thayer the rise of china and india: challenging or reinforcing southeast asia's autonomy?

8/3/2019 Thayer The Rise of China and India: Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast Asia's Autonomy?

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STRATEGIC ASIA 2011 - 12

ASIA RESPONDS TOITS RISING POWERSChina and India

Edited byAshley J. Tellis, Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough

With contributions fromM. Taylor Fravel, Michael J. Green, Chung Min Lee, Rory Medcalf,Harsh V. Pant, Kenneth B. Pyle, Teresita C. Schaffer, Ashley J. Tellis,Carlyle A. Thayer, Dmitri Trenin, and S. Enders Wimbush

THE NATIONAL BUREAU of ASIAN RESEARCHSeattle and Washington, D.C.


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THE NATIONAL BUREAU of ASIAN RESEARCHPublished in the United States of America byThe National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, WA, and Washington, D.C.www.nbr.orgCopyright 2011 by The National Bureau of Asian ResearchAll rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, orotherwise, without prior permission of the publisher.This material is based upon work supported in part by the Department of Energy (National NuclearSecurity Administration).This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United StatesGovernment. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of theiremployees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibilityfor the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or processdisclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to 'any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, orotherwise does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the UnitedStates Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein donot necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.NBR makes no warranties or representations regarding the accuracy of any map in this volume.Depicted boundaries are meant as guidelines only and do not represent the views ofNBR or NBR'sfunders.Design and publishing services by The National Bureau of Asian ResearchCover design by Stefanie ChoiFront cover photo: Werner Van Steen / The Image Bank / Getty Images

Publisher's Cataloging-In-Publica tion Data(Prepared by The Donohue Group, Inc.)Asia responds to its rising powers: China and India / edited by Ashley j. Tellis, Travis Tanner,and Jessica Keough; with contributions from M. Taylor Fravel ... let al.].

p. : ill., maps; cm. -- (Strategic Asia 1933-6462; 2011-12)Based upon work supported in par t by the Department of Energy (National Nuclear SecurityAdministration).Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN: 978-0-9818904-2-51. Asia--Foreign relations--China. 2. Asia--Foreign relations--India. 3. China--Foreignrelations--Asia. 4. India--Foreign relations--Asia. 5. China--Foreign economic relations. 6.

India--Foreign economic relations. 7. Asia--Strategic aspects. I. Tellis, Ashley j. II. Tanner,Travis. III. Keough, jessica. IV. Fravel, M. Taylor. V. National Bureau of Asian Research (U.S.)VI. Series: Strategic Asia; 2011-12.DS33.3 .A85 2011320.95

Printed in CanadaThe paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirement of the American NationalStandard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSIZ39.48-1992.


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Contents

PrefaceRichard f. Ellings

ix

OverviewThe United States and Asia's Rising Giants ,Ashley f. Tellis

An overview of the themes and conclusions of the volume,examining the causes behind the rise of China and India, theimplications for the U.S., and the responses of other Asian states.

3

Special StudyInternational Order and the Rise of Asia:History and Theory ,Kenneth B. Pyle

An examination ofhow Asia's rise relates to classic questions aboutthe integration of rising powers into the international system.

35

Country StudiesChina Views India's Rise:Deepening Cooperation, Managing DifferencesM. Taylor Fravel

An examination of how China views the rise of India and theimplications ofIndia's rise for China's core interests and strategicobjectives.

65


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India Comes to Terms with a Rising China .' 101Harsh V Pant

A discussion of the changing trajectory of Indian policy towardChina and an exploration of how India is responding to China'srise across a range of issue areas central to its strategic calculus.

Japan, India, and the Strategic Triangle with ChinaMichael]. Green

An examination of Japan's relations with and strategies towardChin'a and India.

131

Coping with Giants:South Korea's Responses to China's and India's Rise 161Chung Min Lee

An assessment of Korean efforts to maximize a range of securityand economic interests with the major powers of the Asianstrategic landscape-especially China and India-withoutweakening South Korea's central alliance with the United Statesor loosening its growing linkages with the international system.

Grand Stakes: Australia's Future between China and India 195Rory Medcalf

An examination of Australia's response to the rise of China andIndia, including tensions among economics, security, and values,as well as implications for U.S. strategy in Asia.

Challenges and Opportunities:Russia and the Rise of China and India 227Dmitri Trenin

An analysis of Russian perceptions and policies regarding therise of two Asian giants: one near neighbor, China, and onelong-time ally, India.

Regional StudiesGreat Games in Central Asia 259S. Enders Wimbush

An exploration of the competition for influence in Central Asiabetween China, India, and other powers, as well as CentralAsian responses.


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India Next Door, China Over the Horizon:The View from South AsiaTeresita C. SchafferAn assessment of the responses of countries in South Asia to the

rise of India and China.

285

The Rise of China and India:Challenging or Reinforcing Southeast Asia's Autonomy?Carlyle A. Thayer

A comparative analysis of the impact of China's and India's rise onSoutheast Asian regional autonomy that considers implicationsfor the United States.

313

IndicatorsStrategic Asia by the Numbers 349About the Contributors 363About Strategic Asia 369Index 373


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About the Contributors

Richard J. Ellings (PhD, University of Washington) is President and Cofounder of The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR). Prior to servingwith NBR, from 1986 to 1989 he was Assistant Director and on the faculty ofthe Jackson School ofInternational Studies of the University ofWashington,where he received the Distinguished Teaching Award. He served as LegislativeAssistant in the U.S. Senate, office of Senator Slade Gorton, in 1984 and1985. Dr. Ellings is the author ofEmbargoes and World Power: Lessons fromAmerican Foreign Policy (1985); co-author of Private Property and NationalSecurity (1991); co-editor (with Aaron Friedberg) of Strategic Asia 2003-04:Fragility and Crisis (2003), Strategic Asia 2002-03: Asian Aftershocks (2002),and Strategic Asia 2001-02: Power and Purpose (2001); co-editor of Korea'sFuture and the Great Powers (with Nicholas Eberstadt, 2001) and SoutheastAsian Security in the New Millennium (with Sheldon Simon, 1996); foundingeditor of the NBR Analysis publication series; and co-chairman of the AsiaPolicy editorial board. He also established the Strategic Asia Program andAccessAsia, the national clearinghouse that tracks specialists and theirresearch on Asia.

Michael J. Green (PhD, Johns Hopkins University) is Associate Professor atthe Edmund A. Walsh School ofForeign Service at Georgetown University andJapan Chair and Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudi s (CSIS). He previously served as Special Assistant to the Presidentfor National Security Affairs and as Senior Director for Asian Affairs at theNational Security Council (NSC) from January 2004 to December 2005after joining the NSC in April 2001. Dr. Green spent over five years in Japanworking as a staff member of the National Diet, as a journalist for Japaneseand U.S. newspapers, and as a consultant for U.S. business. He also has beenon the faculty of the Johns Hopkins School ofAdvanced International Studies(SAIS), a Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a staff member at theInstitute for Defense Analyses, and a Senior Adviser to the Office of AsiaPacific Affairs in the Office of the Secretary ofDefense. Dr. Green is a memberof the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute for StrategicStudies, and the Aspen Strategy Group, as well as Vice Chair of the Japan -U.S.Friendship Commission. He serves on the advisory boards of the Center for


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About the Contributors 367

Taiwan's Elections, Direct Flights, and China's Line in the Sand (co-authoredwith David M. Lampton, 2005). Mr. Tanner holds an MA in InternationalRelations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies(SAIS) at the Johns Hopkins University.Ashley J. Tellis (PhD, University of Chicago) is Senior Associate at theCarnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in internationalsecurity, defense, and Asian strategic issues. He is also Research Director ofthe Strategic Asia Program at The National Bureau ofAsian Research and isco-editor of the seven most recent annual volumes in the series, includingStrategic Asia 2010-11: Asia's Rising Power and America's Continued Purpose(with Andrew Marble and Travis Tanner, 2010). While on assignment to theU.S. Department of State as Senior Adviser to the Undersecretary ofState forPolitical Affairs (2005-8), Dr. Tellis was intimately involved in negotiatingthe civil nuclear agreement with India. Previously he was commissioned intothe Foreign Service and served as Senior Advisor to the Ambassador at theU.S. embassy in New Delhi. He also served on the National Security Councilstaff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for StrategicPlanning and Southwest Asia. Prior to his government service, Dr. Telliswas Senior Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation and Professor of PolicyAnalysis at the RAND Graduate School. He is the author of India's EmergingNuclear Posture (2001) and co-author of Interpreting China's Grand Strategy:Past, Present, and Future (with Michael D. Swaine, 2000). His academicpublications have also appeared in many edited volumes and journals.Carlyle A. Thayer (PhD, Australian National University) is Emeritus Professorat the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence ForceAcademy, Canberra, from where he recently retired after 31 years of service.He spent his entire academic career teaching in a military environment, firstat the RE\)'al Military College-Duntroon between 1979 and 1985, and thenat the Australian Defence Force Academy from 1985 to 2010. His later careerinvolved attachments to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii(1999-2002), the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (2002-4), and theAustralian Command and Staff College (2006-7 and 2010). Professor Thayerhas been honored by appointments as the inaugural Frances M. and StephenH. Fuller Distinguished Visiting Professor at Ohio University in 2008 andthe c.v. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor at the School of AdvancedInternational Studies (SA IS) at Johns Hopkins University in 2005. He is theauthor ofover four hundred publications, including Southeast Asia: PatternsofSecurity Cooperation (2010).


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EXECUTIVE S U M M A R Y

'I his chapter presents a c0111parative analysis of the in1pact of China'sand India's rise on Southeast Asian regional autonon1y and considersi111plicat ions for the C.S.. \ lA1:\ A R ( ~ l >\lr.\ :T:Southeast Asian states seek to advance their national interests through theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in order to pr01110teregional autononly and ASEAN's centrality in the region's securityarchitecture. 'vVhile \\'elcol11ing the rise of the region's two large neighbors,especially for the ccononlic opportunities they offer, ASEAN states are alsoconcerned \\'ith preser\'ing regional autonon1Y. They seek an equilibriu111 inexternal relations based on engage111ent \vith China and India, thee n n l e ~ h n l e n t ofhoth rising p()\\,ers in ASEAN-centric n1ultilateral institutions,and the continuance of C.S. presence in the region. Although Southeast Asian~ t a t e s f ~ l \ ' O r C.S. regional in\'olven1ent they do not \vant to be forced to choosebet \\'een external po\\'ers.PO I ICY L\ lPLICAT10 \ :S : Regional ~ t a t e s are concerned that a po\ver shift in China's favor is

under\\'ay. '111e C.S. should continually denlonstrate that it retainssutt1cient n1ilitary p()\\'er to deter Chinese assertiveness.

As East Asia gro\\'s in econon1ic strength, the U.S. nlust redouble its effortsto renlain an attracti\'e nlarket and source of technological innovation.

Southeast Asian states ha\'e beconle n10re proactive in pron10tingASl-',A:-J's centrality in the region's security architecture. The U.S.\\'ould benefit fronl putting n10re diplon1atic effort into consulting andcoordinating \\'ith regional states in advance of ASEAN -related sun1nlitsand nlinisterial n l e e t i n g ~ . India h a i.ll11hitions to becon1e a global power. The U.S. should support agreater, independent Indian role in Southeast Asian security attlirs.


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Southeast Asia

The Rise of China and India: Challengingor Reinforcing Southeast Asia's Autonomy?Carlyle A. Thayer

This chapter presents an analysis of the rise of China and India and itsimplications for Southeast Asia, as well as for U.S. interests in the region.Southeast Asian states welcome China's rise because of the econonlicopportunities it offers, while they look to India as a source of technologyand a nlarket for goods and investnlent. But they are also concerned \vithpreserving regional autonolny in their relations \vith the nlajor po\vers andseek an equilibrium based on continuing U.S. engagenlent, the ennleshnlentof China in I11ultilateral institutions, and an enhanced role for India in theregion's security architecture. In particular, China's rise poses a challenge tothe United States' long-standing prinlacy in Southeast Asia. Tensions in C.S.China relations thus have a considerable inlpact on the region, particularlyin the nlaritinle donlain. Although each Southeast Asian state has developedits own set of bilateral relations with these nlajor pc)\vers, individual statesprefer not to choose between China and the United States, instead favoringa united approach through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN). Melnber states therefore pronlote ASEAN's centrality in the region'ssecurity architecture to enhance regional autononly and nlininlize' nlajorpower interference.

The rise of China and India as nlajor econonlies has resulted in theheightened salience of the nlaritiI11e donlain, particularly the sea lines ofCOnlITIUnication (SLOC) that traverse the northern Indian Ocean and SouthChina Sea. Since the 1990s, India has pursued a "look east" policy designedto promote econonlic linkages. As a result, the boundaries bet\\'een South

Carlyle A. Thayer i" Emeritu" P r o k , , ~ o r


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314 Strategic A ~ i a 2011-12

and Southeast Asia are becon1ing blurred. India can no longer be viewedas n1erely a subcont inental po\ver; instead, it is an enlerging power withstrategic interests in the security of Southeast Asia.

T h i ~ chapter is divided into six sections. The first section assesses thein1pact of the rise of China and India on Southeast Asia's strategic interests.These interests are defined as national resilience (prolnoted throughpolicies of cOIl1prehensive security) and regional resilience (prolTIotedthrough the assertion of regional autonomy and ASEAN norn1s). China'srise poses challenges to the contelnporary regional security order as well asto Southeast Asia's econon1ic development. In response to these challenges,ASEAN has encouraged the United States to ren1ain engaged in the region\vhile vie\\'ing India as adding ballast-that is, geostrategic weight-torelations \vith China. ASEAN seeks to Inoderate great-power rivalry byenll1eshing the n1ajor po\\rers in ASEAN -centric multilateral institutionssuch as the ASEAN Regional Forun1 (ARF), ASEAN Defense Ministers'Nleeting- Plus (ADJ\!INI- Plus), and East Asia Sun1Init (EAS).

Section two canvasses the key forms of China's and India's interactions\vith Southeast Asia across six dimensions: historical, geostrategic,econon1ic, cultural, Inilitary, and nonproliferation. The third sectionconsiders Southeast Asia's changing perceptions of China's and India'srise. During the Cold \lVar, China was viewed as a threat and India wasviewed as a Soviet surrogate. As a result of don1estic economic reforms,however, first in China and then in India, both are now viewed as nlajoreconon1ic partners and contributors to regional security. Section fourthen discusses the n1ain strategies pursued by ASEAN in its relations withboth countries: econ0111ic interdependence, socialization into ASEANnorn1 s, and soft -baIan c i ng.

Section five assesses the in1pact of relations among China, India, andSoutheast Asia on the United States and its interests. Whereas China'sll1ilitary n10dernization challenges U.S. naval supren1acy in the WesternPacific, India and the United States have developed a nascent strategicpartnership that rell1ains a \vork in progress. Southeast Asian states havesought reassurance that the United States will ren1ain engaged in theregion, \vhile also encouraging India to playa greater role in the region'sn1ultilateral institut ions.

Last, section six analyzes four key Southeast Asian states' bilateralrelations \vith China and India. These states are grouped into three categories:continental (Nlyan 111ar and Thailand), littoral (Vietnarn), and n1aritin1e(Indonesia). The continental states have atten1pted to engage both Chinaand India as econon1ic and security partners. Vietnan1, as a littoral state, hasde\Tloped a con1plex strategy of "cooperating and st ruggling" with China to


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CTI1ayer - Southeast A ~ i a 31S

protect its national interests. Indonesia has also developed a dual-track policyof engaging both China and India on econon1ics and security n1atters, hut itcooperates more with India on maritime security issues.

The Impact of the Rise of China and India onSoutheast Asia's Strategic Interests

With a total population of nearly 600 Inillion and a con1bined econon1Yof $1.5 trillion in 2008, Southeast Asia is the United States' third-largestAsian trading partner after China and Japan (and the fifth-largest partneroverall). It is also the largest destination for U.S. investlnent in Asia. l

Of all the regions in Asia, Southeast Asia has developed the strongestsense of regional identity and the I110St enduring n1ultilateral institution,ASEAN. Strategic analysts often divide Southeast Asia into t\VO suhregionsthe n1ainland or continental states and the n1aritill1e states-bisected hyin1portant shipping routes that extend fron1 the Persian C;ulf through theStraits of Malacca and Singapore to the Western Pacific. The econoll1ic riseof China and India has altered this geostrategic fran1e\Vork hy heighteningthe in1portance of the maritime domain, particularly the South China Sea.Southeast Asian states thus n1ay be grouped into three categories: n1ainland(Myann1ar, Thailand, Laos, and Can1bodia), littoral (Philippines, Brunei,Malaysia, and Vietnam), and l11aritime (Singapore and Indonesia).

During the past six and a half decades, Southeast Asia has been vitalh'dependent on U.S. leadership for n1aintaining regional stahility and securit;'.In 1967, five key Southeast Asian states joined together and foundedASEAN. All were anti-Con1munist in orientation and either forn1allyallied with or inclined toward the United States.': ASEAN has n1anagedrelations with the major powers by pron10ting both the regional autonon1yof Southeast Asia and the centrality of ASEAN in Southeast Asia's securityarchitecture. In 1971, for exalnple, ASEAN states declared that SoutheastAsia was a Zone of Peace, Freedon1 and Neutrality (Z()PFAT\), and ill' 1()76they adopted the Treaty of AI11ity and Cooperation (TAe) that enjoinedmember states frol11 using force or the threat of force against each other.Likewise, in 1995 ASEAN states adopted a treaty declaring Southeast Asia anuclear weapon-free zone. ASEAN further asserted regional autonon1y hyexpanding its nlembership to include Brunei in 1984, socialist Victnaln in1995, Laos and Myanl11ar in 1997, and Canlbodia in 19()(). In 2003, A S E A ~

I See "ASFA N ~ l a t t e r ~ for America," E c l ~ t - \ \ ' e ~ t Center amI In .... t1t uk (lj ~ ( l u t l1l'cht .\ ... lclJ) \1 Udll ..... I hI ...interactive d a t a b a ~ e may be a ( ( e ~ ~ e d clt h t t p : / / a ~ t ' a n m c l t t c r .... t()LlmlTkcl.(lrg

'Ihe tl\'e ~ t a t e ~ that founded ASEAN clrt' I n d ( ) n t ' ~ i c l , 1\IelLl)".]cl, tIlt' P h l ! J r ' l ~ l l 1 l ' ' ' ' ' ' ~ l l 1 g , l t ~ ( )rl', Jild Ihdil,llllL


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316 Strategic A ~ i a 2011-12

set the goal of creating an ASEAN con1nlunity by 2015, and in 2007 theorganization took on a fornlallegal personality by the adoption of a charter.

Although up until the end of the Cold War ASEAN avoided directin\"olvenlent in regional security, it has since then sought to promote itsilnportance in Southeast Asia's security architecture. In 1994, it founded theARF as a vehicle to pr0I110te regional autonomy with ASEAN "in the driver'sseat." The ARF counted as founding meInbers all of ASEAN's dialoguepartners, including China and the United States. In 1997, ASEAN initiatedthe ASEAN +3 process \vith China, Japan, and South Korea. Finally, since2003 sixteen countries outside Southeast Asia have acceded to the TAC,\\"hich \\"as opened for accession by external powers in 1987.

U.S. strategic interests in Southeast Asia have rernained relativelyconstant over the past 65 years. First, the United States has maintained asecurity order based on alliances, designed to prevent any power, regionalor external, froIn exerting hegenl0ny over the region. For example, the 2010Quadren1lial Dej('1lse RcvieH' Report states: "The foundation of our presencein Asia reInains our historical treaty alliances. These alliances have helpedInaintain peace and stability for nlore than sixty years, particularly throughthe continued presence of capable U.S. forces in the region, and we remains t e a d t ~ l s t l y cOlnnlitted to the security comn1itn1ents embodied in theseagreelnents." Second, vVashington has promoted a liberal internationaleconolnic order based on free trade and investment. Third, it has encouragedeconOlllic developnlent through assistance prograIns to Southeast Asia'sdeveloping econoI11ies. Fourth, the United States has promoted delnocracy,hunlan rights, and religious freedonl in the region. Finally, after the terroristattacks of SepteI11ber 11, \Vashington has pursued a global war on terrorismthat has focused specifically on terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.Ho\v does the rise of China and India affect Southeast Asia's strategicinterests and relations \\"ith the United States? Regarding China, individualstates have ditferent perceptions of the challenges and opportunities posedby its rise. Several states, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, initially viewedC=hina's econolnic rise as a challenge because of fears that it would lead toa diversion of trade and investnlent fronl Southeast Asia. SOIne states werefurther concerned about being pulled into China's orbit in a dependentrelationship based on supplying raw lnaterials. Gradually, ASEAN statesbegan to collectively vie\\' China's econonlic rise as an opportunity andnl0\"Cd to enhance their unity and cohesion by fornling a viable ASEANfree Trade Area to t ~ l c i l i t a t e collective bargaining with China. I\t the sanletinle, China's econonlic rise has raised concerns an10ng sonle ASEAN

l . ~ . 1kp


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"lhayer - S o u t h e a ~ t A ~ i a 317

states that the United States ll1ight disengage fronl the region and pursueprotectionist policies-anxieties that \vere heightened in 1994 \\'ith thesigning of the North Anlerican Free Trade Agreenlent (NAfTA).China's econonlic power has provided the foundation for thenl0dernization and transfornlation of its anned forces. It is evident thatBeijing is developing robust anti-access/area-denial capabilities that \\'illaffect the ability of the LJ.S. Navy to operate in the VVestern Pacific. "Thisincreased nlilitary prowess also has inlplications for the South China Sea,where four Southeast Asian states have conflicting territorial and nlaritinledisputes with China. China's growing assertiveness in the fornl of na\'alexercises has raised regional security concerns about the decline in U.S.prinlacy and the United States' disengagenlent fronl Southeast Asia.

India's rise has provided ASEAN \vith the opportunity to addgeostrategic weight to the region's relations \vith China, thus reinforcingASEAN's centrality in Southeast Asia. ASEAN secured India's nlenlbershipin the ARF and, nlore significantly, in the EAS process. Both India andASEAN have conle to view each other as attractive n l a r k e t s ~ Ne\\' I)elhi valuesinvestnlent in India's infrastructure, while ASEAN seeks access to India's ITsector. In addition, several ASEAN states and India no\\' see each other aspotential partners in providing nlaritiIne security in the eastern Indian ()ceanand northern approaches to the Strait of Malacca.

The greatest threat to Southeast Asia's strategic interests lies in thepotential for great-power rivalry to undernline regional autononly. IVlilitaryfriction between China and the United States in East Asia \\'oLdd quicklyspill over into Southeast Asia. U.S. allies and strategic partners such asthe Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Malaysia \vould be pressured toside with the United States, and all ll1enlber states \vould need to decidewhether ASEAN nlultilateralis111 was a better guarantee of their nationalsecurity than alignnlent \vith a nlajor pO\\Ter. Security relations \vith theUnited States could be undennined if regional states felt that 'v\Tashingtonhad entrapped thenl in a dispute not of their o\\'n nlaking. At the \ ' e l ~ y least,nlilitary friction bet\veen the United States and China \vould se\'erely testASEAN's unity and cohesion.

Key Forms of Southeast Asian Interactionwith China and India

This section reviews the key for111s of Southeast A.sian interaction \\'ithChina and India across six dinlensions: historical, geostrategic, econonlic,cultural, Inilitary, and nonproliferation.


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3 1 Strategic Asia 2011-12

HistoricalConten1porary Southeast Asia has been profoundly influenced by the

interaction of states in the region with the precolonial empires of Indiaand China. Precolonial Indian influence was pervasive due to the spread ofBuddhisl11 and Hinduisl11. Hovvever, the most significant fornl of strategicinteraction took place through China's tributary system. This system servedthree purposes: it ackno\vledged il11perial China's primacy, it enhancedC=hina's security by creating a buffer of friendly states on the country'ssouthern periphery, and it regulated trade, often to the advantage of thesupplicant. In contrast, India had no con1parable strategic n1echanism tostructure its relations \vith Southeast Asia.

Southeast Asia's autononl0US interactions with India and China werelargely curtailed during the colonial era by European powers incorporatingSoutheast Asian states into their en1pires. Although Burma was ruledas part of British India, else\vhere in the region relations with India andChina \vere truncated. The one exception to this was the 111igration of largenun1bers of Chinese and Indians to work as laborers on plantations andother infrastructural projects.

rlhe postcolonial era gave birth to new nation-states and new formsof interaction bet\\'een Southeast Asian states and India and China. Indiaen1erged as a strong proponent of decolonization and played a leading rolein pron10ting nonalignn1ent. In particular, New Delhi's advocacy of thefive principles of peaceful coexistence resonated in Burma, Indonesia, andCall1bodia. Elsewhere in the region, anti-Conlmunism assumed greatersalience following the Chinese Comillunist Party's ascension to power andthe onset of the Cold War in Asia. China established close relations withCon1n1unist Vietnan1 in 1950 but found itself ostracized elsewhere. The endof the Cold War later created the conditions for both China and India to reengage \vith Southeast Asia.

C;eostrategicI)ecolonization after \Vorld War II was a decade-long process nlarked

by the independence of the Philippines in 1946 and Malaya (subsequentlyrenan1ed Malaysia) in 1957. The new states of Southeast Asia pursued threedifferent patterns of alignn1ent: pro-Western (Philippines, Thailand, Malaya/Malaysia, and South Vietnan1), neutral or nonaligned (Burma, Indonesia,C=an1bodia, and Laos), and pro-Communist (North Vietna111). The UnitedStates exerted influence bilaterally vvith its treaty allies the Philippines and

j 'I hcllLllld W,1'-, ncver co!oni/ed, ~ l 1 l g , 1 p o r e , Brunei, and F a ~ t Timor became independent in 1963,]YH4, ,111J 2002, rC"r'L'dl\'ely

ij


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Thayer - Southeast Asia 31'-)

Thailand and nlultilaterally through the Southeast Asia Treaty ()rganization(SEATO ).:1 India and China both enlerged as proponents of the fiveprinciples of peaceful coexistence and were pronlinent at the Afro-AsianConference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. Sinlilarly, India played anlajor role as chair of the International Control Conlnlission in Canlbodia,Laos, and Vietnanl, which oversaw the Geneva Agreenlents of 1954. Indiaand China also supported the policies of neutrality adopted by BUrIlla andCambodia. At the saIne tinle, India developed close political and nlilitaryties with Indonesia until the I11id-1960s, while China, along \vith the SovietUnion, became a strong supporter of North Vietnanl.

The foundations of nl0dern Southeast Asian regionalisnl \veredeveloped in World War II when Britain set up the South East AsiaCommand as an anti- Japanese theater of operations covering lhailand,Malaya, and Indonesia. Regionalisnl took steps for\vard \vith the creation ofSEATO in 1954, the Association of Southeast Asia in 1961, and 1\;1aphilindoin 1963. 11 By the 1960s, the idea of Southeast Asia as a distinct region hadtaken hold anlong indigenous elites, who consciously pronloted the idea ofa common regional identity, and in 1967 it enlerged as a distinct geopoliticalregion with the fornlation of ASEAN.

EconomicSoutheast Asia sits at the crossroads of historic SLOCs bet\veen the

Indian and Pacific oceans that developed fronl the fifteenth to seventeenthcenturies. During this period, Southeast Asia becanle the vital entrepotfor trade from Europe, the eastern Mediterranean, and India to China andJapan. The "age of cOInmerce" canle to an end in the seventeenth century,and the role of India and China receded during the colonial era.

In the postcolonial era India turned inward econonlically, developedtrade links with the Soviet Union, and renlained disengaged fronlSoutheast Asia. Sinlilarly, the People's Republic of China (PRe) turnedinward in the 1950s and 1960s and, with the exception of relations \vithVietnanl, remained cut off from Southeast Asia econolnically. China andIndia only re-emerged as I11ajor economic players in Southeast Asia inthe 1990s after separately carrying out donlestic econonlic refornls andseeking integration with the global econonlY. High gro\vth rates nladeChina, India, and Southeast Asia 111utually attractive nlarkets. A key

') "Ihailand and the P h i l i p p i n e ~ were the only region


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320 StrategiL A ~ i a 2011-12

turning point in China's relations with the region can1e in 2002 with the~ i g n i n g of a fran1evvork agreen1ent for the China-ASEAN Free TradeAgreeinent ( ( ~ A F T A ) . - India follo\ved suit seven years later by signing anagreen1ent \vith ASEA N covering the free trade of goods.

( ~ l l l t l l r a l As discussed above, India's cultural influence in Southeast Asia was

pervasi\'e in the precolonial era and led to what historians call Indianization.Indianization refers to the process by which local rulers underpinnedtheir legitilnacy by grafting the values of Hinduisn1 and Buddhisn1 ontoindigenous belief systen1s. \Vith the exception of Vietnam, 1heravadaBuddhisn1 becaine the state religion of all Illainland states. Hinduismand Buddhisn1 forn1ed the basis of state legitinlacy in the Indonesianarchipelago until the arri\'al of Islan1 in the thirteenth century. Such deepcultural connections bet\\'een India and Southeast Asia have not proveddurable enough, ho\vc\'er, to translate into Inore pern1anent bonds in theconteillporary period. Indian influence in Southeast Asia is now Illainlytransillitted by the large diaspora con1n1unities in Malaysia (2 n1illion),.\lyann1ar (1 InHlion), Singapore (371,000), and Thailand (150,000), as wellas by overseas Indian residents \vho work in Southeast Asia. X In Singaporethe Indian diaspora has played a nlajor role in developing ties \vith India,\vhereas political and econonlic discriIllination against the diasporas in.\Iyann1ar and 1Vlalaysia, respectively, has inlpeded the developn1ent ofbilateral ties bet\veen India and those countries.

By \\'ay of contrast, in the precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial eras,( ~ h i n a n1ade a sustai ned cultural in1pact on only one state in Southeast Asia:\Tietnan1. Ho\vever, the PRC and Vietnanl becanle adversaries during the( ~ a I n b o d i a n conflict (197R-91), and all forn1s of cultural and educationalinteraction \vere tenninated. In the late 1970s, up to 250,000 ethnic Chinesef1ed Vietnanl to China. lhis hiatus in relations canle to an end in 1991\vhen China and \Tietnan1 restored nornlal relations, and Vietnanlese nowrepresent the third-largest group of foreign students in China.

Today, the overseas Chinese con1n1unity constitutes a Illajority of thepopulation in Singapore (7 ~ o ; ( ) ) and over a quarter of the population inA-/lalaysia ( 2 6 ( ~ ) ) . There are also sizeable overseas Chinese cOlnmunities inBrunei (1 S ( ~ ) ) , lhailand (1 ~ - l ; ( ) ) , and Canlbodia (7%).Y Overseas Chinese

I hI" I " "OI11t'tII11l'" ,1bhrl'\'i,lkd ,\ ( 'I, L\ for ,\SFA.N -Chill,l Frct? Trade Agrt.'CI11t?Ilt., ( ' / . \ , IIII.' \\'o,.ld }-udlJollA. ~ ( ) ( ) l ) (\\',l"hingtun, D.C . CIA, 20{)L), ,l\'ailable ,1t h t t p ~ : / / w \ \ ' w . c i , l .

gO\'/ I l b L n ~ ' / publil..,lt j( 111,,1 t11L'-\\ orld- LILtbook/index.htI11I., IbId.


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Ihaycr

influence is arguably strongest in "Thailand, \\'here a po\\'erful Sino-'Ihaibusiness class took root historically, but it is also strong in .\lalaysia,Indonesia, and the Philippines. Although n1an: in the Chinese diasporaassin1ilated into local conln1unities, others retained a separate sense ofcultural identity through Chinese language schoob and religious practices,At till1es, overseas Chinese con1n1unitics ha\'e sut1tTed fron1 harshracial discrin1ination, particularly in Indonesia, \\'here the del110cTaticgovernn1ent only recently ren10ved discrin1inatory r e g u l a t i ( ) n ~ against theindigenous ethnic Chinese con1n1unity.

China has responded to the \videspread intcrL'st its rise has proyokcdin Southeast Asia by developing Confucius Instit utes to pron10te Chineselanguage and culture. By contrast, it is only in the last half decade thatIndia has begun to systen1atically pron10te educational and culturalexchanges to enhance its relations in the region, particularly \\'ithn1ainland Southeast Asia.

MilitaryTIlere have been three instances of China usin u n1 ilitar\' force auainsta Southeast Asian state in the contemporary periOll and all' havc i l 1 \ ~ ) h ' c d

Vietnan1. TIle PRC seized the southern Paracellslands fron1 South \rietnanlin 1974 and clashed \:vith Vietnan1ese na\'al forces in .\larch lYHR at ~ o u t h Johnston Reef in the Spratly Islands. In addition, ( ~ h i na conduL-ted apunitive attack on northern Vietnan1 in February-\larch lY7'lJ in responseto Vietnall1's invasion of Can1bodia.

China only began to pron10te defense cooperation \\'ith ~ o L l t h e a ~ t Asia in the 1990s under the rubric of its "ne\\r concept of security," \\'hid1will be discussed belo\v. Bet\veen 19lJ9 and 2000, ( ~ h i n a signed long-tern1cooperat ion fran1e\vork agreenlents \vith all ten [ \ S I ~ _ A . : \ n1en1bers. ~ e Y c n of these agreell1ents (\:vith 11lailand, Nlala\'sia, \riet nan1, Brunei Si ntraporl'the Philippines, and Laos) include clauses '011 dcfcll,e (ooperati(;11 i l l ~ o h ' i l l ~ a range of activities such as high-level exchanges, na\'al port \"isits, "strategicdialogues, sll1all-scale exercises, n1ilitary education and training, arI11S andequipn1ent sales, and cooperation bet\\reen national defense i n d u ~ t r i e s . In addition, China has pursued defense cooperation Inultilateralh" b\brokering agreell1cnts \vith ASEAN and alh'ancing initiatiYes in the ~ \ R I ' - , prin1arily focused on nontraditional security i s s u e ~ .

India's defense relations \vith Southeast A ~ i arl' n1ainl) bilateral.l)efense ties with Singapore are particularh' dose, \\'ith the t\\'O sides ha\'i ngconducted increasingly cOlllplex annual j'oint na\'al e x e r c i s e ~ SinCl) 1L)Y;.India also conducts joint exercises \\rith l n d o n e ~ i a 1.111d Ihailand, \\"ith a


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322 ~ ratcgil A ~ i a 2011 -12

focus on the Andanlan Sea and approaches to the Strait of ~ l a l a c c a , andhosts a nlajor nayal c x e r c i ~ e , l\Iilan, in the Andanlan Sea. In February 2011,\\'arships fronl Indonesia, ~ I a l a y s i a , Myannlar, Singapore, and Thailandparticipated in the exercise, \vhile Brunei, the Philippines, and Vietnanl sentnayal obseryers. In tenns of anns sales, India sells \veapons, equipnlent, andspare parts to ~ I y a n I n a r and \Tietnanl.

"v0 IIp rol ~ r 1"(1 ti011:'\0 ~ o u t h e a s t Asian state possesses nuclear \veapons. 111 As nlentioned

earlier, in 199:; ASEA:-\ nlelHbers adopted the Southeast Asia Nuclear\\Teapon-free Zone (SEAN\\,FZ) Treaty, \vhich enjoins signatories not todeyc!op, n l a n l l t ~ l c t u r e , or control nuclear \veapons and prohibits thelll fronlstationing, transporting, using, or testing nuclear \"'eapons in SoutheastAsia. ASt-.Al\' states haye since encouraged the nuclear powers to accede tothis treaty. But \vhen China offered to do so first, ASEAN denlurred, hopingto bring the other nuclear states on board at the saIne tilHe. 11 AlthoughASLA:'\ s u p ~ 1 o r t s the international nonproliferation reginle, its Inenlbersdo not ah\'ays present a united front. In May 1998, for exanlple, \vhenIndia conducted a series of nuclear tests, only Malaysia, the Philippines,and '1 hailand condenlned India, \vhereas Vietnanl Illerely called fornuclear disarnlanlent \\Tithout singling India out. -2 Senior ASEAN officialsdeclined to nlake a statelnen1. \;\'hen the issue was raised at the annualARt- Ineeting, the A S E A ~ ( ~ h a i r deleted all references to India in the finalstatenlent. Silllilarly, only four ASEAN nlenlbers have supported the U.S.led Proliferation Security Initiative (Singapore, Brunei, Canlbodia, and thePhilippines), \\,hile the relnaining six nleInbers either actively opposed it(Indonesian and ~ l a l a y s i a ) or declined to support its principles (Laos,\lyannlar, rIhailand, and \TietnaIn).

1 ~ l ' f ' 0 r h th,lt :\orth ~ o r l . ' , l I" PW \ Ilill1g 11lllk


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Southeast Asian Perceptions of the Rise of China and IndiaChina

Southeast Asian perceptions of the PRe:, Asia's first (:on1n1unisl slate,\vere heavily influenced by Cold War alignnlents, ( ~ h i n e s e inter\'ention in theKorean conflict, and PRC support for Conlnlunist \'ietnan1 and ( = o n 1 n 1 u n i ~ t insurgencies in Southeast Asia. 'TIle region's pro- \ \ T e ~ t e r n s t a t e ~ \'ie\\'ed Chinaas a threat and withheld diplonlatic recognition for a quarter ora century. Incontrast, the nonaligned states extended diplonlatic recognition to e:hina.

Perceptions of China began to alter in the 1Y70s as the \Tietnan1 \\ 'arwound down and the United States con1pleted n1ilitary disengagl'n11'ntfronl nlainland Southeast Asia. IVlalaysia establ i ~ h e d d iplon1atic relat ions\vith China in May 1974, as did the Philippines and lhailand a year later.Nonetheless, China's past support for regional Con1nlunist parties lett aresidue of suspicion that lingered for O\Ter a decade and a half. It \\"as notuntil 1990 that Indonesia restored diplonlatic ties \\'ith China, thus openingthe door for Singapore and Brunei to follo\\' suit.

There is no one Southeast Asian perception o f C h i n a ~ rather, perceptionsvary frol11 country to country and are shaped by differing Llctors, including theparticular issues of concern to each state. In 19H9, C=hina's brutal s u p p r l ' ~ ~ i o n of the pro-denlocracy nlovenlent in Tianannlen Square raised c ( ) n c e r n ~ aboutthe ((China threat" in the region's denl0cratic and deIllocratically inclinedstates. By the early 1990s, those states \vith a littoral on the South C:hinaSea had beconle alarnled by the l11anne1' in \vhich e ~ h i I 1 a \\'as p u r ~ u i n g i t nlaritinle clair11s. lhey \videly viewed the PRC's adoption of the La\\' on theTerritorial Sea and Contiguous Zone in 1992 as a clain1 to the entire sea.China's oil exploration activities brought it into conflict \\"ith \rietnanl and ledboth countries to scranlble to occupy island features. ASEA:'\ r e ~ p o n d e d b:'issuing a declaration of concern urging unnan1ed part i e to resoh'e the n1atterpeacefully. 111e anxieties of Southeast Asia's littoral states concerning C h i n e ~ l ' assertiveness were aroused again in 1995 \vhen China occupied ~ l i s c h j e f Reef,which had been clainled by the Philippines. A S E A ~ issued another publicdeclaration calling for restraint and the peaceful settlen1ent of disputes.

By 1995, virtually all nlenlbers of ASEAN perceived China as a ~ e c u r i t y threat to the region. So prevalent \vas this \rie\\' that eh inest' st rategists andpolicynlakers began to re-evaluate ho\'v best to a ~ ~ u a g e Southeast Asianconcerns. The end result \vas China's ((ne\v security concept," \ \ 'h ich \ \ ' a ~ first presented to a nleeting of the ARF in 1997. 1hl' nl'\\' ~ e c u r i t y cOllceptsignaled Beijing's intention to pursue a policy ofcooperatiYe n l u l t j } a t e r a l i ~ 1 1 1 with ASEAN and its 111enlbers, including a nlajor enlphasis 011 nontraditional


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324 StrdtcgiL A ~ i d 2011-12

~ e c u r i t y threats. In 2 0 ( ) 2 ~ after several years of negotiations, the PRCand ASf"A\f agreed to a [)('c1aration on Conduct of Parties in the SouthChina Sea ( 1 ) ( ) C ) ~ reducing concerns about C h i n a ~ s territorial an1bitions.A . a further den10nstration of reassurance, China becan1e the first externalpO\\Tr to accede to the protocol endorsing the TAC in 2002.

In the decade and a half after 1 9 9 5 ~ concerns shifted fron1 the Chinathreat to the il11plications of the P R C ~ s econon1ic rise for the region. +Southeast Asian states initially feared that Chinese grc)\vth vvould be attheir expense and take the forn1 of trade and investn1ent diversion. Thesefears intensified as China began negotiations for entry into the \A/orIdI'rade ( ) r g a n i z a t i o n ~ \\'hich it eyentually joined in 2001. A lnajor turningpoint occurred during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, ho\vever, \vhenBeijing's ~ u p p o r t i \ T policies contrasted \vith those of the International,\ !onetary fund (backed by the United States), which in1posed conditionson its loans. C]1ina not only refrained froIl1 devaluing its currency butalso contributed to regional bailout packages. As a r e s u l t ~ Southeast Asian...,tates caine to vie\\" the P R C ~ s ecol10111ic rise n10re as an opportunity thana challenge. In ~ u n 1 ~ C:hina caine to be perceived as an indispensablel'conolnic partner and the 111ain engine of regional grc)\vth.I h i phc11ol11enal eco11on1ic g r e ) \ v t h ~ however, provided the foundationfor Chi na to n1oder11 ize al1d transforn1 its 111iIitary forces. AlthoughBeijing's ne\\" cooplTatiye approach to Southeast Asian security had been\\"e1l received in thc r e g i o n ~ SOI11e states began to suspect that one of C h i n a ~ s n 1 ( ) t i \ " a t i o n ~ for ad\"ancing its ne\\' security concept was to underIl1ine theL T . ~ . alliance ~ y s t e n 1 that had been the n1ainstay of regional security foro\"cr four d e c a d e ~ . C ~ h i n a ' s approach failed to gain traction and provedcounterproducti\"e, a it ~ t i l 1 1 L l l a t e d Southeast Asian states, particularlyS i n g a p o r e ~ to ~ e e k r e a ~ ~ u r a n c e fron1 \Vashington that the United States\\"ould rel11ain engaged in regional aftlirs.

In p a r t i c u l a r ~ littoral ~ t a t c ~ on the South China Sea becan1e increaSinglyconcerncd about the gro\\,th of C:hinese naval p c ) \ v e r ~ especially after satellitein1agery contlrI11cd that (:hina had constructed a n1ajor base on HainanI ~ l a n d . i4.t1er 2 0 0 ; ~ renc\\'ed C : h i n e ~ e assertiveness in the South ( ~ h i n a Seafurthcr heightened regiol1al concerns about Beij i n g ~ s intentions. In 2 0 0 9 ~( ~ h i l 1 a not only p r o t l ) ~ t l ' d against SUbl11issions by Nlalaysia and Vietnanl to

( ,1I h k \ j ]),1\ IT (h 111c\" " l ' \ \ " ld l l " l t \ ( (1Illl'pt' ,1l1d ~ ( ) L l t h l \ h t . \ ~ i , l , " III . \."11 II/h'i/il' ' \ l ' ( l / f i t \ ' : JlO/iL ,\'( Iltllll'II,\l \. l" J I )c\\ III \ \', I ll\ l ' l l i "Ing,lf'll/l'. 11htIt lltL' oj "'llUthl',l"t , \ .... I,l!l ~ t L l d i c ...., 2()(U), K')' 1( ) I \"h 11 (I(lh $lutl1L,.),t \"Lll1 \ \ hpl ' l t l \ l ' " $11 tl1L' ( 'h l l1c\ ( h,llkl1gl


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the UN Con1n1ission on the Lin1its of the Continental Shelf hut ottlcialh'tabled a n1ap of the South China Sea lllarked \vith nine dashed lines. ~ hisn1ap in1plied that China \1\'as clain1ing 8 0 ( ~ o of the Inaritin1e area. (Jtherincidents followed in March and May 20 11, \\'hen ( = h i n e ~ e patrol b o a t ~ acted aggressively toward Philippine and \ T i e t l 1 a n 1 e ~ l \ exploration \ ' e s ~ e b , respectively, in contested \vaters.

In SUll1, Southeast Asian states have oscillated fron1 \'ie\\'ing (:h inaas the lllain threat to regional security in the 1960s and 1970s-due toBeijing's support for C0111111unist insurgencies-to \'ie\\'ing i t rise in the1990s as the n1ain driver of regional econonlic gro\\,th, and then hackto a middle position of viewing China's econOlllic rise p o ~ i t i \ ' e l y but itsn1ilitary rise with apprehension. China's recent a s ~ e r t i \ ' e n e s s in the SouthChilla Sea has detracted fron1 the positive-sunl \'ie\\' of the country\economic rise and caused Southeast Asian s t a t e ~ to r e c o n ~ i d c r theirperceptions about the benign nature of the P R ( ~ ' s gro\\'ing PO\ \Tr . (J1ina\actions are seen not only as directly threatening littoral s t a t c ~ , particularlyVietnan1, but as likely undern1ining regional security by pro\'oking theUnited States. '-TIlus, they challenge ASEAN's assertion of autonon1y andcentrality in regional security affairs.

IndiaAs described ahove, India's precolonial relations \\'ith S o u t h e a ~ t A ~ i a

were largely based on trade and C0111n1erCe, the diffusion of Hindu andBuddhist religious practices, and generally peaceful i n t e r ~ t a t e r e l a t i o n ~ . India largely squandered this legacy \vhen it allo\\'ed the n1on1cntun1 of itsrelations with the region to slo\v dO\1\'n and stagnate in the years follo\\'i ngWorld War II.'h Prior to the 1990s, India \\'as vie\\'ed as a country lockedin South Asia with a closed, backward econon1)' that \ \ ' a ~ lnarginal toSoutheast Asian a f t ~ l i r s . There \1\'ere regional concerns, hc)\\'e\'er, about thegro\vth of Indian naval po\ver, particularly follo\\'ing India\ inter\'entionin Maldives in 1988. 1

Southeast Asian perceptions hegan to change in the 1 9 L ) ( ) ~ \\'hcn India\d0111estic reforn1s led to rapid econon1ic gro\\Tth and :-\e\\' I)elhi beganto engage with selected Southeast Asian states under its look east polic).India increasingly can1e to be viewed as an attractive n1arket and ccononlic

1(, K.\' KC"ll\',ll1, "'l i lt ' Role of Rq!,iol1,d I n " t i t L l t i o n ~ 111 Indl


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326 Stratcgil A . ~ i a 2011 - ]2

partner. " ASEA0J responded to India's rise by granting the country sectoralpartner status in lLJ92 and full dialogue status in 1995. Two year later, it~ u p p o r t e d India's nlen1bership in the ARF, and in 2002 the two partnersbegan to lneet annually at the sunln1it level. Concerns about India's navalpc)\\'er dissipated the follo\\'ing year after New Delhi acceded to the TAC.Relations \\'ere further strengthened \vhen ASEAN successfully pronl0tedIndia's inclusion in the r ~ A S process in 2005.

'I hus, \\'hile Southeast Asian concerns about Chinese assertivenessgre\\\ India increasingly becanle perceived as a n1ajor independent po\verthat could pn)\'ide ballast in relations with external states, particularly as anlenlber of the EAS process. The track record of recent interaction betweenIndia and A S E A ~ states has served to reinforce perceptions of the country'srise in positi\'e-sunl tenllS. India is no\v viewed as a dependable econolnicpartnec a counter\\'eight to China's rise, and a state that will be supportiveof ASEA0J's assertion of regional autonon1y.

Factors Shaping Southeast Asia's Relationswith China and India

In the 1970s, ASEA:\ fornlalized its linkages with external powersby lneeting \\'ith its dialogue partners in a post-Ininisterial conferenceinlnlediate}y follo\\'ing the annual nleeting of the group's foreign lninisters.'I h i process took the fOrIn of an ASEAN nleeting \vith all its dialoguepartners as a group (ASEA.N +10) and then separate meetings betweenA S ~ _ A T \ and each dialogue partner (ASEAN + 1). Although individualSoutheast Asian states do pursue their own bilateral relations with Chinaand IIH.iia, all take into account the lnultilateral fralnework provided byASr,A0:. C:hina and India \\Tre accorded consultative partner status in 1991and 19LJ2, respecti\'ely. India \vas subsequently elevated to the status of fulldialogue partner in I)ecenlber 1995, \vith China following in July 1996.

A S E A ~ pursues three strategies to manage its relations with bothcountries: the prolnotion of econolnic interdependence, socialization intoregional nOrIns or the


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'Ihayer - S ( ) l l t h l ' a ~ t A ~ i a

Econofnic InterdependenceAfter China becanle a full dialogue partncc ASr.Al\' and Beijing

quickly fornlalized relations by setting up a joint cooperation con11nittee tocoordinate all cooperative nlechanisn1s at the \\Torki ng lC\Tl. '} he proccss ofenn1eshing China advanced in late 2002 \vith the adoption of a fran1C\\'orkagreen1ent on conlprehensive econolnic cooperation. 'This agreelnent laidthe foundation for vvhat becan1e CAFTA. In 200S an agreen1ent on trade ingoods \vas r e a c h e d ~ followed in 2007 by an agreen1cnt on trade in StT\'icesand in 2009 by an investnlent agreelnent. CAfTA entered into forcc inJanuary 2010 for A S E A N ~ s six developed econonlies and \\'ill take effect forthe four least -developed nlenlbers in 2015.Efforts to ennlesh India in a sinlilar \veb of econon1ic interdependencehave proceeded n10re slowly. After ASEAN accorded India sectoraldialogue partner s t a t u s ~ the t\VO sides began to explore cooperation intrade, i n v e s t l n e n t ~ science and t e c h n o l o g y ~ and tourisn1. But the scopc ofcooperation relnained restricted due to I n d i a ~ s foot-dragging on f ~ l c i l i t a t i o n nleasures. In 2003, India and ASEAN finally signed a fran1c\\'ork agrcelnenton cOlnprehensive econonlic cooperation as the tirst step to\\'ard an fTA.It took another six years, ho\vever, before a trade in goods agreen1ent \\'asfinally concluded. Subsequently, India signed a bilateral FTA \\'ith '{ hail andin 2003 and less fonnal cOlnprehensive econolnic cooperation agreclnentswith Indonesia, Malaysia, Myannlar, Singapore, and \Tietnanl. Negotiationsare currently underway to conclude agreenlents covering trade in servicesand investn1ents. Although India ranks an10ng the top-ten ASEA:-\ tradingpartners, the two-way volun1e of trade is 10\\'. 111e n10st recent figures sho\\'that bilateral trade reached only $43.9 billion in 200'J-I 0 (see Table A1 inthe Appendix).

Socialization: Shaping Attitudes through Intcnlctiol1The end of the Cold War changed Southeast A s i a ~ s strategic context.

ASEAN becanle n10re proactive in pron10ting its nonns of conlprehensi\'l'security in external relations and created an entirely ne\\' securityinstitution, the ASEAN Regional Forun1. 111e first nleeting of the ARf \vasheld in Bangkok in 1994 and attended by eighteen founding n1enlbers. Inaddition to ASEAN's six foreign n 1 i n i s t e r s ~ participants included foreignministers from formal dialogue partners ( A u s t r a l i a ~ ( = a n a d a ~ the EuropeanUnion, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of K o r e a ~ and the United S t a t e s ) ~ ASEAN's consultative partners (China and RussiaL and invited obser\'crs(Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnaln). India forlnally joined in 1Y9h.


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3 2 Strategic A ~ i ~ l 2011- 12

(:hina's interaction \\'ith ASEAN has likely contributed to itssocialization into A S E A ~ n o r n 1 S ~ at the very least, Beijing has revisedi t diplon1atic rhetoric in order to "talk the talk" with Southeast Asian~ t a t e s . In 2003, A S t A ~ and China issued a joint declaration on a strategicpartnership, the first fonnal agreen1ent of this type for both sides. 'Thedeclaration included a provision for the initiation of a new securitydialogue \\'hile abo prolnoting general cooperation in political n1atters.1he follo\\'ing year, ASEAI'\ and China agreed to a five-year plan of action(runn ing fron1 2005 to 20 10) to raise relations to the level of an "enhanced~ t r a t e g i c p a r t n e r s h i p . " ~ " ()\'erall, there are at least 48 joint con1n1ittees thatpro\'ide the n1cchanisn1s for engagen1ent between ASEAN and China, inc o n t r a ~ t to only eighteen ASEAN-India joint con1lnittees.

( ~ h i n a has arguably also been socialized into ASEAN nonns through111elnbcrship in the A R ~ . Although initially disn1issive of n1ultilaterala r r a n g e l n c n t ~ , Beijing soon can1C to appreciate that it could benefit froITIacti\'c engagen1cnt and a s ~ u l n e d a pron1inent role in the ARF's intersessional\\'ork prograln related to confidence-building lneasures. In 2003, it launcheda Jl1ajor initiati\'c by succcssfully proposing the creation of a security policyl'onfcrcncc cOlnpriscd of scnior lnilitary and civilian officials dra\vn fron1all ;\Rl- n1cn1bers. C:hina also has been a strong proponent of cooperativen 1 e a ~ 1 l l T S to a d d r c ~ ~ nontraditional security challenges.

India shares cOlnpatible values \vith ASEAN and is n1uch less inneed than ( ~ h i n a of socialization into the group's nonns. Indeed, the fivep r i n c i p l e ~ of peaceful c o e x i ~ t e n c e advocated by India during the Cold Warforn1 thc core of thc ASEr\;..J \\'ay. Both sides strongly support the norn1Sof national ~ o \ ' e r e i g n t ) and noninterference in internal a f t ~ l i r s . ASEANand India abo entered into a Partnership for Peace, Progress and SharedProsperity in 2 0 ( ) ~ . Yt't the current fi\'e-year plan of action (2011-15), \vhichc o n t a i n ~ HO points for cooperation, appears rudin1entary when con1pared tothl' l a t e ~ t ( ~ h i n a - A S E , ~ ~ plan of action (20 II-IS) with over 200 detailedp o i n t ~ of cooperation for the saIne tin1e period.

s( ~ f t -Hell el Jl (i JlgA S l - ~ r \ l\' h a ~ o u g h t to enll1esh all the n1ajor powers throughl'ngagen1ent in the r\Rl-'. It i n ~ i s t s , ho\\'ever, on ren1aining in the driver's seat

a chair and that the n o n l 1 ~ en1bodied in the ASEAN \vay guide the ARF'sd e c i ~ i o n n 1 a k i n g proccss and \vork progralns. ASEAN seeks to use thesen 1 l ' c h a n i ~ n 1 ~ to lnoderate the in1pact of the lnajor po\vers on Southeast

"I..'\.' ( J r h k \. 111.l\\.'1" \ 11..'lllJl11 " lktl..'Ih.'\.' Policy cl11d Ib Impdd on hlrcign RcLltiO!1


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Asia by drawing then1 into ASEAN-centric n1ldtilateral arrangenlents. Inaddition, the organization seeks to uphold regional autonollly hy pronl0tingequilibriun1 anl0ng the n1ajor powers and avoiding circunlstances \vhere itn1ust choose between then1.

ASEAN has therefore adopted a policy of soft-balancing as a hedgeagainst the potentially disruptive effects of China's risc and continuallyencourages the United States-as \vell as Japan, South Korea, and Indiato relnain engaged in regional security atLlirs as a counter\veight to (]lina.The group expanded its strategic linkages beyond the (]lina-donlinatedASEAN +3 fran1ework to include the United States, Japan, South Korea,Australia, New Zealand, India, and Russia in the AI)NII'vl-Plus p r o c e s ~ . ASEAN also included India, Australia, and Ne\\' Zealand in the inauguralEAS and later enlarged the EAS to include the United States and Russia.

The Impact of Southeast Asia's Relationswith China and India on the United States

This section considers the inlpact of S o u t h e a ~ t i \ ~ i a ' s gro\\'ing r e l a t i o n ~ with China and India on U.S. interests in the region. As descrihed earlierin the chapter, U.S. policies toward Southeast A ~ i a are deri\'ative of a largerglobal fralne\vork that seeks to n1aintain a "just and sustainahle internationalorder" pren1ised on a rules-based systen1 of representati\'c and r e s p o n ~ i b l e international organizations in order to pron10te free trade and the \ ' a l u e ~ ofhlunan rights, religious freedon1, and den10cracy.- I Such policies arc alsoset within the context of a broader approach to the Asia-Pacific region. l ~ o r exan1ple, the United States pursues its glohal objecth'es regionally throughsupporting Inultilateral institutions such as the A ~ i a - P a c i f i c Econonl1cCooperation (APEC), the Trans- Pacifi.c Partnership (TPP), and the LAS. InSoutheast Asia, the Obalna adn1inistration has given priority to developinga stronger relationship with ASEAN, re-engaging \vith the ARE andbeC0111ing a charter n1enlber of the ADMIvl- Plus p r o c e s ~ .

The U.S. alliance systen1 underpins regional ~ e c u r i t y in both the \ ~ i a Pacific and Southeast Asia. As the 2010 L'.S. I'\ational Security Strategyn1akes clear, "alliances \vith Japan, South Korea, Australia, the P h i l i p p i n e ~ , and Thailand are the bedrock of security in Asia and a foundation ofprosperity in the Asia-Pacifi.c r e g i o n . " ~ ~ The ()balna adnlinistration h a stressed the in1portance of \vorking \vith elnerging po\\'crs, ~ t r a t c g i c partners (Singapore), potential strategic partners (Indonesia, ~ l a l a y s i a , and

I ";\Jcltiol1cll Sccurity ~ t r < . 1 k g y , " 01tlL'c of tlw Pre"idellt of tlw l 'l1Ikd "'LitL''', \ Icl: .20] (), \.2,~ Ibid., -12.


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330 ~ t r a t e g i c A ~ i a 2011-12

\TietnaI11), and the region's I11ultilateral architecture to 111aintain a securityen\'irOnIllent conduci\'e to econoInic development. In addition, the U.S.~ a t i o n a l Security Strategy underscores the inlportance of bilateral relations\\'ith China, India, and Russia as Hcritical to building broader cooperationon a r e a ~ of n1utual i n t e r e s t , n ~ such as pronl0ting trade and investnlent andcountering \'iolent extrel11isln and nuclear proliferation.

Ecollonzic [nzpelcfChina has displaced the United States as ASEAN's largest trading

partner. In 2009, t\\'o-\vay trade bet\veen ASEAN and China was valued atS17R billion, or 11.6Qoof total trade (see Table A2 in the A p p e n d i x ) . - ~ l TheLTnited States ranked fourth, after the EU -27 and Japan, at $150 billion, or9 . 7 ( ~ ) of total t\\'o-\\'ay trade, \\'hile India ranked eighth at $39 billion, or1.6();() of t\vo-\vay trade. According to the ASEAN ~ r r a d e Statistics [)atabasefor 200L}-1 0, China enjoyed a surplus of $22 billion with ASEAN, over threetin1es India's s u r p l u ~ of 57 billion.

I'rade tlgures for individual countries reveal that only four of ASEAN'sten Illelnbers are Illajor players (see Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix). Inten11S of total t\vo-\\'ay trade, Singapore tops the list, followed by Indonesia,~ l a l a y s i a , and 'nlailand. In terrns of bilateral trade with China and India,Singapore is like\vise the leading iIllporter and exporter. Malaysia and'Ihailand are the next-largest ASEAN trade partners with China, while.vlalaysia and Indonesia are the second- and third-largest trade partners\\'ith India. \Tietnan1 has displaced Indonesia to becoIne the fourth-largestAStAN destination for Chinese goods, and 11lailand ranks fourth in trade\vith India in tenllS of both inlports and exports.( ~ h i n a not only buys prin1ary conlnl0dities and natural resources,particularly oil and gas, fron1 the ASEAN states but also buys electronicparts and conlponents. 'The cOLlntry's econonlic rise has also altered theregion's political econonl)', given that Southeast Asian states manufactureparts and con1ponents that are shipped and assen1bled in China prior toexport abroad. In other words, ASEAN states are both dependent on andsubordinated in a production net\vork that feeds China's export-orientatedn1anufacturing industries.'I he United States has pronl0ted free trade primarily through APEC,but progress stalled as countries failed to nleet COInnlitInents agreed to at

"'\,ltlor"l,d ~ e l : l l [ " l t \ ' ~ t r t l t q " ~ : , " Ottll'l' of the P r t . ' ~ i d t ' n t of the United S t < l t e ~ , 1\la)' 2010, ,D.I :\ondhl'k"", L ~ 1ll\'e"tl11l'nt 111 ~ o l l d 1 l ' , l " t ,\"itl continue" to d \ \ ' a r f C h i l l e ~ e i n v e ~ t l 1 1 e n t . CUl11uLltive

l ' . \ . direct ill\'l'''tnh.'nt 111 . \ ~ L \ : \ " t t l k ~ for 2(}()(}-20()H totaled ~ d 4 . H billion, cOl11pared to a total of"'::1.1 bJllion In ChIJlC" l ' direct in\'l,,,tn1l'nt for tl1l' ~ < 1 1 1 1 t ' period. ~ e ASEAN Stllti,\tiL"a! rcarllook 1008(1,1",lrL1: : \ ~ I . \ ' \ \l'crd,lrl,lt, 2()()l}), 1,+,!, h t t p : / / \ \ ' \ \ ' \ \ " a ~ e a n . o r g / p u b l i c < l t i o n ~ / , 1 ~ e , l I 1 q d b ( ) H . pdf.


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aq

the 1994 Bogor SUInn1it held in Indonesia. In 2002 the B u ~ h adnlinistrationlaunched the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative to t ~ l c i l i t a t e bilateral tradeagreeinents between the United States and individual nlenlber c o u n t r i e ~ . Singapore quickly canle on board, but F"fAs \vith '] hailand and Iv1alaysiahave foundered. The Oban1a adn1inistration h a subsequently adopteda regional approach through the TPP, a nlultilateral FTA fOrIned in 2006.According to U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, the TPP is a criticalelen1ent for "unlocking the Asia- Pacific region to LT.S. b u s i n e ~ s e s . ' " '1 heUnited States has entered into negotiations \\Tith TPP nlenlbers Singapore,New Zealand, Brunei, and Chile to create an expanded trade agreenlentproviding greater n1arket access and is strongly encouraging Ivlalaysiaand Vietnan1 to join these efforts. There are no prospects, ho\\'C\'er, for anASEAN-U.S. FTA, and the TPP is unlikely to expand to include nlore than ahandful of Southeast Asian states.

U.S. interests in Southeast Asia are Inore seriously challenged by theUnited States' lopsided econonlic relationship \vith ( ~ h i n a , especially regardingU.S. debt, and the U.S.-induced global financial crisis. As senior officials readilyadmit, Washington's authority to pronlote good governance and econon1icgrowth has been severely din1inished..2h In addition, ( ~ h i n a ' ~ no-strings-attachedapproach to aid has opportunistically taken advantage of situations \\,here localstates rankle over the conditions attached to U.S. assistance progranls.

It is also worth noting that China's construction of dains on the upperMekong River to provide electricity for the country's southern provinces h a potentially serious consequences for the econonlic \Tiability of do\\'nstreanlstates. There are tw o Inajor bodies that pron10te responsible de\ 'elopnlentthe Mekong River Comn1ission and the Greater l\lekong Subregion (adevelopment project funded by the Asian Developn1ent Bank)-but thecentral Chinese governinent is not represented in either organization. ,The Oban1a adlninistration has sought to address the concerns of n1ainlandSoutheast Asian states over this issue by launching the Lc)\ver MekongInitiative to pron10te environinentaL educational, and infrastructuraldevelopment. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton h a Inet four tinles \vith theforeign ministers of TIlailand, Laos, Can1bodia, and Vietnan1 to advancedevelopment projects.

2:'- I'vlackenzie C. Babb, "U.S. f \ I a k e ~ P r o g r e ~ ~ on T r a n ~ - Pcll-ihL' 1rcllk," Burcau of I\1tl'rnatlo\1,llInformatio\1 P r o g r a m ~ , U.S. Department of State, April 6, 2() IO.2( ) Carlyle A. 'Ihayer, "I'vlaritime Strategic O\-en'iew oftl1l' ,.\"ia-P,llitic R q ~ l o n , " 1\1 Re(//I..;;ilJp, , " ' l ~ f t ' dl l (1

Secure Seas !()f' All: lJItcnllltiOlllll ;\]lritilllc Securit)' C ( l } ~ f t T C I J C ( ' ~ ( ) ( ) L ) , cd. [O .... I1LI,l [10 ( ~ l I 1 g , l p o r l ' : Select P u b l i ~ h i n g in a ~ ~ o c i a t i o n with Republic of Singapore : \ , l \ ' ~ a\1d R ~ I ~ , 2()()9), 26.2- China i a dialogue partner of the f\lekong River COll1mi" .... io\1 hut not ,l jorm,l! \11l'mhcr It \....

r e p r e ~ e \ 1 t e d on the (;reater Mekong Subregion Economic Cooperatlo\1 Progrclm by YUl111clll Prm'I\1\:l'and the C;llangxi Zhuang A l l t ( ) n O m O u ~ Region.


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?l32 Strategil A . ~ i a 2011-12

India's gr()\ving econOI11ic engagen1ent with Southeast Asia, althoughstill chvarfed by China's, is conlplinlentary rather than conlpetitive withU.S. interests and has created a ne\v nlarket for Southeast Asian goods andinvestnlcnt. rurthern10re, \vith projections indicating that India will havethe \vorld's third-largest ('conon11' by 2025, the country's econon1ic presencein Southeast Asia can be expected to increase vis-a-vis China ..2S

Political-Security Inlpact( ~ h i n a 'has atteI11pted to otfset U.S. political and security int1uence in

~ o u t h c a s t Asia by pron10ting exclusive arrangenlents with East Asia, suchas the ASEAi\ +3 sun1n1it process. China has been proactive in pushing theA S l ~ A \ . ' +3 to institutionalize defense cooperation and n1ilitary exchangesaI110ng its n1en1bers, \\'ith a particular focus on nontraditional security

l1issues..2 'I hese etforts to pronlote East Asian exclusivisn1 resulted indisagreeI11ent al110ng Southeast Asian states. Malaysia favored retaining theA S r , A ~ +3 as the 111ain \Tehicle for regional econon1ic integration, \vhereasSingapore and Indonesia t ~ l \ T o r e d developing n10re inclusive ll1ultilateralarrangcl11ents such as the tAS. The latter countries successfully pronl0tedIndia as a founding l11en1ber in 2005 and added the United States and Russiaas n1el11 bel'S h\Te years later.

China also en1ploys both Illultilateral and bilateral n1echanisITIS toenl11esh A S E A ~ states in a \veb of security cooperation. By depreciatingarrangel11ents that focus on conventional or traditional security issuesin t ~ l v o r of nontraditional security issues, China plays into ASEAN'spredilection to give priority to transnational security threats. In 2002, forexan1ple, ( ~ h i n a and A S E A . ~ issued a Joint I)eclaration on Cooperationin the Field of :\on-Traditional Security Issues, and in 2009 ASEANupgraded its '\Iinisterial i\Ieeting on Transnational Crin1e to include Chinaas a full participant. Like\\'ise, China has used its n1elnbership in the ARFto prol11ote dialogue, conhdence-building n1easures, and n1ultipolarity,particularly to address nontraditional security issues such as hUl11anitarianassistance and clisaster relief, in contrast to unnan1ed powers that Beijingalleges practice hegel11onisI11, bullying, and gunboat diplon1acy. ,() In2002, ASEAN responded to pressure fronl the Bush adn1inistration toprioritize the global \\Tar on tt'rrorisn1 and pressure fron1 Beijing to address, IZolwrt 0, I ~ L l l , t ' , I roO 11.''>11111011> hl'l nr c ti l l ' I lOll "c t ~ o r e i g n r\ tLir" COI11I11 i ttee, ~ L l b ( ( ))lll"lllttee Oil the

\ l lddk L ht lind ,",uuth \"I,l. \\',hhll1gtO!1, [),( ., .\pril.:=i, 2011I ),l\ Id \Ll"l', '\O!1- l l ,ldlt\(l l lcl l "L'l l lnty III Chi!1cl r\SFr\;...' COOPl'r,lti()!1: ' Ihe I ! 1 ~ t i t u t i o ! 1 , 1 I i / a t i o ! 1 (l! l Z q , ~ I ( ) l l c l l ~ l ' l l l r L t > ( ' ( ) ( I ~ ) l ' L l t l ( ) l l ,ll1d ti l l ' 1 \()!ution of Ll"t A ~ i t l l 1 Rcgio!1,1Ii"m:' ,\SiUII SlIITL'Y ':=;0,110. l ( luI>! .\ugu"t .2() I () I: ~ ( ) S , 1 , ~ , , " , ~ ) l ' l ' L ! l h ('!lII1l'''l' ~ ) r l ' ' ' l d l . ' l 1 t Il,ll1g ICll l l I l II I Itll1gKOK, ,h reported by \.inllLltl, St'pkmbcr 3, ll)l)ly'


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Iha\'cr - S ( ) u t h l ' a ~ t A ~ i a l3.J,

nontraditional security issues by bracketing both concerns and setting upthe ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorisnl and TransnationalCrin1e. But China's proposal of a regional security treaty for adoption bythe ARF was left on the table by ASEAN 111el11bers \vho perceived it as anattenlpt to undernline U.S. engagenlent in Southeast Asia. '

In contrast, India's political and security engagel11ent \\'ith SoutheastAsian states, particularly Indonesia, Vietnanl, 'nlailand, and Nlalaysia, h a conlplinlented rather than conflicted \vith U.S. interests and priorities.India supports the "Eyes in the Sky" progran1 of the littoral states along theMalacca Strait, and an increasing nUlnber of regional na\'ies haye begun toparticipate in the Milan exercise hosted by India in the Andanlan Sea. Indiaalso offers valuable capacity-building by hosting Southeast Asian oft1cers inprofessional nlilitary education and training progran1s.

In sunl, Southeast Asian states seek to enn1esh all nlajor external PO\\'lTSin ASEAN-centric nlultilateral institutions such as the A R ~ , A l ) 1 ' v l ~ I - P l u s , and EAS in order to nl0derate their rivalry and reduce their il11pact onregional security. To do this, ASEAN states have pursued three interrelatedstrategies-soft-balancing, the pronl0tion of ASEA:\ nornlS, andeconoll1ic interdependence with China and India. l r \ S E A ~ has been largelysuccessful in integrating China into the regional architecture, \\'hereasIndia's integration is still at the fornlative stage. Ho\\'eyer, recent ( ~ h i neseassertiveness in the South China Sea has led A S E A ~ to pron10te additionalsoft-balancing n1easures to nl0derate Beijing's behayior. Key 111enlbers ofthe organization have also encouraged both India and the United S t a t e ~ toplaya greater role in the region to o f t ~ ~ e t Chinese assertiYeness.

Southeast Asian States between China and IndiaThis section reviews the interaction of f()llr key Southeast Asian ~ t a t e s

\vith China and India, considering the continental ~ t a t e s first and then thelittoral and nlaritinle states .

Myanrn(lfIvlyann1ar shares land borders \vith China and India and has becon1c

a cockpit of geostrategic rivalry bet\veen thel11. China opportunisticallyintervened when Myann1ar \vas slapped \\"ith sanctions by the \\Test afterrepressing the pro-del11ocracy lTIOVenlents in l L J ~ ~ and lLJLJO. Ha\"ingprovided the State La\v and Order Restoration (:ouncil (SLC) R ( ~ ) \\"ith"I Carh'lc A 'J hd \TL S U / l , ! I C l ~ t Asil: P l t t L T I 1 ~ ul , \ t ' t l int I' ( t ) t l / l t ' } d l } t l l l \ "PI \ tr l l tq!: Rq1()rt

( C < l l ~ l 1 l ' r r < l : Au"t;-ali


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. ~ 3 - + ~ t r a t e g i ( A ~ i a 2011-12

nearly 52 billion in nlilitary assistance, Beijing gained access to signalsintelligence fronl l i ~ t e n i n g posts n10nitoring naval n10ven1ents in the Indian()ccan. CJ1ina is presently the n10st ilnportant source of trade, investnlent,and de\'elopn1ent assistance to Nlyanlnar. In particular, the PRC has focusedon building energy and transportation infrastructure-roads, rail, and gasp i p e l i n e ~ - t h a t link southern China \vith ports on the Indian Ocean. TIle( ~ h i n a :\ational Petroleunl Corporation (CNPC) is exploring for oil in\\'aters otf Rakhine State a \\'ell as constructing a pipeline to link the portin Kyaukpyu to the to\\'n of '\luse on the border. In addition, in April 2011,( ~ h i n a and Nlyann1ar signed a n1en10randunl of understanding (MOU) tojointly construct a raih\'ay parallel to the pipeline.India initially sided \vith the international con1n1unity in condelnning.\lyann1ar hut soon reyersed policy in response to growing Chinese influencein the country. '.' India's look east policy \vas initially ailned at cultivating\l) 'anlnar as a land bridge to the lnarkets of Southeast Asia. Later, however,India ~ o u g h t to OyerCOlne endelnic insurgency in its northeast states fron1g r o u p ~ hased in ~ l y a n l 1 1 a r by eliciting the cooperation of the SLORC andits s u c c e ~ s o r , the State Peace and l)evelopnlent Council (SPDC). India'scounterinsurgency strategy also included road-building projects to link itsnortheast to 1\ 1yannlar and 'nlailand. ;,

India is one of .\lyanl11ar's largest trade partners, with the balance oftrade five to one in .\lyann1ar's favor (see Table A 1 in the Appendix), and inJune 2010 the t\\'o countries reached a trade agreenlent that slashed inlportduties on a large nun1ber of goods. Trade is concentrated in three n1ainsectors: hydrocarbons, phan11aceuticals, and beans and pulses. India, \vhichis not self-sufficient in energy, as prioritized investing in Myann1ar's oiland gas sectors. ()T'\(;C \Tidesh Lin1ited, for exan1ple, is exploring blocks offSitt\\T in Arakan State.

( ~ h i n a ' s interaction \vith 7\lyanl11ar has led to the n1igration of Chinesehusinesslnen into northern 1\lyann1ar, where they donlinate cross-bordertrade. Beijing h a an i n t e r e ~ t in n1aintaining a peaceful border and supportedthe ~ t a t u s quo \\'hen the S P I ) ( ~ negotiated ceasefire agreen1ents \vith ethniclninority groups and their arn1ed forces. However, China found itself in adilcnlnla in 200Y \\'hen thl' SPl)C n10ved to incorporate ethnic n1inorityforces into the national anny prior to the 2010 elections. When fightinghroke out after the gOyernlnent n10ved against the Kokang ethnic Ininority,30,000 people fled into (:11il1a's Yunnan Province, tenlporarily straining

lZl'luud I grdl',lLl, "lllliIJ'" \mhlt It Ill" II I [ ~ U r l 1 1 , l , " A. \ l l l l l SIIlTt ' , I ' -is, no. 6 (:-.Jon?l11Iwr -I )e(emher.2()()SJ: L)3h . : ; ~ 1)oml11k J. \:,lrdl, "( :ro",,Bordl.T (:h,lO": .\ (:ritiqul' of IndLl'-. Attel11pb to ~ e d l r e Ih N o r t h e c l ~ t Tribal\ r\.\h through COOr'l.TJt lOll \\ ith \ h',1I1l11,lr" ,,, -\ II) Rl' l ' i t ' l t ' 2S, no. 1 (\\'interSpring 2()()S): 161 71


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'1 haycr - S ( ) u t h l ' a ~ t A ~ i a 33)

relations between the two countries. q China responded by Illobilizinglnilitary forces and closing the border. Visits by ]ia (Jinglin, chainnanof the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, to ;V1vanlnaril11Inediately after the 2010 elections and by ne\\'l) elected presiden't '1 heinSein to Beijing in May 2011 signaled that relations had returned to norn1al.

Thailandll1ailand is a treaty ally of the United States and h o ~ t ~ the l a r g e ~ t

n1ultilateral n1ilitary exercise in the \vorld, Cobra (;old. 'I hailand \ \ ' a ~ ~ b the first Southeast Asian state to sign a long-tern1 coopcrat ion fran1e\\'orkagreen1ent \vith China in 1999. This agreen1ent included a d e f t ' n ~ e clausethat has led to the gradual developn1ent of n1ilitar\,tooneration, includin bnavaI port visit S, 111 iii tary 0 tficer excha11ges, j 0 int patrob, In all-scaIe j0 in texercises by special forces, lin1ited anns sales, and an annual s t r a ~ e g i c dialogue. ll1e election of Thaksi11 Shi11c1\\'atra as prin1c Ininister in 2()0 Iresulted in the developlnent of close econOlllic and political ties bet\\'eenB a n ~ k o k , and ~ e i j i n g . Thaksin was particularly concerned \\'ith protectingThaIland s agncultural sector and repeatedly sought special a c c e s ~ to theChinese 111arket.

Thailand has son1etin1es acted equivocally as a L'.S. ally. for exalnple, theThaksin governn1ent did not in1n1ediately support the global \\'ar on t e r r ( ) r i ~ n 1 . Although later, after a change in Thai policy, the L ~ n i t e d States designatedThailand a n1ajor non-NATO ally. Washington suspended n1ilitarv assistancein 2006 ~ h e n the '1 hai mili tary seized power. China opport un i ~ t i ( : \ l h ' steppedIn. WIth Its own n1ilitary assistance package, and in 2010 '1 hailand (alongWIth 1\I1yann1ar, Laos, and Calnbodia) refrained fron1 joining other ASl-'JAr\Inen1bers and the United States in raising the South C=hina Sea issue at theseventeenth ARF n1eeting.

ll1ailand shares a n1aritin1e border \,yith India as \\'ell as con\'ergent \'ie\\'sabout n1aritin1e security. Both navies conduct joint e x e r c i ~ e s and coordinatepatrols in the approaches to the Strait of N 1 a h ~ c c a , and India, 'I hailalid, andMyann1ar are signatories to the Tripartite 1\Ilaritin1e Agreen1ent. In ()ctober2003, India and Thailand signed their first fran1C\\'ork agreen1ent for an fTA.aloI.1gside several MOUs covering cooperation in tourisn1, biotechnology,agnculture, and intelligence-sharing on c o u n t e r t e r r o r i ~ n 1 . :-.Je\\' I)elhi h a offered to assist Thailand in the developlnent of nuclear energy, along \\'ithencouraging ll1ai investlnent in India's north\\'est pro\'inces and prolnotingthe construction of a high\,yay linking the t\VO countries \'ia ~ 1 y a n l n a r .

; I " C ~ l i n a ' ~ 1\,lyallm,u Strategy: E l e L t i o n ~ , nhnic Politic" ,1l1d Il0I11 1111 ] l " " " II1krn,lt]OI1,l] (.n..,].., (;rl UI"',A ~ l < l BncllI1g, no. I 12, September 21, 20 I 0, 2 -3 .


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330 St ratcgiL' A ~ i a 2011 -12

In 2010, Indian in\'estlnents in 1hailand stood at $1.5 billion, while Thaiinvestnlents in India totaled 5800 nlillion. During Prinle Minister Abhisit\ lejjaji\'a's state \'isit to India in April 2011, the tvvo sides agreed to step upnegotiations to conclude an agreelnent on goods, services, and investlnents,as \\'ell as to initiate a nlinisterial-level defense dialogue and considercooperating on antipiracy and defense technology.

\rietll(UllLTntil the end of the (:old \Var, India's close political relations with

\'ietnanl \\'ere ah\'ays overshado\\'ed by Soviet-Vietnanlese relations. Butthe collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced the conlnlonality of strategicinterests bet\\'cen Hanoi and Ne\v [)elhi, particularly vis-a-vis China, andpro\'ided India \vith the opportunity to develop relations with Vietnanl aspart of its look east policy. [)efense cooperation has played a central rolein the bilateral reLltionship due to India's considerable experience withproducing and Inai ntaini ng Soviet - n l a n u f ~ l c t u r e d equipnlent. -, 1he firstprotocol on d e f e n ~ e cooperation \vas signed in Septenlber 1994, and this\ \ ' a ~ later upgraded into a Inore fornlal defense cooperation agreenlent( I ) ( :A) in (vlarch 2000 during the first visit by an Indian defense nlinister to\'ietnan1. Under the ternlS of the I)C=A, India agreed to assist Vietnanl \vithupgrading its fl eet 0 f Ii( -21 aircraft and nava1\va rships (frigatesan d t ~ l s tattack craft), help train the \rietnanlese nlilitary, and enhance cooperationbet\\'Ccn the t\\'O states) national defense industries. In 2005, Vietnanl andIndia initiated an annual ~ t r a t e g i c dialogue at the senior level.

'Ihe year 2007 111arked a nlajor turning point in relations bet\veenthe t\\'O countries. In ~ o \ ' e n l b e r , Vietnanl and India raised their bilateralrelationship to a strategic partnership, and in I)ecenlber they stepped upd e f e n ~ e cooperation as a result of [)efense Nlinister A.K. Antony)s trip to\'ietnanl. India subsequently pro\'ided Vietnanl \vith a nlassive anlount of~ p a r e parts to keep its ~ o \ ' i e t -era fleet operationaL including nlodernizingthe nl ilitary)s anti - ~ u b n l a r i ne \\'arLlre capabilities. India has also expandedprofessional nlilitary edUl'ation and training progranls for Vietnalnesed l ' f l ' n ~ e p e r ~ o n n e L and Indian Na\'y ships regularly call at Vietnanlesep o r t ~ . I)efense ' \ l i n i ~ t e r r\.ntony returned to Vietnanl in ()ctober 2010 tofu rthe I' con 0 lidate d l' fe n L' ties.

A is clear fronl the le\'el of defense cooperat ion, India and Vietnanlha\'e (on\'ergent ~ e c u r i t y interests, not the least of \vhich is to lnaxinlizetheir 1'00111 for 111aneU\'CT i 11 dl'al il1g \vith China and other Inajor po\vers.

P,ll lkell k IheL I l1dlel-\ ' ldl l ,1111 l ~ l ' l , l t l \ ) l l ' " "'l'l,L1 !ll/" Ll1hcll1(t'd cO()pl ' rc l t io l1, " ,\triltcglL l!li/fr,,,;/,,,; 32,11\) hi \( ) \ , ' l11h, ' r ~ 1 ) ( ) K I : ] l lK') L)C)


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India's relations with Vietnanl, as \vith other Southeast Asian states, providea basis for a larger Indian role in East Asia. Vietnaill's relations \\'ith Indiaenhance Hanoi's drive to avoid dependency on anyone external po\\'er.Both share nlutual benefits in the defense relationship. India's sale of anns,equipnlent, and spare parts enhances Vietnanl's ahility to nl0dernizt' itsarn1ed forces while avoiding conlplete dependency on Russia.

By contrast, VietnalTI's fralllework for its hugely asynl111etric relationshipwith China is one of "cooperation and strug

thayer the rise of china and india: challenging or reinforcing southeast asia's autonomy?

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