tenth week art 978-1014 order of intestate succession

8/11/2019 Tenth Week Art 978-1014 Order of Intestate Succession

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-29192. February 22, 1971.]

GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS,plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAXIMO

DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Benjamin Pineda for plaintiff-appellee.

Ceasar R. Monteclaros for defendant-appellant.

D E C I S I O N

VILLAMOR,J p:

Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.

From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21, 1965,

Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against

Maximo de la Cruz, alleging, among others, that on August 24, 1963, she and

several co-heirs, including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition

agreement (a copy of which was attached to the complaint) over a certain portion

of land with an area of around 20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had agreed

to adjudicate three (3) lots to the defendant, in addition to his corresponding

share, on condition that the latter would undertake the development and

subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of the agreement, all

expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale of

the aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, by the

other co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant refused to

perform his aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the aforesaid lots.


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The plaintiff prayed the court to order the defendant to comply with his obligation

under the extra-judicial partition agreement and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as

attorney's fees and costs.

In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicialpartition agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no

cause of action against him because the said agreement was void with respect to

her, for the reason that the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz,

deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial partition

agreement by mistake; and that although he had disposed of the three lots

adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale were not sufficient to

develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The answer contained a

counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise sold her

share in the estate for P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial partition agreement

being void insofar as the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4)

of the proceeds as his share by way of reversion. The defendant prayed that the

complaint be dismissed; that the extrajudicial partition agreement be declared

void with respect to the plaintiff; and, on his counterclaim, that the plaintiff be

ordered to pay him the sum of P2,500.00.

On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19, 1965,

declaring the plaintiff in default for not having answered the counterclaim.

On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation

of facts:

"1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the 'Extra-

Judicial Partition Agreement' dated August 24, 1963, which we marked

as Exhibit 'A' for the plaintiff, and Exhibit "1" for the defendant, which

partition agreement was marked as Annex 'A' in the complaint;

"2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-

mentioned Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement was for the distribution of

the lard in question for the heirs of Pelagia de al Cruz; however the

parties further agree that several lots in the said land have been sold by


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some of the co-heirs, and there are now several houses constructed

therein and residents therein;

"3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed

Administrator and In-charge of the development and subdivision of the

land in question, as provided for in the aforementioned extrajudicial

partition agreement;

"4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page 3, 3rd

paragraph to the last of said partition agreement have been sold by the

defendant herein; and parties further agree that there are no properly

constructed roads, nor proper light and water facilities;

"5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the

deceased Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and

predecessor in interest of the land which was the subject matter of the

extrajudicial partition agreement;

"6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said

Pelagia de la Cruz;

"7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October

16, 1962, as evidenced by a death certificate, which is marked as Exhibit

'2' for the defendant; and

"8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece

of the said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la Cruz

died on September 22, 1935, as evidenced by Exhibit '3' for the

defendant."

In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quoheld that the defendant,

being a party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising

in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz;

hence, he must abide by the terms of the agreement. The court ordered the

defendant "to perform his obligations to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-

29561 as described on page 2 of the Extrajudicial Partition Agreement"


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(meaning, apparently, that the defendant should develop the subdivision because

said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this purpose), and to pay the

plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of P500.00 as

attorney's fees, and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's

counterclaim. The defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial' but the same was

denied. Hence, this appeal.

The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to the

following:

1. The court a quoerred in not holding that the extrajudicial partition

agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, and,

consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action againstdefendant-appellant.

2. The court a quoerred in holding that defendant-appellant is estopped

from questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the agreement

enforced.

3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual

damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in not granting the

relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.

We shall discuss seriatimthese errors as thus condensed.

1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that

the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement,

was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate on October 16, 1962 that defendant-

appellant is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece

of Pelagia de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of the said

Pelagia de la Cruz; that plaintiff-appellee's mother died on September 22, 1935,thuspre-deceasingPelagia de la Cruz; and that the purpose of the extrajudicial

partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirsof

Pelagia de la Cruz.


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The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is an heir of

the decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere

grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of

representation.

"ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct

descending line, but never in the ascending.

"In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of

brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood."

Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.

"ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes

the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly

takes place . . ."

Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y

Iturralde, 5 Phil., 176 (1905), said:

". . . [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased can not

participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a

nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral

line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons and

daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the case if

Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his deceased uncle."

In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are

her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily,

plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece, is excluded by law from the inheritance.

But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the

extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is

concerned? They did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The

express purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the

parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of

Pelagia de la Cruz. Indeed, the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee


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was participating therein in representationof her deceased mother. The pertinent

portion of the agreement is herein quoted, thus:

"NOW, THEREFORE, we . . . and Diego delos Santos, married to

Anastacia dela Cruz, Mariano delos Santos married to Andrea

Ramoy: Gertrudes delos Santos,married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delos

Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to

Narciso Ramota; all in representation of our mother,MARCIANA DELA

CRUZ, . . ., do hereby by these presents, mutually, voluntarily and

amicably agree among ourselves to equitably divide the property left by

the deceased PELAGIA DELA CRUZ, and adjudicate unto ourselves

definite and independent portions of the estate in the following manner . .

."

It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties

thereto were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was

one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such

an heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the

Civil Code, which reads:

"ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir,

but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person."

Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the

deceased owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir,

when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the

true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void (De

Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49). A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could

hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.

2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-

appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-appellant.

Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts

which are prohibited by law or are against public policy (Baltazar vs. Lingayen


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Gulf Electric Power Co., et al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA

522]). In Ramiro vs. Grao, et al., 54 Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:

"No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party

sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake. And

while there is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is that the

acts and declarations of a party based upon an innocent mistake as to

his legal rights will not estop him to assert the same, especially where

every fact known to the party sought to be estopped is equally well

known to the party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J., 1125, 1126.)"

And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148, February

28, 1963 (7 SCRA 367), this Court said:"Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise

the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow

herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of

these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband,

but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties.

But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute

estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be apprised of

his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because

silence without knowledge works no estoppel . . ."

3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be sustained

in view of the conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore, actual or

compensatory damages must be duly proved (Article 2199, Civil Code). Here, no

proof of such damages was presented inasmuch as the case was decided on a

stipulation of facts and no evidence was adduced before the trial court.

We now come to defendant-appellant's counterclaim, in which he alleged that

plaintiff-appellee sold her share to a certain person for the price of P10,000.00,

and claims that he is entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds by right of

reversion. It will be noted that plaintiff-appellee had been declared in default on

defendant-appellant's counterclaim; but the latter did not present any evidence to


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prove the material allegation therein more specifically, the alleged sale of the

former's share for the sum of P10,000.00. That no such evidence had been

adduced is understandable, for the parties expressly submitted the case for the

resolution of the court upon their stipulation of facts which, unfortunately, did not

make any mention of the alleged sale; and neither had defendant made any offer

or move to introduce the necessary evidence to that effect for the consideration

and evaluation by the trial court.

Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellee's having

been declared in default, the latter must be deemed to have admitted all the

allegations in his counterclaim, so that the court a quoshould have granted the

relief prayed for by him. We find no merit in this contention.

Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:

"SECTION 1.Judgment by default. If the defendant fails to answer

within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of

the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default.

Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence and

render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the fact

proven may warrant. This provision applies where no answer is made to

a counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party complaint within the period

provided in this rule."

The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of

Civil Procedure. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this

Court said:

"Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment by

default against a defendant who has neither appeared nor filed his

answer does not imply a waiver of rights except that of being heard and

of presenting evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by the

defendant of the facts and causes of action of the plaintiff, because the

codal section requires the latter to adduce his evidence in support of his

allegations as an indispensable condition before final judgment could be


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given in his favor. Nor could it be interpreted as an admission by the

defendant that the plaintiff's causes of action find support in the law or

that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed for . . ."

Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the partiesthat said plaintiff-appellee admitted having received a portion of the estate by

virtue of the extrajudicial partition agreement dated August 24, 1963, to wit:

"(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-29561, containing an area of 1,691 sq. m. as

described in the Technical Description to be adjudicated to Diego delos

Santos, married to Anastacia dela Cruz; Mariano delos Santos, married

to Regina Baluyot; Hilario delos Santos, married to Andrea

Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos,married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo delosSantos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos, married to

Narciso Ramota, in co-ownership, share and share alike."

Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his

contention that the lower court erred in not passing on his counterclaim and,

consequently, in not sentencing appellee to turn over to him his corresponding

share of said portion received by appellee under the void partition. Remote

relatives or unrelated persons who unduly received and took possession of

the property of a deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null and

void partition, must restore it to the legitimate successor in the inheritance (De

Torres vs. De Torres, et al., supra). Of course, if such share has already been

disposed of by appellee to a bona fidepurchaser, as seems to be indicated in

the unproven allegations of the counterclaim, We cannot render judgment

awarding any specific amount to defendant-appellant as his proportionate

share of the proceeds of such sale for the reason that, as already stated

above, this aspect of the counterclaim has not been touched upon in thestipulation of facts nor has it been supported by evidence which appellant

should have presented in the lower court but did not.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed

from is hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from

any liability to and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim,


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appellee is hereby sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his corresponding

share of the property she has received under the extrajudicial partition

hereinbefore mentioned if the same has not already been disposed of as alleged.

Costs in both instance against plaintiff-appellee.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando,

Teehankee, Barredoand Makasiar, JJ.,concur.

|||(de los Santos v. de la Cruz, G.R. No. L-29192, February 22, 1971)

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-18753. March 26, 1965.]

VICENTE B. TEOTICO,petitioner-appellant, vs.

ANA DEL VAL CHAN, ETC., oppositor-appellant.

Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellants.

J. C. Zulueta, G.D. David & N.J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WIFE OF CITIZEN NOT

AUTOMATICALLY CITIZEN BUT MUST PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH

REQUIREMENTS. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen does not automatically

become a Philippine citizen upon her husband's naturalization. She must first

prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the

disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before shemay be deemed a Philippine citizen.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR RULE; POLICY OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION TO

PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP. The rule laid down by this Court in this and in

other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national policy of


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selective admission to Philippine citizenship which after all is a privilege granted

only to those who are found worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody

at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines,

irrespective of moral character, ideological belief, and identification with Filipino

ideals, customs and traditions.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO,J p:

Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in theCity of Manila leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in

Spanish which she executed at her residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo,

Manila. She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will and on the left

margin of each and every page thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G.

Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn affixed their signatures below

the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and every page of the will

in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was acknowledged

before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her witnesses.

In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was

possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal

pressure or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any

influence of fear or threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will

and that she had neither ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she

could dispose of all her estate.

Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to

Rene A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said

spouses the testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while

the naked ownership thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are

the legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina


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Mortera as her sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not

otherwise disposed of in the will.

On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will

before the Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing onSeptember 3, 1955 after the requisite publication and service to all parties

concerned.

Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a

deceased sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose

Mortera, a deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an

opposition to the probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will

was not executed as required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically andmentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will

was executed under duress, threat or influence of fear.

Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the

oppositor had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due

hearing, allowed the oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisco

Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor amended her opposition by

alleging the additional ground that the will is inoperative as to the share of Dr.

Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who took care of the testatrix

during her last illness.

After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its

decision on November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate but declaring the

disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the

portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way

of intestate succession.

Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a

motion for reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion

of the estate to be vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr.

Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion

for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which decrees the probate of


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the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene and to file a

motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which

nullified the legacy made in his favor.

The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, bothpetitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion

which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated

portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that

portion which admits the will to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and

oppositor assign several error which, stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled

down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene

in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been duly admitted to probate?;

and (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic validity

of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to

be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?

These issues will be discussed separately.

1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene

in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in

the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate

(Ngo The Hua vs.Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an

interested party has been defined as one who would be benefitted by the estate

such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem.).

On the other hand, in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17,

1962, this Court said:

"According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a

petition for letters of administration must be filed by an 'interested

person.' An interested party has been defined in this connection as

one who would be benefitted by the estate, such as an heir, or one

who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate

Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G., 1171). And it is well settled in

this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings,


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the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto

must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

(Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G. R. No. L-3370, August 22, 1951;

Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311)."

The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the

provisions of the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the

estate in the event that the will is denied probate?

Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has

no interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she

have any claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears

therein any provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion ofthe estate. She has also no interest in the will either as administratrix or

executrix. Neither has she any claim against any portion of the estate because

she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she previously had an interest in the

Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it long before the

execution of the will.

In the supposition that the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any

interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such

right only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil

Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose

Mortera, a deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of

Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give

her any comfort for, even if it be true, the law does not give her any right to

succeed to the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca

Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by

law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus, Article992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab

intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; . . ."

And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey vs. Fabie, 68

Phil., 128, as follows:


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"'Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the

father or mother who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of

succession. They cannot be called relatives and they have no right

to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie, but the law does not

recognize it. In this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the facts

and upon the presumptive will of the interested parties; the natural

child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the

legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter

considers the privileged condition of the former and the resources

of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the

natural child nothing but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of

a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily broken in life;

the law does no more them recognize this truth, by avoiding further

grounds of resentment.' (7 Manresa, 3d ed., p. 110.)"

The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted

child of Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by

adoption is limited solely to the adopter and the adopted does not extend to the

relatives of the adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly

provided for by law. Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and

the collaterals of the adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir

of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

"The relationship established by the adoption, however, is

limited to the adopting parent, and does not extend to his other

relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted

child cannot be considered as a relative of the ascendants andcollaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children

which they may have after the adoption, except that the law

imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of adoption.

Neither are the children of the adopted considered as descendants

of the adopter. The relationship created is exclusively between, the


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adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the relatives of

either." (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652)

"Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted,

and does not extend to other members of the family of either; but

the adopted is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter to

avoid scandal." (An Outline of Philippines Civil law by Justice Jose

B. L, Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See alsoCaguioa,

Comments and Cases on Civil law, 1955, Vol. 1, pp. 312-313;

Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)

It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary

or as legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court aquo.

2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly

admitted to probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been

admitted not only because it was not properly attested to but also because it was

procured thru pressure and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by

mistake believing that it contained her true intent.

The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by theevidence of record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of

the instrumental witnesses.

Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she

executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the

testatrix signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every

page thereof at the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental

witnesses and the notary public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her

and the other witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix was the first one to

sign and later she gave the will to the witnesses who read and signed it.

Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was

the testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix

was the first one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and


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afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the

will the testatrix was in the best of health.

Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of

the witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clausebefore he signed the document, and that all the witnesses spoke either in

Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the instrumental witnesses and the

testatrix signed the will at the same time and place and identified their signatures.

This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively, that

the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her

instrumental witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.

The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also

belied by the evidence. On this point the court a quomade the following

observation:

"The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under

the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to

sustain the conclusion that there was improper pressure and undue

influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation of the testatrix from the

oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure to seepersonally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr.

Rene Teotico to exclude visitors, took place years after the

execution of the will on May 17, 1951. Although those facts may

have some weight to support the theory of the oppositor, yet they

must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing could have

prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to, from

subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and

express her own testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by

the oppositor and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the

Escolta, in Quiapo and in Sta. Cruz, Manila, walking and

accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions, each of

them was able to talk with her."


18/110

We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with

the foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and

her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix

simply because she lived in their house several years prior to the execution of

the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in that she was

virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is insufficient

to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix freely

and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion

executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and

undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a

kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy

her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own(Coso vs.Deza, 42 Phil., 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will

that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here

was not done, for the evidence presented not only is sufficient but was disproved

by the testimony the instrumental witnesses.

3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity

of the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of

decisions among which the following may be cited:

"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the

provisions of the will cannot be entertained in probate proceeding

because its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been

executed in accordance with the requirements of the law."

(Palacios vs. Palacios, 58 O.G. 220)

". . . The authentication of a will decides no other questions

than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and thecompliance with those requisites or solemnities which the law

prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by

implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions;

these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its

authentication. The questions relating to these points remain


19/110

entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been

authenticated. . . .

"From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate

the provisions therein contained, it does not follow that such

provisions lack of efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the

law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the

matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the

testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be

punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or

to public morals." (Montaanovs. Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-

680)

"To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for

all, the facts that a will was executed with the formalities required

by law and that the testator was in a condition to make a will, is the

only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the

probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings

determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has

no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the

will. It can not decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and

another one valid." Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, 428)

Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a

quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A

must be set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another

reason why said pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not

given an opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to

intervene in this proceeding. As a corollary, the other pronouncements, touchingon the disposition of the estate in favor of some relatives of the deceased should

also be set aside for the same reason.

WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares

that the will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to


20/110


21/110

2. ID.; ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS; CHALLENGE TO THE VALIDITY OF

ADOPTION CANNOT BE MADE COLLATERALLY. A no less important

argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the

adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition but in a direct

proceeding frontally addressing the issue. The settled rule is that a finding that

the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be

questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases

where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary

jurisdictional facts were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp.

719-720].

3. CIVIL LAW; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; BIRTH CERTIFICATE; ONE OF

THE PRESCRIBED MEANS OF RECOGNITION. On the question of Doribel's

legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the

respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable

piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under Article

265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the

petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers onlyprima facieevidence of

filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is

lacking in the case at bar.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENTIARY NATURE OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS TO BE

SUSTAINED ABSENT STRONG, COMPLETE AND CONCLUSIVE PROOF OF

ITS FALSITY OR NULLITY. Mauricio's testimony that he was present when

Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandably suspect, coming as it did

from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila denying her earlier statement in

the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact

that it was never offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it,

however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of

Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must

be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity

or nullity."


22/110

5. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMACY OF CHILD CAN BE QUESTIONED ONLY IN A DIRECT

ACTION. Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the

impropriety of the present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy

cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct

action seasonably filed by the proper party. The presumption of legitimacy in the

Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential character. It serves a more

fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,

and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the

child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the

proper parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the

child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issuein another

action for a different purpose. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. I, p.559.)

6. ID.; SUCCESSION; LEGITIMATE AND ADOPTED CHILDREN SUCCEED

THE PARENTS AND ASCENDANTS; RATIONALE. The philosophy

underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and

grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his

collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring

properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love forthem and as a provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this

earth.

7. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; GRANDDAUGHTER HAS A RIGHT

TO REPRESENT HER DECEASED FATHER. There is no question that as

the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and

Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of

the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is

entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived,

which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; RELATIONSHIP CREATED BY ADOPTION DOES NOT EXTEND

TO THE BLOOD RELATIVES OF EITHER PARTIES. While it is true that the

adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right


23/110

as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The

relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and

the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.

D E C I S I O N

CRUZ,J p:

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to

inherit from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them

that right, asserting it for themselves to the exclusion of all others.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario,

Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and

Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on

March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their

properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all

surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with

Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting

of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil

Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was

resisted by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights

to the disputed estate as the decedent's lawful descendants.

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this timefor the accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and

Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed

as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The

complainants asserted the defense they raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that

Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the legitimate


24/110

daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's

share in his parents' estate by right of representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis

of practically the same evidence.

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26, 1986, 1 that

Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and

Isabel Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2Doribel

was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February

27, 1967.3Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno

and Rafaela by right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986,4Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed

Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of

Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded

the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were

consolidated. In its own decision dated February 28, 1989,5the

respondent court disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the

appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil Case No. 1042 (CA-

G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and

Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the

deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other

respects.

SO ORDERED.

That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal

of the respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence

of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it

declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and

Isabel Sayson.
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The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally

adopted because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the

decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified

her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil

Code, naming among those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate,

legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction."

Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the

legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila,

who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural

mother.6

The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seekto annul the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and

Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to

demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to

challenge the decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That

was way back in 1967.7Assuming that the petitioners were proper parties, whatthey should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing

to the birth of Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia

and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should have done this earlier, before

the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he

had personal knowledge of such birth.

As the respondent court correctly observed:

When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) daysbefore the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have

notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps

withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for

the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child

is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an
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adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that the adoption of the

plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and

binding to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, thetrial judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the

finding inter aliathat the adopting parents were not disqualified.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the

validity of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition

but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts

exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral

proceeding,for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity of

the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were

proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720].

(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso,8this Court declared:

Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd

Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:

An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the

burden of proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void

merely because the fact needed to show statutory compliance is

obscure. While a judicial determination of some particular fact, such as

the abandonment of his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to

the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of adoption, this does not

make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of the decree that the factbe determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in accordance with

the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the

determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be

collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted

children would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the
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same at all investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by

different tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have

been valid, while another court would hold it to have been of no avail.

(Emphasis supplied.)

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial

courts as affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth

certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of

recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family

Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers onlyprima

facieevidence9of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However,

such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila

was understandably suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The

affidavit of Abila10denying her earlier statement in the petition for the

guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never

offered in evidence in the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth

certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of Appeals,11where we

ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the

absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the

present proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned

in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed

by the proper party.

The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this

purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It

actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil

status cannot be attacked collaterally.The legitimacy of the child can be

impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,by the proper

parties, and within the period limited by law. The legitimacy of the
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tenth week art 978-1014 order of intestate succession

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