thayer vietnam people's army: corporate interests and military professionalism
TRANSCRIPT
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ThePoliticalRoleoftheVietnamPeoplesArmy:
CorporateInterestsandMilitaryProfessionalism
CarlyleA.Thayer
PapertoPanelon
UnderstandingVietnamesePolitics:
NewApproachesandIssuesfromtheField
AssociationofAsianStudiesAnnualConference
SheratonCentreTorontoHotel,Toronto,Canada
March1518,2012
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ThePoliticalRoleoftheVietnamPeoplesArmy:
CorporateInterestsandMilitaryProfessionalism
CarlyleA.Thayer
Abstract
The role of the military in a Leninist politicalsystem represents a distinct subset of civil
militaryrelations.Themilitaryisrequiredtoplayadomesticpoliticalroleinsupportofthe
onepartyregime inadditionto itsroleasdefenderofthestatefromexternalattack.This
paper presents a case study of the political role of the Vietnam Peoples Army (VPA) in
contemporaryVietnam.
Vietnamslongyearsofrevolutionandwarhaveresultedinthemilitarysengagementwith
society
in
a
number
of
state
building
activities
such
as
economic
defence
zones,
national
defence industry, commercial enterprise, and socialization of the general public through
universalconscriptionandcompulsorydefenceeducationforstudents.
Since1991theVPAhascomeunderpressuretoreformandthendivestitselfofcommercial
enterprisesnotdirectlyrelatedtonationalsecurity.Themilitaryspolitical influenceatthe
national levelhasdecreased in linewithanoticeabletrend inmilitaryprofessionalismand
institutionalautonomy.
ThesedevelopmentsdonotmeanthattheVietnamesemilitarywillwithdrawentirelytothe
barracks.AsaresultofhistoricallegaciestheVietnamPeoplesArmywillcontinuetoplaya
major
role
in
society
through
national
conscription;
the
maintenance
of
large
reserves,
militia and selfdefence forces; defence education, and socioeconomic development in
economicdefencezones.Thenewlyemergingthreattosovereignty inVietnamsEastSea
willintensifythetrendtowardsmilitaryprofessionalismandinstitutionalautonomy.
INTRODUCTION
WiththecollapseofsocialisminEasternEuropein1989,andthedisintegrationoftheSoviet
Union in 1991, arguably there are only five socialist states remaining: China, Cuba, Laos,
North Korea, and Vietnam. The Vietnam Peoples Army (VPA) and it role in Vietnamese
society
has
always
been
subject
to
the
special
dynamics
inherent
in
the
relationship
between communist parties and their armed forces. On the one hand, the Vietnam
CommunistParty(VCP)exercisesstrictpoliticalcontroloverthemilitary,asitdoesoverall
otheragenciesofthestate.Militaryofficersarepartof,butalsosubordinateto,theofficial
partyhierarchythatdominatesthevarious levelsofstateandsociety.Ontheotherhand,
thecommuniststategrants thearmed forcesaprivilegedplace insociety:historically the
VPA has been viewed as the indispensable tool of the workerpeasant class to fight
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imperialistenemiesbothwithinandoutsidethestate.Consequently,thearmedforcesare
integratedpermanentlyintotheinfrastructureofthestate,andtheirpoliticalinfluencehas
beenrelativelystableovertime.Nevertheless,fluctuations inthepolitical influenceofthe
VPA have occurred, and they have often been indicators not only for change within the
armedforces,alsoforshiftsinVietnamesepoliticsasawhole.
Oneof
these
fluctuations
was
visible
in
the
1990s.
For
Vietnam,
the
decade
of
the
1990swasframedbytwocrises:thecollapseofthesocialistsystem inEasternEuropeand
theSovietUnionandtheAsianFinancialCrisisof199798.Bothoftheseeventsexacerbated
cleavagesamongtheVietnamese leadership,whichwasdividedaboutthescopeandpace
ofeconomicreformsandthedegreetowhichVietnamshouldpursue integrationwiththe
globalmarket.Fearfulthatthecollapseofthesocialistsystemcouldmake itvulnerableto
externalsecuritythreats,andconcernedthatitwouldnotbeabletostemthechallengeof
major economic reform without the help of the military, the Vietnam Communist Party
decided to increase the role of the armed forces in political affairs. As a result, the VPA
becameamajor participant inVietnams thirdwaveof statebuilding (Vasavakul 1997b).
Subsequently, retired senior military officers were selected state president and party
secretarygeneral,andmilitaryrepresentationontheVCPsCentralCommitteeincreasedat
boththeseventh(1991)andeighth(1996)nationalpartycongresses.
Thisperiodofmilitaryascendancywasshortlived.In2001,theninthpartycongress
declined to reappoint the incumbent secretary general (a retired military officer) to a full
fiveyear termandelectedacivilian instead.Military representationon thePolitburowas
reducedbyhalf,leaving itwithonlyoneVPAmember.ItappearedthatafterVietnamhad
overcomethedualthreatofthebreakdownofthecommunistblocandtheAsianfinancial
crisis,theVCPwasconfidentenoughofitspositiontoreturnthestrengthofthemilitaryin
thepartys
key
bodies
to
pre
crisis
levels.
A
major
study
of
this
period
concluded
that
these
developmentsrepresentednotonlyaprocessofdefiningpowersharingbutalsocontinued
partycontrolofthearmy(Vasavakul2001:338).Vasavakul(2001:255356)alsomadetwo
predictions regarding the future role of the military in Vietnam. First, the VPA would
continuetoberunbypoliticalgeneralswhowerenotlikelytobecomespokespersonsfor
professional officers even though the military was given increased autonomy over
professionalmatters.Second,theVPAwouldcontinuetoplayanimportantroleinshaping
the newpolitical,economic, andsocialorderbecause themilitary hadbecomeboth red
and entrepreneur, i.e they had linked their communist identity with both national
economicdevelopmentingeneralandmilitaryownedbusinessesinparticular.
Thispaper
reviews
the
militarys
role
in
politics
from
2001,
Vasavakuls
account
was
published, to the present. The paper argues that while the militarys role has undergone
somesignificantadjustments,itsoverallinfluenceonpoliticsandsocietyhasremainedata
steady state. Three factors explain this stasis. First, there is consensus among the party
leadershipthatthemilitaryshouldcontinuetoplayaroleinstatebuildingthroughnational
conscriptionandwhat isbroadlytermed socialistconstruction.Second,the leadershipof
VCPcontinuestoacceptMarxistLeninist ideologicalstricturesthat legitimisesthepolitical
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roleofthemilitary inVietnamsonepartystate.Third,economicdevelopmentandglobal
integration have replaced the more traditional security concerns of the 1990s as the key
drivers of Vietnamese politics. Despite the general level of stability in militaryparty
relations at society level, Vietnams membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and integration into the global economy has generated external pressures on the VPA to
relinquish
ownership
of
its
commercial
enterprises.
This
is
a
potentially
significant
developmentthatwilllikelyresultingreaterpoliticalautonomyfortheVPAinnationallevel
politicsasitgivesprioritytomilitaryprofessionalism.
This paper also highlights other crucial changes in militaryparty relations as
economicdevelopmentandnationalsecurityconcernshavebecome intertwined.Thishas
become particularly apparent as Vietnams plans to develop its maritime territory in the
SouthChinaSeahavebeenchallengedbyChina(Thayer2008b:3741).Thishasgenerated
pressuresontheVPAtomodernise itsforces,raise itsprofessionalstandards,andstepup
internationaldefencecooperationwithregionalstatesinordertobetterdefendVietnams
nationalsovereignty.Inthefuture,theVPAislikelytobelessredandentrepreneur,thatis
lessideologicallyandcommerciallyorientated,andmorekhakiandprofessionalasmilitary
expertise and corporate interests dominate. The following discussion reviews these
developments in three parts. Part one presents an historical overview of the military
involvement inpoliticsfrom1946to2001.Parttwoanalysesthecontemporaryroleofthe
militaryinpolitics,nationaldefence,securityaffairs,theeconomy,andsocietyfrom2001to
the present. Subsequently, part three discusses the factors that account for altered
influence of the military in national politics and its persistence at societal level. The
conclusionprovidesasummaryofcontemporarycivilmilitaryrelations inVietnamandthe
factorsthathaveshapedthem.
THEMILITARYSINVOLVEMENTINPOLITICS,19462001
TheVietnamPeoplesArmywasfoundedin1946.Initially,itcomprisedaplatoonofthirty
four members led byVo Nguyen Giap, a political general, communist revolutionary and a
seniormemberoftheIndochineseCommunistParty.Since1946,theVPAhasbeenengaged
inarmedconflictforatotalofthirtysixyears,includingthewarsagainsttheFrench(1946
54),theUnitedStates(195975)andtheKhmerRouge inCambodia(197789).Duringand
aftertheKoreanWarintheearly1950s,ChinaassistedtheVPAtotransformitselffroman
antiFrench guerrilla force into a conventional army. Subsequently, the VPA continued its
transformationinto
amodern
regular
force
during
the
Vietnam
War,
this
time
with
Soviet
assistance. By 1987, the VPA had 1.26 million troops and was the worlds fifth largest
standingarmy.
Despite the VPAs transformation into a formidable military force, it has always
remainedunderfirmpartycontrol(Thayer1985:245248).Thepartyexercisescontrolover
theVPAthroughthemechanismofdualroleelites.Inotherwords,seniorpartymembers
simultaneouslyoccupythehighestranks inthemilitary.Fromitsveryorigins,theVPAwas
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commanded by socalled political generals, i.e. communist revolutionaries who had no
prior military experience (Turley 1977). At the same time, party control was reinforced
through a parallel structure of political commissars and political officers within the VPA
itself,1directedbyapartymilitarycommitteecomposedofmembersofthePolitburoand
CentralCommittee.Since1985,partycontroloverthearmedforceshasbeenexercisedby
theCentral
Military
Party
Committee
(Dang
Uy
Quan
Su
Truong
Uong).
With the establishment of a communist oneparty state, first known as the
DemocraticRepublicofVietnam(DRV,195475)andsubsequentlytheSocialistRepublicof
Vietnam (SRV, 1976present), the VPA has been assigned multiple roles, not the least of
which is responsibility for defence of the homeland. The VPA has also been assigned
political,internalsecurity,andeconomicproductionroles(Thayer1985:250254andThayer
2001).Intheviewofpartyleaders,themilitarycannotplayapoliticallyneutralrolebecause
itmustcarryoutitshistoricmandateasaninstrumentofmaintainingthesupremacyofthe
workerpeasant alliance against its class enemies. However, the multiple roles of the
military inVietnamesesocietymaybeaccountedfornotonlybyMarxistLeninist ideology
but also by its guerrilla heritage and protracted periods of armed conflict and external
threatstonationalsecurity.
Table1:MilitaryRepresentationonVCPExecutive
Year/Position Politburo* CentralCommittee*
Year(Congress) Military
Representation
Percent Military
Representation
Percent
1986(6th) 2of13 15.4 9of124 7.3
1991(7th
) 2of13 15.4 13of146 8.9
1996(8
th
)
2of
19
10.5 17
of
170 10.0
2001(9th
) 1of15 6.7 14of150 9.3
2006(10th) 1of14 7.1 17of160 10.6
2011(11th
) 1of14 7.1 19of175 10.9
Average _ 10.4 _ 9.25
*fullmembers
Source: The authors personal FileMaker Pro 9 database on all members of the VCP Central
Committee,1951present.Alternatemembersarenotincluded.
In other words, the VPA has been continually engaged in statebuilding, economic
production and internal security. In order to fulfil these roles, the VPA has always been
accordedblocrepresentationonthepartysCentralCommittee(seeTable1).Between1960
and 1982, for example, military representation on the Central Committee averaged 14.6
percent of full members. With the adoption of economic reforms (doi moi) in 1986,
however,militaryrepresentationdeclinedtosevenpercentof fullmembers.Similarly,the
1Partycontrolistheresponsibiliby oftheGeneralPoliticalDepartment.Politicalcommissarsandofficersare
trainedinaseparatePoliticalAcademy(QuanDoiNhanDan,18February2011.
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VPAs representation on the Politburo has fallen from an average of 20.7 percent in the
1970sandearly1980stoonlyonemember(or7.1percent)in2011.Since2001,thissingle
memberhasbeentheVPAsmostseniorgeneralwhosimultaneouslyholdsthepositionof
MinisterofNationalDefence.
In addition to its representation on the partys Central Committee and Politburo,
uniformed
military
officers
stand
for
election
to
and
serve
as
deputies
in
the
National
Assembly and on its various committees. The Minister of National Defence is ex officio a
member of Cabinet and the National Defence and Security Council. The VPA also plays a
political role through the socialisation of conscripts into the values of Vietnams socialist
regime.Inotherwords,theVPAactsasoneofthemaintransmissionbeltsforrecruitment
into the party. Finally, the VPA also played an important role historically in socialist
construction through involvement in building infrastructure, economic production and
naturaldisasterrelief.
WhileVPAengagementinthecommunistregimehasbeenaconstantinVietnamese
politics since the 1940s, its intensity has seen significant fluctuations. For instance, the
collapseofsocialisminEasternEuropeinthelate1980ssetthestageforaperiodofmilitary
ascendancy inthe1990s.Vietnamesepartyconservativesandmilitary leadersarguedthat
VietnamwasthreatenedbyaWesternplotofpeacefulevolution.In1992, intheshadow
ofthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,Vietnampromulgatedanewstateconstitution.Forthe
firsttime,thearmedforceswerechargedwithdefenceofthesocialistregimeinaddition
todefenceofthefatherland.GeneralLeDucAnh,theformerMinisterofNationalDefence
andseniormemberofthePolitburo,wasselectedpresidentandexofficiocommanderin
chiefofthearmedforces.2
In1996,attheeighthnationalpartycongress,militaryrepresentationontheCentral
Committee
temporarily
rose
to
ten
per
cent,
the
highest
figure
since
the
fourth
nationalparty congress in 1976. The following year, Vietnam was struck by three typhoons: the
AsianFinancialCrisis,amajornaturaldisastercausedbyarealtyphoonandmassivepeasant
protestsinThaiBinhprovince.ItwasinthiscontextthatinDecember1997,Lt.GeneralLe
KhaPhieu(retired),formerheadofthearmysGeneralPoliticalDepartment(GPD),replaced
Do Muoi as VCP secretarygeneral. This marked the first occasion that a retired career
militaryofficerwasappointedparty leader.Significantly,this leadershipchangetookplace
ataplenarysessionoftheCentralCommitteeandnotatanationalpartycongress.
Butbytheearly2000s,Vietnamhadlargelyrecoveredfromthemultiplecrisesofthe
late 1990s. Vietnams economy grew at an unprecedented rate averaging 7.63 percent
between2000
and
2007.
Further,
Vietnam
stepped
up
the
pace
of
economic
integration
by
signing a major bilateral trade agreement with theUnited States that came into effect in
2ThePresidenthasresponsibilityforseniorpromotions.Forexample,followingtheeleventhpartycongress,
PresidentNguyenMinhTrietappointedLt.GeneralNgoXuanLichdirectoroftheGeneralPoliticalDepartment
replacingGeneralLeVanDung(VietNamNetBridge,2March2011).Subsequently,inDecember2011,
VietnamscurrentPresident,TruongTanSang,promotedninegeneralstoseniorrankincludingeighttothe
rankofSeniorLt.General(VietNamNews,7December2011).
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late 2001. As a result, economic development and global integration replaced traditional
security concerns as the key drivers of domestic politics. These developments coincided
with growing disenchantment within the VCP over the lacklustre leadership of Secretary
GeneralPhieuand the increasing roleofthemilitary indomesticpolitics.Phieusposition
wasseverelyunderminedwhenCentralCommitteemembers learnedthathehaddirected
the
military
intelligence
service
to
conduct
wire
taps
on
Politburo
colleagues
(Thayer
2003a).Thus inApril2001,theCentralCommittee issuedanunprecedentedrebuketothe
MinisterofNationalDefence,GeneralPhamVanTra,andtheChiefoftheGeneralStaff,Le
VanDung.SecretaryGeneralPhieufellvictimtothisbacklash.Althoughhewasendorsedby
thePolitburoforanothertermaspartyleader,thisrecommendationwasoverturnedbythe
Central Committee. Phieu was replaced asVCP secretarygeneral at the ninth congress in
2001. As Vietnam weathered the aftershocks of the collapse of socialism and the Asian
Financial Crisis, the militarys political role has gradually receded. It was now the partys
managerial elite that took centre stage to manage Vietnams integration with the global
economy.
MILITARYENGAGEMENT INPOLITICS, SECURITYAFFAIRS,THEECONOMYAND SOCIETY:
20012010
While Phieus replacement, Nong DucManh, signalled a lessening of military influence at
the highest echelons of the party, the continuing interference of General Department II
(military intelligence) in party affairs provided evidence of the VPAs autonomy within
Vietnams political system. This was also highlighted by the fact that the military as an
institution suffered only a minor blowback from Phieus misuse of the VPAs intelligence
service.
For
example,
VPA
representation
on
the
Central
Committee
was
reduced
onlymarginallyattheninthnationalpartycongressin2001fromtheprevioustenpercentto9.3
percent. Similarly, General Pham Van Tra emerged relatively unscathed. While he was
dropped two places in the protocol rankings, he retained his portfolio as Minister of
NationalDefenceandseatonthePolitburo.Iftherewasamainvictiminthemilitary,itwas
GeneralPhamThanhNgan,headoftheGeneralPoliticalDepartment.Hewasdroppedfrom
thePolitburo.GeneralLeVanDung,Chiefof theGeneralStaff (CGS), retainedhisseaton
the Central Committee and was elected to the partys Secretariat. Five months after the
tenthcongress,DungreplacedThanhasheadoftheGPD.
DespitePhieusfall,complaintsaboutthemilitarysinterferenceinpoliticscontinued
after2001.
In
2004,
two
of
Vietnams
most
respected
retired
military
generals
wrote
private
letters to the partys senior leadership charging that the military intelligence service was
abusingitspowerbyinterferingininternalpartyaffairs(Thayer2008a).Nolessafigurethan
General Vo Nguyen Giap demanded an investigation into the extralegal activities of
General Department II because of the failureof the VCPs key bodies to take appropriate
action. General Giap specifically charged that General Directorate II had attempted to
manipulatefactionalisminthepartybysmearingthepoliticalreputationsofleadingfigures
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includinghimself (Thayer2008).GeneralGiapwassupported inhisaccusationsby retired
Major General Nguyen Nam Khanh. Khanh, a pillar of the establishment, was the former
head of the Central Committees Propaganda and Training Department, former Political
Officer for Military Region 5, and former deputy head of the VPAs General Political
Department. He accused General Department II of slandering, intimidation, torture,
political
assassination
as
well
as
manipulation
of
internal
party
factionalism
for
its
own
partisanpurposes.Khanhdocumentedhisallegationsbyquoting fromtheclassifiedNews
BulletinproducedbyGeneralDirectorateII(Thayer2008a).
Ifthere isanysubstancetotheallegationsraisedbygeneralsGiapandKhanh,they
demonstrate that key military leaders were actively involved in internal factional politics
withintheVCPitself.Significantly,itwasonlyinthelate1990sthatthefirstattemptswere
undertakentobringnationalsecurityandintelligenceagenciesunderlegislativecontrol.For
example, the first Ordinance on Intelligence was issued by the chairman of the National
Assembly Standing Committee in December 1996. In September the following year, the
Prime Minister issued Decree 96/CP on defence intelligence. These documents placed
controloverthemilitaryintelligenceserviceinthehandsofthestatepresidentandunified
directionofthegovernment.However,bothdocumentsweredraftedbytheVPAandleftit
withsuchextensivepowersthat itwasstillabletooperateoutsideofeffectivepartyand
government control. Even the Law on National Security, passed in November 2004 in an
efforttorestorepartyandstateoversightofthemilitary,didnotseverelyerodetheVPAs
powerofpoliticalintervention.OneindicationthatGeneralDirectorateIIhadcomethrough
thisreviewprocessunscathedandwasviewedasavaluablecontributortonationalsecurity
came in March 2008 when the VCP secretarygeneral, Nong Duc Manh, awarded it the
designationthePeoplesArmedForcesHeroforitsremarkablecontributionsoverthepast
decades(Quan
Doi
Nhan
Dan,
25
March,
2008).
The militarys ability to maintain its political influence was also reflected in its
representationontheVCPsmainbodiesafterthetenthcongressin2006.Forinstance,VPA
representation on the Central Committee rose slightly from fourteen members or 9.3
percent (ninth congress) to seventeen members or 10.6 percent. Moreover, the
composition of the VPA bloc on the Central Committee highlighted the importance that
boththepartyandthemilitaryassignedtotheVCPVPArelationship.TheVPAsseventeen
membersincluded:chiefofthegeneralstaff,headanddeputyheadoftheGeneralPolitical
Department, head of the Technical General Department, three deputy ministers, the
commander of the navy, the political commissar of the AirDefence Air Force political
commissarsfor
Military
Regions
1,
3,
4,
7and
9,
the
commander
of
Military
Region
5,
the
deputy commander/chief of staff for Military Region 2, and the head of the National
Defence Academy. This pattern of VPA representation on the partys Central Committee
continuedaftertheeleventhnationalpartycongressin2011.
Inthesamevein,theVPAhasretaineditssingleseatonthePolitburo,withDefence
Minister General Pham Van Tra replaced at the tenth congress by General Phung Quang
Thanh,ChiefoftheGeneralStaff.Shortlyafterwards,GeneralThanhalsobecameDefence
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Minister. Both Generals Tra and Thanh are career regular army officers and represent a
break from the political generals who were traditionally appointed in the past. General
ThanhwasreappointedtothePolitburoatthe2011eleventhpartycongress.
The analysis of the VPAs involvement in political institutions has pointed to
fluctuating, but overall significant levels of military participation in Vietnamese elite
politics.3However,
assessing
military
involvement
in
the
political
apparatus
is
only
one
way
of measuring the quality of civilmilitary relations. Comparative analysts have broadened
theirperspectiveon civilmilitary interactionsbydiscussing the involvementof the armed
forces inothermainareasofstateaffairs:nationaldefence,securityaffairs, theeconomy
andsociety.Accordingly,thefollowingsubsectionsreviewtheVPAsengagement inthese
keyarenasofsociopoliticalandsecurityrelationships.
VPAsRoleinNationalDefence
Intermsof itsnationaldefencerole,theVPAunderwentamassivestrategicreadjustment
throughoutthe1990s.In1987,theVPAsmainforcestoodatamassive1.26milliontroops.
Withinayearof itswithdrawalfromCambodia in1989,600,000soldiersweredischarged.
Bytheendofthe1990s,furthermanpowerreductionslefttheVPAwith484,000mainforce
troops (Thayer 1995 and Thayer 2000a). First and foremost, this drastic drop in troop
numbers reflected Vietnams changed strategic priorities after the end of the Cold War.
Revisingitspriorfocusonpossibleaggressionbyimperialism,Vietnambegantotakenoteof
other,more regionalthreats. In1998,Vietnams firstDefenceWhitePaper identified hot
spots intheSouthChinaSeaasthemainexternalthreattoVietnam(SocialistRepublicof
Vietnam1998:18). However, two majorstrategicmissions assigned to theVPA national
defenceand
economic
production
remained
the
same.
Vietnam's
second
Defence
White
Paper issued in2004declared,forexample,thatthemaintasksofthearmed forceswere
to maintain combat readiness for safeguarding the socialist homeland and making a
contributiontothecauseofnationalconstruction(SocialistRepublicofVietnam2004:37).
By 2004, the altered strategic environment had dramatically changed Vietnams
placeintheworld.Vietnamhadnotonlynormalizeddiplomaticrelationswithallitsformer
enemies,buthadavidlysoughtregionalandglobal integrationthroughmembership inthe
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and membership in the WTO. Consequently, the
Vietnam Peoples Army was charged with responsibility not only for traditional security
threatssuch
as
territorial
conflict
in
the
South
China
Sea
and
peaceful
evolution
but
non
traditional threats as well. In this regard, the 2004 White Paper mentioned illegal drug
traffickingandtransportationofweapons,piracy,transnationalorganizedcrimes,terrorism,
illegal immigration and migration, and degeneration of ecological environment (Socialist
RepublicofVietnam2004:12).
3ForananalysisoftheroleofseniormilitaryofficersininternalpartypoliticsseeVuving2011.
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Table2VietnamsDefenceBudgetaspercentofGDP,199909
(inbillionUSdollars)
Year VPASize* Defence Budget
(DB)**
GDP** DB as % of
GDP**
1999 484,000 2.1 34.5 6.0
2000 484,000 2.6 36.8 7.2
2001 484,000 3.1 39.4 7.9
2002 484,000 2.6 42.2 6.2
2003 484,000 2.6 45.3 5.8
2004 484,000 3.0 48.8 6.1
2005 455,000 3.2 52.9 6.0
2006 455,000 3.2 57.3 5.6
2007 455,000 3.7 62.1 5.2
2008 455.000 2.1 66.0 3.2
2009 455,000 2.1 69.0 3.0
Sources:
*InternationalInstituteofStrategicStudies,TheMilitaryBalance(19992000to2010)
**DefenceIntelligenceOrganisation,DefenceEconomicTrendsintheAsiaPacific(2009:27).
Nevertheless, Vietnamese leaders remained concerned with external ideological
enemies. These fears were directed mainly at the network of anticommunist overseas
Vietnamese living in America, France, Australia and other Western countries. The 2004
Defence White Paper stated that Vietnam is facing the threat of schemes and ploys by
external hostile elements in collusion with internal reactionaries to interfere in Vietnams
internalaffairsandtocausesociopoliticalunstability[sic]inVietnam(SocialistRepublicof
Vietnam 2004: 1112). While Vietnam regularly expressed concerns about these Diaspora
groups,by2009Vietnamsdomesticsecuritysituationhadbecomestabilizedeventhough
hostileforces[continued]toinciteviolenceandseparatismissomeareasofthecountry
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2009: 16 and 18). The improved internal security situation
enabled further troop reductions throughout the 2000s. Between 2001 and 2005, for
example,29,000soldiersweredischarged,bringingmanpowerstrengthdownto455,000a
force level that has been maintained up to the present. According to official Vietnamese
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figures,thedefencebudgetasaproportionofGDPfluctuatedbetween1.8and2.5percent
ofGDPbetween2004and2008(SocialistRepublicofVietnam2004:35and2009:38),but
thesefigureshavebeendiscountedastoolowbyoutsideanalysts(seeTable2).
Despite thedownsizingof themilitaryand thedecline in theoverallproportionof
the
defence
budget,
expenditure
on
the
armed
forces
nevertheless
increased
in
absolute
terms between 2002 and 2007. This was due to the VPAs efforts to meet its defence
responsibilities by embarking on a selective program of upgrading existing stocks of
serviceableweapons,forcemodernization,increasingmilitaryprofessionalism,andstepping
up international defence cooperation. As a result, Vietnams spending on defence rose in
absolute terms from US$ 2.6 billion in 2001 to 3.3 billion in 2007, with significant funds
allocatedtotheVPAsmodernizationprogram.Defencespendingfellprecipitously in2008
and2009whentheglobalfinancialcrisisimpactedonVietnam(seeChart1).
Chart1VietnamsDefenceBudget,19992009
(inbillion
US
dollars)
Source:DefenceIntelligenceOrganisation,DefenceEconomicTrendsintheAsiaPacific,(2009:27).
TheonsetofVietnamscurrent forcemodernization programcanbe traced to the
mid1990s(Thayer1997).Sincethattime,Vietnamhasbeenseekingtodevelopadeterrent
capability in the South China Sea through the acquisition of modern Svetlyakclass fast
attackcraftandGephardclassfrigatesarmedwithsurfacetosurfacemissiles,sixKiloclass
conventional submarines, Bastion landbased antiship cruise missiles, Extended Range
Artillery Munitions and possibly the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. Vietnam has also
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modestly modernized its air force through upgrade programs for its MiG21s and Su22s,
andtheacquisitionofahandfulofSu27andtwentySu30jetfightersarmedwithadvanced
airtoairandairtosurfacemissiles.Theairdefenceforcehasacquiredanewgenerationof
surfacetoairmissilessuchastheS300PMU.Vietnamsforcemodernizationprogramhas
also stressed the development of selfreliant capabilities in its national defence industry
throughco
production
(eg.
the
Dutch
manufactured
SIGMA
class
corvette)
and
technology
transfers at the lower end of the technology scale (Thayer 2009b). In 2011, Vietnam
producedandlauncheditsfirstPatrolBoat(modelledontheSvetlyakoffshorepatrolvessel)
andatripledecktroopship (TuoiTre,3October2011andFragrantHarbour [HongKong]
No.263,NovemberDecember2011,38).
TheVPAsmodernizationprogram,coupledwithregionalintegrationwithVietnams
Southeast Asian neighbours, have produced pressures to step up the pace of military
professionalismtoensurethattheofficercorps iscapableofabsorbingnewtechnologies,
meetingthewiderangeofresponsibilities ithasbeenassigned,andengagingwithASEAN
partners.InordertoensurethatVPAofficerskeepabreastofandassimilatetointernational
standards of military professionalism Vietnam has begun introducing wideranging
educational reforms since the late 1990s. Similarly, Vietnams program of professional
militaryeducation(PME)andtraininghasbeenenhancedinordertoimprovetheskillsand
qualifications of the officer corps. In addition, VPA officers are being sent abroad in
increasing numbers to attend professional development courses in countries such as
Australia, India, Malaysia and the United States. In 2008, Vietnam hosted its first PME
course for foreignmilitaryofficers.Finally,Vietnamhasmarkedly intensified international
defencecooperationthroughtheexchangeofhighleveldelegations,negotiationofdefence
cooperation and arms and technology procurement agreements, sending observers to
foreignmilitary
exercises,
and,
most
recently,
joint
patrols
and
joint
exercises
with
regional
navies(Thayer2008b).
TheMilitaryandDomesticSecurity
As notedabove, the 2004 Defence WhitePaper assigned the VPAa role role in domestic
securityaffairs,primarilythroughcounteringthethreatofpeacefulevolution.TheVPAhas
been very circumspect, however, about involving itself in direct confrontation with the
public,preferringtoseetheMinistryofPublicSecuritysarmedpolicetaketheleadrolein
dealing with public protests, riots and violent demonstrations. Nevertheless, in February
andMarch
2001
the
VPA
was
deployed
to
the
Central
Highlands
to
deal
with
an
outbreak
of
unrest by several thousand members of mostly Christian ethnic minorities (known as the
DegarpeoplesortheMontagnards) inthreeprovinces.Thesedisturbancesreceivedmuch
attentionbecausetheytookplaceontheeveoftheninthnationalpartycongress.National
securityauthoritieswerequicktoblameoutsidehostileforces.Inparticular,theypointed
toFULRO(FrontUnifieLiberationDesRacesOpprimes,UnitedFrontfortheLiberationofthe
Oppressed Races). The FULRO was an ethnonationalist separatist movement of highland
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ethnicminoritiesthatdatedtothe1960sbuthadpersisted in itsstruggleafterunification
wellintothe1990s.
Whenunrestbrokeoutin2001,atleastthirteenVPAregimentswerepostedtothe
CentralHighlandstoprovidesecuritybymanningcheckpointsandsecuringtheborderwith
Cambodia(AgenceFrancePresse,27April2001).Soldierswerebilletedwith localfamilies,
while
political
cadres
directed
a
campaign
of
political
education
designed
to
calm
the
situationandpreventillegaldeparturestoCambodia.Butrenewedunresteruptedin2004,
which Vietnamese security authorities blamed on alleged instigation by the Montagnard
FoundationintheUnitedStates.TheMontagnardFoundationisanorganizationcomprised
ofhighlandethnicminoritieswhoworkedwithU.S.SpecialForcesduringtheVietnamWar.
Evidently,thislinkagebetweendomesticethnicminoritiesandtheMontagnardFoundation
isanexampleofwhattheVietnamesegovernmentconsiderstobethe threatofpeaceful
evolution.
Although the security situation has been brought largely under control, ethnic
minorityunrestcontinuestoconcerncentralauthorities.InFebruary2007,forexample,the
National Defence and Security Council discussed plans to boost national defence and
security in strategic areas including the Central Highlands, border regions and the
Northwest(VietnamNewsService,27February2007).Inthiscontext,theVPABorderGuard
has been given responsibility for combating illegal drug trafficking and transportation of
weapons,illegalimmigrationandmigrationaswellasothertransnationalcriminalactivities,
whichareparticularlyprevalentintheborderareasinhabitedbyethnicminorities.
Accordingtothe2010FreedomHousereportonVietnam(Gainsborough2010:10),
the situation in the Central Highlands has remained volatile, and unrest has recently
increased over land disputes resulting from confiscations to develop large stateowned
coffeeplantations.
The
Central
Highlands,
it
appears,
will
continue
to
figure
prominently
on
theVPAsdomesticsecurityagendafortheforeseeablefuture.VPAforceswerereportedly
involved in security operations in May 2011 when unrest broke out among the Hmong
ethnicminorityinDienBienprovincealongtheborderwithLaos(AgenceFrancePresse,16
April2011).
ButsecurityoperationsarenottheonlyVPAinstrumenttoaddresstheunrestinthe
Central Highlands. The armed forces have also long been involved in developing
infrastructureandprovidingsocialwelfareservices inremoteborderregions.Accordingto
VietnamsmostrecentDefenceWhitePapertheVPAcurrentlyrunstwentytwoeconomic
defence zones (khu kinh tequan su) from the Central Highlands to the China border
(SocialistRepublic
of
Vietnam
2009:
118).
An
estimated
20,000
households
belonging
to
the
familiesofsoldiersandmilitiahavebeensettledinDakLakandBinhPhuocprovincesalone
(ThayerandHervouet2004:373374andThayerforthcoming:466467).ArmyCorporation
15, the 15th Army Corps and the Dak To Army Corps have been involved in land
reclamation, infrastructureandhousingconstruction, irrigationandwatersupply,forestry,
education and public health. According to Freedom House, however, such programs are
often implemented within governmentcontrolled parameters and perceived by minority
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populations as aimed at weakening their unique cultural and linguistic identity.
(Gainsborough2010:10).
Moreover, the VPA has assisted lowland Vietnamese resettle in the Central
Highlandswhereclearedlandhasbeenturnedoverforthecultivationofcashcropssuchas
coffee,rubber,cashewnuts,cotton,pepper,maizeandgreenbeans.Notsurprisingly,these
resettlementprograms
have
been
controversial
in
some
areas
because
of
their
impact
on
residentethnicminoritycommunities.WhenethnictensionserupttheVPAifoftenaskedto
assistotherelementsofthePeoplesArmedForcesinmaintaininglawandorder.
TheVPAsEconomicActivities
Inadditionto itsnationaldefenceand internalsecurityroles,theVPA isalsochargedwith
makingacontributiontothecauseofnationalconstruction.Therearemanyaspectstothis
role, includingassistingwithsocioeconomicdevelopment,poverty reduction,andnatural
disasterresponseandmitigation.However,themostprominentroleoftheVPAinnational
construction takes the form of direct ownership of national defence industries and
commercialenterprises.
TheVPAsinvolvementincommercialactivitiesbeganinthe1980swiththeadoption
ofdoimoi (Thayer 2003a). In March 1989, nine major army economic construction units
wereconverted into legalentities (corporationsorgeneralcorporations)underDecree46
issuedbytheCouncilofMinisters.Thesenewcorporationswerepermittedtooperateon
thesamelegalbasisasstateownedenterprises,includingobtainingcreditfromstatebanks
and formingjoint ventures with foreign partners. In a short period of time, there was a
marked rise in thenumber of militaryowned corporationsanda rapidexpansion of their
economic
and
commercial
activities.
These
corporations
became
important
generators
ofrevenue, and by the early 1990s, they had massively broadened their production of
consumergoods(VietnamNewsAgency,21February1993).In1993,thearmysetupitsfirst
joint stock commercial bank. In the following year, there were over 330 armyrun
commercialbusinesses,includingsixtymilitaryownedenterprisesoperatedbyregularunits.
Thenumberofjointventureswithforeignpartnersjumpedfromfortyninein1995tosixty
seven in 2003. The scope of the armys commercial activities embraced consumer goods,
garmentsandtextiles,automobilemanufacturing,constructionwork,shipandplanerepair,
hotels and real estate, mechanical engineering, as well as telephone, fax and internet
services.4
Inline
with
national
policy
to
reform
the
state
owned
enterprise
sector,
however,
militaryownedenterpriseswerealsorequiredtorestructurefromthemid1990sonwards.
Thereweretwomajorwavesofenterprisereforms(Thayerforthcoming:463468).Thefirst
lasted from 1995 to 1997 and resulted in the reduction of the number of militaryrun
4MilitaryrunenterprisesreportedlyhavebeenimplicatedinsmugglingtimberfromLaos(VoiceofAmerica
News,29July2011).
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corporations from 335 to 193, mainly through mergers. Nonetheless, a number of these
mergerstookplaceonlyonpaperandthereformsofthefirstwavedidlittletogeneratethe
capitalnecessarytoupdateoldequipmentandoutmodedtechnology.
Table3ListofMajorDefenceDepartmentGeneralCorporations
MilitaryTelecommunicationsGeneralCorporation(Viettel)
TruongSonConstructionGeneralCorporation
NortheastGeneralCorporation
FlightServicesGeneralCorporation
General
Corporation
No.
15
MilitaryPetrolGeneralCorporation
GeneralCorporationNo.28
ThanhAnGeneralCorporation
TanCangGeneralCorporation
MilitaryBank
Source:SocialistRepublicofVietnam2009:119.
A second wave of reforms was initiated in May 1998 in a directive issued by the
Central Military Party Committee. The main aim of these reforms was to improve the
efficiencyofmilitarycorporationsand increasetheircapacitytoundertakemajorprojects.
At that time, thenumberofmilitaryenterpriseswas reduced to164, following theCMPC
directivethatcalledforunprofitablefirmtobedissolved.Thedirectivefurtherdecreedthat
army divisions, provincial units and specialized departments within the defence ministry
werebarred
from
operating
commercial
enterprises.
In
late
1999,
Prime
Minister
Phan
Van
Khai directed that military corporations rationalize their commercial activities (Thayer
forthcoming:465). Inordertooverseethisprocess,theEconomicsDivisionoftheGeneral
DepartmentofNationalDefenceIndustryandEconomicswasupgradedtothestatusofan
independentEconomicsDepartmentwithinthedefenceministry.
Itwouldappearthatthesecondwaveofreformofarmyenterprisesdidnothavea
major impact. The VPA defended its corporate interests and business continued more or
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lessasusual. Infact, itwasestimated in2001thatthenumberofcompaniesoperatedby
theVPAhadrisenagaintotwohundred,atleastfortyofwhichwerejointventures,withan
annual turnover estimated at US $320 million (Janes World Armies electronic edition,
accessed10October2001). In2001,theMilitaryTelecommunicationGeneralCorporation
or Viettel, entered the lucrative internet5 and mobile phone markets to directly compete
withstate
enterprises.
By
2003,
the
revenues
generated
by
military
owned
enterprises
had
shotuptoU.S.$653.6million(QuanDoiNhanDan,7January2003).Moreover,theMilitary
Commercial Joint Stock Bank raised its chartered capital in 2003 to enable it to provide
credittolargeprojects.
Butthemilitarysgrowingeconomicandcommercial interestsdirectlyclashedwith
the imperatives of global economic integration when Vietnam became a member of the
WTO. In2007, it was estimated that thearmystillownedabout140 companiesandheld
shares inmorethantwentyadditionalfirms inalmosteverysectoroftheeconomy.These
enterprisesreportedlygeneratedUS$2billion inrevenue in2006(ThanhNien,31January
2007). Trying to address both the internal and international pressures in this field, the
Central Committee passed a resolution in January 2007 requiring that all business
enterprisesoperatedbythearmy,publicsecurity,partyandmassorganizationsbeplaced
under state management. The decision specified, however, that the VPA would retain
ownershipandcontrolovercompaniesthatweredirectlyrelatedtonationaldefenceand
security.While theprocessofhandingoverownershipofallothercompanieswas due to
beginbeforetheendof2007,itsoonbecameevidentthatthisdeadlinewasunrealistic.In
December 2007, Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh stated that his ministry
wouldhandoveraround140militaryownedcommercialenterprisesto thestateby2012
and focus on training and building up a regular modern army (QuanDoiNhanDan, 19
December2007).
In 2008, the National Assembly adopted the Ordinance on Defence Industry that
providedthelegalbasisforthetransferofmilitaryrunbusinessesandsetouttheprinciples
and legal framework for national defence industries to be retained by the Ministry of
NationalDefence.PlanstodivesttheDefenceMinistryofitsbusinessenterprisesappeared
togathersteaminApril2008whenthePrimeMinisterissuedinstructionsforthedivestiture
of one hundred and thirteen militaryowned enterprises (VietNamNews, 4 April 2008).
While the initiative led to the divestment, restructuring or disbandment of small military
businesses, itallowedtheVPAandtheDefenceMinistrytoholdontotheirmostprecious
asset,Viettel,andnineothermajorgeneralcorporations(seeTable3).
InJanuary
2010,
Viettel
was
officially
acknowledged
as
one
of
Vietnams
eight
largest
economic groups, and the first to be run by the Defence Ministry. In addition to its core
telecommunication business, Viettel was allowed to branch out into the field of military
information technology meeting the criteria set out in the 2007 decree that made it
5ViettelbecamethefirstnetworkoperatorinVietnamtoofferitscustomers4G(fourthgeneration)
broadbandtechnology(VietnamNewsAgency,12May2011).
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possiblefortheVPAtomaintaincontroloverenterprisesdirectlyrelatedtonationalsecurity
interests. Accordingly, Viettel remains an important source of income for the military,
despite the governments overall strategy to reduce VPA involvement in commercial
activities. Viettel has increased its revenues 1,500 times within 10 years, from US$2.1
million in 1999 to $3.2 billion in 2009 (Viet Nam News, 13 January 2010). Viettel has
emergedas
one
of
Southeast
Asias
most
profitable
military
businesses
with
investments
in
Cambodia,LaosandHaiti.
TheArmedForcesandSociety
The fourtharea ofmilitarypolitics relates to the way theVPAengageswithsociety, both
directlyandindirectly.TheVPAsdirectinfluenceonsocietyisexercisednotonlythroughits
455,000soldiersandtheirfamilies,butalsothroughnearlyfivemillionreserves,militiaand
otherparamilitaryforces.Inaddition,thereareoveroneandahalfmillionmembersofthe
VietnamVeteransAssociation,not includingtheirdependenthouseholds. Inaddition,the
VPA interacts with society through two major mechanisms: national conscription and
compulsorydefenceeducation.
Vietnam has maintained a system of national conscription since the late 1950s.
Currently,allmalesagedbetween17and45andwomenagedbetween18and40whohold
professionalskillsarerequiredtoregisterwiththeofficesofthemilitarycommandatthe
commune, ward or district where they reside. New recruits are given six months basic
training and then assigned to units that engage in road building, planting trees or other
infrastructure projects. At present, nearly one million men reach military age each year.
Legally all medically qualified males are eligible for service, but there is a long list of
exemptions,including
deferments
for
students.
Military
service
is
generally
sought
after
by
youthsfromruralareas,whilethereisapalpableaversiontomilitaryservicebytheirurban
counterparts, especially those from welloff families who either pay bribes or enrol their
sons in parttime classes and university preparatory courses to avoid the draft.
Nevertheless,asaresultofthemassivereduction inthesizeoftheregulararmy,Vietnam
haslittledifficultyinmeetingitsmanpowerrequirements.1Duetothecompetingdemands
of the countrys market economy, however, the VPA has found it difficult to attract
educationallyqualifiedindividuals.
The VPA has also long provided vocational training for soldiers slated for
demobilization.Priortotheadoptionofdoimoi,demobilizedsoldierswerereturnedtotheir
former
employers
who
were
required
to
provide
them
with
ajob.
During
the
difficult
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, however, the VPA became
involvedinvocationaltraininginordertoreducetheburdenonbusinesses.Duringthefive
year period from 1996 to 2001, the Ministry of National Defence set up three technical
collegesandeighteenjobpromotioncentrescapableofhandling35,000traineesayearfor
both long and shortterm courses. In the fiveyear period ending in 2001, 80,000
demobilized soldiersweregivenvocational trainingand 45,000demobilized soldiers were
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assistedbyjobpromotioncentres in findingemployment (VietnamNewsAgency,30May
2001). In 2011Vocational TrainingSchool22beganavocational course for1,150soldiers
demobilised from military service. The course included training in pharmacy, information
technology, electronics, automobile technology, and driving (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 29
September2011).
The
second
mechanism
through
which
the
VPA
exercises
influence
in
society
is
throughanextensiveprogramofdefenceeducationforhighschoolanduniversitystudents,
government officials, community leaders and religious dignitaries. In May 2001, Prime
MinisterPhanVanKhaisignedDirectiveNo.15/2001OnDefenceEducation inallcolleges,
universities, and schools belonging to administrative agencies, political and social
organizations. Both the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Education and
Trainingweregivenresponsibilityforcarryingoutthedirective.
In August 2001, the Prime Minister established the Central Council for Military
Education,which includedmanyseniorgovernmentofficials.TheCounciloversaw,among
other things, the redrafting of the curriculum for national defence education. Defence
educationand itscurriculumweremadecompulsory forallstudents inseniorhighschool
and above. During the 2006 school year, for example, over three million students from
2,866schoolsanduniversitiesattendednationaldefenceeducationcourses.Textbooksand
study documents were jointly prepared by the Ministry of National Defence, the VCP
Organisation and Personnel Commission and the Ministry of Education and Training. In
addition, the VPA General Political Department and the VCP Ideology and Culture
Commission organized training courses on national defence for more than one hundred
leaders,editorsandjournalistsfromcentralpressagencies.
Defenceeducationcourseswerealsorunbymilitaryregionalcommands. InMarch
2007,for
example,
Military
Region
5reported
that
it
had
conducted
courses
for
over
half
amillion persons in the previous year. At the same time, Military Region 4 High Command
conducted its twentyfirstcourseondefenceeducation fordirectorsand vicedirectorsof
colleges,universities,highschoolsandstateownedenterprises.MilitaryRegion3provided
defenceeducationto8,700teachersfromschools,collegesanduniversitiesbetween2001
and2010(QuanDoiNhanDan,19February2011).Thefollowingmonth,theHighCommand
of Military Region 9 concluded its twentythird defence education course for eightysix
provincialofficialsfromtheMekongDelta.
Vietnams defence education program is significant because it brings Vietnams
educatedyouthandothermembersofsociety intocontactwith thearmed forcesand its
officers.Most
importantly,
they
are
introduced
to
if
not
indoctrinated
with
the
militarys
conservative views on national security. Furthermore, the series of defence education
courses provides important legitimation for the political role of the armed forces in
Vietnamsonepartystateandforthemilitarysrolesindomesticaffairs.
Likemanyothermilitaries inSoutheastAsia,theVPAalsotriesto influencesociety
throughthemassmedia.Onewayofachievingthisaimisthoughthepublicationofitsmass
daily,QuanDoiNhanDan(PeoplesArmyofVietnam),withaweekdaycirculationofseveral
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hundred thousand copies. The VPA alsopublishes the ArmyLiterature and ArtsMagazine
(VanNgheQuanDoi) a popular literature magazine. In addition, the military has its own
publishinghouse,NhaXuatBanQuanDoiNhanDan(PeoplesArmyPublishingHouse)that
producesbooksonmilitaryhistoryandbiographiesofmilitaryheroes.Althoughthemilitary
doesnotownradioortelevisionstations,itdoesproduceavarietyofpopularprogramsfor
thestate
run
network.
Through
efforts
like
these,
which
complement
its
deep
involvement
indefenceeducation,theVPAremainsafixtureinthedailylivesofordinaryVietnamese.
EXPLAININGTHELEVELOFMILITARYINVOLVEMENTINPOLITICS
Samuel Huntington (1991) coined the term third wave to describe the global process of
democratization that took place in the fifteenyear period following the military coup in
Portugal in April 1974. Huntington estimated that during this period thirty countries
underwentatransitionfromauthoritariantodemocraticrule.SinceHuntingtonsstudywas
published, a further eight countries arguably made a similar transition in the AsiaPacific
region. The list includes: Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea,
East Timor, and Pakistan. Several of these countries have suffered reversals, such as
Pakistan and Thailand, but have since experienced fresh democratic transitions (however
thesituation inThailandremainshighlyvolatile).Processesofdemocratictransitionshave
almost invariablyresulted inattemptsbypoliticalelitestoplacethemilitaryundercivilian
control;butciviliancontrolhasnotnecessarilyendedthemilitarysengagementindomestic
politics.
In his study of civilmilitary relations in the AsiaPacific, Muthiah Alagappa (2001)
noted that since the mid1980s there has been a clear trend in reduction in the political
powerof
militaries
across
the
region.
In
the
same
vein,
Vasavakul
(2001:
356)
concluded
her
study of the military in Vietnam by arguing that the Vietnam Peoples Army in 2001 was
likely [to continue] toplayan important role inshaping thenewpolitical,economic,and
social order in the future because the VPA had successfully altered its role from
revolutionaryheroestoredentrepreneursandpoliticalgeneralswouldcontinuetodefend
the armys commercial interests. In other words, Vietnam appeared unlikely to be
influencedbyregionaltrendsidentifiedbyAlagappa.
ThecasestudypresentedinthispapersuggeststhatVasavakulsassessmentsmade
in2001havebeenovertakenbyevents.First,heruseofthetermpoliticalgenerals(taken
fromTurley1977)nolongeraccuratelydescribestheindividualswhohavetakencommand
of
the
VPA
after
2001.
General
Phung
Quang
Thanh,
for
example,
is
a
product
of
professionalmilitaryeducationinVietnamandtheSovietUnion. Second,Vasavakulsuseof
thetermredissomewhatmisleadingbecauseitresonateswiththetermredandexpert
used to describe tensions in Chinese civilmilitary relations in the 1960s. While Vietnam
justifiespartydominanceoverthemilitaryonideologicalgrounds,ithasnevergonetosuch
extremesasChinaduring theCulturalRevolution.Third, Vietnamsmilitaryentrepreneurs
have lost influence within the VPAs institutional hierarchy, with much of the militarys
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economicpowernowalmostexclusivelyconcentrated inViettelacompanyrunnotonly
by generals, but by professional managers as well and nine other general corporations
controlledbyregionalmilitarycommands.
Inotherwords,itappearsthatsince2001theVPAhasaspiredtoachievethelevels
ofmilitaryprofessionalismand forcemodernisationnecessaryfor itsmissionofdefending
Vietnamsterritorial
sovereignty
particularly
in
the
South
China
Sea.
In
this
context,
the
VPA
has relinquished some of its influence over the party, state and the economy, while it
increaseditsauthorityoveritsinternalmilitaryaffairs.Nevertheless,theVPAhasremained
politically influential after 2001, confirming Vasavakuls overall prediction of stable civil
military relations in Vietnam. To begin with, the interests of Vietnams military
establishment continue tobe representedby itsmemberson theVCP CentralCommittee
andbytheVPAsmostseniorgeneralonthePolitburo.Similarly,theVPAcontinuetoplay
aninfluentialroleinsocietythroughoversightofmilitia,selfdefenceandreserveforces,a
largeveteransnetwork,conscription,anddefenceeducationcourses.Hence,thenotionof
decliningmilitaryinfluencethatAlagappapostulatedforotherSoutheastAsianstatesdoes
notaccuratelycapturethedynamicsunderway inVietnam.The followingsectionanalyses
thereasonsforthisphenomenon.
VPAInvolvementinPolitics:KeyFactors
Inthescholarlyliteratureoncivilmilitaryrelations,manyauthorshavepointedtofourmain
variablesthatcanexplainthetrajectoryofmilitaryengagementinthepoliticsofparticular
nationstates:historical legacies,qualityofciviliangovernance, international influenceand
internalmilitaryculture. Thissectiondiscusses the relevanceof these four factors for the
caseof
Vietnam,
beginning
with
historical
legacies.
Todays
VPA
still
carries
many
features
that date back to its foundation amidst Vietnams struggle against French colonial rule.
Significantly,thepoliticalroleoftheVPAwasdeterminedattheoutsetbyMarxistLeninist
ideology,accordingtowhichtheVPAwasan instrumentoftheworkerpeasantallianceto
seize power from the capitalist class. The subsequent prolonged wars against the French
and the United States seemed to confirm this MarxistLeninist premise of historical
determinism,providingthefoundationfortheVPAsnationaldefence,internalsecurityand
politicalroles.
The independencestruggleand thewaragainst theUnitedStatesalsoaccount for
theVPAswiderangingengagementwithsociety.TheVPAswarethos,enshrinedincurrent
doctrine
of
allpeoples
national
defence,
stresses
the
importance
of
maintaining
large
reserve, militia and selfdefence forces, and calls for the active involvement of the main
forcesineconomicproduction,socialistconstructionandotherstatebuildingactivities.But
while thewarshada formativeand lasting influenceon theVPAandVietnamesesociety,
the grounds for the militarys institutional involvement in politics were laid in periods of
relativepeace.Mostimportantly,theVPAscurrentroleasoneofthemaincomponentsof
thecommunistsystemhas itsroots inVietnamsperiodsofpoliticalconsolidation,suchas
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theestablishmentoftheDRVin1954andtheSRVin1976.Consequently,theVPAbecame
oneofthefourmainpillarsoftheregime,alongsidetheparty,thestateandtheVietnam
FatherlandFront(anumbrellagroupformassorganizations).TheVPAsblocrepresentation
on the partys Central Committee and in the National Assembly is a product of these
periods.Asaresult,politicalandmilitaryrolesbecamefused,andtheyremainsotoday.
Another
factor
in
explaining
the
levels
of
military
participation
in
politics
is
the
qualityofciviliangovernance.Militariesfinditdifficulttointerfereinorassumedominance
over political affairs if civilian groups run effective and stable governments. This link
between the effectiveness of civilian governance and military participation in politics has
alsobeenobvious inVietnam.Militaryengagement inpolitics increased inthe late1990s,
when the Asian Financial Crisis threatened Vietnams economic growth, but it decreased
soon after the economic problems had been resolved. Since 2006, civilian Prime Minister
NguyenTanDungandhiscabinethavetakentheleadinmanagingtheeconomy,delivering
highlevelsofeconomicgrowth,improvedpublicservicesandpoliticalstability.Whilethere
havebeensomedivisions intherulingelite,particularly inresponsetotheglobalfinancial
crisisof2008,thesedidnotunderminetheeffectivenessofthegovernmentasawhole.In
2006, for example, Vietnam witnessed the emergence of a network of prodemocracy
dissidentsknownasBloc8406(fromthedateoftheirfounding)andotherpoliticalactivists
whochallengedonepartyrule.However,thisgrouphassofarnotposedaseriouschallenge
to the legitimacy,power anddurabilityof Vietnamsoneparty regime (Thayer2009aand
2010).
Onvitalelementintheincreasingthestrengthofcivilianrulehasbeentheenhanced
prominenceofthelegislatureandcabinetingovernance.Significantly,PrimeMinisterDung
has used legislation and executive decisions to regulate and control military affairs. For
example,
Vietnams
2009
Defence
White
Paper
noted
that
the
National
Assembly
haspassedanumberoflawsconcerningnationaldefence,suchastheLawonAmendmentsand
Supplements to several articles of the Law on the VPA Officers, the Law on National
Defence, the Law on Amendments and Supplements to several articles of the Law on
MilitaryService,theLawonNationalSecurity,theLawonthePeoplesPublicSecurity,and
theLawonNationalBorder.TheStandingCommitteeoftheNationalAssemblyhasissueda
series of national defence decrees:Decree on Maritime Police, Decree on the Militia and
SelfDefenceForce,DecreeonIntelligence,DecreeontheBorderGuard,DecreeonNational
Defence Mobilization and the Decree on Defence Industry (Socialist Republic of Vietam
2009:5152).
Vietnams
legislative
effort
has
updated
and
amended
outmoded
ordinances
and
filled in legalgapstokeepupwithVietnamstransitiontoamarketeconomy.In2009,for
example, the National Assembly passed the Law on Militia and SelfDefence Forces, inter
alia,torequireprivatizedstateownedenterprisestoraiseandtrainselfdefenceforces.The
importance of Vietnams growing package of defence legislation is that it provides a
regulatoryframeworkforstatecontroloverthearmedforcesandalegalbasisforthemany
domestic roles of the armed forces. But despite this increasing empowerment of civilian
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22
government,theexperienceofthelate1990shasalsoshownthatVCPleaderscontinueto
rely on the VPA whenever they feel that domestic stability could be undermined by
economiccrisisorexternalsecuritythreats.
The third factor highlightedbyscholarsas paying acrucial role indetermining the
levelofmilitaryparticipationinpoliticsisrelatedtointernationalinfluences.Sincethemid
1980s,however,
Vietnams
regime
has
largely
insulated
itself
from
external
influences
that
could undermine oneparty rule or alter existing civilmilitary relations. For instance,
Vietnam successfully weathered the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union by implementing economic reforms that made it
independentfromMoscowsfinancialsupport(ThayerandHervouet2004:363366).
Similarly,Vietnamsmembership inASEANandtheASEANRegionalForum (ARF) in
the mid1990s, have not impacted significantly on the internal dynamics of Vietnams
regime. Neither ASEAN nor the ARF require its members to meet certain benchmarks in
terms of their democratic quality or civilmilitary relations. Nonetheless, Vietnams
increasingintegrationintotheSoutheastAsianregionhasledVPAgeneralstointensifytheir
defence cooperation activities with external states. This has taken the form of reciprocal
highlevel visits, naval port calls, and defence education exchanges. The net result of this
process has been to socialize Vietnams military leaders into new values and norms
governing thedomestic and external roles of the armed forces. These external influences
have combined with domestic pressures (such as the divestiture of most militaryrun
commercialenterprises)torefocusthemilitarysroleinnationalpoliticstothepromotionof
greater military professionalism. However, none of this has reduced the militarys long
standingroleinstatebuildingwithsocietyatlarge.
Fourth and finally, scholars of civilmilitary relations tend to emphasize the
importanceof
internal
military
factors.
In
recent
years,
the
most
important
development
in
this field has been the push for increased military professionalism in the VPA. Since the
1980s, there is some evidence that a debate has taken place within the VPA over the
relativeinfluenceofpoliticalcommissarsonprofessionalmatters.Overtimeandaftersome
experimentation,theroleofpoliticalofficershasbeensupplantedbytheonecommander
system (FitzGerald1989).Today,thebalancehasshifted in favourofcareerprofessionals
whomustpreparetheVPAformodernwars.Inthisregard,Vietnamhasdrawnlessonsfrom
both Iraq wars as well as the modernization of Chinas Peoples Liberation Army. The
increased stress on professionalism notwithstanding, the system of political commissars
remainsinplace.6ThemilitaryscurrentblocrepresentationonthepartyCentralCommittee
is
likely
to
remain
stable,
reflecting
the
VPAs
corporate
interests.
In
the
same
vein,
the
planneddivestmentofthemajorityofmilitarybusinesseshassupportedthetrendtowards
themilitarysprofessionalizationtosomeextent,buttheVPAcontinues toholdontoten
majorgeneralcorporationsascashcowsandsourcesofemploymentformilitarypersonnel.
6PolitburoResolutionNo.51NQ/TU,VetieptuchoanthiencochelanhdaoduaDang,thuchienchedomot
nguoichihuyganvoithuchienchedochinhhuy,chinhtrivientrongQuandoinhandanVietNam,(QuanDoi
NhanDan,14January2011).
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CONCLUSION
Theroleofthemilitaryinacommunistpoliticalsystemrepresentsadistinctsubsetofcivil
military relations. Classical civilmilitary relations theory argues that the military should
eschewapoliticalroleinordertoenhanceitsprofessionalmilitarycompetence inexternal
defence.
But
in
Leninist
political
systems
the
military
almost
invariably
plays
a
domestic
political role inorder toensurethesurvivalofthesocialistregime.Vietnam, forexample,
amended its state constitution after the collapseof the Soviet Union to explicitly identify
defenceofthesocialistregimeasoneofthemilitaryscoremissions.Accordingly,theVPA
continuestobeheavily involved inVietnamspolitical institutions.Mostseniorofficersare
members of the VCP, and the military selects its own delegates to attend national party
congresses. The VPA is given bloc representation on the party Central Committee and
representation inthePolitburo.Similarly,activedutymilitaryofficersstandforelectionto
andserveasdeputiesintheNationalAssembly,andthemostseniormilitaryofficerserves
asMinisterofNationalDefenceandhasaseatinCabinet.
While the involvement of the VPA in politics and society has experienced
fluctuationsovertime,theoveralltrendofcivilmilitaryrelationsinVietnamsincetheearly
2000s has been marked by stasis. Regional and global advances towards democratization
and depoliticization of the military have not impacted on Vietnam in similar fashion as
elsewhere in the AsiaPacific. Vietnam reduced the role of military officers in the upper
echelonsof theVCP tosomeextent (thepostofVCPsecretarygeneralwas returned into
civilian hands in 2001 after being held by a retired general for four years), but VPA
representation instateandpartybodieshas remained relativelystable. In thesamevein,
the VCPs CentralCommitteehas ordered themilitary (and otherstatebodies aswell) to
relinquish
ownership
of
their
commercial
enterprises
by
2012,
but
the
VPAs
continuedcontroloverViettelandninemajorgeneralcorporationswillallowthemilitarytoretaina
soundeconomicpowerbase.Inaddition,theVPAiscertaintocontinuetoplayamajorrole
insocietyatlargethroughnationalconscription;themaintenanceoflargereserves,militia
andselfdefenceforces;defenceeducation,andsocioeconomicdevelopmentineconomic
defencezones.
DespitetheVPAscontinuedentrenchment inpolitical,socialandeconomicaffairs,
however, there have been signs of increasing professionalism within the military as a
defenceforce.Thishastakentheformofenhancedmilitaryeducationandtraining,bothat
home and abroad, in order to better manage the process of force modernization now
underway.At
the
same
time,
Vietnam
is
widening
its
military
engagement
with
the
region
and the world. The VPA has taken the first tentative steps towards creating a cadres of
specialists that can be committed to peacekeeping operations under the United Nations.
Thus, while Vietnams socialist regime and its armed forces have so far successfully
withstood domestic and international pressures for democratization and less politicised
civilmilitaryrelations,thegeneralsseemtohavedevelopedagreaterinterestintraditional
areasofdefenceaffairs.
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1 In order to address potential oversupply of conscripts, in July 2005 Vietnam reduced the length of
compulsoryservicefromtwoyearstoeighteenmonths,and loweredtheageofeligibilityformilitaryservice
fromthe1827yearrangeto1825years.Individualsaged26and27wereshuntedintothereserves.Theterm
ofservice forpersonsholdingtechnicalqualifications orserving in the navywasreduced from three to two
years.Fortheannualrecruitmentdrivein2011see:QuanDoiNhanDan,19February2011.