the 1964 us presidential election: a case of extreme values
TRANSCRIPT
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
The 1964 U.S. Presidential Election
A Case of Extreme Values
Nicholas Neuteufel
POLI 412H: United States National Elections
Prof. Jason Roberts
May 3, 2023
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The landslide of the 1964 United States presidential election may seem boring to some or
even just an interesting outlier within the scope of more competitive elections. However, the
massive electoral defeat of Barry Goldwater by President Lyndon Johnson offers very interesting
insights into the essential components of US electioneering and a demonstration of the
hypotheses of political scientists. A careful data-focused analysis reveals interesting lessons
about the effectiveness of presidential campaigns and the so-called fundamentals of electoral
politics (economic growth, presidential approval, etc.).
This essay will argue that the 1964 Republican presidential primaries were structurally
flawed and could have led to a better outcome—that is, a candidate with a higher probability of
winning the general election—despite the wariness of “strategic candidates.” In its second part,
this essay will argue that the only truly significant campaign event was the Republican Party
convention and that fundamentals were overwhelmingly in Johnson’s favor. This essay also
argues that Goldwater’s campaign may have been very effective—despite the tremendous loss—
as it overcame constraints in vote share such as party identification, presidential approval, and
inter-party ideological difference. This conclusion is robust to considering Alabama’s exclusion
of Johnson from the ballot and confronts the narrative of Goldwater being a weak candidate.
The Primaries
Fifteen states and the District of Columbia held voting primaries for majority party
nominees in 1964, though only the fifteen states held primaries for the Republican Party
(McGillivray and Scammon 910). The Democratic primary cycle was very uneventful. Keech
and Matthews go so far as to say that the primaries had literally “no effect on President
Johnson’s prospect for nomination” (100). This claim comes despite the fact that there was a
candidate challenging the incumbent president. Governor George Wallace of Alabama
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campaigned in the Democratic primary, “seeking to prove a point more than to challenge” the
President (100). Wallace campaigned in three states and received a sizable minority of votes
(34% in Wisconsin, 30% in Indiana, and 43% in Maryland), but did not seriously threaten
Johnson’s nomination at the Democratic convention in Atlantic City (101). The lack of strong
competition most probably derived from the existence what Sides and Vavreck call “strategic
candidates” (35). Strategic candidates are individuals who seek out “election years in which the
playing field is tilted toward” either their party or their individual candidacy (35).
Strategic candidates were most probably dissuaded from running in the 1964 Democratic
primaries for two reasons. First, Johnson was an incumbent president. Sides and Vavreck note
that “incumbent presidents are hard to beat” (35). They are very strong in contests in which they
run. Since 1900, only five incumbents lost the presidency, compared to fourteen incumbent
winners (35). Second, Johnson was not only an incumbent, but an incumbent that was enjoying
record levels of average presidential approval ratings (Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings”).
There was also tremendous economic growth during the 1964 primary season. Hibbs shows that
the growth of real personal disposable income during Johnson’s first term was more than four
percent (150). This is tremendous growth. The landslide of the 1972 presidential election when
Nixon won re-election with 49 states only saw a growth in real personal disposable income of
3.5% (ibid). Given Johnson’s great approval ratings and the great economic growth of the United
States at the time, it is hard to imagine that any viable candidate within the Democratic Party
would chose to try to seriously challenge Johnson rather than wait until an incumbent-free 1968.
This suspicion is confirmed by the post-Johnson primary battle during the 1968 Democratic
primary cycle.
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The Republican primary process, however, was much more of a contest. It began with no
“clear-cut choice” or front-runner for the nomination (Keech and Matthews 80). In fact, the New
York Times speculated in 1960 that Nixon’s service as vice president for eight years, his
popularity with the party’s “rank and file,” and his ideological moderation would make him the
favorite (80). However, an electoral defeat for Nixon in the California’s governor’s race seemed
to make Nelson Rockefeller the favorite in 1962 (81). Rockefeller was never able to transfer that
reputation into polling success, however. Barry Goldwater, a US Senator from Arizona won the
Republican nomination, despite never being a media-picked “favorite,” according to Keech and
Matthews (82). Goldwater managed to win 38.33% of the primary popular vote as well (despite
the fact that some of the fifteen states’ primaries were effectively “off-limits” to Goldwater
because of “favorite son” candidates).
Goldwater secured a strong minority of the votes and the nomination, despite a lack of
national popularity among Republicans. Table 1 and Figure 1 show the Gallup preferences for
GOP nominees among Republicans nationally throughout the primary season.
CANDIDATE JAN
FEB APR
MAY JUNE
JULY
NIXON 29%
31% 26%
28% 25% 22%
GOLDWATER
23%
20% 14%
14% 10% 22%
LODGE 19%
12% 42%
37% 26% 21%
ROCKEFELLER
12%
16% 6% 9% 9% 6%
G. ROMNEY 8% 5% 4% 3% 5% 0%SCRANTON 4% 7% 4% 4% 9% 20%
Table 1: Data from the Center for Range Voting, citing Gallup
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Jan Feb Apr May June July0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
Preference of Republicans polled by Gallup for Republican nominee for Pres-ident, 1964
Nixon Goldwater Lodge Rockefeller G. Romney Scranton
Month of Poll
Perc
enta
ge o
f Rep
ublic
ans p
olle
d
Figure 1: Data from the Center for Range Voting, citing Gallup
Nixon held a consistent twenty percent to 31% share of Republican preferences
nationally. Despite that national popularity, Nixon dropped out of the race before the convention.
Nixon was not too serious of a campaigner and was probably a strategic candidate who dropped
out thinking that campaigning against Johnson was futile. This assertion is supported by his
efforts and success during the 1968 election cycle. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. peaked in April with
42% and led for most of the race, despite the fact that he spent the entirety of the primary season
in Saigon acting as America’s ambassador to South Vietnam (Keech and Matthews 81). The
group of citizens organizing a write-in campaign for Lodge was not able to translate his
popularity with Republicans in general into a significant number of primary victories or
delegates to the Republican convention in San Francisco (81).
Given that Goldwater won the nomination, there is a noticeable gap between the polling
data and the results from the primaries. There are a few factors that likely played a role. The first
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is the limited number of primaries—there were only fifteen voting primaries for the Republican
nomination, rather than one for each state and territory. The specific demographics and “favorite
son” trend of certain states made it hard for candidates actively campaigning to translate any
national popularity into specific primary victories in multiple contests. The second problem with
the primary process was the fact that there was little active campaigning by candidates other than
Goldwater. As stated previously, Lodge was acting as Ambassador to South Vietnam; all votes
for Lodge were write-in votes (McGillivray and Scammon 910-914). Nixon dropped out early in
the contest and Rockefeller was plagued by personal issues such as a divorce and infidelity
accusations (Keech and Matthews 82).
However, there was more to the primaries than weaker-than-desire candidate
competition. The nature of the primary’s plurality forced-vote system allowed a relatively
unpopular candidate, even among the general Republican base, to win the contest (“The 1964
Republican Primary”). The Center for Range Voting demonstrates that William Scranton would
have been the Condorcet winner of the primary campaigns and “probably would have won [a]
range vote” as well (ibid). Gallup polling data pitting other Republican candidates for the
nomination versus President Johnson are very interesting and helpful in evaluating the impact of
the primary system used in the 1964 cycle. Table 2 details the results of Gallup polling asking
voters’ preferences among the three choices of Johnson, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and undecided.
CANDIDATE
10-JAN 28-FEB 18-MAR
19-APR
JOHNSON 66 68 68 65HC LODGE 23 27 27 30UNDECIDE
D11 5 5 5
Table 2
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Table 3 details the results of Gallup polling comparing voters’ preferences among the three
choices of Johnson, Richard Nixon, and undecided.
CANDIDATE
28-FEB 18-MAR
1-JUL
JOHNSON 69 68 70NIXON 27 27 27
UNDECIDED
4 5 3
Table 3
Table 4 shows the preferences of persons polled by Gallup between the actual nominees:
Johnson and Goldwater. This set includes polls both before and after the conventions, unlike
Tables 2 and 3, which have only polls before the conventions.
CANDIDATE 1-JAN 1-JUL 13-JUL 9-AUG 16-SEP 18-OCT 2-NOVJOHNSON 75 77 77 59 65 64 64
GOLDWATER
20 18 20 31 29 29 29
UNDECIDED 5 5 3 10 6 7 7Table 4
The Gallup data illustrate that before the Republican nominating convention (which took
place from July 13th to the 16th), both Scranton and Nixon fared better against Johnson than
Goldwater did in polls of all voters. In a Gallup poll on January 22nd, Republicans polled only
preferred Goldwater to President Johnson by 6 percentage points—47% for Goldwater to 41%
Johnson (“The 1964 Republican Primary”). These data show that Goldwater was divisive among
Republicans when they were asked before the convention.
The problem, however, is that the plurality voting system and limited number of states
holding a primary allowed Goldwater to win delegates more easily, as voters either split their
votes among non-Goldwater candidates and “unpledged”/“uncommitted” or started a large write-
in campaign. Perhaps a different voting system would have nominated a candidate more up to the
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task of the defeating President Johnson, even if one accounts for the impact of strategic
candidates not running. (The Center for Range Voting indicates that the actively campaigning
Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton would probably have been the nominee in an alternate
voting world.) The strategic failure of the Republican primary was illustrated in a Gallup poll
asking Democratic county chairs in several states which Republican candidate had the “best
shot” (or the highest probability) of defeating Johnson in the general election. The results of the
poll are shown in Table 5.
CANDIDATE VOTES
PERCENT
SCRANTON
302 21.53%
GOLDWATER
297 21.17%
NIXON 246 17.53%ROCKEFE
LLER246 17.53%
LODGE 243 17.32%OTHER 69 4.92%
Table 5: Data from the Center for Range Voting, citing Gallup
Almost 70% of Democratic county chairpersons stated that a candidate other than
Goldwater had the “best shot” of defeating Johnson. Thus the Republican primary system led to
the nomination of a candidate that almost 70% of Democratic leaders said did not have the “best
shot” to defeat President Johnson.
The Center for Range Voting argues that any of the other candidates would have had a
better chance of beating Johnson, as they were more popular among Republicans and because
they were considered “more moderate” than Goldwater (“The 1964 Republican Primary”). One
cannot, however, truly know that a different voting system would have resulted in a candidate
with a better chance of defeating President Johnson, as a different voting system may have
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changed the calculus of candidates, changing their decisions to enter the primary campaign or
not and whether to campaign in a different matter or not.
The General Election Campaigns
Even with the possibility of a “better” Republican candidate, the data bear out that the
1964 election was Johnson’s to lose first and foremost. The fundamentals of economic growth,
partisanship, and presidential approval were very much on Johnson’s side. In addition, the
Republican nominating convention was the only “game-changer” in terms of popular vote share.
Popular vote intention, as show through Gallup trial-heat polling, was very stable
throughout the general election season. This rule has two exceptions: the time period surrounding
the major party nominating conventions and just before Election Day. (There were no debates
between Goldwater and Johnson, so the impact—or lack thereof—of presidential debates cannot
be tested with 1964 data.)
There is a notable increase in those declaring a preference or intention to vote for
Goldwater from the month of June to the remaining months. This is most probably a result of the
Republican nominating convention, which took place from July 13 to July 16. Campbell, Cherry,
and Wink show that Goldwater had a bump of +12.9 percentage points in pre-and-post-
convention trial heat polls, while Johnson had a net change of 0 (295). Given the lack of a bump
for Johnson, Goldwater’s bump most probably came from Republicans previously disenchanted
with the idea of supporting Goldwater. The bump certainly did not come solely from
Goldwater’s selection of William Miller as his running-mate; Miller and Goldwater were very
similar in ideological terms (Keech and Matthews 87). These voters most probably declared
themselves as “undecided” or uncertain and then became more confident in selecting Goldwater
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as a result of positive media coverage of the Republican convention. The hypothesis is also
supported by the magnitude of the bump—12.9 percentage points is above the mean for both out-
party and Republican conventions (8.7 and 7.0 points, respectively; Campbell, Cherry, and Wink
295), which makes sense given the fractured nature of the primary popular vote and Gallup
polling.
Table 6 and Figure 2 show the results of Gallup trial-heat polling asking the voters’
preferences for President.
Month of Poll Lyndon B. Johnson (D) % Barry Goldwater (R) %
June77% 18%76% 20%
July62% 26%59% 31%
August 65% 29%
September65% 29%62% 32%
October64% 29%64% 36%
Table 6: Gallup trial-heat polling data throughout the general election season
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 90%
10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
Gallup Trial Heat Presidential Polling (June - October 1964)
Lyndon B. Johnson (D) % Moving average (Lyndon B. Johnson (D) %)Barry Goldwater (R) % Moving average (Barry Goldwater (R) %)
Chronological Number of Poll(1 & 2, June; 3 & 4, July; 5, August; 6 & 7, September; 8 & 9, October)
Perc
enta
ge o
f Res
pond
ents
Figure 2: Data taken from Gallup (“Gallup Presidential Election Trial-Heat”)
The trial-heat polling pitting Goldwater against Johnson mirror the approval and
disapproval ratings of Johnson as president for the most part. This is because in general
presidential approval is a significant signal and a good proxy for vote intentions throughout a
campaign (Erickson and Wlezien). In fact, when including presidential approval in a model for
popular vote share, the independent impact of the economy as a fundamental disappears (ibid).
1964 is a good example to demonstrate presidential approval’s impact on US presidential
elections. Figure 3 shows the approval versus disapproval of President Johnson from his
ascension to office after the Kennedy assassination to November 25th (after the election), using
Gallup data. Note that “against” includes both actual against votes and all “other.” Since no
approval data exist from June 25th to November 25th, the data are interpolated.
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12/5
/196
312
/15/
1963
12/2
5/19
631/
4/19
641/
14/1
964
1/24
/196
42/
3/19
642/
13/1
964
2/23
/196
43/
4/19
643/
14/1
964
3/24
/196
44/
3/19
644/
13/1
964
4/23
/196
45/
3/19
645/
13/1
964
5/23
/196
46/
2/19
646/
12/1
964
6/22
/196
47/
2/19
647/
12/1
964
7/22
/196
48/
1/19
648/
11/1
964
8/21
/196
48/
31/1
964
9/10
/196
49/
20/1
964
9/30
/196
410
/10/
1964
10/2
0/19
6410
/30/
1964
11/9
/196
411
/19/
1964
0
20
40
60
80
Johnson Approval versus Disapproval, December 1963-November 1964
Approve Disapprove
Date of Poll (Interpolated from 6/25 to 11/25, as no data exist)
Perc
enta
ge
Figure 3: From Gallup (“Gallup Presidential Approval”) and Roper Center (“Presidential Approval for President Johnson”)
Johnson’s approval was very high during his first term. In fact, it set a precedent for
highest average approval rating of a presidential term (Gallup, “Gallup Presidential Approval
Ratings”). Figure 4 shows the average Gallup approval rating for select US Presidents during
their first terms of office. Johnson had the highest average of all of the presidents since Gallup
began collecting presidential approval data—his first-term approval rating average was 74.2%
(ibid). This 74.2% is very high in comparison to the average first-term approval rating of the
presidents considered (excluding Johnson): 56.68%. In fact, Johnson’s first-term approval rating
is 1.686 standard deviations above the mean first-term presidential approval rating. This
achievement is more impressive when one considers that Johnson’s peak approval was only fifth
among the eleven presidents. His peak approval rating came at 79% in February 1964 (ibid),
helping to ward off serious primary challengers, but not helping to seriously distort the average
approval rating of his first term.
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Har
ry T
rum
an
Dw
ight
Eis
enho
wer
John
Ken
nedy
Lynd
on J
ohns
on
Ric
hard
Nix
on
Ger
ald
Ford
Jim
my
Car
ter
Ron
ald
Rea
gan
Geo
rge
H.W
. Bus
h
Bill
Clin
ton
Geo
rge
W. B
ush0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Average first-term Gallup Presidential approval rating
Presidents of the United States
App
rova
l Rat
ing
(%)
Figure 4: Data from Gallup (“Presidential Approval Ratings”)
Johnson’s record high approval ratings throughout the polling window (from his
ascension to office until the election) and the relatively stable trial-heat polling data demonstrate
a lack of true “game-changing” events outside of the Republican convention. A true game-
changer would probably have shifted voters’ approval or disapproval of the sitting president in
some way. One problem with this analysis, however, is a lack of presidential approval data—the
time period from June to November is interpolated. One significant historical event during this
time period was Congressional passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution authorizing the use of
conventional military force by President Johnson in Southeast Asia (“Iraq versus Vietnam”).
Gallup did not begin polling on the Vietnam military incursion until May of 1965. There is little
reason to believe that this was controversial or meaningful for the election since the American
public has a general ignorance of foreign policy matters and bipartisan support for the Resolution
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(it passed the Senate 88-2). This hypothesis is supported by a lack of meaningful change in
Gallup trial-heat polling data during or just after August (see Figure 2).
Breaking down the Returns
The 1964 election became notorious as a landslide, a result which surprised none at the
time (Keech and Matthews 84). Despite the landslide status of the election, however, there is
evidence that the Goldwater campaign performed very well and exceeded the expectations of
vote share models. This is most probably because Goldwater’s popular vote share exceeded the
constraints of party identification, inter-party ideological difference, and presidential approval,
even when one considers Alabama’s exclusion of Johnson from the ballot.
Erickson and Wlezien identify partisanship as a fundamental for the general election, as it
sets the terms for how party-affiliated voters determine for whom they will vote. 1964 offers a
mixed bag of examples and support for this idea. Democratic Party identification in 1964 was the
highest it has ever been in recorded US history. 51% of registered voters identified as Democrats
in 1964 (“Independents Take”). That majority represented a net partisanship rate of 26
percentage points over Republicans, who appealed to 25% of the registered voting population
(ibid). 1964 marked the apex of net partisanship, at least since 1939 (ibid). This stark divide does
help to partially explain the magnitude of the landslide that occurred in 1964.
While a record partisan divide almost certainly helped drive the margin between Johnson
and Goldwater, national exit polling done by Gallup shows that there was significant cross-party
voting during the election. Twenty percent of Republicans polled voted for the Democratic
nominee, Johnson (“Election Polls”). This divide probably occurred because of division within
the Republican Party (discussed previously). However, cross-party voting went both ways, at
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least in responses to exit polling. Thirteen percent of registered Democrats polled voted for
Goldwater (ibid). Independents split 56-44 for Johnson (ibid). Thus national exit polling suggests
that partisanship was not as much a constraining factor in vote choice in the 1964 election as
other elections, when cross-party voting was lower (ibid).
One possible explanation for the increase in cross-party voting is an increase in
ideological difference. Paddock analyzes the platforms of eleven states’ Republican and
Democratic parties, looking at seven different areas: capitalism, redistribution, internal
sovereignty, labor, universalism, foreign/defense, and overall ideology (756-757). Figure X
details the inter-party differences in ideology scores from 1956, 1960, and 1964. Larger values in
either the positive or negative direction indicate a larger difference; positive values indicate
when the Democrats were more liberal on an issue than Republicans that year and negative
values indicate when Republicans were deemed more liberal than Democrats that year.
Cap
italis
m
Red
istri
butio
n
Inte
rnal
Sov
erei
gnty
Labo
r
Uni
vers
alis
m
Fore
ign/
Def
ense
Ove
rall
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Inter-party differences in mean ideology scores for eleven states
1956 1960 1964
IssueDiff
eren
ce (D
em L
iber
alis
m -
GO
P Li
bera
lism
)
Figure 5: Data from Paddock (756)
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In each of the seven areas, the inter-party difference grew from 1960 to 1964. This
increase in difference most probably comes from the platforms of selected state Republican
parties becoming more conservative. This hypothesis makes sense given an increase in
Democratic Party affiliation (to a historic high), the activism and direction of Goldwater
Republicans, and the relatively common agenda of Kennedy and Johnson. This increase in inter-
party ideological difference makes the results more impressive for the Goldwater campaign, as it
probably distanced the Republican Party from the median voter—in a year where 51% of voters
identified as Democrats.
A third constraint on a candidate’s voter share is the approval of the sitting president
(whether or not the election is a re-election). This is because presidential approval serves as a
good proxy for Americans’ view of the economy, partisanship, and more (Erikson and Wlezien).
Presidential approval also models actual vote intentions extremely well—even better than actual
vote intention polls at times (Erikson and Wlezien). Thus presidential approval can be seen as an
expectation of vote share for candidates (or at least, as a constraint on possible vote share). For
the challenger, presidential disapproval serves as the expectation, which makes sense given a
“referendum” view of re-elections (or in the case of Johnson, incumbent first election).
The fact remains that Goldwater was trounced in popular vote. He won only 38.233% of
the popular vote, excluding Alabama, to Johnson’s 61.677% (Leip; Peters, “1964 Presidential
Election Results”). However, Goldwater outperformed expectations given by presidential
approval. Considering Johnson’s highest disapproval of 1964 (30% of those polled on
11/25/1964, after the election; Gallup), Goldwater won an additional 8.2% of the popular vote
(Gallup; “Presidential Approval for President Johnson”). If one uses interpolation to find the
expected approval on Election Day, Goldwater beats presidential disapproval by nine percentage
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points. If one uses the last day of full presidential approval data available before Election Day,
Goldwater beat expectations by thirteen percentage points. These performances above
expectations came despite both an all-time high in Democratic Party identification and a greater
distance of Republican ideology from the median voter.
Another piece of evidence showing the possibility of an effective Goldwater campaign is
James Stimson’s measure of the “national policy mood,” which attempts to show how liberal or
conservative the general public of the United States is. Stimson’s data are especially useful
beginning at the end of 1958, when data are given on a quarter-year basis. Figure 6 shows the
national policy mood of the United States from 1952 (the beginning of data collection) to the
fourth quarter of 1964.
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1958
d19
59a
1959
b19
59c
1959
d19
60a
1960
b19
60c
1960
d19
61a
1961
b19
61c
1961
d19
62a
1962
b19
62c
1962
d19
63a
1963
b19
63c
1963
d19
64a
1964
b19
64c
1964
d40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
47.703
54.021
52.015
56.397
58.646
60.31664.726
63.663
63.829
64.039
65.85765.668
65.23167.167
71.00171.89670.6
65.848
66.179
65.629
66.13364.663
57.07256.123
58.83661.075
56.444
58.47 58.903
55.769
53.294
60.712
National Policy Mood of the United States (1952 - 1964)
Year (1952-1958) or Quarter-Year (4Q 1958 to 4Q 1964)(Dotted line is the two-period moving average)
Libe
ralis
m (h
ighe
r = m
ore
liber
al)
Figure 6: Data from Stimson (n.p.)
The window in question is from 1963d to 1963c, the period from Johnson’s succession of
Kennedy to the day of the 1964 election. The US national policy mood experiences a noticeable
decrease beginning in the first quarter of 1964 (1964a) to the third-quarter of 1964 (1964c). Such
Neuteufel 17
a conservative shift did not occur at all during the 1960 presidential election. During the 1960
general election season, there was a remarkable increase in liberalism according to Stimson’s
data. A very different shift occurred during the 1964 election cycle. The 1964 decrease in
national policy mood score meant a more conservative population, or at least, a population more
receptive to conservative arguments. This probably resulted from conservative activism and
political mobilization for Republicans, as presidential approval remained stable throughout the
period (Gallup, “Presidential Approval Ratings”). This is supported by the previous analysis of
Goldwater’s vote share exceeding expectations set by presidential approval despite the height of
Democratic affiliation in 1964 and greater ideological distance from the median voter.
One last piece of evidence for a more generous evaluation of Goldwater’s campaign
comes from Douglas Hibbs’ “Bread and Peace” model of presidential election vote share. His
model uses the weighted-average growth of real disposable personal income per capita during
the sitting presidential term and casualties from US involvement in foreign wars to predict the
vote share of the incumbent party’s candidate (149). Since 1964 did not see a significant number
of casualties in the Vietnam conflict before Election Day, the economic indicator is the one used
to predict the vote share for Johnson. Figure 7 is Hibbs’ (150) diagram showing the vote share of
the incumbent party as a percentage on the y-axis and the economic growth indicator on the x-
axis. The line shows the expected vote share.
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Figure 7: From Hibbs (150)
Hibbs’ model actually predicts a one-to-two percent greater vote share for Johnson.1 However,
the decrease in the national policy mood and Goldwater’s performance above presidential
disapproval demonstrate that the election result was not Johnson underperforming, but perhaps a
better-than-expected Goldwater campaign. Goldwater’s 1964 vote share thus beats Erikson’s and
Wlezien’s measure focusing on presidential approval and Hibbs’ model focusing on economic
growth in spite of two constraints and even when one considers the fact that Alabama excluded
Johnson from the ballot.
Conclusion
1 Though he does not account for the impact of Alabama’s exclusion of Johnson, as this paper did earlier. However, Alabama’s impact on national vote share is negligible.
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The 1964 election has a great deal of implications for both US electoral politics and the
conservative movement that arose from the ashes of Goldwater’s defeat. George F. Will wrote in
1998 that Goldwater knew that he meant more than the loss of 44 states in one election,
including a change of his party to a more conservative one. Will went on to say that Goldwater
did not need to fear, as “[p]erhaps he sensed that he had won the future” and that 1964 was only
a premonition and a beginning, that the “27,178,188 of us… who voted for him in 1964 believe
he won, it just took 16 years to count the votes.”
Will conveniently forgets the context in which Goldwater won the nomination. The 1964
Republican primary process was not nearly as competitive as other Republican primary years. It
only included fifteen voting states in which Goldwater competed against a man living in South
Vietnam propelled by a write-in campaign (Lodge), a strategic candidate who dropped out of the
race early (Nixon), and other moderates among whom many Republicans split their votes. The
plurality system of voting helped Goldwater by fracturing votes. A change of voting systems
from a plurality system to a range or Condorcet vote could have helped Republicans pick a more
moderate candidate, even in spite of the reluctance of strategic candidates. This means that
Goldwater may not have shifted the Republican Party solely through his primary campaign, as
some would argue.
Will’s argument does, however, make more sense in the general election context of 1964.
The only significant event (or “game-changer”) in terms of popular vote share in polling data
seems to have been the Republican convention, which led to a 12.9 percentage point bump for
Goldwater. The convention and Goldwater’s campaign seemed to help Republican unity, despite
animosity between Rockefeller and Goldwater. At the very least, the convention probably
persuaded more Republicans to oppose Johnson and vote for Goldwater. No other event had a
Neuteufel 20
truly significant on the available data from Gallup, including the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution which led to later escalation in Vietnam. The lack of “game-changer” events
underlined the importance of the fundamentals, including record high average presidential
approval for a first term and tremendous economic growth.
This essay, however, confronts the notion that Goldwater was a weak candidate. Perhaps
there is something to Will’s argument in that respect. Goldwater lost in a tremendous land-slide,
of course, but he did outperform the expectations of two notable vote share models. He
outperformed presidential disapproval (a standard put forth by Erikson and Wlezien) by at least
eight percentage points and Hibbs’ model of “bread and peace” by at least one percentage point.
He beat these models despite a greater ideological difference from the median voter (compared
to 1960) and an all-time high in Democratic Party identification. Additional support for this
hypothesis comes from quarterly national policy mood data showing that the general public of
the US became more conservative in mood over the course of the 1964 campaign cycle, in
contrast to the becoming-more-liberal trend of the 1960 general election season. These claims are
robust to account for Alabama’s exclusion of President Johnson from the ballot.
1964 thus acts as an example of the importance of fundamentals in structuring
presidential elections and constraining the possible vote share of the candidates. Nevertheless,
there is a good deal of evidence that Goldwater’s campaign was more effective than is generally
believed, even when one accounts for the exclusion of Johnson from the ballot in Alabama.
Despite this campaign effectiveness in terms of popular vote share over expectations, Goldwater
was not able to translate that campaign effectiveness into Electoral College success. There was
little for Goldwater to do meaningfully while Johnson was enjoying incredible success in
presidential approval and economic growth.
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There is some solace, then, for conservatives in the fact that Reagan served to take up the
mantle of Goldwater during a time in which the fundamentals were much more favorable for
Goldwater’s and Reagan’s party and were much less a constraint on the campaign asserting
Goldwater’s ideas. Further research should be done to see how Goldwater outperformed these
models or if there is some ceiling on the effectiveness of these models in cases of extreme values
(in terms of economic and political fundamentals). Given Goldwater’s possible impact on
national policy mood and his outperforming multiple models, however, there may be some credit
due to Goldwater and Republicans from 1964 that has not been given yet.
Neuteufel 22
Works Cited
Campbell, J. E., L. L. Cherry, and K. A. Wink. "The Convention Bump." American Politics
Research 20.3 (1992): 287-307. SAGE Publications. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
"Election Polls -- Presidential Vote by Groups (1964)." Gallup Dot Com. Gallup, Inc., 2014.
Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
Erickson, Robert S., and Christopher Wlezien. The Timeline of Presidential Elections: How
Campaigns Do (and Do Not) Matter. Kindle ed. N.p.: Amazon, 2012. Print.
"Gallup Presidential Election Trial-Heat Trends, 1936-2008." Gallup Presidential Election
Trial-Heat Trends, 1936-2004. Gallup, Inc., n.d. Web. 07 Apr. 2014.
Hibbs, Douglas A., Jr. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections." Public
Choice 104 (2000): 149-80. Douglas Hibbs' Personal Website. Web. 29 Mar. 2014.
"Independents Take Center Stage in Obama Era." Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press RSS. N.p., 21 May 2009. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
"Iraq Versus Vietnam: A Comparison of Public Opinion." GALLUP. Gallup, Inc., 24 Aug. 2005.
Web. 05 Apr. 2014.
Keech, William R., and Donald R. Matthews. The Party's Choice. Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1976. Print.
Leip, David. "1964 Presidential Election." US Election Atlas. N.p., 2012. Web. 30 Mar. 2014.
McGillivray, Alice V., and Richard M. Scammon. America at the Polls, 1960-1992 Kennedy to
Clinton: A Handbook of American Presidential Election Statistics. Vol. 1. Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994. Print.
Paddock, Joel. "Inter-Party Ideological Differences in Eleven State Parties: 1956-1980." The
Western Political Quarterly 45.3 (1992): 751-60. JSTOR. Web. 29 Mar. 2014.
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Peters, Gerhard. "1964 Presidential Election." 1964 Presidential Election. The American
Presidency Project, n.d. Web. 28 Mar. 2014.
Peters, Gerhard. "1964 Presidential Election Results." 1964 Presidential Election. N.p., n.d.
Web. 04 Apr. 2014.
"Presidential Approval for President Johnson." Presidential Approval for President Johnson. The
Roper Center, n.d. Web. 08 Apr. 2014.
"Presidential Approval Ratings -- Gallup Historical Statistics and Trends." Presidential Approval
Ratings. Gallup, Inc., n.d. Web. 29 Mar. 2014.
"Reading Book "The Gallup Polls, Public Opinion 1935-1971"" Gallup Data. The Center for
Range Voting, n.d. Web. 1 Apr. 2014.
"The Republican 1964 Primary." Keech & Matthews on Republican 1964 Primary. The Center
for Range Voting, n.d. Web. 05 Apr. 2014.
Sides, John, and Lynn Vavreck. The Gamble: Choice and Chance in the 2012 Presidential
Election. Kindle ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013. Kindle Edition.
Stimson, James. "Policy Mood." Policy Mood. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
2011. Web. 05 Apr. 2014.
Will, George F. "The Cheerful Malcontent." The Washington Post. N.p., 31 May 1998. Web. 8
Apr. 2014.
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Appendix: Union Membership
0102030405060708090
Union Membership versus Johnson Vote Share (1964)
Union Membership Percentage Johnson Vote Share Percentage
US State or D.C. (in alphabetical order, omitted for clarity)(First orange dot is Alabama, where Johnson was not on the ballot)
Perc
enta
ge
r = 0.341176 (with Alabama); r = 0.381499 (without)
r2s = 0.116401 and 0.145541
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%
Union Membership versus Turn-out of Voting Age Population (VAP)
Union Membership Rate Turn-out of VAP
US State and D.C. (alphabetically, excluded for clarity)
Perc
enta
ge
r = 0.502540057 with Alabama; r2 = 0.252546509
r = 0.50724746 without; r2 = 0.257299986