terrorism & philippine armed groups draft chapter

8/13/2019 Terrorism & Philippine Armed Groups Draft Chapter

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TERRORISM AND PHILIPPINE ARMED GROUPS:

NETWORKS, LISTS, AND THE PEACE PROCESS

(Draft of a chapter in a coming book by SSN and Small Arms Survey-Geneva tentatively

titledPrimed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the

Philippines)

A specter is haunting the world Southeast Asia the !hilippines " the specter ofterrorism#$

%here are a number of things we have to be clear about regarding the problem ofpost-&'$$ international terrorism of theAl-Qaedatype as far as the !hilippines is

concerned# ne is that it is a very real problem (as real as the bombings and civilian

casualties) regarding which being in a denial mode will not do any good# %he fact that

the appeal or spread of international terrorist networks or links in the !hilippines has

deeper root causes and a broader historical and situational contet should not lead to thebrushing off of the problem as merely symptomatic of bigger basic problems of the

people#

ne danger would be not to take the terrorism problem seriously enough at its

own level where there is already a need for immediate counter-measures# Sometimeseffective counter-actions are held back by valid human rights concerns# Still terrorism

in the main sense of deliberately targeting civilians to spread terror or etreme fear

among the civilian population is itself a serious violation of human rights including themost basic right to life and freedom from fear#

At the same time in many authoritarian states and in undemocratic internationalcontets counter-terrorism has arguably cost more innocent civilian lives and humanrights violations than terrorism# And though one should not deny the problem of

terrorism neither should one eaggerate it#* Nor as in the case of the !hilippines

conflate it with more fundamental problems of a different nature#

%his overview seeks to relate (or perhaps more precisely interrogate) the

globally dominant or hegemonic anti-terrorism analysis and discourse with what might becalled +the !hilippine front, (encompassing both +the oro front, and +the .ommunist

front,) of the +global war on terror, (G/%)# %here is a different more grounded and

historically informed perspective of the main security problem in the !hilippines# %he

case of the !hilippines particularly of its ma0or armed groups raises 1uestions about thedominant notions of a Southeast Asian terrorist network or alliance and about the

dominant definitions and listings of terrorist organi2ations# %he differences in

perspectives about terrorism and insurgency normally translate into differences in policyapproaches# %his is best illustrated in the G/%3s impingement into and subsuming of

$/ith apologies to 4arl ar and 5riedrich 6ngels for their opening line of The Communist Manifesto#*.omment by Dr# %imo 4ivimaki Senior 7esearcher Nordic 8nstitute of Asian Studies on *9 :uly *;;


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the crucial peace processes for resolving decades-old rebellions and internal armed

conflicts in the !hilippines#

Not the ain Security !roblem =ere

/e have to be clear that terrorism whether international or domestic is notthemain national or human security problem in the !hilippines even with regards to the

various non-state or anti-state armed groups here# 8t might be so at the international level

or even Southeast Asia (S6A) but not in the !hilippines# %he reference in *;;* to the!hilippines (after Afghanistan *;;$ and before 8ra1 *;;>) as the +second front, of the

+global war on terror, distorts the picture# 8t may be that big a problem for the ?#S#

government which has accordingly become deeply interested in the !hilippines again

but it is not that big a problem in the !hilippines#

6ven the Government of the 7epublic of the !hilippines (G7!) knows this but is

going along with its ma0or military ally the ?nited States (?#S#) for the !hilippine

government3s own security interests# %he latter3s main security or armed conflictproblems are the more than three decades-old (since $&;; years old engines

of conflict in uslim indanao and older than $;; years roots of strife in Cu2on have

been pushed aside to put in place a domestic reflection of present conflict and strife inAfghanistan and 8ra1# =owever to suddenly eplain all 5ilipino ongoing armed struggles

in terms of what is happening elsewhere in Asia is not only a gross manifestation ofignorance about this country but irresponsible regarding the 1uest for peace#>

ne ?#S#-based counter-terrorism scholar has in fact advised the ?#S#government thus +Nonetheless ?#S# officials must recogni2e that neither the ASG nor

the 8C5 pose the largest security threat to the G7!# 8ndeed the ASG is a nuisance

though were it able to attack anila on a regular and sustained basis serious economic

>.omment by 6duardo arino field consultant and campaigner Eogota .olombia on *F August *;;


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repercussions would result %he single greatest threat to the !hilippine state continues

to come from the .!!'N!A#,F %he two biggest oro rebel groups NC5 and 8C5

are not as urgent a threat as the .!!'N!A currently is only because of ade1uate ongoingpeace processes and ceasefires with the former " which are not obtaining with the latter#

Although the .!!'N!A has been designated as +terrorist, by the ?#S# and the6uropean ?nion (6#?#) the .!!'N!A is not as alarming to the counter-terrorism radar

screen because not being 8slamist9to start with it obviously cannot be part of theAl-

Qaedanetwork# Eoth ASG and 8C5 are 8slamist and therefore have some basis forlinking or being linked withAl-Qaedaand :8# %here would be noAl-Qaedaor :8 links in

the !hilippines if there were no groups like ASG and 8C5# Eut there would be in the

first place no 8C5 and ASG if there was no NC5 from which they sprung# 8n other

words it is the oro rebellion or insurgency which provides the milieu the social baseand the logistical modalities forAl-Qaedaor :8 to enter so0ourn and operate in the

!hilippines esp# in uslim indanao#

%he currently dominant counter-terrorism discourse and research that hasemphasi2ed the Southeast Asian network ofAl-Qaedaand :8 including their +coopting,

!hilippine armed groups like ASG and 8C5 into this network# p# F#


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David /right-Neville of onash ?niversity has noted that +the bulk of terrorism-

related research consists mainly of a cataloguing of individual terrorists and theorgani2ations and networks to which they belong#,& !=A7 4im Eeng of the .ity

?niversity of =ong 4ong says +the tendency has been to connect seemingly unrelated

dots to form a vast network, and to use terrorism as +the conceptual blueprint to eplainreligious and political violence, in the region#$; +8n 0oining up the dots to uncover the

Al Jaeda network in the region, says Andrew %an of Nanyang %echnological

?niversity +it is important to bear in mind that given the comple nature of the ororebellion and the presence of fundamental grievances not every uslim rebel in the

region is a dedicated Al Jaeda operative#,$$ 8n other words don3t miss the indigenous

or locali2ed roots of the conflicts in the region#

At the same time %an notes that some local scholarship has been too inward-

looking has failed to engage broader scholarship and to relate to broader global

developments and perspectives#$* 4it .ollier of the 8nternational .risis Group (8.G) and

Australian National ?niversity notes the reluctance of many country specialists steepeddeeply in local history and culture to take terrorism seriously as a legitimate field of

in1uiry even 1uestioning the value of this field# =e also criti1ues the perspectives ofglobal and regional specialists for their al-Qaeda-centric and :8-centric paradigms

respectively#$> Eut .ollier and 8.G have been 1uite :8-centric themselves#

%he Juestion of %errorist Networks

Speaking of the 1uestion of terrorist networks Iachary Abu2a of the ?#S#

8nstitute of !eace (?S8!) speaks ofAl-Qaeda3s global +network of subsidiaries,alternatively +affiliates, or +franchisees, with :8 as its regional affiliate in S6A#$F %his

sounds almost like a multinational or transnational corporation which might be calledAl-

Qaeda 8nc# 7ohan Gunaratna of the Singapore-based 8nternational .entre for !oliticalKiolence L %errorism 7esearch (8.!K%7) also speaks of Al-Jaeda3s +global network of

&David /right-Neville +Dangerous dynamics activists militants and terrorists in Southeast Asia, The

Pacific %e&ie' Kol# $H No# $ arch *;;F p# *$;!=A7 4im Eeng +8s %here an al Jaeda Network in Southeast AsiaM,N!ASnytt No# > September *;;>

p# ) $$*#$*.omment by !rof# Andrew %#=# %an Senior Cecturer 4ing3s .ollege ?niversity of Condon and :oint

Services .ommand and Staff .ollege ?4 (now with ?niversity of New South /ales-Asia in Singapore)on $* :uly *;;4it .ollier +%errorism 6volving 7egional Alliances and State 5ailure in indanao, in Dal0it Singh andCorraine .# Sala2ar (eds#) Southeast Asian Affairs ())*(Singapore 8nstitute of Southeast Asian Studies

*;;;# See also Iachary

Abu2a +%entacles of %error Al Jaeda3s Southeast Asian Network, Contemporary Southeast Asia Kol#

*F No# > December *;;* pp# F*H-


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terror, inc# in the Asia-!acific 7egion#$9 Congtime .able News Network (.NN) :akarta

Eureau .hief aria A# 7essa has put the networking most specifically this way

N%6 :emaah 8slamiyah3s leaders created a clandestine umbrella organi2ation known

as 7abitatul u0ahidin which includes all the armed uslim groups in the region the

8C5 Abu Sayyaf Caskar :undullah and several others# Although each of these groups

has a separate leadership structure for specific operations they act essentially as part of

the #emaah !slamiyah and al-Qaeda terror net'or#$ p# $#


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interest of the 8C5 +starts and finishes, with the fate of the$an+samorothe oro

nation in uslim indanao Southern !hilippinesO +As far as we are concerned there is

no point in interfering in a bigger problem to create an 8slamic state across S6AO#,*;And neither is there a point for the 8C5 in interfering with establishing an 8slamic state

in 8ndonesia it being hard enough to establish one in uslim indanao# ne might say

the same for the ASG with its own agenda of establishing an 8slamic state in the whole ofindanao#

8t is then perhaps no wonder that there appear to be no 5ilipinos or %hais amongthe members of :8 which on the other hand includes 8ndonesians Singaporeans and

alaysians#*$ :8 is essentially and largely an 8ndonesian organi2ation with an 8ndonesian

agenda# 8ts.arul !slam(D8) roots there date back to the $&9;s its spiritual leader Abu

Eakar Ea3asyir sees himself as the intellectual heir of D8 and many :8 operatives comefrom families connected with the failed D8 pro0ect#** 8t simply is etraneous to the

!hilippines even if it has operatives here# /hat is more even 8.G reports in *;;> that

+many 8ndonesians still 1uestion whether :8 eists as a formal organi2ation#,*> %he

obvious 1uestion to us is can too many 8ndonesians be wrong about a phenomenon intheir own countryM .ollier more recently notes that :8 +has become a convenient

shorthand for the terrorist threat in 8ndonesia, where non-:8 +freelance, 0ihadis arealready the more +immediate threat to /estern targets in particular#,*F

%he problem with +0oining up the dots, is that this often partakes of the nature ofmilitary'police intelligence work rather than social'political science work what .ollier

himself called +intelligence laundering by persons too close to security services for

comfort#,*9 Social' political science work and investigative 0ournalism which rely too on

much military'police intelligence sources are not only of dubious academic'0ournalisticintegrity but also of dubious accuracy because of the limitations of their intelligence

sources# 5or eample the 0ournalistic claim to be +an eyewitness account,*F#*98bid *H#*


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intelligence reports have been actually contested even within the broader intelligence and

police communities# ne high-profile police raid of an alleged 8slamic terrorist front

organi2ation resulting in the arrest of $H suspected terrorists in anila in :anuary *;;9was based on such intelligence reports which turned out to be mistaken flawed or

inade1uate ($9 of those arrested were released soon enough for lack of evidence)# %his

resulted in a congressional investigation and the sacking of the main police officerconcerned#*&

%his is not to necessarily underestimate or look down on analysis coming frompolice and intelligence sources in comparison with academic analysis# 8ndeed good

intelligence analysts have got it better than many academics in terms of wiser

understanding of the human condition in times of war and terrorism and knowing the

heart and not only mind of the matter including the operational tricks#>; 8ntelligencedetails which +0oin up the dots, cross-checked with a variety of government non-

government public private and even non-state armed group sources in the hands of

competent grounded and open-minded country specialists +become vital clues in

understanding the real world face-to-face relationships that make specific terroristattacks possible#,>$

Still confessions and intelligence debriefings of captured terrorists as well as

alleged photographic evidence from high-tech surveillance has led to assertions like +it

was clear to me that the main al-Jaeda ally in the !hilippines was the 8C5,>*and thatthe 8C5 continues to harbor the :8 in indanao particularly in the :8 training .amp

:abal Juba in ount .ararao#>> rdinarily +!ictures don3t lie,>Fbut much eperience

and wisdom has also shown that pictures do not necessarily reveal +the truth the whole

truth and nothing but the truth#, %wo (now retired) 5ilipino generals who have up closeand personally engaged with the 8C5 leaders (the .entral .ommittee no less) and

commanders (especially the crucial base commanders) through the ongoing peace process

assess whatever 8C5-:8 link to be +peripheral limited to individuals or small groups,not involving +the mainstream 8C5 which has shed such links if any they had

before#,>9

7essa book#*&.hristian 6sguerra +!olice 7evamp !N! sacks controversial .8DG chief in botched antiterror raid,

Philippine .aily !n0uirer ** 5ebruary *;;9 p# A9# %he then .hief of the .riminal 8nvestigation and

Detection Group (.8DG) of the !hilippine National !olice (!N!) referred to is the same Senior

Superintendent 7odolfo +Eoogie, endo2a#>;

.omment by arino#>$.ollier +%errorism 6volving 7egional Alliances, *@#>*7essa Seeds of Terror$> $*F#>>7euters +7! alaysia 8ndonesia urged to dismantle :8 terror camps,Philippine .aily !n0uirer **

April *;;F7essa Seeds of TerrorH#>9Ct# Gen# 7odolfo 7# Garcia A5! (7et#) and ?ndersecretary 7amon G# Santos in reactions to Gunaratna

at the +eeting on indanao, on & :une *;;< at the ND.!#


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%hey even likened the 8C5 to any big organi2ation like the Armed 5orces of the

!hilippines (A5!) in the sense of having its own recalcitrants like the akwood

mutineers of which it would be unfair to e1uate to the whole A5!# %hey noted that thecounter-terrorism epert himself (Gunaratna) whom they were responding to had made

the update about +:83s unhappiness with the 8C5, because of its distancing from :8#

%hey spoke of the field inspection of t# .ararao conducted by the civil society networkEantay .easefire which found the supposed 8C5-:8 training camp area to be unviable or

unsustainable among others because of no near water source# %hey said that the 8C5

base commander Samir =ashim whom the epert alleged to be hosting such trainingthere has been in ill health and was based in Euliok several hundred kilometers away

from t# .ararao#>H As the case of the ASG best showsthese are at most tactical alliances of convenience more pragmatic than ideological

referred to in the vernacular as+amitan(using each other) or +coopting, each other to

use the terms of counter-terrorism literature# 8n the longer view such networks are moreincidental rather than critical to !hilippine insurgency and indanao rebellion# >@

%he Juestion of %errorist rgani2ations

Eefore really going into this 1uestion it might be noted that the +dangerous

dynamics, of terrorism has to do not only with destruction (whether terrorist or counter-

terrorist) but also with the discourse of definitions (of terrorism) and designations (ofterrorist organi2ations)# /right-Neville has a most interesting tentative typology of

8slamist groups in S6A to begin the process of developing a deeper understanding of the

attitudinal dynamics which might lead to the transformation of unarmed struggle toarmed struggle to terrorism# Eased on increasing degree of political alienation he has

three classifications

$# acti&ists- usually contain their action safely within the parameters of eisting laws

*# militants" more inclined to push past the boundaries of eisting laws but with a self-

limiting nature which reflects moral and ethical boundaries

>#>H8.G +:emaah 8slamiyah in South 6ast Asia, >;#>@.omment by !rof# :ulkipli # /adi 8nstitute of 8slamic Studies ?niversity of the !hilippines on *9

September *;;


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># terrorists" no such self-limiting nature leads to a moral disengagement that makes it

easier to ignore the conventional distinction between combatant and non-combatant

and to 0ustify committing violence against a wider audience>&

?sing this typology the NC5 and 8C5 would be militant and the ASG and :8 in the

!hilippines would be terrorist#

%hat seems fair enough but there are some problems with the term +militant, for

one# 8n other contets like in 4ashmir or Ga2a it is almost synonymous to +terrorist, orat the very least an armed rebel or insurgent# A alaysian academic writing on militant

8slam in alaysia uses +militant, to describe the use of unlawful force and violent acts to

achieve one3s political ob0ectives which acts would create either public fear or hatredagainst the other or would result in public disorder with possible detrimental effects on

societal cohesion#F; Eut in the !hilippines +militant, has a very different connotation

associated with the +peaceful but militant vigorous but non-violent, struggle of open and

legal cause-oriented groups against the arcos dictatorship#

%his connotation has been carried over to the post-arcos period up to the present

where it refers mainly to open and legal +national-democratic, (nat-dem) organi2ationsand activism associated with$a+on+ Alyansan+ Maa"ayan(EAAN)# 8n fact its

activism is often referred to as +militant activism, to distinguish it from the moderate

activism of the +social-democrats, (soc-dems)# So if someone in 4ashmir or Ga2a wereto read a !hilippine news report about +the militant EAAN, s'he would probably

mistake this to be an 8slamist group# 8nterestingly the term +militant, has for the most

part had no local application to the oro front of struggle whether to pre-martial law

oro student activism or to the NC5 and 8C5#

%he more +dangerous dynamics, of discourse definitions and designations comes

with the use of +the % word#, /right-Neville3s concept of +terrorists, is fair enough# 8nfact he draws on the definition of terrorism in the ?#S# .riminal .ode +premeditated

politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national

groups or clandestine agents usually intended to influence an audience#,F$ %hishowever ecludes states as sub0ects (perpetrators) of the violence#

%he emerging definition in the ?nited Nations (?N) as paraphrased by Secretary-General 4ofi Anan is any action +intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to

civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling

a Government or an international organi2ation to do or abstain from doing any act#,

%his does not eclude states as sub0ects as Anan in fact says categorically +States can be

guilty of terrorism#, Eut he also addresses possible terrorism by national liberation

>&/right-Neville +Dangerous dynamics, >$#F;Dr# 4amarulni2am Abdullah +ilitant 8slam and the 7ise of !olitical Kiolence in alaysia, (.ase study

prepared for the Southeast Asian .onflict Studies Network 7egional /orkshop on 6thnic and 7eligious

.onflict in Southeast Asia ogyakarta 8ndonesia *F-*@ September *;;$) F#F$/right-Neville +Dangerous dynamics, >;#


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movements +As for the right to resist occupation it must be understood in its true

meaning# 8t cannot include the right to deliberately kill or maim civilians#,F*

ur own attempt at a core legal definition of terrorism based on a number of

sources and references including international humanitarian law (8=C) is this the

systematic emplyme!tby states groups or individuals of acts or threats of violence oruse of weapons "eli#e$ately ta$%etti!% t&e ci'ilia! pp(lati! individuals or

infrastructure for the primary purpose of sp$ea"i!% te$$$ $ e)t$eme *ea$ am!% t&eci'ilia! pp(lati!in relation to sme plitical $ +(asiplitical #-ecti'eandundertaken .it& a! i!te!"e" a("ie!ce(key elements in boldface type)/ Ey systematic

we meannot 0ust a few isolated terrorist acts but a clear and consistent pattern1 plan or

policy of terrorist acts or methods which makes ita terrorist or+ani2ation#F>

8t is important that terrorism is defined without limiting the sub0ect or perpetrator

of that activity# %he ?#S# State Department as well as 6#?# definitions limit the sub0ect or

perpetrator e#g# +sub-national groups#, As a result there might be dynamics where

civilian targeting by one side is treated as terrorism while civilian targeting by the otherside is not#FF

8ndeed the most important common element in these several different definitions

is the targeting of non-combatants# et it is precisely this element which is missing in

the new !hilippine Anti-%errorism Caw called the +=uman Security Act#,F9 %his wouldconsiderably widen the net as it were therefore making it potentially dangerous for

abuse by state authorities# /right-Neville complains that +too often anecdotal evidence

has been taken out of contet and used to demoni2e individuals and groups that do not

meet most standard definitions of terrorism even though such groups might see violenceas an important part of their political strategy#,FSoliman # Santos :r# +%errorism %oward a Cegal Definition,Philippines 3ree Press *@ December

*;;* pp# *@-*FF.omment by Dr# 4ivimaki#F97epublic Act No# &>H* approved on < arch *;;H#F;#FH7uben %horning +%errorism and .ounter-%errorism in Southeast Asia /hich is the Greater %hreatM,

N!ASnytt No# > September *;;> p# $;#


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=owever the +new terrorism, paradigm or school of analysts led by Eruce

=offmanF@characteri2es this post-&'$$ terrorism as resembling a global insurgency which

may be unsystematic and may target not 0ust civilians but also iconic government andmilitary targets# %he ob0ective is not so much political as religious and is not so much

for an intended audience but to punish and destroy targets# %his school of thought is

critical of the narrow approach of the G/% but wants it epanded into a +Global.ounter-8nsurgency#,F& et the latter would be even more worrisome in terms of

dangerously widening the net#

Apparently an internationally acceptable encompassing legal definition of

terrorism continues to be elusive while there is now a bothersome drift to conflate

terrorism and insurgency " as has already been happening on the !hilippine front# As a

5ilipino uslim scholar says even +%errorism has its own distinct nuances the worldover and the case of the !hilippines strongly shows the need to bear such distinctions#,9;

Cet us take first the most prominent list with the most far reaching conse1uences

and sanctions " the ?#S# State Department3s list of terrorist organi2ations with its threeclassifications " in this case as concerns !hilippine armed groups as of :une *;;# ther Terrorist r+ani2ations (%) - AEE 7S9$

Eased on the local knowledge of the track record of these several armed groups

and on the afore-cited definitions of terrorism inc# that of the ?#S# .riminal .ode onlythe ASG and the 7S can be rightly classified as terrorist organi2ations with their resort

to bombings of urban population centers civilian transport and passenger terminals# %he

!entagon Gang is basically a criminal kidnap-for-ransom (457) syndicate but composedof former oro rebels# %he N!A and the AEE (now merged with fellow N!A

breakaway group the 7evolutionary !roletarian Army as 7!A-AEE) do not have a track

record of systematically targeting civilians#

%he AEE no longer eists as AEE but as 7!A-AEE under the%e"olusyonaryon+

Partido n+ Man++a+a'a-Pilipinas(7!-! 7evolutionary /orkers !arty-!hilippines)

which had split from the .ommunist !arty of the !hilippines (.!!)# %he 7!-!'7!A-AEE is currently in a peace process with a ceasefire with the !hilippine government for

several years now# %he 7!A-AEE3s recent armed hostilities have actually been more

with the rival N!A than with any other armed force# 8n its heyday in the late $&@;s andearly $&&;s as the N!A3s armed city partisan unit in etro anila the old AEE had

F@See Eruce =offman!nside Terrorism(New ork .olumbia ?niversity !ress rev# ed# *;;


12/22

conducted numerous urban guerrilla assassination-type operations against mainly police

targets and some ?#S# military personnel# %he most prominent such ?#S# victim of the

old AEE was .ol# :ames N# 7owe Deputy .ommander of the :oint ?#S# ilitaryAssistance Group (:?SAG) in $&@ %he ?#S# has never forgotten this about the old

AEE even as it doesn3t seem to have updated itself about the 7!A-AEE#

/hen the ?#S# first listed the AEE in *;;$ this is what the 7!A-AEE had to say

among others +%he inclusion of the PAEE3 presently the 7!A-AEE in the list of

terrorist groups is utterly condemnable# n closer look many of those included in the listare legitimate revolutionary organi2ations worldwide that are waging revolutionary

struggle against oppression and eploitation in their respective countries# %he ?#S#

government3s deliberate miing up of revolutionary organi2ations with bandits criminal

syndicates and terrorist groups can only be taken as an attempt to malign revolutionarymovements if not eposes its distorted and biased definition of terrorism#,9*

%he N!A terrorist listing not only by the ?#S# but also by the 6#?# the

Netherlands ?nited 4ingdom (?#4#) .anada and Australia in *;;* has becomeparticularly controversial because the issue has resulted in the suspension of peace talks

at the instance of the .!!-led National Democratic 5ront (ND5) since *;;F# ?nlike withthe ASG and the 8C5 the N!A has no 8slamic connection that could possibly put it in

the network ofAl-Qaedaor :8# Eut the N!A has been the most avowedly +anti-?#S#

imperialist, among the !hilippine armed groups even more than the ASG which has alsokilled not only ?#S# military personnel but even civilians# %his must largely eplain the

inclusion of the N!A in the ?#S# list#

Cong before this ?#S# list the !hilippine government since the arcosdictatorship has often referred to the N!A as +communist terrorists, (.%s) or +dissident

terrorists, (D%s) while referring to the NC5 and 8C5 as +uslim terrorists, or

+secessionist terrorists#, Eut in fairness to the overall historical record of the N!A in itsconduct of armed struggle it has not as a policy and has not generally in practice engaged

in terrorism or acts of terrorism by deliberately targeting civilians# %his would go against

its strategy of building a wide and deep peasant mass base in the countryside as the mainpolitical re1uirement for rural guerrilla warfare# A mass base based mainly on fear rather

than on winning the hearts and minds of the people would only be counter-productive to

the aoist protracted people3s war " either by making it more protracted or by

unwittingly helping the government3s +war of 1uick decision#,

%he long-time N!A practice of li1uidation of civilian informers (to be

distinguished from military deep penetration agents) and other +bad elements, (e#g# cattlerustlers rapists and other criminals) and the more recent N!A practices of +revolutionary

taation, (etortion to many esp# the government) and of attacks on civilian

infrastructure (usually business company cell sites vehicles and e1uipment for refusal topay +revolutionary taes,) are grey or borderline areas as to whether these constitute

terrorism or acts of terrorism#

9*.arapali Cualhati .ommanding fficer 7evolutionary !roletarian Army-Ale Eoncayao Erigade (7!A-

AEE) !ress Statement @ December *;;$#


13/22

Some of these acts may be characteri2ed as violations of !hilippine criminal law

though what are ordinarily common crimes like murder and grave coercion areconsidered absorbed in the political offense of rebellion#9>Some may also be considered

violations of 8=C like the attacks or reprisals on civilian ob0ects and infrastructure which

do not serve valid military ob0ectives#9F

Serious violations of 8=C (i#e# war crimes) andfor that matter acts of terrorism can'should nothowever be considered to be validly in

furtherance of rebellion#99 Still on the overall balance of things it would be inaccurate

if not unfair to characteri2e the N!A as a +terrorist organi2ation#,

Actually the same conclusion was already made $; years ago (in $&&


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(A:E) ASG AEE 5ree Kietnam 7evolutionary Group 8ndigenous !eople3s 5ederal

Army (8!5A) :8 4abataang akabayan (4) 4umpulan u0ahidin alaysia (4)

8C5 NC5 N!A !eople3s 7evolutionary 5ront 7S 7ebolusyonaryong =ukbongEayan (7=E) and al-Jaeda# 8t must be noted however that not all of these notably the

8C5 are in the ?#S# State Department3s list of terrorist organi2ations indicating that it

does not necessarily follow what is indicated in the %4E#9@

/e have already commented about the ASG 7S AEE and N!A# %he A:E is

really 0ust another name military-coined for the ASG# %he 5ree Kietnam 7evolutionaryGroup and the !eople3s 7evolutionary 5ront if they ever eisted have long become

defunct# %he 8!5A has been largely inactive and could hardly be characteri2ed as

+terrorist, " its closest claim to this was the planting of a few intentionally ineffectual (as

in dud) +bombs, and telephone calls to announce their location along with an indigenouspeoples3 demand for federalism#

:8 4 and al-Jaeda 1ualify as terrorist but they are not 5ilipino organi2ations

nor have known 5ilipino members though they operate here# 4 is the underground butbasically unarmed nat-dem youth organi2ation affiliate of the ND5# %he 8C5 and

NC5 are oro rebel groups not terrorist organi2ations# 7=E is a communist rebelgroup which broke away from and currently has active hostilities (like the 7!A-AEE)

with the N!A# 8ncidentally in the %4E group profile of the 7=E among others the

aoist N!A is repeatedly referred to as the +!CA, apparently confused with the .hinese!eople3s Ciberation Army#

%he obvious point is about 1uestions of accuracy and 1uality of supposed +in-

depth information, in the %4E as shown especially regarding a country (in this case the!hilippines) which the ?#S# ought to know better because of its long-time special

relations and even military presence here# ne can only imagine the dire conse1uences

of such information +for researchers policymakers emergency responders and thegeneral public#, .learly as regards such a +knowledge base, local knowledge knows

better#

%errorism and the !eace !rocess with the 8C5

ne dire conse1uence of such information has been in its translation into an

overriding post-&'$$ anti-terrorism policy# 8n the !hilippines this started with !residentArroyo3s emorandum rder No# >H providing for a $F-pillar anti-terrorism policy in

ctober *;;$ " +but this plan in the main emphasi2es military measures# 5undamental

grievances such as oro landlessness poverty unemployment widespreaddiscrimination and .atholic militia abuses remain unaddressed#,9& 8ncidentally this was

also when the peace negotiations with the 8C5 started to slow down# And by December

*;;> she would say that +%he government will not allow the peace process to stand inthe way of the overriding fight against terrorism#,

[email protected] by !rof# %an#9&%an +%he 8ndigenous 7oots of .onflict in Southeast Asia, $$$#


15/22

ther similar lines of thinking show that the anti-terrorism syndrome has become

an obstacle or threat to the viability of various peace processes esp# peace negotiations

with rebel groups# /e 1uote some now

- +5rom these intelligence reports it is very clear :emaah 8slamiyah and al-Jaeda have a

solid presence in the !hilippines# et the government in its peace talks continues tooffer autonomy to the 8C5 in its stronghold#,


16/22

positive the current positive international conditions,


17/22

%he government understandably wanted validation or verification of the 8C53s

:une *;;> avowed renunciation of terrorism and terrorist links# No less than the 8C5

imam(religio-political leader) Salamat =ashim had stated it this way 0ust a few weeksbefore his death (thus like some kind of +dying declaration,) +%here can be no more

strong ground for the 8C5 to condemn terrorism than that it is anathema to the

teachings of 8slam# %o stress seriously this point 8 hereby reiterate our condemnation andabhorrence of terroristic tendencies in order to eschew the reverse side of the language of

endemic state violence# .onse1uently we re0ect and deny any link with terrorist

organi2ations or activities in this part of the Asian region particularly in South!hilippines and elsewhere in the world#,H*

Kalidation and trust eventually came and continues to come in the form of 8C5-

A5! intelligence cooperation and 0oint action in the interdiction of criminal'terroristelements and also up close and personal interaction between the counterparts of both

sides in the ceasefire maintenance and in the peace talks# A 5ilipino general on the

government side of this peace process attributes much of the mutual confidence to its

being built by close personal interaction# =e said there is a way of gauging the sincerityof the other side in and out of the peace negotiations# Cike a +certain honor among

warriors, he is certain about the mainstream 8C5 +negotiating on a sincere basis, andhaving +shed terrorist links if they had before#,H> 8n the final analysis it is the !hilippine

government3s perceived sincerity of the 8C5 (in contrast to its perceived insincerity of

the ND5) which has been holding back its endorsement of a ?#S# listing of the 8C5 as aterrorist organi2ation#

Some counter-terrorism eperts and 1uarters have only recently had to eat their

words about (declaring) the 8C5 as a terrorist organi2ation which is part of theAl-Qaeda or :8 network in S6A# /hereas before the line was to chide +the government in

its peace talks (for) continu(ing) to offer autonomy to the 8C5 in its stronghold,HF now

some of them already say that +there is a need to move forward with the peace process,albeit in the frame of it being +one way to de-radicali2e these groups,H9and not so much

because there is a centuries-old Eangsamoro problem to be solved#

7ather than being +the main short-term obstacle to rooting out the terrorist

network,Hreprinted inAsh-Shay Ash-ShaheedSalamat =ashim 89e must 'in the stru++le;(.amp Abubakre As-

Siddi1ue indanao Eansamoro Darul :ihad Agency for outh Affairs " 8C5 *;;9) @-H>Ct# Gen# 7odolfo 7# Garcia A5! (7et#) in reaction to 7ohan Gunaratna at the +eeting on indanao,

on & :une *;;< at the ND.!# Also Ct# Gen# 7odolfo 7# Garcia A5! (7et#) interview by Soliman #

Santos :r# on *> :une *;;< in !asig .ity#HF7essa Seeds of Terror $F;#H9Gunaratna remarks at the +eeting on indanao, on & :une *;;


18/22

continue as a 2one of lawlessness in which terrorism can thrive,H@especially if the

conditions which give rise to terrorism are not addressed# 8n fine and in perspective the

peace process can provide collateral benefits for the war on terror even as this is not andshould not be the main ob0ective of the peace process#

%o paraphrase 7obert 5# 4ennedy some of us see +sanctuaries of terror,H&

inindanao and ask why we would rather look at the +sanctuaries of peace,@;there and

ask why not more#

%errorism and the !eace !rocess with the ND5

%he G/% has also added fuel to the other local war situation involving the N!A

- both its protracted people3s war and the government3s counter-insurgency war# %hereis a local contet here that does not 1uite fit the ?#S#-led anti-terrorism approach#@$ Eut

the !hilippine government3s counter-insurgency war has been framed as a counter-

terrorist war " esp# with the ?#S# +terrorist, listing of the .!! the N!A and ND5 .hief

!olitical .onsultant !rof# :ose aria Sison (whom most believe to actually be the .!!.hairman) in August *;;*# %he Arroyo administration has welcomed and taken

advantage of this listing as shown soon thereafter by the +Nine-!oint Guidelines 8ssuedby the !resident 7e the .!!,@*and by her order for redeployment of the A5! against the

N!A in August *;;* (her order renewed in :une *;; Among the guidelines were

*# %he .!!-N!A has engaged in terrorist acts against civilian targets as part of the

overall aim to overthrow the duly constituted government and the democratic systemB

F# %he government welcomes the action of the ?#S# declaring the .!!-N!A as a

terrorist organi2ationB this is not interference in the internal affairs of the !hilippinesB


19/22

%he government calls upon the entire citi2enry to get involved in the fight against

the .!!-N!A

Sison then instantly reciprocated in kind with a call for +all-out resistance, against

the +?#S#-directed acapagal-Arroyo regime, and for strengthening +all types ofalliances to isolate and remove the acapagal-Arroyo ruling cli1ue#,@F %he +terrorist,

tagging seems to have had the effect of some kind of siege mentality on the ND5 side

especially as far as Sison himself is concerned#@9

8n an irony of sorts the >< th.!! anniversary statement of *< December *;;F said

that the N!A +is now trying to develop the ability to make and use the weapons that the8ra1i resistance is now using rocket-propelled grenades improvised eplosive devices

mortars and other close range weapons#,@


20/22

%here was a small window of opportunity here for those who would advocate the primacy

of peace negotiations over military action in dealing with the ma0or rebel groups not 0ust

the .!!-N!A-ND5 but also the 8C5#

%hus the conventional wisdom of +not negotiating with terrorists, should not be

absoluti2ed# %here must be more nuancing even where there is a +foreign terroristorgani2ation, designation# A designation whether +terrorist, or otherwise is not all

there is about an organi2ation# 8t3s actual actuations should be more controlling for the

setting of policy about it# Domestic policy is or should be distinct from the policy of aforeign country#

%he issue of +terrorist, designation or listing is distinct from the issue of peace

negotiations# Arguably the best current eample is the Sri Canka peace process withthe Ciberation %igers of %amil 6elam (C%%6)# %he C%%6 has long been designated by

the ?#S# and most recently in *;;< by the 6#?# as +terrorist#, et without necessarily

lifting this designation both the ?#S# and 6#?# have epressed support for the continued

pursuance of the Sri Canka peace process#

Eut such above-1uoted dovish views appear to have lost much of the policy battleat the .abinet level to the hawks as shown when the !resident lays down the hard line#

As we already indicated in the case of the 8C5 the campaign against terrorism reflects

a drift toward the militari2ation of the response to terrorism and predominance of themilitary and military solutions in addressing not only terrorism but also rebellion and

internal armed conflict# %his is due not only to pro-war vested or institutional interests in

the military but also to something more ideological#

At another more comprehensive or encompassing level the counter-terrorism

syndrome has reinforced an already dominant or hegemonic ideology of national security

particularly its thrust of counter-insurgency as the framework to address insurgency orrebellion# 6ven the peace process has become subsumed under a national or internal

security framework# %he peace negotiations in particular through the !A!! have been

sub0ect to the .abinet versight .ommittee (..) on 8nternal Security created by6ecutive rder No# *$ with a counter-insurgency +Strategy of =olistic Approach#, @@

At least in the case of the ND5 it seems that the Arroyo government3s ob0ective

for the peace process is no longer so much addressing the root causes of rebellion as it isdemobili2ing the rebel forces# 6ven before Arroyo there has been the persistent

militarist mentality of degrading the military capability of the rebels in order to be able to

impose a peace settlement on them#

@HSec# 6duardo 7# 6rmita +%he !eace !rocess Addressing Separatism %errorism 8nsurgency and

Development, paper delivered at the 9thCecture Series of the 7amos !eace and Development 5oundation

8nc# akati .ity September


21/22

And now as of :une *;;


22/22

8n the light of this recent history and the rich resource of even 0ust domestic

eperience (though often more negative than positive) in peace negotiations not only withthe ND5 initially in $&@

terrorism & philippine armed groups draft chapter

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