Nature of work1

A B C D E F G Graduate

Law/literature/

Education 23.9 4.2 14.1 4.4% Science 33.3 26.2 20.5 9.3 Technology 7.6 53.5 13.8 8.1 Agriculture 14.1 18.3 15.1 20.8 Medical/dental/

Home/economics

economics 20.0 18.5 45.6 10.6

pharmaceutical 66.6 7.9 9.0 6.9

and others 39.6 30.2 7.9 5.1 I. A = Specialized. B = Technological. C = Research. D = Managerial.

E = Clerical. F = Marketing. G = Other. 2. Labour administration.

Source. Ministry of Education, Research Section, School Background and Job Category in Work-places, p. 21, 1967.

6

Management and leadership in industry

In studying the factors contributing to Japan’s industrialization and technological progress, we note some aspects which cannot easily be measured. Economists refer to these globally as the ‘Japanese potentiality’. The evolution of the management system and entrepreneurial activity during the process of industrialization of Japan, and general attitudes towards industry are examined below.

Management and industrial development

The organization of government-owned factories At the end of the Tokugawa period, there were already a few factors employing hundred of workers : these enterprises were owned and managed by the Bakufu (Shogunate Government) and some hans (feudal clans); after the Meiji Restoration, the new government took over their administration. Yokosuka shipyard is a typical example. Since the machinery and steel industries were not yet developed at that time, the activities of this shipyard included the production and repair of machinery as well as shipbuilding; thus, it dealt with heavy industry in general.

The take-over by the Meiji régime made little immediate difference to the organization and management of these heavy- industry enterprises. At the Yokosuka shipyard five categories of personnel could be distinguished, namely : (a) senior managers (high-level government officials) ; (b) middle-level managers (also


government officials) ; (c) supervisory workers (government employees); (d) workmen not on the permanent staff; and (e) temporary labourers (unskilled workers doing miscellaneaous jobs). The five categories corresponded to the social strata of that period. Most of those in class (a) were of samurai origin, while class (e) was composed of the poverty-stricken and prisoners. Those in class (c) had been previously employed by the Bakufu, and in this respect were distinguished from those in class (d).

Changes in the government organization, coupled with the increasing numbers of workers and the growing importance of the technological factor in the work, led before long to some changes in the industrial picture also. By 1873, the second grade of officials at the Yokosuka shipyard included thirty-eight engineers, while the next lower level included 102 technician/ supervisory staff. Nowever, most of the rigid grade distinctions were still in force, and it was not until the late 1870s that it became possible for initially unskilled workers who received training in the enterprise’s own training institution to be upgraded to skilled j0bs.l

At this period, most of the industrial equipment was still being imported, as also were the engineers and skilled workers who operated it. The high-level and middle-level Japanese personnel in the enterprises were engaged mainly on administrative work, even when their titles indicated a more technological activity.

As regards the wage system, whereas during the early days the relation between the pay and the job was rather uncertain, with increasing precision of job allocation and control system, wages came to be matched to the worker’s status, which was determined precisely and firmly in the factory. Around 1885, the category of workmen was subdivided into groups such as ‘special’, ‘general’, ‘boys’ and probationers; and each of these had three to eight further sub-divisions.

I R. Bendix, ‘ACase Study in Cultural andEducationalMobility : Japan and the Protestant Ethic’, in: N. J. Smelser and S. M. Lipset (eds.), Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development, 1966.

Management and leadership in industry I35

Management in private industrial enterprises

Around 1885 the Meiji Government, realizing that the financial situation of its directly operated factories was unsatisfactory, transferred these factories progressively to private enterprises, many of which adopted the policy of employing workers indi- rectly as a means of converting the deficit operation to a profitable one. Even in quite large factories, many processes were performed by hand: and the supervision of the many manual labourers raised difficulties. In such cases the owner subcontracted the production work, retaining the accounting and sales sectors under his direct control. Under the subcontractor system, the ‘boss’ recruited labourers (sometimes through agents), controlled the works, and paid the wages.

The organization of the private enterprises in the Meiji period thus differed substantially from that of the government- controlled factories.

However, the progressive mechanization of the production process and the expansion of the scale of activity accelerated the transition from the subcontractor (indirect employment) system to the direct-employment system. The timing of the transition differed from industry to industry, usually occurring when skill in operating machines, rather than simple manual work, came to be essential.

At the same time, the expertise of the increasing body of newly emerging technologists and technicians became more and more valued in high-level posts in the factories.

Early twentieth-century ‘paternalism’ in management

Government-controlled factories, including those later transferred to private hands, had been on a fairly large scale, with thousands of workers, from the early days. Other enterprises which started in the 1880s expanded gradually; and this expansion naturally tended to increase the social distance between employers and employed.

Social solidarity in the local community decreased with the tendency to recruit workers from further afield; and communi-


cation between proprietors, managers and workers within the enterprise progressively deteriorated. Difficulties of this kind increased further as enterprises established branches in different geographical areas. Meanwhile, labour relations remained primitive, with low wages and penalty systems persisting.

It was not until 1910 that labour unions became active in demanding improvement of working conditions. Simultaneously, active criticism came from the outside in the form of general reviews and articles in magazines; but the theme was analysed as a humanitarian question rather than as an economic problem.

It is reasonable to assume, and the history of other advanced countries supports the view, that the retention of such primitive labour conditions was due to the industrialists’ need to compete in the international markets at a period when not only their natural but also their technological resources were still limited. However, various changes in general conditions soon promoted a transformation in the style of industrial management.

First in importance was the change in the labour movement. U p to 1910, the workers expressed their protest against the primitive labour system and poor working conditions by sabotage and rioting. Numerically, protest demonstrations at the peak in the Meiji era, in 1911, amounted to only fifty-seven labour disputes with about a thousand workers participating.

In 1912, the labour union established itself on a nation-wide basis. At first, its policy was one of co-operation between labour and management, but gradually it developed a more class- conscious attitude. As a result, labour disputes in 1918 numbered well over 2,000, with over 335,000 workers participating.

Second was the change in the general educational level of the workers, which had risen with the spread of compulsory education and educational standardization. Only very few workers were now without at least elemenrary school education.

In the third place, the number of ‘graduates’ from junior and senior high schools had increased greatly, and quite a number of them had administrative and managerial posts, though their further career prospects were not equal to those of the university graduates.


T h e general effect of these changes in the industrial picture was to encourage and stimulate labour activities and labour union movements. Management and administration were not strongly enough established to meet the changing needs of the time in spite of the enormous growth of the management structure. A new outlook was needed; in response to this need, there appeared the new type of management called ‘familism’ or, more usually, ‘paternalism’. In this system, the relation between the capitalist-industrialist and his workers resembles that between parents and sons; both sides accept that the interest and welfare of the one depends directly on the other. The system is based on the traditionally Japanese concept of a family-centred life, where the wholesome relation between the head of the family, or a patron, and the rest of the clan creates a warm atmosphere of co-operation.

Even before 1910, such ideas had already been expressed by capitalist-industrialists and administrators. The first draft of the factory laws was prepared in 1898 and was presented to the National Diet several times, but its approval was delayed until r g ~ I ; and the strong opposition to these laws from the capitalist- industrialists and managing administrators was motivated precisely by the fear that such laws would disturb the existing paternalistic system.

Later developments of paternalism in management

Differences between the paternalistic ideology in management before 1910, when the stress was on human relations, and that of the later years were very marked.

During the fifteen years following 1905, Japan’s industrial revolution was in full swing; the economy fluctuated violently under the impact of international forces, but industrialization was nevertheless achieved with amazing rapidity.

During the previous period, the relation between management and workers had been established in terms of the difference of social status between master and servants: rises in wages and


betterment of workers’ conditions were regarded as charitable acts graciously accorded by managements.

The years around 1910 saw great social changes in Japan. The Meiji era ended in 1912, and after the transition to the Taisho era managements were forced to accept a very different relationship with the labour movements; union activity took on new life and labour laws-including factory laws-were established.

To maintain their position, capital and management strenghtened their advocacy of the paternalistic ideology based on the traditional obedience in the father-son relationship, and tried to concretize this ideology in the management of human relations and the use of manpower. The ideology was manifested practically in improvements in wages and other provisions for the workers.

For the hiring of workers in this system, there were no definite contractual relations between employer and employee : an employee was treated like a member of the family. The position and the kind of work was allotted to each worker according to some ‘ascribed qualification’ rather than to his proved ability. The ‘ascribed qualification’ was determined during the Meiji era by where a worker came from and what family he belonged to; this was the case especially in the early government-operated factories. After 1910, however, there was a change in the method of assessing qualifications, and a new system of status differentiation was gradually established, under which the place of each worker was decided according to his school history (see Table 33). H e could start as a staff member or an ordinary worker depending on his school career, and from then on he could hope to be promoted according to his years of service within his class. The necessary requirements for promotion in this system, based essentially on seniority, were hard work within the given class for a considerable period of time, good cultural adaptation to the enterprise, and loyalty.

Another important feature of employment conditions was what is called the ‘lifetime commitment’. Once a man was employed in an enterprise, he could expect never to be dismissed-


unless in exceptional circumstances. On the other hand, it was also expected that he would not leave the enterprise by his own choice.

The economic depression during the late 1920s yielded some interesting illustrations of the operation of these conditions. Instead of dismissing workers, the employers cut working hours -and of course wages at the same time; but they also put in hand construction work on the factory sites, to use labour which would otherwise have been redundant.

However, the senior priority system based on status and length of service and the ‘lifetime commitment’ system did not apply to the temporary workers at the bottom level, who served as a ‘safety valve’ for the higher-level workers in times of depression.

TXXE 33. Relation between educational level and position in enterprises, ZIUUld I930

Classification Position’ Educational level

Senior staff Head of department

Section chief

General staff Staff member

Foreman

Workers Workers, 1st class

Workers, 2nd class

Temporary workers

University or

Junior-High graduates

Higher elementary graduates (6 years)

Elementary graduates (4 years)

I. The actual status of similarly named positions might vary to some extent between enterprises.


The wage structure for permanent employees in 1922 was as follows:1

Basic wage, or reguiar salary plus ‘normal allowances’ (general allowance, commuting allowance, housing allowance, clothing allowance, daily commodities allowance, boarding allowance) ; there were also labour-management allowances (position and function, good time-keeping, long service; a children’s nursery (for working mothers) and a seasonal bonus). In contrast to the practice during the Meiji era, these allowances were payable to ordinary workers as well as staff members. After 1920 every worker was eligible for the seasonal bonuses. An important change from the earlier practice was that special labour-management allowances were offered to staff members.

Another important novelty was the introduction of wage increases based on length of satisfactory service. After twenty years, wages might well amount to two or three times as much as for a newly engaged worker. This fitted in with paternalist concepts, by allowing for the growing expenses of the typical worker, who would probably join an enterprise as a young bachelor and would in due course marry and have a family to support. At the same time it constituted a reward for loyalty to the enterprise, and of course encouraged workers to stay in their job.

The aspects of paternalism described above were practised mainly among the larger enterprises. This style of industrial management should be seen not so much as an extrapolation of Japan’s traditional social practices to the industrial sphere, but rather as an adaptive measure introduced by managements to enable them to cope with some of the problems raised by the explosive growth of industry.

The most important problem for the administration, ham- pered by an inadequate management structure, was how to secure and maintain the supply of skilled labour required for the expansion of production. Technology could at need be imported

I P. 250-4, 1955.

Showa Dojinkai, Historical Study of Wage Structure in Japan,

Management and leadership in industry 141

from foreign countries, but the management of human affairs is not so simple; the methods successfully realized in Europe might well prove unsuitable. Any imported method would need careful study and adaptation to meet the social conditions of Japan. In a period when there was not even a simple mechanism for operating the labour market, it was necessary to evolve a style essentially Japanese in management techniques : paternalism was the response to this need.

The ‘paternalist’ system after th Second World War The seniority and lifelong employment systems persisted in the industrial structure of Japan after the Second World War, though the reasons for their continued retention were entirely different from those responsible for their earlier introduction.

Before the war, the managements and employers established the system on their initiative and for their convenience; after the war it was the employees who demanded the maintenance of the same system.

During the disturbed post-war period, the labour unions in their concern to avoid unemployment protested strongly against dismissals and demanded from the managements that the lifelong employment system should be retained, to give them security in their daily lives; the wage system based on seniority followed naturally from this.

In quantitative terms, in 1954 the percentage of workers in the manufacturing industry who had served for five years or more was 43 per cent. How, then, should the paternalist system of management be assessed, particularly in relation to technological development ?

Though management techniques were established by the employer, it was nevertheless important for him to have the assent and approval of his employees before introducing them. Under the paternalist system the turnover of labour decreased in the larger enterprises, and the training of skilled labour within the enterprise itself became more and more feasible; this constituted an important element in technological development. But


this important element operated effectively to supply skilled workers only within the individual enterprise.

While management administration continued largely to follow the traditional Japanese pattern, its methods fortunately also corresponded with the fundamental rules of rational organization.

It must, however, be borne in mind that the basis of the system was not tried merit, but rather a theoretical assessment of merit related to the level of school education.

Meanwhile, the continuance of technological evolution since 1955 has brought out significant new aspects affecting manpower; and since the Second World War the younger workers have laid progressively greater stress on the values of national (rather than enterprise) loyalty and the dignity of the individual. Hence it seems possible that the paternalistic system may not hold out much longer. Moreover, with managements as well as the young workers according greater importance to the actual ability rather than the mere seniority of their personnel, there is a good chance that these more modern values will ultimately prevail in Japan.

Character and role of enterprise leaders

The question of leadership in relation to economic growth and technological development has been studied in the field of history of management, taking entrepreneurship as the main object. The source material for these studies consists largely of biographies and autobiographies describing the lives of individual leaders. By focusing on entrepreneurs in large-scale enterprises such as the zaibatsu (plutocracy), on their management ideas, the details of their systems, their outside activities, their connexions with the political world, and their energetic efforts to develop industries, it has been possible to obtain a meaningful over-all picture of their significance for the industrialization of Japan. The pattern of leadership is found to be characterized by the following five types of activity: the pursuit of economic gain; technological development; political action in direct support of


main objectives; unification of organizations; activities motivated primarily by social values.

Leaders who have contributed to the progress of industrialization in thz past IOO years have been active in one or more of the above fields. However, the nature of the leadership required to originate and promote industrial development must necessarily change according to the times; recent phases are examined below.

Leadership at the time of the Me@ Restoration The leaders in this period were still mainly members of the feudal samurai class that dominated the Tokugawa era and had strong political influence. Not only their entrepreneurial outlook, but also their value judgements and whole style of operation were coloured bv this background. Because of their dominance, moreover, their culture permeated also to other social strata, setting the general tone. In view of this, it will be useful to consider the samurai culture a little more closely. Though the spirit behind it suffered some change over the whole period of the Tokugawa era, the characteristics relevant to the present analysis persisted: they can be defined as a pioneering spirit and a distaste for excessive commercialism.

At the time of the Meiji Restoration the government forced the feudal lords to return to the Emperor the control of the land and of the people. The fief system-economic basis of the earlier paternalistic relation between upper and lower sumurai-was first modified and then gradually destroyed entirely. The pioneering spirit then manifested itself in a new form when leaders, breaking with the traditional past and devoting their energies to the industrialization of the future, voyaged abroad seeking knowledge about science and technology.

The activities of Eiichi Shibusawa, who introduced modem banking and joint-stock corporations into Japan, illustrate the characteristic avoidance of intensive commercialism. His management system stressed ‘the oneness of morality and economy’. Of his undertakings, numbering altogether over I,OOO a little under a half were commercial and economic while the remainder


were of the nature of social and public works. It may be, however, that this lack of complete concentration on economic aspects contributed to the later financial failure of the government- owned factories.

Industrial leadership at the dawn of private enterprise

The private enterprises which, in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, took over industry from government control were of two broad types. The one was politically sponsored and was able to promote development through its close connexions with government; the zaibatsu (plutocracy) were typical repre- sentatives of this group. The other type had to rely on their own efforts, receiving no government assistance.

Enterprises of the first type were in many cases able to acquire capital through the transfer of State property to their private ownership, and thus laid the foundations of famous modem industrial empires. As the volume and variety of their activities increased, it became necessary to adapt their management systems accordingly. Many of the leaders at that time had been trained under the new educational law passed in 1872; they introduced Western methods into their enterprises and accorded full recognition to ability and efficiency in their personnel. The samurai spirit was not so strong in them as the feeling for economic gain.

Among the enterprises of the second type were a number of early textile companies, followed later by machinery firms.

Some of the leaders of the private enterprises did however retain the Confucian ideas that constituted the basis of the Tokugawa social régime; others introduced concepts consonant with the Christian faith, their administrations revealing their humanistic ideology and emphasizing social values while seeking financial profit. These managements promoted plans for improving the workers’ conditions, and allotted part of their profits to social work; they took ‘small profits’ as their motto. They were in fact operating with conflicting motives, since in this period of private-capital formation the goal of capital accumulation was of paramount importance for the expansion of


production, and finally economic values had to predominate over humanistic ones.

Rationalization and scientific management

Forced by domestic and international conditions, Japanese industry rapidly gained national independence. The importance of developing technology was fully recognized ; priority was accorded to heavy industry and the encouragement of exports.

Able leaders soon appeared, capable of merging the traditional paternalistic style of management with modern ideas on rationalization. Analysis of the social (i.e. family) and educational background of these leaders in the 1920s (see Table 34) shows that 44 per cent were university graduates, while a further 17 per cent had received higher education at professional establishments of equivalent level, making 61 per cent together. In comparison with this figure, the situation in the 1880s-when the grand- fathers of the 1920 leaders were active-was far behind, with only 17 per cent altogether having received higher education of any kind.

Another interesting comparison (see Table 35) shows how the numbers of top-level enterprise personnel studying abroad varied over the years; the 1920s appear to have been a peak period in this respect. The United States and the United Kingdom were the preferred countries for studying modern management methods. By modifying their traditional paternalistic system in the light of this expertise acquired from other countries, the Japanese industrial leaders succeeded in rationalizing their own enterprises in turn.l And within the framework of this modernization effort the part played by the increased use of technology, both imported and domestically developed, has certainly been vital.z

I Samples of the survey on business élite which provide the basic data of Tables 34 and 35 are top managers of big business of present-day Japan. However, only a small number replied.

2 Books about Okochi Masatoshi: Yukio Cho, ‘3itsugyo rw Shiso’ [Business Thoughtl, Gendai Nihon Shiso Taikei, Vol. 2, p. 44-7, Tokyo, Chikuma Shobo, 1964; and Toshio Yamazaki, Gijutsu-shi


TABLE 34. Social and educational background of leaders of industry in the 1920~

High-school Elementary and University

school professional graduates number Father’s occupation (%) school (%I

(%I

Administrators of government and public offices

Administrators of big enterprises

Specialists Samurai Executives of big enterprises

Landowners Executives of small enterprises

White collar Over-all

7

20 21 26

30 39

52

31 O

7

20 21

24

28 29

21

75 25

86

60

50 58

42 32

27 25 44

I4

50 31

33 4

I99 I. Research Committee, Japan Sociological Society, Social class structure

in Japanese society, Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1957. This book indicates the following social grading: (a) governor; (b) professor; (c) judge; (d) top management of big enterprises; (e) doctor. Source. J. C. Abegglen and Hiroshi Mannari, ‘Nihon no Sangyo Shidosha to Gakureki’ [Business Leaders and Their Educational Career in Japan], Chu0 Koron, December, 1963, p. 188 (special issue on management problems).

The position of executives since the Second World W a r Before 1940, management was more or less influenced by State control. Simultaneously with the end of the Second World War, the zaibatsu was dissolved, the antimonopoly law was passed and the traditional management system broke down. Since then,

[History of Technology], p. 124-5 and 184-5, Tokyo, Tokyo Keizai Shinpo-sha, 1961 ; Okochi Memorial Association (eds.), Okochi Masa- toshi - Hito to sono J;jo [Okochi Masatoshi - Character and Circum- stances], Tokyo, Nikkan Kogyo Shinbun-sha, 1954. Survey of the modernization of Japan centring around industrial

technique and technicians : Yujiro Hayashi, Shihon-shugi to Gijutsu [Capitalism and Technique], Tokyo, Chikuma Shobo, 1966.

Management and leadership in industry

TABLE 35. Study abroad of top-level Japanese enterprise personnel, 1880-1960

I47

country 1880s

United States United Kingdom Germany and Austria France Others

TOTAL

3 5 2 I I - I2

1920s

25

3 I2

2 I

43

1960 - 2 3 O O I - 6

Top-level personnel as percentage of total numbers studying abroad 3 22 6

Source. J. C. Abegglen and Hiroshi Mannari, ‘Nihon no Sangyo Shidosha to Gakureki’ [Business Leaders and Their Educational Career in Japan], Chu0 Koron, December, 1963, p. 194 (special issue on management problems).

the position of industrial executives has improved and the importance of their role has received greater and greater recognition in the prevailing climate of rapid economic growth and technological innovation. An investigation of social classes in six big cities in 1952 revealed that executives of large enterprises were ranked fourth out of thirty selected occupations; this may be related to Japan’s enormous advances in international competition. Top leaders of enterprises are taking an active partlin politics, culture and education, and are continually extending the scope of their activities; they become members of councils and committees with government-related responsibilities and leaders in land cultivation ; they promote technological innovation, modern systematization and social welfare.

A very high proportion (91 per cent) of modern top-level executives are graduates of higher-educational institutions. Thus while family connexions do not appear to carry undue weight, since only a few executives are sons (or sons-in-law) of owners of large enterprises, in the present industrial climate conditioned by keen international competition, an academic qualification is


clearly essential for advancement. In the future, management will have to be based on these modern principles, probably leading to some kind of meritocracy.

Japanese attitudes and national character

It was pointed out in the general survey shown in Chapter I that such features as racial homogeneity, common language, orderly social relations and cultural continuity helped greatly to protect the Japanese people against perturbations during periods of rapid social change. Japanese attitudes especially towards industrialization are briefly examined below.

Attitudes towards industrialization

Considerable changes occurred in the social goals of the active leaders under the interacting forces of Western materialistic civilization and traditional Japanese culture.

By supreme dedication in the decade following the Meiji Restoration, social reform was achieved involving a substantial degree of Westernization; but the changes in this direction could not be carried to extremes without provoking strong criticism of the distinctive effect on the traditional Japanese way of life; compromise was reached at a point ensuring large material improvements.

The progressive integration of the State, starting from the end of the nineteenth century, and with only short periods of relaxation-marked, for example, by romanticism in literature, by demands for wider suffrage, and by the establishment of trade unions-corresponded essentially to a nationalistic concept based on Western ideas; the leaders responsible for this development deliberately placed national objectives before individual or sectional ones. The aim was to build up Japan to equal in strength the great Western powers. With this objective paramount, the importance of achieving a high level of industrial-


ization was firmy recognized by the National Diet and its subsidiary bodies, and was securely incorporated in the government’s policy.

With strong State backing, this nationalist ideology maintained its hold until 1945. In the immediately following period, when Japan’s international standing was low, State control weakened and the domestic situation consequently deteriorated. At this stage entrepreneurs turned their attention to non-military industries, by which they planned to restore and stabilize the national living standards. In this, their goals coincided with those of the government, and accordingly measures were taken to protect these important new industries.

However, it was not the leaders alone who reacted positively to changing circumstances; the Japanese people as a whole have succeeded in rationalizing their traditional attitudes and have adopted a quasi-Western way of life without apparent difficulty. This adaptation was probably facilitated by the absence of religious prejudice in Japan.

The Japanese character

H o w did the people respond to their leaders’ policy of national integration and industrial development ? In order that leadership should be fully successfd, it is not enough for followers to obey blindly; they must approve the chosen policy and actively support it. This is the relation that is required between the State and the people, as well as between executives and employees of enterprises.

What were the characteristics of the Japanese people, what were the essential fatures of the Japanese culture relevant to this relation? These questions were pondered at length by enterprise leaders and intellectuals after the Meiji Restoration, and were the subject of scholarly investigations by foreigners who had lived and travelled in Japan for long periods. Below are listed some special features considered by various representative authors to be characteristic of the Japanese people; they are all


mentioned in books published before 1953.~ The first is a list of characteristics relevant to the national character itself Moderate and reasonable, not ultra-radical. Expecting to be approached in a manner fitting to his position. Gentle and generous ; tolerant, receptive to different cultures,

not simply admitting their existence; willing to retain things of the past.

Skilful assimilators of foreign ideas; though basically conserva- tive, quick to adopt anything if it seems likely to yield profits.

Harmonious, integrated and peacefully co-operative. Excellent in imitation and practical application, but lzcking in

Interested in the outside world, jumping at novelties and

Adaptable, but lacking in firmness against the pressure of

Diligent, patient, faithful, sincere, steady and good at self-

Respecting honour more than money; afraid of ridicule.

originality.

appreciative of exotica.

circumstances.

training.

The second is a list of characteristics relevant to human relations : Sensitive to moral and reliable relations based on reason. Respecting human relations and personal factors more than the

Regarding relations with others as predominating over self. Emphasizing sense of duty more than loyalty and filial piety,

benevolence and sympathy; and also gratefulness. Unrationalized human relations. Obedience to authority. Readiness to form narrow human relations that are cliquish and

content of an issue in dispute.

exclusive.

I Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, Kokumin-sei Chosa Iinkai-hen, Nihon- jin no Kokumin-sei, [Institute of Statistical Mathematics, Research Committee of Japanese National Character (eds.), A Study of Japanese National Character], p. 530-41, Tokyo, Shiseido, 1961. Japanese character as described comprehensively in thirty-seven books is surveyed.

Management and leadership in industry 151

It will of course be noted that some of the above characteristics appear to be mutually contradictory. While they must be considered as relating to the period before the Second World War, a later statistical survey1 covers the period up to 1963.

It is traditional in Japanese society that if an individual receives material or spiritual kindness or aid, which is called an

Choice of one 'new morality' and 'filial piety'

32 W

The new morality : 'respect for individual rights' or

'Filial piety' 'respect for liberty'

61 7o 40%

15% Choice of one 'new morality' and 'repayment of a favour'

28 % Choice of 'filial piety' and 'repayment of a favour'

FIG. II. The 'old morality' and the 'new morality'. (Source. Chikio Hayashi et al., Zusetsu, Nihon-jin no Kokumin-sei [Figurative Explanation of the Japanese National Character], p. 71, Tokyo, Shiseido, 1965.)

I The results of the continuous survey from 1953 to 1963 by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics are presented in the following books : Tokei Suri Kenkyujo, 'Kokumin-sei no Kenku, Dai Sanji Chosa', Tokei Suri Kenkyujo Iho [The Institute of Statistical Mathematics, 'A Study of 'Japanese National Character, the Third Survey', Report of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics], Vol. III, No. 2, 1964; Chikio Hayashi et al., Zusetsu, Nihon-jin no Kokumin-sei [Figurative Explanation of the Japanese National Character], Tokyo, Shiseido, 1965-


(favour), he is expected to be gratefd for this for a long time, perhaps for the rest of his life; and he owes repayment, in the form of gifts, services or obedience. This special human relationship, involving repayment of a favour and filial piety, is seen as the ‘old morality’, while respect for personal rights and liberty are seen as the ‘new morality’, and an attempt has been made to classify individuals on this basis (see Figure II).

The individuals questioned were asked to indicate which two items they considered most important out of the following four : ‘old morality’ (‘repayment of favour’ and ‘filial piety’); ‘new morality’ (‘respect for individual rights’ and ‘respect for liberty’). The results are indicated by the percentages marked against the sides and apices of the triangle in Figure I I.

As many as 61 per cent of the sample consider filial piety most important; other items are given priority by 40 per cent to 50 per cent of the sample. Respondents who considered only the ‘old morality’ important amounted to 28 per cent, and respondents who combined the old and the new moralities amounted to about 50 per cent. Hence, as judged from this analysis, the ‘old morality’ is deeply rooted in their minds. But there are substantial differences between different age groups. Among respondents in their twenties, for example, only 19 per cent accord importance to ‘repayment of a favour’; for the over- sixties the proportion is 64 per cent.

‘Diligence’ is one of the special features of the Japanese character noted above; the proportion of Japanese describing themselves as ‘diligent’ is 60 per cent. Other nations rate themselves in this respect as follows: Federal Republic of Germany, 80 per cent; France, 37 per cent; and Chile, 29 per cent. The Japanese self-rating is thus lower than that of the Germans but higher than that the other nations. From a study carried out among high-school students in the United States, the results indicated that the Japanese are more diligent than the Americans.

Whether or not the above list of the Japanese national characteristics is reliable, in order to evaluate these special features as contributions towards industrialization it would be necessary to investigate in depth such points as their effects at


each stage of industrialization; their modifications under changing conditions; and the degree of variation of these attributes between individuakl

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABEGGLEN, James A. The Japanese factory. Glencoe, Ili., The Free Press, 1958.

BENNET, John W.; ISHINO, Iwao. Paternalism in the Japanese economy, anthropological studies of Oyabun-Kobun pattern. Minneapolis, Minn., University of Minnesota Press, 1963.

FUJITA, Wakao, Nihon Rodo-Kyoyaku Ron [Theory on Japanese labour agreement]. Tokyo, Tokyo University Press, 1961.

HAZAMA, Hiroshi. Nihon-tekà Keàeà no Kequ [Genealogy of Japanese management]. Tokyo, Nihon Noritsu Kyokai, 1963.

-. Nihon Romu-Kanri-shi Kenkyu [Study on history of Japanese labour management]. Tokyo, Diamond, 1964.

OKAMOTO, Hideaki. Kogyoka to Genba Kantoku-sha [Industrialization and field overseer]. Tokyo, Nihon Rod0 Kyokai, 1965.

OUCHI, Tsuneo. Skokuba no Soshiki to Kanri [Organization and management of workshop]. Tokyo, Diamond, 1957.

SUMIYA, Mikio. Nihon Chinrodo-ski Ron [Theory on history of wage labour in Japan]. Tokyo, Tokyo University Press, 1955.

-. Social àmpact of industrialization in Japan. Japanese National Commission for Unesco, 1963.

I G o Ishida, ‘Beikoku Gakusei no Nihonjin Kan’, Kyoikzt Shakaigaku Kenkyu [‘The American Students’ View of the Japanese, A Study of Educational Sociology], (Tokyo), No. 21, 1967, p. 201.

Appendix

Members of working group and drafting group

Japanese working group

Name Dr. Osamu Abe

Dr. Shiro Baba

Mr. Shoichi Hirono

fi. Ken-ichi Iida

Dr. Giichi Kamo

Dr. Takashi Mukaibo

Mr. Kikuo Nishida

Speciality Economics

Sociology

Agricultural economics

History

History

Chemistry

Educational planning

Post Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Professor,

Research Councillor,

Tokyo Kyoiku University

Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Council,

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Research Department, Yawata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd.

Chairman, Japanese Society of Science History,

Professor, Kanto-Gakuin University

Professor, University of Tokyo

Councillor for Educational Planning and Research, Minister’s Secretariat, Ministry of Education

156 Appendix

Mr. Goro Oda Science policy

Mr. Tadao Okawa Agriculture

Mr. Toshio Economics Shishido

Dr. Minoru Tanaka History

Mr. Akira Uchino Techno- economics

Dr. Toshio History Yamazaki

Chief, Planning Section, Planning Bureau, Science and Technology Agency

Chief, Investigation and Information Section, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Council,

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry

Councillor, Economic Planning

Economic Planning Bureau,

Agency Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Planning Bureau, Science and Technology

Planning Section,

Agency Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Report drafting group

Dr. Osamu Abe Dr. Shiro Baba Mr. Kantaro Honda Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries

Council, Ministry of Agriculture Mr. Ken-ichi Iida Mr. Ryoichi Iwauchi Tokyo Institute of Technology Mr. Kunioki Kato Tokyo Institute of Technology Mr. Toshio Shishido Mr. Akira Uchino

technological development in japan; a case study; case studies on

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