the 1987 constitution

Political Law Review Case Digest SBCA AY 2013-2014, Commissioner Sarmiento

THE MONMON COMMISSION Catalla. Precion. Sta. Maria. Trios

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THE 1987 CONSTITUTION CHREA VS.CHR G.R. NO. 155336, November 25, 2004; July 21, 2006 FACTS: Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the Commission. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR collapsed the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request. In light of the DBMs disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBMs disapproval of the plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. The CSC-Central Office denied CHREAs request in a Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same. CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHRs fiscal autonomy. ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management? HELD: The petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA and its are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are disallowed. 1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System. The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans qualification. This power to administer is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state. 2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized and irregular

In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the national government. In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM. (It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBMs function is merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that PPCs compensation system conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758. ) 3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit: SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications. Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification. Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a superfluity 4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy. Palpably, the CAs Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy. Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other bodies including the CHR. Thus: SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit. SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. SEC. 29. Other Bodies. There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of



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the Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency. From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to time. In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal autonomy. Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership. We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus- Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. 5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation standardization laws. NOTES: 1. Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus standi considering that there exists no official written record in the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide organization of its employees nor is there anything in the records to show that its president has the authority to sue the CHR. On petitioners personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHRs upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commissions savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank

and file, are derived. Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREAs request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREAs personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and due process. 2. In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law of providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions, the DBM, in the case under review, made a determination, after a thorough evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization. The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme, explicitly provides that no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President. Here, the DBM discerned that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHRs proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change the context from support to substantive without actual change in functions. This view of the DBM, as the laws designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. CA, we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies. JELBERT B. GALICTO VS. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III 667 SCRA 150 Facts: On July 26, 2010, Pres. Aquino made public in his first State of the Nation Address the alleged excessive allowances, bonuses and other benefits of Officers and Members of the Board of Directors of the Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC) which has been unable to meet its standing obligations. Subsequently, the Senate of the Philippines (Senate), through the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, conducted an inquiry in aid of legislation on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits of GOCCs and government financial institutions (GFIs). Based on its findings that officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices, the Senate issued Senate Resolution No. 17 urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs]. Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the [GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes. EO 7 provided for the



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guiding principles and framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs and GFIs. A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI employees and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010. EO 7 was published on September 10, 2010. It took effect on September 25, 2010 and precluded the Board of Directors, Trustees and/or Officers of GOCCs from granting and releasing bonuses and allowances to members of the board of directors, and from increasing salary rates of and granting new or additional benefits and allowances to their employees. The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On December 13, 2010, the respondents filed their Comment. They pointed out the following procedural defects as grounds for the petitions dismissal: (1) the petitioner lacks locus standi; (2) the petitioner failed to attach a board resolution or secretarys certificate authorizing him to question EO 7 in behalf of PhilHealth; (3) the petitioners signature does not indicate his PTR Number, Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance Number and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Number; (4) the jurat of the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping failed to indicate a valid identification card as provided under A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; (5) the President should be dropped as a party respondent as he is immune from suit; and (6) certiorari is not applicable to this case. Issue: Whether the Petitioner lacks locus standi> Held: Petitioner lacks locus standi. Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. This requirement of standing relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, as a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question when (1) he can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Jurisprudence defines interest as material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancyor a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he stands to be prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation. The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who

has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued and implemented. The respondents meanwhile argue that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since future increases in salaries and other benefits are merely contingent events or expectancies. The petitioner, too, is not asserting a public right for which he is entitled to seek judicial protection. Section 9 of EO 7 reads: Section 9. Moratorium on Increases in Salaries, Allowances, Incentives and Other Benefits. Moratorium on increases in the rates of salaries, and the grant of new increases in the rates of allowances, incentives and other benefits, except salary adjustments pursuant to Executive Order No. 8011 dated June 17, 2009 and Executive Order No. 900 dated June 23, 2010, are hereby imposed until specifically authorized by the President. In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7. It has been held that as to the element of injury, such aspect is not something that just anybody with some grievance or pain may assert. It has to be direct and substantial to make it worth the courts time, as well as the effort of inquiry into the constitutionality of the acts of another department of government. If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial, then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify such an excursion into constitutional adjudication. The rationale for this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means trifle. Not only does it assure the vigorous adversary presentation of the case; more importantly, it must suffice to warrant the Judiciarys overruling the determination of a coordinate, democratically elected organ of government, such as the President, and the clear approval by Congress, in this case. Indeed, the rationale goes to the very essence of representative democracies. Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v. Hon. Zamora, as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole citizenry. Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in that case. The Court made a similar ruling in Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo and held that the petitioners therein, who are national officers of the IBP, have no legal standing, having failed to allege any direct or potential injury which the IBP, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a consequence of the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5. We note that while the petition raises vital constitutional and statutory questions concerning the power of the President to fix the compensation packages of GOCCs and GFIs with possible implications on their officials and employees, the same cannot infuse or give the petitioner locus standi under the transcendental importance or paramount public interest doctrine. In Velarde v. Social Justice Society, we held that even if the Court could have exempted the case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue could not be resolved any way, due to procedural infirmities and shortcomings, as in the present case. In other words, giving due course to the present petition which is saddled with formal and procedural infirmities explained above in this Resolution, cannot but be an exercise in futility that does not merit



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the Courts liberality. As we emphasized in Lozano v. Nograles, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the stringent requirements of personal injury to the broader transcendental importance doctrine, such liberality is not to be abused. Finally, since the petitioner has failed to demonstrate a material and personal interest in the issue in dispute, he cannot also be considered to have filed the present case as a representative of PhilHealth. In this regard, we cannot ignore or excuse the blatant failure of the petitioner to provide a Board Resolution or a Secretarys Certificate from PhilHealth to act as its representative. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS 267 SCRA 408; G.R. NO. 122156; 3 FEB 1997 Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void. Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel

Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose. The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question. The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock. The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too. KILOSBAYAN, INC., ET. AL. VS. GUINGONA, ET. AL. G. R. NO. 113375, MAY 5, 1994 Facts: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which seeks to prohibit and restrain the implementation of the Contract of Lease executed by the PCSO and the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation in connection with the on-line lottery system, also know as lotto. Petitioners strongly opposed the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. It submitted that said contract of lease violated Section 1 of R. A. No. 1169, as amended by B. P. Blg. 42. Respondents contended, among others, that, the contract does not violate the Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the issues of wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the ambit of judicial reviews; and that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit. Issues: 1. Whether or not petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition. 2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid. Held: As to the preliminary issue, the Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities. As to the substantive issue, the Court agrees with the petitioners whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument. Therefore the instant petition is granted and the challenged Contract of Lease is



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hereby declared contrary to law and invalid. A.M. NO. 11-7-10-SC JULY 31, 2012 RE: COA OPINION ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE APPRAISED VALUE OF THE PROPERTIES PURCHASED BY THE RETIRED CHIEF/ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT. R E S O L U T I O N PER CURIAM: The present administrative matter stems from the two Memoranda, dated July 14, 2011 and August 10, 2010, submitted by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, to the Office of

the Chief Justice. These Memoranda essentially ask the Court to determine the proper formula to be used in computing the appraisal value that a retired Chief Justice and several Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have to pay to acquire the government properties they used during their tenure. THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS This issue has its roots in the June 8, 2010 Opinion1 issued by the Legal Services Sector, Office of the General Counsel of the Commission on Audit (COA), which found that an underpayment amounting to P221,021.50 resulted when five (5) retired Supreme Court justices purchased from the Supreme Court the personal properties assigned to them during their incumbency in the Court, to wit:

1wphi1

Name of Justice Items Purchased Valuation under CFAG (in pesos)

Valuation under COA Memorandum No. 98-569A (in pesos)

Difference (in pesos)

Artemio Panganiban (Chief Justice)

Toyota Camry, 2003 model

341,241.10 365,000.00 23,758.90

Toyota Grandia, 2002 model

136,500.00 151,000.00 14,500.00


115,800.00 156,000.00 40,200.00

Ruben T. Reyes (Associate Justice)


579,532.50 580,600.00 1,067.50


117,300.00 181,200.00 63,900.00

Angelina S. Gutierrez (Associate Justice)


115,800.00 150,600.00 34,800.00

Adolfo S. Azcuna (Associate Justice)


536,105.00 543,300.00 9,195.00


117,300.00 145,000.00 27,700.00

Sony TV Set 2,399.90 2,500.00 100.10 Ma. Alicia 5,800.002

The COA attributed this underpayment to the use by the Property Division of the Supreme Court of the wrong formula in computing the appraisal value of the purchased vehicles. According to the COA, the Property Division erroneously appraised the subject motor vehicles by applying Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997 and its guidelines, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01,3 when it should have applied the formula found in COA Memorandum No. 98-569-A4 dated August 5, 1998. Recommendations of the Office of Administrative Services In her Memorandum dated August 10, 2010, Atty. Candelaria recommended that the Court advise the COA to

respect the in-house computation based on the CFAG formula, noting that this was the first time that the COA questioned the authority of the Court in using CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 and its guidelines in the appraisal and disposal of government property since these were issued in 1997. As a matter of fact, in two previous instances involving two (2) retired Court of Appeals Associate Justices,5 the COA upheld the in-house appraisal of government property using the formula found in the CFAG guidelines. More importantly, the Constitution itself grants the Judiciary fiscal autonomy in the handling of its budget and resources. Full autonomy, among others,6 contemplates the guarantee of full flexibility in the allocation and utilization of the Judiciarys resources, based on its own determination of what it needs. The Court thus has the recognized authority to allocate



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and disburse such sums as may be provided or required by law in the course of the discharge of its functions.7 To allow the COA to substitute the Courts policy in the disposal of its property would be tantamount to an encroachment into this judicial prerogative. OUR RULING We find Atty. Candelarias recommendation to be well-taken. The COAs authority to conduct post-audit examinations on constitutional bodies granted fiscal autonomy is provided under Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, which states: Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution. emphasis ours This authority, however, must be read not only in light of the Courts fiscal autonomy, but also in relation with the constitutional provisions on judicial independence and the existing jurisprudence and Court rulings on these matters. Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence In Angara v. Electoral Commission,8 we explained the principle of separation of powers, as follows: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution. The concept of the independence of the three branches of government, on the other hand, extends from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry.10 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates; lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.11 Under the Judiciarys unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those imposed by the Constitution itself. Thus, judicial independence can be "broken down into two distinct concepts: decisional independence and institutional independence." Decisional independence "refers to a judges ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based solely on the individual facts and applicable law." On the other hand, institutional independence "describes the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of government." Simply put, institutional independence refers to the "collective independence of the judiciary as a body." In the case In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, the Court delineated the distinctions between the two concepts of judicial independence in the

following manner: One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class. A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance of an independent Third Estate. italics and emphases ours Recognizing the vital role that the Judiciary plays in our system of government as the sole repository of judicial power, with the power to determine whether any act of any branch or instrumentality of the government is attended with grave abuse of discretion, no less than the Constitution provides a number of safeguards to ensure that judicial independence is protected and maintained. The Constitution expressly prohibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction, as enumerated in Section 5, Article VII of the Constitution, or from passing a law that undermines the security of tenure of the members of the judiciary. The Constitution also mandates that the judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy, and grants the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. Jurisprudence has characterized administrative supervision as exclusive, noting that only the Supreme Court can oversee the judges and court personnel's compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The Constitution protects as well the salaries of the Justices and judges by prohibiting any decrease in their salary during their continuance in office, and ensures their security of tenure by providing that "Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office." With these guarantees, justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisals brought on by their judicial action. They can act inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and by the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. All of these constitutional provisions were put in place to strengthen judicial independence, not only by clearly stating the Courts powers, but also by providing express limits on the power of the two other branches of government to interfere with the Courts affairs. Fiscal Autonomy One of the most important aspects of judicial independence is the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy. Just as the Executive may not prevent a judge from discharging his or her judicial duty (for example, by physically preventing a court from holding its hearings) and just as the Legislature may not enact laws removing all jurisdiction from courts, the courts may not be obstructed from their freedom to use or dispose of their funds for purposes germane to judicial functions. While, as a general proposition, the authority of legislatures to control the purse in the first instance is unquestioned, any form of interference by the Legislative or the Executive on the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy amounts to an improper check on a co-equal branch of government. If the judicial branch is to perform its primary function of adjudication, it must be able to command adequate resources for that purpose. This authority to exercise (or to compel the exercise of) legislative power over the national purse (which at first blush appears to be a violation of concepts of separateness and an invasion of legislative autonomy) is necessary to maintain judicial independence27 and is expressly provided for by the Constitution through the grant of fiscal autonomy under Section 3, Article VIII. This provision states:



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Section 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. In Bengzon v. Drilon, we had the opportunity to define the scope and extent of fiscal autonomy in the following manner: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.29 (emphases ours) In this cited case, the Court set aside President Corazon Aquinos veto of particular provisions of the General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the Judiciarys constitutionally guaranteed independence and fiscal autonomy. The Court ruled: In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated from the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed. The Courts declarations in Bengzon make it clear that the grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary is more extensive than the mere automatic and regular release of its approved annual appropriations; real fiscal autonomy covers the grant to the Judiciary of the authority to use and dispose of its funds and properties at will, free from any outside control or interference. Application to the Present Case The Judiciarys fiscal autonomy is realized through the actions of the Chief Justice, as its head, and of the Supreme Court En Banc, in the exercise of administrative control and supervision of the courts and its personnel. As the Court En Bancs Resolution (dated March 23, 2004) in A.M. No. 03-12-01 reflects, the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary serves as the basis in allowing the sale of the Judiciarys properties to retiring Justices of the Supreme Court and the appellate courts:

WHEREAS, by the constitutional mandate of fiscal autonomy as defined in Bengzon v. Drilon (G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150) the Judiciary has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require"; WHEREAS, the long-established tradition and practice of Justices or Members of appellate courts of purchasing for sentimental reasons at retirement government properties they used during their tenure has been recognized as a privilege enjoyed only by such government officials; and WHEREAS, the exercise of such privilege needs regulation to the end that respect for sentiments that a retiring Justice attaches to properties he or she officially used during his or her tenure should be in consonance with the need for restraint in the utilization and disposition of government resources. By way of a long standing tradition, partly based on the intention to reward long and faithful service, the sale to the retired Justices of specifically designated properties that they used during their incumbency has been recognized both as a privilege and a benefit. This has become an established practice within the Judiciary that even the COA has previously recognized.32 The En Banc Resolution also deems the grant of the privilege as a form of additional retirement benefit that the Court can grant its officials and employees in the exercise of its power of administrative supervision. Under this administrative authority, the Court has the power to administer the Judiciarys internal affairs, and this includes the authority to handle and manage the retirement applications and entitlements of its personnel as provided by law and by its own grants.33 Thus, under the guarantees of the Judiciarys fiscal autonomy and its independence, the Chief Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who, what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the parameters of the Courts granted power; they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the grant as grantor. In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the Courts exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En Banc to manage the Judiciarys own affairs. As a final point, we add that this view finds full support in the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM), Volume 1, particularly, Section 501 of Title 7, Chapter 3, which states: Section 501. Authority or responsibility for property disposal/divestment. The full and sole authority and responsibility for the divestment and disposal of property and other assets owned by the national government agencies or instrumentalities, local government units and government-owned and/or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries shall be lodged in the heads of the departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government, the local government units and the governing bodies or managing heads of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries conformably to their respective corporate charters or articles of incorporation, who shall constitute the appropriate committee or body to undertake the same. italics supplied; emphases ours This provision clearly recognizes that the Chief Justice, as the head of the Judiciary, possesses the full and sole authority and responsibility to divest and dispose of the properties and assets of the Judiciary; as Head of Office, he determines the manner and the conditions of disposition, which in this case relate to a benefit. As the usual practice of the Court, this authority is exercised by the Chief Justice in consultation with the Court En Banc. However, whether exercised by the Chief Justice or by the Supreme Court En Banc, the grant of such authority and discretion is unequivocal and leaves no room for



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interpretations and insertions. ACCORDINGLY, premises considered, the in-house computation of the appraisal value made by the Property Division, Office of `Administrative Services, of the properties purchased by the retired Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, based on CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 dated April 23, 1997, as directed under the Court Resolution dated March 23, 2004 in A.M. No. 03-12-01, is CONFIRMED to be legal and valid. Let the Commission on Audit be accordingly advised of this Resolution for its guidance. SO ORDERED. SANIDAD vs. COMELEC 181 SCRA 529 Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled 30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a newspaper columnist of Overview for the Baguio Midland Courier assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers) of the said resolution, which provides During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues. Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods. Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (a columnist, commentator, announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period) can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis. LAMP VS. SEC OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT 670 SCRA 373 Facts: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty(LAMP), a group of lawyers

who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,8 and, therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the evils of pork barrel. Issues: Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case? Whether or not the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is unconstitutional and illegal? Held: I. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the Court. LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue. Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition. II. The Court rules in the negative. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress. To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on x x x baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion. Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law which is outwardly legal and capable



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of lawful enforcement. PORK BARREL: The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget. As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact. NOTES: POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC (G.R. NO. 127325 - MARCH 19, 1997) Facts: Private respondent Atyy,. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Private initiative for Reforms,Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing thepublication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest LawCenter, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco fileda motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC.The petitioners herein Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention. Issue : Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision. Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions onthe conduct of such initiative. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision

or an amendment of the Constitution. Ruling : Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or notthe petition is a revision or amendment has become academic. SALONGA VS. PAO G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 Facts: On September 6, 1980, a bomb exploded inside the room of Victor Burns Lovely Jr, a Philippine-born American citizen. The explosion almost killed him and injured his younger brother Romeo. Lovely was then brought by the military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital) for medical assistance. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives and damage to property. When his room was investigated, the authorities found several pictures taken at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza. Petitioner Jovito Salonga and his wife were among those who appeared in the group pictures, including Lovely. On September 12, 1980, another bomb exploded in Rustans Makati killing an America lady and injuring several people. The younger brother Romeo was presented during President Marcos; anniversary television radio press conference. According to Romeo, he drove Victor to Salongas residence on two occasions. The next day, the headlines of different newspaper came out implying that Jovito Salonga was linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. After several days, Lovely was taken out of the ICU of the hospital and was transferred to the office of Col. Madella. Several bombs were again reported to have exploded in the different parts of Metro Manila. Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings, one of them was Jovito Salonga. On October 21, 1980, the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at the Manila Medical Center and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. The lawyers of Salonga were not permitted to visit him in his hospital room until the Court issued an order directing that the petitioners right to be visited by counsel be respected. On November 2, 1980, Salonga was transferred from the hospital to an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. Salonga claimed that he was informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was he investigated or questioned by any military of civil authority. On November 27, 1980, Salonga was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed under house arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga still without the benefit of any investigation or charges. On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent Salonga a Notice of Preliminary Investigation stating that the case has been set on December 12. Petitoner said that up to the time martial law was lifted,



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he had not received any copied of the charges against him. On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over to the Ministry of Justice. On February 24, 1981, respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint against petitioner for violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885 and BP 31 in relation to Art 142 of the RPC. The inquest court set the preliminary investigation for March 17, 1981. Salonga was allowed to leave the country to undergo comprehensive medical examinations. He was one of those who suffered serious injuries during the Plaza Miranda Bombing. On March 26, 1981, an amended complaint dated March 12, 1981 charging him with violation of RA 1700 as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. Preliminary investigation was conducted. The counsel for petitioner then filed a motion ro dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. Judge Pano denied the motion. He then issued an order for filing an information for violation of the Revised Anti0Subversion Act, as amended, against the petitioner and forty others. The said resolution is now being challenged by the petitioner. He contends that there is no prima facie case established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. Issue: Whether the information filed against Jovito Salonga should be dismissed for failure to establisha a prima facie case against him. Held: Yes, the case should be dismissed. The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive organizations in the United States nowhere mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of the organizations mentioned in the complaint. Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It should not have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, -has no probative value as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had already testified that during the party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action was taken but only political discussion. Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive organization. The petitioner s opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought and expression. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. The constitutional guaranty may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. In the case at bar, there is no threat against the government. In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence of membership in a subversive organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. In the case, there is no proof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal means. Lovely also declared that his bombing mission was not against the government, but directed against a particular

family. TAADA VS TUVERA G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997 Facts: On April 15, 1994, respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Sec. of the Department of Trade and Industry, representing the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act). On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the ratification by the President of the Philippines (Fidel V. Ramos) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization. The WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts thereof. The Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO. Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention. They argue that the WTO agreement violates Sec 19, Article II, providing for the development of a self reliant and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII, providing for the Filipino first policy. Issue: Whether Resolution No. 97 is unconstitutional. Held: The Supreme Court ruled the Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino interests only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international community. The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court gave due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.



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SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY GR No. 159086 February 3, 2004 Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued. In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. Issue: (1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional? (2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless

arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. DAVID VS. PRES. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO GR No. 171396 May 6, 2006 Facts: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power. Issue: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional. Held: The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP



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1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress

lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met. Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws. Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural c

the 1987 constitution

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