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The Afghanistan ConflictReforming the Village Warby David Katz

In the strategic debate over Afghanistan, two opposing schools of thought haveemerged. The first asserts that a durable victory requires a functioning, legitimate, and representative nation-state; the second contends that U.S. national security

concerns can be satisfied without committing to a wholesale restructuring of the country.The predominate school advocates surging ground troops and deeper national commit-ment; its counterpart seeks solution through long-distance punitive strikes using cruisemissiles, unmanned predator drones, or raids by special operations forces.

Limiting the strategic response to whether America is either spending billions ofdollars and suffering thousands of dead to restructure whole countries or is a distantsword bearer antiseptically raining down death and destruction is, however, a falsechoice. Washington’s challenge is to field a decisive and cost-effective global strategyimplemented by successful tactics to bring a durable victory.

To be sure, Afghanistan is a seemingly intractable problem. Throughout history,dozens of foreign armies have marched into the country—from the ancient Greeks andPersians, to the Mongol hordes, to British, Russian, and Soviet occupiers. None ofthem remained, and the legacy of their battles and campaigns has not been empire butan indigenous Pashtun tribal structure and culture, refined and honed over millennia forfierce resistance against invaders.

The Pashtuns are permanent in the region. The Americans are not. The Afghans willwait out this latest incursion as they did those by every foreign invader since Alexanderthe Great. Unless Washington adopts a new and imaginative strategy that will separatethe Taliban from the Pashtun tribes, the U.S. footprint in Afghanistan is bound to disap-pear with no lasting legacy.

David Katz is a West Point graduate, former GreenBeret captain, and Silicon Valley entrepreneur.He formed DaraCom to facilitate the strategicuse of twenty-first century technologies to com-municate effectively with unconnected or non-technical individuals and communities through-out the world.

SHIFTING STRATEGIES

In his address to the nation on October 7,2001, announcing the beginning of combat op-erations in Afghanistan—or Operation Endur-ing Freedom (OEF) as it would come to beknown—President George W. Bush defined thenascent campaign as

carefully targeted actions … designed to dis-rupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base

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of operations and to attack the military capa-bility of the Taliban regime … Every nationhas a choice to make … In this conflict, thereis no neutral ground. If any government spon-sors the outlaws and killers of innocents, theyhave become outlaws and murderers them-selves. And they will take that lonely path attheir own peril.1

This goal was reaf-firmed in “The NationalSecurity Strategy of theUnited States,” the Bushadministration’s strategydocument, published inSeptember 2002, whichsought to “disrupt anddestroy terrorist organi-zations by … denyingfurther sponsorship,support, and sanctuaryto terrorists by convinc-

ing or compelling states to accept their sover-eign responsibilities.”2

Nine years later, Operation Enduring Free-dom has progressed through three distinct stra-tegic phases:

Phase one. Beginning as a counterinsur-gency campaign, OEF quickly developed intoan offensive war of maneuver where massedNorthern Alliance militias advanced to engagethe Taliban in open battle. OEF phase one waswaged unconventionally—utilizing the Taliban’slocal rivals and supported by the CIA, ArmyGreen Berets, and U.S. air power. It toppled theTaliban regime in a rapid and cost-effective man-ner that was over to all intents and purposes byDecember 20, 2001, when the U.N. Security Coun-cil established the British-led International Se-curity and Assistance Force (ISAF) “to assistthe Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenanceof security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.”3

Phase two. Characterized by a logisticalbuildup and strategic defense waged througha conventional war of attrition, the secondphase began with Operation Anaconda inMarch 2002 when more than 1,000 U.S. soldiersconducted fierce firefights in the Tora Bora re-gion, inflicting hundreds of casualties on theTaliban, their Pashtun tribal backers, and theiral-Qaeda allies.4

For all its achievements, Operation Ana-conda was not decisive. It did not, in any strate-gic sense, destroy the enemy’s forces, seize theirterrain or populations, or break their will to fight.Quite the contrary in fact, it marked the begin-ning of the strategic defense as U.S. forces failedto pursue the enemy over the Pakistan border,thus enabling the creation of sanctuaries in thatcountry’s Northwest Frontier Provinces and theFederally Administered Tribal Areas from whichthe Taliban would carry out sporadic and dif-fuse guerilla operations.

Imposing a conventional framework onwhat had been a chaotic unconventional cam-paign, the new strategy involved the construc-tion and expansion of ISAF bases around thecountry as the force grew from its initial 600-strong size to the current 131,700.5 Numeroustactical operations were launched. The Afghannational government, army, police and borderforces were created. Twenty-six provisional re-construction teams were dispatched to theprovinces.6 Civil and public works were com-missioned and funded by the internationalcommunity.

The shift from a tribal-based counterinsur-gency to a conventional Western diplomatic andmilitary framework was an abrupt and radicalchange for Afghanistan, not least since the mod-est strategic goal of denying al-Qaeda a base of

The U.S.-backedKarzaigovernment isseen as a foreignimplant similar toSoviet-backedgovernments.

1 The Washington Post, Oct. 7, 2001.2 “The National Security Strategy, September 2002,” TheWhite House, chap. III, p. 2.3 “Security Council Authorizes International Security Force forAfghanistan,” resolution 1386, United Nations, New York, Dec.20, 2001.

4 “Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden andWhy It Matters Today,” report to U.S. Senate, Committee onForeign Relations, 111th Congress, Washington, D.C., Nov.30, 2009.5 “Key Facts and Figures,” International Security and Assis-tance Force, North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), accessedDec. 14, 2010.6 “ISAF Regional Command Structure,” International Secu-rity Assistance Force, NATO, Oct. 22, 2009.

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operations gave way to compellingthe Afghan government to enforceits authority over the country’s tribalentities—something that had histori-cally resulted in insurrection. Smallwonder, therefore, that the latest im-position of modern state structureson this tribal society generated areaction that served to unify and mo-tivate current and possibly futuregenerations of Pashtuns againstU.S. forces, their allies, and the Af-ghan government. For most Af-ghans, the U.S.-backed Hamid Karzaigovernment has been as much a for-eign implant as the Soviet-backedcommunist governments; its militaryoperations in the provinces are al-most as foreign an exercise as West-ern interventions.

The ISAF’s tactical successesnotwithstanding, the Taliban contin-ued to attack and did so in increas-ing numbers. The conventional warof attrition focused on kinetic opera-tions against enemy forces in Afghanistan tothe exclusion of Pakistani sanctuaries, militantmadrasas (Islamic schools), and Pashtun tribaland religious imperatives. Moreover, it mis-matched U.S. tactical advantages of speed, com-munication, and firepower against Pashtun stra-tegic advantages of permanence, religious andtribal will, moral purpose, local knowledge, lan-guage, and culture.

The ISAF could inflict cumulative casual-ties numbering in the tens of thousands on theTaliban without deterring them, their Pashtuntribal backers, or their al-Qaeda allies. The rea-son for this is simple arithmetic. The total fertil-ity rate—the average number of children bornto a woman over her reproductive lifetime—inthe Taliban’s sanctuary of Pakistan’s NorthwestFrontier Provinces is 5.17; in Afghanistan, it is

6.6.8 If these rates bracket the actual rates oneither side of the border, the provinces’ popula-tion of eighteen million doubles every eleven tofourteen years, providing some eight to ninemillion additional males for jihad. This regenera-tive capacity trumps any casualty rate the ISAFcan inflict on the Taliban in Afghanistan. TheTaliban needs to protract the conflict in order torealize its strategic advantage provided by birthrate. The ISAF’s strategy not only provided thattime but also surrendered the strategic offen-sive to the enemy, which could decide at its lei-sure if and when to engage.

Ultimately, the second strategy failed be-cause it lacked a way to convert tactical gainsinto strategic victory. The ISAF’s tactical-stra-tegic disconnect manifested itself in emergentbad habits; timid generalship allowed force pro-tection where avoidance of casualties is a pre-dominate strategic objective. It fixated on per-

Katz: Pashtun Society

Pashtun village society operates within strong indig-enous traditions. Foremost among them are the qawm,a densely layered weave of local, social-solidarity net-works, and the manteqa, a culturally uniform, shared-geographic space, usually based around clusters ofsmall villages.

7 “The Pakistan Reproductive Health and Family PlanningSurvey (PRHFPS),” National Institute of Population Studies(NIPS), Islamabad, 2001, p. 48.

8 “Afghanistan Statistics,” UNICEF, New York, 2008, ac-cessed Feb. 7, 2011.

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sonalities, not war goals. Remote, periodic cull-ing of the Taliban’s leadership through Predatordrone strikes and commando raids achieved “sil-ver bullet” status for a command substitutingtactical body and bean counting for strategicgains.

Phase Three. This phase commenced withthe insertion of 4,000 Marines into the HelmandRiver valley on June 30, 2009, as part of a newclear and hold strategy that de-emphasized pro-tecting military forces in favor of deploying themacross Afghanistan.9 As Gen. David Petraeusexplained to the Senate Armed Forces Commit-tee on April 1, 2009,

In order to address the situation in Afghani-stan, we will implement a comprehensivecounterinsurgency approach that works todefeat existing insurgent groups, develops the

institutions required to address theroot causes of the conflict, main-tains relentless pressure on terror-ist organizations affiliated with theinsurgency, dismantles illegal drugnetworks, and prevents the emer-gence of safe havens for thosetransnational extremist groups …A properly sized, trained, andequipped Afghanistan National Se-curity Force is a prerequisite forany eventual drawdown of interna-tional forces from Afghanistan …In addition, we will bolster the ca-pabilities and the legitimacy of theother elements of the Afghan gov-ernment—an effort in which, inmuch of Afghanistan, we will bebuilding, not rebuilding.10

While maintaining mostframeworks of the second phase,this strategy avoided the pitfallof a conventional war of attritionby employing a comprehensivecounterinsurgency approach. Thestrategic goal of compelling Af-ghanistan to exercise sovereign

control over its territory remained preeminent,and open-ended direct tactical engagement re-mained the means. Petraeus specifically men-tioned an endpoint where ISAF’s security re-sponsibilities would be transferred to the Af-ghans and its forces drawn down. The ques-tion is whether a foreign war can evolve, or de-volve, into a purely Afghan war.

WINNING AFGHANISTAN

The United States and its allies have beenbattling the Taliban for nearly a decade, to noconclusive effect. While having a wide spec-trum of responses and capabilities, they haverelied almost exclusively upon direct tactical en-gagement, ignoring for the most part soft power,

Accounting for some 42 percent of Afghanistan’s 29-million-strong population and concentrated in theeast and the south of the country, the Pashtuns havedominated Afghan policies since the country’s foundingin the mid-eighteenth century. Above, darkest shadingrepresents Pashtun regions.

9 The Washington Post, July 3, 2009. 10 Gen. David H. Petraeus, statement before the Senate ArmedServices Committee, Washington, D.C., Apr. 1, 2009.

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whether religious, economic, social competition,or co-optation. Yet armed force is only one meansto defeat an adversary. In order to execute a suc-cessful war in Afghanistan or elsewhere, theWest must broaden its approach, initiate newmethods and remove failed ones.

The minimum goal must be to preclude theestablishment of armed Salafi Islam in failed na-tion-state sanctuaries or defeat it locally whereit threatens U.S. or Western national interests.Ultimately, this will require the removal ofIslamism’s hold on targeted tribal societies al-though this cannot be directly achieved throughexternal intervention but rather through a deci-sive engagement between indigenous constitu-encies. As such, Western nationals, whetherarmed or nongovernmental organizations, are notpart of the permanent solution.

Specifically, the key to victory lies in thereformulation of Afghanistan’s Pashtun villagesociety to the extent that it not only rejectsSalafi Islam as its sole or preeminent organiz-ing and motivating principle but also invigo-rates competitive forces—political, cultural, re-ligious, economic, and ideological—capable ofsuperseding and/or replacing the Salafi inter-pretation of Islam in those societies. Such natu-ral competitors must create in-place, multigen-erational societies, whose opposition to radi-cal Islam is self-maintaining, self-replacing, andself-organizing. Their emergence requires thatthe West alter the predominance, range of con-trol, and the depth and balance among thesenatural forces, elevating certain constituenciesand diminishing others, without forgetting fora moment that these are native constituenciesand are not proxy forces dependent upon for-eign support and intervention.

The advantage of societal reformulation isthat it uses existing constituencies, operatingwithin natural parameters and constraints, whichprecludes the cost of introducing, preparing, andeducating societies on foreign concepts; de-creases the probability of rejection; and also re-duces the probability that natural competitorsare co-opted and used against U.S. and alliedforces. Also, the use of existing constituenciesdecreases the need to deploy Western forces indirect tactical engagements. Lastly, evolution-

ary and consistent reformulation, rather thanabrupt radical transformation, avoids supplyingreactionary elements in society with a rallyingfocus.

DECENTRALIZATION AND ITS MERITS

Reformulation of a targeted society takesplace within that society’s natural operating pa-rameters and constraints. In the case of south-ern Afghanistan, local Pashtun village societyoperates within the Hanafi school of Sunni Mus-lim jurisprudence and Pashtunwali indigenoustraditions of the region expressed through narkh,a Pashto word meaning informal or traditionallaws and rules.11 Qawm (Dari) is a densely lay-ered weave of constantly renegotiated, local, andsocial solidarity networks. Manteqa (Pashto) isa self-identified, culturally uniform, shared-geographic space, usually based around clus-ters of small villages.12

Together, they articulatethe depth, range of con-trol, predominance, andbalance among naturaland traditional Afghanconstituencies.

The straightforwardintegration of local vil-lage society to the cen-tral state will be no mean feat. The qawm net-works have historically been inaccessible, if nothostile, to the imposition of external, hierarchi-cal control, all the more so to a central govern-ment seeking to impose a Western-type staterun by English speaking, transnational elites andbacked by foreign troops. Current village-basedcounterinsurgency programs such as the Village


Victory lies in thereformulation ofPashtun villagesociety to rejectSalafi Islam.

11 Shahmahmood Miakhel, Understanding Afghanistan: TheImportance of Tribal Culture and Structure in Security andGovernance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009),p. 2.12 Raphy Favre, “Interface between State and Society in Af-ghanistan,” Aizon, Addis Abeba, Feb. 2005, pp. 5-8.


Stability Program, Afghan Public ProtectionProgram, Community Defense Initiative, andLocal Defense Initiative that operate throughshuras or jurgas (local or tribal consultativecouncils) will either be co-opted by a large rep-ertoire of local interests or rejected because, attheir core, they are antithetical to qawm andmanteqa interests.13

Short of a funda-mental restructuring ofthe Afghan state, there-fore, the solution is toconstruct an intermedi-ate edifice or interfacebetween the antitheticalaspects of the Afghanstate and village society.This structure should beable to directly accessqawm networks, migratethem to the central state

over time, fight the sectarian war, and stabilizethe village system. This requires that the pre-dominance, range of control, depth and balanceamong the networked constituencies that makeup village society is altered, elevating some anddiminishing others. This intermediate structuremust be evolutionary, rather than revolutionary,so as to preclude a reactionary backlash. Itshould, moreover, isolate and atomize those linksSalafists use to access the village society’s so-cial structure.

Admittedly, the situation in Afghanistanis chaotic. The central government does notpossess an established, widely trusted, or ac-cepted capacity for institutional governanceand is challenged by numerous warlords andheavily armed tribes dotting the Afghan andPakistani landscape. Co-opting and makingthem enemies of Salafi Islam and allies of thenational government will be difficult, but thereare historical precedents for long-term success.The most directly applicable is the “internal im-perialism” of Amir Abdurrahman (1880-1901),

aptly named the “Iron Amir,” who consolidatedpreviously independent tribes under centralgovernment authority. Likewise, Zahir Shah’slong and peaceful reign (1933-73) was largelydue to its co-optation of and cooperation withvillage society: He successfully maintained bal-ance among tribes, religious leaders, and thecentral government by limiting its presence androle in the countryside and by skillful use of softpower.14

By way of repeating Abdurrahman’s con-solidation while emphasizing Zahir’s co-optation, a prominent man from each manteqashould be selected as baradur ikhan (or he-roic local leader in Pashto) and endowed withpermanent, indivisible, and inheritable federalassets, obligations, and powers. These are in-tended to align the baradur ikhan, his family,extended relations, and constituents with thecentral government, and they then become aconduit between it and the qawm in eachmanteqa, facilitating the incorporation of vil-lage society over time to the state. By elevat-ing select qawm members, providing themwith federal assets (fiefs), and requiring al-legiance and owed service (homage), the pre-dominance, range of control, depth, and bal-ance among the networked constituenciesthat make up village society are altered,interlinking the village with the decentralizedsubstructure, and by extension—with thestate’s central superstructure. Additionally,the manteqa’s fixed physical location attachesthe baradur ikhan, his family, and clan to adefined geographic area they must defend ifthey want to retain the centrally-awarded ben-efits. If properly managed, the federal inves-titure of an individual from the manteqa andthe qawm can generate a cascade of personalobligations and owed service—ultimately tothe central government—from the baradurikhan downward to his retainers in themanteqa, and horizontally through mutualsupport obligations to other baradur ikhansacross manteqas.

The competitionbetweenthe Afghangovernment andthe Taliban maybe about whowill providepublic order.

13 The New York Times, Mar. 11, 2010. 14 Miakhel, Understanding Afghanistan, p. 21.

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Decentralization also im-poses an obligation on the cen-tral government, which mustassist and support its represen-tative, his family, retainers, andconsti tuents, not intr igueagainst them, or reduce themto servitude. While it mayspecify terms and conditionsfor operat ing the f ief , thegovernment’s goal is to gener-ate a string of long-term, per-sonal obligations from promi-nent individuals and families inthose areas it needs to consoli-date. Prior conditions on thebaradur ikhan for holding andoperating the fief cannot beoverly constraining to ensurethat federal assets are pro-tected and operated profitably.

INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY

Newly-appointed baradur ikhans in thevarious manteqas will play a central role in cre-ating links between village society and the cen-tral government. It is to them that local con-stituents would pledge personal allegiance inexchange for profiting from centrally createdassets and federal alignment. The baradurikhan must deliver homage, military service ofa specified number of retainers in battle or gar-rison, or service support, such as digging for-tifications, carting supplies, providing arms orvehicles, etc. Additionally, the baradur ikhanmust provide hospitality and food for federalrepresentatives and attend meetings at the na-tional level when summoned.

A long-tenured baradur ikhan can providedirect, consistent, and stable civil-military rep-resentation to the manteqa. Long tenure makesit possible to fulfill cross-generational personalobligations between the central government, itssubjects, and the qawm network. Without theability to redress grievance or interface with theoriginal, local individual guarantor or his family,neither the subject nor the qawm will risk a mean-

ingful relationship with the central authorities.Long tenure provides consistency and stabilitywhich minimizes random shocks to the qawmand manteqa, allowing for better planning andhigher societal growth with lower societal risk.Ultimately, a long tenure facilitates the evolu-tion of baradur ikhans’ individual performanceinto the standard for the office, laying the foun-dations of institutional governance.

The baradur ikhan’s duties as direct civil-military representative to the manteqa includeterritorial defense, both separately and in coor-dination with, but not subordinate to, the localconsultative body (jurga or shura), administra-tion of governmental goods and services, andfacilitation of the government-qawm relation-ship.15 As such, the baradur ikhan would recruitand maintain a professional constabulary fromlocal families. He would also incorporate thosefamilies, as appropriate, to his centrally-providedfiefs requiring formal homage obligations (i.e.,


15 Seth Jones, “Community Defense in Afghanistan,” JointForces Quarterly, 2nd Quarter, 2010, p. 11.

Refined and honed over millennia for fierce resistanceagainst invaders, Afghanistan’s Pashtun tribal society mustbe separated from the Taliban and its Salafist allies andaligned to the central government as a prerequisite forwinning the war.

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armed support) from them to him. While thereare many specific approaches, the baradur ikhanshould report to the provincial governor as well

as the interior ministry,be independent fromdistrict Afghan NationalArmy and Afghan Na-tional Police elementsand operate on his ownrecognizance underguidance from the pro-vincial governor.

The baradur ikhan’sduties are not to imposecentral law onto the

manteqa or into the qawm but primarily to con-duct stability operations and maintain the peace.His long tenure and qawm interconnections en-sure the firm subordination of tactical priorities,martial ideals, and warlike instincts to politicalgoals and minimizes the misuse of force in pur-suit of purely tactical goals or for the psychicrewards of purposeless victories.16 As a local,albeit elevated by the central government, hewould operate with deep understanding andacknowledgement of local traditions.

Given the inherent power of the baradurikhan, additional governmental checks and bal-ances, as well as constraining regional offices,should be implemented. On stability operations,the baradur ikhan reports to the provincial gov-ernor and could be removed by him with theconcurrence of the Interior Ministry and thedefense department. On constituency-relatedissues (fief, homage, allegiance), the baradurikhan answers to a federal justice of the peace.Unless and until hostile areas are pacified, sta-bilized, and consolidated under central con-trol, there is no advantage to antagonizing theqawm by introducing national police or anyvariant of this profoundly alien concept.17 Thisis why the baradur ikhan is different and dis-

tinct from any national police force.Beyond defeating Taliban paramilitaries and

bandits, successful stability operations provideconsistent, stable public order. The essentialcompetition between the Afghan governmentand the Taliban may, in fact, be about who willprovide public order and to what end. Given thepresumption of sovereignty and the self-polic-ing nature of the qawm, enforcing public orderin Afghanistan requires the ability to maneuveramong a large array of local interests. A viableapproach is to facilitate the acculturation of na-tional needs through village society’s socialframework into the qawm, manteqa, and shura.The baradur ikhan and his retainers, a local, per-manent, federal force whose self-interest and per-sonal survival is inextricably linked to govern-mental success, can operate inside the qawm toredirect and/or co-opt its mechanisms for en-forcing public order to federal ends.

The baradur ikhan’s responsibility for re-gional stability offers significant military andstrategic advantages, mainly by freeing the Af-ghan army from territorial duties. This allows thearmy to remain a mobile strike force, employingthe psychological weight of its presence and itsmobility to pacify unruly districts with economyof force measures and to avoid the heavy forceprotection requirements of a garrisoned force.

Economically, the baradur ikhan with hisintimate knowledge of both the qawm and thecentral government serves as an intermediarybetween the two. He not only satisfies theqawm’s demand for government goods and ser-vices delivered at the right place, quantity, qual-ity, and price but also stimulates demand throughpromotion, time, place, safe storage, and trans-port.18 In other words, a central government de-livering a generic selection of non-priced goodsand services on an ad hoc basis to a qawm willsee those goods and services co-opted by localinterests for local purposes. By contrast, thebaradur ikhan matches the assortment of gov-

16 Edward Luttwak, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 2.17 Thomas Blau and Daryl Liskey, “Analytics and Action inAfghanistan,” Prism 1, Sept. 2010, pp. 42-5.

18 Philip Kotler, Marketing Management: Analysis, Planning,Implementation and Control (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1988), pp. 529-32.

Salafism is amodern movementthat lacks historicweight comparedto traditionalIslam.

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ernmental goods and services to the market, seesthat they are properly transported to where themarket can gain access to them, or stored untilthey are ready for use, and exchanged for money,goods, or services. As an intermediary channel,the baradur ikhan also regularizes the transac-tion by standardizing the ordering, as well asvaluing and paying for goods or services be-tween the central government and the qawm. Asthe trade-relations mix is fulfilled by completedtransactions between the government and theqawm, trust is created between the local and na-tional institutions.

Cross-border sanctuaries present a chal-lenge to any state. In theory, states either re-spect sovereign borders or declare war in orderto violate them. On the ground, weak or failedstates may be unable to control their borders,pursue national strategy asymmetrically throughdeniable proxy forces, or find it expedient to al-low restive minorities to become a neighbor’sproblem.

To fight the Taliban and its allies in theirPakistan sanctuaries, the Afghan governmentcould make use of ghazis—semiautonomouswarlords operating as a vanguard for the centralgovernment—who would focus on expansioninto contested areas and sanctuaries outside theoperative Afghan state. These ghazis couldconduct limited campaigns in hostile or con-tested Pashtun territories with a view to confed-erating independent manteqas and tribes andconsolidating hostile manteqas under their au-thority and de-facto Afghan central control.19

The ghazis must be co-opted, controlled,and counterbalanced in order to preclude com-petition with the state. U.S. funding, logisticaland combat support, as well as air power andspecial forces support are all available counter-balances. Shifting support among competingghazis could reinforce dependency on U.S. andallied forces. Upon successful societal reformu-lation of confederated or consolidated popula-

tions, the ghazis will have to be incorporatedinto the Afghan state institutions through “actsof union” granting equal rights to those popu-lations through locally arbitrated rather thancentrally appointed representation.

FIGHTING ARMED SALAFISM

The war in Afghanistan is both nativist andsectarian. Any viable strategy must engage anddefeat the Taliban in both. As an alien implant ina predominantly Hanifi Sunni society, armedSalafism in Afghanistan has exploitable weak-nesses. For one thing, its doctrinarian oppres-siveness creates an enormous resource drainand places Salafism in opposition to many pre-existing local constituencies and natural soci-etal forces. For another, despite its atavisticyearning for the restora-tion of an idealized past,Salafism is a modernmovement that lacks his-toric weight compared totraditional Islam. TheTaliban, in particular, arepoorly tutored in Islamicand Afghan history andhave rudimentary famil-iarity with the Qur’an andthe Shari‘a (Islamic law), not to mention politicaland theoretical developments in the Muslimworld during the twentieth century.20 This in turnleaves them exposed to numerous counter-strat-egies. It is possible, for example, to exploitSalafism’s doctrinal characteristics and tenden-cies to wedge it away from and render it foreignto Afghan society, then use that foreignness toinvoke an immune response from natural com-ponents of that society. It may also be possibleto enhance and intensify existing schisms be-tween doctrinal purist Salafists and their morepragmatic and less theological jihadist counter-


19 See a similar idea in Robert Bartlett, England under theNorman and Angevin Kings: 1075- 1225 (Oxford: ClarendonPress, 2000), p. 73. 20 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban (New Haven: Yale University Press,

2000), p. 93.

The Russiansbegan usingSufism as acounterbalanceto Salafism inChechnya.


parts until the local movement collapses—an ap-proach that was successfully employed inChechnya and Algeria where the Armed IslamicGroup’s methods were so violent as to be ques-tioned by some Salafi clerics.21

While both counter-strategies are feasible,the “foreignness” approach is most accessibleand universal. Initially, Salafi sects must be de-nied a local foothold by the development anddeployment of wedge issues that separate themfrom traditional, local village society. These canrange across numerous sectarian, ethnic, andnational divides as the Pakistani military at-tempted to wedge the Ahmadzai Wazir andMeshud Taliban factions apart in Waziristan.22

Ultimately, the theocratic case against Salafi Is-lam can be made and formalized in religious rul-ings (fatwas) issued by respected Pashtun ulema,something that should not be too difficult giventhe Taliban’s low level of religious knowledge.

Once the divide is drawn between Salafismand local, traditional Islam, the historical weightand resources of local religion must be mobi-lized for challenging Salafism for grassroots con-trol of the mosque, imam, and ulema. Imams canbe recruited to report on parishioners who chal-

lenge traditional doc-trine. Parishioners canseize the religious en-dowments of radicalizedmosques or the mosquesthemselves. Establish-ing an affiliated, ruralHanafi Islamic madrasa(school) system, provid-ing a local center of grav-ity for community-based

social services, job training and placement,youth recruitment and education, all within pre-existing qawm and manteqa structures providesanother avenue for challenging Salafism. As with

radical Islamic schools, these madrasas shouldbe free of charge and driven by missionary zeal.As such, they should be able to attract vettedand trained ulema and clerics as well as thebrightest and most ambitious students sinceofficial recognition of their diplomas would pro-vide a safe and lucrative avenue to governmentemployment and social services.23

Such a system can provide a means for re-inforcing and defending local religion’s positionwithin the village social network while drivingSalafism outside it. It employs the same methodused to install Salafism in the Pashtun areas ofPakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province andBaluchistan during the 1980s but to oppositeeffect.24 For example, emphasizing the differ-ences between Pashtunwali and Salafi interpre-tations of the Shari‘a can create internal contra-dictions for Salafi Pashtuns, forcing them tochoose between being good Pashtuns and goodSalafis. Likewise, the employment of local ulemaand mullahs provides them with a material in-centive to spread the message within villagesociety. At a minimum, it co-opts local religiousresources and prevents their co-optation by oth-ers. Affiliation among local madrasas aids infor-mation flow and facilitates rapid response.Coupled with provincial associations for re-gional ulema and mullahs for additional educa-tion, specific services, and mutual defense, thesystem creates a religious critical mass compet-ing directly with Salafi Islam—all without directgovernment presence.

The outcome is a coherent distributionchannel for a competitive Pashtun Hanafi reli-gious model where the individual adherent canbe both a good Pashtun and a good Muslim asopposed to the Salafi model that rejects tradi-tional Pashtun social structure.25 A competing

21 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The New Global Threat:Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” Middle East Policy, Dec. 2001,pp. 25, 30.22 Mona Kanwal Sheikh, “Disaggregating the PakistaniTaliban,” Danish Institute for International Studies Brief,Copenhagen, Sept. 2009, p. 5.

Grassrootspatriotism couldfuel rejectionof foreignconcepts suchas Wahhabism.

23 Olivier Roy, “Islamic Radicalism in Afghanistan and Paki-stan,” U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Emer-gency and Security Service, Jan. 2002, p. 11; S.J. Malik,“Dynamics among Traditional Religious Scholars and TheirInstitutions in Contemporary South Asia,” The Muslim World,July-Oct. 1997.24 Rashid, Taliban, p. 89.25 Ibid., p. 92.

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madrasa system can also attack acritical vulnerability of armed Salafimovements by aggressively vyingwith them for new recruits. Thiscould, in turn, limit the Taliban’s abil-ity to replace its combat losses,shrink its available pool of man-power, and drive up its labor costs.The confluence of these factors maycascade through to Taliban combatoperations, reducing tempo, de-creasing range, changing tactics andfocus. If successful, a competingmadrasa system should providetheological shock troops matchingthe Taliban’s religious zeal and ex-ceeding them in religious education.The end result would be an equaland opposite self-organized, armed,extra-tribal, sectarian force funda-mentally opposed to the Taliban.

There are other minority sectsin Afghanistan and Central Asia thatcan buttress the sectarian waragainst armed Salafism, notably the Sufi move-ment, which in many ways embodies the antith-esis to Salafism. Its incorporation of local be-liefs and variations of practice falls into the sin-ful category of Bid’a, or religious innovation af-ter Islam’s first generations; its veneration ofsaints, visitation of tombs, celebration of theProphet Muhammad’s birthday, all violatetawhid—the uniqueness and unity of God—byrevering anything other than God.26

Sufism’s propensity to regionalize, accul-turate, and seek economic uplift imbues it withthe ability to create combined religious-ethnic-economic wedge issues. As such, it can offer anadvantageous religious model for Pashtuns ver-sus Salafism and be successful in competing fornew adherents. Establishing Sufi centers orcloisters with schools in border regions intro-

duces a strategic, sectarian challenge to theSalafis. Sufism in Chechnya operates in a mili-tary-style cell structure.27 This could easily beimported to Afghanistan. In hostile locations,Sufism operates underground schools, and thecombination of military organization and ten-dency to secrecy may allow for strategic pen-etration of Salafi areas.28 Indeed, the Russiansbegan using Sufism as a counterbalance toSalafism in 1996 under Chechen president AslanMaskhadov, and the idea of promoting Sufismas a counterbalance to Salafism is gaining cur-rency in some U.S. defense-related think tanks,such as the Rand Corporation and the HeritageInstitute.29

Given their inclination to oppose foreignoccupation, Sufis fought alongside Salafis and


Burqa-clad Afghan women show identification cardsas they wait to cast their votes at a school converted toa polling center in Kandahar, August 20, 2009. To winthe fight against Salafism, the historical weight andresources of local religion must be mobilized forgrassroots control of the mosque, imam, and ulema.

26 Mary Brill Olcott, “Sufism in Central Asia: A Force forModeration or a Cause of Politicization?” Carnegie Endowmentfor International Peace, Russian and Eurasian Program, Wash-ington, D.C., May 2002, p. 1; Wiktorowicz, “The New GlobalThreat,” p. 20.

27 Mairbek Vatchagaev, “The Role of Sufism in the ChechenResistance,” North Caucasus Analysis, Jamestown Founda-tion, Washington, D.C., Dec. 31, 1969.28 Olcott, “Sufism in Central Asia,” p. 16; Reuters, June 26,2009.29 Reuters, June 26, 2009.

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Baathists against U.S. forces in Fallujah in 2004,and this factor may limit their strategic employ-ment.30 However, Sufi expansions into Salafi ar-eas will undoubtedly induce Salafi attacks,which could in turn provide the impetus forarmed Sufi response. Moreover, the use of Af-ghan non-Salafi sects, like the Sufis, directlychallenges Salafi claims to sacred legitimacy, frag-ments their attempts to organize village society,and plunges those areas under Salafi control intodestructive, internecine, sectarian war.

Finally, the newly-appointed ghazis couldbe induced to support the Hanafi system andSufi monasteries so as to introduce religiouscompetition at the local level in harmony with,but not a direct component of, the decentralizedsystem. On a wider level, local patriotism canreinforce the sectarian wedge. A Pashtun cul-tural renaissance will compete with radical Islamas a societal motivator and organizer. A Pashtuncultural renaissance, distributed as an ethnic-tribal component of a federally-funded, religious-educational system, could support the estab-lishment of specifically created local groups.In addition to providing cultural identification,these groups could become natural competi-tors, promoting and distributing indigenousdogma with positive or punitive scope on is-

sues, including Pashtuntribal history, politics,and genealogy. Theirgrassroots patriotismcould fuel rejection offoreign concepts such asWahhabism and the in-dividuals and groupscarrying it.

Pashtun patriotismcould be a means to iso-

late and drive out foreign, non-Pashtun radicalsand their religious concepts. It could directlyattack the linkage between non-traditional, non-local Islamic jurisprudence and militarism. Track-

ing, targeting, and locating foreign militantswould be consistent with such groups andhighly useful to U.S. intelligence. Promoting lowintensity conflict between the proponents ofPashtun patriotism and foreign-derived Islamicmilitarism could shut down the pipeline of for-eign recruits coming to centralized training fa-cilities. This would force Islamic radicals to ex-pend resources replicating training bases in eachlocale where they seek to operate.

ECONOMIC STRATEGY

Religious and ideological motivators pro-vide the will. Political and cultural organizationsprovide the force. Economic programs providethe staying power. The goal of a national logis-tics system is to compete for tribal affiliation,based upon standard of living. National logis-tics programs conducted at the district level mustbe delivered as a package of goods and ser-vices only to clans willing to affiliate or ally withthe national, provincial, and district govern-ments or their representatives, such as thebaradur ikhan. Goods or services must not bedelivered to clans of suspect loyalty or to thoseunwilling to make a substantial, up-front com-mitment. This would be counterproductive andcould, in fact, serve to aid and abet nationalself-destruction. The tribes who ally will winand expand; those who oppose will lose andcontract. U.S. allied forces would be the arbi-ters of the difference. The advantage of a basic,franchised package of goods and services isefficient delivery, comprehensive program con-trol, coherence of government support at thedistrict level, and ease of replication.

Forces such as demographic, industrial,agricultural, distribution, and communicationsmake the strategic offensive possible but are of-ten overlooked in war planning because they donot generally require soldiers. Replacing U.S.soldiers with local nationals and tribal-basedlogistic programs can be a tremendous force mul-tiplier. The national logistic program must gen-erate measurable, positive results for allied clans,qawm, and manteqa. Demographic programssuch as public health, field medical, and mid-

30 Rafid Fadhil Ali, “Sufi Insurgent Groups in Iraq,” Terror-ism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., Jan.25, 2008.

Replacing U.S.soldiers with localnationals andtribal-basedprograms can bea force multiplier.

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wifery-based prenatal and childbirth programswould need to enhance the birthrate, decreaseinfant mortality, and increase life expectancy forallied clans. The cumulative result is to engineera higher growth rate for clans opposing radicalIslam, rather than for those supporting it. Thenet effect, and strategic goal, is to create a mul-tigenerational, in-place tribal army, and an alliedpopulation that would grow faster and live longerthan radical Islam’s supporters.

Industrial economic programs may includethe creation of specialized guilds to establish,train, and support a myriad of manufacturing,mining, and engineering activities. For example,a federal fief delivered to a government alliedmanteqa could be a man-powered, machine shopfor metal and wood parts manufacture, completewith a district manufacturing contract. The pro-vincial governor and interior ministry would de-termine which allied family receives it in ex-change for becoming a baradur ikhan. The re-gional manufacturing guild council would thenbe responsible for setting it up, training guildmembers, and getting the manteqa into opera-tions. Specialized guilds have the advantage ofbeing self-organizing, self-motivating, and self-maintaining. They could be used to seed andsupport industrial activity in allied families andacross the nation. This would develop, if notcreate, local economies. Guild-generated indus-trial specialization would create local econo-mies with greater efficiency, diversification, andresilience. Industrial finance programs could in-clude micro-finance for village-based busi-nesses, guild-based businesses, and women-and minority-based businesses. The net effectand strategic goal is to create more prosperoussocieties, capable of supporting larger, denserpopulations, full-time law enforcement, and civildefense capabilities.

Agricultural programs may include seedbanks, production, distribution, and sales co-operatives as well as district and provincial levelconsulting. These programs would be measuredby the comparative increase in calories per dayprovided to allied or affiliated families and tribesversus those supporting radical Islam. The neteffect and strategic goal would be to createlarger, higher density, better fed populations

with a lower incidence of illness due to dietarydeficiency.

Distribution programs make use of trans-portation, roads, bridges, fuel, fleet management,etc. The ability to movematerial, military, and al-lied populations may be-come the most importantlever of pacification inAfghanistan. Targetedpopulation growth couldbe the ultimate arbiter ofsovereignty, displacingthose who oppose thegovernment with thosewho support it. The con-trol and reformulation ofPashtun societies, twocomponents of victory,are in many ways prepped by military, political,and religious initiatives and fueled by economicprograms riding national distribution grids intothe societal battle-space. The geographic coher-ence of economic programs is facilitated by thephysical distribution grid.

Perceptual coherence is facilitated by theintroduction of a new communications grid dis-tributing intellectual property. Creating and dis-tributing a low cost, suitably engineered smartphone for disseminating information, intelli-gence, and knowledge to locals in hostile re-gions via one-to-one conversations, party-linediscussions, and one-to-many broadcasts prepsthe intellectual battlefield for further governmentinitiatives. This grid also serves as a platformfor collecting visual, audible, text, and other in-formation from locals in hostile regions allowingthe coordinating authorities to sequence andcalibrate future actions.

CONCLUSIONS

Distributive, economic, religious, and mili-tary initiatives are the means of achieving vic-tory in Afghanistan if expressed through natu-rally occurring enemies of armed Salafism. Thestrategic intent is to destroy Salafist military ca-pacity, seize control of Pashtun populations un-

An alliedPashtun tribalsociety andparamilitary isthe most efficientmeans ofconducting anoffensive againstradical Islam.



der Salafism’s grasp, and reformulate those so-cieties so that they ally with the governmentand reject radical Islam. A multigenerational, al-lied, in-place, Pashtun tribal society and para-military is the most efficient means of conduct-ing a comprehensive, strategic offensive thatmatches radical Islam’s advantages of perma-nence, religious and tribal will, local knowledge,language and culture. The allied Pashtuns’ livesmust be measurably superior to radical Islam’sPashtun supporters and opposed to them as amatter of politics, culture, religion, and ideology.

The rise of armed Salafi Islam has been agenerational phenomenon. Washington can suc-ceed by moving off the strategic defensive andlaunching a comprehensive, coherent, and gen-erational strategic offensive against Salafi Islamin Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Pashtun majorityprovinces. The requirements of U.S. strategy areto engage and destroy core enemy forces deci-sively, seize populations, and break the enemy’s

willpower. U.S. strategy must, therefore, be com-prehensive to allow for the use of any tool toachieve victory, across the spectrum from soci-etal competition to armed force, and must alsobe coherent, harnessing all individual outcomesfrom agricultural and ideological competition tomilitary conflict.

The U.S. strategic offensive against armedSalafi Islam must match its advantages of ter-rain, tribal and cultural knowledge, language,birth rate, and permanence. In order to be practi-cal and efficient across multiple generations, itshould be self-organizing, self-maintaining, andself-replicating. Victory in Afghanistan will mani-fest in the creation of a multigenerational, in-place, Pashtun village society with a paramili-tary and population whose lives and work aremeasurably superior to Salafi Islam’s Pashtunsupporters and that opposes them as a matter ofpolitics, culture, religion, and ideology.

Not a Prayer at Finnish Fitness CenterEspoo, Finland—According to Ombudsman for Minorities Eva Biaudet, a ban on prayerissued by Lady Fitness Entresse in Espoo [Finland] was not discriminatory. Biaudet’sstance on the matter is based on her discussions with the owner of the fitness center and therepresentatives of the Muslim community in Espoo.

In August, Lady Fitness Entresse, located in the Entresse shopping complex in theEspoon Keskus district of the city, posted a notice on the wall of the locker room asking itsclients to refrain from praying and eating in its premises. The sign read, “The locker room isa religion and politics-free zone where everyone can spend their free time in a neutralmanner.”

In her statement, Minority Ombudsman Biaudet noted for example that the request torefrain from praying was drawn up in a matter-of-fact way, and it did not call specialattention to any particular religion.

The representatives of the Muslim community in Espoo Center agreed to the viewexpressed by the owner of the fitness center, to the effect that the facility was not consideredto be a suitable place for prayer. Biaudet feels that a prayer space organized in the shoppingmall library would be more appropriate and could serve all religious groups among regularusers of the library.

Helsingin Sanomat, Dec. 21, 2010

the afghanistan conflict reforming the village warv~reforming...katz: pashtun society/ 17 the...

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