Terrorism

Overview

• Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Rationality of Terrorism

• Religious Radicalism and Violence

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Intergovernmental– “Traditional” state vs. state conflict– Symmetrical in that have to formally equal

entities (states)– Advantage goes to defense

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Intragovernmental War– Encompasses everything from coups d’etat to

revolutionary movements– Asymmetrical– Advantage goes to offense

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• They differ also on the objective

• In intragovernmental war, the aim is for the anti-government forces to forge an alliance with a significant third party group within the country

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

“In domestic violence...the essence of the conflict is the appeal to third parties. The direct action of the opponents upon each other, particularly in coups d’etat, remains important, but the decisive characteristic of the struggle is the effort to gain the support of those who initially are neither friend nor foe” (Huntington, p. 490)

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Anti-government forces, being in the minority, need to – persuade a majority of the population to

acquiesce, if not actually support the group, or– persuade a significant (important) elite group to

join the cause

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

“The counterelite attempts to win the target group through terrorism and persuasion. In the ‘normal’ intergovernmental war violence is directed primarily against the enemy; it is a means of reducing his numbers and of undermining his will to resist...

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

“In the initial phases of a revolutionary war, however, the counterelite directs its terrorism and violence primarily against the members of the target group. The aim of the violence is not to eliminate the forms of the government but to win the members of the target group” (Huntington, p. 494)

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

“[Terrorism] is a weapon, however, which is effective not against the strong but against the vulnerable. Though sporadic murders and bombings would never suffice to destroy the forces of the government, they may suffice to win the active or passive support of the target group” (Huntington, pp. 495-96)

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• To succeed, the revolutionary group needs a secure base of operations

• Given the aims of the revolutionary group, negotiation makes little sense

• Negotiation will be perceived as weakness and simply further embolden the recruiting and propaganda efforts of the anti-government forces

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

“The decisive aspect of revolutionary war thus is the struggle for the loyalty of the vulnerable sector. In a sense, the war is conducted like an agonizing and bloody electoral campaign. If the counterelite can establish and maintain itself as the leader of the alienated sector, it has won its battle” (Huntington, p. 500)

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• On the other hand, if the revolutionary group is unable to maintain itself, then violence is going to continue as it struggles to gain that upper hand or until it is eliminated

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

“The more detached a government is from the society disrupted by revolutionary war, the more able it will be to surmount these obstacles [i.e., of running counter to traditional ideas and established interests]”...

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

• Obstacles for success include:– division in opinion in the home country for

support of the war– over reliance on the challenged groups in order

to fend off the revolution

Inter vs. Intragovernmental War

“Revolutionary war is most likely in a society occupying an extensive territory and divided between different communities and races in which one group predominates in the government” (Huntington, p. 501).

Logic of Terrorism

• Not all political insurgent groups resort to terrorism

• Not all revolutionary groups resort to terrorism

• So, when does terrorism become the chosen mode of political warfare?

Logic of Terrorism

• Note, the logic of collective action would suggest that terrorist groups should not form:

“Why should a rational person become a terrorist, given the high costs associated with violent resistance and the expectation that everyone who supports the cause will benefit, whether he or she participates or not?” (Crenshaw, p. 511)

Logic of Terrorism

• Conditions for terrorism to become “rational” choice:– Weapon of the “weak”

– Raises question of what is the basis for the weakness?• majority of population does not share ideological

commitments of the group

• failure to mobilize support successfully or effectively

• repression nullifies recruitment and mobilization efforts

Logic of Terrorism

“No matter how acute or widespread popular dissatisfaction may be, the masses do not rise spontaneously; mobilization is required” (Crenshaw, p. 514).

Logic of Terrorism

• Rationality of terrorism (continued)– time constraints (impatience)– optimism for prospects of success

• Sources:– changed circumstances in the target regime

– practices in target regime increase its moral and political vulnerability

– new resources coming into the group

Logic of Terrorism

• Given the preceding, what is the cost/benefit calculus for terrorists

Logic of Terrorism

1. Threats to physical well being

2. Loss of support

1. Agenda setting

2. Pressure government for concessions

3. Create revolutionary conditions

4. Inspiration for resistance

Costs Benefits

Religious Violence

• That cost/benefit calculation is further disrupted by the introduction of a religious element into the calculation

• Religion adds:– moral certitude and/or rectitude– absolutism– transhistorical dimension “A satanic enemy cannot

be transformed; it can only be destroyed”

Religious Violence

“In some cases religious activists have been prepared to wait for eons -- and some struggle have not been expected to be completed within human history; they must await their fulfillment in some transtemporal realm. There is no need, therefore, to compromise one’s goals in a struggle that has been waged in divine time and with the promise of heaven’s rewards...”

Religious Violence

“There is no need, also, to contend with society’s laws and limitations when one is obeying a higher authority. In spiritualizing violence, therefore, religion has given terrorism a remarkable power” (Juergensmeyer, p. 525).

Religious Violence

• If violence becomes an attractive option for some groups, then how should governments respond?

• Is violence (a “war on terror”) an option?

Religious Violence

“The war-against-terrorism strategy can be dangerous, in that it can play into the scenario that religious terrorists themselves have fostered: the image of a world at war between secular and religious forces. A belligerent secular enemy has often been just what religious activists have hoped for. In some cases it makes recruitment to their causes easier, for it demonstrates that the secular side can be as brutal as it has been portrayed by their own religious ideologues” (Juergensmeyer, p. 533).

Religious Violence

• Unless certain of ability to eliminate the threat, then probably not a viable strategy for success– conditions for certainty:

• threat is easily recognizable minority

• threat is contained in specific geographic area

• willing to engage in total war effort over potentially many years

Religious Violence

• If can’t eliminate threat, then second option may to try to alter the cost/benefit calculation by increasing the costs of participation in terrorist groups

• May help dislodge some of the fringe members of the group, but unlikely to work against the hardcore believers at the heart of the group

Religious Violence

• Violence wins– Peace possible if the terrorist demands are met and the

target regime concedes

• Remove religion from politics– Likelihood of that seems limited though

• Try to take the high ground and demonstrate own commitment to moral (if not religious) principles (e.g., the rule of law, democracy, etc.)