Thanat Khoman Oral History Interview – JFK#1, 10/28/1964 Administrative Information

Creator: Thanat Khoman Interviewer: Ivan Campbell Date of Interview: October 28, 1964 Place of Interview: Bangkok, Thailand Length: 8 pages Biographical Note Thanat Khoman was the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Thailand from 1959 to 1971. This interview focuses on the John F. Kennedy [JFK] administration’s policies on Southeastern Asia and Khoman’s founding of the John F. Kennedy Foundation in Thailand to honor JFK after his assassination. Access Open Usage Restrictions According to the deed of gift signed February 3, 1965, copyright of these materials has been assigned to the United States Government. Users of these materials are advised to determine the copyright status of any document from which they wish to publish. Copyright The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.” If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excesses of “fair use,” that user may be liable for copyright infringement. This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of copyright law. The copyright law extends its protection to unpublished works from the moment of creation in a tangible form. Direct your questions concerning copyright to the reference staff. Transcript of Oral History Interview These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room of the John F. Kennedy Library. The transcripts were scanned using optical character recognition and the resulting text files were proofread against the original transcripts. Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have occurred at the bottoms of the pages of the original transcripts. If researchers have any concerns about accuracy, they are encouraged to visit the Library and consult the transcripts and the interview recordings.

Suggested Citation Thanat Khoman, recorded interview by Ivan Campbell, October 28, 1964, (page number), John F. Kennedy Library Oral History Program.

Thanat Khoman– JFK #1

Table of Contents Page Topic 1 Impressions of John F. Kennedy [JFK] 2 Unrest in Laos 3 JFK administration’s policies in Thailand and Vietnam 4 Belief that South Vietnam was key to stopping Southeast Asia from becoming

communist 5 Peace Corps in Thailand 6 Learning of JFK’s assassination 7 Founding of John F. Kennedy Foundation in Thailand

'!:his is I van Car:.rbcll in 3ang kok . Today ic October 28, 1964. The plac2 is t n2 c:.iicc a: llis ·:Excellency Thanat Khoman, Foreign Hinister to Tha:.land ..

Gur p~rpose is to record material which would otherwise not be put dm:n on pap~r, a~0 consequently forever lost to future historians.

This i s an ·::.o:caJ. history in Hhich you give your impressions, Your Ezccllency , of }~~sident Kennedy, l1is policies, achievements, his mistakes, his failures, if you wish .

I van CanpbeL: 11Your Excellency, \vhen did you first meet John F. Kenne d:;•? "

Thanai: iJ10ma.n : ' ·I had the honor and the pleasure of meeting President Kennedy i~ Washington in 1962; I went there to have discus­s ions \.Ji th the United States Govern111ent as a result of \vhich a joint: cOiar.mnique Has issued by the govcrruuents of United .States and Thniland. ''

Ivan Campbell: "i.Jhat Here your impressions of the man John F. Kennedy?"

Thanat Khom<:m: ' tJ;,.]e have heard about President Kennedy a great deal throu8h the press, radio and other media. We knew that he ~as still a young man, that he was intense in his desire to preserve and maintain peace. We learned about his past records as senator, but '\vhen I first met him at the Hhite Hous e in Washington, I was impressed not so much by his youth but his intense desire to do something and to achieve some­tl~ing to keep the peace in the '\vorl d. He was· at the same time quite relaxed in his demeanour but you can see in his eyes the intensity of his mind, of his intellect and also - -if I raay say so - - the throbbing of his heart, \vhich longed for a firni and sound peace. We discussed a great deal a~out the situation in Southeast Asia, the situation in Thailand, the s i. tuation i n neighboring. countries; Laos, South Vietnam and other s . Dut everything leads to one simple question: how could peace and stability be maintained in Southeast Asia? Eo~~: coulcl freedom and independence be preserved for nations whic h want to remain free and independent? After a rather long discussion he took me to meet the members of the Joint Chiefs o f the Staff, including some of the members, I believe, of the National Security Council, and he introduced me to them. I particularly remember General Taylor and also a fe1v others. At that time they ~o-1ere meeting in the room adjoining the room i n l.vhich he received me, I think the geslure of int:roduc.i.ng ml! to the members q£ his staff of the National

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Security Co_uncil or the Joint Chie fs of Staff, I do not exactly recall --1 think the fact that he took me to meet Hith them i~ an indication that he i s not alone in persuing t~e endeavors to ma intain and preserve peace but at the same time he has very able advisor s ~vho worked very closely Hith :lin to achieve· that objective."

"l:'resent Kennedy \>las a man of thought and action. Do ym.: recall in his inaugural address, he said ask not what A:-:1erica \vill do for you, but what we together can do for the freedom of man? Your Excellency, very little concerned Pres ident Kennedy more than peace among nations and united States relations with Thailand. Then, in that respect, Your Exce llency, would you comment upon United States assistance to Thailand, ~·lith particular reference to aid to Thailand's countersubversion efforts."

Thanat ~houan : '; If ' I may recall, soon after his election and after he as sumed the high office of the presidency of the United States, one of the first things that he did was to go to Vienna to meet ~.; i th the heads of the Soviet Govern..-uent. I do not knoH the details of that meeting. But I think I could pres ume that if he went to Vienna to meet \vi th the leader::; of the Sovie t Union, it vJas because President Kennedy must have thought that the situation ·o f the world at that particular ti.ffie tvarranted his meeting with the leaders of the Soviet Union v1ho are heads of another \vorld, and if the peac e and stability in the world would be pre­served such a meeting was necessary . After that meeting we saw tbat ·sorne efforts were done to untang l e the situation in Laos •;..,hich at that time was in <t critical stage, and also that ~eeting led to the Geneva Conference to settle the pro­blem of Laos . Now the problem of Laos, the situation of Laos, had a very close and very deep bearing on the situa­tion of Thailand, because if there were disturbances in Laos; such disturbances could and did spill over into Thai­lan e:. The e ffect s and consequences of the situation in Laos could be gauged in Thailand in many ways, especially the activ.:.tie ::; of the communist agents ~mrking at the Lao­tian base bordering Thailand. Hany agents ~vere s en t from Laos i.nto 1'hailand to engage in illegal activities of infiltration , subversion and poss ibly of insurgency. The .;ovcrnnc.nt and the people of Thailand were alerted to such a danGer and He did everything we could to prevent the si:=uation from developing into a stage \vhere insurgency i·iOL:i.d be carried out by the communists and the pro-connnunist factions . Crash programs were started to OJ?en up the areas whic h were the objectives of infiltration and s ubver sion by

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:i1e c c;·.1;;1unis ts from the Laotian base. A grea t deal of :.: ..J t-:2:;·, oi 2nergy, people \-Jere consecrated to that task of p:..· e ·.·c n c::.n:::; ~he conn·,·,unists from ach i e ··.r:Lng their aims. And ~ : : e C:1::.l: cd St.;tes, knowing the detcrr.1i-:.1ation of the Thai (;:,ve: r; t.:Je: n t and the people not to allmv the communists c :i.t.1c ;: ;': r or:J Laos or ·e~se\vhcrc to set up a base o£ operation .:_;-_ ·fha~. J.<:~ c1d, ha!: come to our aid. Fresident Kennedy, his ::tc..:=.: a nd i1i :-; colleagues in the United States Government , ;e: ;_· 2 ;_n1 ar2 o f tl1c e fforts by the Thai Government and people, a nc! iL ;:ea di ly cooperated through the agen(;ies of the United - ~~ ':es ':;ov2rnment in l.'hailand. He are deeply appr~ciative o£ ;: ;tnt: unders tnnding, sympathy and cooperation extended by Fr cs i.cicm t Kennedy h imself and his government. The result is L1.:::. ;: , by nipping in the bud the communist activities in 1:hc I-;o:.:- t heast nnd the llorth of Thailand, \ve denied them the possj_ Ji. lity of setting up a base o£ operation against Thai­L::nd e.nd pe1·hap::; also .:gainst the Hhole of Sou t heast Asia."

I v an CaL:p be l l: "In ::-clati.on to h is statesmanship, you touched upon Lao !O , Your Excellency. Could you reflect a moment on his po l.>:: j_es i n relation to ThaiJ.and and Vietnam?"

Thanat Khoman: ''1,Jc].J., as I said, the main objectives of President K~nnc dy, QS I understood them, were to seek ways and means o f den ying thos e who wanted to create conditions Hhich may lead t o hostility and conflict in the world the possibility o f c a rrying out their desire. And tha t was, I think, the obj ect of the meeting in Vienna. Nmv after that meeting the res ul t c:s ~-Je can nmv gauge, since time has elapsed, was the intention of l:'res ident Kennedy ~·las to try to work out some sor t of an a::;reem ent or modus vivendi with the head of the comwun i st ~1orld, to ~revent communist activities from spread­i ng to Southeast Asia and from denying the communists the possibi ility of taking over the free areas of Southeast Asia. Now, Laos at that time was in turmoil. The agreement, I bel i.eve, 1vas tu convince the head of the Soviet Government, and consequently the head of the communist world, that they ha d no advantage in seeing turmoil reach a critical point in La os or in South Vietnam, and it >vas an attempt to trust the head o f t he Soviet Government and the communist ~10rld that t hey mi ght do something. They might influence the other c ommw n i st elements, especially the Asian communists to vJOrk f o1· pe ac e rathe r than work tm·1ard aggression and totvard _ s prcadin~ t he seeds of conflict and hostility in Southeast Asia . UcH, the agreement arrived at in Geneva may have p;:-ov cd to be someHhat different from what could be e::-::pected t hen - - I'm talkingabout 1961 and 1962. In any case the e ff or ts and the attemp t were vlOrth~vhile. If it did not

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I Yan C.;.mpDe l .i. :

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so l v e the p1;oblems , at least it clarified the position of t h e Suro~ean communists vis-a-vis the Asian communists, and for ~etter 6r f or worse the Geneva a greement has a part in :, ,.,.:;p :i.ng 1£los f rom being the stage of larger conflict. So, I t~ ~n~ , we can giv e. at l east this c redit to the Geneva azreemcnts .

" l-ioH in regard to South Vietnam, I think President Ke nnedy .:md the Unite d S tates Gover nment the n were fully a•.-1a· · ~ tho.t t he South Vi e tname se , or the Vi e tnamese situation, i~ the keys tone to the \vhole of Southeast Asia. I myse lf na d the opportunity of expounding the same view as far back a s ~n !~ S S . Whil e most people were preoccupied with the s i tuation in Laos, I tried to draw the attention of the members of Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to the fact tha :: Soutll Vietnam h'as in fact the key to the \vhole situation. l r Sou th Vietnam could be kept fre e from domination by the cor:u:r:c:nists , ue could hav e the hope that Southeast Asia could b e i r cc fr om communist control and domination . Now, o f course, \:e co.n s ee n Lch more clearl y than before that South Vietnam ~ol d s tile key to the peace and stability of the whole of Soutiwas t l\ s ia. I f South Vi e tnam '"1ere to fall, then, as \-iell · as n ow, at l east the ou ter ring in Southeast Asia--of course, I arr, ta l :zing f rom Thailand so I consider the former Indo-Chinese sta tes as t i;e oute r ring --if South Vietnam were to fall, i t \:oulci be i n dee d difficult if not impossible to keep Laos from c or.u;:un:~st con t r o l and ,domination, and that is also valid for Cambodia. There f ore, th e situa t ion i n South Vietnam has a ..;er:,· ;_q>or t o.nt b ear i.ng on Thailand, b8cause, as I ~a.i.d, South Vi e t n.-:u--:: , C.:..u11bodia and Laos represent the outer ring as far as Thc:i land' s defense is concerned. If the out e r ring \-lere to fall , the n the danger, the threat, the menace will be appl~cd di rectl y against Thailand, because ' Thailand geoJraph­:l.cally i.. s t he heart of the whol e of Southeast Asia. Then \-le

\li l l be the front line. At present, the battles, the strug-s J.es an~ oe ing wa6ed yet on ti1e oute :c ring, so we are aware of ..:ll :~s situa tion, a nd we are tryi ng to do \vhat He can, every­c:1i.n~ ,,,c can, to prevent the comr.mn ists from taking ove r those r..:oun l:r i.e:s and r; om :i. n:-; di ,~e c tJ.y to our doorst e p."

' "I n respe ct t o Sou t h Vietnam and the critical situation, '::". ... L: r Z::cel l ency , \·.'Ould you care to r en::a r l< or comment on any reflcr. t:i..ons yo0 might llave a s to any thing that might have­bc::::n dune di fferen t ly clue ing the I~ennedy y ears. "

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'f:.:;;:1.::.t Khor:,an: 11 \lr.::::.l ,_it's ahvays very di ff icult to say what could neve been done differently. If I may be so frank as to say, I ~oul~ ~ay: that if what has been done under President i~c,nned:.r could have been done earliel~, if the same avmreness til~::: c· .. i. 0tcd under l'residcnt Kennedy's .:tdministrat ion could aa ·r::: r:::: .. ~sted a few years before and appropriate measures taken accordingly, then perhaps the situation might be soned1a t influenced . But, of course , it is very diff icult to ale~c the governments and peoples far away from the scene of di£ficul ties .:md danger . It always takes a little time t o draw attention to the dangers and to the threats. Jut I don't think the situation is t oo late. I would even say l:;Jat .i..i: no measures bad been taken under President Ken11edy '::; adl!l.:.nistrati on then it would have been too late."

I·,rc.;.n Ca.-::pbell: tt;iindsigltt is al1·1 a ys better than foresight, Your E::cellen\:-' . Your commen ts on President Kennedy as a man of chousht and action fit s well . on what you have said. \-i oul d you care to comment on the Peace Corps, particularly as it app l ie s to Thailand."

Thana:r l(hon·:an : "I ar:1 Hi lling to say that the Peace Corps ide a is indeed a gcne;.-ous idea. It is ~·Jell that govermnents should come into contact 11ith one another. It is vJell to have diplomats stationed in many parts of the world. But I think it is e·ven oo:ce important for the pe ople to c ome into contact Hith one anothe1: , to have first-hand knowledge, first-hand experi­ence and als o first-hand ideas about what we should do in thi s world to keep peace and t o devel op friendly relations between the bations of the world. That is why we have accepted tne idea of receiving members of Peace Corps in Thailand . I thinl~ t he first time Hhen thls idea came i nto contact ,;ith us Has at my house. I had the pleasure and the privilege of receiving Mr. Sargent Shriver in my home. He car.ie ~o c :~plain to us the idea of the Peace Corps. I asked hir.1 about the details of this organization. And after learn:i.n;:; of the details, I told Hr. Shriver that I \vas prep~rcd to rcco~~end to my government to accept members of the l'eacc Corps in Thailand. Ny government decided to accept, .::tnd 1-1hat I can say nmv is that the number o f Peace Cor ps people in Thailand has increased by many folds since the :irsl: Peac e Corps members c ame t o Thailand. These young people ,.,:10 came here \·Ji th no diplomatic privilege, no status ;;;hatsoe·.-er , bu t simply as young men and 't<lomen, came >vith the only t~1in.:; they can offer; tha t is good,vill, and indeed they offe1·ed us ~heir goodHill and also their knowledge, their si~ill. And they came to live \·Jith our people not in hotels, not :i_r: sumptuous hous es, but in our farmers 1 huts, sharing

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theL· {:ood ·and the roof. From what I heard, they \vere not disapp ointed by the rough and sometimes primitive life they ;1ad to lead. Even from those precarious and rather pr::'.r;,::.tive: conditions they have learned something. They leilr:1 :;d t:w t our people l'Ere in Thailand are animated by an iL.J:.e:;-;,se 60odwill, admiration and respcc t for the American people, even though many of them have never seen a p1ccure o£ tl :::: Unite d States. But since they met some of the Amer ican you th, nmv they knoH that at least they can count on f ri 2nds beyo~d the ocean. So, I think, the idea of brin~inJ a people into direct contact with one another is

· indeed tbe most profitable and the most generous idea. 11

Iva.n Carr.pbell: 1:Your ;:;xcellency, I wonder if you vJOuld mind commenting on ';.lh~ !.: your feelin.:;s \vere on that Saturday morning in Nover,tbcr, almost a year ago Hhen you \·7ere iufo..:>med about the as s assination of John F. Kennedy."

Thana t I:homan: 11 I suppose 1 ike many other people, I heard the ne\vS of lrasident Kennedy's assassination through the radio iiith great shock; lte VJas so young, he \vas so active, he was so keen and intense in his desire to work for his country and also for the peace of the Horld. I couldn't say a 1wrd. The only thing I could say was to tell my ~·life

of the sad news. I can tell you that afterwards I talked to my ~other who is close to 80 years old, and she told me that in spite of the fact that she bas never met or seen l:-resident Kennedy the tears came to her eyes. The first t h i ng that I did after I learned of the news v1as to get in touch i·litl: rny headquarters in the Foreign Office in Bangkok. Ac ;.:hat tine , I '=-<as not in Bangkot; I ,,1as at the seaside in South of Thailand . The Pr;i.me Ninister \·.;as ailing then; the forr:.2:.: 1:rime lHnis ter and I got in touch ~vi th the Office of the Prime Hinister so that vle could proceed wi th some formalities like sending telegrams of condolences, and also prepared for a trip for the funeral of President Kennedy. Unfortunately, there Here no planes available because it was a \Jeei~end. The event occurred during the 'l.veekend. So, even thou~h t he Government of 'l'hailand appointed me as its repre­senta:::Lve to the funeral of President Kennedy, I couldn't make t~e trip because there was no pl ane available, and if I ~2re to ~o ahead in any case, I would arrive after t he. func;:-aJ.. So, I decided not to g o and then the Govermr.ent of Tlu::i:'.<:~nd appointed our Ambassador i n Was hington to rev:c.sc;11: Thailand."

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Ivc.n Campbe~l : "In csmclusi on, Your Excellency, would you corrnnent on tnc:: J cr.n F .. Kennedy Foundation in Thailand vlhich has been fou nd ed un ~Yc.ur ~xce ll ency 1 s initiative."

L1c.nat t<.homc.n: "I c.:1n say that the idea of doing something to perpetuate l're::s :Lde nt Kennedy's mer:10ry came to my vlife and to myself s~ontancou sly. We did not consult with anyone. We only tal~~ E- d about that, and \ve thought that something has to be done:: :12rc in 'l'hailand to keep the memory of President Kennedy aliv,:, especially his good deeds, his lifetime efforts to s er\re not only the American nation, but fara\o7ay nations like c:osc of Southeast Asia, like Thailand. We thought that the fLturc generations in this country >wuld vJant to know -v;hat 1-rssident Kennedy had done for them, even though indirectly. \,!e Hant them to learn about tl"E efforts of one man to serve his c o11nt;~y, to serve the cause of international peace, to serve the cause of human dignity, the cause of justice, indeed t 'he cause of the ~vhole of mankind. \-Je felt sure that the f ut ure generations in Thailand will benefit from the e;~perienccs through -v;hich President Kennedy had gone, indeed his -;.;hole life, his efforts, his sacrifices and the circum-s t:anccs of his death. Even though he may belong to a fara\vay coun t ry , the youth of Thailand could draw an inspiration from hir: d2-,;o tion t o his people and to r.-tany other freedom loving people i n the world. That is why we started the John F. Kenne dy foundation. Instead of suggesting to the Thai Govern­men t t o build a statue of the late President, I thought that the TJ--:.a:i_ people \VOuld ~-Jant to take part in this memorial to the :.ate }residen t -- to President Kennedy. And I thought t hat ~~nee Fresident Kennedy was a man of ideal as well as action, and because of his youth, and because of the fact that he Ka s deeply interested in the youth, not only the youth of his c ountry but the youth all the ¥7orld over, I set as an objective or rather we set as an objective of the John F. Kennedy Foundation that it should be dedicated mostly to educa ~ ion , to 3ood understanding bet\Jeen the peoples of .the Uni t ed ~Latcs of America and Tha il and, and that would be a liv.i. ng or;anization in Hhich not only the government Hould take par i:, but also as many people as possible in Thailand. And indeed since the establishment of the John F. Kennedy Foundation, contributions have poured in from many sources and many quarters. Many contributions are very modest, because they came from school cll:;..ldren, teachers. Some -Other contri.butions ar e large because they came from business people and ::=rom govcnrrr.en t people. nut I can say that the John F. K-:mwd:' Foundation represents the people of Thailand. It does not J:c2i>r 2s cnt only a section or a portion of the Thai people.

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.1..1: ..: ·.c . 'i'~1<.1i p<::u1JL: have j oinec] '- ~1 to coE.rul:!ll10r a tc the ~ood dcL~s.and good actions of President Kennedy, and they want that Foundation to work in confirmity with the ideals in ili1ic~1 l'resident Kennedy believed. He have a modest start, but I am sure that in the future this Foundation ;.;ill continue to grow and will per form the services that President Kennedy would himself have expected of the Foundation."

" Its purpose, then, Your Excellency, is in education. 11

Tha:1at Khoman : 11Especiall.y in education and, as I said, to develop and promote the good understandin0 betvJeen the people of Thailand and the people of the United States through exchanges o.: :::eachers, students, artists, scientists, people from all walks of life. We will try to do it, but we are not in a hurry; w~ want to do things as well as possible. So we first ~-;ant to ga the:- strength before we do something, and once \>le

fael that we have enough strength we will do the things which vJe hope Hi.ll honor the memory of l'r es ident ~ ennedy. 11

Iv.::; n Campbell: nThat is indeed a noble purpose. Thank you very much, Your E:ccel.lency."

The preceding has been an appr~isal of the Kennedy years by His Excellency Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister to Thailand recorded on October 28 , 1964 in Bangkok , Thailand. This is Ivan Campbell in Bangkok.

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