text til richardson

8/3/2019 Text Til Richardson

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Introduction

More than most philosophers before him, Nietzsche sets out to analyze the human condition on the

basis of how it has evolved over time. He does this by analyzing aspects he finds problematic on the

basis of their genealogy, their formation over time, often finding the solution to our contemporary

difficulties in a long and problematic past. I his "genealogical" research Nietzsche seems to find that

the human life-form as we know it arises from a violent socializing formation, a domestication or

even taming if the human nature. This transaction from animal to human life-form happened over

a relatively short period of time and that it is far from completed, it has thus left scars that can be

seen in the culture. For Nietzsche the constant changing human being doesn't have a fixed nature, it

is 'becoming'. However, the change that has already taken place shows a tragical aspect, we are

already formed irreversibly in a way we cannot liberate ourselves from. If there is such a thing as

human freedom this freedom implies hardship, a laborious self-creation accessible only to he who

can master and unify all his diverging drives. Maybe Nietzsche sees this as a possibility, but when

outlining this as a goal we should strive against, this is mostly to propose a direction out of the

resentment towards a upwards-going life. Nietzsche himself is the first to point out the difficulty

when it comes to separating active and reactive wills.

When we said that there is a deeply founded formation of the human nature forged by

himself, this means, the way Nietzsche sees it, that certain parts of his nature lies behind, that his

drives are not designed to fit domesticated social life. These unassimilated aspects lies hidden

underneath the surface, in such a way that we cannot recognize them even though they are presentin our ideas beliefs and actions. What we take to be a neutral ideas often hides intentions, unknown

to ourselves. This is why Nietzsche turns to genealogy, he tries to understand where our values,

beliefs, ideas and priorities stem from.

Most of the faculties that make us human, at least what we tend to associate with

humanistic values, have their seat in a long socializing procedure, where memory, language and self

consciousness inserts themselves in the human body, radically altering our relation with the

environment. One of the most visible traces of this socializing procedure concerns the way we have

learned to hold back drives, or to "pause" them. This "pausing", the capability to hold back our

drives, not responding immediately to them, is closely connected to memory and thus to


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consciousness and language. In his essay concerning freedom in Nietzsches thinking, John

Richardson refers to this "pause" the following way:

... the capacity must include a strong inhibitive power, to refrain from acting immediately

upon ones drives. The promiser is able to insert a pause in which to consult its

commitments, and determine what these require in this circumstance. In its strong power to

restrain the drives, this capacity is ascetic; here it draws, perhaps, on existing forces of

restraint present independently in the drives. This is the first preschooling for spirituality:

not to react immediately to a stimulus, but instead to take in hand the inhibiting, excluding

instincts.

Nietzsche is not the first to have discovered the connection between the interdiction of a drive and

the development of "spirituality" or "consciousness" , we find this already in the the old testament,

when Adam and Eve are forbidden a three of wisdom. We also find it in the philosophy of

Kierkegaard, among others. However, Nietzsche is much seems to be radical when it comes to the

consequences of the ability to insert a pause. In the following essay, it is exactly this "pause" we

will try circle. This obliges us to keep two different lines of thought in mind simultaneously. The

first question we'll try to illuminate is what this "pause" means to Nietzsche and in what way it

plays a decisive role in the becoming of man. On the same time we will have try to discuss the very

nature of this short reflexive moment and look closely on what drives this pause supposedly

prevents. Nietzsche seems to think that these drives, far from being 'inhibited' rather gets refracted,

or as to say: "bent" in new directions. This brings up another question concerning the very function

of these drives. If they are prevented, then there exist something from which they are prevented,

meaning that they must have a teleological end. On the same time Nietzsche alters between several

neighboring concepts such as drives, wills and desires, switching one with another successively.

When it comes to the "pause" it resembles that a development has taken place, as though he pause

itself is growing. From the outset only simple impulses were stopped, but trough development of

language and consciousness, the manipulation of drives gradually becomes more complex, leading

to social patterns of interdiction, prohibition a vast number of drives.

When Nietzsche writes that be can see the primitive drives even in the most abstract

thinking, this cold mean that a simple impulse at the bottom might transform and manifest itself

even in the most distanced expressions, as though the impulse had never really been stopped but

rather escaped into where it couldn't be recognized.

This line of thought could be illustrated by an exemple rarely discussed directly by Niezsche

but which is present in his thinking. This rather extreme case of suicide, which is unique for humankind. The question is then as follows: would it be possible to understand suicide as an animal drive,


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for example the drive to one's own life, exchanged to its opposite? Or as a social interdiction having

become so large that it finally denies everything? It might even be possible that that the terrorism

we in form of altruistic suicide attack, hides a nihilist ressentment similar to the one Niezsche

describes as an "imaginary revenge". When the sociologist Emile Durkheim disscus suicide, he

sparates it into three catagories, the egoistic, the altuistic and the anomic. The anomic or absurd

suicide separates itself by the fact that doesn't have an egoistic self-narrative motivation. It is the

silent drive, the sudden impulse of jumping from a cliff or similar. If we take this to be the case,

then man seems to possess an impulse slighly different from most other animals, maybe a

spontaneously "no" derived from this socializing formation where it stepped out of an immanent

relation to the world.

A closer reading of the interdiction and the "pause" which enables community on same time

turning man into a conscious linguistic communicative being. To see how Nietzsche reveals thesemovements related to the pause, we will start by some of his prehistorical 'myths' concerning the

moment of socialization and constitution of language, before we move over to the texts related to

the taming of the human nature through punishment and creation of a self-conscious subject.

1. The language and metaphor.

One access to the decisive moment of socialization in the history can be found in an early text by

Nietzsche, namely ber Wahrheit und Lge in aussermoralischen Sinn. In this text the philosopher

sketches out the transmission that must have taken place, from arbitrary metaphors to administrative

concepts. What Nietzsche finds is that the metaphor seems to mirror the world itself, being literally

a transformation of forms. Nietzsche claims that the metaphor in this sense corresponds to the world

allowing the interchanging forces and allowing a flow without stopping it .In the non-

representational language, the impression is immediately translated to expression, in order for the

energy to pass through the body, without being magazined. Nietzsche views the metaphors as

referring to the earliest forms of language which show a more immanent and non-interrupted

relation to the environment, the metaphor itself being nothing more than the transaction form one

form of energy to another, as though we had to do with a economical principe of balance between

outcome and income. The analogy Nietzsche uses to explain language this is that of deaf man

formations in the sand to imagine how music must sounds like. This means firstly that language

itself has no similarity whatsoever with what it draws attention to and secondly that accepting this

metaphorical level in language becomes crucial.

Wei der Ton als Sandfigur, so nimmt sich das rtselhafte X des Dings an sich einmal als

Nervenreiz, dann als Bild, endlich als Laut aus.


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So the language results from the transaction from an immediate impulsive experience to a sonic

description. The word are in this way created by a force, a primal experience, turning in to a way of

affirming or chanting the world by series of tones. There is then no such thing as truth or truth

correspondence, the same way there was no logical aim for the creation of the metaphor in the fistplace. The metaphor is rather a bodily expression answering an impression, where the will to power

shows itself as an active anthropomorphism. The interpretation of the world find place trough

movement and contact without there being any pause. But from this point on Nietzsche tracks the

development of philosophical concepts.

1. Metaphor and concept.

So what we see in the next turn is that those who become superior, the masters, in communities,

imposes their own definitions of resemblances between phenomena that are naturally or to say

metaphorically different. What Nietzsche claims is that language is not only restricted to words, but

also involves gestures, look, and touch, actually all kinds of signs becomes comprehensible for

somebody else. As we said, communication derives from describing what is different as similar. To

Nietzsche the difference, or what Deleuze calledpure difference is primary, meaning that all things

are primarily singular. So even when Nietzsche makes his ontology of forces, he is doing a counter-

or anti-ontology, he characterizes by escaping characterization.

This means that for Nietzsche the idea of unity, of harmony between the world and its

representation has been superimposed by effort of power. It is already a long time after the language

with categories and rules of usage, has been installed that the philosopher tries to explain the

diversity by the underlying unity. This is the reason why the representational philosophy the way

Gilles Deleuze describes it, is founded on a first duplication which it never escapes from. Concepts

concerning real things receive their proper linguistic existence, the one referring to the other in a

series of references. The only way to prevent further duplication of references is to create rigorous

concepts, but even here it is impossible to escape from the first double: the word corresponding to

the thing, or to put it differently, the impression restricted by its enunciation in language.

If we go back to Nietzsche, and having already said that communicative words and

categories are installed by the means of pressure, we see that some individuals comes in position of

defining what exists and what doesn't on behalf of the others by extrapolation, by classifying what

is different as being the same. When it becomes problematic to keep these classifications, there is a

tendency of reaching for an abstract and ideal solution, creating concepts to excuse the lack of

complete cohesion. One example that Nietzsche uses often to explain this operation of repression of

difference is the way the perceive the leaf of a tree. The leaves, which differs naturally the one from


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the other, are suddenly interpreted and understood as coming from the same concept or idea,

namely the "leaf", as though there existed some kind of stencil or non-materialistic design beyond

all naturally existent leaves: an original form to which all leaves are nothing but false and inexact

copies. This means in the that man believes in the language: He believes that "the leaf" is the arche

of all leaves. What we see is that from the already established language, man forges himself a

metaphysical truth, separated and unable to mix itself with reality. To Nietzsche this constitute a

error which could be described as an exaggeration. In the risk of oversimplifying we could say that

learning proper names of objects pressures the body, correcting and punishing the senses. The body

then re-acts in a reactive manner, turing against itself claiming that all that it perceives are lies. This

is a typical philosophical resentment keeping and revitalizing the scar. Form having to accept

numerable leaves it insists on the absolute truth of "leaf", transcending the language rules and

manifesting it as an unreachable corrective to the senses. So the classification of leaf is carving outobjects, while the metaphysical leaf correspond to carving away the entire world. Having been

"corrected" or "punished" once, the body indulges itself in further punishing. This is of course only

a way of depicting a tendency, but it aims to see how the truth is related to language and how the

body is involved in this transmission of forces. Me must also remember that re-sentiment, is comes

from or re-feeling the same thing twice. Language makes it possible to transmit the damages, or

impose it on other. In this way re-sentient would mean to make others re-feel your pain. We know

that when Nietzsche is skeptical of empathy, this might be one of the reasons. Creating a

metaphysical world is transmitting, imposing on others a bodily damage. Nietzsche claims

humorously that it wasn't Athens that forced Socrates to drink the cup of poison, it was Socrates

who forced Athens to drink from the cup of poison. Nietzsche sees Socrates as symptom of

resentment, of instincts turned against themselves and then spread to others trough dialectical

reason.

To Nietzsche the representative language is in itself a weakening of the contact between the

human being and its surroundings. What is remarkable with this detachment is that man ends up

defending his own linguistic creation rather than the objects around him. In this sense, being wise is

the same as no longer believe one's eyes. What might be wrong in the correspondence between

object and word, is always interpreted blamed on nature and its appearing and deceiving character,

the last one not being faithful to its representation. On the other hand language is deceiving in a

twofold manner: first and foremost by the way it manipulates and changes our perception, secondly

by contributing to replacement of the world by its metaphysical double. We could interpret this as a

twofold repression that must have taken place in our distant past. The first level in this repression is

the denial of the existing world and its 'metaphorical' character. On the next level we se very

repression of what has been repressed, meaning forgetting the fact that something is forgotten. Man


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has forgotten his own forgetting, he is still unable to see his own forgetfulness. He has forgotten

that he erased sensory stimuli by forging communicative signs. According to Nietzsche it is evident

that something like an ideal "leaf" behind all visible leaves doesn't exist, there is no Platonist ideal

world behind the appearance. It is on the contrary the word "leaf" - created in order to render

variety homogenous - that tricks us into thinking that there must be some kind of uniformity behind

non-identical things. We are thus obliges to return to the question of the "pause", the blocking or

excluding instincts and search in the repression.

Taking a different path this could be illustrated by scene in 1984 by George Orwell, where

the one of the protagonist OBrien holds up four fingers forcing Winston to seeing five. Winston

receives his punishment repeatedly for having seen four, until he actually sees five fingers. The

point here is not that OBrien replaced a truth with a lie, but rather that Winston got instructed into

seeing what was necessary, and by this, one finger got added to his perception.The case Nietzsche is of course different but it involves a similar pressure on the body. The

immediate exchange, the stream flowing through the body is suddenly interrupted by certain rules

prescribing how the phenomena should be perceived and to other phenomena. This "pause"

consisting of the replacement of a metaphorical transaction with descriptive words and concepts

takes place the moment when one starts to learn how to stop the impulses. This irruption deeply

alters the human condition as though he suddenly stands out of nature, transcending it.

Another link to the pause can be be found in the observations made by Breuer concerning

hysteria. Hysteria seemed to Breuer to have its origin in an abrupt impulse, where several of the

patients had gone through series of painful experiences without being able to express them. Being

tied up or holding back a scream in order not to disturb others could be examples of cases resulting

in hysteria. Breuer claims that something connected to the body was held back and thus "paused"

resulting in behavioral and linguistic disturbances. Breuer relates this illness to the neural system,

claiming, like Nietzsche, that symptoms manifest and alters themselves. Nevertheless Nietzsche

seems to avoid all naturalization, he searches the symptoms collectively both in biology and in

deep-culture, even in the philosophy as system of values.

From the perspective on the metaphorical level and the language, we will move over to another

perspective concentration more precisely on the origin of consciousness. In a short passage in Die

Frhliche Wissenschaft the author claims that consciousness understood as self-awareness seems to

be superfluous in the sense that one could be perfectly able to survive without this ability. Most

activities, such as thinking feeling and remembering does not depend on conscious thinking. In fact

most of our life still takes place outside the realm of consciousness, we are only aware of a small

percentage of our life. The capability of consciousness is closely related to the need to


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communicate. It seems that there must have been an urge to communicate in order to survive by the

means of others. In an evolutionary perspective, this need from the outside, these critical moments

where man has not been auto-sufficient has forced it to communication and contributed to the

development of the ability of expressing oneself. In the long run this ability or even faculty has

accumulated in such a way that there must have been an overload, a power to communicate

transgressing the need it originated from. Consciousness springs out of this pressure to

communicate. It doesn't consist of other things than the capability to connect with another

individual. It thereby expresses a need of protection, a need for somebody equal- Man has

unwillingly been forced into understanding and to make himself understood. This means that he has

learned to recognize his own feelings and needs only in order to express them. Language and

consciousness are two sides of the same matter. This means that man has learned to become aware

of himself socially and that language itself is the expression of the herd-nature in man, in oppositionto his individual sides. Learning to know yourself only happens in this social context and in such a

way that whatever you explore about yourself are not personal or singular treats but rather the treats

that you have in common, the ones that are shared and therefore non-personal. Form this point

Nietzsche draws two conclusions. The first one is that consciousness only concerns surface

knowledge, thing that are common, average, general and therefore more shallow, it only concerns

the less complex feelings or thoughts, which are exactly those who we are able to communicate

share. The next conclusion Nietzsche draws is that while each person undoubtedly has its own

singular way of experiencing and feeling, what enters the consciousness doesn't seem to be as

individual anymore. It takes on a more common, even false or shallow character as though is gets

flattened . Once again we see that consciousness is not only a very small part of what Nietzsche

calls ouranimal consciousness, but also only a surface phenomena of empty signs:

...Alles, was bewusst wird, ebendamit flach, dnn, relativ-dumm, generell, Zeichen,

Herden-Merkzeichen wird, dass mit allem Bewusstwerden eine groe grndliche

Verderbnis, Flschung, Veroberflchlichung und Generalisation verbunden its

What we see here once again is that Nietzsche is skeptical of our ability to communicate trough the

means of language guided by consciousness because both these faculties are designed to facilitate

socializing. Consciousness and language are not neutral tools, they were meant to serve to

assimilate one another, a homogenization shaping our drives to fit into the herd. This means once

again that language and consciousness threatens or slows down or render the drives connecting

them with a bigger social body. It also means that language and consciousness have their origin in

the dependancy of others, that is to say the weaker notself-sufficient sides of us. Here Nietzsche

makes gesture to Darwin, suggesting that consciousness and language has favored the weaker,


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almost like a "survival of the weakest" or at least "survival of the manny". Of course here we see

how Nietzsche evaluates or reevaluates the values in order to make us think or rethink

consciousness and language.

Metaphysics

We started earlier with how metaphors became concepts in a way that leads the human being to

detach himself from his immanent participation in the world. Now we have also seen how,

according to Nietzsche, language and conscience bring out the average or even low sides of our

nature. What lacks however is a deeper understanding of the relationship between "the pause" as it

were, and the metaphysics. We have already connected it with the body and the language,

expressing that it essentially is a denial of the world. It is by the detachment and condemnation of

the body then the world that man creates his metaphysical alternative. What we se here is thatmetaphysics is an elaboration of the language, while the language itself is an elaboration of the

body. In this way it is the body who is being repressed. Regarding the example mentioned earlier,

we see that when the "leaf" blocs a sensory access to the leaves, this results later in a "will to

believe" directed towards a "leaf-identity" incorporating itself in the sensory perception. The

language and the body allies in a metaphysical connection. The imagination springs out of this

alliance. When the senses are restricted, the imagination fulfills the gap. The blocking of our senses

becomes a habit. And this habit is withheld by the force of an active imagination

"So Wenn ein Leser heute die einzelnen Worte (oder gar Silben) einer Seite smmtlich

abliest - er nimmt vielmehr aus zwanzig Worten ungefhr fnf nach Zufall heraus und

"errth" den zu diesen fnf Worten muthmaasslich zugehrigen Sinn -, eben so wenig sehen

wir einen Baum genau und vollstndig, in Hinsicht auf Bltter, Zweige, Farbe, Gestalt; es

fllt uns so sehr viel leichter, ein Ungefhr von Baum hin zu phantasiren. Selbst inmitten

der seltsamsten Erlebnisse machen wir es noch ebenso: wir erdichten uns den grssten

Theil des Erlebnisses und sind kaum dazu zu zwingen, nicht als "Erfinder" irgend einem

Vorgange zuzuschauen. Dies Alles will sagen: wir sind von Grund aus, von Alters her - an's

Lgen gewhnt."

Making up or inventing the impression, means being in a language mode even when sensing. But

this condition doesn't seem to be very stable. Within the regime of metaphysical truth we act as

proud "inventors". Nietzsche interprets this as an expression of vanity. What is being repressed is

exactly the invention, inasmuch as this one gets explained as a discovery. The language construction

becomes a "discovered" truth, something originating and belonging to the nature of truth. The

philosopher tend to put forward hypotheses, finding the exact same thing we had predicted without

being able to see that a "will to believe" belonging to the regime of truth had already programmed


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this discovery. It is in this sense the metaphysical language seems to influence the senses. We end

up seeing whatever we immagine, without being in contact with the immediate surrondings. The

imagination of what is real is enforced by the language while the sensory information stays

unconscious. On the same time the harmony between the thought and what is real cannot be

sustained without expense. The corporeal dimension needs to be continuously influenced in order to

keep the correspondence stable. In this case, withholding the truth means blaming the senses of

deceiving us. In this relationship the conception of body expands, involving all material things, all

appearances capable of deceiving us in regard to the true world. A world which is capable of

deceiving us cannot originate from the "truth" or the "true world". To see this we must go back to

how the truth was interpreted as something meta-physical in the fist place. The explanation is then

that there must exist two separated worlds:

Wie knnte Etwas aus seinem Gegensatz entstehn? Zum Beispiel die Wahrheit aus dem

Irrthume? Oder der Wille zur Wahrheit aus dem Willen zur Tuschung? Oder die selbstlose

Handlung aus dem Eigennutze? Oder das reine sonnenhafte Schauen des Weisen aus der

Begehrlichkeit? Solcherlei Entstehung ist unmglich; wer davon trumt, ein Narr, ja

Schlimmeres; die Dinge hchsten Werthes mssen einen anderen, eigenen Ursprung haben,

(...) - Diese Art zu urtheilen macht das typische Vorurtheil aus, an dem sich die

Metaphysiker aller Zeiten wieder erkennen lassen; diese Art von Werthschtzungen steht im

Hintergrunde aller ihrer logischen Prozeduren; aus diesem ihrem "Glauben" heraus bemhn

sie sich um ihr "Wissen", um Etwas, das feierlich am Ende als "die Wahrheit".

The metaphysical belief is rooted in the belief in absolute contradiction of values. This is how the

idea of two worlds are kept alive. After the object has become familarized, the observation is

connected to the word itself (in will to believe) only this time a correspondence is interpreted as

being possible. A refined tautology is experienced as the effect of truth itself. The truth (the idea,

the essence, res cogitans, the transcendental subject, or even the natural laws) is rediscovered

underneath the appearance. This doesn't mean that all change or movement is denied, it only means

that these are thought in a framework, or a Wesen. What escapes is how the interpretation itself is

part of the phenomenon. Once again the body obeys the need to repress, but it doesn't do so without

setting up a counter-force and on the same time reinforcing the image of truth and forcing it into

exceeding its own limits. While obtaining a truth hubris or truth ecstasy, a well hidden will to power

appears as a reactive force. The truth finding philosopher suddenly reveals his own tyrannic need of

having created the world in his own picture. The language was a labour on the body, but in return

the body ended up influencing the language, shaping and adapting it to a new will to power andpushing it to dangerous acknowledgements.


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Grad und Art der Geschlechtlichkeit eines Menschen reicht bis in den letzten Gipfel seines

Geistes hinauf.

The problem seems to be a complex one. Le language which is set to secure the rightful image of

the world cannot do so without erasing differences in degree and introduce dichotomies. The same

way we cannot maintain an image of a harmonious world corresponding to our perception without

ontologically, giving it a specific nature whether this has the form of "transcendental subject",

"drives" or "reason". These are all symptoms of "the will to insist" in something eternal and non-

changing. Generalization by means of concepts results in everything becoming self-identical,

everything gets simplified and end up being similar.

The aim of this view on metaphysics the way Nietzsche sees it is not to confirm that the image of

truth has diluted us. What imports is to understand how the truth has derived from a certain

language practice, that in itself constitute a hypostatized perspective that has spread making the

corporal life difficult. What Nietzsche claims is that the metaphysical belief of something behind

the appearances leads to a downward going life. If language is a violence against objects, then the

discourse of truth is not only a violence against objects but also against the body. This time

perspective shifts from the language to the formation of the body.

The contradiction between the world and the image of the world implies the danger of

slipping back to the classical dichotomy between what is fake and what is authentic. This is why the

connection between the outer world, the body and the language has to be seen as inseparable. These

are merged into each other and doesn't allow for reduction. By changing perspectives Nietzsche

tries build down this distinction instead of accentuating it or fixing it a hierarchical system. If we

understand the world as an openness, or a stream, then all our relations to this world has an

interpretative character This means that the body participates actively in the interpretation the

world. It is the corporal situation that manifests itself in the language. The metaphysical of language

must thereby be understood as one interpretation among others, one perspective held by a bodilysituation. This is also why Nietzsches needs to create myths, for example concerning the pre-

historic origin of mankind. Man, the way Nietzsche paints him, must somehow have been stroke by

a physical crisis. A scar or wound must have provoked a reactive will. That means a will that has

contributed to the creation of the metaphysical world. An extreme feeling of pain must have

connected itself to a judgement of life itself. A body that does ill, is ill. The body becomes

responsible, hurting the soul. It is the body itself that shows the evil. A condition in which the body

is the cause of a denial of the immediate life, and the immediate world. This "no" to the world,

manifested in language is in itself a further intensification where the hatred against the self appears.

The "no to the flesh" is a direct contradiction, opposing the senses. Instead of an active affirmative


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and affective "will to life", the desire devaluates, and gets interpreted as the enemy. The body

doesn't deserve the world. A metaphysical "soul" enters claiming on the same time that the body

doesn't deserve it. And since the body is a part of a larger body, namely the material world, this

means that the material world doesn't deserve the soul either. The soul must have sinned in order to

have been thrown down and captured in such a bodily torture chamber. If we believe Nietzsche this

road leads to a degenerated life form, a nihilistic rejection or as Nietzsche puts it : Wille zum Nichts.

On the moral level, Nietzsche wants to evaluate the our values, the way we evaluate. Moral as

system of values is closely linked to all form of activity. Prioritizing, even the most instinctive one,

is already interpretation and judgement. This is why we search the origin of the moral stats in the

biological field. Nietzsche himself claims to do an effort as 'doctor' by interpreting the cultural

symptoms of illness. The maladies is to be found in the relationship between the outspoken moraland the life or culture that can be read on basis of this moral stance. This is where the will to power

lying underneath the moral code becomes visible. What we have to question is the value of the

categories of good and evil themselves, for even this dichotomy arises from a certain set of

conditions.

Being a doctor the way Nietzsche claims, implies being a philologist, all the time language

and body cannot be separated. Here Nietzsche has a genealogical approach to values and morality

showing in what way concepts like "good" was related to "noble", related to the nobles, understood

as the social elite. The wealthy defined himself as "good" as opposed to the ignoble and vulgar

mob. What was evaluated as bad, weak or inferior in general, was likewise associated with the

segment of the society who held a lower rank. The masters grasped for themselves the right to

define good and bad and in such manner that all language users associated good with noble and

wealthy, finally with social rank itself. For this reason we find in particular word like "authentic"

and "true" and therefore also "truthful" used about the same social elite. Being proper or pure was

literally having the fortune to keep a good hygiene and clean nutrition. However, this concept of

being "pure" falls in to a different interpretation when the priest character (which to Nietzsche also

includes Socrates) appears. Nietzsche sees this more specificity in relation to the jewish people,

which in spite of their poor condition, elaborates the value of being poor:

Die Juden sind es gewesen, die gegen die aristokratische Wertgleichung (gut = vornehm =

mchtig = schn = glcklich = gottgeliebt) mit einer furchteinflenden Folgerichtigkeit

die Umkehrung gewagt und mit den Zhnen des abgrndlichsten Hasses (des Hasses der

Ohnmacht) festgehalten haben, nmlich die Elenden sind allein die Guten, die Armen,

Ohnmchtigen, Niedrigen sind allein die Guten, die Leidenden, Entbehrenden, Kranken,

Hlichen sind auch die einzig Frommen, die einzig Gottseligen, fr sie allein gibt es


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Seligkeit - dagegen ihr, ihr Vornehmen und Gewaltigen, ihr seid in alle Ewigkeit die Bsen,

die Grausamen, die Lsternen, die Unersttlichen, die Gottlosen...

As a result of social stigmatization, the lower people in the ssociety falls into a reactive

interpretation, which shows itself useful as a revenge towards the "master" class. Psychology is the

weapon of the slave. The Jewish counter-attack, the way Nietzsche reads it, consists in spreading

pessimistic attitude towards life in a way that devaluates the value related to the upper classes; a

subtraction of the "higher life" of the masters. This means that the will of the slaves got reduced and

held back by the masters for a long time without release, until it finally managed to find a way out.

Though, in order to find the means to escape it had to transform. So when it first shows itself this is

in the shape of a reactive deformed will to power according to Nietzsche. The first thing we see it of

all that a new system of values opens up possibility a reactive will to power. A resentment, trough a

creative and self-conscious pessimism reaches the surface but it is camouflaged, disguised as

"love". As one have already guessed, this love is directed towards a non-existent world prohibiting

earthly desire. This signifies of course an imaginary revenge inasmuch as the slaves cannot but

reduce the drive towards expanding life.

The value of good/bad which sprang out of the masters self-understanding as an active confirmative

path for the will to expand itself. But in the next turn a deformed and elaborated moral containing

the dichotomy good/evil sets itself over the the first one. It was due to the lack of alternatives that

moral values like "forgiveness", "love thy enemy", "patience" and "equality" grew out. The origin

of these new moral ideals could be understood as both a social relation and a bodily interpretative

expression, expressed through a will that got held back until finally finding an exit, as an inverted

will. This struggle between two sets of values, one being good/bad and the other one good/evil, has

stood in opposition to each other in the european history slowly but surely gaining depth and

becoming more spiritual. Finally a philosophical priesthood managed to incorporate the strong and

powerful into the collective feeling of guilt.To understand how metaphysical language as well as the dichotomy of good/evil

established itself, Nietzsche goes back to how society got created. From this perspective we see the

collective creation of what we can be referred to as the "human being", which means adapting each

individual to a collective herd-structure. In order for man to get civilized and domesticated the

world in which he lives needs a certain outlook. This means that his nature has to be tamed. The

human animal has to be predictable and routined. It is here we find the importance of memory and

responsibility, as components in the creation of a reflexive subject. We have already mention how acertain repression must have taken place in the body in Niezsches view. A long lasting cultivation

of human conception of time, a taming of affects and impulsivity takes place, via what Nietzsche


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refers to as Pyrotechnical. Here we see that pacts and promises are contributing the development of

guiltiness. The individual who owes something to another gets severely punished if he doesn't keep

his promise. (...Richardson)... This means that when he agrees to a contract he pledges his body to

his creditor. The subject (who is also subjected to the law) gets fixed trough the relationship of guilt

and duty, he is owing something to somebody outside himself. This way he is forced into rememberin a double way, not only remember the past but also remember the future, meaning that he has to

inscribe into the memory that will later be recalled. At the same time and trough this violent

transformation of the body man is hypnotized. Trough this pain, man is hypnotized into being

receptive to certain ideas. And when he has to make up for himself, he also need to be himself, and

act like himself. Memory and time are crucial preconditions form the development of the self. We

should underline however that this doesn't happen as though is was part of a bigger scheme or telos.

The genealogy of Nietzsche goes directly against an essentialist reading of history:

So hat man sich auch die Strafe vorgestellt als erfunden zum Strafen. Aber alle Zwecke,

alle Ntzlichkeiten sind nur Anzeichen davon, da ein Wille zur Macht ber etwas

weniger Mchtiges Herr geworden ist und ihm von sich aus den Sinn einer Funktion

aufgeprgt hat; und die ganze Geschichte eines Dings, eines Organs, eines Brauchs

kann dergestalt eine fortgesetzte Zeichen - Kette von immer neuen Interpretationen und

Zurechtmachungen sein, deren Ursachen selbst unter sich nicht im Zusammenhange zu

sein brauchen, vielmehr unter Umstnden sich blo zufllig hintereinander folgen und

ablsen.

Troughout this creation of man and society, the punishment has several significations (deterrence,

respect for authority, prevention from further damage, ritual or even party...). However, only does it

partially dispose for the bad consciousness. The human is now law-abiding and thereby tamed. In

this regard it doesn't even have to be punished, as long as the the criminal can be excused aand the

guilt be distributed to each member og the society. The permanent guilt comes as we can see in on a

later stage. Being part of the society all participants are responsible. When the socialization has

take palce, a new rupture follows. It doesn't want to be associated with its animal heritage. All

instincts that can be related to the animal drives has to go; a major reflexive self-attack

reformulates and aggressive instinct. All what man once was, is now purged away by man himself.

Bad conscience holding a reactive will power constitutes in itself an entire system of moral

interpretation: ideals like altruism, self-sacrifice, self-denial are being tying down to the human

behavior. The individual life builds up a system of values honoring their own creators to whom it

owes earthly life. The question of owing here takes a very literal meaning, owing one's life tosomebody in the sense that it has to be given back, or repaid trough self-sacrifice and by showing

regrets and being aware of one's guilt. The more we go back. The more this interest for own


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genesis is tracked down the more this image of a 'founding father' becomes metaphysical entity: in

the end transfigured as god. Everything that is human is limited and finds its opposite in the concept

of "good", in such way that man himself finally becomes guilty par excellence. The corporal

expression such as propagation, art and violent discharge of affects are depotentiation. Instead, man

learns to turn his "other cheek" softening all conflicts. We can see this as a kind of ointment

relieving a wound, but on the same time this ointment poisons the scar and makes it deeper and

uglier. Finally man wants his own extinction in a nihilism. He longs for eternal rest.

As we have seen a non-existent world gets prioritized while man internalizes the patterns and

mechanisms of guilt. In this self-plaguing, man becomes corporally introvert and developers a

meta-entity on the body level, in the form of a soul and an identity gets related to this non-physical

soul. The idea of the subject has its root in a long historical sequence of interpretation and re-interpretation bound terms establishes by the body and language. Injecting the soul into the body

means giving man free will together with the responsibility and the guilt: Thoughts and ideas that

are still operative in the culture. In this regard the western culture can be seen as a nihilistic culture.

The tragical aspect of this formation is he finds is situated and bodily conditioned language-wise

by a long history he cannot get out of. The relatively recent transformation of the drives means that

man carries with him strong instincts and aims that has other ends than those who can be met.

Nietzsche seems to think consciousness and language shares origin composing two sides of

the same. In this way our language itself is filled with values that we cannot govern. When

Nietzsche says that we can't get rid of God as long as we believe in the grammar, this also means

that language itself alters our thinking, luring us into believing in the classification of verb (the

activity) the subject (responsible for acting) and object (something towards which action directed).

These tensions between drives their pausing Man cannot change these existential conditions on

short term, he cannot throw of himself his illness, the illness called "human". A bow ha been braced

but the force hold it in tension are disappearing. This is also why Nietzsche presents mankind as a

weakened animal, where he could just as well have said enforced animal. For when the value

Nietzsche choses is life itself, he sees man as struggling with a will to end it. On the same time ma

is a becoming without ends. In this openness the religion enters searching to stitch the wounds that

the existence imposed. The religion managed to take a way the feeling of reluctancy, but not

without poisoning the wounds. The body carries within itself the spark of a crisis which threatens to

explode when the religious values lose their values. Nietzsche saw religion as a necessary escape

from an existential crisis caused by the socialization. It made it possible for mankind to prevail,

although in the long run it weakened him even more. Related to this religion we find the whole

system of values that runs trough the culture, we find it in science and the different systems of


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value. In an open self-transforming world of forces, values are destined to devaluate themselves.

This is why Nietzsche separates two kinds of nihilism, the active and the reactive. The first one is

linked to avoiding ontologizing the existence and holding open the perspective,never hypostatizing

a set of values giving the them status of truth. He who believe is destine to experience the loss of

meaning, therefore he must tolerate this destruction. The other kind of nihilism is desiring the lack

of coherence by desiring the end of everything. So both forms are directed trough an emptiness of

sens, a leveling of the value of truth and meaning. The difference however is that the first one is

willing to accept and to want his because it opens for creation and life. It affirms the flow. The

second wants the emptiness it desires the lack of meaning, insisting on it and leading itself towards

it as a final goal. The pause that we started with has somehow a connection to this detachment.

...

text til richardson

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