the abilene paradox

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We present with pride the following reprint of an article from our Summer 1974issue. If you haven't already read this classic article on the management ofagreement-and the catastrophes that result when it is mismanaged -you're infor a treat. If you have read it, you're in for another treat : Harvey's epilogue,which immediately follows the article, and commentaries by Rosabeth Moss Kanterand Arthur Elliott Carlisle, immediately following the epilogue . Together, thecommentaries by Kanter and Carlisle form, in effect, an 'Abilene Defense'=orways to fend off an Abilene Paradox .

No actual silver stake is recommended, just some canny advice on how to maneuverto keep people from rushing into agreement- out of politeness, a misguided senseof the "lay of the land," or ignorance-on something that none of them really wantsto do or should do. On and off the job, we have all faced our ownAbilene Paradox-several times at that. Now we have some ways to face it down .

The Abilene Paradox :The Management o fAgreement

Jerry B. Harvey

ghe July afternoon in Coleman, Texas (popula-tion 5,607) was particularly hot-104 degreesas measured by the Walgreen's Rexall Ex-Laxtemperature gauge. In addition, the wind wasblowing fine-grained West Texas topsoilthrough the house. But the afternoon was stilltolerable-evern potentially enjoyable. Therewas a fan going on the back porch ; there was

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cold lemonade; and finally, there was enter-tainment. Dominoes . Perfect for the condi-tions. The game required little more physicalexertion than an occasional mumbled com-ment. "Shuffle em," and an unhurried move-ment of the arm to place the spots in the ap-propriate perspective on the table . All in all,it had the makings of an agreeable Sunday af- 17

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ternoon in Coleman -that is, it was until myfather-in-law suddenly said, "Let's get in thecar and go to Abilene and have dinner at thecafeteria."

I thought, "What, go to Abilene?Fifty-three miles? In this dust storm and heat?And in an unairconditioned 1958 Buick?"

But my wife chimed in with,"Sounds like a great idea . I'd like to go. Howabout you, Jerry?" Since my own preferenceswere obviously out of step with the rest I re-plied, "Sounds good to me," and added, "I justhope your mother wants to go."

"Of course I want to go," said mymother-in-law. "I haven t been to Abilene in along time."

So into the car and off to AbiIenewe went . My predictions were fulfilled . Theheat was brutal . We were coated with a finelayer of dust that was cemented with perspira-tion by the time we arrived . The food at thecafeteria provided first-rate testimonial mate-rial for antacid commercials.

• Some four hours and 106 miles laterwe returned to Coleman, hot and exhausted .We sat in front of the fan for a long time insilence . Then, both to be sociable and tobreak the silence, I said, "It was a great trip,wasn t it?"

No one spoke. Finally my mother-

in-law said, with some irritation, "Well, to tellthe truth, I really didri t enjoy it much andwould rather have stayed here. I just wentalong because the three of you were so en-thusiastic about going. I wouldn't have goneif you all hadn t pressured me into it ."

I coulde t believe it . "What do youmean 'you all'?" I said . "Don t put me in the'you all' group. I was delighted to be doingwhat we were doing . I didnt want to go. Ionly went to satisfy the rest of you. You ie theculprits ."

My wife looked shocked . "Don t callme a culprit . You and Daddy and Mama werethe ones who wanted to go. I just went alongto be sociable and to keep you happy. I wouldhave had to be crazy to want to go out in heatlike that ."

Her father entered the conversationabruptly. "Hell!" he said .

He proceeded to expand on whatwas already absolutely clear . "Listen, I neverwanted to go to Abilene . I just thought youmight be bored . You visit so seldom I wantedto be sure you enjoyed it . I would have pre-ferred to play another game of dominoes andeat the leftovers in the icebox."

After the outburst of recriminationwe all sat back in silence. Here we were, fourreasonably sensible people who, of our ownvolition, had just taken a 106-mile trip acrossa godforsaken desert in a furnace-like temper-ature through a cloud-like dust storm to eatunpalatable food at a hole-in-the-wall cafete-ria in Abilene. when none of us had reallywanted to go. In fact, to be more accurate,wed done just the opposite of what we wantedto do. The whole situation simply didn't makesense .

At least it didii t make sense at thetime. But since that day in Coleman, I haveobserved, consulted with, and been a part ofmore than one organization that has beencaught in the same situation . As a result, they

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have either taken a side-trip, or, occasionally,a terminal journey to Abilene, when Dallas orHouston or Tokyo was where they reallywanted to go. And for most of those organi-zations, the negative consequences of suchtrips, measured in terms of both human mis-ery and economic loss, have been muchgreater than for our little Abilene group .

This article is concerned with thatparadox-the Abilene Paradox. Stated simply,it is as follows : Organizations frequently takeactions in contradiction to what they reallywant to do and therefore defeat the very pur-poses they are trying to achieve . It also dealswith a major corollary of the paradox, whichis that the inability to manage agreement is amajor source of organization dysfunction .Last, the article is designed to help membersof organizations cope more effectively withthe paradox's pernicious influence .

As a means of accomplishing theabove, I shall : (1) describe the symptoms ex-hibited by organizations caught in the para-dox; (2) describe, in summarized case-studyexamples, how-they occur in a variety of or-ganizations ; (3) discuss the underlying causaldynamics ; (4) indicate some of the implica-tions of accepting this model for describingorganizational behavior; (5) make recom-mendations for coping with the paradox;and, in conclusion, (6) relate the paradox toa broader existential issue .

SYMPTOMS OF THE PARADOX

The inability to manage agreement, not theinability to manage conflict, is the essentialsymptom that defines organizations caughtin the web of the Abilene Paradox . That ina-bility to manage agreement effectively is ex-pressed by six speciFic subsymptoms, all ofwhich were present in our family Abilenegroup.

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JERRY B. HARVEY is professor of management

science at the George Washington University in

Washington, D.C. He is a graduate of the

University of Texas in Austin, where he earned

an undergraduate degree in business administra-

tion and a Ph.D in social psychology.

A member of the International Consultant'sFoundation, a Diplomate of the AmericanBoard of Professional Psychology, and a rnem-ber of the O D. Network, he has served as aconsultant to a wide variety of industrial, gov-ernmental, religious, and voluntary organiza-tions. He has written a number of articles inthe fields of organizational behavior and edu-cation and currently is involved in the explora-tion of moral, ethical, and spiritual issues ofmork. In the pursuit of that interest, he recentlyhas completed a new book entitled The AbileneParadox and Other Meditations on Manage-ment, to be published by Lexington Books .

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1. Organization members agree pri-vately, as individuals, as to the nature of thesituation or problem facing the organization .For example, members of the Abilene groupagreed that they were enjoying themselvessitting in front of the fan, sipping lemonade,and playing dominoes.

2. Organization members agree pri-vately, as individuals, as to the steps thatwould be required to cope with the situationor problem they face. For members of theAbilene group "more of the same" was a solu-tion that would have adequately satisfiedtheir individual and collective desires .

3 . Organization members fail to ac-curately communicate their desires and/orbeliefs to one another. In fact, they do just theopposite and thereby lead one another intomisperceiving the collective reality. Eachmember of the Abilene group, for example,communicated inaccurate data to other mem-bers of the organization. The data, in effect,said, "Yeah, it's a great idea . Let's go to Abi-lene," when in reality members of the organi-zation.individually and collectively preferredto stay in Coleman .

4. With such invalid and inaccurateinformation, organization members makecollective decisions that lead them to take ac-tions contrary to what they want to do, andthereby arrive at results that are counterpro-ductive to the organization's intent and pur-poses. Thus, the Abilene group went to Abi-lene when it preferred to do something else .

5. As a result of taking actions thatare counterproductive, organization mem-bers experience frustration, anger, irritation,and dissatisfaction with their organization .Consequently, they form subgroups withtrusted acquaintances and blame other sub-groups for the organization's dilemma . Fre-quently, they also blame authority figuresand one another. Such phenomena were illus-

20 trated in the Abilene group by the "culprit" ar-

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gument that occurred when we had returnedto the comfort of the fan .

6. Finally, if organization membersdo not deal with the generic issue - the inabil-ity to manage agreement-the cycle repeatsitself with greater intensity. The Abilenegroup, for a variety of reasons, the most im-portant of which was that it became con-scious of the process, did not reach thatpoint.

To repeat, the Abilene Paradoxreflects a failure to manage agreement . Infact, it is my contention that the inability tocope with (manage) agreement, rather thanthe inability to cope with (manage) conflict,is the single most pressing issue of modernorganizations.

OTHER TRIPs TO ABILENE

The Abilene Paradox is no respecter of indi-viduals, organizations, or institutions . Fol-lowing are descriptions of two other trips toAbilene that illustrate both the pervasivenessof the paradox and its underlying dynamics .

Case No. 1 : The Boardroom .The Ozyx Corporation is a relatively small industrialcompany that has embarked on a trip to Abilene. Thepresident of Ozyx has hired a consultant to help dis-cover the reasons for the poor profit picture of thecompany in general and the low morale and produc-tivity of the R&D division in particular . During theprocess of investigation, the consultant becomes in-terested in a research project in which the companyhas invested a sizable proportion of its RdcD budget .

When asked about the project bythe consultant in the privacy of their offices,the president, the vice-president for research,and the research manager each describes it asan idea that looked great on paper but will ul-timately fail because of the unavailability ofthe technology required to make it work .Each of them also acknowledges that con-tinued support of the project will create cash



flow problems that will jeopardize the veryexistence of the total organization .

Furthermore, each individual indi-cates he has not told the others about hisreservations . When asked why, the presidentsays he can t reveal his "true feelings becauseabandoning the project, which has beenwidely publicized, would make the companylook bad in the press and, in addition, wouldprobably cause his vice-president's ulcer tokick up or perhaps even cause him to quit,"because he has staked his professional reputa-tion on the project's success."

Similarly, the vice-president for re-search says he can t let the president or the re-search manager know of his reservations be-cause the president is so committed to it that"I would probably get fired for insubordina-tion if I questioned the project ."

Finally, the research manager sayshe can t let the president or vice-presidentknow of his doubts about the project becauseof their extreme commitment to the project'ssuccess.

All indicate that, in meetings withone another, they try to maintain an optimis-tic fasade so the others wont worry undulyabout the project. The research director, in

particular, admits to writing ambiguousprogress reports so the president and thevice-president can "interpret them to suitthemselves ." In fact, he says he tends to slantthem to the "positive" side, "given how com-mitted the brass are ."

The scent of the Abilene trail waftsfrom a paneled conference room where theproject research budget is being consideredfor the following fiscal year. In the meeting itself, praises are heaped on the questionableproject and a unanimous decision is made tocontinue it for yet another year. Symboli-cally, the organization has boarded a bus toAbilene .

In fact, although the real issue ofagreement was confronted approximatelyeight months after the bus departed, it wasnearly too late. The organization failed tomeet a payroll and underwent a two-yearperiod of personnel cutbacks, retrenchments,and austerity. Morale suffered, the most com-petent technical personnel resigned, and theorganizations prestige in the industry de-clined .

Case No . 2: The WatergateApart from the grave question of who did what,Watergate presents America with the pro found puzzle

"The inability to manage agreement, not theinability to manage conflict, is theessential symptom that defines organizationscaught in the web of the Abilene Paradox .That inability to manage agreement e f fectively

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is expressed by six speci f ic subsymptoms . . . .f" 21



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of why. What is it that led such a wide assortment ofmen, many of them high public officials, possibly in-cluding the Prrsident himself, either to instigate or togo along with and later try to hide a pattern of be-havior that by now appears not only reprehensible,but stupid? (The Washington Star and Daily News,editorial, May 27, 1973.)

One possible answer to the editorialwriter s question can be found by probinginto the dynamics of the Abilene Paradox . Ishall let the reader reach his own conclu-sions, though, on the basis of the followingexcerpts from testimony before the Senate in-vestigating committee on 'The WatergateAffair."

In one exchange, Senator HowardBaker asked Herbert Porter, then a member ofthe White House staff, why he (Porter) foundhimself "in charge of or deeply involved in adirty tricks operation of the campaign ." In re-sponse, Porter indicated that he had hadqualms about what he was doing, but that he

was not one to stand up in a meeting andsay that this should be stopped . . . . I kind ofdrifted along ."

And when asked by Baker why hehad "drifted along," Porter replied, "In allhonesty, because of the fear of the group pres-

sure that would ensue, of not being a teamplayer," and " . . I felt a deep sense of loyaltyto him (the President] or was appealed to onthat basis." (The Washington Post, June 8,1973, p. 20 . )

Jeb Magruder gave a similar re-sponse to a question posed by committeecounsel Dash . Specifically, when asked abouthis, Mr. Deans, and Mr . Mitchell's reactionsto Mr. Liddy's proposal, which included bug-ging the Watergate, Mr. Magruder replied, "Ithink all three of us were appalled . The scopeand size of the project were something that atleast in my mind were not envisioned . I donot think it was in Mr. Mitchell's mind or Mr.Deans, although I cant comment on theirstates of mind at that time.

Mr. Mitchell, in an understated way,which was his way of dealing with difficultproblems like this, indicated that this was notan "acceptable project ." (The WashingtonPost, June 15, 1973, p. A14 .)

Later in his testimony Mr.Magruder said, ". . . I think I can honestly saythat no one was particularly overwhelmedwith the project. But I think we felt that thisinformation could be useful, and Mr .lrlitch-elI agreed to approve the project, and I thennotified the parties of Mr . Mitchell's ap-proval." (The Washington Post, June 15,1973, p. A14 .)

Although I obviously was not privyto the private conversations of the principalcharacters, the data seem to reflect the essen-tial elements of the Abilene Paradox . First,they indicate agreement . Evidently, Mitchell,Porter, Dean, and Magruder agreed that theplan was inappropriate. ("I think I canhonestly say that no one was particularlyoverwhelmed with the project .") Second, thedata indicate that the principal figures thenproceeded to implement the plan in contra-diction to their shared agreement . Third, thedata surrounding the case clearly indicate

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that the plan multiplied the organization'sproblems rather than solved them . And fi-nally, the organization broke into subgroupswith the various principals, such as the Presi-dent, Mitchell, Porter, Dean, and Magruder,blaming one another for the dilemma inwhich they found themselves, and internecinewarfare ensued .

In summary, it is possible that be-cause of the inability of White House staffmembers to cope with the fact that theyagreed, the organization took a trip toAbilene .

ANALYZING THE PARADOX

The Abilene Paradox can be stated succinctlyas follows: Organizations frequently take ac-tions in contradiction to the data they havefor dealing with problems and, as a result,compound their problems rather than solvethem. Like all paradoxes, the Abilene Paradoxdeals with absurdity. On the surface, it makeslittle sense for organizations, whether theyare couples or companies, bureaucracies orgovernments, to take actions that are diamet-rically opposed to the data they possess forsolving crucial organizational problems .Such actions are particularly absurd sincethey tend to compound the very problemsthey are designed to solve and thereby defeatthe purposes the organization is trying toachieve. However, as Robert Rapaport andothers have so cogently expressed it, para-doxes are generally paradoxes only becausethey are based on a logic or rationale differ-ent from what we understand or expect .

Discovering that different logic notonly destroys the paradoxical quality but alsooffers alternative ways for coping with simi-lar situations . Therefore, part of the dilemmafacing an Abilene-bound organization maybe the lack of a map-a theory or model-

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that provides rationality to the paradox . Thepurpose of the following discussion is to pro-vide such a map.

The map will be developed by ex-amining the underlying psychological themesof the profit making organization and thebureaucracy and it will include the followinglandmarks: (1) Action Anxiety; (2) NegativeFantasies; (3) Real Risk; (4) Separation Anxi-ety; and (5) the Psychological Reversal ofRisk and Certainty. I hope that the discussionof such landmarks will provide harried orga-nization travelers with a new map that willassist them in arriving at where they reallywant to go and, in addition, will help them inassessing the risks that are an inevitable partof the journey.

ACTION ANXIETY

Action anxiety provides the first landmarkfor locating roadways that bypass Abilene .The concept of action anxiety says that thereasons organization members take actions incontradiction to their understanding of theorganization's problems lies in the intense

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anxiety that is created as they think aboutacting in accordance with what they believeneeds to be done . As a result, they opt to en-dure the professional and economic degrada-tion of pursuing an unworkable research pro-ject or the consequences of participating in anillegal activity rather than act in a mannercongruent with their beliefs . It is not that or-ganization members do not know what needsto be done - they do know. For example, thevarious principals in the research organiza-tion cited knew they were working on a re-search project that had no real possibility ofsucceeding . And the central figures of theWatergate episode apparently knew that, fora variety of reasons, the plan to bug theWatergate did not make sense .

Such action anxiety experienced bythe various protagonists may not make sense,but the dilemma is not a new one . In fact, itis very similar to the anxiety experienced byHamlet, who expressed it most eloquently inthe opening lines of his famous soliloquy :

To be or not to be; that is the question :Whether 'tis nobler in the mind to sufferThe slings and arrows of outrageous fortuneOr to take arms against a sea of troublesAnd by opposing, end them3 . . .(Hamlet, Act 111, Scene 11)

ious lament into that of the research managerof our R&D organization as he contemplateshis report to the meeting of the budget com-mittee. It might go something like this:

To maintain my sense of integrity and self-worth orcompromise it, that is the question . Whether'tis no-bler in the mind to suffer the ignominy that comesfrom managing a nonsensical research project, or thefear and anxiety that come from making a report thepresident and V.P. may not like to hear .

So, the anguish, procrastination,and counterproductive behavior of the re-search manager or members of the WhiteHouse staff are not much different from thoseof Hamlet; all might ask with equal justifica-tion Hamlet's subsequent searching questionof what it is that

makes us rather bear those ills we have than fly toothers we know not of . (Hamlet, Act III, Scene II)

In short, like the various Abileneprotagonists, we are faced with a deeperquestion: Why does action anxiety oocur2

hlEGATIVE FANTASIES

Part of the answer to that question may befound in the negative fantasies organization

It is easy to translate Hamlet's anx- members have about acting in congruence

"f A1 ction anxiety is supported by the negativefantasies that organization members haveabout what will happen as a consequence o ftheir acting in accordance with their

24 understanding of what is sensible ."

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with what they believe should be done . Ham-let experienced such fantasies.

Specifically, Hamlet's fantasies ofthe alternatives to the current evils were moreevils, and he didnt entertain the possibilitythat any action he might take could lead toan improvement in the situation . Hamlet'swas not an unusual case, though . In fact, the"Hamlet syndrome" clearly occurred in bothorganizations previously described . All ofthe organization protagonists had negativefantasies about what would happen if theyacted in accordance with what they believedneeded to be done .

The various managers in the R&Dorganization foresaw loss of face, prestige,position, and even health as the outcome ofconfronting the issues about which they be-lieved, incorrectly, that they disagreed . Simi-larly, members of the White House stafffeared being made scapegoats, branded asdisloyal, or ostracized as non-team players ifthey acted in accordance with their under-standing of reality.

To sum up, action anxiety is sup-ported by the negative fantasies that organi-zation members have about what will happenas a consequence of their acting in accordancewith their understanding of what is sensible .The negative fantasies, in turn, serve an im-portant function for the persons who havethem. Specifically, they provide the in-dividual with an excuse that releases him psy-chologically, both in his own eyes and fre-quently in the eyes of others, from theresponsibility of having to act to solve orga-nization problems .

It is not sufficient, though, to stopwith the explanation of negative fantasies asthe basis for the inability of organizations tocope with agreement . We must look deeperand ask still other questions : What is thesource of the negative fantasies? Why do theyoccur?

REAL Risx

Risk is a reality of life, a condition of exis-tence . John Kennedy articulated it in anotherway when he said at a news conference, "Lifeis unfair." By that I believe he meant we donot know, nor can we predict or control withcertainty, either the events that impinge uponus or the outcomes of actions we undertake inresponse to those events .

Consequently, in the business envi-ronment, the research manager might findthat confronting the president and the vice-president with the fact that the project was a"turkey" might result in his being fired . AndMr. Porter's saying that an illegal plan of sur-veillance should not be carried out could havecaused his ostracism as a non-team player .There are too many cases when confronta-tion of this sort has resulted in such conse-quences. The real question, though, is not,Are such fantasized consequences possible?but, Are such fantasized consequences likely?

Thus real risk is an existential con-dition, and all action do have consequencesthat, to paraphrase Hamlet, may be worsethan the evils of the present. As a result oftheir unwillingness to accept existential riskas one of lifes givens, however, people mayopt to take their organizations to Abilenerather than run the risk, no matter how small,of ending up somewhere worse .

Again, though, one must ask, Whatis the real risk that underlies the decision toopt for Abilene? What is at the core of theparadox?

FEAR OF SEPARATION

One is tempted to say that the core of theparadox lies in the individual's fear of the un-known. Actually, we do not fear what is un-known, but we are afraid of things we do 25

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know about. What do we know about thatfrightens us into such apparently inexplicableorganizational behavior?

Separation, alienation, and loneli-ness are things we do know about- and fear.Both research and experience indicate that os-tracism is one of the most powerful punish-ments that can be devised . Solitary confine-ment does not draw its coercive strength fromphysical deprivation . The evidence is over-whelming that we have a fundamental needto be connected, engaged, and related and areciprocal need not to be separated or alone .Everyone of us, though, has experiencedaloneness. From the time the umbilical cordwas cut, we have experienced the real anguishof separation -broken friendships, divorces,deaths, and exdusions. C. P. Snow vividlydescribed the tragic interplay between loneli-ness and connection :

Each of us is alone; sometimes we escape from oursolitariness, through love and affection or perhapscreative moments, but these triumphs of life arepools of light we make for ourselves while the edgeof the road is black. Each of us dies alone.

That fear of taking risks that mayresult in our separation from others is at thecore of the paradox . It finds expression inways of which we may be unaware, and it isultimately the cause of the self-defeating, col-

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lective deception that leads to self-destructivedecisions within organizations .

Concretely, such fear of separationleads research committees to fund projectsthat none of its members want and, perhaps,White House staff members to engage in ille-gal activities that they dori t really support .

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVERSAL

oF RISK AND CERTAINTY

One piece of the map is still missing . It relatesto the peculiar reversal that occurs in ourthought processes as we try to cope with theAbilene Paradox. For example, we frequentlyfail to take action in an organizational settingbecasue we fear that the actions we take mayresult in our separation from others, or, in thelanguage of Mr . Porter, we are afraid of beingtabbed as "disloyal" or are afraid of being os-tracized as "non-team players ." But thereinlies a paradox within a paradox, because ourvery unwillingness to take such risks virtuallyensures the separation and aloneness we sofear. In effect, we reverse "real existential risk"and "fantasied risk" and by doing so trans-form what is a probability statement intowhat, for all practical purposes, becomes acertainty.

Take the R&D organization de-scribed earlier. When the project fails, somepeople will get fired, demoted, or sentencedto the purgatory of a make-work job in anout-of-the-way office. For those who remain,the atmosphere of blame, distrust, suspicion,and backbiting that accompanies such failurewill serve only to further alienate and sepa-rate those who remain.

The Watergate situation is similar.The principals evidently feared being ostra-cized as disloyal non-team players. When theillegality of the act surfaced, however, it wasnearly inevitable that blaming, self-protec-



tive actions, and scapegoating would result inthe very emotional separation from both thePresident and one another that the principalsfeared. Thus, by reversing real and fantasiedrisk, they had taken effective action to ensurethe outcome they least desired .

One final question remains: Whydo we make this peculiar reversal? I supportthe general thesis of Alvin Toffler and PhilipSlater, who contend that our cultural empha-sis on technology, competition, individual-ism, temporariness, and mobility has resultedin a population that has frequently experi-enced the terror of loneliness and seldom thesatisfaction of engagement . Consequently,though we have learned of the reality of sepa-ration, we have not had the opportunity tolearn the reciprocal skills of connection, withthe result that, like the ancient dinosaurs, weare breeding organizations with self-destruc-tive decision-making proclivities .

A POSSIBLE ABILENE BYPASS

Existential risk is inherent in living, so it is im-possible to provide a map that meets theno-risk criterion, but it may be possible to de-scribe the route in terms that make the land-marks understandable and that will darifythe risks involved. In order to do that, how-ever, some commonly used terms such as vic-tim, victimizer, collusion, responsibility, con-flict, conformity, courage, confrontation,reality, and knowledge have to be redefined .In addition, we need to explore the relevanceof the redefined concepts for bypassing orgetting out of Abilene .

• Victim and victimizer. Blamingand fault-finding behavior is one of the basicsymptoms of organizations that have foundtheir way to Abilene, and the target of blamegenerally doesn t include the one who criti-cizes. Stated in different terms, executives be-

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gin to assign one another to roles of victimsand victimizers . Ironic as it may seem, how-ever, this assignment of roles is both irrele-vant and dysfunctional, because once a busi-ness or a government fails to manage itsagreement and arrives in Abilene, all itsmembers are victims . Thus, arguments andaccusations that identify victims and victimizers at best become symptoms of theparadox, and, at worst, drain energy from theproblem-solving efforts required to redirectthe organization along the route it reallywants to take .

• Collusion. A basic implication ofthe Abilene Paradox is that human problemsof organization are reciprocal in nature . AsRobert Tannenbaum has pointed out, youcali t have an autocratic boss unless subor-dinates are willing to collude with his autoc-racy, and you cant t have obsequious subor-dinates unless the boss is willing to colludewith their obsequiousness .

Thus, in plain terms, each person ina self-defeating, Abilene-bound organizationcolludes with others, including peers, superi-ors, and subordinates, sometimes consciouslyand sometimes subconsciously, to create thedilemma in which the organization finds it-self . To adopt a cliche of modern organiza-tion, "It takes a real team effort to go to Abi-

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lene." In that sense each person, in his owncollusive manner, shares responsibility for thetrip, so searching for a locus of blame outsideoneself serves no useful purpose for either theorganization or the individual . It neitherhelps the organization handle its dilemma ofunrecognized agreement nor does it providepsychological relief for the individual, be-cause focusing on conflict when agreement isthe issue is devoid of reality. In fact, it doesjust the opposite, for it causes the organiza-tion to focus on managing conflict when itshould be focusing on managing agreement .

• Responsibility for problem-solu-ing action. A second question is, Who is re-sponsible for getting us out of this place? Tothat question is frequently appended a thirdone, generally rhetorical in nature, with"should" overtones, such as, Isn't it the boss(or the ranking government official) who isresponsible for doing something about thesituation?

The answer to that question is no.The key to understanding the func-

tionality of the no answer is the knowledgethat, when the dynamics of the paradox are

in operation, the authority figure-and oth-ers-are in unknowing agreement with oneanother concerning the organization .'s prob-lems and the steps necessary to solve them.Consequently, the power to destroy the para-dox's pernicious influence comes from con-fronting and speaking to the underlying real-ity of the situation, and not from oneshierarchical position within the organization .Therefore, any organization member whochooses to risk confronting that reality pos-sesses the necessary leverage to release the or-ganization from the paradoxs grip.

In one situation, it may be a re-search director's saying, "I don t think thisproject can succeed." In another, it may be JebMagruder's response to this question of Sena-tor Baker :

If you were concerned because the action was knownto you to be illegal, because you thought it improperor unethical, you thought the prospects for successwere very meager, and you doubted the reliability ofMr. Liddy, what on earth would it have taken to de-cide against the plan?

Magruder's reply was brief and tothe point :

""Con f lict is a part o f any organization . . . .However, analysis of the Abilene Paradoxopens up the possi bility o f two kinds o fconflict-real and phony . On the surface,they look alike . But, like headaches,they have di f ferent causes and there fore

28 require Gtif ferent tre(ltment .""



Not very much, sir. I am sure that if I had foughtvigorously against it, I think any of us could have hadthe plan cancelled. (Time, June 25, 1973. p . 12.)

• Reality, knowledge, confronta-tion. Accepting the paradox as a modeldescribing certain kinds of organizationaldilemmas also requires rethinking the natureof reality and knowledge, as they are gener-ally described in organizations. In brief,the underlying dynamics of the paradox clear-ly indicate that organization members gener-ally know more about issues confronting theorganization than they dori t know. The vari-ous principals attending the research budgetmeeting, for example, knew the researchproject was doomed to failure . And Jeb Ma-gruder spoke as a true Abilener when he said,"We knew it was illegal, probably, inappro-priate ." (The Washington Post, June 15, 1973,p. A16 . )

Given this concept of reality and itsrelationship to knowledge, confrontation be-comes the process of facing issues squarely,openly, and directly in an effort to discoverwhether the nature of the underlying collec-tive reality is agreement or conflict. Accept-ing such a definition of confrontation has animportant implication for change agents in-terested in making organizations more effec-tive . That is, organization change and effec-tiveness may be facilitated as much byconfronting the organization with what itknows and agrees upon as by confronting itwith what it doesn t know or disagrees about .

REAL CONFLICT AND PHONY CONFLICT

Conflict is a part of any organization . Cou-ples, R&D divisions, and White House staffsall engage in it . However, analysis of the Abi-lene Paradox opens up the possibility of twokinds of conflict-real and phony. On thesurface, they look alike . But, like headaches,

F-___. ". . .1.

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they have different causes and therefore re-quire different treatment .

Real conflict occurs when peoplehave real differences . ("My reading of the re-search printouts says that we can make theproject profitable." "I come to the oppositeconclusion.") ("I suggest we bug' the Water-gate." "I'm not in favor of it .")

Phony conflict, on the other hand,occurs when people agree on the actions theywant to take, and then do the opposite . Theresulting anger, frustration, and blaming be-havior generally termed "conflict" are notbased on real differences. Rather, they stemfrom the protective reactions that occur whena decision that no one believed in or was com-mitted to in the first place goes sour. In fact,as a paradox within a paradox, such conflictis symptomatic of agreement!

GROUP TYRANNY AND CONFORMIlY

Understanding the dynamics of the AbileneParadox also requires a"reorientation' inthinking about concepts such as "group tyr-anny = the loss of the individual's distinctive-ness in a group, and the impact of conformitypressures on individual behavior in organiza-tions. Group tyranny and its result, indi-vidual conformity, generally refer to the coer-cive effect of group pressures on individualbehavior. Sometimes referred to as Group-think, it has been damned as the cause foreverything from the lack of creativity in or-ganizations ("A camel is a horse designed bya committee") to antisocial behavior in juve-niles ("My Johnny is a good boy. He was justpressured into shoplifting by the kids he runsaround with") .

However, analysis of the dynamicsunderlying the Abilene Paradox opens up thepossibility that individuals frequently per-ceive and feel as if they are experiencing the 29



coercive organization conformity pressureswhen, in actuality, they are responding to thedynamics of mismanaged agreement . Con-ceptualizing, experiencing, and respondingto such experiences as reflecting the tyranni-cal pressures of a group again serves as an im-portant psychological use for the individual :As was previously said, it releases him fromthe responsibility of taking action and thusbecomes a defense against action. Thus,much behavior within an organization thatheretofore has been conceptualized as reflect-ing the tyranny of conformity pressures isreally an expression of collective anxiety andtherefore must be reconceptualized as a de-fense, against acting.

A well-known example of suchfaulty conceptualization comes to mind . It in-volves the heroic sheriff in the classic Westernmovies who stands alone in the jailhousedoor and singlehandedly protects a suspected(and usually innocent) horse thief or mur-derer from the irrational, tyrannical forces ofgroup behavior-that is, an armed lynchmob. Generally, as a part of the ritual, hethreatens to blow off the head of anyone whotakes a step toward the door. Few ever takethe challenge, and the reason is not thesheriff's six-shooter. What good would onepistol be against an armed mob of severalhundred people who really want to hangsomebody? Thus, the gun in fact serves as aface-saving measure for people who don twish to participate in a hanging anyway. ("Wehad to back off. The sheriff threatened toblow our heads off.")

The situation is one involving agree-ment management, for a careful ji nvestigatorcanvassing the crowd under co}~ditions inwhich the anonymity of the inte ! iewees re-sponses could be guaranteed wou d probablyfind: (1) that few of the indivi als in thecrowd really wanted to take part ' the hang-ing; (2) that each person's partici ation came

30 about because he perceived, f lsely, that

others wanted to do so ; and (3) that each per-son was afraid that others in the crowd wouldostracize or in some other way punish him ifhe did not go along

.

DIAGNOS[NG THE PARADOX

Most individuals like quick solutions, "dean'solutions, "no risk" solutions to organizationproblems. Furthermore, they tend to prefersolutions based on mechanics and technol-ogy, rather than on attitudes of "being ." Un-fortunately, the underlying reality of the para-dox makes it impossible to provide eitherno-risk solutions or action technologies di-vorced from existential attitudes and realities .I do, however, have two sets of suggestionsfor dealing with these situations . One set ofsuggestions relates to diagnosing the situa-tion, the other to confronting it .

When faced with the possibility thatthe paradox is operating, one must first makea diagnosis of the situation, and the key to di-agnosis is an answer to the question, Is the or-ganization involved in a conflict-managementor an agreement-management situation? Asan organization member, I have found it rela-tively easy to make a preliminary diagnosisas to whether an organization is on the wayto Abilene or is involved in legitimate, sub-stantive conflict by responding to the Diagnostic Survey shown in the accompanyingfigure. If the answer to the first question is"not characteristic," the organization is prob-ablynot in Abilene or conflict . If the answeris "characteristic," the organization has aproblem of either real or phony conflict, andthe answers to the succeeding questions helpto determine which it is .

In brief, for reasons that should beapparent from the theory discussed here, themore times "characteristic" is checked, themore likely the organization is on its way toAbilene. In practical terms, a process for man-

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ORGANI7ATION DIAGNOSTIC SURVEY

Instructions : For each of the following statements please indicate whether it is or is not characteristicof your organization .

1 . There is conflict in the organization .2 . Organization members feel frustrated, impotent, and unhappy when trying to deal with it . Many are

looking for ways to escape. They may avoid meetings at which the conflict is discussed, they maybe looking for other jobs, or they may spend as much time away from the office as possible by takingunneeded trips or vacation or sick leave .

3. Organization members place much of the blame for the dilemma on the boss or other groups. In "backroom" conversations among friends the boss is termed incompetent, ineffective, "out of touch," or acandidate for early retirement . To his face, nothing is said, or at best, only oblique references aremade concerning his role in the organizatioris problems . If the boss isn t blamed, some other group,division, or unit is seen as the cause of the trouble : 'We would do fine if it were not for the damnfools in Division X ."

4. Small subgroups of trusted friends and associates meet informally over coffee, lunch, and so on todiscuss organizational problems. There is a lot of agreement among the members of these subgroupsas to the cause of the troubles and the solutions that would be effective in solving them . Such conversa-tions are frequently punctuated with statements beginning with, 'We should do . . . ."

5. In meetings where those same people meet with members from other subgroups to discuss the prob-lem they "soften their positions," state them in ambiguous language, or even reverse them to suit theapparent positions taken by others.

6. After such meetings, members complain to trusted associates that they really didn 't say what theywanted to say, but also provide a list of convincing reasons why the comments, suggestions, and reac-tions they wanted to make would have been impossible . Trusted associates commiserate and say thesame was irue for them .

7. Attempts to solve the problem do not seem to work . In fact, such attempts seem to add to the problemor make it worse .

8. Outside the organization individuals seem to get along better, be happier, and operate more efEec-tively than they do within it .

aging agreement is called for. And finally, ifthe answer to the first question falls into the"characteristic" category and most of theother answers fall into the category "not char-acteristic," one may be relatively sure the or-ganization is in a real conflict situation andsome sort of conflict management interven-tion is in order.

COPING WITH THE PARADOX

Assuming a preliminary diagnosis leads oneto believe he andlor his organization is on the

way to Abilene, the individual may choose toactively confront the situation to determinedirectly whether the underlying reality is oneof agreement or conflict. Although there are,perhaps, a number of ways to do it, I havefound one way in particular to be effective -confrontation in a group setting. The basicapproach involves gathering organizationmembers who are key figures in the problemand its solution into a group setting. Workingwithin the context of a group is important be-cause the dynamics of the Abilene Paradoxinvolve collusion among group members ;therefore, to try to solve the dilemma by 31

F_.._F___.-



working with individuals and small sub-groups would involve further collusion withthe dynamics leading up to the paradox .

The first step in the meeting is forthe individual who "calls" it (that is, the con-fronter) to own up to his position first and beopen to the feedback he gets. The owning upprocess lets the others know that he is con-cerned lest the organization may be makinga decision contrary to the desires of any of itsmembers. A statement like this demonstratesthe beginning of such an approach :

I want to talk with you about the research project.Although I have previously said things to the con-trary. I frankly don t think it will work, and I am veryanxious about it . I suspect others may feel the same,but I don t know . Anyway, I am concerned that I mayend up misleading you and that we may end up mis-leading one another, and if we aredt careful, we maycontinue to work on a problem that none of us wantsand that might even bankrupt us . That's why I needto know where the rest of you stand. I would appreci-ate any of your thoughts about the project . Do youthink it can succeed?

What kinds of results can one ex-pect if he decides to undertake the process ofconfrontationl I have found that the resultscan be divided into two categories, at thetechnical level and at the level of existentialexperience . Of the two, I have found that for

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the person who undertakes to initiate the pro-cess of confrontation, the existential experi-ence takes precedence in his ultimate evalua-tion of the outcome of the action he takes .

• The technical level . If one is cor-rect in diagnosing the presence of the para-dox, I have found the solution to the technicalproblem may be almost absurdly quick andsimple, nearly on the order of this:

"Do you mean that you and I and therest of us have been dragging along with a re-search project that none of us has thoughtwould work? It's crazy. I can t believe wewould do it, but we did . Let's figure out howwe can cancel it and get to doing somethingproductive." In fact, the simplicity and quickness of the solution frequently dorit seempossible to most of us, since we have beentrained to believe that the solution to conflictrequires a long, arduous process of debilitat-ing problem solving .

Also, since existential risk is alwayspresent, it is possible that one's diagnosis isincorrect, and the process of confrontationlifts to the level of public examination real,substantive conflict, which may result inheated debate about technology, personali-ties, and/or administrative approaches . Thereis evidence that such debates, properly man-aged, can be the basis for creativity in orga-nizational problem solving. There is also thepossibility, however, that such debates can-not be managed, and substantiating the con-cept of existential risk, the person who initi-ates the risk may get fired or ostracized . Butthat again leads to the necessity of evaluatingthe results of such confrontation at the ex-istential level .

• Existential results. Evaluating theoutcome of confrontation from an existen-tial framwork is quite different from evaluat-ing it from a set of technical criteria . Howdo I reach this conclusion? Simply from in-terviewing a variety of people who have cho-



sen to confront the paradox and listening totheir responses. In short, for them, psycho-logical success and failure apparently are di-vorced from what is traditionally acceptedin organizations as criteria for success andfailure .

For instance, some examples of suc-cess are described when people are asked,"What happened when you confronted the is-sue?" They may answer this way :

I was told we had enough boat rockers in the organi-zation, and [ got fired . It hurt at first, but in retro-spect it was the greatest day of my life . I've got an-other job and I'm delighted. I'm a free man .

Another description of successmight be this:

I said I don t think the research project can succeedand the others looked shocked and quickly agreed .The upshot of the whole deal is that I got a promotionand am now known as a"rising star." It was the highpoint of my career.

Similarly, those who fail to confrontthe paradox describe failure in terms divorcedfrom technical results. For example, one mayreport :

I didn't say anything and we rocked along until thewhole thing exploded and Joe got fired . There is stilla lot of tension in the organization, and we are stillin trouble, but I got a good performance review lasttime . I still feel lousy about the whole thing, though .

From a different viewpoint, an in-dividual may describe his sense of failure inthese words :

[ knew I should have said something and I didn't .When the project failed, I was a convenient whippingboy. I got demoted; I still have a job, but my futurehere is definitely limited. In a way I deserve what Igot. but it doesri t make it any easier to accept becauseof that .

Most important, the act of confron-tation apparently provides intrinsic psycho-logical satisfaction, regardless of the techno-logical outcomes for those who attempt it .

1------ -7• -

The real meaning of that existential experi-ence, and its relevance to a wide variety of or-ganizations, may lie, therefore, not in the sci-entific analysis of decision making but in theplight of Sisyphus. That is something thereader will have to decide for himself.

TFiE ABILENE PARADOX

AND THE MYTH or SISYYHUs

In essence, this paper proposes that there is anunderlying organizational reality that in-cludes both agreement and disagreement, co-operation and conflict . However, the decisionto confront the possibility of organizationagreement is all too difficult and rare, and itsopposite, the decision to accept the evils ofthe present, is all to common . Yet those twodecisions may reflect the essence of both ourhuman potential and our human imperfecta-bility. Consequently, the choice to confrontreality in the family, the church, the business,or the bureaucracy, though made only occa-sionally, may reflect those "peak experiences"that provide meaning to the valleys.

In many ways, they may reflect theexperience of Sisyphus. As you may remem-ber, Sisyphus was condemned by Pluto to a


33


perpetuity of pushing a large stone to the topof a mountain, only to see it return to itsoriginal position when he released it. As Ca-mus suggested in his revision of the myth,Sisyphus's task was absurd and totally devoidof meaning. For most of us, though, the liveswe lead pushing papers or hubcaps are no lessabsurd, and in many ways we probably spendabout as much time pushing rocks in our or-ganizations as did Sisyphus.

Camus also points out, though, thaton occasion as Sisyphus released his rock andwatched it return to its resting place at thebottom of the hill, he was able to recognize

SELECTED BIELIOGYAPHY

Chris Argyris in Intervention Theory and Method :A Behavioral Science View (Addison-Wesley,1970) gives an excellent description of the processof "owning up" and being"open," both of which aremajor skills required if one is to assist his organiza-tion in avoiding or leaving Abilene .

Albert Camus in The Myth o f Sisyphusand Other Essays (Vintage Books, Random House,1955) provides an existential viewpoint for copingwith absurdity, of which the Abilene Paradox is aclear example .

Jerry B: Harvey and R . Albertson in"Neurotic Organizations: Symptoms, Causes andTreatment," Parts I and II, Personnel Journal (Sep-tember and October 1971) provide a detailed ex-ample of a third-party intervention into an organi-zation caught in a variety of agreement-manage-ment dilemmas .

Irving Janis in Victims of Groupthink34 (Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1972) offers an alternative

the absurdity of his lot and, for brief periodsof time, transcend it.

So it may be with confronting theAbilene Paradox. Confronting the absurdparadox of agreement may provide, throughactivity, what Sisyphus gained from his pas-sive but conscious acceptance of his fate .Thus, through the process of active confron-tation with reality, we may take respite frompushing our rocks on their endless journeysand, for brief moments, experience whatC. P. Snow termed "the triumphs of life wemake for ourselves' within those absurditieswe call organizations .

viewpoint for understanding and dealing withmany of the dilemmas described in `The AbileneParadox." Specifically, many of the events thatJanis describes as examples of conformity pres-sures (that is, group tyranny) I would conceptual-ize as mismanaged agreement .

In his The Pursuit of Loneliness (BeaconPress, 1970), Philip Slater contributes an in-depthdescription of the impact of the role of alienation,separation, and loneliness (a major contribution tothe Abilene Paradox) in our culture .

Richard Walton in Interpersonal Peace-making: Confrontation and Third Party Consulta-tion (Addison-Wesley, 1969) describes a variety ofapproaches for dealing with conflict when it isreal, rather than phony.

If you wish to make photocopfes or obtain reprints

of this or other aTficles in ORGANIZATIONAL DnrN,tICS,

please refer to the special reprint serviceinstructions on page 80.



Abilene Revisited: An EpilogueJerry B. Harvey

"The Abilene Paradox" was born October 9, 1971 as part of a presentation I gave to theOrganization Development (OD) Network about some variations of ideas contained in apaper Dick Albertson and I had written on neurotic organizations . I remember the datenot because of the presentation, but because the Texas Longhorns suffered an ignominious48-27 defeat at the hands of the Oklahoma Sooners; no self-respecting Texan could forgeta disappointment of that magnitude .

Two hours before the session, I was "sweating bullets" trying to think of a proto-typical example of a neurotic organization, one that had done something blatantly insane .For reasons that remain incomprehensible, I suddenly thought of my family and a trip wetook one hot Sunday afternooon across a godforsaken desert to eat an indigestible mealin a hole-in-the-wall cafeteria in Abilene, Texas, and . . .

The audience apparently thought the story itself was great, but they didn't seemto think too much of the remainder of the speech -primarily, I suspect, because I had onlya very superficial explanation for why such craziness occurred .

Since, of course, I heard the Abilene story for the first time when I told it, I wasequally puzzled about its underlying dynamics. Consequently, soon after I returned homeI sequestered myself in my office and, with Dick's encouragement, a great deal of passion,and very little sleep, tried to figure it out . One week and sixty-five pages later, I thoughtI had .

EARLY REjECTION

Publishers didli t, however. For instance, the editor of a major monograph series in the ODfield returned it to me with the comment, "The nicest thing I could say about your workis that it would make a good high school senior thesis ." That hurt . Generally I'm not vindic-tive, but in his case I still harbor the fond hope of suckering him into a meal at the AbileneCafeteria .

I decided to reduce the manuscript to article length . I felt as if I were applyingmedicinal leeches to a baby that wasn t sick . In its shrunken state, it was further rejectedby a major management journal because it fit 'neither the journal's editorial style nor itspolicy of printing material of proven value to experienced managers." Since then, represen-tatives of the same journal have asked me to produce an article for them exactly like the"Abilene Paradox," but on a completely different topic . I guess they have either changedtheir editorial style or neglected to read Heidegger s observation that most of us humanbeings have to confine ourselves to developing a single thought .

Running short of courage, I nevertheless sent it to Bill Dowling, then editor of

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Organizational Dynamics, and awaited his letter of rejection . Failing to collude with mynegative fantasies, he agreed instead to publish it if I would allow him to do some editorialwork on it - including the removal of (1) an interview I had conducted with a group of lem-mings just before they went over the cliff and (2) the word my father-in-law really usedwhen commenting upon our disastrous trip to Abilene .

His argument was persuasive, and though I someday hope to remove the scar tis-sue from the very minor surgery he performed, I will always be in his debt . God bless BillDowling; I am in his debt. He died much too young .

THE PERIPASETIC PARADOX

Once the article was printed, it apparently "took off ." In the years since it first appeared,for example, I have been inundated with cards, letters, and telephone calls from people whohave described other "trips to Abilene," including couples who have gotten married whenthey wanted to remain single, couples who have gotten divorced when they wanted to staymarried, parishioners who built church buildings none of them wanted, school systems thatimplemented curricula none of their stakeholders supported, and countries that went to warwhen their citizens wanted peace .

In a similar vein, I have frequently been thanked and occasionally castigated forfacilitating marriages, divorces, promotions, demotions, good business decisions, lousybusiness decisions, family reconciliations, and family fights .

THE TRANSFORMING PARADOX

McGraw-Hill has seen fit to make a movie about the Paradox . Filmed in the style of TheWaltons, with me as the narrator, the film has provided me with a number of great learningexperiences, one of which occurred not long ago as I walked down the aisle of a plane boundfor Dallas. As I passed a Iather frumpy-appearing woman, she looked up and shouted forall to hear, "Are you the star of that movie, The Abilene Paradox?" Where that gorgeousfemme fatale came from, I dont know, but as I modestly replied (in my suavest actor'svoice), "Yes, Maam, I am," I thought to myself, "Robert Redford, eat your heart out ."

Paradoxically, the Paradox has had its dark side, too . For example, a videotapeof me (talking about the Paradox) has been reproduced and 'bootlegged' literally all overthe world without my permission or the permission of the organization that legitimatelyproduced it. Consequently, every time a naive (and sometimes not-so-naive) person tells me,"Our organization showed the videotape of your Abilene speech at our training programand we really enjoyed it," my blood boils at the lack of ethics on the part of those whoknowingly did (and do) it . I also bridle when I realize the amount of money I might havemade had I known how to market it and control its distribution . Ultimately, though, I think



my own sense of greed disturbs me the most because, deep down, I know I have been givena gift which is mine to share, not to hoard .

THE PARADOX AS PHANTOM

All this has occurred despite the fact that, to this day, I cannot prove scientifically that theAbilene Paradox actually occurs . For example, it is altogether possible that my in-lawsreally wanted to go on the original trip, but changed their stories once we arrived in Abileneand had such a lousy time . All I know for sure is that from the time the trip was first sug-gested I didn't want to go, and I drove the Buick . In that sense the problem, existentially,was mine .

So, given all that has occurred, would I change any of what I wrote? Not really.Oh, I might make a few cosmetic alterations, such as reinserting the interview with the lem-mings; stressing the role which anaclitic depression plays in causing the separation anxietycentral to trips to Abilene; and exploring in greater depth the ethical, moral, and spiritualaspects of the Paradox.

Still, in Heiddeger's terms, those are extensions of the same basic idea . Whethermy expression of the idea is flawed or not, I accept it for what it is -my initial effort todo the best I could with the thought that the Good Lord -out of confusion, compassion,appreciation, administrative errors in the Idea Assignment Division, or other reasons be-yond the limits of my human comprehension -saw fit to offer me.

An Abilene De fense: Commentary OneRosabeth Moss Kanter

Public agreement, private disagreement . "The Abilene Paradox" points out that this situa-tion almost inevitably leads to people going along for the ride even when they know better .The result: trouble .

The Abilene Paradox has two parts. The first involves a person's inaccurate as-sumptions about what others think and believe . This sometimes takes the guise of whatsocial scientists call "pluralistic ignorance'-everybody in a group holds a similar opinionbut, ignorant of the opinion of others, believes himself to be the only one feeling that way.The second part of the paradox involves•a persons unwillingness to speak up about whatshe does think and believe . It is easier, more comfortable, or safer to keep quiet and be

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swept along by the current . Combine pluralistic ignorance with the path of least resistanceand, before you know it, you're in Abilene .

Part one, then, is a problem of data. Part two is a problem of risk . The manager'stasks are to manage communication to allow the data to surface and to manage the or-ganizational context to enhance power and reduce risk .

MANAGE COMMUNICATION

How can communication be managed in this way? Here are some guidelines :Establish debates. Clearly, the first task for a manager is to set communication

norms -and he or she has to go first . Participative management has become a cliche, butthe idea of consulting others about possible decisions and genuinely pushing to hear thenegatives still makes sense . One way to encourage other people to express what they reallythink is to frame every issue as a debate between alternatives -a matter of pros and cons .Instead of presenting issues as matters of concurrence=Td like to do X, wouldn't you?'=they should be presented as matters for debate: "X has been proposed; let's examine thepros and cons." Instead of considering only one choice, always seek alternative courses of

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Rosabeth Moss Kanter is the Class of 1960Professor at the Harvard Business School,which she joined in 1986 after serving on theYale faculty for 9 years and founding Good-measure. Inc., the Boston-based consultingfirm. Author of The Change Masters, Men andWomen of the Corporation, and 7 other books,she has most recently written the book Creat-ing the Future : The Massachusetts Comebackand Its Promise for America (Summit Books),with Governor Michael S. Dukakis. She iscompleting a new book for Simon and Schustertentatively titled The Great Corporate Balanc-ing Act : Managing the Fallout from the En-trepreneurial Explosion .



action='What else might we be doing with that money or that time?'=and then evaluatethe main choice against the alternatives . Doing this requires actively valuing the additionaltime that debate can take, but a"bias for actioli' without considering alternatives can indeedland an organization in Abilene .

Assign gadflies, devil's advocates, fact checkers, and second guessers. There .arecertain well-established roles whose very definition involves confrontation, contrariness,and argument. Making sure that there is always someone playing the role of questioner("Is that conclusion accurate?") or prober ("C'mon now, you calit really believe thati") isa way to ensure that contrary opinions will begin to surface. If the role is formally assigned,some of the risk associated with speaking up is reduced, and everyone understands it's noth-ing personal. Making this into an assigned role also permits rotation, so that everyone getsto play devil's advocate from time to time. Gradually the questioning style will become partof the normal routine. Third parties such as consultants and facilitators often play this role.But think how effective it would be as part of the work group's own repertoiret

Encourage organizational graffiti. My colleague Barry Stein deserves credit forthis idea, which he is implementing in a very large company with a tradition of bureaucracyand conformity. The problem : People were not yet ready for open communication abouttheir concerns . What was needed was devices that would allow people to comment on theirconcerns regularly but anonymously. The solution was to use unattended computer termi-nals as a site for the corporate equivalent of "glaffiti"-remarks of any kind about any issue .Although written surveys and consultant interviews often serve this function, the appealof organizational graffiti is that it is spontaneous, ongoing, timely, free-form, open-ended,and-as people comment on each other's inputs-interactive .

MANAGE THE ORGANIZATIONAL CON2HXT

How can the organizational context be managed to enhance power and reduce risk? Hereare a few ways.

Make confronters into heroes. Instead of shooting messengers, reward them . Ofcourse, this is really hard . How many of us thank the bearers of bad news7 How manywhistle blowers on corporate misconduct have kept their jobs, let alone gotten tokens ofappreciation? And what rewards go. to people who stop the trip to Abilene-a passiveresult-as opposed to those who push action forward7 But still, if managers learn to valuethe honest expression of concerns because doing so will prevent more trouble later, thenthere is hope. If the organization provides role models, if the prizewinners and recognitiongarnerers include people known for their outspokenness rather than for their conformity,then more people can be encouraged to speak up .

Develop a "culture of pride."This is one of the cornerstones of the successful, in-novative companies I identified in The Change Masters . A culture of pride builds collectiveself-esteem through abundant praise and recognition. People are made visible ; they arevalued for their accomplishments . Standards of high performance are communicated over

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and over again . Thus when collective pride is high, individual self-esteem is also high . SeIf-identified winners feel more secure psychologically and find it easier to take risks .

Create empowering structures . If people are informed and well-connected, theycan more readily exercise independent judgment and speaking up is less risky . Organiza-tional power comes from access to information, political support, and resources ; power-lessness, in contrast, means not only a lack of access to, but also a dependence on, the bossto provide everything . Some of the structures that provide power include networks of peerswho provide political backing and a forum for communication ; sufficient employmentsecurity so that the job is not on the line every time the person speaks up ; and affiliationswith more than one work unit or reporting relationships with more than one boss, so thatthe person always has an alternative set of ties .

CHECXPOINTS AND MILESTONFS

Surfacing data and empowering people are good ways to help prevent starting out for Abi-lene, but they do not always guarantee that organizations won't begin some troublesometrips anyway, without full discussion of the consequences . Sometimes that's because no onereally understands the consequences yet, or feelings and opinions really are not that strong .The organization can find itself partway to Abilene before anyone knows they were headedthere. This situation is increasingly common as decisions become more complex .

Even harder than preventing bad decisions from being implemented is turningthem around halfway to their destination . So my final thought is this: AII organizationaltrips,should include some checkpoints to permit the travellers to pause, regroup, and con-sult the map one more time .

If you dont want to go to Abilene after all, it's never too late to take a road tosomewhere else .

An Abilene Defense : Commentary TwoArthur Elliott Carlisle

In educating his nephew Wormwood in the wiles of temptation, the old devil Screwtapetalks of the discord that can be engendered by urging people to argue in favor of what theybelieve (often incorrectly) other people want to do ; this in spite of their own desire to doexactly the opposite. The net result is, of course, that no ones wishes are fulfilled and at-tempts to develop mutually satisfying and successful joint ventures fail .

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The participants become angered by their frustration and, in this particular case,a discussion on whether to have tea in the garden or in the house results in not having teaat all (C .S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters, New York : The Macmillan Company, 1944, pp .133 and 134). This oft-recurring theme provides the basis for many literary comedies ofmanners and, fortunately, Jerry Harvey made it operational for managers in the "AbileneParadox."

The behaviors described by Professor Harvey are reenacted all too frequently indecision-making sessions where managers must jointly determine courses of action that areoften of vital importance to their organizations . They are important symptoms-symptoms that cannot be ignored, because they demonstrate an inability to manage an or-ganization in a truly professional manner . Indeed, they reflect deep-seated organizationalproblems that go far beyond questions of conflict or agreement. Effective management re-quires the setting of clear objectives-where possible by consensus, but occasionally byedict-after hearing all sides and positions .

CLIMATE or FEAR: A FAILURE OF MANAGEMENT

A failure of management occurs when a climate exists in which organization members areunwilling to express conflicting opinions whether the boss is present or not . This reluctance

Arthur Elliott Carlisle is professor of manage-ment at the University of Massachusetts atAmherst. He is also author of another remark-ably popular Organizational Dynamics classic :N1acGregor, " which appeared in the Summer1976 issue .


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results from the fear of being viewed by both peers and superiors as someone who is nota team player or as someone who does not support the bosss known pet projects . Further-more, when being a"yes-(wo)man" is believed to be the best route to promotion, somethingis profoundly wrong. This sort of behavior at best results in reduced organizational effectiveness and at worst leads to organizational decline or even dissolution .

In Western industrialized countries management has entered a new era, one inwhich business organizations are facing substantially increased competition -not onlyfrom abroad, but also from domestic firms seeking new markets with fundamentally differ-ent products. For example, the invasion of the electronic calculator from outside the indus-try caught traditional manufacturers like Marchant and Friden with a line of outmodedproducts. There is every reason to believe this pattern will continue . Organizational sur-vival now requires a level of expertise beyond what has been needed in the past, and thisexpertise is often available only at lower organizational levels .

To an ever-increasing extent, subordinates are better-trained in analytical andtechnical skills than are their superiors . Both domineering and charismatic leadership havebecome truly dangerous as a general modus operandi. An attitude at lower levels that "(s)hemay not always be right, but (s)he's always the boss" or an all-consuming desire to beviewed as a team member at whatever cost can result in the loss of contributions by trulytalented personnel who could improve organizational performance .

Avoiding the Abilene Paradox requires, first, recognition of its potential as atrap -recognition at the highest organizational levels, including the members of the boardof directors . (Directors are often guilty of'Abilene' behavior.) The next phase involves bothmanagement training and organization development . Managers must be reminded of theirresponsibility to communicate and gain commitment to the attainment of multiple objec-tives . Organization development is essential for maintaining a climate in which the AbileneParadox cannot flourish, let alone survive.

THE RIGHT KIND oF CLIMATE

Managers tend to pattern their leadership styles after those of their superiors ; therefore,managers at the highest levels must make it clear, by their own example, that all the organi-zation's managers are responsible for creating a healthy organizational climate. This cli-mate is one in which :

• Members are not afraid to express their opinions and, when they feel it appropriate,to challenge those of others when they have the facts.

• The "Kill the messenger who brings the bad news" syndrome is no longer part of theorganizational canon.

• Dissent, if backed up with data and analysis, does not brand the dissenter as a loner,a troublemaker, or someone who is not a team player ; instead, it is recognized as a profes-sional responsibility and rewarded .

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• Changing ones mind, particularly after new information or argument is presented, isnot seen as a sign of weakness, but rather of strength and self-confidence .

• Attainment of realistic group and individual objectives, rather than pleasing the bossor being a good team member, is the basis for organizational reward and advancement .

An organization that is to avoid the destructive consequences of an Abilene Para-dox requires one additional ingredient: Management training and organization develop-ment are not enough if the necessary raw materials are lacking . At managerial and technicallevels, hiring and promotional practices must seek self-confident, sensitive (but not super-sensitive), non-risk-aversive men and women, competent enough to be readily hired else-where. Such individuals do not play Screwtapes "Let's have tea in the garden" game .

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the abilene paradox

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