Texts in Early Modern Philosophy

Texts in Early Modern Philosophy | Hugh Hunter | p. 384

Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, (1713) | THE SECOND DIALOGUE

Texts in Early Modern Philosophy

George Berkeleys Principles and Dialogues

Taught by Hugh Hunter

Spring, 2016, University of Ottawa

Table of ContentsGallileo, The Assayer (1623)1[Sec. 1.]The Assayer (Il Saggiatore)1Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Bk. 14[Sec. 2.]Introduction 1.1.1 54[Sec. 3.]Chapter 2. NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND.6Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Bk. 210[Sec. 4.]Chapter 1. OF IDEAS IN GENERAL, AND THEIR ORIGINAL.10[Sec. 5.]Chapter 2. OF SIMPLE IDEAS.17[Sec. 6.]Chapter 3. OF IDEAS OF ONE SENSE.18[Sec. 7.]Chapter 4. OF SOLIDITY.19[Sec. 8.]Chapter 5. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF DIVERS SENSES.22[Sec. 9.]Chapter 6. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF REFLECTION.22[Sec. 10.]Chapter 7. OF SIMPLE IDEAS OF BOTH SENSATION AND REFLECTION.22[Sec. 11.]Chapter 8. SOME FARTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR SIMPLE IDEAS.25[Sec. 12.]Chapter 9. OF PERCEPTION.31[Sec. 13.]Chapter 10. OF RETENTION.32[Sec. 14.]Chapter 11. OF DISCERNING, AND OTHER OPERATIONS OF THE MIND.33[Sec. 15.]Chapter 13. OF SIMPLE MODES, AND FIRST, OF THE SIMPLE MODES OF SPACE.37[Sec. 16.]Chapter 17. OF INFINITY.41[Sec. 17.]Chapter 19. OF THE MODES OF THINKING.43[Sec. 18.]Chapter 20. OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.44[Sec. 19.]Chapter 21. OF POWER.45[Sec. 20.]Chapter 22. OF MIXED MODES.55[Sec. 21.]Chapter 23. OF OUR COMPLEX IDEAS OF SUBSTANCES.56[Sec. 22.]Chapter 25. OF RELATION.65[Sec. 23.]Chapter 27. OF IDENTITY AND DIVERSITY.66Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Bk. 379[Sec. 24.]Chapter 3. OF GENERAL TERMS.79[Sec. 25.]Chapter 6. OF THE NAMES OF SUBSTANCES.84Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1689), Bk. 492[Sec. 26.]Chapter 1. OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL.92[Sec. 27.]Chapter 2. OF THE DEGREES OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.95[Sec. 28.]Chapter 3. OF THE EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.97[Sec. 29.]Chapter 9. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.100[Sec. 30.]Chapter 10. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.101[Sec. 31.]Chapter 11. OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS.108Leibniz, Monadology (1714)115[Sec. 32.]G. W. Leibniz, Monadology 1-6115Malebranche, The Search After Truth (167475)116[Sec. 33.]Book 3, Part 2, Chapter 1116[Sec. 34.]Book 6, Part 2, Chapter 3116Malebranche, Elucidations of the Search After Truth (1678)120[Sec. 35.]6th Elucidation: Knowledge of the Existence of Bodies120Bayle, Dictionary (1697)121[Sec. 36.]Entry: Pyrrho121Berkeleys Unpublished Notebooks (1706-9)123[Sec. 37.]Philosophical Commentaries: Notebook B123[Sec. 38.]Philosophical Commentaries: The Text, Notebook A158Berkeley, An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision (1709)206[Sec. 39.]DEDICATION206[Sec. 40.]THE CONTENTS208[Sec. 41.]AN ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW THEORY OF VISION215Berkeley, A Treatise concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge (1710)267[Sec. 42.]Title267[Sec. 43.]DEDICATION268[Sec. 44.]THE PREFACE269[Sec. 45.]INTRODUCTION270[Sec. 46.]OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE PART I (Basics)282[Sec. 47.]OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE PART I (Objections and Replies)284[Sec. 48.]OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE PART I (Development of Immaterialism)309Berkeley, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, (1713)335[Sec. 49.]Title335[Sec. 50.]DEDICATION336[Sec. 51.]THE PREFACE337[Sec. 52.]THE FIRST DIALOGUE339[Sec. 53.]THE SECOND DIALOGUE375[Sec. 54.]THE THIRD DIALOGUE391Berkeley, Philosophical Correspondence between Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, (1729-30)420[Sec. 55.]I JOHNSON TO BERKELEY:420[Sec. 56.]II BERKELEY TO JOHNSON426[Sec. 57.]III JOHNSON TO BERKELEY: TO THE REV'D DR. BERKELEY429[Sec. 58.]IV BERKELEY TO JOHNSON435Berkeley, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher, (1732)438[Sec. 59.]16. No religion, because no human liberty438[Sec. 60.]17. Farther proof against human liberty439[Sec. 61.]18. Fatalism a consequence of erroneous suppositions441[Sec. 62.]19. Man an accountable agent443[Sec. 63.]20. Inconsistency, singularity, and credulity of minute philosophers443Berkeley, The Theory of Vision or Visual Language shewing the immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity Vindicated and Explained (1733)446[Sec. 64.]Letter and text446On the Will of God (1751)466[Sec. 65.]Sermon Text: Matthew c. 6 v. 10466

Gallileo, The Assayer (1623)The Assayer (Il Saggiatore)

Source: Stillman Drake,Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo(New York: Doubleday & Co., 1957) 231-280

1. It now remains for me to tell Your Excellency [Don Virginio Cesarini, chamberlain to Pope Urban VIII], as I promised, some thoughts of mine about the proposition "motion is the cause of heat," and to show in what sense this may [p.274] be true. But first I must consider what it is that we call heat, as I suspect that people in general have a concept of this which is very remote from the truth. For they believe that heat is a real phenomenon or property, or quality, which actually resides in the material by which we feel ourselves warmed. Now I say that whenever I conceive any material or corporeal substance, I immediately feel the need to think ofit as bounded, and as having this or that shape; as being large or small in relation to other things, and in some specific place at any given time; as being in motion or at rest; as touching or not touching some other body; and as being one in number, or few, or many. From these conditions I cannot separate such a substance by any stretch of my imagination. But that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, noisy orsilent, and of sweet or foul odor, my mind does not feel compelled to bring in as necessary accompaniments. Without the senses as our guides, reason or imagination unaided would probably never arrive at qualities like these. Hence I think that tastes, odors, colors, and so on are no more than mere names so far as the object in which we place them is concerned, and that they reside only in the consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated. But since we have imposed upon them special names, distinct from those of the other and real qualities mentioned previously, we wish to believe that they really exist as actually different from those.

1. [p.275] I may be able to make my notion clearer by means of some examples. I move my hand first over a marble statue and then over a living man. To the effect flowing from my hand, this is the same with regard to both objects and my hand; it consists of the primary phenomena of motion and touch, for which we have no further names. But the live body which receives these operations feels different sensations according to the various places touched. When touched upon the soles of the feet, for example, or under the knee or armpit, it feels in addition to the common sensation of touch a sensation on which we have imposed a special name, "tickling." This sensation belongs to us and not to the hand. Anyone would make a serious error if he said that the hand, in addition to the properties of moving and touching, possessed another faculty of "tickling," as if tickling were a phenomenon that resided in the hand that tickled. A piece of paper or a feather drawn lightly over any part of our bodies performs intrinsically the same operations of moving and touching, but by touching the eye, the nose, or the upper lip it excites in us an almost intolerable titillation, even though elsewhere it is scarcely felt. This titillation belongs entirely to us and not to the feather; if the live and sensitive body were removed it would remain no more than a mere word. I believe that no more solid an existence belongs to many qualities which we have come to attribute to physical bodies-tastes, odors, colors, and many more.

1. A body which is solid and, so to speak, quite material, when moved in contact with any part of my person produces in me the sensation we call touch. This, though it exists over my entire body, seems to reside principally in the palms of the hands and in the finger tips, by whose means we sense the most minute differences in texture that are not easily distinguished by other parts of our bodies. Some of these sensations are more pleasant to us than others. . . . The sense of touch is more material than the other senses; and, as it arises from the solidity of matter, it seems to be related to the earthly element.

1. Perhaps the origin of two other senses lies in the fact [p.276] that there are bodies which constantly dissolve into minute particles, some of which are heavier than air and descend, while others are lighter and rise up. The former may strike upon a certain part of our bodies that is much more sensitive than the skin, which does not feel the invasion of such subtle matter. This is the upper surface of the tongue; here the tiny particles are received, and mixing with and penetrating its moisture, they give rise to tastes, which are sweet or unsavory according to the various shapes, numbers, and speeds of the particles. And those minute particles which rise up may enter by our nostrils and strike upon some small protuberances which are the instrument of smelling; here likewise their touch and passage is received to our like or dislike according as they have this or that shape, are fast or slow, and are numerous or few. The tongue and nasal passages are providently arranged for these things, as the one extends from below to receive descending particles, and the other is adapted to those which ascend. Perhaps the excitation of tastes may be given a certain analogy to fluids, which descend through air, and odors to fires, which ascend.

1. Then there remains the air itself, an element available for sounds, which come to us indifferently from below, above, and all sides-for we reside in the air and its movements displace it equally in al