the 8 th annual pharmaceutical regulatory & compliance congress november 7, 2007 washington, dc

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The 8 th Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC James A. Donahue, III Chief Deputy Attorney General

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The 8 th Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC James A. Donahue, III Chief Deputy Attorney General. Disclaimer:. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

The 8th Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance

CongressNovember 7, 2007

Washington, DC

James A. Donahue, III Chief Deputy Attorney General

The 8th Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance

CongressNovember 7, 2007

Washington, DC

James A. Donahue, III Chief Deputy Attorney General

Page 2: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

Disclaimer:Disclaimer:

The opinions expressed in this presentation are my own and not those of Attorney General Tom Corbett or the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General

The opinions expressed in this presentation are my own and not those of Attorney General Tom Corbett or the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General

Page 3: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

What is Antitrust?What is Antitrust?

The Antitrust Laws mean you are entitled to the benefits of Competition.

Robert LandeVenable Professor of LawUniversity of Baltimore

The Antitrust Laws mean you are entitled to the benefits of Competition.

Robert LandeVenable Professor of LawUniversity of Baltimore

Page 4: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

Overall State GoalOverall State Goal

Get the benefits of competition in the drug industry. Benefits often go to others:

DoctorsPharmacies PBMs

Get the benefits of competition in the drug industry. Benefits often go to others:

DoctorsPharmacies PBMs

Page 5: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

In Short, the States seek lower pricesIn Short, the States seek lower prices

For themselves because of budget constraints

For consumers because of affordability and economic viability concerns

For themselves because of budget constraints

For consumers because of affordability and economic viability concerns

Page 6: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

Competition RequiresCompetition Requires

A functioning market Where consumers have

access to information about:Price, andQuality

A functioning market Where consumers have

access to information about:Price, andQuality

Page 7: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

Or Put another way Or Put another way

Competition requires Transparency:

Clinical TransparencyEconomic Transparency

Competition requires Transparency:

Clinical TransparencyEconomic Transparency

Page 8: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

Key Area of FocusKey Area of Focus

Reverse PaymentsUnder what circumstances will

a payment from a brand name drug company to a generic drug company where the brand name company is accusing the generic of patent infringement be unlawful.

Reverse PaymentsUnder what circumstances will

a payment from a brand name drug company to a generic drug company where the brand name company is accusing the generic of patent infringement be unlawful.

Page 9: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

Two ViewsTwo Views

The Cardizem ViewThese arrangements are per

se illegalThe Valley Drug/K-Dur View

No illegality as long as the arrangement does not expand the bounds of the patent

The Cardizem ViewThese arrangements are per

se illegalThe Valley Drug/K-Dur View

No illegality as long as the arrangement does not expand the bounds of the patent

Page 10: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

In Re Cardizem CD Antitrust LitigationIn Re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation

By delaying Andrx’s entry into the market, the Agreement also delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who could not enter until the expiration of Andrx’s 180-day period of marketing exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or transfer.FN12 *908 There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the Agreement, all of its other conditions and provisions notwithstanding, was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.

332 F.3d 896, 907-08 (6th Cir., 2003). (Footnote omitted).

By delaying Andrx’s entry into the market, the Agreement also delayed the entry of other generic competitors, who could not enter until the expiration of Andrx’s 180-day period of marketing exclusivity, which Andrx had agreed not to relinquish or transfer.FN12 *908 There is simply no escaping the conclusion that the Agreement, all of its other conditions and provisions notwithstanding, was, at its core, a horizontal agreement to eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.

332 F.3d 896, 907-08 (6th Cir., 2003). (Footnote omitted).

Page 11: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva PharmaceuticalsValley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals

Unlike some kinds of agreements that are per se illegal whether engaged in by patentees or anyone else, such as tying or price-fixing, the exclusion of infringing competition is the essence of the patent grant. As one court has concluded “when patents are involved … the exclusionary effect of the patent must be considered before making any determination as to whether the alleged restraint is per se illegal.”

334 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir,. 2003) (citation omitted).

Unlike some kinds of agreements that are per se illegal whether engaged in by patentees or anyone else, such as tying or price-fixing, the exclusion of infringing competition is the essence of the patent grant. As one court has concluded “when patents are involved … the exclusionary effect of the patent must be considered before making any determination as to whether the alleged restraint is per se illegal.”

334 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir,. 2003) (citation omitted).

Page 12: The 8 th  Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory & Compliance Congress November 7, 2007 Washington, DC

Why Care?Why Care?

These are agreements among horizontal competitors to restrict output.

Generic entry can result in as much as an 80% reduction in drug prices.

These are agreements among horizontal competitors to restrict output.

Generic entry can result in as much as an 80% reduction in drug prices.