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The Australian Government, the US alliance, and the Cuban Missile Crisis:
A history and policy analysis
Laura Thompson
Doctor of Philosophy College of Arts & Education Victoria University, Australia
2017
Abstract
In October 1962, the world was brought to the brink of nuclear catastrophe. The Cuban
Missile Crisis marked the closest the United States (US) and the Soviet Union came to
military conflict that might have led to nuclear annihilation during the Cold War. This
thesis investigates the Australian Government’s policy response to the crisis. In doing
so, it makes an original contribution to Australian Cold War history and to the extensive
literature on the crisis.
The Australian Government’s policy response to the crisis is examined in the context of
the Australia-US alliance. A diplomatic history, this thesis relies heavily on declassified
government records from Australian and American archives. Additionally, oral history
interview transcripts, audio-visual materials, Hansard, newspapers, and private
collections, were consulted in order to reconstruct comprehensively Australia’s policy
on this matter and the factors that shaped it.
This thesis examines: Australia’s awareness of the Cuban situation; the Menzies
Government’s policy on the crisis, specifically, factors it considered—and did not
consider—in formulating its policy; and the Government’s immediate implementation
of that policy, including the reactions of some sections of the Australian community to
that policy. It demonstrates that despite limited advance notice and awareness of the
Cuban situation, the Government swiftly declared support for the US in the crisis,
specifically, its resolution to be presented to the United Nations Security Council. It
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reveals that certain politicians, diplomats, and public servants were concerned about:
Australia’s obligations under the Australia New Zealand United States Security Treaty;
the legality of the US response; the precedent set by the quarantine; the implications of
US policy on the crisis regarding Australian nuclear ambitions; Australia maintaining its
trade relationship with Cuba; and the repercussions the crisis could have on collective
defence arrangements, which Australia relied on for its security. Despite these concerns
and challenges, the Government considered the successful management of the US
alliance paramount in formulating and implementing its policy on the crisis.
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Doctor of Philosophy Declaration
I, Laura Thompson, declare that the PhD thesis entitled “The Australian Government,
the US alliance and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A history and policy analysis” is no more
than 100,000 words in length including quotes and exclusive of tables, figures,
appendices, bibliography, references and footnotes. This thesis contains no material that
has been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for the award of any other academic
degree or diploma. Except where otherwise indicated, this thesis is my own work.
LAURA THOMPSON 30 August 2017
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To Clive, in memoriam
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Acknowledgements
Victoria University, Australia (VU), awarded me a scholarship that supported me to
undertake my PhD. The National Archives of Australia (NAA) and the Australian
Historical Association also awarded me a digitisation scholarship that enabled me to
access remotely a number of records held at the NAA, Canberra. I am sincerely grateful
for their generous support.
Staff at archives and libraries in Australia and the US provided valuable assistance. I am
indebted to: Andrew Cairns of the NAA, Canberra, who facilitated countless
declassification requests; Edmund Rutlidge of the NAA, Sydney, who knew where to
dig for relevant ABC records; David Langbart and Edward Uribe of the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland, who were a
wealth of knowledge on NARA and its records; the staff at the JFK Presidential Library
and Museum; and Mark Armstrong-Roper and the staff of the VU library. I also wish to
thank the individuals who kindly took time to correspond privately with me on my
research.
I am especially grateful to my supervisors, Phillip Deery and Allan Patience, as well as
Lyndon Burford, Leonardo Campus, Benoît Pelopidas, and those who attended the
Wilson Center’s Nuclear History Boot Camp 2016, for their insights, suggestions, and
constructive feedback, from which this thesis has benefited immensely.
My colleagues at Victoria University, particularly those in office E212, have provided
me with incredible support and many laughs throughout my PhD experience. Special
thanks goes to Lutfiye Ali, Kara Dadswell, and Rob Kaczan.
Finally, thank you to my grandfather for inspiring my love of history and my family for
fostering it. Thank you to Jason Stanley for his support, and to my friends for their
encouragement and patience. Thank you to Joshua Egan who, in recent months, has
taken care of me so that I could take care of the PhD. Finally, I would like to
acknowledge my beautiful dog and study buddy, Clive, the first to hear all of my
research ideas.
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Contents
Tables viii
Illustrations ix
Acronyms and Abbreviations x
Note on Publications xv
Note on Sources xvi
Introduction 1
1 Australians Learn of the Crisis 18
2 Cabinet Formulates Australia’s Policy on the Crisis 88
3 The Cuban Crisis and Australian Nuclear Ambitions 125
4 Australian Legal and Ethical Commitments to the US 194
5 Australia-Cuba Trade: An Irritant in Australia-US Relations 222
6 Initial Implementation of Australia’s Policy on the Crisis at Home and Abroad 272
Conclusion 333
Bibliography 341
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Tables
Table 1 Total value of Australian imports from, and exports to, Cuba for
financial years 1952–64.
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Illustrations
Illustrations contained in this thesis have been reproduced with the permission of
Fairfax Syndication and the JFK Library:
Illustration 1 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October 1962, 4.
Illustration 2 Sydney Morning Herald, 23 November 1962, 2.
Illustration 3 John F. Kennedy Library and Museum (JFK Library): 1963-07-08 B, AR, AR8009-B, C, “Luncheon in Honor [sic] of the Prime Minister of Australia Robert Gordon Menzies, 1:30PM,” 8 July 1963.
Illustration 4 Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 1962, 2.
Illustration 5 Sydney Morning Herald, 2 November 1962, 2.
Illustration 6 Sydney Morning Herald, 26 October 1962, 2.
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Acronyms and Abbreviations
AAEC Australian Atomic Energy Commission
ABC Australian Broadcasting Commission/Corporation
ACT Australian Capital Territory
AEST Australian Eastern Standard Time
AFA Air Force Association
AIB Allied Intelligence Bureau
ALP Australian Labor Party
AMA Australian Medical Association
ANU Australian National University
ANZ Archives New Zealand
ANZAM Australian, New Zealand and Malayan area
ANZUS Australia New Zealand United States Security Treaty (1951)/
alliance
ASD Australian Signals Directorate
ASIS Australian Secret Intelligence Service
AT&T American Telephone and Telegraph Company
AUST Australia
AUSTEO Australian Eyes Only
AWM Australian War Memorial
BAC British Aircraft Corporation
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BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BHP Broken Hill Propriety Company Limited
CDF Central Decimal File
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CPD Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
CSR Colonial Sugar Refining Company
CTBTO Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation
CWIHP Cold War International History Project
DCGS Deputy Chief of the General Staff
DFAT Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
DMI Directorate of Military Intelligence
DSB Defence Signals Branch
EEC European Economic Community
END Extended nuclear deterrence
EST US Eastern Standard Time
ExComm Executive Committee of the National Security Council
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters
GMT Greenwich Mean Time
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
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ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
ITN Independent Television News
ITV Independent Television Network
IRSIG International Regulations on SIGINT
JFK John F. Kennedy
JIB Joint Intelligence Bureau
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee
KT Kilo-ton
MRBM Medium-range ballistic missile
NAA National Archives of Australia
NARA National Archives and Records Administration, College Park,
Maryland, US
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NFZ Nuclear-free zone
NLA National Library of Australia, Canberra
NMA National Museum of Australia, Canberra
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968)
NSA National Security Archive
NSW New South Wales
NTBT Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
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NTI Nuclear Threat Initiative
OACSI Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
OB Outside Broadcast
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PKI Indonesian communist party
PM Prime Minister
PRC People’s Republic of China
RAAF Royal Australian Air Force
RAF Royal Air Force
RG Record Group
RSSAILA Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Imperial League of
Australia
SAGW Surface-to-air guided weapon
SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organisation
SIA Secret Intelligence Australia
SIGINT Signals Intelligence
SIS Secret Intelligence Service
SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SOE Special Operations Executive
TFX Tactical Fighter Experimental
TNT Trinitrotoluene
UK United Kingdom
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UKUSA United Kingdom-United States Agreement
UN United Nations
UN Comtrade United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database
US United States of America/United States
USAAF United States Army Air Force
USAF United States Air Force
USD United States dollars
USIA United States Information Agency
VOA Voice of America
WFP World Food Programme
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Note on Publications
Some of the research undertaken for this thesis I published under my former name,
Laura Stanley, not Laura Thompson:
Stanley, Laura. “Cuban Missile Crisis special.” ABC Local Radio. Radio programme presented by Richard Fidler. Broadcasted 15 October 2012. http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2012/10/15/3610878.htm (accessed 15 October 2012). (The programme was also broadcasted on ABC Radio National on 17 October 2012).
—— “Australia’s untold reaction to the Cuban Missile Crisis.” The Conversation, 16 October 2012. https://theconversation.com/australias-untold-reaction-to-the-cuban-missile-crisis-10104 (accessed 16 October 2012).
—— and Phillip Deery. “The Menzies Government, the American Alliance and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Australian Journal of Politics and History 59, no. 2 (2013): 178–195.
—— “Cuban Missile Crisis.” Conversations with Richard Fidler, Volume 2, ABC Local Radio, 2013. (Compilation of selected Richard Fidler radio interviews which includes Laura Stanley, “Cuban Missile Crisis special”).
—— “The Australian Government and the Cuban missile crisis: an antipodean perspective,” 217–35. In An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-year retrospective. Edited by David Gioe, Len Scott, and Christopher Andrew. Studies in Intelligence Series. Oxon: Routledge, 2014.
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Note on Sources
The vast majority of Australian government records cited in this thesis can be found in
the declassified files of the Department of External Affairs (now the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)). Some of these files were already available to the
public at the National Archives of Australia (NAA). Requests were lodged to view
several files not yet examined and almost all were declassified. The majority of the files
relevant to this thesis have the access status “open with exception,” meaning that some
folios within these files remain classified. Additionally, requests were lodged regarding
files that were already available and declared open with exception in order to ascertain
if further folios could be declassified. Despite the classification restrictions on most
External Affairs files on the crisis, they are numerous, large, and rich sources.
Obtaining access to Australian intelligence agency files however, proved much more
difficult. While several External Affairs files relating to the Joint Intelligence
Committee were examined for this thesis, the NAA does not have in its custody files on
the crisis created by the Joint Intelligence Bureau, the Defence Signals Branch, and the
military intelligence services (Directorate of Military Intelligence, Directorate of Naval
Intelligence and Security, and the Directorate of Air Force Intelligence). Requests for
such files were lodged by the NAA with the current controlling agencies on my behalf
in March 2013 and, at the time of submission of this thesis, remain pending.
Furthermore, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston,
Massachusetts (JFK Library) applied unsuccessfully on my behalf to have additional
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records made available from a partly declassified file regarding a meeting of allied
intelligence officials during the crisis. It is worth noting therefore that the intelligence
aspects of Australia’s experience of the crisis, while addressed in this thesis, remain
closely guarded and have been investigated as far as has proved feasible.
Records of the Kennedy Administration and US government cited in this thesis were
collected during a field visit to the JFK Library and the National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park, Maryland, in late 2012. Copies of New Zealand
government records held at Archives New Zealand, Wellington, were generously
provided by my colleague, Lyndon Burford. A number of databases containing digitised
records of foreign governments, which are cited in the bibliography, were also viewed
in the course of research for this thesis.
Unless otherwise stated, the Australian government directories published in December
1962 and June 1964 were used to identify the full names and positions of relevant
individuals where such information was not included in government records. 1
The major daily newspapers published in every Australian capital city in 1962 were
examined for this thesis; only two were inaccessible to the author: Sydney’s Daily
Telegraph and Perth’s Daily News. While the Cuban Crisis was reported in regional and
Directory to the Office of the Governor-General, the Parliament, the Executive Government, the 1
Judiciary, Departments and Authorities (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, December 1962); and ibid., June 1964.
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local newspapers, an analysis of their coverage of this event is beyond the scope of this
thesis. The digitisation of newspapers and periodicals has enabled researchers to 2
access, locate, and search relevant sources with ease. However, apart from the Age,
newspapers printed in 1962 have not yet been digitised. Consequently, the newspapers 3
and periodicals that feature in this thesis were located following weeks of intensive and
slow searches of microfilm.
See, for example, “Cuban Blockade By U.S. Ships: Huge Fleet Is Fanning Out Over Atlantic,” News-2
Mail (Bundaberg, Queensland), 24 October 1962, 1; and “Air-Sea Blockade Of Cuba By U.S.: Kennedy Throws Down Gauntlet To Khrushchev: Ships Carrying Arms Will Be Turned Back,” Kalgoorlie Miner (Kalgoorlie, Western Australia), 24 October 1962, 1. Newspapers that were mostly printed from 1803-1954 are available on Trove, an information resource 3
managed by the National Library of Australia, Canberra (NLA): NLA, Trove, http://trove.nla.gov.au (accessed 5 July 2017). The Age is available online: Google Newspaper Archive, https://news.google.com/newspapers (accessed 5 July 2017).
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Introduction
The early 1960s was a period of “unprecedented tension, turbulence and crisis” in
international relations. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was one such crisis that 1 2
could have led to nuclear catastrophe. This thesis examines Australia’s policy response
to this defining episode of the Cold War and the twentieth century in the context of the
Australia-US alliance. Australia and the Cuban Missile Crisis is a subject that,
surprisingly, has been overlooked by historians. This thesis addresses this
historiographical gap and in doing so, sheds new light on Australian-American relations
and on Australia’s Cold War experience in the early 1960s.
Three main areas of inquiry are addressed in this thesis: when and how Australia learnt
about the Cuban Crisis; the Australian Government’s policy on the matter, specifically,
how it formulated its policy and factors it did, and did not, consider in its decision-
making; and the initial implementation of that policy during the immediate crisis period.
The first area of inquiry, which deals with Australia’s awareness of the crisis, is studied
in Chapter 1. This chapter explores when and how Australian intelligence officials were
alerted to the crisis. A historical background on intelligence cooperation between
Australia and the US provides the necessary context for how the Australian intelligence
community obtained information on the Cuban situation. Also, it examines when and
Gordon Greenwood, “Australian Foreign Policy in Action,” in Australia in World Affairs, 1961–1965, 1
eds. Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), 1. “Cuban Missile Crisis” is the name typically given to this event by Western scholars, who have 2
produced the majority of the literature on this subject. While this term appears throughout this thesis given its use in the literature, the term “Cuban Crisis” is employed more frequently in this thesis as it was the term used by the Australian Government at the time. In the former Soviet Union, the episode is known as the “Caribbean Crisis,” and in Cuba, the “October Crisis.”
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how key Australian diplomats, public servants, the Prime Minister, and the wider
Australian public were informed of the crisis. It also looks at initial Australian
television, radio, and newspaper reporting on the crisis, including US President, John F.
Kennedy's address to the American people, which was relayed around the world. It
concludes with an examination of the first Australian parliamentary statements on the
crisis.
The second area of inquiry regarding the Australian Government’s policy on the crisis,
which deals with policy formulation and considerations, is the largest section of the
thesis comprising four chapters. Chapter 2 examines the Cabinet’s deliberation on the
matter, and the policy it subsequently formulated. It also looks at the role of Australian
Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, in Cabinet and how Cabinet’s deliberation on the crisis
has been discussed and interpreted by government officials. Further, it briefly examines
Garfield Barwick’s tenure as Minister for External Affairs and his relationship with his
Department, given they took responsibility for, and managed, Australia’s response to the
Cuban Crisis. Chapters 3 to 5 critically analyse three factors (each in turn) relevant to
the Government’s policy on the crisis: Australian nuclear ambitions; Australia’s treaty
obligations, for example, to the United States (US) under the Australia New Zealand
United States Security Treaty of 1951 (ANZUS), and the legality of US actions towards
Cuba; and Australia-Cuba trade and its effect on Australia-US relations. These chapters
provide significant insight into the context in which the Menzies Government
determined its policy on the crisis, and factors that did and did not influence its
decision-making. They reveal how the Government perceived the nuclear threat posed
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by the crisis and who it considered responsible for the crisis and its resolution. Most
importantly, Chapters 2 to 5 highlight Australia’s geo-strategic and geo-economic
interests, specifically, the significance of the US alliance in Australian foreign policy-
making, and how the Government proposed best to manage the alliance and its interests
during the crisis.
The third and final area of inquiry, which is dealt with in Chapter 6, focuses on the
Menzies Government’s initial implementation of its policy during the crisis. This
chapter places Australia’s policy in the context of domestic matters. It looks at the
relationship between the crisis, Australia’s policy on the matter, and the Government’s
launch of its new three-year defence programme. It also compares the Government’s
perception of the nuclear threat posed by the crisis with the views of other Australians,
including Australian officials located at the UN in New York. This chapter explores
Australia’s implementation of its policy at the UN during the most intense period of the
crisis. In doing so, it highlights the various attitudes Australian officials held regarding
the UN. The thesis concludes with a summary of the research findings and a discussion
of avenues for further study, despite the extensive literature published on the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
The Cuban Missile Crisis has interested historians, political scientists, and sociologists
internationally since that fateful October in 1962. Scholars have generated an
abundance of literature too voluminous to cite or review here in detail. In the 25 years
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after the crisis, scholars studied it predominantly through an American lens. However,
from 1987, the crisis was examined from Soviet and Cuban viewpoints following the
opening of Moscow archives and the critical oral history conferences organised by
James G. Blight and janet M. Lang (who spells her first name with a lower case j).
Historian James G. Hershberg referred to these respective phases as the “first wave” and
“second wave” of missile crisis scholarship. This study benefits significantly from the 3
extensive literature on the crisis because it provides the context for Australia’s response.
Some of the most notable studies of the last four decades have been undertaken by
Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali; Jutta
Weldes; James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, David A. Welch, David Lewis, and Philip
Brenner; Sergo Mikoyan and Svetlana Savranskaya; and Sheldon Stern. Of more recent 4
studies, Michael Dobbs’ One Minute to Midnight is noteworthy as an original, minute-
by-minute analysis of the most intense thirteen-day period of the crisis: 16 to 28
October 1962. Dobbs drew on American, Soviet and Cuban archival records and 5
testimonies to explore the finer details of the occurrences that make up the crisis, which
historians have tended to gloss over. He also exposed some of its myths that others have
James G. Hershberg, “The Global Cuban Missile Crisis—Surfing the Third Wave of Missile Crisis 3
Scholarship,” in “The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: New Evidence From Behind the Iron, Bamboo, and Sugarcane Curtains, and Beyond,” ed. James G. Hershberg et al., Cold War International History Project Bulletin (published in cooperation with the National Security Archive), Issue 17/18 (2012), 7. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown 4
and Company, 1971), which was revised with co-author Philip Zelikow in 1999: Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn. (New York: Longman, 1999); James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, with the assistance of David Lewis, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993); Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964. The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997); Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis, vol. 12 Borderlines Series (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002); Sergo Mikoyan, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November, Svetlana Savranskaya, ed. (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 2012); and Sheldon M. Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 2012). Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear 5
War (New York: Arrow, 2009).
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simply repeated in their assessments. Dobbs therefore provided new insights on the
crisis, including, for example, on the reconnaissance flights, positioning of American
ships during the quarantine, and storage location of nuclear warheads, which are absent
in the earlier literature. The ability to compare Australia’s experience with, for example,
what the US knew about the crisis and when it knew it, and its diplomatic engagement
with other states during the crisis, is most helpful in researching Australia’s response,
and subsequently, its relations with the US at this time.
Some of the key primary sources located by Dobbs were published online by the
National Security Archive (NSA) in 2008. The NSA, an independent, non-government 6
research institute and library located at The George Washington University, Washington,
D.C., collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the Freedom of
Information Act. It manages a Cuba Documentation Project, which contains over 15,000
declassified documents on the crisis on microfiche. Cuban Missile Crisis documents 7
are also readily accessible to scholars courtesy of the Cold War International History
Project (CWIHP). The CWIHP is part of the History and Public Policy Program at the
Wilson Center, the official memorial to US president Woodrow Wilson and non-partisan
policy forum for addressing global issues through independent research and open
dialogue. The research focus of the program is on non-US perspectives of contemporary
history. The CWIHP maintains an excellent digital archive on the crisis, which currently
“One Minute To Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War by Michael 6
Dobbs,” The National Security Archive, 4 June 2008, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/dobbs/gitmo.htm (accessed 7 January 2016). “Cuba Documentation Project,” The National Security Archive, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/latin_america/7
cuba.htm (accessed 7 January 2016).
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contains 579 documents from around world. Indispensable for scholars of the crisis are 8
the Archive’s electronic briefing books and the CWIHP’s bulletins through which they
disseminate recently declassified and digitised documents relating to the crisis. Both
organisations can be relied on to provide original and fascinating new sources,
emphasising that there is still much to glean from this Cold War episode despite its
extensive literature. A history of Australia’s experience of the crisis makes an important
and timely contribution to what continues to be a topic of intense historical interest.
It is necessary to note that this thesis does not deal with the intricacies of the Cuban
Missiles Crisis as it played out in Washington, Moscow, and Havana, nor does it
provide a detailed analysis of the actions taken by the US, the Soviet Union or Cuba.
Furthermore, it does not provide a detailed analysis of how the latter part of the most
intense period of the crisis was experienced in Australia nor the lessons that Australia
drew on the crisis. Such topics, while worthy of future study, are beyond the scope of
this thesis. In providing a history and analysis of the Menzies Government’s policy on
the crisis, which was swiftly formulated and declared, this thesis concentrates on the
early, intense days of the crisis in which the Government determined and implemented
its policy.
Histories of how several other states and regions experienced, and responded to, the
Cuban Missile Crisis have been published in English: Brazil, Britain, Canada, China,
“Cuban Missile Crisis,” Digital Archive: International History Declassified, Cold War International 8
History Project, Wilson Center, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/31/cuban-missile-crisis (accessed 8 January 2016).
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France, Italy, Latin America, and Turkey. The leading study on the British response—9
and of any state indirectly involved in the crisis—is Len Scott’s Macmillan, Kennedy
and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military and Intelligence Aspects, which is an
insightful and comprehensive analysis of British foreign policy. As underscored by its
sub-title, Scott’s in-depth investigation focused on the political, military and intelligence
facets of the British Government’s management of the crisis. He examined the
Government’s attitude towards Cuba under the leadership of Fidel Castro; British
government and opposition views on American-Cuban relations in this period; the roles
of individuals and their influence on British foreign policy development, including the
“special relationship” between the United Kingdom (UK) and the US; and British
popular reactions to the crisis. In addition to its findings, Scott’s study is a helpful 10
model for this thesis; both are diplomatic histories and state case studies on the crisis.
For the Brazilian response to the crisis, see: James G. Hershberg, “The United States, Brazil, and the 9
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962,” pts. 1 and 2, Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 2 (2004): 3–20, and 6, no. 3 (2004): 5–67. For the British response, see: L. V. Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military and Intelligence Aspects (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1999); and Jim Wilson, Launch Pad UK: Britain and the Cuban Missile Crisis (United Kingdom: Pen and Sword Books, 2008). For the Canadian response, see for example: Jocelyn Maynard Ghent, “Canada, the United States, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Pacific Historical Review 48, no. 2 (1979): 159–84; Peter T. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993); and Asa McKercher, “A ‘Half-hearted Response’?: Canada and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962,” International History Review 33 (2011): 335–52. For the study on China, see Enrico Maria Fardella, “Mao Zedong and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis,” Cold War History 15, no. 1 (2015): 73–88. On the French response (in English), see “Cuban Missile Crisis: Charles de Gaulle,” Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/lessons-policymakers/charles-de-gaulle/ (accessed 6 July 2017). For Italian reactions to the crisis, see Leonardo Campus, “Italian political reactions to the Cuban missile crisis,” in An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-year retrospective, David Gioe, Len Scott, and Christopher Andrew, eds., Studies In Intelligence Series (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 236–57. For the study on Latin America and the crisis, see Renata Keller, “The Latin American Missile Crisis,” Diplomatic History 39, no. 2 (2015): 195–222. For the Turkish response, see: Süleyman Seydi, “Turkish-American Relations and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1957-63,” Middle Eastern Studies 46, no. 3 (2010): 433–55. Numerous histories on how several states and regions experienced, and responded to, the crisis have been published in languages other than English. For example, there are book-length studies on Europe and the crisis (in French), see Maurice Vaisse, ed., L'Europe et la crise de Cuba (Paris: Armand Colin, 1993), and Italy and the crisis (in Italian), see Leonardo Campus, I Sei Giorni che Sconvolsero il Mondo: La crisi dei missili di Cuba e le sue percezioni internazionali (Firenze, Italy: Le Monnier, 2014).
Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis.10
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Hershberg labelled these histories on the crisis experiences of states other than the
superpowers or Cuba as the “third wave” of scholarship on the crisis. It is within this
category of the historiography that this thesis can be located. This third wave is, in part,
a result of historians’ efforts to decentralise the crisis by investigating perspectives other
than those held in Washington and Moscow. It is also partly a consequence of more
archives opening their doors to researchers. The outcome is that scholars, rather than 11
documenting the event as simply a showdown between the two superpowers, are
beginning to write about it as the global nuclear crisis that it indeed was. However, how
to explain an international crisis comprehensively remains an important question
beyond the issue of access to primary sources, and subsequently, their interpretation. As
Michael H. Hunt observed,
A crisis unfolds in many layers, drawing leaders and their agents in different countries into shifting relationships. An international history that asks us to interpret a crisis in terms of its multiple participants compounds the problem of extracting a stable meaning out of a highly dynamic and interactive process. Only when all the parties involved are combined to achieve a rounded picture are these difficulties most fully apparent. 12
Despite these challenges, it will only be possible to understand and evaluate better the
Cuban Crisis, as well as other international crises, with fuller accounts on the part of all
the participants. The Cold War International History Project’s release in 2012 of an 800-
page bulletin containing never-before published, non-US primary sources, including
translated archival records from more than 20 states “behind the iron, bamboo, and
sugarcane curtains, and beyond,” makes a new and substantial contribution to the
growing international history of the crisis, and is indicative of the progress regarding
Hershberg, “The Global Cuban Missile Crisis,” 7.11
Michael H. Hunt, Crises in U.S. Foreign Policy: An International History Reader (New Haven, US: 12
Yale University Press, 1996), 422.
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decentralisation and accessibility. Although this bulletin is mainly concerned with 13
communist sources, and to some extent, those from the so-called neutral states, much
remains unknown about the experiences of US allies during the crisis. However,
Australia, along with some other non-US English language archives, was intentionally
excluded from the bulletin ““[f]or space reasons and to underline this publication’s
value to a field still dominated by Americans.” While the decision of the editors is 14
understandable on the ground of accessibility, the rich and plentiful archival evidence
available on Australia and the crisis has been under-utilised, and no scholar, other than
the present author, has produced dedicated studies on the subject. This thesis therefore
makes a major contribution to the historiography of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given
that the topic has been overlooked by most scholars, it is perhaps unsurprising then that
references to Australia and the crisis in the relevant existing literature—books, journal
articles and biographical works—are sparse, scattered and superficial.
Prue Torney-Parlicki is the only scholar to have discussed Australia’s response to the
crisis. However, the crisis was not her focus. Torney-Parlicki’s article, “Lies, Diplomacy
and the ABC: Revisiting ‘the Russo affair’,” and her biography of the journalist, Peter
Russo, Behind the News, examine the Australian Government’s reaction to what it
considered were inflammatory comments made by Russo of the Australian Broadcasting
Commission (ABC) on 29 October 1962. Russo remarked on the manner in which the
James G. Hershberg and Christian F. Ostermann, eds., “The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: New 13
Evidence From Behind the Iron, Bamboo, and Sugarcane Curtains, and Beyond,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin (published in cooperation with the National Security Archive), Issue 17/18 (2012).The bulletin includes new evidence on the crisis from: Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany (East and West), Hungary, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Russia, Switzerland, North Vietnam and Yugoslavia.
Evidence from Canada, India, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United Nations (UN), was also 14
excluded from the bulletin: ibid., n. 6, 10.
!9
Americans and Soviets handled the crisis and the swiftness with which Australia
declared its support for America’s actions. Through “the Russo affair” case study, 15
Torney-Parlicki provided useful insight into Australia’s response to the crisis and,
importantly, she positioned this response in the context of Australian-American
relations. In doing so, Torney-Parlicki revealed the sensitivity of the Australian
Government to alleged anti-American opinion, and its attempts to silence it. This thesis
examines the basis for and extent of the Government’s approach towards the US
alliance in order to provide a deeper and more nuanced understanding of Australian-
American relations in this period.
The 1963 Australian short film, It Droppeth as the Gentle Rain, also faced censorship.
The film, which was co-directed by Albie Thoms and Bruce Beresford, marked the
beginning of experimental structuralist film in Australia, and starred subsequently
prominent Australians, including Germaine Greer. But its importance to this thesis,
however, is its subject matter. The banned film was described as “an artistic response to
the politicization of the Cuban Missile Crisis ... [that] represents an alternate history of
what nearly did happen.” It was commonly known as “the ‘shit’ film” for the
metaphorical portrayal of excrement as fallout following nuclear war; the use of falling
mud on black and white film was an effective depiction. This representation, use of the
word “shit”, and other references that were allegedly blasphemous, are the reasons
Fiona Hooten claimed the censors deemed it offensive. A satire on the media, religion,
See Prue Torney-Parlicki, “Lies, Diplomacy and the ABC: Revisiting ‘the Russo affair’,” Overland 176 15
(2004): 45–50, which is an examination of occasions when the ABC has defended itself against claims it facilitated anti-American sentiment; and Prue Torney-Parlicki, Behind the News: A Biography of Peter Russo (Crawley, Western Australia: University of Western Australia Press, 2005), 281–91, where this affair, and thus the crisis, is explored in the context of Russo’s life.
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and global events, it is an interesting example of how some in the Australian arts 16
community perceived the crisis. While this study forms part of the sparse literature
relating to Australia and the Cuban Crisis, it is not relevant to the Australian
Government’s formulation and implementation of its policy on the crisis, and it is
therefore not investigated further in this thesis.
Gordon Greenwood made reference to Australia and the crisis in Australia in World
Affairs: 1961–1965. However, his reference relates to Australia’s relationship with the
United Nations (UN) in this period. Greenwood included some brief reflections of
Australian Government and Opposition parliamentarians on the UN with regards to the
crisis. Whilst these references are of little assistance in determining Australia’s 17
response to the Cuban Crisis, they prove helpful in comprehending it. This thesis,
therefore, considers Australian views on the role and influence of the UN during the
crisis.
Members of Parliament and representatives of the diplomatic corps in October 1962
made few references to the crisis in biographical or other works. Those who have
commented on the crisis in their memoirs, having mainly referred to President
Kennedy’s handling of it, include Prime Minister Menzies; Australian Labor Party
(ALP) backbencher, Leslie Haylen; Australian Ambassador to the US, Howard Beale;
Fiona Hooton, “It Droppeth as the Gentle Rain: The Birth of Australian Experimental Film,” Metro 16
Magazine (Melbourne) 159 (2008): 138–41. Greenwood and Harper, Australia in World Affairs, 50–1.17
!11
and Liberal Party backbencher, Malcolm Fraser. Biographers of Fraser have ruminated 18
on his parliamentary speeches on 5 March and 13 August 1964 when he articulated the
precedents set by the crisis and their implications for Australia and Southeast Asia,
particularly Vietnam. Fraser also reflected on the crisis in The Daniel Mannix 19
Memorial Lecture he delivered at the University of Melbourne in 1987, where he
recalled hearing Menzies talk about the supposedly-confidential Cabinet discussions on
how Australia should respond to the situation in Cuba. Fraser claimed to have been told
that after much debate among Cabinet members, Menzies declared that it was in
Australia’s interest to support its American ally; this was, Menzies believed, the only
course of action Australia could have taken. Although he was not a politician of this 20
period, Alexander Downer, Australian foreign affairs minister in the Howard
Government, in a speech concerning nuclear proliferation, recalled the anxiety he felt as
a young boy during the crisis. These works have generally proffered interesting, yet 21
ephemeral, reflections on the crisis and the importance of this event to the Cold War.
However, apart from Fraser’s views shared in The Daniel Mannix Memorial Lecture, no
substantial insight regarding Australia’s policy response can be found in these works.
While they are helpful in identifying the attitudes and beliefs, even in hindsight, of
R. G. Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memories of Men and Events (Melbourne: Cassell Australia Ltd, 18
1967), 145; Leslie Haylen, Twenty Years’ Hard Labor (South Melbourne: Macmillan of Australia, 1969), 173; Howard Beale, This Inch of Time: Memoirs of Politics and Diplomacy (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1977), 184–5; and Malcolm Fraser and Margaret Simons, Malcolm Fraser: The Political Memoirs (Carlton, Victoria: The Miegunyah Press, 2010), 128, which is part-memoir and part authorised biography.
Alan Renouf, Malcolm Fraser & Australian Foreign Policy (Sydney: Australian Professional 19
Publications, 1986), 41–2; and Philip Ayres, Malcolm Fraser: A Biography (Richmond, Victoria: William Heinemann Australia, 1987), 92–5 and 174–5.
Malcolm Fraser, “The Daniel Mannix Memorial Lecture—Sir Robert Menzies: In Search of Balance,” 20
lecture delivered at Wilson Hall, University of Melbourne, 30 July 1987, transcript, http://www.unimelb.edu.au/malcolmfraser/speeches/nonparliamentary/mannixmenzies.html (accessed 5 April 2010).
Alexander Downer, “The spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons: the sum of all our 21
fears” (speech delivered at Sydney Institute, 17 February 2003). Published in Sydney Papers 15, no. 1 (2003): 30–8.
!12
certain politicians and diplomats, in the absence of a framework within which to place
such reflections, their value—both inherent and to this thesis—remains limited. For the
first time, this thesis provides a framework for such reflections.
In studies on Australia in the 1960s, there are fleeting references to the crisis as an event
that simply occurred that decade. While these studies provide a picture of other key 22
events of this period, they are general in nature and provide no more than a timeline.
Studies of Australia’s Cold War are of no further assistance regarding the crisis.
Scholars have been assiduous in their examinations of Australia in the immediate post-
war period and up to the late 1950s. However, the extensive literature on this period has
subsequently implied that Australia’s Cold War concluded with this decade. As a 23
result, the crisis and other events of the early 1960s have been overlooked in terms of
Australian Cold War historiography. In their two-volume history on Australia’s Cold
War published in 1984, editors Ann Curthoys and John Merritt narrowed the focus of
their study to what they described as, “those briefer periods when a real war appeared
likely.” In terms of their study, this was the period 1945–1959, although they also 24
noted that the same could be said of the years 1979–1984. This is an extraordinary
justification for the focus of their study given that in the 1960s—particularly during the
crisis—the world faced the very strong possibility of nuclear war. It is also a prime
See, for example: Australia in the 1960s (Adelaide: Rigby, 1980); Robin Gerster and Jan Bassett, 22
Seizures of Youth: The Sixties and Australia (Melbourne: Hyland House, 1991); and Jacqueline Kent, In the Half Light: Reminiscences of growing up in Australia, 1900–1970 (Sydney: Doubleday, 1991).
See, for example, David Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’: Australia’s Cold War, 1948–23
1954 (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1999), which includes an excellent review of the historiography on Australia’s Cold War in the introduction; L.J. Louis, Menzies’ Cold War: a reinterpretation (Carlton, Victoria: Red Rag Publications, 2001); and Peter Love and Paul Strangio, Arguing the Cold War (Carlton, Victoria: Red Rag Publications, 2001).
Ann Curthoys and John Merritt, eds., Australia’s First Cold War, 1945–1953, Vol. 1: Society, 24
communism and culture (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), xii.
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example of the limited historiographical attention and interest that has been paid to
Australia’s Cold War of the early 1960s. Nonetheless, this scholarship provides a useful
background on the people, politics, and issues facing Australia in the decade or so
before the crisis, which in turn, helps place Australia’s policy response in context.
While there is still a good deal to learn about Australia’s Cold War, much is known
about Australia’s role in some international affairs up to and during the early 1960s
through extensive studies undertaken on Australian foreign and defence policies
including on the ANZUS Treaty—and the Australia-US alliance. Although these 25
studies neglect to examine Australia’s response to the crisis, the literature reveals that
Australian governments were obsessed with countering the communist menace at home
and abroad. As such, the first half of Australia’s Cold War saw sustained military
involvement in Southeast Asia, notably the wars in Korea (1950–53) and Vietnam
(1962–75), and smaller-scale conflicts of the military and diplomatic kind over issues
For studies on Australian-American relations, ANZUS, and Australian foreign and defence policies 25
during the Cold War, specifically in this period, see for example: Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938–1965 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967); Greenwood and Harper, Australia in World Affairs; T.B. Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1968), chap. 5; Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: A Survey of International Relations 1941–1968 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); H. G. Gelber, ed., Problems of Australian Defence (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1970); John Hammond Moore, ed., The American Alliance: Australia, New Zealand and the United States 1940–1970 (North Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1970), chap. 4; Joseph A. Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1980), chap. 1; Glen St J. Barclay, Friends in High Places: Australian-American Diplomatic Relations Since 1945 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), chap. 6; Joseph A. Camilleri, ANZUS: Australia’s Predicament in the Nuclear Age (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1987), chap. 1–3; Norman Harper, A Great and Powerful Friend: A Study of Australian American Relations Between 1900 and 1975 (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1987), part 4; Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australia’s road to Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), chap. 1–5; Glen St J. Barclay, A Very Small Insurance Policy: The Politics of Australian Involvement in Vietnam, 1954–1967 (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1988), 14–36; Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), 44–86; Peter G. Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965, The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1992); Philip Bell and Roger Bell, Implicated: The United States in Australia, Australian Retrospectives (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Peter G. Edwards, A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965–1975, The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (St Leonards, New South Wales (NSW): Allen & Unwin, 1997), 20–4.
!14
involving Malaysia, Borneo, West New Guinea, Thailand, Laos, and Indonesia.
Australian foreign and defence policies therefore strongly focused on regional issues,
especially the regional threat of communism, and these engagements dominate the
scholarship on Australia’s involvement in international affairs in the early 1960s.
Cuba receives a passing mention in texts on Australian foreign policy during the Cold
War, but little of substance regarding policy-making, relations, or the Cuban Crisis can
be gleaned. Furthermore, no literature has been located on Australia’s relations with 26
Cuba in the 1950s and early 1960s. Australian foreign policy studies that refer to Cuba,
do so under the umbrella of the Caribbean, and only briefly examine relations between
the two states in the post-Cold War period. 27
Scholars have noted that Australian foreign and defence policy increasingly looked to
the US in this period. Although British foreign policy was kept in close view, the US
alliance took precedence. The US was the ally on which Australia depended should its
geo-strategic interests be threatened, and this was reflected in both the ANZUS Treaty
and Australian foreign and defence policies. As such, the successful management of the
US alliance was seen to be in Australia’s national interest. Some scholars have
characterised the nature of Australia’s role in this relationship as being one of servitude
See, for example: J. A. Camilleri, An introduction to Australian foreign policy, 4th edn. (Milton, 26
Queensland: The Jacaranda Press, 1979), 108, and 128–9; and Claire Clark, ed., Australian Foreign Policy: Towards a Reassessment (North Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1973), 86 and 140.
See, for example, Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the World of the 27
1990s (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 312.
!15
or compliance. David McLean has challenged these interpretations that dominate the 28
literature on Australian-American relations however, having claimed that these
conclusions, “have often perpetuated, not transcended, the misunderstandings which
characterized the cold war itself.” McLean argued that “the most serious consequence
has been a blurring of the extent to which Australia maintained a sense of its own
interests.” While Australian policymaking in this period hinged on the US alliance, it 29
was not due to American pressure or a desire to meet American expectations, but a
result of Australia’s recognition of its own national interest. This thesis examines the
extent to which parallels can be drawn with McLean’s conclusions regarding Australia’s
policy response to the crisis.
It is worth noting here that in addressing events of the 1960s, most of the scholarship—
especially that on Australian foreign and defence policies—represents an assessment of
these policies. Scholars have made recommendations for future policy-making and
provided cost-benefit analyses of the Australia-US alliance for the purposes of
evaluating, for example, whether Australia should continue to invest in its alliance with
the US. This is not a criticism of this scholarship. These studies assist with situating this
thesis in the context of domestic and international affairs confronting Australia, and the
state of the Australia-US alliance at this time. This observation is made, however, to
illustrate the need to locate these diplomatic and political assessments in a historical
For an excellent historiographical review of Australian-American relations during the Cold War, see 28
David McLean, “Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical Review,” The International History Review 23, no. 2 (2001): 299–321.
Ibid., 320.29
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context; one that can paint a more complete picture of Australia’s Cold War in the early
1960s.
This study of Australia’s response to the Cuban Missile Crisis—first and foremost—
rectifies an historiographical gap in Australia’s Cold War. Through examination of this
Cold War episode, this thesis provides new insight on the Cuban Missile Crisis, and
importantly, enhances our understanding of, the Australia-US alliance. It examines the
influences that shaped Australian foreign and defence policies—both on the crisis and in
the early 1960s—and specifically, illuminates why the successful management of
Australian-American relations was an imperative component of these policies, and more
broadly, in Australia’s perceived national interest.
!17
1
Australians Learn of the Crisis
The eminent Twentieth Century British diplomat, Alexander Cadogan, once described
secret intelligence as “the missing dimension […] of most diplomatic history.” 1
According to Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, “most political and much military
history” ignores or underplays intelligence. Citing numerous examples, they rightly
stated: “The great danger of any missing historical dimension is that its absence may
distort our understanding of other, accessible dimensions.” And as such, historians of
national or international politics, they declared, “can never afford to ignore it.” 2
Intelligence is a critical aspect of the Cuban Missile Crisis. For the US—and
subsequently Australia—the crisis commenced in October 1962 when the US
discovered that the Soviet Union had installed nuclear-capable missiles in Cuba;
intelligence that was obtained from photographs taken by its U2 spy planes on
reconnaissance missions over the island. It is for these reasons that this history and
policy analysis of Australia and the Cuban Crisis examines the Australian intelligence
community’s experience, specifically, when and how some intelligence officials became
aware of the crisis. This chapter demonstrates the closeness of the Australian-American
alliance on intelligence cooperation—an important feature of the relationship either
overlooked or underemphasised by scholars. This is where the story, and this chapter,
begins.
Alexander Cadogan, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M. 1938-1945, David Dilks, ed. (London: 1
Cassell, 1971), 21, cited in Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, eds., The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (Great Britain: Macmillan, 1984), 1. Andrew and Dilks, The Missing Dimension, 1–2.2
!18
This chapter also examines when and how other Australians learnt of the Cuban Crisis.
It studies information sharing at the diplomatic level to initial public broadcasts
regarding the Cuban situation, which were delivered on television, radio, and in print. It
demonstrates that Prime Minister Robert Menzies, senior government ministers, key
diplomats and public servants, and the Australian public—depending on where one was
located—had different, but nonetheless, limited, awareness of the crisis. Additionally,
this chapter challenges Prue Torney-Parlicki’s assertion that the Government had
significant advance notice of the crisis and instead, illustrates that the Government had
little warning compared to its allies. It concludes with the Menzies Government’s first,
and swift, parliamentary statement on the matter—its declaration of its policy on the
crisis that placed Australia behind the US.
Origins of Australian-American Intelligence Cooperation
A strong relationship with the US has been a critical and continuing consideration in
Australian foreign and defence policy. Australian governments have carefully managed
and maintained the US alliance since the arrival of the Great White Fleet in 1908 to
defence cooperation in conflicts in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, including the
stationing of American marines in Darwin in 2012. Intelligence cooperation and
coordination is an especially strong and long-standing facet of the Australia-US
alliance, the foundations for which were laid during World War II. The outline below 3
For this history, see generally: Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, The Ties That Bind: Intelligence 3
Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries – the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 2nd edn. (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1990); and Christopher Andrew, “The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo–American Connection,” Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 2 (1989): 213–56. A revised and abridged version of that article is found in P. J. Boyce and J. R. Angel, eds., Diplomacy in the Marketplace: Australia in World Affairs, Volume 7, 1981–90 (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1992), 82–114.
! 19
on the origins of Australian-American intelligence cooperation contextualises this
aspect of the relationship and Australian officials’ awareness of the crisis.
The British-American alliance during World War II demanded intelligence collaboration
in a number of areas, including signals intelligence and ocean surveillance. Cooperation
began in 1941 and by 1942, the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the
British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and its Secret Intelligence Service (SIS),
concluded a joint agreement for the coordination of secret intelligence, covert action,
and sabotage operations. The world was divided into American or British-led spheres
where either the OSS or SOE was the controlling agency and the other the subordinate.
The intention was to avoid confusion arising from separate organisations conducting
operations in the same country. 4
Although the two states were already collaborating in signals intelligence, high-level
cooperation in this area was formalised under a second agreement—the Britain-United
States Agreement—in April 1943. The Agreement also covered staff exchanges, detailed
regulations for handling and disseminating ULTRA material (British intelligence
produced from intercepted military, rather than diplomatic, traffic), and security
regulations for its recipients. 5
See Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, 1–3.4
Britain obtained intelligence later labelled ULTRA when its code-breakers at Bletchley Park deciphered 5
German military communications encrypted by the ENIGMA machine. Initially, the British kept its attainment, but not the information itself, secret. They told the Americans about their code-breaking success at the same meeting where this agreement was concluded: Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, 2.
! 20
As intelligence collaboration between the UK and US increased, so too did the
involvement of Australia, as well as Canada and New Zealand. The level of Allied
cooperation, particularly in signals intelligence and regarding Japan, is underscored by
the presence of numerous intelligence facilities in Australia at that time. In April 1942,
the Central Bureau of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB) was activated in Melbourne.
It was “a combined Allied signals intelligence agency for the Pacific,” run by an
American chief with an Australian deputy. It was one of 16 intercept stations that
operated in Australia at different periods during World War II; nine of which were
Australian, four American, two British, and one Canadian. Australian agencies, Secret 6
Intelligence Australia (SIA) and Special Operations Australia (which later became the
Services Reconnaissance Department) of the AIB, also contributed to Allied efforts,
with the latter having conducted an attack against Japanese shipping in Singapore, and
raids, for example, in Malaya and Borneo. 7
Even after World War II ended, intelligence cooperation continued between Australia,
the US, the UK, Canada and New Zealand. In 1946, American and British
cryptographers determined methods for ongoing intelligence collaboration, and a US
Liaison Office was established in London. Plans were devised to avoid duplication of
work and the American and British agencies agreed to an exchange programme for
For more on these facilities in Australia, including their operators and locations, and the contributions of 6
Canada and New Zealand in signals intelligence and ocean surveillance during this period, see Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, 3–4. The authors also provided an example of Australian–New Zealand cooperation in signals intelligence, for it was New Zealand’s naval authorities that alerted Australian officials to the presence of Japanese submarines near Sydney Harbour in May 1942. See Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, 4.7
! 21
personnel. Importantly, it was decided that each agency would share solved material
with the other. 8
By 1948, post-war intelligence cooperation between the Allies was cemented with the
UK-USA Security Agreement, commonly known as the UKUSA Agreement. It is a
tiered agreement with the US as the First Party, and Australia, the UK, Canada and New
Zealand, the Second Parties. Australia was formally admitted in 1956. As First Party, 9 10
the US has dominated the partnership throughout the post-war period. Jeffrey Richelson
and Desmond Ball attributed this to the US possessing the greatest signals intelligence
collection capability and its considerable subsidising of Australia’s and other states’
signals intelligence activities, in terms of both finances and resources. They
persuasively argued that American capability of challenging Soviet power, and its
military supremacy among the Western Allies throughout the Cold War, would have
likely influenced intelligence collection priorities. Richelson and Ball claimed that
American dominance among the Second Parties is also demonstrated, for example, by
the willingness of those parties to provide the US with, or permit it to construct,
facilities on their soil. 11
Ibid.8
Ibid., 4–5 and 7.9
Alan Fewster, “‘We must be careful to avoid seeking intelligence simply for its own sake’,” Inside 10
Story, 1 August 2014, http://insidestory.org.au/we-must-be-careful-to-avoid-seeking-intelligence-simply-for-its-own-sake (accessed 26 November 2014).
Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, 7–8. For a comprehensive list of the locations and types of 11
intelligence facilities of the UKUSA parties, including in their own states and abroad as at 1990, see Appendix 1, 333–357.
! 22
Signals intelligence is the main feature of the Agreement in which the collection
responsibilities of the parties are delineated; each party is responsible for gathering
signals intelligence in a particular part of the world. Additionally, the Agreement covers
access requirements and handling arrangements regarding intelligence gathered,
standardised code words, security agreements for signals intelligence personnel
employed by the agencies of each party, and measures for sharing and storing code-
worded data. While signals intelligence is at the centre of the Agreement and the post-12
war relationship, the parties formally cooperate in other areas of intelligence including
ocean surveillance, covert activities and security operations. Although Australia 13
maintains intelligence relationships with other states, the UKUSA partnership is by far
the most important to Australia, and likewise the other parties. It was courtesy of the 14
UKUSA relationship that Australia received signals intelligence alerting it to the crisis
in Cuba in October 1962.
According to the authors, these requirements for signals intelligence are specified in the series, 12
‘International Regulations on SIGINT’ (signals intelligence) (IRSIG): Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, 4–5.
Ibid., 6.13
For example, Australia maintains a close relationship with its neighbours, Singapore and Malaysia, in 14
signals intelligence: Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, 7.
! 23
Australian Intelligence Officials are Alerted to the Crisis
Private Sue Gordon was among personnel of the Defence Signals Branch (DSB) 15 16
alarmed by the situation in Cuba in October 1962. Gordon was a trained stenographer
and member of the Women’s Royal Australian Army Corps from 1961−4. At the time 17
of the crisis, Gordon worked as a cipher operator—“the elite in Signals” she claimed—
in 403 Signals Regiment. She was assigned to the DSB’s station at Watsonia, Victoria,
less than 20 kilometres from Melbourne. Established in 1960, the Watsonia station 18
was then “the main signals station in Victoria for the Army,” and thus it regularly
received a high volume of signals “traffic.” 19
Gordon was working the night shift when news of the Cuban situation transpired. She 20
recalled seeing the machines (through which signals were relayed) “spewing out” coded
tape labeled with the highest security classification. Despite her training and Top 21
Sue Gordon was the Commissioner for Aboriginal Planning from 1986–88 and the first indigenous 15
Australian to head a Western Australian government department. In 1988, she became the state’s first indigenous magistrate and first full-time Children’s Court magistrate, an appointment she held for the next 20 years. During that period, Gordon was also the Commissioner of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission and chaired a range of government initiatives affecting Australian indigenous communities. See “Sue Gordon (2002),” Graduates, Alumni, Faculty of Law, The University of Western Australia, http://www.law.uwa.edu.au/alumni/graduates/2000s/gordon (accessed 24 March 2013).
The agency has undergone several name changes. Previously the Defence Signals Bureau, it was 16
renamed the DSB from October 1949 to January 1964. It then became the Defence Signals Division until 1977 when it was renamed the Defence Signals Directorate. In May 2013, it became the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD): “History,” ASD, Department of Defence, Australian Government, http://www.asd.gov.au/about/history.htm (accessed 12 April 2014).
See: Sue Gordon interviewed by John Bannister, “Bringing Them Home Oral History Project,” Perth, 17
12 October 1999, OH ORAL TRC 5000/52, Oral History and Folklore collection, National Library of Australia, Canberra (NLA); and Sue Gordon interviewed by Noah Riseman, “Indigenous Ex-service Men and Women Oral History Project,” Perth, 25 November 2010, OH ORAL TRC 6260/5, Oral History and Folklore collection, NLA. I am grateful to Noah Riseman for this reference.
Gordon interviewed by Riseman, 2010; and Sue Gordon, email to author, 19 March 2013.18
See Gordon to author, 19 March 2013.19
Ibid.20
Gordon interviewed by Riseman, 2010. In this interview, Gordon erroneously referred to the Bay of 21
Pigs incident instead of the Cuban Crisis; the former occurred before Gordon signed-up for the Army on 19 October 1961. This was clarified in private correspondence; see Gordon to author, 19 March 2013.
! 24
Secret clearance, she “never expected to receive one of those in [her] time in the Army.”
Gordon and another private “panicked,” obviously anxious about the situation that was
unfolding. And they were not alone: the shift sergeant, a returned soldier from Japan
and Korea, was “having a fit” she recalled, and promptly contacted senior personnel 22
“to come see all of this.” The Shift Sergeant informed Gordon that such material 23
would result in the Australia's defence force being “put on high alert.” 24
It is likely that this signals intelligence alerted Australia’s Directorate of Military
Intelligence (DMI) to the situation in Cuba. Its Director from 1960–4, Colonel (later 25
Major General) Stuart Graham, was so concerned about the state of affairs that he
travelled to the US on a “fact finding mission.” He arrived in Washington D.C. prior to
President John F. Kennedy’s famous televised national address on 22 October. 26
Gordon to author, 19 March 2013.22
Gordon interviewed by Riseman, 2010.23
Gordon to author, 19 March 2013. Gordon had previously claimed that “the Australian army went on 24
alert” (emphasis added); see Gordon interviewed by Riseman, 2010. No evidence has been located to support Gordon’s claim that the Army was put on alert.
See Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War, January 25
1967—June 1968. The Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975 (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 2003), 32.
Colonel J.O. Langtry (Retired) for Australian Army, conversation with author, 11 January 2013; and 26
Colonel J.O. Langtry, “Colonel John Osborne Langtry’s Military Service: Part II, Australian Regular Army,” unpublished memoirs, 87. I am grateful to J.O. Langtry for sharing with me extracts of his memoirs written for his family, and to Desmond Ball for putting us in touch. Kennedy’s address is discussed throughout this chapter. For the transcript, see John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (JFK Library): Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Speech Files, JFKPOF-041-018, “Radio and television report to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962,” http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-041-018.aspx (accessed 3 August 2015).
! 25
Graham served 39 years in the Australian Army in a variety of command, staff and
diplomatic roles. He spent 1956 at the United States Armed Forces Staff College 27
before being posted to the Australian Military Mission in Washington D.C. where he
worked from 1957–8 as an intelligence officer. Graham was respected by his 28
subordinates and “widely regarded as having one of the best minds in the army.” 29
According to Graham’s former colleague, the late Major General John Whitelaw, “in the
late 1950s, Australia’s defence intelligence arrangements were neither sophisticated nor
extensive, falling considerably short of what the developing Cold War environment
demanded.” As Director of DMI, Graham sought to develop “a more responsive
framework.” He supported progress regarding joint intelligence arrangements and
promoted relations with his American and British counterparts. He also understood the
importance for Australia to develop and maintain solid relationships with its Southeast
Asian neighbours. In 1963, Graham was decorated for his efforts, and was subsequently
appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS) (an Australian Army liaison role
with the armies of the UKUSA countries) and then Head of the Australian Defence Staff
in London. 30
Graham held command roles in World War II, the Occupation of Japan, and the Vietnam War; see 27
Major General John Whitelaw, “Obituaries: Fighting man who led by inspiration,” The Australian, 28 August 1996, 14. Graham is more commonly associated with the controversial barrier minefield installed at Dat Do during the Vietnam War under his command, and consequently, the toll of Australian casualties in Vietnam from mines. Greg Lockhart’s, The Minefield: An Australian tragedy in Vietnam (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2007) is a source dedicated to this subject. A more even-handed account of Graham and the minefield can be found throughout McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive. Graham’s wife, Joyce, is deceased and attempts to locate their two sons, Stuart and Ray, and Graham’s former colleagues in order to learn more about him, were unsuccessful: Langtry, letter to author, undated (received 10 January 2014); Nancy Whitelaw, telephone conversation with author, 13 January 2014; and Ashley Ekins, email to author, 15 January 2014.
See Whitelaw, “Obituaries: Fighting man who led by inspiration,”; and Lockhart, The Minefield, 40. 28
McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, 32. 29
See Whitelaw, “Obituaries: Fighting man who led by inspiration.” For more on his appointments, see 30
McNeill and Ekins, On the Offensive, 254 and 498, n.4.
! 26
A friend and subordinate of Graham in the DMI, Australian Colonel J.O. ‘JOL’ Langtry
(retired), experienced these developments in joint intelligence arrangements with the US
first-hand. In 1962, Langtry worked for the US Army as an Exchange Officer
(Intelligence)—the first appointed to the Pentagon since World War II. He was posted 31
to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (OACSI), the senior
intelligence body of the US Army. The objective of Langtry’s assignment was to 32
advance intelligence collaboration between the Australian and American armies on
Indonesia, his area of specialty. 33
Langtry recalled Graham’s visit to the US that October. The arrival of his Australian
boss in Washington D.C., he felt, “was in connection with the Cuban Crisis”; that was
“no coincidence.” Following their productive meeting in the Australian Embassy on 22
October, Langtry hosted a social gathering in his home that evening in light of
Graham’s visit. He also invited his American boss, Lieutenant-Colonel Don Schafer
(who had been seconded to a Cuban Task Force), his other American superiors, and
some more guests. Langtry observed that “they seemed tense on arrival.” The
Americans had brought with them a portable television. Even though Langtry had a
television, the Americans did not want to miss seeing their President’s national address
on the situation of which, as intelligence officers, they would have been well aware.
Little was said after the broadcast and cars soon arrived to collect the Americans and
See Langtry to author, 11 January 2013; and Langtry, unpublished memoirs, v.31
See Langtry to author, 11 January 2013. For more on OACSI, see Richelson and Ball, The Ties That 32
Bind, 122. See Langtry to author, 11 January 2013.33
! 27
their television. A car from Australia’s Washington Embassy also arrived earlier than
planned to collect Graham, who “had been recalled to Australia post-haste.” 34
These oral histories are essential to our understanding of Australia’s experience of the
Cuban Crisis, and more specifically, the intelligence dimension of this history. Their
importance should not be underestimated. They demonstrate that some Australian
intelligence officials had knowledge of the crisis in Cuba before 22 October. For them,
the crisis began before Kennedy publicly announced it, and as is shown later in this
chapter, earlier than it did for other Australians. Also, these oral histories illustrate the
significance of the crisis in terms of the manner in which intelligence officials
responded to the situation. Furthermore, they reveal the close intelligence relationship
between Australia and the US. The intelligence Graham possessed seemingly showed
the significance of the situation and thus warranted his US visit, but was inadequate to
the extent that it justified his “fact-finding mission.” By liaising directly with his US
counterparts, it was likely that Graham believed he could obtain for Australia a more
detailed assessment of the situation and how it was to be managed. The knowledge and
understanding he gained of US military culture and intelligence matters—and the
networks he presumably established—during his three-year posting to the US, meant
Graham was well placed to undertake such a visit. Also, given his objectives regarding
joint intelligence collaboration, the Cuban situation presented Graham, and thus
Australia, with an opportunity to strengthen its alliance with the US in that regard.
Given military personnel are only recalled home in serious circumstances, Graham’s
Langtry to author, 11 January 2013; and Langtry, unpublished memoirs, 87–8. No evidence identifying 34
who recalled Graham has been located.
! 28
recall indicates the significance of the crisis to the Australian Government, his role in
relation to it, and the information he possibly gathered in the US.
Although the oral histories are essential elements of Australian intelligence officials’
awareness of the crisis, they provide no insight on Australian intelligence on the
situation, including how intelligence officials assessed the nuclear threat the crisis
posed. Several factors, for example, are unknown: the intelligence obtained from the
coded tape or from Graham’s US visit; with whom in the Australian intelligence
community and beyond this intelligence was shared; and whether this intelligence
informed and influenced threat assessments and policy. Nevertheless, the oral histories
remain valuable sources because, apart from a single intelligence report discussed in the
next chapter, to date no other records have been located or are available regarding
Australian intelligence officials and the crisis. Given the crisis occurred more than 50 35
years ago, capturing the oral histories of former Australian public servants directly
involved with Australia’s response to this crisis is an almost insuperable task. There is
the additional dilemma that the secret world of intelligence often wishes to remain just
that. In contrast, sources on Australia’s experience at the political, diplomatic, and
bureaucratic levels are rich and plentiful.
The author requested access to records on the Cuban Crisis created by the Joint Intelligence Bureau, the 35
DSB, and the military intelligence services (DMI, Directorate of Naval Intelligence and Security, and the Directorate of Air Force Intelligence) on 22 March 2013. The National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAA) immediately forwarded the author’s requests to the agencies currently controlling these records because it does not have such agency records on the crisis in its custody. More than four years later, these requests remain pending.
! 29
Key Australian Diplomats and Public Servants are Informed of the Crisis
In contrast to Australian intelligence officials, Australian diplomats and public servants
became aware of the crisis only a matter of hours before Kennedy’s address. Australia’s
Washington Embassy realised that something significant was impending on 22 October
when it learnt that Kennedy had requested time on national television for a broadcast
that evening on “A subject of the Highest National Urgency.” First Secretary to the
Embassy, Donald Jasper Munro, promptly advised the Department of External Affairs 36
(External Affairs) in Canberra. Due to Australia’s longitudinal position, it received
Munro’s initial communiques in the early hours of 23 October. In his first cablegram, 37
Munro noted that Kennedy’s meetings scheduled with the National Security Council,
Cabinet, and Congressional party leaders indicated the seriousness and urgency of the
matter. He added that American naval “manoeuvres” in the Caribbean had given the 38
press cause to speculate that the “subject” was Cuba. 39
Munro was made an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE) in 1970 while he 36
was First Assistant Secretary, Economic Division, of the Department of Prime Minister: “Supplement to the London Gazette,” 13 June 1970, 6401, http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/45118/supplements/6401/page.pdf (accessed 9 January 2014). One US document listed Munro as Minister at Australia’s Embassy in Washington in June 1962: JFK Library: Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, White House Staff Files, Sanford Fox File, Social Events, Box 15, 061862 Luncheon (Stag), Prime Minister of Australia — Menzies, Monday June 18 1962 at 1:00pm, “Administrative arrangements for the arrival at Washington of the Right Honorable [sic] Robert Gordon Menzies, C.H., Q.C., M.P., Prime Minister of Australia,” Office of the Chief of Protocol, Department of State, Washington D.C.,13 June 1962, 2.
Canberra was nine hours ahead of London and 14 hours ahead of Washington D.C. and New York (non-37
daylight saving time). See National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAA): A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, inward cablegram (I.38
26158), Australian Embassy, Washington (Washington Embassy) to Department of External Affairs, Canberra (External Affairs), 22 October 1962.
See NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, inward cablegram (I.26158), Washington Embassy to External 39
Affairs, 22 October 1962. The British press were likewise speculative; see NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, inward cablegram (I.26168), Australian High Commission, London to External Affairs, 22 October 1962.
! 30
Subsequently, Munro, along with representatives of 45 other US multilateral and
bilateral allies, was then called to a briefing on the “subject” at the State Department 40
that afternoon before Kennedy’s broadcast. It was Munro, not the Australian 41
Ambassador to the US, Howard Beale, who attended the briefing: Beale had returned to
Australia on 21 October for two months’ leave. The Australian Government, therefore, 42
was without its key envoy at this crisis point. However, Munro demonstrated acumen;
prior to the meeting, he correctly deduced the “subject” was Cuba and its “offensive
capability.” It is also worth noting that the Australian Ambassador to the Soviet Union 43
from 1960–62, Keith Waller, had returned to Australia in mid-September 1962. 44
However, Waller’s replacement, Stewart Jamieson, did not assume duty in Moscow
until 19 November 1962. Significantly, the Australian Government lacked 45
ambassadorial representation to the two superpowers for the most intense period of the
crisis.
See Roger Hilsman, The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle Over Policy (Westport, US: Praeger, 40
1996), 107. NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, inward cablegram (I.26164), Munro to External Affairs, 22 October 41
1962. See “Beale Home,” Sydney Morning Herald, 22 October 1962, 5. According to the Adelaide Advertiser, 42
Beale returned on 22 October 1962: “Ambassador Home,” Advertiser, 22 October 1962, 6. NAA: A1838, TS262/12/8/1, inward cablegram (I.26188), Munro to External Affairs, 22 October 1962.43
Keith Waller, A Diplomatic Life: Some Memories, Australians in Asia Series No. 6 (Nathan, 44
Queensland: Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, July 1990), 32. Waller went on to become Ambassador to the US from 1964–1970 and Secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs from 1970 to his retirement in 1974: “Obituary: Sir Keith Waller. A diplomat of the old school,” Canberra Times, 17 November 1992, 7.
Department of External Affairs, “Representation: Australian Representation Overseas,” Current Notes 45
on International Affairs (Current Notes), vol. 33, no. 11, November 1962, 82. Jamieson’s previous posting had been in South America as Ambassador to Brazil from 1960–62: Kathleen Dermody, “Jamieson, Stewart Wolfe (1903–1975),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University (ANU), http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/jamieson-stewart-wolfe-10613 (published in hardcopy 1996; accessed online 17 November 2015).
! 31
At the State Department meeting at 6:15 p.m. US Eastern Standard Time (EST), Munro
received an intelligence briefing from Under Secretary of State, George W. Ball, and
Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Roger Hilsman,
alongside representatives of other US allies. Ball and Hilsman briefed the assembled
representatives on the installation of mobile, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)
and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) bases in Cuba. Representatives were given
the opportunity to grasp the rapidly intensifying situation by viewing reconnaissance
photographs of the sites. Hilsman detailed the nature of the Soviet threat and told
representatives that the US had no concrete evidence of nuclear warheads in Cuba.
Nevertheless, he advised that the missiles would be pointless without nuclear warheads,
which could be easily hidden, and the US believed storage for them was under
construction. Munro inquired privately about the number of ballistic missile bases, but
Hilsman declined to disclose this information. Ball and Hilsman advised representatives
that their heads of state would receive the same briefing in their capitals, as well as an
advance copy of Kennedy’s address. The briefing was critical for Australia. It 46
provided Munro, and subsequently the Australian Government, with access to
photographic evidence of the missile build-up and the most detailed information it had
on the situation. The details of the American response to the missile build-up, however,
were excluded from the briefing, leaving representatives to obtain that information
directly from the presidential address, which immediately followed the meeting. 47
NAA: A1838, TS262/12/8/1, inward cablegram (I.26204), Munro to External Affairs, 22 October 1962, 46
1–4. Ibid., 1.47
! 32
Afterwards, Munro cabled External Affairs; it received his communique at
approximately 10:30 a.m. Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST). 48
While Munro was forwarding his initial cablegrams, an assistant secretary in External
Affairs, William (Bill) D. Forsyth, was awakened by a telephone call to his home at
4:00 a.m. One of Forsyth’s responsibilities was Australian–American relations, which
involved liaison with the US Embassy, Canberra. The caller was the First Secretary to
the US Embassy and the American counsellor handling the Cuban Crisis, Donald W.
Lamm. Lamm advised Forsyth that the Embassy “had just received a cable asking them
to inform the Australian Government that President Kennedy was going to make […] a
statement of the very highest importance, a matter of war and peace.” Lamm asked to 49
meet with Forsyth at the earliest time possible so that he could pass on the State
Department’s cable summary and extracts sent for the Government. 50
After Lamm visited Forsyth in his office at approximately 5:30–6:00 a.m., Forsyth
promptly contacted Deputy Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister, James (Jim)
Secretary to Cabinet, John Bunting, noted at the beginning of the Cabinet meeting on 23 October that 48
Minister for External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, remarked: “Message from Ambassador in US now coming through”: NAA: A11099, 1/59, Cabinet Notebook, 23 October 1962. The corresponding time of the meeting at the State Department, Kennedy’s address, and the Cabinet meeting, as well as Ambassador Beale’s absence, strongly suggests the message was Munro’s cablegram (I.26204). All times referred to in this thesis are in AEST unless otherwise indicated.
William Douglass Forsyth interviewed by Mel Pratt, “Mel Pratt Collection,” Canberra, January–49
February 1972, OH ORAL TRC 121/27, transcript, Oral History and Folklore collection, NLA, 287–8. Ibid., 288.50
! 33
F. Nimmo, at his home, whom he thought would have access to Menzies. Nimmo, 51
who had occupied this position since 1960, was a Treasury veteran, having entered that
Department in 1939; he was the First Assistant Secretary of the Banking, Trade and
Industry Branch before joining the Department of Prime Minister. At around 7:00–52
7:30 a.m., Nimmo visited Forsyth’s office to collect the documents delivered by Lamm
and remarked he was reluctant to disturb “the old man” before 9:00 a.m. A worker until
late at night, Menzies was not considered at his best at the beginning of Cabinet
meetings, which would commence around 10:00–10:30 a.m. One minister analogised,
“Seated in his chair he reminded me sometimes of Cape Town’s Table Mountain capped
by cloud;” sunlight and a cigar were helpful stimulants. Forsyth mentioned to Nimmo 53
that he would leave it to his best judgement, but emphasised that it was “a very
important matter and rather urgent.” Consequently, Nimmo placed an early telephone
call to the PM’s Canberra residence and then “he took the papers up to Mr Menzies’
room […] and they went through them.” 54
Ibid., 288. According to this transcript, Forsyth contacted “Jim Miller ... then an assistant secretary in 51
the Prime Minister’s Department.” This is most likely a transcription error and should have instead noted Jim Nimmo, who then occupied that role in the Department, and whose name has thus been inserted here. Director of the Historical Publications and Information Section of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, David Lee, was unable to locate one “Jim Miller” of the Department at that time and agreed the reference should be to Nimmo; see David Lee, email to author, 17 April 2013. Donald Lamm’s name, which appears in the transcript as “Don Lamb”, is also incorrectly spelt. The transcript is a copy of the original (according to a handwritten note on the first page) because Forsyth never returned his annotated copy. This indicates the transcript was not redacted. It is also possible that the interviewer/interviewee had Lamm confused with Knox Lamb of the American Consulate in Brisbane. For more on Lamm’s diplomatic postings, see Steven M. Speich, “In Memoriam: Donald Wakeham Lamm, 1914–1996,” https://sora.unm.edu/sites/default/files/journals/auk/v116n03/p0818-p0818.pdf (accessed 12 July 2017).
JFK Library, National Security Files (NSF), Countries, Box 8A, Australia General 7/6/63–7/8/63, 52
“Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House” (with enclosure: biographic sketch, “Nimmo, James Ferguson, Australia, Deputy Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department”) from Department of State, Washington, D.C. (Department of State), undated.
Alexander Downer, Six Prime Ministers (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 1982), 17–8.53
Ibid., 288.54
! 34
While Nimmo risked getting the PM out of bed—and the wrong side for that matter—it
was the right decision. Menzies then had the opportunity to review the State 55
Department documents prior to Kennedy’s national address as the State Department
intended. It was important to have the PM informed of the Cuban situation from the
earliest possible moment, given the speed at which it unfolded and that it was raised in
Cabinet and Parliament later that morning, as is discussed further in this, and the next,
chapter.
It is possible that this was not the first Menzies had heard of the crisis. In this period, it
was commonplace for the intelligence agencies to brief the PM, and also the Minister
for External Affairs, on such highly classified matters. While Menzies and Barwick 56
officially learnt of the crisis on 23 October, Australian intelligence officials—given their
prior awareness as has been demonstrated—probably informed them earlier. Desmond
Ball has written that policymakers however often have considerable difficulty utilising
intelligence, especially signals intelligence, for sometimes they are unable to capitalise
on their special knowledge because of the risk of revealing their sources and methods. 57
Three years later, the Secretary of the Department, John Bunting, made the wrong decision. He delayed 55
telephoning Menzies at 8:00 a.m. to advise of Singapore’s separation from the Federation of Malaysia because the PM did not expect or like to be called at that time. However, when Bunting informed Menzies later at 10:00 a.m., noting his decision to defer due to the time and in hope that he could furnish him with a fuller report, the PM silently then verbally disapproved, his displeasure lingering for some days: John Bunting, R. G. Menzies: A Portrait (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 110–1.
See Desmond Ball, conversation with author, 9 January 2013. The author’s attempts to access records 56
created by the intelligence agencies on the crisis—see n.35—and locate records to support this from the departments of Prime Minister and External Affairs were unsuccessful.
Desmond Ball, “Silent witness: Australian intelligence and East Timor,” The Pacific Review 14, no. 1 57
(2001): 36.
! 35
Given the UKUSA Agreement was then secret, Menzies and Barwick may have found 58
it difficult to capitalise on the signals intelligence the Government had obtained on the
Cuban situation.
It is very likely that the Director-General of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service
(ASIS) from 1960–68, Walter Cawthorn, was, like Graham, one of the senior 59
Australian intelligence officials who had advance notice of the Cuban situation. Perhaps
Cawthorn discussed Cuba with Barwick when the two met in Melbourne on the
afternoon of 22 October — interestingly, the day before official news of the crisis
broke. A record of what was discussed however, has not been located. ASIS by then 60
came under the Department of External Affairs, with the director responsible directly to
the Minister. However, Barwick and Cawthorn were among few Australians then 61
aware of the agency’s existence; established in 1952, ASIS remained a secret—
including from members of the government—for over 20 years. 62
In 1977, the Australian PM refused to respond to a question from the Opposition Foreign Affairs 58
Spokesman as to whether Australia was a Party to the Agreement: Richelson and Ball, The Ties That Bind, 5–6. These days, the ASD refers to the Agreement on its website, and includes a hyperlink to The National Archives UK website, specifically, the reference details for Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) files on the Agreement released in June 2010: “UKUSA Allies,” ASD, Department of Defence, Australian Government, http://www.asd.gov.au/partners/allies.htm (accessed 2 May 2015).
Peter Hohnen, “Cawthorn, Sir Walter Joseph (1896–1970),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, 59
National Centre of Biography, ANU, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/cawthorn-sir-walter-joseph-9715 (published in hardcopy 1993; accessed online 14 November 2014).
NAA, Sydney: M3943, 1, [Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick] Diaries, 1962 appointment diary (small 60
size), 22 October 1962. ASIS was then based in Melbourne: Fewster, “‘We must be careful to avoid seeking intelligence simply for its own sake’.”
Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins (Crows Nest, New South Wales: Allen & Unwin, 61
2006), 104. “History,” ASIS [foreign intelligence] [sic], Australian Government, http://www.asis.gov.au/About-Us/62
History.html (accessed 14 November 2014). According to one report, Calwell, as Leader of the Opposition, was briefed on the existence of ASIS (or “listed” to use the ASIS term), but not his successor, Gough Whitlam: Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (Port Melbourne, Victoria: William Heinemann Australia, 1989), 83 and 85. Even in December 1970, former Minister for External Affairs, R. G. Casey, kept Cawthorn’s role as the head of ASIS secret. In an obituary on the former ASIS Director-General for publication in Melbourne’s Age and Sun newspapers, Casey referred to Cawthorn as an “Advisor to the Department of Defence”: NAA, Melbourne: M1129, CAWTHORN/W J, obituary on Cawthorn for the Age and Sun by R. G. Casey, 6 December 1970, 1.
! 36
Prime Minister Menzies is Briefed on the Crisis
In addition to Nimmo’s briefing, Menzies was briefed by the American Ambassador to
Australia, William C. Battle. This was as per Kennedy’s instructions, which required
Battle to deliver personally a message and advance copy of his address to Menzies. This
was also consistent with the State Department’s advice to Munro at the meeting hosted
by Hilsman and Ball. Battle commenced his ambassadorship, which happened to be 63
his first, only three months before the crisis. A lawyer and former manager of
Kennedy’s presidential campaign in Virginia, he was also Kennedy’s friend, the two
having met while commanding patrol torpedo boats in the Pacific during World War
II. Battle felt he quickly established a strong rapport with Menzies, whom he 64
admired. The Battle and Menzies families became friends and they saw one another 65 66
on a regular basis. Whenever Battle had important information from the White House 67
for the PM, he contacted Menzies directly. Accordingly, Battle claimed “there was never
more than a two-hour delay in seeing him. Of course, the Cuban Missile Crisis is one of
those situations.” Battle added that “after receiving the communication from
Washington as to what was going on ... [he] delivered all of the background to the Prime
Minister before it happened.” Battle however was in Adelaide, South Australia, from 68
See NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 3, Kennedy to Menzies, 23 October 1962.63
Battle held this ambassadorship from 1962–4. For more on Battle, see “Biographical Note,” William C. 64
Battle interviewed by Dennis O’Brien, Charlottesville, Virginia, 2 March 1970, JFKOH-WCB-02, transcript, John F. Kennedy Oral History collection, JFK Library; and JFK Library, NSF, Countries, Box 8, Australia General 6/6/62–6/15/62, “Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House” (with enclosure: biographic sketch, William C. Battle, United States Ambassador to Australia) from Department of State, 11 June 1962.
See Battle interviewed by O’Brien, 1970.65
See A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 2, 1944–1978 (Carlton South, Victoria: Melbourne 66
University Press, 1999), 550–1. Heather Henderson, ed., Letters to My Daughter: Robert Menzies, letters, 1955–1975 (Millers Point, 67
NSW: Pier 9, 2011), 108, n.1. Battle interviewed by O’Brien, 2 March 1970, paras. 65–6. See also NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 3, 68
Kennedy to Menzies, 23 October 1962.
! 37
20–27 October. Although Menzies had a strong and well-known distaste for the
telephone, which he rarely used, it is plausible that Battle rang Menzies and 69
“delivered” his briefing before Kennedy’s broadcast (“it”), and therefore early on the
morning of 23 October. 70
Menzies also received a personal letter from Kennedy. This letter, and the advance copy
of Kennedy’s address, were probably amongst the documents Lamm provided Forysth
and, subsequently, Nimmo delivered to Menzies. In his address, Kennedy referred to the
nuclear capabilities of the weapons in Cuba. However, in his letter, he wrote as though
he had evidence of nuclear warheads in Cuba. Specifically, Kennedy stated that
evidence of offensive nuclear missile bases installed by the Soviet Union in Cuba was
“accurate beyond question,” and he emphasised the offensive nature of the weapons.
Kennedy also recalled his public statement of 13 September 1962 where he pledged that
if at any time the Communist buildup in Cuba were to…become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies. 71
Bunting, R. G. Menzies, 36–7; and Henderson, Letters to My Daughter, x.69
That Battle delivered his briefing to Menzies by telephone is supported by the absence of a cablegram 70
on it, and newspaper articles that demonstrate Battle remained in Adelaide and maintained his busy schedule. For the overall programme of Battle’s Adelaide visit, see: “U.S. Envoy’s Visit to Adelaide,” Advertiser, 20 October 1962, 6. For more on his programme on 23 October, see: Battle interviewed by O’Brien, 1970, paragraphs 66–8; M. Armitage, “About People: big day for U.S. envoy’s wife,” Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 21; “Vice-Regal,” Advertiser, 24 October 1962, 2; “‘Most Careful Decision’: visit by envoy,” Advertiser, 24 October 1962, 3; and M. Armitage, “About People: A.A.A. dinner. U.S. ambassador is guest,” Advertiser, 24 October 1962, 19.
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 3, letter from Kennedy to Menzies, 23 October 1962. For Kennedy’s full 71
press statement and excerpts of replies to questions of 13 September 1962, see Document III-37: “Unilateral military intervention (in Cuba) on the part of the United States cannot currently be either required or justified,” in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 373–5.
! 38
He advised Menzies of his immediate course of action, briefly repeating what was
outlined in his address. Kennedy also noted that the Australian Ambassador in
Washington D.C. would be “briefed on the details.” The briefing to which Kennedy 72
referred was likely the one Munro attended at the State Department that preceded his
address. Kennedy concluded that he hoped Menzies would ask Australia’s Permanent
Representative to the UN in New York, James Plimsoll, “to work closely with [the US
Ambassador to the UN] Adlai Stevenson and speak forthrightly in support of” the
American resolution presented to the UN Security Council. 73
Menzies was one of 43 political leaders to whom a presidential letter was sent. New 74
Zealand Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake, also received a letter from Kennedy. The
Prime Ministers’ letters were almost identical. Menzies’ letter was more personalised
than Holyoake’s letter; Kennedy addressed him as “Bob.” Kennedy also referred to
Plimsoll by his name rather than his position and expressed hope that Australia’s
Permanent Representative would be asked “to work closely” with Stevenson.” In 75
contrast, Kennedy greeted Holyoake impersonally as “Mr. Prime Minister” and stated
that he hoped the New Zealand PM would “instruct [his] representative in New York to
work actively with the United States ... in the [UN].” Holyoake’s letter also included an
additional, concluding sentence: “The Department of State will keep your Ambassador
informed of all developments.” Its absence from Menzies’ letter suggests this was 76
Ibid.72
Ibid.73
Hilsman, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 106.74
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 3, Kennedy to Menzies, 23 October 1962. Emphasis added.75
Archives New Zealand (ANZ): Cuba: Political Affairs–General [10/62-10/62], ABHS 950 76
W4627/4461, 399/4/1, 3, Kennedy to Holyoake, 23 October 1962. Emphasis added.
! 39
implied. It is clear from the letters that Kennedy had a closer relationship with Menzies
than with Holyoake. Menzies however, was not favoured in terms of information
sharing. On 23 October, Australia and New Zealand seemed to have a somewhat
limited, yet equal, awareness of the crisis compared to other US allies.
The Timing of Australian Officials’ Learning of the Crisis and Comparisons with
Other US Allies
The timeframe in which the Australian Government learnt of the crisis contrasts with
existing scholarship on Australia and the crisis and some other US allies’ experiences.
In one of her studies outlined in the Introduction, Prue Torney-Parlicki stated: “Two
days before Kennedy’s broadcast, the department [External Affairs] sent a cablegram to
Australian embassies listing aspects of the crisis to be kept in mind, including
Australia’s declared support for the United States.” This claim is incorrect: public 77
servants in External Affairs had no knowledge of the crisis on 20 October; as has been
demonstrated, they learnt of the crisis on 23 October. Furthermore, the Australian
Government first declared its support for the US on 23 October; this will be addressed
in the last part of this chapter. The first page of the cablegram Torney-Parlicki cited to
support her claim was erroneously dated 20 October. A closer examination reveals its
true date, 29 October, which was noted on the final page. Additionally, Torney-Parlicki
quoted a statement in the cablegram regarding US defence capabilities in Southeast Asia
Torney-Parlicki, Behind the News, 285. Torney-Parlicki made a similar statement in “Lies, Diplomacy 77
and the ABC,” 47.
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during the crisis. This quotation originally appeared in a paper prepared for Barwick, 78
which he first received on 25 October, and not on 20 October. This thesis therefore 79
revises earlier scholarship regarding the date on which public servants in External
Affairs learnt of the crisis, and corrects Torney-Parlicki’s claim that they, or the
Australian Government more generally, received such significant advance notice of the
crisis.
Although the Australian Government did not officially receive the advance notice
Torney-Parlicki claimed, some of its allies did. Before his State Department meeting,
Munro suspected that some US allies knew more than they admitted, and therefore he
believed Australia was being kept in the dark. He told External Affairs: “I know that the
British have been informed about the nature of the crisis and what is to be done about it,
but they have been sworn to absolute secrecy.” Munro did not disclose the source of his
information and the UK did not provide Australia with any indication of what it knew. 80
Munro was correct: the UK, which the US considered to be a “key ally,” had advance
notice of the crisis. On 17 October 1962 during a meeting of the Executive Committee
of the National Security Council (ExComm)—a group of senior advisers assembled by
Torney-Parlicki’s source is NAA: A1209/80, 1962/920 part 1, but it does not contain the cablegram to 78
which she referred. The actual source of this information is NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, outward cablegram (O.19418), External Affairs to Australian Mission to UN, New York, and Washington Embassy, 20 October 1962, correct date: 29 October 1962. Pages 2–4 of this four-page cablegram are located later in this file and not with the initial and erroneously dated page.
See NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 3, External Affairs paper on “The Cuban Crisis” with annotations, 79
William D. Forsyth to Barwick, 25 October 1962, “Conclusion,” 5–7. NAA: A1838, TS262/12/8/1, inward cablegram (I.26188), Munro to Department of External Affairs, 22 80
October 1962.
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the President during the Cuban crisis to secretly deliberate on the situation —Secretary 81
of State, Dean Rusk, suggested a military strike against the MRBMs. He stated that as
part of that proposed action, the US “inform key allies,” probably the day before. Allies
considered “key” included British PM, Harold Macmillan; French President, Charles de
Gaulle; West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer; and “possibly the Turks and a few
Latin American Presidents.” Menzies was not named; Australia was not considered one
of the “key allies” to be informed in advance of the Cuban situation or Rusk’s proposed
response to it. 82
While a military strike on the MRBMs did not eventuate, the US nevertheless provided
the UK with advance notice of the Cuban situation and its alternative response to it.
Macmillan became aware of the crisis on 19 October. So too did the British Ambassador
to the US, David Ormsby Gore, and senior British officials. The latter had been 83
briefed in-person by the Deputy Director for Intelligence of the US Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), Ray Cline, at a conference on intelligence methodology at CIA
headquarters. Although Australian intelligence officials might have attended this 84
For further discussion on the composition of ExComm and its role during the crisis, see David R. 81
Gibson, Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), ch. 3.
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, 82
eds. Edward C. Keefer, Charles S. Sampson, and Louis J. Smith (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 23: “Memorandum for the File,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d23 (accessed 25 February 2016).
See L. V. Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military and Intelligence 83
Aspects (Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1999), 39–48.
Cline briefed: Director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau, Kenneth Strong; Chairman of the Joint 84
Intelligence Committee, Hugh Stephenson; Cabinet Secretary designate, Burke Trend; and Counsellor, British Embassy, Washington, Thomas Brimelow: ibid.
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conference, no records are available that confirm this. According to Len Scott, the 85
British Government may have unofficially learned of the crisis via intelligence channels
as early as 17 October. However, Macmillan did not receive official notification of the 86
crisis until 21 October. He recorded in his diary: “About 10pm I got a message from
President Kennedy, giving a short account of the serious situation wh. [which] was
developing between US and USSR [Soviet Union], over Cuba.” Interestingly, that was
the first time Macmillan mentioned the crisis in his diary despite daily entries on 19 and
20 October 1962. What should be emphasised, however, is that Kennedy had made 87
personal contact with Macmillan at 10:00 p.m. on 21 October (Greenwich Mean Time
(GMT)). This meant, taking into account the previous section, that Menzies was
informed of the Cuban Crisis just over 24 hours later than the British PM. 88
Furthermore, at noon on 22 October 1962, US Ambassador to the UK from 1961–69,
David K. E. Bruce, called on Macmillan and presented a “long letter” from Kennedy
and “a great dossier” to prove the secret Soviet missile deployments in Cuba, contrary
to the specific assurances given by the Soviet Government. Menzies did not receive 89
similar documents until more than 10 hours later.
The author’s request for a review of classified records on this conference was denied in February 2013. 85
The relevant record is John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (JFK Library): National Security Files (NSF), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), General, Conference on Intelligence 10/62, 8/62–3/63.
Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 39–48.86
Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries: Prime Minister and After, 1957–66, ed. by Peter Catterall 87
(London: Macmillan, 2011), 508 (21 October 1962). See also Peter Catterall, “Modifying ‘a very dangerous message’: Britain, the non-aligned and the UN during the Cuban missile crisis,” in An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-year retrospective, David Gioe, Len Scott and Christopher Andrews, eds. Studies in Intelligence Series (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 73.
Canberra was nine hours ahead of London and 14 hours ahead of Washington D.C. and New York (non-88
daylight saving time). Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries, 508 (22 October 1962). In that meeting, Bruce did not provide 89
Macmillan with an advance copy of the President’s national address; it arrived at approximately 5:00p.m.: ibid., 509 (22 October 1962).
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The advance notice that Macmillan received meant that the British Government had
more time than Australia, and other allies, in which to consider the Cuban situation and
respond to the US course of action. As shown earlier in this chapter, most US allies only
heard about the crisis immediately prior to Kennedy’s national address on 22 October
1962 at 7:00 p.m. (EST), the President’s speech having informed them of how the US
proposed to respond to the situation. By the time Kennedy delivered his address,
Macmillan and British Foreign Secretary from 1960–63, Alec Douglas-Home, had
already replied to Kennedy’s letter, in which they said that they would “support him in
his determination to prevent the Russians ‘get away’ [sic] with this new act of
aggression.” Although the British were swift to pledge their support for the US 90
privately, Chapter 2 will show that the Australian Government was quicker to do so
publicly. Nonetheless, the British could promptly express their support for the US in the
Cuban Crisis because of the advance notice provided to them by the Kennedy
Administration.
The advance notice that the US gave the UK reflects the “special relationship” the two
states had in this period. This was, in part, a result of the close friendship between
Kennedy and Ormsby Gore. Even though the US and the UK were Australia’s closest 91
Ibid., 509–10 (22 October 1962).90
For an excellent examination of this relationship, specifically, the “unique intimacy” between Ormsby-91
Gore and Kennedy, see Michael F. Hopkins, “David Ormsby Gore, Lord Harlech, 1961–65,” in Michael F. Hopkins, Saul Kelly and John W. Young (eds.), The Washington Embassy: British Ambassadors to the United States, 1939–77 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 130–49. See also Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 94; and Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight (New York: Arrow, 2009), 215. Indicative of that special relationship was Britain’s foreknowledge of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and its agreement with the US for the latter to use its Caribbean territories for subsequent combat operations; see Nigel J. Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2002), 66-7; and Scott, Macmillan, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 27.
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allies, evidently, it did not have the “special relationship” with them that they shared
with each other.
In Munro’s cablegram to External Affairs where he suspected the British were aware of
the crisis, he implied that Canadian Ambassador to the US, Charles Ritchie, also knew
more than he stated, and therefore so did the Canadian Government. Although in their
discussion Ritchie claimed also to be uninformed, the language he used to describe the
situation indicated to Munro he had discussed it with US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk.
Ritchie also remarked to Munro “that there had recently been a good deal of intelligence
material” on a situation arising for the US regarding “an assessment of offensive
capacity.” External Affairs had therefore been advised by Munro that Australia was 92
less privileged than some of its allies regarding its awareness of the crisis. In terms of
how the Kennedy Administration planned to proceed, the President's national address
would be most informative.
President Kennedy’s Address to the American People
On 22 October 1962 at 7:00 p.m. (US Eastern Standard Time (EST)), President
Kennedy interrupted evening broadcasting to address the nation, and most of the world,
on the situation in Cuba. In a direct and sombre speech lasting 17 minutes, he detailed 93
the crisis in Cuba and his Administration’s plan of action. While Prime Minister
NAA: A1838, TS262/12/8/1, inward cablegram (I.26188), Munro to Department of External Affairs, 22 92
October 1962. Stacey Bredhoff, To the Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington D.C.: Foundation for 93
the National Archives, 2012), 40.
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Menzies had an advance copy of the address, as discussed earlier, this was the first
others had heard of the situation.
Beginning with a reference to the Soviet build-up in Cuba, Kennedy informed his
audience that there was now unmistakeable evidence that “a series of offensive missile
sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island.” He asserted that their purpose
was “to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.” Covering
much of what was disclosed to the representatives of US allies at the State Department
meeting, Kennedy claimed:
This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base—by the presence of these large, long-range and clearly offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction—constitutes an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas.
The President declared that the US would “not prematurely or unnecessarily risk the
costs of world-wide nuclear war in which even the fruits of victory would be ashes in
our mouth—but neither will we shrink from that risk at any time it must be faced.”
Acting in “the defense of our own [US] security and that of the entire Western
Hemisphere,” he then outlined his Administration’s initial, seven-step response.
First, the Kennedy Administration stated that it would impose a quarantine on the
shipment of offensive military equipment to Cuba. Second, it would continue to survey
Cuba and the build-up. Third, Kennedy declared:
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It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union. 94
Although scholars have never described it as one, arguably, this third step represents a
presidential doctrine, just like the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Eisenhower
Doctrine of 1957. In essence, the ‘Kennedy Doctrine of 1962’ declared that the US 95
would retaliate against the Soviet Union if an attack was launched from Cuba against
the Western Hemisphere. In a similar vein to other doctrines, it strongly reflects US
unilateralism, which is discussed further in the next chapter.
Fourth, the US reinforced its base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and put additional units on
standby. Fifth, it called for an “immediate meeting” of the Organ of Consultation of the
Organization of American States (OAS). Sixth, Kennedy advised that his
Administration was seeking an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council. He
further advised that the US resolution would “call for the prompt dismantling and
withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of UN observers,
before the quarantine can be lifted.” Seventh, and finally, Kennedy called on
Khrushchev “to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (JFK Library): Papers of John F. Kennedy, 94
Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Speech Files, JFKPOF-041-018, “Radio and television report to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962,” http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-041-018.aspx (accessed 3 August 2015). The Department of External Affairs included a transcript of the President’s address in its monthly digest Current Notes on International Affairs (Current Notes), vol. 33, no. 10, October 1962, 41–5.
In the Truman Doctrine, the US declared that it would “assist free peoples who are resisting attempted 95
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” While the doctrine was initially proclaimed to obtain congressional support for aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent the possibility of Communist subversion, it underpinned US Cold War and modern foreign policy. The Eisenhower Doctrine declared that the US would render any Middle Eastern government assistance, if requested, to prevent a Communist takeover. For a summary of presidential doctrines declared later in the Cold War, see Joan Hoff, “The American Century: From Sarajevo to Sarajevo,” Diplomatic History 23, no. 2 (1999): 290, n.8.
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world peace and to stable relations between our two nations.” Not only was the 96
content of the President’s address significant, so was the medium through which he
delivered it.
Television and the Crisis
Kennedy was the first US President to use television effectively to address the American
people. He held 64 press conferences during his presidency, and unlike those given by
his predecessors, they were broadcast live on television without delay or editing. On
average, each was watched by 18 million viewers. Additionally, Kennedy delivered 97
live televised speeches to the nation from the Oval Office. His address on 22 October at
7:00 p.m. EST on what would become known as the Cuban Missile Crisis was one such
occasion.
Kennedy’s televised address was a pivotal moment in the Cuban Crisis and in American
television history. Writing on the evolution of American television, Erik Barnouw
dedicated a section of his study to the crisis and, in particular, to Kennedy’s address. 98
According to Barnouw, the important role television played “was so much taken for
granted” that Administration officials “recommended not only what should be done, but
what President Kennedy should say on the air.” Kennedy’s address was, he asserted, an
JFK Library: Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Speech Files, 96
JFKPOF-041-018, “Radio and television report to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962,” http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-041-018.aspx (accessed 3 August 2015).
See “John F. Kennedy and the Press,” JFK Library, http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/John-97
F-Kennedy-and-the-Press.aspx (accessed 31 March 2014). Erik Barnouw, Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of American Television, 2nd rev. edn. (New York: Oxford 98
University Press, 1990), 307–12.
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“ultimatum via TV” to Khrushchev. It was delivered by television in order to give it
“maximum force,” which could not be effected “merely through diplomatic channels.”
The intention was to counter any public perception following the Bay of Pigs incident
that Kennedy was “soft on communism.” And the timing was critical: campaigns were
underway for midterm elections, typically regarded as an opportunity for voters to
demonstrate their level of satisfaction with the sitting president and party. Viewers saw
Kennedy “fully in control,” the broadcast having shown him as “a brilliant technician in
the consolidation and use of political power,” and arguably, television. 99
President Kennedy’s televised address has become central to how the Cuban Crisis is
remembered. Those with an interest in this Cold War episode would recognise a
photograph of customers in a Californian department store gathered around television
sets watching Kennedy deliver his address. This photograph, taken by the renowned
staff photographer at the American news magazine Life, Ralph Crane, is an iconic image
associated with the crisis. Its significance was emphasised in an exhibition marking the
fiftieth anniversary of the crisis, “To the Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis,”
curated by Stacey Bredhoff of the National Archives’ John F. Kennedy Presidential
Library and Museum. Crane’s photograph appeared several times throughout the 100
publication accompanying the exhibition, including the front cover. It also seems to 101
have been what Bredhoff pictured when designing the opening exhibit. On entering,
Ibid.99
“To the Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” National Archives and Records Administration, 100
exhibition: 12 October 2012–3 February 2013, Lawrence F. O’Brien Gallery, National Archives Building, Washington D.C. The exhibition was held at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, Massachusetts, from 12 April–11 November 2013.
See Bredhoff, To the Brink, front cover, 40, and 82–3.101
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visitors found themselves in a dark room that contained a single television set playing
an excerpt of Kennedy’s address. Cleverly, Bredhoff transported visitors 50 years 102
back in time to where they, just like the customers in the Californian department store,
would watch the President warn of the possibility of nuclear war. It was the first the
American people had heard of the impending crisis in Cuba, and it was therefore a
fitting start for visitors to the exhibition. While enabling those who watched Kennedy’s
address in 2012 to relate to those in 1962, Bredhoff also located the American people in
the Cuban Crisis. The emphasis placed on the televised nature of Kennedy’s address in
this exhibition and accompanying publication, has ensured this aspect of the crisis has
been preserved.
The significance of Kennedy’s address to the histories of the Cuban Crisis and
American television does not, however, extend to television news coverage of the crisis
in the US. In 2002, the Paley Center for Media, formerly the Museum of Television and
Radio, brought together a panel of speakers to discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis and 103
American television. In a prelude to a question, the then president of the organisation
and panel host, Robert M. Batscha, highlighted two respects in which television affected
the crisis, and vice-versa. He described it as “an early event in the public being able to
follow a crisis [… and] in the White House using television in a crisis situation.”
Batscha then asked the panel:
Author’s visit to exhibition “To the Brink” (Washington, D.C.), 12 November 2012.102
“Mission & History,” The Paley Centre for Media, https://www.paleycenter.org/about-mission-history-103
history/ (accessed 7 July 2017).
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Could you assess how important television was from the point of view of communicating the crisis, from the point of view of policy, and from the point of view of where were we in the history of television news in covering events and what difference did it make? 104
In response to this and subsequent questions, all of the speakers played down the
significance of television. Former UN correspondent for CBS, Richard C. Hottelet,
stated that “the missile crisis was not a pictorial crisis […] There were people who had
things to say.” While acknowledging that there were pictures of the UN Security
Council, this, he noted, was “a far cry of course from what we have today. The remotes,
the satellites, the uplinks, the digital cameras and all the rest of it, didn’t exist.” Hottelet
therefore believed “television figured […] only marginally.” It was, he considered,
principally a crisis for radio and the press, and as such, Hottelet suggested it did not
play an important role in both covering and communicating the crisis. 105
Well-known former political reporter, Sander ‘Sandy’ Vanocur, concurred. A reporter for
NBC News at the time of the crisis, Vanocur recalled that the night of Kennedy’s 106
address “was the only time all week I did a live spot.” This he did direct from the White
House. In terms of communicating the crisis, Vanocur suggested therefore that apart
from that single occasion, television was not of critical importance. 107
“Media’s Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The Paley Center for Media, http://www.paleycenter.org/104
p-cuban-missile-crisis (accessed 3 April 2014). The Paley Center uploaded this webpage in October 2012 for the fiftieth anniversary of the crisis. It contains a video clip from the panel discussion in 2002, from which the author transcribed the speakers’ comments.
Ibid.105
“Sander Vanocur Biography (1928–),” Theatre, Film, and Television Biographies: Daniel J. Travanti to 106
Dick Vitale, film reference, http://www.filmreference.com/film/26/Sander-Vanocur.html (accessed 4 April 2014).
“Media’s Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The Paley Center for Media, http://www.paleycenter.org/107
p-cuban-missile-crisis (accessed 3 April 2014).
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This was the point of view even from within the White House. Batscha asked former
journalist, and then Deputy Director of the US Information Agency (USIA), Donald M.
Wilson: “What did you learn from inside the government about television coverage of
this particular event? Did it change any behaviour?” Expressing his agreement with
Hottelet and Vanocur, Wilson stated:
[T]elevision was not a major player at that time compared to what it shortly became just several years afterwards. And I remember being very concerned about how various matters would be reported but I certainly think I was more concerned about what the New York Times and the Washington Post would say, than I was about what television would say. It wasn’t that powerful then. 108
Wilson’s insight is invaluable. Not only did he hold a key position in the USIA, which
was responsible for disseminating the Administration’s views to the public in other
countries, but he was standing in for the ailing USIA Director and notable radio and
television journalist, Edward R. Murrow. The consensus amongst the panel, therefore, 109
was that in terms of covering and communicating news on the crisis in the US,
television was not the medium of critical importance when compared with radio and the
press.
The role television played in news reporting on the crisis has received a more positive
reception across the Atlantic. There were two television channels in the UK and both
Ibid.108
“Donald M. Wilson” (Obituary), Times (Trenton, New Jersey), 11 December 2011, http://obits.nj.com/109
obituaries/trenton/obituary.aspx?pid=155005033 (accessed 4 April 2014). For an excellent examination of Murrow and the Kennedy Administration, see Gregory M. Tomlin, Murrow’s Cold War: Public Diplomacy for the Kennedy Administration (Lincoln: Potomac Books, University of Nebraska Press, 2016). For more on Murrow, generally, see Robert William Pirsein, The Voice of America: An History of the International Broadcasting Activities of the United States Government: 1940–1962 (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 421–2; and Alan L. Heil, Jr., Voice of America: A History (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 68–71.
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broadcast news: the commercial channel, Independent Television Network (ITV),
whose news programmes were provided by Independent Television News (ITN), and of
course, the BBC. Although there were fluctuations, each attracted around half the
audience share in the 1960s. According to former ITN chairman, David Nicholas, the 110
Cuban Crisis revolutionised and legitimated television as a news medium. In his 111
career with ITN, Nicholas worked as a journalist, newsreader, producer, and editor, and
eventually served as its editor-in-chief, chief executive, and chairman. In 2001, he was
recognised with a Lifetime Achievement award by News World, an organisation
including some of the most well-known and respected news outlets internationally.
Reflecting on the 31 years he spent in the ITN newsroom, Nicholas averred that “there
were only two stories that changed the world”: the Cuban Crisis and the collapse of the
Berlin Wall in 1989. When the former occurred, he was an ITN journalist. While 112
Chairman of ITN, Nicholas told British broadcasting historians, Stuart Hood and Garret
O’Leary, that
For more on the structure of British commercial television, see Stuart Hood and Garret O’Leary, 110
Questions of Broadcasting (Great Britain: Methuen London, 1990), 24–6. Ibid., 35–6.111
Patrick Fletcher, “The man behind the ITN story; Sir David Nicholas: a key thinker in the rise of 112
television news,” Western Mail (Cardiff, Wales), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+man+behind+the+ITN+story%3B+Sir+David+Nicholas%3A+a+key+thinker+in...-a080361533 (28 November 2001). The article erroneously referred to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1963, not 1962.
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television news really came of age with the Cuban missile crisis which was in 1962. First of all, it was a very pictorial issue in the sense that Kennedy in mobilising American forces and raising the issue in a dramatic radio and television speech said ‘Look, here are pictures of missile sites in Cuba’ and ‘Here are pictures taken by reconnaissance aircraft of rockets on the decks of Soviet freighters on their way to Havana’. That was an amazing week of huge international tension when the world faced the possibility of a nuclear exchange. It was a real crisis and it was moving so fast in the way that modern communications can with the exchange of notes between Moscow and Washington. Newspapers were almost out of date by the time they got loaded into the vans and television news — not just ITN but the BBC [(British Broadcasting Corporation)] as well and US television — was really up to the minute in those days showing the picture, showing what was happening, explaining what was going on. And people turned to television and said: ‘What’s happened since I saw the last news programme three hours ago?’ It seems to me that that was a moment of sudden puberty for television news when it ceased to be a kind of rather enhanced newsreel and turned into the place you go to first for the latest news. 113
In that sense, television brought the Cuban Crisis to life for British viewers. As well as
keeping viewers up to date with the unfolding situation, the imagery seemingly helped
convey the gravity of the situation. The significance of television news reporting of this
event was also recognised by official BBC historian, Jean Seaton, and former BBC
television news and current affairs producer, Rosaleen Hughes, in their study of the
BBC and the Cuban Crisis. Along with radio reports, television news, they asserted,
provided “the most immediate and accurate source of information throughout the crisis
since events moved so fast they had overtaken the newspaper reports before they hit the
streets.” They noted that the immediacy and pictorial nature of the crisis was facilitated
by the Telstar 1 satellite. Telstar 1 was the first privately financed space project 114
sponsored by Bell Telephone Laboratories (then a division of the American Telephone
Hood and O’Leary, Questions of Broadcasting, 35–6.113
Jean Seaton and Rosaleen Hughes, “The BBC and the Cuban missile crisis: Private worlds and public 114
service,” in An International History of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 50-year retrospective, David Gioe, Len Scott and Christopher Andrew, eds. Studies in Intelligence Series (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 43 and 51.
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and Telegraph Company (AT&T)) who also constructed the satellite, the British and
French postal services, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA). Following its launch from Cape Canaveral, Florida, on 10 July 1962, Telstar 115
1 enabled a television signal to be sent across the Atlantic between North America and
Europe. Although Telstar was only positioned to transmit images across the ocean for 116
about 20 minutes per orbit (it took approximately two and a half hours to circle Earth),
live television broadcasts were available to international audiences for the first time. It
also enabled telephone calls and fax images to be relayed between the continents. The 117
Cuban Crisis was the first significant international affair where news images were
beamed instantly from the US. As Seaton and Hughes demonstrated, it was also “the
first international crisis when television was indispensable to its understanding and an
integral part of how the British public understood and reacted to it.” 118
Clearly television played a part in the Cuban Crisis, and the crisis in the medium’s
history. Hence, it is remembered as a television crisis. Given that the literature on the
Cuban Crisis is dominated by US scholars and their perspectives, and much has also
been written in relation to the UK, television has become a medium associated with
Western state perspectives and memories of the crisis. However, in terms of its
significance regarding news reporting on the crisis, the contrast between the American
Perry Vlahos, “Still in orbit: Telstar, the 50-year-old satellite and genesis of telecommunications for 115
the masses,” Sydney Morning Herald, 12 July 2012, http://www.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/still-in-orbit-telstar-the-50yearold-satellite-and-genesis-of-telecommunications-for-the-masses-20120711-21uhb.html (accessed 9 April 2014).
Elizabeth Howell, “Telstar: Satellites Beamed 1st TV Signals Across the Sea,” SPACE.com, 12 116
February 2013, http://www.space.com/19756-telstar.html (accessed 9 April 2014). Adam Mann, “Telstar 1: The Little Satellite That Created the Modern World 50 Years Ago,” Wired, 10 117
July 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/07/50th-anniversary-telstar-1/ (accessed 9 April 2014). Seaton and Hughes, “The BBC and the Cuban missile crisis,” 43.118
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and British experiences is stark, particularly with respect to television news as a
pictorial source of latest developments.
Where then can Australia’s experience be located in this literature? What role did
television play in Australian news reporting on the Cuban Crisis? It is difficult to assess
the role, and thus significance, of television in Australian news reporting on the Cuban
Crisis. Technical and archival limitations are decisive factors here, and cannot be
understood without an outline of Australian television history.
Australia was slow to introduce television compared to the US and the UK, which
began broadcasting in 1928 and 1936 respectively. The Great Depression, and in 119
particular, World War II, delayed the development of the new medium in Australia. Its
introduction seemingly was hampered by a lack of interest from the government,
especially from Prime Minister Menzies. According to Tim Bowden, who has had a
long association with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) as an author,
journalist, and broadcaster, Menzies “personally thought the whole concept of television
was a vulgar abomination which Australia could well do without.” Years after 120
“Popular Australian television,” Australian Government, http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/119
australian-story/popular-austn-television (accessed 12 April 2014). Tim Bowden with Wendy Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee! Celebrating 50 Years of ABC-TV 120
(Sydney: ABC Books, 2006), 14, 25, 30–1. For more on Bowden, see “Tim Bowden – Biographical Summary,” Tim Bowden’s Blog: Author, Journalist and Broadcaster, http://www.timbowden.com.au/biography (accessed 23 July 2014).
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Australia had television, Menzies continued to hold it in considerable contempt, having
written in a personal letter, the “medium is one I detest.” 121
Television finally started in Australia in late 1956, just in time for the Olympic Games
held in Melbourne that November. It was however, only available to residents of
Melbourne and Sydney. It was estimated that just 5,000 black-and-white television sets
had been purchased prior to the Games’ opening on 22 November. Only five percent 122
of Melbourne households, and one percent of Sydney households, owned a television; a
set then cost the average worker six to 10 weeks’ wages. Thousands more 123
experienced the new medium through department store windows. By comparison, 50 124
percent of households in the US—where television was well-established—owned a
television in 1955. By 1959, approximately 60 percent of households in Melbourne 125
and Sydney had television and watched it regularly. By the Cuban Crisis in October 126
1962, television—only six years old—was well on its way to becoming an established
medium in Australia. Every Australian capital city had television except Canberra and
Darwin, where it did not arrive until late 1962 and 1971 respectively. 127
Menzies to Alfred Stirling, 14 October 1963, “Papers of Sir Robert Menzies, 1905–1978,” MS 121
4936/1/30/247 (manuscript), NLA, cited in A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 2, 1944–1978 (Carlton South, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1999), 473.
Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 14.122
“Popular Australian television,” Australian Government, http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/123
australian-story/popular-austn-television (accessed 12 April 2014). Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 14.124
Ibid., 29.125
Colin Jones, Something in the Air: A History of Radio in Australia (Kenthurst, New South Wales: 126
Kangaroo Press, 1995), 66. “Popular Australian television,” Australian Government, http://australia.gov.au/about-australia/127
australian-story/popular-austn-television (accessed 12 April 2014).
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Whereas US television only involved commercial networks, and British television 128
consisted of a duopoly between the BBC and ITV, Australian television—from its 129
inception—reflected a mix of national and commercial broadcasting. At the time of the
Cuban Crisis, viewers in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane and Adelaide each had a choice
of three channels: the national broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Commission
(now Corporation) (ABC); and two commercial networks. The ABC and one
commercial network was available in both Perth and Hobart. In Canberra, television
was only available on a commercial channel. Ironically, the national capital was the 130
last of these capital cities where an ABC television service was established. This
occurred on 18 December 1962 and thus after the crisis had eased. In October 1962, 131
the commercial networks had also established television stations in some major towns
in regional areas in Australia's eastern states. The national broadcaster arrived later, 132
with most Australian regional centres accessing the ABC television network between
1963 and 1966. At the time, broadcasting across great distances within Australia was 133
either difficult, or in some cases, impossible.
See “TV History,” Archive of American Television, http://www.emmytvlegends.org/resources/tv-128
history (accessed 12 July 2017). Hood and O’Leary, Questions of Broadcasting, 35.129
In Melbourne, the ABC’s television station was ABV, and the commercial stations were HSV (channel 130
7) and GTV (channel 9). In Sydney, the ABC’s station was ABN, and the commercial stations were TCN (channel 9) and ATN (channel 7). In Brisbane, the ABC’s station was ABQ, and the commercial stations were BTQ (channel 7) and QTQ (channel 9). In Adelaide, the ABC’s station was ABS, and the commercial stations were ADS (channel 7) and NWS (channel 9). In Perth, the ABC’s station was ABW and the commercial station was TVW (channel 7). In Hobart, the ABC’s station was ABT, and the commercial stations were TVT (channel 6). In Canberra, there was one commercial network station, CTC (channel 7). All ABC stations operated on channel 2. Victoria and New South Wales each had additional commercial stations in four regional areas, and Queensland and Tasmania each had a further commercial station in one region: K. M. Archer, Commonwealth Statistician, and Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia, No. 48–1962 (Canberra: A. J. Arthur, Commonwealth Government Printer, 1962). See also Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 57 and 85; and “Timeline: 1950–1959,” Television.au, http://televisionau.com/timeline/1950-1959 (accessed 12 April 2014).
The ABC’s television station in Canberra was ABC3. See Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s 131
Jubilee!, 85. See n.130.132
For a comprehensive list of ABC television service start dates and locations from 1960–66, see 133
Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 85.
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Temporary microwave links enabled live pictures to be sent from an Outside Broadcast
(OB) van on location, but only where there was line-of-sight contact with the studio or
direct contact with the transmission tower. Essentially, OB vans were mobile studios.
When television commenced, the ABC had just two—one in Melbourne, the other in
Sydney—which they used strategically to cover key events. However, there was no 134
terrestrial link between the states. That is, there was no permanent radio communication
system connecting, for example, a television station in Melbourne with a transmitter in
Sydney from which the Melbourne signal could be rebroadcasted, and vice-versa. 135
Such a network connecting all Australian states, which included major regional centres
in addition to state capitals, was not established until July 1970. Instead, news from 136
Melbourne, such as highlights of the Olympic Games, was telerecorded and then flown
to Sydney where it was aired, and distributed overseas.
Telerecording, also known as kinescoping, was a difficult and cumbersome process. It
involved filming images on a television monitor from a fixed camera, which was
synchronised with the television signal. The sound was recorded separately and later
synchronised with the film. Although videotape machines that recorded better quality
black-and-white images became available in Melbourne and Sydney in October 1961,
and in all states by early 1962, telerecording continued up to the 1970s as the ABC
See Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 26.134
In later years, there were a few occasions where the ABC set-up temporarily a series of microwave 135
links and repeaters to telecast significant events, including: the opening of Federal Parliament followed by a tour of the Governor-General’s home, Yarralumla, broadcasted between Canberra and Sydney on 21 February 1959; the centenary of Australia’s most famous horse race, the Melbourne Cup, broadcasted between Melbourne and Sydney, in conjunction with the commercial networks, on 5 November 1960; and for a number of sporting and other events broadcasted between Melbourne and Sydney from 24 December 1960 to 3 January 1961. See Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 43 and 62.
See Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 135.136
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gradually introduced the machines where it had a television service. Their gradual
introduction is perhaps attributable to the expense of the new technology—a videotape
recorder then cost approximately $100,000.00, and a 60-minute tape, $200.00—and yet
the reusability of the tape was considerably more cost effective than using film stock for
telerecording. 137
Although the US and UK were first linked by satellite in 1962, it was not until June
1967 that Australia was able to receive satellite transmissions. The US Pacific Ocean
ATS-B satellite enabled Australians to watch Expo ’67 from Montreal, Canada. While 138
the wandering Intelsat II satellite, which had been misplaced into orbit, briefly enabled
images and sound of the remote Western Australian town of Carnarvon to be broadcast
to the UK directly via satellite in late 1966, this was “a one-way affair.” Australian
viewers had to wait for the BBC telerecording to be flown over. Even though the
programme was recorded live, it could not be watched by Western Australian viewers
due to the absence of terrestrial links with Carnarvon. Having had the new satellite 139
technology for only six months, Australia broadcast live the memorial service for Prime
Minister Harold Holt to the US, UK, Japan, and Pacific nations, as well as Europe via
the Eurovision network. But such satellite technology was not available in Australia 140
in the early 1960s, specifically during the Cuban Crisis. This meant that, unlike the UK,
Ibid., 22–5 and 82–5.137
Ibid., 115.138
The two programmes broadcast were Down Under Comes Up Live and Our World. In essence, the 139
former was a rehearsal for the latter, a BBC project aimed to show life unfolding in real time in 30 countries connected by a network of satellites. Carnavon, the location of Australia’s first earth station and home to a 13-metre-diameter dish on Brown’s Range, was the only site from where the images could be sent. See Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 104, 107, 115 and 119.
See Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 122.140
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Australian viewers were unable to receive instantly televised news stories from the US,
nor the UK or elsewhere for that matter. As such, the Cuban Crisis did not play out on
Australian television as a live event. While the event was nonetheless dramatic, it is
unlikely that Australian television would have had the impact that British scholars and
industry personnel have described, as outlined earlier.
In the era before satellites in Australia, films and telerecordings had to be flown in from
overseas, and just like Australian-produced programmes, transported around the
country. Consequently, there was delay. According to the well-known Australian current
affairs journalist and producer, Ken Chown, many television news items were two or 141
three days old, sometimes older, at the time of broadcast. In the words of another 142
journalist, it was “ancient history compared to newspapers and radio.” 143
As films and telerecordings of programmes had to be transported, rather than beamed,
to and around Australia, ABC television services relied heavily on local content. 144
However, this was not the case with television news. The major stories of the day in
ABC radio news bulletins had to be mirrored in the television news of all states
regardless of the local content those services wanted to televise. This was ordered by the
Editor-in-Chief of the ABC news service, and later Controller of News, W.S. (Wally)
See Brian Davies, “TV producer ushered in a new era of journalism,” Sydney Morning Herald, 31 141
October 2013, http://www.smh.com.au/comment/obituaries/tv-producer-ushered-in-a-new-era-of-journalism-20131030-2wgw9.html (accessed 19 June 2014).
See Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 36.142
Mann, “Telstar 1.”143
See Bowden with Borchers, 50 Years: Aunty’s Jubilee!, 62.144
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Hamilton, who was concerned to uphold “national” news values. The introduction of 145
the telecommunications network in July 1970 connecting all Australian states made
national news broadcasting all the more possible. It is likely that the Cuban Crisis 146
would have dominated ABC and commercial television news bulletins like it did ABC
radio, as discussed in the next section.
Despite the availability of telerecording, in particular, to capture and preserve
programme material, no recordings of Australian television news bulletins or stories
relating to the Cuban Crisis produced by the national or commercial television
broadcasters could be located. Catalogue searches of the Australia’s National Film 147
and Sound Archive gleaned no results, and the National Archives of Australia’s Sydney
Reading Room, which holds numerous ABC records, have no such records in their
custody. Furthermore, the Sydney and Melbourne-based libraries of the Seven 148
Network and Nine Network—the only two commercial television networks in existence
at that time—likewise do not possess such records. According to Joe Varga, who has 149
worked in the archives department of the Seven Network for 40 years, “Off air daily
news was not considered important enough to warrant an expensive recording
Ibid., 36–7.145
Ibid., 135.146
“Off-airs” is the industry term for such recordings. An off-air is a recording of what went to air—the 147
news presenter, stories, footage shown, commercials, et cetera—as one discrete show. Essentially, it is what an individual could capture today if they recorded a television news bulletin on their home recorder: Archives Division, Nine Network, email to author, 10 January 2014.
The ABC Archives were not consulted in the course of this research; its older records 148
are available through the National Archives of Australia and the daily fee charged to visitors was beyond the budget for this research: “Frequently Asked Questions,” ABC Archives, http://www.abc.net.au/archives/contact.htm (accessed 12 July 2017). This is, nevertheless, a possible avenue for future research.
Caroline Rush, Seven Network, telephone conversation with author, 13 January 2014; Caroline Rush, 149
Seven Network, emails to author, 13–16 January 2014; Jenny Allen, Nine Network, telephone conversation with author, 10 January 2014; and Archives Division, Nine Network, emails to author, 10 and 15 January 2014.
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process.” Telerecording, he stated, was the only process available. It was clumsy and 150
expensive, and thus reserved for “only very important programs,” explained Varga.
Although videotape machines were introduced the year before the Cuban Crisis, Varga
claimed they were “not around” until the late 1960s and “videotape was very
expensive.” This suggests that while two $100,000.00 machines may have been 151
within the national broadcaster’s budget, they were not within the Seven Network’s.
Hence, only significant programmes were recorded; news bulletins were not considered
significant.
The archivist at the Nine Network also suggested that the recording process and the
time and cost associated with it, explained the absence of off-airs of the news in this
period. The news was a live broadcast, during which the presenter would throw to
filmed segments. Telerecording used film, which could only be exposed once. “If you
had the film stories why film them again and the newsreader?” the archivist asked
rhetorically. This indicates that telerecording news bulletins was an unnecessary and 152
potentially costly exercise in terms of film stock.
However, some short segments of film on the Cuban Crisis produced by foreign
broadcasters are available in Australian archives. Australian television broadcasters
would receive such footage as a small roll of film from Visnews or other foreign news
Joe Varga via Caroline Rush, email to author, 16 January 2014. This remained the case for the next 30 150
years; the Seven Network only has complete television news bulletins from 1994 onwards: Rush to author, 14 January 2014. The Nine Network confirmed they do not have off-airs of the news from 1962: Archives Division, Nine Network, to author, 10 January 2014.
Varga via Rush to author, 16 January 2014.151
Archives Division, Nine Network, to author, 15 January 2014.152
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providers, which they could play during their bulletins, using either the original
voiceover or their own over the top. Some footage acquired by the ABC, and now held
by the National Archives of Australia (NAA), is available, for example, Soviet First
Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan’s flight to Cuba to meet with Fidel Castro regarding
the crisis, as well as his meeting with US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson. 153
Summaries of footage received, but not archived, are also available, including an
excerpt of President Kennedy’s national address, and a six-minute background to the
Cuban Crisis complete with shot list. The Nine Network archivist stated that news 154
recordings from the early 1970s use such vision sparingly, sometimes simply a map
with a voiceover. It is therefore unlikely that film segments were used more regularly 155
a decade earlier. As films were flown in from overseas and delay was inevitable,
perhaps such footage was often no longer newsworthy on its arrival, a factor which
would have been exacerbated by the fast-moving pace of the Cuban Crisis. However, it
is not possible to determine if, when, or how they may have been aired in news
bulletins. Although ABC television logs containing daily operations sheets are available
for this this period, they do not record such information. Furthermore, the Nine 156
Network does not have scripts or transcripts dating back to 1962. Television news 157
broadcasts on the crisis therefore seemingly came and went as quickly as the crisis
itself. While “Television hit radio like a vigorous water plant taking over a pond,” to
For the footage, see NAA, Sydney: “CUBA segments ex ABC film,” Disc 1, “INZ8431–Mikoyan and 153
Stevenson.” For a textual summary of the footage, see NAA, Sydney: SP1198/2SP1198/2/0, WOB 53, Box 53, INZ. 7301–INZ. 9000, TV News, INZ8401–INZ8500, “Meeting of Mikoyan and Stevenson and Mikoyan Departure for Cuba,” uncatalogued. Box 53 contained numerous other textual summaries of footage that is unavailable.
NAA, Sydney: Visnews by BCINA, Source: NBC News, “President Kennedy’s Speech on Cuban 154
Blockade,” New York, 23 October 1962, uncatalogued; and Visnews by BCINA, Source: Visnews, “US_[sic]Cuban Conflict – Background Scenes,” London, 23 October 1962, 1–3, uncatalogued.
Archives Division, Nine Network, to author, 10 January 2014.155
NAA, Sydney: SP638, B16, ABN TV logs, 19 October–30 November 1962, uncatalogued.156
Archives Division, Nine Network, to author, 10 January 2014.157
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quote an historian of radio in Australia, as shown below, the latter remained an 158
important and regular source of news.
Radio and the Crisis
Technological and programme changes in the late 1950s to early 1960s emphasised the
importance of news to radio broadcasting. The introduction of tape-recording, which
enabled interviews to be recorded and aired during programmes, and short news
bulletins on the hour, ensured that news radio was innovative and regularly accessible
to listeners. Most newspapers only published daily editions, and television was
available for several hours a day. In contrast, six Australian radio stations operated a 24-
hour service by 1962. With approximately 97 percent of households in Australia’s
capital cities owning a radio in 1955, it was clearly a popular medium through which
Australians kept themselves entertained and informed. For many Australians, it 159
would have been an important source for regular and up to date news reports on the
Cuban Crisis.
ABC radio first reported news of the potential for a Cuban Crisis on Monday 22
October 1962 at 9:00 p.m. on station 2FC. The news presenter stated that, according to
the BBC correspondent in Washington D.C., there were rumours there of “a possible
crisis over Cuba” following Kennedy’s decision to abruptly end his election tour and
return to the White House. Rusk had likewise cancelled an “out-of-town engagement”
Jones, Something in the Air, 66.158
Jones, Something in the Air, 66, 68, 70, 78–9.159
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and American service chiefs had been requested to remain in the capital. While “big
movements of American marines” were observed in Florida, the Department of Defense
stated that these were in relation to annual exercises. Earlier in the bulletin, it was
reported that a commando group of exiled Cubans named Alpha 66 threatened to sink
British merchant ships trading with Cuba and spotted in Cuban territorial waters. 160
Local news and two other overseas stories—the India-China border dispute and a
Norwegian shipwreck—were of greater newsworthiness, Cuba being the eighth of
twelve national news item read in that bulletin. There was no mention of Cuba in the 161
subsequent and final ABC radio news bulletin for that night. 162
At 6:00 a.m. the following morning, 23 October 1962, Kennedy was the lead national
news story on ABC radio station 2FC. The news presenter announced that at 9:00 a.m.,
Kennedy would deliver a national radio and television broadcast on “a subject of the
highest national urgency.” The subject was unknown but there were reports, he stated,
that “some new action against Cuba—possibly a blockade—is contemplated.”
Kennedy’s Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, would not elaborate on the broadcast but
told reporters that the President had had conversations with Rusk, Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, former US Ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson, and
NAA, Sydney: SP641/1, WOB 68, ABC radio (2FC) transcript of national news bulletin with 160
annotations, 22 October 1962, 9:00 p.m. Regarding British trade and shipping to Cuba in this period, see Guto Rhys Thomas, “Trade and Shipping to Cuba 1961–1963: An Irritant in Anglo-American Relations,” (PhD diss., University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2001).
NAA, Sydney: SP641/1, WOB 68, ABC radio (2FC) transcript of national news bulletin with 161
annotations, 22 October 1962, 9:00 p.m. Ibid., 10:30 p.m.162
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Director of the Administration’s Berlin Task Force, Martin Hillenbrand. The urgency 163
of the subject matter, suspicions over Cuba and a blockade, and Kennedy’s discussions
with these particular senior officials, indicated to thoughtful listeners that a significant
foreign policy issue had arisen for the US.
That Kennedy’s broadcast “may deal with a major matter of overall foreign policy,” was
in fact reported by the ABC in its next radio news bulletin. This bulletin, which aired on
2FC only 45 minutes later, was much more detailed. Previously, the news presenter 164
had simply said that Kennedy would deliver a national radio and television broadcast.
But in this bulletin, he stated “President Kennedy has asked all radio and television
stations in the United States to cancel their normal programs to allow him to
broadcast.” By stipulating that Kennedy required every American radio and television 165
network to broadcast his address and the effect this would have on their programming,
the seriousness of his speech was greatly emphasised. The gravity of the situation was
underscored by the report that congressional leaders who were in the midst of election
campaigning had been summoned back to Washington D.C. and a fleet of Air Force jets
would facilitate their return. It was reported that stock markets in New York, London,
Montreal, and elsewhere had fallen dramatically. Suspicions that the matter involved
Cuba were repeated. It was announced in this news bulletin that ambassadors from
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and South American states were called to
Ibid., 23 October 1962, 6:00 a.m. For more on Hillenbrand’s appointments, see Wolfgang Saxon, 163
“Martin J. Hillenbrand, 89, Expert on European Affairs, Is Dead,” New York Times, 18 February 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/18/obituaries/martin-j-hillenbrand-89-expert-on-european-affairs-is-dead.html (accessed 7 July 2017).
NAA, Sydney: SP641/1, WOB 68, ABC radio (2FC) transcript of national news bulletin with 164
annotations, 23 October 1962, 6:45 a.m. Ibid.165
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the State Department. While ambassadors from other states, including Australia, were 166
also called to the State Department, this was not reported. The situation was therefore
portrayed as one that would only affect South American states and US allies in Europe.
Correspondents were reported as having said that Kennedy’s upcoming address and its
mysteriousness had brought “an air of wartime tension to Washington.” The US Navy
had since cancelled its Caribbean exercise—a mock assault of Puerto Rico and other
manoeuvres—involving 40 ships and 20,000 marines, 6,000 of which were to storm
ashore. Such an exercise would have required significant logistical planning. Thus its 167
cancellation would not have been taken lightly and would have exacerbated the sense of
tension. Importantly, it signalled the increased availability of the US Navy. This news
bulletin—rebroadcast at 7:15 a.m. on 2BL and at 7:45 a.m. on 2FC—was the last to air
prior to Kennedy’s address. 168
As noted, it was 9:00 a.m. on 23 October 1962 on Australia’s east coast when Kennedy
delivered his address. The Voice of America (VOA), the US government shortwave
radio service under the auspices of the USIA, transmitted the President’s speech as a
“special worldwide broadcast.” The USIA ordered the VOA to broadcast around-the-169
clock in Spanish and mount saturation coverage in English to the Americas and the rest
of the world. VOA therefore enabled Kennedy to address an international, as well as a
Ibid.166
Ibid.167
NAA, Sydney: SP641/1, WOB 68, ABC radio (2BL) transcript of national news bulletin, 23 October 168
1962, 7:15 a.m.; and NAA, Sydney: SP641/1, WOB 68, ABC radio (2FC) transcript of national news bulletin with annotations, 23 October 1962, 7:45 a.m.
NAA, Sydney, C102, 1499944, ABC Sydney recording, “President Kennedy Speech to the World on 169
the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 23 October 1962. For discussion on the USIA, VOA and Cuba, specifically the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis, see Heil, Voice of America, 68–71.
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national, audience on the Cuban situation, including Australian listeners. The ABC in 170
Sydney recorded Kennedy’s address in its entirety, complete with opening and closing
remarks from the Voice of America reporter at the White House. While the extent to 171
which the broadcast was incorporated into ABC radio programming is unclear, it is
likely that Australian listeners heard Kennedy live on their radio sets. This is indicated
by the emphasis in ABC radio news bulletins, as detailed above, that the President
would deliver his address at 9:00 a.m. Furthermore, as noted earlier, only significant
material was recorded. The fact that the ABC recorded Kennedy’s address demonstrates
its significance at that time and to Australian broadcasting history. So significant was
President Kennedy’s broadcast that it was the only story reported on ABC radio in the
subsequent news bulletin at 10:00 a.m. on 2BL. 172
Read All About It: Australian Newspaper Reporting on Kennedy’s Impending
Address
In addition to television and radio, newspapers alerted Australians to the Cuban Crisis
and kept them informed of its developments. In their final editions on 22 October 1962,
the Melbourne Herald and the Adelaide News were the first Australian newspapers to
report on speculation that an international crisis possibly involving Cuba was
Australia may have also attempted to reach an international audience, particularly its Asia-Pacific 170
neighbours, through its shortwave radio service, Radio Australia, which was then under the auspices of the ABC. At the time of the Cuban Crisis, it broadcast for 21.5 hours a day and claimed to be “the most listened to overseas shortwave broadcast service in the world”: “You are a Good Neighbour with the ABC,” Advertiser (Adelaide), advertisement, 23 October 1962, 6. For more on Radio Australia and its use as a weapon during the Cold War, see Errol Hodge, Radio Wars: Truth, Propaganda and the Struggle for Radio Australia (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
NAA, Sydney: C102, 1499944, ABC Sydney recording, “President Kennedy Speech to the World on 171
the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 23 October 1962. NAA, Sydney: SP641/1, WOB 68, ABC radio (2BL) transcript of national news bulletin with 172
annotations, 23 October 1962, 10:00 a.m.
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developing. Both newspapers reported that such speculation stemmed from the
concentration in recent days of Air, Naval, and Marine forces in Florida and the
Caribbean, and the naval manoeuvres there. Kennedy’s premature return to Washington
because of a slight cold also aroused suspicion. The News observed that Kennedy
appeared to be making “a surprisingly quick recovery” and consequently, “there was
speculation as to whether his cold had been treated as a ‘diplomatic illness’ to cover
some official need” to return to the capital. It described his return as one reason for “the
sense of excitement which seized Washington.” The Herald noted that Administration
officials, such as Rusk, were at their desks that day and the Defense Department was
“unusually staffed.” While the News stated that the White House declined to comment
on reports of a “‘tense’ new” Cuban situation, the Herald wrote that “a disclosure of
some kind” from the White House was expected that day (22 October 1962 in the
US). 173
News of a potential crisis involving Cuba was reported by Australia’s other daily
metropolitan newspapers the following day, 23 October 1962. The Adelaide Advertiser
and the Brisbane Courier-Mail both quoted New York's Daily News, which had already
referred to the situation as a “Cuban crisis.” Besides the Herald and the News, the 174
Sydney Morning Herald was the only other newspaper to report that a slight cold was
the official reason given for Kennedy’s abrupt return to Washington. It was also the 175
“Marine movements start ‘buzz’: Cuba Crisis Rumors [sic] in the U.S.,” Herald, 22 October 1962, 6; 173
and Raymond Kerrison, “Action on Cuba: Tight U.S. ship curbs,” News, 22 October 1962, 2. “Crisis Talks in Washington,” Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 3; and “Kennedy holds crisis talks over 174
Cuba–or?,” Courier-Mail, 23 October 1962, 4. “Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1. See 175
also “Marine movements start ‘buzz’: Cuba Crisis Rumors [sic] in the U.S.,” Herald, 22 October 1962, 6; and Raymond Kerrison, “Action on Cuba: Tight U.S. ship curbs,” News, 22 October 1962, 2.
! 70
only newspaper in addition to the Herald to report that key Administration officials
were at their desks and the Defense Department was “unusually well-staffed.” 176
In similar vein to the Herald and the News, all of the other daily metropolitan
newspapers reported on the continuing US naval manoeuvres in the Caribbean,
suggesting that this was linked with a possible crisis over Cuba. The Enterprise, the US
Navy’s nuclear-powered and newest “supercarrier”, was spotted heading south in the
Atlantic even though it was not in the original list of ships participating in the naval
exercise, reported the Hobart Examiner, implying doubt over whether this was in fact an
exercise. Reports in the Melbourne Sun, the Advertiser, and the Hobart Mercury that 177
a warships tour for reporters was abruptly cancelled by the US Navy would have
furthered suspicion. The Sydney Morning Herald was the only newspaper besides the 178
News to report on the movements, and concentration, of Marines in the US South,
which it stated were “believed to be connected with the Cuban situation.” 179
Nonetheless, each newspaper noted that US officials had denied that the exercise was in
relation to Cuba. Furthermore, almost all newspapers made much of the report that in
Key West, Florida, which is in close proximity to Cuba, an air control tower that was
“From Page 1: “Crisis” Talks by Top U.S. Officials,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 3; 176
and “Marine movements start ‘buzz’: Cuba Crisis Rumors [sic] in the U.S.,” Herald, 22 October 1962, 6. “U.S. on Verge of Cuban Action?” Examiner, 23 October 1962, 1.177
“The big Washington mystery..,” Sun, 23 October 1962, 7; “Stop Press: President to Speak,” 178
Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 1; and “American Signs Point to Fresh Crisis,” Mercury, 23 October 1962, 3.
“Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1; 179
“From Page 1: “Crisis” Talks by Top U.S. Officials,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 3; and Raymond Kerrison, “Action on Cuba: Tight U.S. ship curbs,” News, 22 October 1962, 2.
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hurriedly built was operational, ostensibly to manage a heavy increase in air traffic. It 180
was also reported that at nearby Boca Chica naval air station, military leave had been
cancelled and a battalion of marines had arrived. As the Sun put it, “unusual 181
numbers” of uniformed men were spotted throughout the Florida Keys. The Perth 182
West Australian concluded its article by suggesting that the situation was either
legitimate or that the US was exaggerating. Quoting the New York Herald Tribune, it
stated “Either something very big is brewing or the Kennedy Administration wants to
give the impression that it is.” 183
In addition to the movements of marines in the Caribbean, the descent of officials on
Washington, including the President, would have indicated a problem was looming for
the US. While only two newspapers in addition to the Herald and the News mentioned
Kennedy’s return to Washington from his election campaign tour, most reported that 184
the White House had recalled some top Congressional leaders to the capital. Reports 185
that the US was formulating a new foreign policy were also reported. In an attempt to
“Cuban Exile Group Threatens to Sink British Ships,” Age, 23 October 1962, 4; “Cuba Exiles Sail on 180
the British!” Sun, 23 October 1962, 7; “Crisis Talks in Washington,” Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 3; “Airport busy — Cuba link?” Courier-Mail, 23 October 1962, 1; “American Signs Point to Fresh Crisis,” Mercury, 23 October 1962, 3; and “U.S. on Verge of Cuban Action?” Examiner, 23 October 1962, 1.
“Cuban Exile Group Threatens to Sink British Ships,” Age, 23 October 1962, 4; “Cuba Exiles Sail on 181
the British!” Sun, 23 October 1962, 7; “U.S. on Verge of Cuban Action?” Examiner, 23 October 1962, 1; “Crisis Talks in Washington,” Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 3; and “Airport busy — Cuba link?” Courier-Mail, 23 October 1962, 1. Only the Advertiser and the Courier-Mail reported the cancellation of military leave.
“Cuba Exiles Sail on the British!” Sun, 23 October 1962, 7.182
“Exiles Sail to Sink U.K. Shipping,” West Australian, 23 October 1962, 1.183
“Crisis Calls To Capital,” Canberra Times, 23 October 1962, 1; and “Kennedy Plans Vital Statement 184
On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1. “Crisis Calls To Capital,” Canberra Times, 23 October 1962, 1; “The big Washington mystery..,” Sun, 185
23 October 1962, 7; “Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1; “Stop Press: President to Speak,” Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 1; “American Signs Point to Fresh Crisis,” Mercury, 23 October 1962, 3; and “U.S. on Verge of Cuban Action?” Examiner, 23 October 1962, 1.
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demonstrate the credibility of such reports, the Canberra Times and the Sun wrote that
Congressional leaders are typically informed of, and consulted on, new foreign policy
initiatives in advance by the President, suggesting that this was the reason for their
recall. However, the issue that seemed to arouse the most suspicion was the weekend, 186
and supposedly secret, meetings in Washington of top officials, which every newspaper,
except for the Herald and the News, reported. The Sydney Morning Herald wrote that it
was unofficially reported that Kennedy had called the National Security Council into
session for that day (22 October 1962 in the US). The “unprecedented” nature of these
meetings for this Administration, in terms of their frequency and timing, was
emphasised. As such, each newspaper reported that a clarifying statement from the 187
White House was expected, and “within hours” according to the Canberra Times and
the Mercury. However, only the Sydney Morning Herald and the Advertiser reported 188
that such a statement would come from the President, who would deliver “a televised
speech tonight [22 October 1962 in the US] on a subject of the ‘highest national
urgency’.” The Sydney Morning Herald stated that the White House requested
television networks for 30 minutes of broadcasting at 7:00 p.m. EST for the President.
Additionally, it noted that reporters had been told to standby for possible further
“Crisis Calls To Capital,” Canberra Times, 23 October 1962, 1; “The big Washington mystery..,” Sun, 186
23 October 1962, 7; “Stop Press: President to Speak,” Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 1; “American Signs Point to Fresh Crisis,” Mercury, 23 October 1962, 3; and “U.S. on Verge of Cuban Action?” Examiner, 23 October 1962, 1.
“Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1; 187
“Crisis Calls To Capital,” Canberra Times, 23 October 1962, 1; “President Holds “Crisis” Talks,” Age, 23 October 1962, 3; “The big Washington mystery..,” Sun, 23 October 1962, 7; “Crisis Talks in Washington,” Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 3; “Kennedy holds crisis talks over Cuba – or ?” Courier-Mail, 23 October 1962, 4; “Exiles Sail to Sink U.K. Shipping,” West Australian, 23 October 1962, 1; “American Signs Point to Fresh Crisis,” Mercury, 23 October 1962, 3; and “U.S. on Verge of Cuban Action?” Examiner, 23 October 1962, 1. While the Canberra Times reported on the meetings, no reference was made to their “unprecedented” or secret nature.
Ibid. This was also reported the day before in the Herald: “Marine movements start ‘buzz’: Cuba 188
Crisis Rumors in the U.S.,” Herald, 22 October 1962, 6.
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announcements prior to Kennedy’s meetings and address. Interestingly, both the 189
Sydney Morning Herald and the Advertiser referred to Kennedy’s televised address and
neither acknowledged that it would also be broadcast on radio. Again, this highlights the
importance of, and emphasis on, television as a news medium and to the Cuban Crisis.
The Sydney Morning Herald and the Courier-Mail were the only newspapers that
quoted the insightful reports of the New York Herald-Tribune on the potential reasons
for the impending crisis:
Perhaps the Kennedy Administration had found that Cuba has acquired offensive military capability. President Kennedy said on September 13 that if this happens the United States would take some action. The President wants to demonstrate American ability to handle a two-front crisis. 190
References were then made to the extensive US naval manoeuvres in the Caribbean, and
the Herald-Tribune was quoted as having stated that Kennedy may “want to execute a
similar manoeuvre involving Berlin.” Just as the Examiner implied, mentioned 191
earlier, these newspapers too doubted whether such manoeuvres were in fact an
exercise, suggesting they may even be a trial run.
“Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1; and 189
“Stop Press: President to Speak,” Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 1. “Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1. See 190
also “Kennedy holds crisis talks over Cuba – or ?” Courier-Mail, 23 October 1962, 4. The Advertiser was the only other newspaper to refer to the comments of the Herald-Tribune, but only in regard to Cuba’s possible offensive missile capability: “Crisis Talks in Washington,” Advertiser, 23 October 1962, 3.
“Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1; and 191
“Kennedy holds crisis talks over Cuba – or ?” Courier-Mail, 23 October 1962, 4.
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Rumours have been current for a couple of days that Cuba is in the process of acquiring medium range missiles and bombers. One unconfirmed report was that Cubans are building emplacements for a 1400-mile-range rocket. Another unconfirmed report is that Russia is giving Cuba IL-28 twin-jet Eagle bombers with a 1,400-mile range. 1
It would only be a matter of hours before President Kennedy would confirm such
reports, noting that this materiel was already in Cuba. Despite a clamp down on news
contacts and sources, the Herald Tribune, and therefore the Sydney Morning Herald 2
and the Courier-Mail, had demonstrated foresight and accuracy in their news reporting.
Noting that although “a major decision over Cuba is looming,” the Sydney Morning
Herald was the only newspaper to report that the situation could involve “unexpected
developments” over Berlin, demonstrating it was acutely aware of the volatile issues in
American-Soviet relations. 3
Typical with all newspaper reporting, some news outlets were better at keeping their
readers informed about the crisis than others. As outlined above, readers of the
Melbourne Herald and the Adelaide News were the first to be notified on 22 October
1962 that a possible crisis over Cuba was afoot. The Advertiser continued to keep
Adelaide residents updated when it reported the following day that the President would
deliver a national address on the situation. However, it is clear from this newspaper
review that the Sydney Morning Herald provided the most comprehensive reporting on
“Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1. See 1
also “Kennedy holds crisis talks over Cuba – or ?” Courier-Mail, 23 October 1962, 4. See “Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1; 2
and “Crisis Calls To Capital,” Canberra Times, 23 October 1962, 1. “Kennedy Plans Vital Statement On ‘Crisis’ Talks,” Sydney Morning Herald, 23 October 1962, 1.3
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the situation. Its Sydney readership would have benefited from its up to date coverage,
particularly the details of Kennedy’s address and reports of its possible subject matter.
However, this survey also demonstrates that by the time they were read, Australian
newspapers contained old news. For example, as detailed in the previous section, ABC
radio news reported on 23 October 1962 at 6:00 a.m. that Kennedy would deliver an
address that would be broadcast on television and radio. That morning, this was
reported in just two newspapers, and only the Sydney Morning Herald was able to
specify its timing. All of the other newspapers simply wrote that a statement from the
White House was anticipated. Furthermore, while the newspapers made much of the
continuing US naval exercise in the Caribbean, ABC radio news reported on 23 October
1962 at 6:45 a.m. it had been cancelled. The claim of former ITN chairman, David
Nicholas, quoted previously, that “Newspapers were almost out of date by the time they
got loaded into the vans,” therefore resonates with Australian newspaper reporting on 4
the crisis. Cognisant of the pace at which the crisis was unfolding, the Sydney Morning
Herald published an advertisement encouraging readers to tune into station 2GB for
more regular updates:
Hood and O’Leary, Questions of Broadcasting, 36.4
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Illustration 1: Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October 1962, 4.
With regards to newspaper reporting, the situation was most dire for Darwin residents.
Darwin’s metropolitan newspaper, the Northern Territory News, was published tri-
weekly. While it published an edition on 23 October 1962, the day that news of the
crisis broke, the situation in Cuba was not mentioned. The subsequent edition on 25
October 1962 contained only a single reference to the Cuban Crisis, which appeared in
the newspaper’s editorial. It stated: “If the utter disaster of nuclear war is avoided over
the Cuban issue, we may well breath [sic] a sigh of relief. But the warning note to the
very near north can’t be ignored.” While the Northern Territory News reported on 1
international affairs, it concentrated on issues affecting Australia’s region, especially
those close to the Territory’s border, and as such, the Cuban Crisis almost went
unreported. Interestingly, the editorial comment shows that the Northern Territory News
assumed that its readers knew about the crisis, even though it did not report on it. In
“Editorial: Time to Take Stock — Fast,” Northern Territory News, 25 October 1962, 6.1
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light of this limited newspaper reporting, and given it would be some time before
television would be available in the Northern Territory, Darwin residents, it seems,
relied heavily on radio to keep themselves abreast of current affairs, possibly more so
than those elsewhere in Australia. Compared to the Northern Territory News, daily, and
not tri-weekly, newspapers were available in regional areas throughout Australia, and
provided comprehensive coverage of the Cuban Crisis. The subject of subsequent 2
newspaper reporting was Kennedy’s address on the Cuban Crisis alongside statements
in Parliament from Australia’s Prime Minister and Opposition leader.
The First Australian Parliamentary Statements on the Crisis
Politicians had gathered in Canberra on 23 October 1962 as the Commonwealth
Parliament of Australia was sitting. Following prayers, Question Time was the first 3
order of business when the House of Representatives went into session at 2:30 p.m.
“International Affairs,” specifically the Cuban Crisis, was the focus of the opening
question. Leader of the Opposition and leader of the Australian Labor Party (ALP),
Arthur Calwell MP, directed a question without notice to the Prime Minister on whether
he would keep the House informed of “developments in diplomatic circles and in naval
and air force fields in the present crisis in United States and Soviet relations over
charges concerning the building of missile bases and jetports in Cuba.” This was a
matter, he continued, “about which the world learnt from an authoritative source for the
A survey of reporting on the Cuban Crisis by Australian regional newspapers is beyond the scope of this 2
thesis. However, for examples of such reporting, see: “Cuban Blockade By U.S. Ships: Huge Fleet Is Fanning Out Over Atlantic,” News-Mail (Bundaberg, Queensland), 24 October 1962, 1; and “Air-Sea Blockade of Cuba by U.S.: Kennedy Throws Down Gauntlet To Khrushchev: Ships Carrying Arms Will Be Turned Back,” Kalgoorlie Miner (Western Australia), 24 October 1962, 1. Parliament previously sat on 18 October 1962; see Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), 3
House of Representatives (House), vol. 37, 18 October 1962.
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first time when President Kennedy delivered his broadcast to the American people a few
hours ago.” Menzies replied that he would seek leave to deliver “a very short statement 4
about the broadcast — but by no means an exhaustive one,” and if there were “further
developments of a kind that [he could] communicate to the House,” then he would do
so. 5
Immediately following Question Time, Menzies delivered a concise and comprehensive
ministerial statement to what the Canberra Times described as “a tense and packed
House.” Menzies steadfastly positioned Australia behind the US in the Cuban Crisis. 6
He began by referring to Kennedy’s broadcast on Cuba, about which he noted members
would be aware, as “a declaration of historic importance.” Kennedy, he stated, had
demonstrated that the Soviet Union was installing “offensive nuclear weapons” in Cuba
and that the Americas were facing “a very grave threat at close quarters;” the gravity of
which was “profoundly demonstrated by both the tone and substance” of his address.
Menzies commended Kennedy’s statement, noting that while it was “inevitably
dramatic, it was in essence defensive.” He expressed appreciation for Kennedy’s
“reference to the vital importance of regional defensive agreements” authorised under
the UN Charter, which he noted were essential for “the common safety” of those in the
region. Here, Menzies inferred the Rio Treaty and the OAS, and the security such
arrangements were intended to provide the people of the Americas. Menzies then
welcomed the willingness of the US “to bring the matter promptly before the United
Arthur Calwell (ALP, Member for Melbourne, Leader of the Opposition), CPD, House, vol. 37, 23 4
October 1962, 1773. R.G. Menzies (Liberal Party, Member for Kooyong, Prime Minister), ibid.5
“Menzies Praises Action By U.S.,” Canberra Times, 24 October 1962, 1.6
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Nations.” He informed the House that he received a personal letter from Kennedy that
morning, detailed earlier in this chapter, which like the broadcast, outlined US plans
over the situation. Menzies reiterated that the US would request an urgent meeting of
the UN Security Council where its ambassador would present a resolution that called for
“missile bases and other offensive weapons in Cuba” to be withdrawn under the
supervision of UN observers. He declared that Australia’s Ambassador to the UN had
been instructed “to do all in his power to support the passing of this resolution.” This
was despite the fact, which Menzies acknowledged, that Australia did not hold a seat on
the Security Council. Menzies also emphasised Soviet duplicity, noting at the beginning
of his statement that Kennedy demonstrated the Soviet Union’s “determination by threat
of aggression to terrorize nations whose only wish is for peace.” He concluded with a
hope that Kennedy’s broadcast and the steps to follow would
bring home to the Soviet Union the nature of the consequences which may flow from its overseas policies. Indeed, the whole matter will serve to test whether the Soviet Union’s constant advocacy of peace possesses either sincerity or substance. 7
Calwell also, by leave, made a statement immediately after the Prime Minister, whose
comments he acknowledged. Calwell began by stating that due to the speed at which
events had occurred since Kennedy’s broadcast “only a few hours ago” (five and a half
hours to be exact), neither he nor other members of the Opposition—and members of
the Government, he presumed—had had an opportunity to read a transcript of
Kennedy’s broadcast. Calwell then noted that only ten minutes ago was Menzies able to
provide him with a copy of the statement he had just delivered. Although he had
Ibid., 1780–1. Menzies’ statement was included in External Affairs’ Current Notes, vol. 33, no. 10, 7
October 1962, 45.
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insufficient time to prepare a considered statement on the situation, he wanted “to add
some remarks of my own to what the Prime Minister has said.” Kennedy’s
announcement of a “naval blockade of Cuba” to halt the arrival of “certain war
materials” there, and of steps intended “to prevent the construction of nuclear missile
sites and air bases which he [Kennedy] believes is proceeding, and which could threaten
disaster” to the Americas, Calwell believed was “in language that cannot be
misunderstood.” He also stated that Kennedy laid “the blame for the sudden crisis on
Russia’s intrusion into the western hemisphere.” Calwell claimed that people around the
world were watching the situation that was unfolding with horror, and emphasised it
was peace not war that they desired. War, he said, was wasteful, produced vast
suffering, and was useless in terms of settling matters. The world was praying, Calwell
stated, for the preservation of peace; an unsurprising choice of words for a man who
was a devout Catholic, and who would later receive a papal knighthood. Calwell also 8
took the opportunity to reiterate his Party’s position on nuclear bases: “No sensible
person would wish to see the extension of nuclear bases anywhere. We of the Labour
[sic] Party are opposed to such extensions whether in Cuba or anywhere else.” He
concluded by stating that Australians he thought hoped that “this present crisis will not
end in armed conflict, but will be resolved peacefully through the United Nations, the
seventeenth anniversary of whose birth occurs to-day.” 9
Mary Elizabeth Calwell, I Am Bound to be True: The Life and Legacy of Arthur A. Calwell (Preston, 8
Victoria: Mosaic Press, 2012), 159–61. Calwell, CPD, House, vol. 37, 23 October 1962, 1781.9
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Menzies and Calwell’s statements were also read in the Senate. Proceedings
commenced at 3:00 p.m., 30 minutes later than the House. Unaware of what had taken 10
place there, George Branson (Liberal Party, Western Australia) asked the representative
for the Minister for External Affairs in the Senate, Bill Spooner (Liberal Party, New
South Wales), as to when the Senate could “expect an authoritative statement from the
Australian Government in relation to this grave situation that has arisen?” Spooner
responded that he would soon ask for leave to make a statement on the subject. But 11
before he could do so, Justin O’Byrne (ALP, Tasmania) asked Spooner a further
question, specifically,
whether in his statement he will give some indication of the Government’s views on the sensational statement made by the President of the United States of America in connexion with Cuba and whether that statement could lead Australia into a world war. 12
He queried further as to whether it could be deduced that such a statement was
“influenced by the pressures from rival Republican and Democrat contenders in the
forthcoming congressional elections?” Spooner simply responded: “This is a matter of
far-reaching importance. I prefer Senator O’Byrne to hear the statement and then make
his own assessment of it.” Clearly, the significance of President Kennedy’s statement 13
was observed in the Senate. At the conclusion on question time, Spooner and the Leader
of the Opposition in the Senate, Nick McKenna (ALP, Tasmania), obtained leave to
deliver the statements in the House of Menzies and Calwell, respectively. McKenna
added: “Speaking personally, I hope that Russia will end the crisis by very promptly
“In Parliament,” Canberra Times, 24 October 1962, 2.10
CPD, Senate, vol. 22, 23 October 1962, 1025. Spooner was also the Minister for National Development 11
and Vice-President of the Executive Council. CPD, Senate, vol. 22, 23 October 1962, 1026.12
Ibid.13
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dismantling the bases that it is causing to be established in Cuba.” Having laid the 14
blame squarely with the Soviet Union, McKenna’s reaction was consistent with the
response of the Government, which is discussed further in Chapter 2.
The following day (24 October 1962), Menzies’ and Calwell’s parliamentary statements
were widely reported in Australian daily, metropolitan newspapers. Most newspapers
reproduced the Prime Minister’s entire speech, and some even published the full text 15
of Kennedy’s address. The crisis, but not Menzies or Calwell’s statements, was also 16
the subject of editorials, which are discussed in later chapters of this thesis. The 17
Courier-Mail was the only newspaper to even reference the Prime Minister’s statement
having condoned the position adopted by the Government:
Australia knows America as a friendly and peaceful nation. Our security—like that of most of the Free World—depends on the United States. In indicating his support of President Kennedy, the Prime Minister (Mr. Menzies) yesterday rightly stated where Australia’s interest in Cuba lies. 18
Ibid., 1028–9.14
“Menzies Praises Action By U.S.,” Canberra Times, 24 October 1962, 1; “Prime Minister Pledges 15
Australia’s Support” and “Support from Australia,” Age (Melbourne), 24 October 1962, 1 and 5; “We Back U.S., Says Menzies: JFK in touch,” Sun (Melbourne), 24 October 1962, 2; “Australian Pledge Of Support,” Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 1962, 1; “Menzies: We back American action,” Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 24 October 1962, 1; “P.M. Says—‘We Support U.S.’” and “Australia’s Support For U.S.,” Advertiser (Adelaide), 24 October 1962, 1 and 6; and “Australia Backs U.S. Stand Over Cuba,” Mercury (Hobart), 24 October 1962, 3. Only the Canberra Times and the Courier-Mail provided a summary as opposed to a full reproduction of Menzies’ statement.
“Kennedy’s Speech in Full: Grave Warning to Free World,” “The 1930s Taught Us a Lesson,” and 16
“Dangers Ahead for U.S.,” Canberra Times, 24 October 1962, 8, 38–9; “Mr. Kennedy’s Address to the Nation on Crisis over Cuba,” Age, 24 October 1962, 5; “Moment of Crisis: The Sun Presents, as the Record of a Momentous Occasion, the Full Text of… President Kennedy’s Cuba Speech,” Sun, 24 October 1962, 28–9; “What President Kennedy Said: ‘Attack by Cuba an attack by Russians’,” Courier-Mail, 24 October 1962, 4; “Full Text Of President’s Cuba Warning” and “President’s Warning,” Advertiser (Adelaide), 24 October 1962, 8 and 10; and “President Tells of Cuban Threat” and “Cuban Decision,” Mercury, 24 October 1962, 8 and 9.
“Cuban Crisis,” Canberra Times, 24 October 1962, 2; “Critical Trial of Strength,” Age (Melbourne), 24 17
October 1962, 2; “The American Blockade of Cuba,” Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 1962, 2; “President says: No!,” Courier-Mail, 24 October 1962, 2; “All the Risks are Grave,” Advertiser, 24 October 1962, 2; and “Chips are down,” Mercury, 24 October 1962, 4.
“President says: No!,” Courier-Mail, 24 October 1962, 2.18
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The Cuban situation was the subject of extensive reporting in the major Australian daily
newspapers into early November 1962.
In addition to the Commonwealth Parliament, parliaments in some Australian states sat
on 23 October 1962. As international affairs is a federal matter, it is not surprising that
the crisis received no mention that day, or in the weeks that followed, in the parliaments
of Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia. The crisis was, 19
however, raised in the New South Wales (NSW) Parliament. Although the discussion
concentrated on civil defence, which is discussed further in Chapter 6, it revealed that
the crisis has sparked widespread concern. In NSW, Bill Chaffey (Country Party
Member for Tamworth) asked the Premier, Bob Heffron (ALP Member for Maroubra)
on 25 October 1962 whether “It is a fact that the current developments over Cuba have
very wide implications for the whole world?” He also asked if the NSW Cabinet had
considered the matter. In essence, Chaffey sought clarity on the Government’s
intentions. Heffron replied that the Government, including the Cabinet, was watching
the matter closely and would be “ready and willing to co-operate in any way we are
expected to act as a people.” He also noted that the federal government had not been in
contact with him or the Cabinet to provide further information or instruction. Heffron
stated:
Victoria’s Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly from 23 October to 29 November 1962 19
inclusive: Victoria: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Session 1962–63, vols. 268–9, 931–2111; Queensland’s Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly from 23 October to 29 November 1962 inclusive: Queensland: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 1962, vols. 233–4, 954–2115; and Western Australia’s Legislative Council or Legislative Assembly from 23 October to 15 November 1962 inclusive: Western Australia: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 1962–63, vols. 162–3, 1858–2991. Whether the crisis was raised in the Tasmanian Parliament cannot be determined. The Tasmanian Parliament did not publish its parliamentary debates until 1979: “Tasmanian government publications: About Hansard,” State Library of Victoria, http://guides.slv.vic.gov.au/tasgovpubs/hansard (accessed 14 July 2017).
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I feel sure that as soon as we learn something of what the federal Government considers we should do, that Government will immediately confer with us at the top level, or get in touch with us right away. I have no doubt that the federal Government will do that, even today, if the need should arise. 20
No evidence has been located to demonstrate that the Menzies Government did in fact
contact Heffron or the NSW Cabinet regarding the crisis. While NSW parliamentarians
were mindful of the possibly of global nuclear war, the lack of communication from the
federal Government is probably a reflection of its assessment of the nuclear threat as
low. This is also discussed further in Chapter 6. A federal matter, state parliaments
seemingly trusted that the Menzies Government was managing the crisis.
The Cuban Missile Crisis moved swiftly with developments unfolding, not just on a
daily, but on an hourly or sometimes minute-by-minute, basis. The vast literature on the
crisis makes this plain, with Michael Dobbs' One Minute to Midnight an excellent
example. An examination of when and how Australians first became aware of the
situation involving Cuba is therefore an important and necessary place for this history of
Australia and the Cuban Crisis to begin.
This chapter has demonstrated that in Australia, intelligence officials were the first to
learn of the crisis, and did so prior to President Kennedy’s address on 22 October 1962
EST. It was signals intelligence, courtesy of Australia’s intelligence cooperation with its
allies originating in World War II, which alerted officials to the situation. This probably
prompted Australia’s Director of Military Intelligence to travel to Washington D.C. to
NSWPD, Session 1962–63–64, vol. 42, 25 October 1962, 1231.20
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inquire further as to the impending crisis. Although the information gleaned by
Australian intelligence officials is unknown, their role nonetheless forms an essential
component of Australia’s crisis experience. In contrast, this chapter has detailed the
information on the crisis obtained by key Australian diplomats in Washington and
public servants in Canberra, who were first informed of the situation by US officials on
22 October 1962 EST and 23 October 1962 AEST respectively. It was on 23 October
1962 that Prime Minister Robert Menzies was briefed on the crisis by Australian
officials and US Ambassador to Australia, William C. Battle. Menzies too was kept well
informed having received a personal letter from Kennedy and an advance copy of his
address. However, unlike some of its allies, Australia did not receive significant
advance notice of the crisis.
The first reports that a potential crisis involving Cuba had developed were published on
22 October 1962 on ABC radio news and in two newspapers, the Melbourne Herald and
the Adelaide News. The following morning, ABC radio reported that Kennedy would
deliver an address on the situation, about which only the Sydney Morning Herald and
the Adelaide Advertiser had informed their readerships. While Australian newspapers
contained detailed and insightful reports, they were somewhat redundant by the time
they went to print. Television was another source of news for Australians living in
capital cities (except Darwin) and some regional areas. However, the absence of
recordings of news bulletins on the crisis means that the role of television in Australia’s
experience cannot be adequately assessed. Nonetheless, the lack of satellites and
terrestrial links, and the consequent delays arising from material being flown in from
! 86
overseas and then transported around Australia, indicate that regarding the crisis,
television was unlikely to have played an integral role in Australia as it did in the UK.
For that reason, it is also inappropriate to suggest that the Cuban Crisis was a television
crisis for Australians in the way it has been remembered in the literature on the subject.
As this chapter has made clear, radio provided Australians with the most up to date
developments on the crisis, and additionally, it broadcast the President’s address.
Further, this chapter has demonstrated that Australian officials became aware of the
crisis around the same time as the Australian public.
It was only a matter of hours after Kennedy’s broadcast that Menzies and Calwell
delivered parliamentary statements on the crisis. Menzies moved swiftly to declare
Australia’s support for US in the crisis and deplore the actions of the Soviet Union. He
advised the Parliament that Australia’s Ambassador to the UN, James Plimsoll, had been
instructed to support the US resolution before the UN Security Council. It was a concise
yet comprehensive statement of policy, and by no means reactive. As the next chapter
will demonstrate, the Australian Government considered a myriad of issues in
formulating its policy, determining the US alliance to be the factor of paramount
importance.
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2
Cabinet Formulates Australia’s Policy on the Crisis
The period 1941–69 is of major significance to Australian foreign policy. The
conclusion of World War II saw the onset of the Cold War, and thus a rapid polarisation
of states into competing ideological and strategic blocs. This was coupled with a
declining British presence in Australia’s region. Additionally, decolonisation brought
about important regional changes, with many states to Australia’s near north gaining
independence. This resulted in dynamic changes in the make-up of the United Nations
(UN) and raised questions for Australian policy-makers as to how they would engage
constructively with their new neighbours in the Asia-Pacific. Significantly and
unsurprisingly, “the shift of Australia’s strategic priorities to Southeast Asia, the fear of
Chinese communism and the associated realignment with the United States, were the
defining features of Australian defence and foreign policy in this period.” It was in this 1
context, and with these strategic priorities in focus, that the Menzies Government
formulated Australia’s policy on the Cuban Crisis.
This chapter examines the Government’s policy-making on the crisis in detail. It shows
how the Government swiftly determined its position, which Menzies declared in
Parliament on 23 October 1962. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, this was on
the same day most Australians, except those in the Australian intelligence community,
first learned of the crisis. By examining the private communications of the Cabinet,
Joan Beaumont, Christopher Waters, David Lowe, with Garry Woodard, eds., Ministers, Mandarins and 1
Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941–1969 (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 5.
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senior ministers, key officials in the Departments of Prime Minister and External
Affairs, and relevant diplomats, the chapter reveals the myriad factors the Australian
Government considered in developing its policy on the Crisis. While Australia’s treaty
commitments, regional security, interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, trade relations,
as well as other states’ responses (especially the British reaction) to the crisis were
contemplated, this chapter argues that the factor of paramount importance was
Australia’s alliance with the United States. Australia’s support for the US on the crisis
was unequivocal and this was emphasised publicly in Parliament. But behind closed
doors, policymakers carefully considered the basis and extent of such support. This
demonstrates that Australia’s policy on the crisis was constrained rather than
unconditional, considered rather than reflexive, and shaped by strategic calculations of
Australian interests. This is made plain, first and foremost, in the records of the Cabinet.
Cabinet Deliberates on the Crisis
Within hours of becoming aware of the Cuban Crisis on 23 October 1962, the
Australian Cabinet deliberated and formulated Australia’s policy on it. The Cabinet, the
primary decision-making body of the government that then comprised the prime
minister and 11 senior ministers, met on Tuesday mornings when Parliament was 2
“Ministries and Cabinets” in Part 6: Historical information on the Australian Parliament, 32nd Edition 2
Parliamentary Handbook of the Commonwealth of Australia (2011), 516, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/handbook/newhandbook/2011-10-13/toc_pdf_repeat/Part%206%20-%20Historical%20information%20on%20the%20Australian%20Parliament.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 29 November 2013). The composition of the Cabinet was significantly reformed following the 1955 election. When Menzies appointed the Ministry, he selected senior and junior ministers, and only senior ministers were to form the Cabinet: David Lee, “Cabinet” in The Menzies Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Politics and Policy, eds. Scott Prasser, J. R. Nethercote, and John Warhurst (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1995), 131–2; and A. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, Volume 2, 1944–1978 (Carlton South, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1999), 315–6.
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sitting, and therefore conveniently, was already scheduled to meet at 10:30 a.m. 3
Cabinet records, specifically the relevant Cabinet notebook, declassified in 2011,
provide important insight into Cabinet’s deliberations on the crisis and the policy-
making process. The Cabinet notebook is not a verbatim or complete account of
Cabinet’s deliberations. Rather, it was used by the Cabinet Secretary as “an aide-
memoire for drafting the formal Cabinet decision after the meeting,” and where 4
necessary, “to give some guidance to his colleagues who were departmental heads about
the manner of giving effect to the decision or about considerations that came into its
making.” However, Cabinet’s discussion of the crisis, including the views of individual 5
ministers, was recorded in the notebook in great detail by the Cabinet Secretary, John
Bunting, who was also the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister. The Cabinet 6
notebook therefore reveals factors that influenced the Australian Government’s policy
on the crisis, each of which is explored in turn, along with other considerations,
throughout this chapter.
“Blockade of Cuba” was the first item the Cabinet discussed that morning. Menzies, as 7
the head of cabinet, chaired the meeting in which he read aloud (but seemingly did not
National Archives of Australia (NAA): A11099, 1/59, Cabinet Notebook, 23 October 1962.3
“Cabinet notebooks – Fact sheet 128,” NAA, Australian Government, http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/4
fact-sheets/fs128.aspx (accessed 22 July 2014). John Bunting, R.G. Menzies: A Portrait (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988), 91.5
Occasionally, Bunting wrote in shorthand or abbreviated words, which were sometimes difficult to 6
decipher. In this section, square brackets denote the author’s interpretation of Bunting’s handwritten notes. NAA: A11099, 1/59, Cabinet Notebook, 23 October 1962. According to the then Minister for Civil 7
Aviation, Shane Paltridge, the order of business was decided by the PM and rarely accorded with the agenda: Lee, “Cabinet,” 132.
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circulate) Kennedy’s letter and referred to his address. However, it was the Minister for 8
External Affairs and Attorney-General, Garfield Barwick, who led the discussion; the
only Cabinet member, according to Minister for Immigration, Alexander Downer,
whose “powers of exposition” equalled, and sometimes exceeded, those of the PM. In 9
the Menzies Cabinet period, ministers were expected and trusted to take responsibility
for their departments, and were considered “the primary authority on their own 10
subjects.” As an international issue, the Cuban Crisis was Barwick’s domain. 11
After noting that a message from Australia’s Ambassador in the US (Chargé d’Affaires,
Donald Munro) was incoming, Barwick went through the President’s statement,
referring to the “evidence of missile capacity,” and the “furtiveness of Russian action,”
in Cuba. According to Bunting, Barwick felt “Kennedy has laid it on the line for Russia
re Cuba + [and] Berlin.” Barwick insisted to his colleagues that Australia instruct its
Ambassador to the UN, Jim Plimsoll, to support the US. He therefore advised that
Australia channel its support for the US through the UN. At that time, Australia was not
a member of the UN Security Council, where the US would present its resolution. 12
However, Barwick presumed it would be vetoed there, and subsequently, the resolution
NAA: A11099, 1/59, Cabinet Notebook, 23 October 1962. British PM, Harold Macmillan, also “read 8
out aloud (but did not circulate) the vital documents” to the Cabinet when it first discussed the Cuban crisis at its meeting on 23 October 1962 at 10:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. (GMT): Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries: Prime Minister and After, 1957–66, Peter Catterall, ed. (London: Macmillan, 2011), 510 (23 October). Emphasis in original. Alexander Downer, Six Prime Ministers (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 1982), 15.9
Ibid., 18.10
Bunting, R.G. Menzies, 81.11
Australia has been a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council on five occasions: 1946–47, 12
1956–57, 1973–74, 1985–86, and 2013–14: “Australia and the Security Council,” UN Association of Australia, http://www.unaa.org.au/australia-and-the-security-council.html (accessed 16 December 2014); and “Australia’s Seat On The UN Security Council,” UN Association of Australia, http://www.unaa.org.au/australias-seat-on-the-un-security-council.html (accessed 16 December 2014).
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would be presented to the General Assembly where Australia would have an
opportunity to support it formally. Barwick told the Cabinet that Australia “must support
[the] US” but the basis of that support needed to be determined. This was where the
discussion then turned. 13
The first question Menzies asked was “Do we have any trade w. [with] Cuba[?],” to
which the Minister for Trade, John McEwen, replied “Nothing as far as I’m aware.” As
Chapter 5 shows, the Minister was incorrect: Australia and Cuba traded and their
economic relations had implications for the Australia-US alliance, which warranted
further deliberation. The discussion, however, had quickly moved on. In agreement with
Barwick, but wanting “not to be too punctilious,” the Minister for Labour and National
Service, William McMahon, then stated “we need to support US,” for it is “in their
interest but also heavily in ours.” He thought it was a matter on which Menzies should
make a statement. Barwick, also “not wantg. [wanting] to be punctilious,” urged that the
Cabinet “approach this with sound common sense,” particularly with regards to
establishing the basis of its position: “is Russian deception the footg. [footing] for
instance—deception is part of the aggression,” he ruminated. The Minister for
Territories, Paul Hasluck, felt that Menzies must make a statement or answer a question
on the matter. He thought that regional security could be the basis of the Australian
Government’s support, specifically, that Australia support the decision of the US to
invoke its regional security arrangements. Barwick agreed that was warranted, but was
concerned “to avoid implications agst. [against] US. bases.” This comment reflects a
NAA: A11099, 1/59, Cabinet Notebook, 23 October 1962.13
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discussion between Barwick and the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs,
Arthur Tange, earlier that morning regarding Australian nuclear weapons ambitions,
which is discussed in Chapter 3. The Treasurer, Harold Holt, stated that the Australian
Government “must of course indicate warm American sympathy,” but limit itself to a
short statement in response to a question. This, he felt, was “in order to let dust settle a
bit before we get into detailed argument.” Holt, therefore, thought the Government
should avoid making a comprehensive and lengthy policy statement on the immediate
situation. McEwen adopted a similar position to Holt. Subsequently, he recommended
that the Government’s policy be a narrow one, but one that expressed unequivocal
support for the US. He was also keen to obtain the British Government’s views of the
situation promptly. According to Bunting, McEwen stated:
As to policy, what we say (in other words) is that we’re with the Americans, no matter what. But we need to discover as soon as we can what the British reaction is. My feeling is as Holt’s that we can’t see through this […] yet to take a detailed stand—so make the base as narrow as we might—but leave no doubt as to our support of US. 14
McMahon agreed “with caution” proposed. 15
Rather than answer a question, Menzies thought that he should make a statement,
agreeing with Holt and McEwen that it should not be detailed. The “shorter the
statement the better,” he added. Menzies began to outline to the Cabinet the proposed
content of his statement, taking into consideration the Ministers’ views. He summarised:
Ibid. 14
Ibid.15
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we thk [think] whole of Sov. [Soviet] activity in Cuba now disclosed is eg. [example] of their deceitl [deceitful] methods[;] the reaction of US is a superb eg. [example] of the value of regional arrangements; that we propose to instruct our Ambassador to lend them our support in UN. 16
But the Ministers, who were eager to help Menzies with the wording, interjected
making it a more collaborative exercise. Barwick advised that Australia “not limit
support ‘to UN’.” McEwen suggested subsequently, “make it support for US in UN;
that[’s] its proposal.” Menzies then went to continue with his outline, stating it would
“Say we welcome US initiative,” but Barwick again interrupted to add “And commend
their approach to UN.” McEwen urged, “Still think we must see the UN reaction.”
Menzies agreed and noted, “if there is a diffce [difference] of vies. [views] we wld
[would] have to take that into a/c [account].” Barwick advised that he would follow-up
the views within the UN. McEwen then clarified that by the Government looking at
other views, it “Doesn’t mean we weaken our support for US but its [sic] a factor in the
handling.” Holt also recommended that Menzies mention the letter he received from
Kennedy. Menzies then concluded the Cabinet’s discussion of the crisis stating that it
would “return to this if necy. [necessary]” once they received the “full texts.” 17
The Cabinet then discussed monetary policy and an issue relating to land in Brigalow,
Queensland. Towards the end of that discussion, Menzies left the meeting to draft his
statement on the Cuban Crisis. That Menzies prepared a written statement on the 18
Cuban Crisis indicates that he approached it as a major speech and “with very great
Ibid.16
Ibid.17
Ibid.18
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care” as distinct from a less formal speech where he would simply “‘say a few
words’.” Formal announcements aside, the PM was otherwise averse to writing out a 19
speech in full beforehand. Meanwhile, the Cabinet continued to go about its business, 20
discussing reconstruction of the Legislative Council in Papua and New Guinea,
stabilisation of the egg industry, and a wheat advance, before it returned to the “Cuba
Blockade.” Bunting simply noted that Menzies, who had re-joined the meeting, read a
draft of his statement and the Cabinet “Agreed.” It therefore accepted Menzies’ 21
statement without change or comment. Bunting summarised the Cabinet’s discussion
and decision in the official Cabinet minute:
The Cabinet felt that the statement should be clear in its support for the United States in the action taken in response to the Soviet activity and deceit, but at this stage should not be more detailed than necessary. 22
The fact that the Cabinet had met and discussed the Cuban situation was reported the
following day by some Australian daily, metropolitan newspapers, including the
Canberra Times, Sun, Advertiser, Courier-Mail, and Mercury. According to the latter
two newspapers, the meeting was “long and intense.” 23
The Cabinet minute and Menzies’ parliamentary statement accurately reflect the
Cabinet’s deliberations as detailed by Bunting in the Cabinet notebook. The Ministers’
For more on the distinction between Menzies’ major speeches and those approached more casually, see 19
Paul Hasluck, The Chance of Politics, Nicholas Hasluck, ed. (Melbourne: Text Publishing, 1997), 10–11. Downer, Six Prime Ministers, 9.20
NAA: A11099, 1/59, Cabinet Notebook, 23 October 1962.21
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, “Cabinet Minute: Decision No. 495,” 23 October 1962.22
“Menzies Praises Action By U.S.,” Canberra Times, 24 October 1962, 1; “We Back U.S., Says 23
Menzies: JFK in touch,” Sun, 24 October 1962, 2; “P.M. Says—‘We Support U.S.’” Advertiser, 24 October 1962, 1; “Menzies: We back American action,” Courier-Mail, 24 October 1962, 1; and “Australia Backs U.S. Stand Over Cuba,” Mercury, 24 October 1962, 3.
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discussion regarding the nature of Soviet actions, the US decision to invoke regional
security arrangements, and its approach to the UN, each became key points in Menzies’
statement, as detailed in the previous chapter. The point that was made absolutely clear
was Australia’s unequivocal support for the US, its most powerful friend. This was
illustrated by the strong contempt Menzies expressed towards the Soviet Union and his
instruction to Plimsoll “to do all in his power to support the passing of [the US]
resolution” in the UN. It should be recalled that in his personal letter to Menzies, 24
Kennedy requested the Australian Government to support the US resolution in the
UN. This therefore demonstrates that the Government met that request, but in light of 25
these Cabinet records, to suggest Australian support was axiomatic would be inaccurate.
Rather, the instruction to Plimsoll reflects the Cabinet’s decision to confine Australian
support for the US to that forum. The Ministers made it plain that the basis of the
Australian Government’s support needed to be carefully determined. Australia’s policy,
they felt, should be narrow, concise, and not overly formal or detailed, for the manner in
which the situation would unfold and other states’ views remained unclear. McMahon
and Barwick’s use of the term “punctilious” exemplifies this. It indicates that they did
not want to be perceived as pedantic about the details of Australia’s position, concerned
that this would impose doubt on the strength of Australian support for the US. McEwen
even made this exact argument when he clarified that by seeking other states’ reactions
to the crisis, Australia’s support for the US was not weakened. Evidently, careful
management and maintenance of the US alliance was of paramount importance to
Australian policymakers.
R.G. Menzies, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House of Representatives (House), vol. 24
37, 23 October 1962, 1780–1. NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 3, Kennedy to Menzies, 23 October 1962.25
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It is clear that the Cabinet notebook is immensely valuable given its ability to illuminate
what the Government took into consideration, and factors that influenced it, in
determining its policy on the crisis. Likewise, it also reveals what the Government did
not consider and what did not influence its decision. In terms of subject matter, there are
three notable absences from the Cabinet notebook. First, there is no reference to the
nuclear threat posed by the crisis. The terms ‘nuclear’ or ‘nuclear war’ simply do not
appear in the Cabinet notebook. There is no mention of the possibility of escalation or
the threat of global war. Second, and somewhat related to the first, there is no reference
to civil defence. There is no discussion or direction given as to whether Australia
should, or should at least consider, activating civil defence plans. This matter was raised
by some state governments and is discussed further in Chapter 6. Third, Cuba is only
referred to geographically and not in terms of being responsible for the crisis. It is made
plain in the Cabinet notebook, and in Menzies’ parliamentary statement which followed,
that the Government only allocated responsibility to the Soviet Union. It was also a
view cleverly depicted by cartoonist for the Sydney Morning Herald, George Molnar:
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Illustration 2: Sydney Morning Herald, 23 November 1962, 2.
As stated earlier, the Cabinet notebook is not a verbatim or complete account of the
Cabinet’s deliberations; it is of course possible that these matters were discussed and
not noted. Nevertheless, their absence from the Cabinet notebook suggests that they
were not deliberated. That the Cabinet did not discuss, in particular, the nuclear nature
of the crisis, is remarkable.
It is also worth highlighting that no information on the Cuban situation was provided to
Cabinet members from the Australian intelligence community to aid them in
determining the Government’s policy on the crisis. While there is no record of the New
Zealand Cabinet having discussed the crisis, which is in stark contrast to Australia, the
Cabinet did receive weekly briefings titled “Intelligence Review” from New Zealand’s
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Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), some of which referred to the crisis. At this stage, 1
Australia’s JIC did not provide similar reports to the Australian Cabinet nor was the
Cabinet provided with any information gleaned by Director of Military Intelligence,
Stuart Graham’s US visit, which was outlined in the previous chapter. Regarding the
latter point, again it is possible that the matter was discussed and not written in the
notebook; the fact that this is intelligence-related makes that plausible. However, it is
more likely that Cabinet members were not provided with any information from the
intelligence services.
On the connection between intelligence and foreign policy formulation, the views of
Keith Waller, the first career diplomat to be appointed Ambassador to the US and later
Secretary to the Department of Foreign Affairs, are most insightful. Waller was asked to
provide a detailed assessment of the intelligence services by Robert Hope, the New
South Wales (NSW) Supreme Court judge appointed to head the Royal Commission on
Intelligence and Security from 1974–77. According to Alan Fewster, who is working 2
on a biography of the former diplomat and public servant, Waller explained to Hope:
“Major foreign policy decisions were not, he wrote, greatly influenced by ‘scraps of
intelligence,’ whether acquired overtly or covertly. While they helped build a broad
The crisis was not mentioned in the Review of 24 October 1962, but it was the lead item of the 31 1
October 1962. Also, there was a reference to the crisis being discussed in a Review dated 26 October 1962, which may have been a special edition on the subject. However, this cannot be verified as the Review was not archived with other Reviews and could not otherwise be located. The Reviews and subsequent editions are contained in a single file covering the period 1960–63: Archives New Zealand (ANZ): Intelligence―General―Intelligence Review, AAFD 811 W3738/1331 CAB 235/1/2. Alan Fewster, “‘We must be careful to avoid seeking intelligence simply for its own sake’,” Inside Story, 2
1 August 2014, http://insidestory.org.au/we-must-be-careful-to-avoid-seeking-intelligence-simply-for-its-own-sake (accessed 26 November 2014). For more information on the Royal Commission and the records it produced, see: NAA, “Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security,” http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/security/royal-commisson/ (accessed 29 September 2015).
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picture on which a decision was made, these fragments were ultimately peripheral.” 3
Indeed, “scraps” seemed the most fitting description of the intelligence available to
Cabinet members when formulating Australia’s policy on the Cuban Crisis. As detailed
in Chapter 1, apart from specific details contained in Kennedy’s address and letter to
Menzies; Munro’s dedicated efforts to obtain information from his colleagues, careful
observation of the press, and attendance at US-run meetings of heads of delegations;
and signals intelligence (the content of which remains unknown), the Australian
Government had little information on the Cuban situation to go on. Moreover, the
intelligence it did possess was all derived from US sources. This thesis shows, just as
Waller stated, that the Cuban Crisis was one such foreign policy decision that was not
greatly influenced by piecemeal intelligence.
Finally, it is significant that no comments were attributed to the Minister for Defence,
Athol Townley. This suggests that he did not attend the Cabinet meeting, which in itself 4
is remarkable. It is difficult to imagine that, if the Defence Minister was in fact in
attendance, he would have had no views to offer the Cabinet in its policy deliberations
on a situation that could lead to global nuclear war. Should Townley have been in
attendance, Menzies presumably would not have accommodated his silence. According
to Bunting, there were a few ministers, Townley being one of them, whose true value
lay not in their portfolio, “but in their general experience and wisdom, including
political wisdom,” and who offered “matter-of-fact practical and political assessments.”
Fewster, “‘We must be careful to avoid seeking intelligence simply for its own sake’.”3
Nor are comments attributed to the following members of Cabinet, albeit with less relevant portfolios: 4
Minister for National Development and Vice-President of the Executive Council, William “Bill” Spooner; Minister for Civil Aviation, Shane Paltridge; Minister for Immigration, Alexander (Alick) Downer; Minister for Primary Industry, Charles Adermann; and Postmaster-General, Charles Davidson.
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Bunting added: “Menzies seldom let a Cabinet discussion go by without having heard
from at least one of these, and if none had by an intervention of his own disclosed a
view, he was practically certain to draw it out of one or all of them.” That Menzies did 5
not draw out Townley’s view on the Cuban Crisis further indicates his absence from the
Cabinet meeting. Townley’s silence and probable absence from Cabinet reflects a more
general silence from the Minister and his Department during the crisis, which, this
thesis demonstrates, was skilfully and predominantly managed by the Department of
External Affairs.
Menzies in Cabinet
In addition to detailing the Cabinet’s reaction to the Cuban Crisis, the Cabinet notebook
provides valuable insight into the conduct of Cabinet meetings. In his second memoir,
Menzies wrote “There is a curious sort of legend in Australia that I was a dictator in
Cabinet, that ministers accepted my views on pain of dismissal or disfavour.” He
dismissed this as “folk-lore,” noting that it failed to do justice to his skilled, courageous,
and experienced colleagues. He also called it “fantastic nonsense” because it suggested
that only he should have been credited for Cabinet’s successful decisions. In Menzies’
view, “no Prime Minister and no member of Cabinet may claim the sole credit for any
particular Government policy or measure. It would be absurd and unfair to his
colleagues if he did so.” 6
Bunting, R.G. Menzies, 88.5
R.G. Menzies, The Measure of the Years (North Melbourne: Cassell Australia Ltd, 1970), 33–4.6
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Opinions were divided as to Menzies’ behaviour in Cabinet. On the PM’s retirement,
Peter Howson, who became Minister for Air in Menzies’ final ministry, wrote in his
diary that Menzies was “Obviously a great parliamentarian and an unrivalled political
leader.” However, he was also critical of Menzies, who intimidated him: 7
He led by dominating, not by team work. He didn’t get the best out of his closest Ministers and assistants. An amazing capacity for hard work; I feel he worked harder than necessary because he wouldn’t let people take some of the responsibility. Hence there was a lot of procrastination. We were all scared of him in Cabinet; most Ministers waited to see what RGM [Menzies] wanted before committing themselves on an issue. 8
Former Minister in Menzies governments, R. G. Casey, who was not on good terms
with Menzies, also referred in his diary to the PM’s inability to make-up his mind on
issues. On Cabinet, Casey noted: “The larger matters of policy he keeps in his own
hands & does not consult Cabinet.” One of Australia’s most well-known public 9
intellectuals, Donald Horne, saw Menzies simply as a chairman in Australian politics. In
his social commentary The Lucky Country, Horne wrote that Menzies’ “great talent was
to preside over events and look as if he knew what they were all about.” 10
Others, albeit warm admirers of Menzies, had views to the contrary. Downer wrote that
“In no aspect of Menzies’ life has he been more misrepresented by commentators than
in his conduct in Cabinet.” Allegations that Menzies was “imperious and overbearing,”
Peter Howson, The Howson Diaries: The Life of Politics, ed. Don Aitkin (Ringwood, Victoria: The 7
Viking Press, 1984), Sunday 23 January, 203. Emphasis in original. Ibid.8
R.G. Casey, undated manuscript fragments, cited in W. J. Hudson, Casey (Melbourne: Oxford 9
University Press, 1986), 215. Casey was also Menzies’ rival for the prime ministership in 1939 following the death of Joseph Lyons; ibid., 104–8.
Donald Horne, The Lucky Country, 3rd rev. edn. (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1971), 187.10
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he stated, are untrue. Menzies “was in no sense a dictator … His aim was to arrive at a
consensus in Cabinet,” with which he would have regular and long meetings. Hasluck 11
stated that “A Menzies Cabinet was certainly not a one-man band. As a general rule he
allowed discussion to proceed freely.” In his 1988 portrait of Menzies, Bunting wrote 12
that the PM “knew and valued the strength, collectively and individually, of his Cabinet
colleagues, and his Public Service advisers, and he always consulted them.” Bunting 13
elaborated that “pre-eminence,” not domination, best described the PM’s relationship
with his Cabinet colleagues, and that Menzies’ specific quality in Cabinet was
“leadership: intellectual, political, parliamentary.” Even Beale, Minister for Supply 14
from 1950–58 and Minister for Defence Production from 1956–58, whose regard for the
PM he believed was not mutual, wrote:
He never tried to override his cabinet on an important matter of policy to which he knew his colleagues were opposed and he would have been foolish to have attempted to do so, for there were some strong and determined men among his colleagues at that time. 15
In his study of Cabinet under Menzies, historian David Lee determined that the critical
views of the PM were “overstated.” Lee concluded that “Coordinated by Menzies,
policy was made collegially by the most senior cabinet ministers and the top-level
public servants.” He drew these conclusions from examining the records of the 16
Downer, Six Prime Ministers, 14–6.11
Paul Hasluck, Sir Robert Menzies (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1980), 16. This work 12
was originally delivered as The Daniel Mannix Memorial Lecture to the Newman College Students’ Club at Wilson Hall, University of Melbourne, on 29 June 1979.
Bunting, R.G. Menzies, 58.13
Ibid., 85.14
Howard Beale, This Inch of Time: Memoirs of Politics and Diplomacy (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne 15
University Press, 1977), 47, and 100–12 for his reflections on Menzies and their relationship. Lee, “Cabinet,” 134–5.16
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Cabinet Secretariat and the Department of Prime Minister, but not the Cabinet
notebook, which was then classified. In terms of the Cuban Crisis, the Cabinet 17
notebook demonstrates that Lee’s conclusions on Menzies in Cabinet and the policy-
making process remain valid. It also substantiates the PM’s own claims about his role in
Cabinet and his interactions with its members. For instance, there is no evidence in the
Cabinet notebook that Menzies behaved like a dictator nor simply presided over
Cabinet’s discussion of the crisis. As was shown in the previous section, the ministers
made important contributions to what was a robust policy discussion. Moreover, the
substance and language of Menzies’ parliamentary statement demonstrates he heeded
their comments. However, the ministers’ input on its precise wording would have
annoyed Menzies. According to Hasluck, “one thing he found hard to take from his
ministers was any attempt to tell him how to draft an announcement.” It is worth 18
noting that, according to the Cabinet notebook, Hasluck made no suggestions regarding
the wording of Menzies’ parliamentary statement on the Cuban Crisis, obviously
mindful not to leave the PM chagrined. Further, this section of the notebook reflects
what Hasluck considered one of Menzies’ “great Prime Ministerial virtues,” that after
letting each minister express his view, he had the ability to “then disentangle the
argument, presenting in his summing-up the points that mattered and those that were
secondary and the major questions which Cabinet must first decide.” Country Party 19
Ibid., 124–5.17
Hasluck, Sir Robert Menzies, 16–7. Beale and Menzies were not close, the former having blamed 18
himself for some of his own discomfort, believing it would have been wiser to have said less and been more tactful. For example, in one Cabinet meeting, Beale suggested finding “a better form of words” for a phrase in a document drafted by Menzies. While the phrase was amended, a colleague later said to Beale, “you bloody fool, don’t you know better than to criticize Menzies’ literary style? ... Nobody should ever suggest to Bob that there could be a better form of words than his”: Beale, This Inch of Time, 109–10. See also David Lowe, “Beale, Sir Oliver Howard (1898–1983),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, ANU, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/beale-sir-oliver-howard-12187 (published in hardcopy 2007; accessed online 5 October 2015).
Hasluck, Sir Robert Menzies, 8–9.19
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backbencher, Doug Anthony, described Menzies similarly, but went further noting his
“extraordinary capacity to synthesise a decision out of all the discussion with which
everybody would agree.” That Menzies left the meeting shortly after the discussion to 20
draft his parliamentary statement, and on his return, the Cabinet accepted it without
change or comment, is testament to the fact that he was able to consolidate his
colleagues’ views into a single policy statement on which they all agreed, and as Beale
put it, “his great powers of lucid expression and his fastidious choice of words.” 21
The legend, as Menzies put it, surrounding his Cabinet interactions, specifically
regarding the Cuban Crisis, even reached Washington. On 8 July 1963, Menzies met
with Kennedy at the White House, having last visited before the crisis on 25 September
1962.
Illustration 3: JFK Library: 1963-07-08 B, AR, AR8009-B, C, “Luncheon in Honor [sic] of the Prime Minister of Australia Robert Gordon Menzies, 1:30PM,” 8 July 1963.
Quoted from P. Weller and M. Grattan, Can Ministers Cope?: Australian Ministers at Work 20
(Melbourne: Hutchinson, 1981), 129 and cited in Lee, “Cabinet,” 133. See also Beale, This Inch of Time, 47.
Beale, This Inch of Time, 47.21
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The State Department prepared Kennedy for the PM’s visit, providing him with the
customary briefing paper, background documents, and biographical details of Menzies’
travelling party. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Averell Harriman, 22
added the following handwritten note at the end of the briefing paper, which was
repeated on the covering memorandum for the President:
The Prime Minister believes he was among the first (if not the first) head of government to support the President’s stand on Soviet missiles in Cuba last October. He did this without consultation with his Cabinet. The President may wish to recall this. 23
Harriman was misinformed, and subsequently, so was Kennedy. As has been shown,
Menzies consulted the Cabinet on the Cuban Crisis, and the Cabinet notebook
demonstrates that the Ministers played an active role in developing the Government’s
policy and eagerly provided input into Menzies’ parliamentary statement. With the
source and date of Harriman’s information unknown, it is not possible to determine
whether this misrepresentation endured since the crisis or arose in connection with
Menzies’ visit. It is also unknown whether the President did in fact recall this in his
meeting with the PM.
In terms of Cabinet consultation, Harriman’s note would have contradicted
correspondence sent from the Menzies Government to the White House. On 23 October
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (JFK Library): National Security Files (NSF), 22
Countries, Box 8A, Australia General 7/6/63–7/8/63, “Memorandum for Mr. McGeorge Bundy, The White House” from Department of State, Washington, D.C. (Department of State), undated.
JFK Library: NSF, Countries, Box 8A, Australia General 7/6/63–7/8/63, “Memorandum for Mr. 23
McGeorge Bundy, The White House” (with enclosure: “Briefing Paper, Appointment with Sir Robert G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia”) from Department of State, Washington, D.C. (Department of State), undated. For the White House memorandum, see “Memorandum for the President: Meeting with Sir Robert Menzies, Australian Prime Minister” from M.V. Forrestal, The White House, 8 July 1963, located in the same file.
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1962, Menzies wrote to US Ambassador to Australia, Bill Battle, and asked him to
transmit a personal message to Kennedy in reply to the President’s letter. In that
message, Menzies advised Kennedy that he had “acquainted” the Cabinet with the terms
of the President’s letter and wished to assure him of their support for the resolution the
US was proposing to submit to the UN Security Council. Therefore, Menzies had 24
informed Kennedy that he had consulted Cabinet regarding the Cuban situation. Battle
too was aware. Furthermore, as noted earlier in this chapter, some of Australia’s major 25
metropolitan newspapers had reported that the Cabinet had discussed the Cuban
situation prior to Menzies delivering his statement in Parliament. 26
Such misconceptions regarding Menzies in Cabinet have been perpetuated by his
biographer, A. W. Martin. As a result of this US visit, Martin claimed that Kennedy
knew where Menzies stood on international issues. In support of this, he cited Menzies’
Jefferson Oration given days earlier, where the PM expressed Australia’s “deep feeling”
for the US, not only because “your friendship contributes so greatly to our national
security,” but because the two nations work for the same free world. Martin also cited 27
the White House memorandum, which included Harriman’s note. This memorandum 28
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, personal message from Menzies to Battle for Kennedy, 23 October 24
1962. This is also supported by his oral testimony: William C. Battle interviewed by Dennis O’Brien, 25
Charlottesville, Virginia, 2 March 1970, JFKOH-WCB-02, transcript, John F. Kennedy Oral History collection, JFK Library, paras. 66–7.
See n.23.26
Menzies was the first non-American to deliver the oration: Martin, Robert Menzies, 465–6. For a 27
transcript of the oration, which also includes a hyperlink to a video of it, see “The Battle for Freedom–Jefferson Oration – By Sir Robert Menzies, The Prime Minister of Australia–Delivered at Monticello, Charlottesville, Virginia, July 4, 1963,” Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Australian Government, http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/browse.php?did=764 (accessed 4 May 2015).
Martin, Robert Menzies (1999), 465–6. Martin provided a shortened citation for this memorandum: 28
“Kennedy Library, NSF, box 8.” His earlier reference to box 8 cited the files “Australia, 6/6/62–6/15/62 and 3/16/63–7/5/63,” which do not contain either Harriman’s note or the memorandum. The correct citation for these records is at n.48.
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was not the ideal evidence for Martin to employ, but he was not to know: the Cabinet
notebook was then closed and it would be over a decade before it would be
declassified. Nonetheless, Martin’s use of this memorandum has, until now, 29
perpetuated the misrepresentation that Menzies did not consult the Cabinet on the
Cuban Crisis, and more generally.
Menzies himself may be responsible for such misconceptions regarding Cabinet
consultation during the Cuban Crisis. It was the PM who discussed the Cabinet’s
deliberations on the crisis with people outside of the Cabinet. In doing so, he
exaggerated his role, probably to assert his pre-eminence, to use Bunting’s phrase. At
The Daniel Mannix Memorial Lecture in 1987, Liberal Party backbencher, Malcolm
Fraser, stated “I heard him tell a story once of a debate within his own cabinet during
the Cuban Missile Crisis;” Fraser’s choice of words indicate that he was not Menzies’
sole audience. Fraser’s recollection of that story is worth quoting at length:
In May 2010, changes to the Archives Act 1983 saw the closed period of Cabinet notebooks shortened 29
from 50 to 30 years. The change has been phased in with the closed period reducing by three years annually until 2020: “Cabinet notebooks – Fact sheet 128,” NAA, http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs128.aspx (accessed 22 July 2014).
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The cabinet had been called together and he asked advice. Many views were put, none having a very clear view of the course Australia should take. If there is a clash between the United States and Soviet Union, did we want to be involved; is the United States right; will she have enough courage to stand; should we be urging caution. After a considerable and lengthy debate, as I heard the story, Menzies put his own view. It was simply that this was a major crisis between east and west. The Soviet Union was taking provocative actions in an area of close and paramount interest to the United States. The United States had thrown down the gauntlet. How then were the interests of the free world to be preserved and best protected? What had to be achieved? Clearly the Russian ships with missiles destined for Cuba, had to turn around if the interests of the free world were to be maintained. What would best achieve that, isolation of the United States or letting it be known to the world that America's allies stood fair square with America on the issue and that if anyone wanted to take on America, they would be taking on America with her friends and allies. Give America courage to stand firm and let it be known that America's allies were with her, that was the only way Australia could contribute to the issue and to the protection of her own interests. Any other course would have positively damaged our interests. 1
According to Fraser, Menzies had indicated that there was considerable debate on the
crisis; his colleagues were unclear as to the course that Australia should take; and thus it
was Menzies who put forth his view that the Government should stand firmly with the
US, thus determining Australia’s policy. For Fraser, Australia declaring its support for
the US was the only course to be taken in its interests. The emphasis, according to
Fraser, that Menzies placed on the importance of Australia maintaining Western
solidarity was evident in Menzies’ parliamentary statement. However, other aspects of
the Cabinet’s deliberations on the crisis were not accurately portrayed. The Cabinet
notebook demonstrates that there was considerable discussion, but not debate, and that
there was consensus among Menzies’ Cabinet colleagues that Australia should support
the US. As has been shown, it was the extent of that support that was deliberated, and it
Malcolm Fraser, “The Daniel Mannix Memorial Lecture — Sir Robert Menzies: In Search of Balance,” 1
transcript of lecture delivered at Wilson Hall, University of Melbourne, 30 July 1987, http://www.unimelb.edu.au/malcolmfraser/speeches/nonparliamentary/mannixmenzies.html (accessed 5 April 2010).
109
was Barwick, not Menzies, who led that discussion. When Menzies put his view—or at
least attempted to, given the enthusiastic interjections of members—he drew on the
perspectives of his Cabinet colleagues in developing his parliamentary statement.
Menzies did not, as the PM seemed to have implied and Fraser recounted, “put his own
view” and therefore determine the Government’s policy on the crisis in the absence of
genuine consultation with the Cabinet. Further, Fraser’s account of Menzies’ story
suggests that the decision to support the US was reflexive and that there was little to
consider in determining the Government’s policy on the crisis. While support for the US
was considered imperative, the extent of that support, as this chapter will continue to
demonstrate, was measured.
Menzies also exaggerated his role in Cabinet and Australia’s support for the US in the
crisis to Battle. The Ambassador recalled the Australian Cabinet’s deliberations on the
situation in his oral history, indicating that the PM had also discussed it with him. Battle
stated:
[Menzies] had a cabinet meeting right after Kennedy’s speech and had made up his mind where he was going. It was in support of the President. And one of his ministers raised the question at that meeting, “Shouldn’t we wait to see what England does? England hasn’t taken a position on this. Shouldn’t we wait to see what the Cabinet there does?” His position was, “Absolutely not. If we act affirmatively, it will make it more difficult for them to do anything else.” 2
Demonstrating his sagacity as a tactician, here Menzies’ strategy was to emphasise to
the US, who regarded him as “a fervent Anglophile,” that he personally did not hesitate 3
Battle interviewed by O’Brien, 2 March 1970, paras. 66–7.2
JFK Library: NSF, Countries, Box 8A, Australia General 7/6/63–7/8/63, “Memorandum for Mr. 3
McGeorge Bundy, The White House” (with enclosure: biographic sketch, “Menzies, Sir Robert Gordon, Australia, Prime Minister”) from Department of State, undated.
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to support the President in his stand on the Cuban Crisis; the views of his Government’s
other great and powerful friend were irrelevant. However, the Cabinet notebook reveals
that Menzies did not dismiss McEwen’s suggestion to obtain the British Cabinet’s view.
As show below, the British view was in fact sought, but not received, before Menzies
delivered his statement to Parliament.
Following the Cabinet meeting—but by then only an hour before Menzies addressed
Parliament—Ralph Harry contacted Allan J. Eastman, Senior Australian External
Affairs Representative in London from 1962–65, for the British Cabinet’s reactions. He
was specifically instructed to obtain British reactions on the quarantine and on
Kennedy’s declaration of retaliatory action against a Soviet attack (a launch of missiles
from Cuba against any state in the Western Hemisphere). But as it was the middle of the
night there, Harry did not receive a reply until that evening. The Australian 4
Government therefore independently and unilaterally declared its position.
There are three points worth noting here. First, the Government determined that it was
more important to swiftly declare its support for the US in the crisis than wait and
review the British position. Second, it is possible that ignorance of the British position
influenced some ministers to recommend that the Government formulate a narrow
policy on the crisis. But as this thesis demonstrates, the other concerns officials held
provided sufficient reason for doing so. Third, it is significant that Harry, rather than a
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, record of telephone conversation, Harry to Allan J. Eastman, 23 4
October 1962. For more on Allan Eastman, see Allan Eastman interviewed by J.D.B. Miller, 2, 3 and 8 August 1977, ORAL TRC 553, National Library of Australia, Canberra.
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member of the Prime Minister’s Department, contacted the London-based Australian
official. In this period, the Australian High Commission, London, was still the
responsibility of the Department of Prime Minister. This is a further evidence that 5
External Affairs was primarily in charge of managing Australia’s response to the Cuban
Crisis.
Fraser’s and Battle’s accounts emphasise Menzies’ concern for his reputation and
blatant disregard for Cabinet confidentiality. While these two examples do not suggest 6
he dominated Cabinet, they do a disservice to the collaborative and collegial approach
he advocated in The Measure of the Years, and evident in the Cabinet notebook.
Consequently, Menzies’ disclosures regarding the Cabinet’s deliberation of the Cuban
Crisis have resulted in that discussion, until now, being misrepresented.
Regarding the claim that Menzies was perhaps the first head of government to express
support for Kennedy’s stand on the Cuban Crisis, it was the US that had in fact
encouraged the PM’s supposed belief. Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office
of Southwest Pacific Affairs, David Cuthell, told the Washington Embassy that
Menzies’ statement was the first one received; the Departments of External Affairs and
Responsibility for administering the Australian High Commission, London, was not handed over from 5
the PM to the Minister for Foreign Affairs until 1 November 1972: Department of Foreign Affairs, “Government to Review Australian High Commission, London,” press release, no. M/35, 20 February 1973, http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/original/00002822.pdf (accessed 23 November 2015). For more on the confidentiality of Cabinet discussions, see “Cabinet notebooks – Fact sheet 128,” NAA, 6
http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-sheets/fs128.aspx (accessed 22 July 2014).
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PM were promptly informed. Battle was of the same understanding. He recalled: “I 7
think he was the first one to cable in complete support. I don’t know how the cables
were received, but I’m sure that, because of the timing and so on, his government was
right a [sic] the top in their support.” 8
Some of Menzies’ contemporaries also believed that the PM was among the first,
possibly the first, to support Kennedy’s stand on the Cuban Crisis. Reflecting on
Menzies’ parliamentary statement, an assistant secretary in the Department of External
Affairs, William Forsyth, stated:
Menzies seized the whole matter, told the House that he had a statement of very great importance to make, and as it turned out, I think Australia was the first — I suppose because of the time whereas in London they were just going to bed, I suppose, or had been in bed — and he made a brilliant short statement which is on the record. 9
Fraser was of a similar impression. At The Daniel Mannix Memorial Lecture he stated:
“Menzies was among the first, perhaps the first international leader to support the
United States in her action.” 10
Menzies certainly was among the first to declare publicly his Government’s support for
Kennedy’s stand on the Cuban Crisis. But he was not the first: Menzies was outpaced
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.26358), Australian Embassy, Washington to 7
Department of External Affairs (copied to Department of Prime Minister), 23 October 1962. Battle interviewed by O’Brien, 2 March 1970, para. 67.8
William Douglass Forsyth interviewed by Mel Pratt, “Mel Pratt Collection,” Canberra, January–9
February 1972, OH ORAL TRC 121/27, transcript, Oral History and Folklore collection, National Library of Australia (NLA), 289.
Malcolm Fraser, “The Daniel Mannix Memorial Lecture.”10
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by New Zealand Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake. On 23 October 1962 at 1:00 p.m.
(New Zealand Time), Holyoake issued a press statement in support of the US. This was
only one hour after Kennedy’s broadcast, and more than four hours before Menzies
addressed Parliament. Whether Holyoake was in fact the first leader to publicly 11
declare his country’s support for the US, however, remains unclear. Seemingly, the
Australian Embassy in Washington was quicker to bring its statement to the attention of
the US State Department, hence Cuthell’s comment. However, it is worth recalling that
despite this discussion over who was first to publicly declare support for the US, some
Western allies, as outlined in the previous chapter, pledged their support sooner
privately, courtesy of having had greater advance notice of the crisis. Nevertheless, as
Battle and Forsyth suggested, the Cuban Crisis was an occasion where time differences
worked to Australia’s and New Zealand’s advantage.
Finally, the speed at which a government expresses support for an ally in a crisis
situation can be a consideration in the policy-making process and in its general
management of that alliance. One well-known example involving Australia was its offer
of ground troops for the UN coalition force led by the US in South Korea in 1950. Then
Minister for External Affairs, Percy Spender, who was one of the strongest advocates
for closer Australian defence and economic ties with the US, learnt that the UK was
going to offer ground troops. Anticipating that an offer by Australia too would be made
Keith Holyoake, “Cuba: Statement by the Prime Minister, 23 October 1962,” New Zealand External 11
Affairs Review, 12/10 (1962), 38–9. The timing of the statement is clarified in Holyoake’s cablegram to selected New Zealand representatives abroad: ANZ: Cuba: Political Affairs – General [10/62–10/62], ABHS 950 W4627/4461 399/4/1 3, “Press statement: Cuba,” 23 October 1962. I am grateful to Lyndon Burford for providing, and assisting with, these references. In terms of Harriman’s handwritten note to Kennedy discussed earlier, it is possible that he had Menzies and Holyoake confused. Holyoake, who also swiftly declared his Government’s support for the US in the crisis, seemingly did not consult his Cabinet.
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but subsequently with underwhelming effect, Spender beat the British to the punch. 12
Strongly encouraged by the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Alan
Watt, Spender was able to convince a very reluctant Acting PM Arthur Fadden to 13
announce Australia’s commitment of a small contingent of ground troops, and manage
the reaction of Menzies who was incommunicado at sea en route to New York. Once
Menzies’ anger subsided—he received the news by radio phone after the fact—he
capitalised on the Australian commitment in his speeches and meetings on his US
visit. “Fast footwork,” wrote historian Peter Edwards, “ensured that Australia 14
impressed the Americans” and “it proved a vital step in Australian-American
relations.” For when the crisis deteriorated dramatically following Chinese 15
intervention late in 1950, Spender was able to press for a security treaty with the US, 16
which following Australian goodwill and tough negotiation by Spender and his
Department, resulted in the ANZUS Treaty of 1951. In the words of the official
historian of Australia’s involvement in the Korean War, Robert O’Neill, it was “one of
[Australia’s] rare significant crises of choice in the conduct of relations with its two
major allies.” 17
David Lowe, Australian Between Empires: The Life of Percy Spender (London: Pickering & Chatto, 12
2010), 134. Garry Woodard, “Watt, Sir Alan Stewart (1901–1988),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National 13
Centre of Biography, ANU, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/watt-sir-alan-stewart-15844 (published in hardcopy 2012; accessed online 19 July 2015).
Lowe, Australian Between Empires, 134.14
Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins (Crows Nest, New South Wales (NSW): Allen & 15
Unwin, 2006), 56–7. Australia’s commitment was also quicker than New Zealand: ibid., 57.16
Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950–53, Volume I: Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra: 17
The Australian War Memorial and the Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), 76.
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Former Cabinet Minister in the Hawke and Keating Governments from 1983–96 and
Foreign Minister from 1988–96, Gareth Evans, acknowledged that the speed at which a
government expresses support for an ally during a crisis can go both ways. A prompt
expression of support for the US for example, can gain you brownie points, but pause
can give you opportunity. During the Cuban Crisis, the Menzies Government tried to 18
strike a balance between the two. By swiftly declaring its support for the US in the
crisis, the Government attempted to win political capital with the Kennedy
Administration, just as it had done with the US in 1950. But in contrast, it was less
willing, and it kept its support narrow in order to keep its options open as the situation
unfolded. Clearly, Harriman’s suggestion to Kennedy that he recall Menzies’ prompt
support on the crisis when he met with the PM, and that Australia was the first to cable
its support, demonstrates that the speed at which Australia acted had a positive effect on
its alliance with the US.
Barwick and the Department of External Affairs
In all major policy matters, “the prime minister is the voice of the government and its
leading exponent and debater, attracting the major attention of the press and other
media.” By virtue of being PM and having announced the Government’s position on 19
the Cuban situation, Australia’s management of the crisis has been attributed to
Menzies. As has been demonstrated, Australian newspapers and the Kennedy
Gareth Evans, conversation with author, 10 January 2015 at Re-assessing the Global Nuclear Order: 18
Past, Present and Future (conference), Globalism Research Centre, RMIT University, and The Nuclear Studies Research Initiative, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Australia, 8–10 January 2015.
Beale, This Inch of Time, 46.19
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Administration’s reaction to Menzies’ visit in 1963 make this plain. However,
declassified government records reveal that he played a minor role. Because it was an 20
international matter, it was Barwick, as Minister for External Affairs, and his senior
advisers, who led Australia’s response. The following background discussion on
Barwick, his handling of the External Affairs portfolio, and his interactions with the
Department, provides the necessary context in which to examine how Australia’s policy
on the crisis was developed and managed.
Barwick entered parliament in 1958 as the Member for Parramatta, a blue ribbon
Liberal seat vacated by Howard Beale following his appointment as Australian
Ambassador to the US. John Howard, later Australian PM, wrote that on entering
politics, “Barwick was already something of a Liberal legend”; he was widely regarded
as Australia’s most accomplished barrister. For Barwick, who held no specific political 21
ambitions, the decision to stand for the seat at a by-election was a difficult one. Citing 22
Barwick’s memoir, Martin claimed that it was his friend Menzies who was chiefly
responsible for enticing him to nominate for Parramatta. But Barwick made it clear 23
that even after he discussed the nomination with the PM, who was more of an
acquaintance, he continued to deliberate on the decision over several days, and
The poor health of the PM may have been a contributing factor in his disengagement from this issue. 20
From late 1962 until well into the New Year, Menzies was stricken with a bout of diverticulitis and fatigue. He was also apart from his beloved wife, Pattie, who due to ill health, had remained in London following the Prime Minister’s conference in mid-September to have her tonsils removed. Pattie was still in London at the time of the Cuban Crisis: Martin, Robert Menzies, 463.
John Howard, The Menzies Era: The years that shaped modern Australia (Sydney: HarperCollins 21
Publishers, 2014), 114–5 and 273. Barwick would eventually return to the law. In April 1964, he became Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia and is the longest-serving incumbent: ibid., 276.
Garfield Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick’s Reflections and Recollections (Sydney: The 22
Federation Press, 1995), ch.8. Martin, Robert Menzies, 369.23
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conferred further with a colleague and his immediate family. A fellow barrister, 24
Menzies likely put forth a strong case, but Martin overemphasised Menzies’ role.
Barwick, who described himself as “set in my ways and used to following my own
paths, perhaps too insensitive to the attitudes of others,” ultimately made-up his own 25
mind. This independence of mind served him well as an advocate and, as shown below,
was appreciated by those in External Affairs.
Eager to have Barwick on the front bench, a man whose legal talents and powers of
exposition he clearly admired, Menzies appointed him Attorney-General in the 26
ministry reshuffle following the November election. At the next election in December 27
1961, Barwick inherited the External Affairs portfolio from Menzies, which, for a time,
he held concurrently with the Attorney-General’s portfolio. Menzies had previously
offered External Affairs to Barwick following Richard Casey’s resignation in February
1960, but because of legislation in train, Barwick wanted to continue on as Attorney-
General. Menzies, himself aware of the onerous workload of two portfolios, was then
reluctant to burden Barwick with External Affairs, concerned that it would jeopardise
his health. Now Menzies agreed with Barwick’s suggestion that he take on the two 28
portfolios following the appointment of two assistant ministers to help with routine
Barwick, A Radical Tory, 102–4.24
Ibid., 109.25
Downer, Six Prime Ministers, 21.26
Martin, Robert Menzies, 377.27
Ibid., 437. Menzies’ concern for Barwick’s health was general in nature: Barwick never told him that he 28
had been diagnosed with an advanced state of diabetes in 1956. Only Barwick’s immediate family was aware of his condition. The potential for the stress of political life to affect his health weighed heavily on Barwick in deciding whether to contest the by-election: Barwick, A Radical Tory, 98–9, 102 and 104.
! 118
work. Given Menzies’ heavy workload and “chequered” experience as External 29
Affairs Minister, he was most likely relieved to pass the responsibility to Barwick,
however much he enjoyed performing on the world stage. Consequently, Australia 30
faced the mounting international problems of the early 1960s—including the Cuban
Crisis—without a full-time Minister for External Affairs. 31
Menzies had long ago determined that Barwick was suitable to be External Affairs
Minister. He had gained experience in the role acting in his predecessors’ absence and
by leading the Australian delegation to the UN General Assembly in 1960. That 32
Menzies was grooming Barwick for the position was further suggested by the PM’s
insistence in 1960 that on his return home following business in London, Barwick take
a leisurely tour through Southeast Asia. According to Barwick, Menzies had asked 33
him to obtain the opinions of Asian and Southeast Asian leaders on Indonesian
President, Sukarno, and his claim to West New Guinea. In the view of many official 34
and unofficial Australian observers, Sukarno was then “becoming perilously dependent
on the support of the Indonesian communist party (the PKI) to maintain himself in
power.” According to Coral Bell, who was described as “Australia’s most distinguished
Barwick, A Radical Tory, 165.29
Martin, Robert Menzies, 437. 30
Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of 31
Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965. The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1992), 229.
Garry Woodard, “‘A Radical Tory’: Sir Garfield Barwick, 1961–64,” in Ministers, Mandarins and 32
Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making, 1941–1969, Joan Beaumont, Christopher Waters, David Lowe, with Garry Woodard, eds. (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2003), 106–7. For Barwick’s recollections on that General Assembly, see A Radical Tory, 162–4.
Martin, Robert Menzies, 437.33
Barwick, A Radical Tory, 168.34
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analyst of contemporary international politics,” the years 1958 to 1965 were “a major 35
period of gathering alarm in Canberra” and alarm concentrated primarily on
Indonesia. The insight Barwick gained on Sukarno and West New Guinea and other 36
key issues in light of this tour proved, according to Martin, “to fit him extraordinarily
well for policymaking in an area about which Cabinet expertise was weak.” He would 37
put it to use immediately.
After he was sworn in, Barwick was briefed at the Department on current issues; West
New Guinea was the most pressing matter. For a decade, Australia had supported Dutch
control of the territory. In late 1961, a Dutch initiative for West New Guinea to 38
determine its future under an UN-supervised plebiscite, sparked much diplomatic
activity but no agreed outcome. Around the same time, Sukarno made increasingly
belligerent statements, indicating he would seize the territory by force. However, the 39
Americans and the British saw Western relations with Indonesia as paramount to the
Dutch position in West New Guinea. If Indonesia used force, the US and UK would not
support the Dutch militarily. Their strategy was to try to persuade the Dutch to accept
the seemingly inevitable Indonesian takeover. Reflecting on the American position,
historian David Lowe wrote:
“Dr Coral Bell AO,” Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University (ANU) 35
College of Asia & the Pacific, ANU, http://bellschool.anu.edu.au/about-us/dr-coral-bell-ao (accessed 11 July 2017).
Coral Bell, Australia’s Alliance Options: Prospect and Retrospect in a World of Change (Canberra: The 36
Australian Foreign Policy Publications Program, ANU, 1991), 30. Martin, Robert Menzies, 437. For Barwick’s reflections on his meetings with leaders on this tour, see 37
Radical Tory, 168–72. Edwards, Arthur Tange, 130–1.38
Edwards, Crises and Commitments, 230.39
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The Americans may have shared the Australians’ apprehensions about the growth of the anti-colonial Afro-Asian bloc in the UN in the mid-1950s, but they did not share Australia’s imperial history, and were prepared to be flexible to win favour with the so-called ‘un-committed’ nations in the Cold War, such as Indonesia. 40
Barwick was quick to recognise the limits of ANZUS. After just three weeks as Minister
for External Affairs, he convinced Menzies and the Cabinet to change its policy on West
New Guinea: in the interest of it too securing good relations with Indonesia, Australia 41
would support moves in the UN to transfer control of the territory to it. Barwick’s long 42
submissions to Cabinet on 11 and 12 January 1962 reflected his own standpoint and
seemingly his acceptance of the advice of Tange and the Department, which for some
time, had been unsuccessfully pressing on Menzies such views. In addition to Barwick’s
initiative and skilled advocacy based on the departmental briefs, it is likely that a letter
to Menzies from Macmillan dated 27 December 1961 in which the British and
American positions were made plain, helped to convince the Cabinet of the need to
rethink Australian policy. On 12 January 1962 regarding Cabinet’s decision, Menzies 43
stated:
Having regard not only to our treaty rights and responsibilities but also to the hard facts of international life, we act in close consultation with the great free powers, particularly Great Britain and the United States of America. No responsible Australian would wish to see any action affecting the safety of Australia on the issues of war or peace in this area except in concert with our great and powerful friends. 44
David Lowe, Percy Spender and the American Century, The Trevor Reese Memorial Lecture, Carl 40
Bridge, series ed., (London: Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, King’s College London, 2002), 35; and repeated in Lowe, Australian Between Empires, 159.
Edwards, Arthur Tange, 130–1.41
Edwards, Crises and Commitments, 230.42
Edwards, Arthur Tange, 130–1.43
Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs (Current Notes), vol. 33, no. 1, 44
January 1962, 41–2. This is also referred to in Edwards, Crises and Commitments, 230–1.
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Previously, Menzies had referred proudly to the strength and support provided by
Australia’s most important allies. Now, Edwards observed, “he was admitting that there
were costs associated with depending on allies for one’s security.” In the months that 45
followed, Australia watched on while the US effectively led diplomatic efforts for a
peaceful transfer of West New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia, resulting in
the signing of a formal agreement in August. By October, the Menzies Government 46
would again find itself reflecting on the US alliance, this time in relation to the Cuban
Crisis.
In his short time as External Affairs Minister, Barwick had successfully advocated a
new policy towards Indonesia. This, as well as his personal qualities and work ethic,
quickly earned him the respect and confidence of his Department, especially its
Secretary, Arthur Tange, with whom he had a strong working relationship. Tange had
been permanent head of the Department since 1954, a position he held until 1965 when
he became High Commissioner to India and non-resident Ambassador to Nepal. On
return to Australia in early 1970, he served as Secretary of the Department of Defence
until age resulted in his compulsory retirement in 1979. Tange is widely regarded as the
last of the great mandarins of the public service. The tribute of Stephen Smith, 47
Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2007–10, is most fitting: “Tange was an outstanding
Edwards, Crises and Commitments, 231.45
Under the agreement, West New Guinea was to be handed over to Indonesia in 1963, with provision for 46
an act of self-determination to be carried out by 1969: ibid.
Edwards, Arthur Tange, passim. This is also reflected in the biography’s sub-title, Last of the 47Mandarins. See also Peter Edwards, “Sir Arthur Tange: Departmental Reformer,” in The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins: Australian Government Administration in the Post-War Reconstruction Era, Samuel Furphy, ed. E-book (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2015), 233–40; and for example, the praise given to Tange by former diplomat and Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Philip Flood, and Malcolm Fraser cited in Howard, The Menzies Era, 366.
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leader and strategic thinker, clear-eyed, principled and effective in both defining and
advancing Australian national interests.” Tange served at a time when public servants 48
were permitted significant independence and influence; the Sydney Morning Herald 49
listed him among the 100 most influential Australians of the twentieth century. In his 50
biography of Tange, Edwards wrote that of the three External Affairs ministers Tange
served in the early 1960s, it was Barwick with whom he possibly achieved the most
success, having played an important role in shaping Australian foreign policy towards
Indonesia over the West New Guinea dispute and later Confrontation. The Cuban 51
Crisis was another key episode.
Tange and his colleagues saw Barwick as a strong minister with his own convictions,
but one who consulted and listened to his advisers and gave clear policy directions. As 52
Ralph Harry, a senior official in External Affairs, recorded in one of his memoirs,
“Barwick brought to the Department […] the lawyer’s skill at mastering his brief, and a
great capacity for infighting in Cabinet on behalf of Department objectives and
projects.” Barwick’s ability to win battles against other ministers and departments, 53
including Menzies and the Department of Prime Minister, gave Tange and his
colleagues great confidence. In contrast to most ministers, who used their offices at
The Hon Stephen Smith MP, “Building Momentum: Australia, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and 48
Disarmament,” Tange Lecture, 12 August 2009, http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2009/090812_tange.html (accessed 23 January 2015).
Edwards, Arthur Tange, ix–x. 49
Tony Stephens, “The most influential Australians,” Sydney Morning Herald, 22 January 2001, cited in 50
Edwards, Arthur Tange, 263. Edwards, Arthur Tange, 114 and 130–7.51
Ibid., 131–2.52
Ralph Harry, The Diplomat who Laughed (Richmond, Victoria: Hutchinson of Australia, 1983), 49–50. 53
See also Ralph Harry, No Man Is a Hero: Pioneers of Australian Diplomacy (Sydney: Arts Management, 1997), 144 and 153.
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Parliament, Barwick worked from the minister’s office in the Department. He roamed
the corridors, striking up debates on issues with officials, who appreciated his robust
and happy disposition and “shirt-sleeves” approach to the day-to-day management of
Australia in world affairs. While Barwick was late to enter politics in 1958 at the age 54
of 54, his timing would prove impeccable. He entered External Affairs after Tange had 55
implemented significant administrative reforms, making it an effective and professional
foreign office and solidifying it as a key department in Canberra’s bureaucracy. It also 56
meant “he was not shackled by old policies that had reached the end of their shelf life,”
and was thus “a policy innovator and moderniser,” wrote former Australian diplomat,
Garry Woodard. While Australia’s relationship with Indonesia, specifically over West 57
New Guinea, was the case in point, Edwards claimed that Barwick was otherwise less
eager than his predecessors “to rethink and reshape the fundamentals of Australian
policy.” According to Edwards:
Barwick’s tenure of the External Affairs portfolio was generally marked by a vigorous and determined effort to seek longstanding goals by familiar means, not to formulate a new vision. At the top of the list of goals was the desire to see Australia closely associated with the United States in efforts to preserve the security of non-communist states in Southeast Asia. 58
As shown in the next chapter, Barwick and Tange’s contemplation of nuclear weapons
and Australian defence reflect an attempt to achieve those goals.
Edwards, Arthur Tange, 131–2.54
Barwick, A Radical Tory, 96.55
Edwards, Arthur Tange, 114.56
Woodard, “‘A Radical Tory’,” 107.57
Edwards, Crises and Commitments, 229–30. The US alliance and constructive engagement in post-58
colonial Southeast Asia had been the principal concerns of the Department under Spender and Casey: Richard Broinowski, Fact or Fission?: the truth about Australia’s nuclear ambitions (Carlton North, Victoria: Scribe Publications, 2003), 37.
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3
The Cuban Crisis and
Australian Nuclear Ambitions
Barwick and Tange were concerned about the potential effect of the Cuban Crisis on
Australia’s defence, and particularly future Australian-American cooperation over
missile bases. Their consideration of this issue at 9:45 a.m. on 23 October 1962, and
therefore prior to the Cabinet meeting, was probably behind Barwick’s concern “to 1
avoid implications agst. [against] US. [sic] bases”, which he expressed to Cabinet later
that morning. Tange sent a minute of the discussion to the following four External 2
Affairs officials: his two most senior officials, Ralph Harry and Bill Forsyth; China
specialist, Hugh Dunn; and head of the Economic and Social section in the UN Branch,
Robert Robertson. In his minute of their discussion, Tange noted that in light of the 3
Cuban situation, he and the Minister had drawn several conclusions regarding foreign
bases. These were later repeated verbatim as “points for consideration” in a secret 4
paper titled “Cuba Crisis” that the Department had drafted for Barwick. 5
The meeting was scheduled in Barwick’s diary, but was preceded by a question mark: NAA, Sydney: 1
M3943, 1, [Papers of Sir Garfield Barwick] Diaries, 1962 appointment diary (small size) of Garfield Barwick, 23 October 1962. However, Tange confirmed in his minute that the meeting occurred “this morning”: NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, Minute, Tange to Harry, Forsyth, Dunn and Robertson, 23 October 1962. National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAA): A11099, 1/59, Cabinet notebook, 23 October 1962.2
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, Minute, Tange to Harry, Forsyth, Dunn and Robertson, 23 October 3
1962. I am grateful to James Dunn, who in 1962 was the Australian Consul to Portuguese Timor, for confirming that the “Dunn” to which Tange referred was Hugh Dunn: James Dunn, email to author, 25 October 2015. For more on Hugh Dunn, see Alexander Downer (former Minister for Foreign Affairs), “Hugh Dunn,” media release FA141, 13 November 2005, http://foreignminister.gov.au/releases/2005/fa141_05.html (accessed 11 July 2017). I am also grateful to Matthew Jordan, Historical Publications and Research Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, for information that assisted me to identify the “Robertson” to which Tange referred as Robert Robertson: Matthew Jordan, email to author, 2 September 2015. NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, Minute, Tange to Harry, Forsyth, Dunn and Robertson, 23 October 4
1962. NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, “Cuba Crisis,” draft paper for the Minister, undated.5
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For many years, Tange wrote, the Soviet Union had objected to “bases with an offensive
capacity” and had constantly called for their dismantling. In light of US
pronouncements, Barwick and Tange concluded:
We should consider carefully the concept that the presence of such bases and weapons on Cuban soil represents an act of Soviet aggression (the President said that any nuclear missile launched from Cuba would be treated as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States requiring full retaliation). 6
Barwick and Tange believed the Soviet Union would make much of US claims, and
would compare their weapons in Cuba with, for example, US nuclear weapons in
Turkey. Barwick and Tange were also aware that US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, had
recently shown Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, the locations of American
bases in Europe. They felt that the US may therefore need to emphasise Soviet
“deception” and “secrecy” regarding the base in Cuba. Furthermore, Barwick and Tange
thought it probable that a resolution condemning foreign bases “of all kinds” would be
moved in the UN General Assembly. 7
Reflecting on such views on foreign bases and offensive weapons, Barwick and Tange
considered Australia’s position. They asserted: “Australia has a distinct interest in
preserving the right of powerful allies to put bases and offensive weapons in Australia if
we want them.” As shown later in this chapter, the Menzies Government did want them.
However, Barwick and Tange recognised the potential effect of the Cuban Crisis on
such ambitions, as well as the contradictions of this position. The Soviet Union could
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, Minute, Tange to Harry, Forsyth, Dunn and Robertson, 23 October 6
1962. Ibid. Emphasis in original.7
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consider the future installation of American nuclear weapons in Australia as an act of
aggression, which could invite a response from the Soviets commensurate with the
American response towards Cuba. They concluded:
We are presumably vulnerable to a Soviet blockade (in the name of a ‘quarantine’) of any American offensive weapons which may be located on Australian soil at some future time and targetted [sic] on the Soviet Union. 8
However, this was a hypothetical scenario to which Barwick and Tange determined:
“we presumably cannot allow our policy in the present Cuban matter to be affected by
this consideration.” The Minister and Secretary were careful to balance “long-term 9
aspirations with immediate political realities.” Australian endorsement of the rights of 10
powerful states to install offensive weapons and bases on the territory of allies, as the
Soviets had done in Cuba, would have contradicted US policy on the Cuban Crisis.
Ultimately, this could have jeopardised the US alliance on which Australia heavily
relied. For Australia, maintaining the US alliance was paramount to the risk of a
possible Soviet-imposed quarantine should it one day host American nuclear weapons
and bases. Consequently, the Menzies Government’s willingness to host American
offensive weapons and bases would sit, even if uneasily, alongside condemnation of the
Soviet Union.
In addition to providing fascinating insight into a key consideration behind Australia’s
policy on the Cuban Crisis, there are three other aspects to Tange’s minute that merit
Ibid.8
Ibid.9
Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins (Crows Nest, New South Wales (NSW): Allen & 10
Unwin, 2006), 268.
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discussion: its significance to Australia’s nuclear history; its alignment with the Defence
Committee’s appreciation regarding a nuclear capability for Australia; and its
consistency with the Government’s reply to a UN inquiry, which contained a clear
statement of Australia’s policy on nuclear weapons. Each aspect is discussed here in
turn.
Tange’s minute is highly significant for our understanding of Australia’s nuclear history,
which has attracted the interest of scholars in the post-Cold War period. In documenting
Australia’s interest in acquiring nuclear weapons from the 1940s to the early 1970s,
scholars have shown how Australia attempted unsuccessfully to procure them from
allies, focusing on approaches made to the UK, and to maintain the option to develop an
indigenous arsenal. In his frequently cited study on Australia’s nuclear ambitions, 11
international security scholar, Jim Walsh, documented in detail Australia’s attempts to
acquire nuclear weapons from the UK: it made its first official request in 1958 for the
purchase of tactical nuclear weapons, and the second in 1961 regarding an agreement
for nuclear weapons on-demand that would enable Australia to draw on the British
For an excellent review of the scholarship on Australia and nuclear weapons to 2013, including 11
discussion of the literature regarding whether Australia actually sought an indigenous nuclear capability or to maintain the option of developing one, see Luke Auton, “Opaque Proliferation: The Historiography of Australia’s Cold War Nuclear Weapons Option,” History Compass 11, no. 8 (2013): 561–72. For the key studies on the subject, see: Lachlan Clohesy and Phillip Deery, “The Prime Minister and the Bomb: John Gorton, W.C. Wentworth and the Quest for an Atomic Australia,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 61, no. 2 (2015): 217–32; Justin Wilson, “Conflicting Interests: Australia and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968,” War & Society 20, no. 2 (2002): 107–28; Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Isotopes and Identity: Australia and the Nuclear Weapons Option, 1949–1999,” The Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 1 (2000): 1–23; Wayne Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Carlton South, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2000); Jim Walsh, “Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of Australia's Nuclear Ambitions,” The Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 1 (1997): 1–20; and Alice Cawte, Atomic Australia, 1944–1990 (Kensington, NSW: New South Wales University Press, 1992). However, see also: Christine M. Leah, Australia and the Bomb (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Christine Leah and Rod Lyon, “Three visions of the bomb: Australian thinking about nuclear weapons and strategy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 64, no. 4 (2010): 449–77; Christopher Hubbard, “From Ambivalence to Influence: Australia and the Negotiation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 4 (2004): 526–43; and Richard Broinowski, Fact or Fission?: the truth about Australia’s nuclear ambitions (Carlton North, Victoria: Scribe Publications, 2003).
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nuclear weapons stockpile. While the approaches made to the UK are important, they 12
are not discussed here and they form only a part of Australia’s nuclear story. This
section therefore does not claim to be a comprehensive and detailed account of
Australia’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. Rather, it aims to outline the examples
in the relevant literature of Australian interest in acquiring US nuclear weapons into
which Tange’s minute may be fitted. Also, unlike the British approaches mentioned
above, Tange’s minute is an example of Australian interest in US nuclear weapons—not
a request for weapons—and therefore it needs to be considered in that context. Also,
this discussion does not examine the basis of Australia’s interest in acquiring a nuclear
capability in terms of evaluating hypotheses on why states do or do not proliferate;
while Tange’s minute is placed in historical context, the proliferation puzzle has been
discussed well and in much detail elsewhere. Tange’s minute is of particular 13
significance to the historiography because it reveals that in 1962, some Australian senior
officials had an interest in acquiring—specifically hosting—American nuclear weapons.
This thesis demonstrates that this is in contrast to the literature which implies: first, that
Australia’s interest in acquiring allied nuclear weapons ceased in 1961; second, that
Australia was mainly interested in acquiring British nuclear weapons; and third, that
acquisition of a nuclear capability entailed either procuring or developing it. In
illustrating the significance of Tange’s minute in this regard, this thesis brings together
the sparse and scattered historiographical remnants of Australian interest in US nuclear
weapons from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. Additionally, in concluding this
chapter, some challenges involved in working with this historiography are identified.
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 1–9.12
Jim Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt: Power, Ideas, and Institutions in International Politics,” (PhD diss., 13
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000), chs.3–5 (case study on Australia). I am grateful to Jim Walsh for providing me with a copy of his dissertation.
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Before exploring this, a very brief outline of Australian governments’ perceptions of its
security environment and alliances provides the context for Australia’s interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons.
The threat of Communist expansionism was the overriding security preoccupation of
Australian governments in the post-war period. They were fearful that Communist
forces would take advantage of instability in Southeast Asia resulting in Australia’s
neighbours falling to Communism like proverbial dominoes, jeopardising the security
of the region, and therefore Australia. Such notions were reflected in the language the
Government used to speak about defence. For example, in a speech to Parliament on 4
April 1957, Menzies stated: “It is of immense importance to us that the free countries of
South-East Asia should not fall one by one to Communist aggression.” It was in this 14
context that from the late 1940s to the early 1970s, Australia pursued policies of
containment of, and then forward defence against, Communism in its “near north”
committing troops to conflicts in Korea, Malaya, Malaysia (opposing Indonesia’s
Konfrontasi), and Vietnam. Colloquially, the concept of forward defence was voiced,
and accepted, as “‘better to fight in somebody else’s backyard’.” Concerned with the 15
stability of its region, Australia entered into a number of security agreements in the
1950s. The most important was ANZUS in 1951, which is discussed throughout the
thesis and in the next section, specifically regarding the Cuban Crisis. Along with the
R.G. Menzies, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House of Representatives (House), 4 14
April 1957, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1957-04-04/0113/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 20 July 2015), 1. Menzies is also quoted in Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 14.
Harry Rayner, Scherger: A biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger KBE CB DSO AFC 15
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1984), 150.
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UK and New Zealand, Australia also formed the British Commonwealth Far East
Strategic Reserve (shortened to Commonwealth Strategic Reserve) in 1955. While the
Commonwealth Strategic Reserve was available for force deployment anywhere in
Southeast Asia, its primary role was to deal with external threats to Malaya. 16
Furthermore, the Manila Treaty of 1954, which subsequently established the South East
Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), reflected a commitment by Australia, the US, the
UK, France, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan, to defend
collectively against perceived Communist aggression in the region. In the view of the 17
Defence Committee—the highest decision-making body of the Department of Defence
whose function was to advise the Minister on defence policy and its financial
requirements, as well as coordinate the Boards within the Department —collective 18
defence arrangements were necessary for Australia did not have the capabilities to
defend itself “unaided against the military power of the communist nations.” While
SEATO was such an arrangement and the only one for the collective defence of
Southeast Asia, the Organisation faced difficulties in reaching unanimous decisions on
key issues and developing effective plans in support of general strategic concepts for
regional defence. ANZUS therefore was considered to be “potentially the most valuable
Treaty” to Australia as it provided “the best available assurance of United States
assistance in the event of a threat of actual attack on our territory.” The Defence
Mark Lax, From Controversy to Cutting Edge: A History of the F-111 in Australian Service (Canberra: 16
RAAF, Air Power Development Centre, 2010), 8–9. For more on ‘domino theory’, SEATO, defence policies, and military and alliance commitments in 17
Southeast Asia from 1948–65, see Peter G. Edwards, with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965. The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1992).
Stephan Frühling, ed., A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945 (Canberra: Defence 18
Publishing Service, Department of Defence, 2009), 1; and “How the Commonwealth has managed the defence of Australia: Defence Committee,” NAA, Australian Government, http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/explore/defence/administration.aspx (accessed 29 May 2015).
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Committee further acknowledged that the West’s strength in the Southeast Asian and
Pacific region rested “primarily on the availability of formidable United States military
power;” so too did Australia’s defence. The so-called “domino theory” therefore was 19
closely intertwined with Australia’s support for the US alliance. So too was an
understanding that future regional conflicts could involve nuclear weapons.
The explosion of the first atomic device and the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in 1945 saw the dawn of the nuclear age. Shortly after, a nuclear arms
race followed, and technological advances in weaponry were made. The destructive
capacity of nuclear weapons changed the way people think and states behave. It was in 20
this context of a new strategic environment, as well as regional instability, that
Australian governments, which were deeply concerned about the Communist threat and
its effect on Australia’s security, contemplated, and at various times attempted, to
acquire or develop a nuclear capability from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. The 21
NAA: A4311, 698/2, “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” endorsed by Defence Committee, 19
25 January 1962, 10–13, paras. 33–4, 36, 38 and 40. In terms of collective defence, the Defence Committee also referred to Australian, New Zealand and Malayan area (ANZAM), an arrangement between Australia, New Zealand and the UK for the protection of the Malayan area. However, it simply concluded that its main practical value derived from the Strategic Reserve in Malaya/Singapore and the Organisation’s activities were mostly directed towards supporting SEATO planning: ibid., 12, para. 37. For more on ANZAM, see David Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century (Beaconsfield, Victoria: Circa, 2006), 98. Despite claims to the contrary, Scherger maintained that SEATO was effective, particularly as “‘a stabilising influence in the area’”: Rayner, Scherger, 164, and also 149–50.
On the revolutionary effect of nuclear weapons on world politics, see Michael Mandelbaum, The 20
Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989).
This is not to say, however, that the level of the perceived threat to Australia’s security and its nuclear 21
policy correspond nor that Australia’s interest in nuclear weapons stemmed only from security threats. The key finding of Walsh’s doctoral research in which he analysed 132 nuclear decisions and outcomes (78 related to a case study on Australia) was that the prevailing theory of nuclear behaviour, which is based on external threats to a state and that state’s technical capacity, lack evidence. The major critique of this theory, which is that nuclear outcomes are attributable to international norms, is also unsupported. Rather, Walsh found that “influence of institutions and the internal politics of decision making are consistently more important than the power, resources, or ideas for explaining nuclear behaviour, and in particular, for explaining the puzzle of limited proliferation”: Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 2–3 and passim (chapter three, “Australia, 1954–1996,” is modelled closely on his earlier article “Surprise Down Under”).
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following discussion focuses on Australia’s attempts to acquire American nuclear
weapons and the relevance of Tange’s minute to this historiography, as well as the
difficulties Australian governments faced in relying on collective defence arrangements
for Australia’s security.
Australia had shown interest in gaining access to American nuclear weapons since as
early as 1954. Australian thinking about nuclear weapons in the 1950s, as in most of 22
Europe and the US, included a belief that nuclear weapons would spread and become a
normal feature of modern militaries. The UK had entered the nuclear club in 1952, 23
and France and the People’s Republic of China (China) were then also expected to
join. This expectation and its anticipated effect on Australia could be found in 24
everything from prime ministerial statements to army training manuals. In 1954 the 25
US amended its Atomic Energy Act, enabling it to station nuclear weapons in NATO
member states. J.L. Lawrey, an official in Australia’s Washington Embassy, sought
confirmation from Special Assistant to the US Secretary of State for Atomic Affairs,
Gerard Smith, that Australia would also be “eligible for assistance.” Lawrey reported 26
that Smith,
Cawte, Atomic Australia, 106.22
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 2.23
France became a nuclear power in 1960, and China, 1964: Cawte, Atomic Australia, 112. Regarding the 24
expectation that France and China would become nuclear powers, see Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 2. Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 2.25
Cawte, Atomic Australia, 106.26
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who is of an excessively cautious disposition, did not reply quite as categorically as we would have wished, being doubtless mindful of the fact that Administration legal advisors are still engaged on analysis of the new Act’s provisions, but said that in view of the existence of the ANZUS treaty he assumed that there would be no difficulty on this score. 27
Some in the intelligence community and the military services would have been
encouraged by these developments. In July 1956, Casey noted in his diary that the
Director of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Alfred Brookes, “put the
idea to Allen Dulles in Washington of more US concern with Australia by reason of the
need for a non-American long-range launching place.” Brookes was close to Dulles, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1953 to 1961, who resigned in
the months following the botched invasion at Cuba’s Bay of Pigs in April. Regarding
this excerpt from Casey’s diary, the authors of the unofficial history of ASIS stated:
It is not clear from the context whether Brookes was offering Australia as a launch-pad for inter-continental ballistic missiles or for aircraft, but either way nuclear weapons would have been involved. 28
Against this background of NATO developments, the first option is certainly plausible.
Furthermore, the authors noted that another diary entry from Casey referred to a
discussion between Brookes and Dulles on “graduated deterrents”—the use of
conventional weapons through to nuclear weapons. Clearly, the two officials were
discussing nuclear options. Casey concluded, however, that the ASIS Director obtained
“J.L. Lawrey, Australian Embassy Washington, report of meeting with Gerard Smith, 22 September 27
1954, in A5462/1 138/5,” quoted in Cawte, Atomic Australia, 106. Brian Toohey and William Pinwill, Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (Port 28
Melbourne, Victoria: William Heinemann Australia, 1989), 52.
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little hard information from the CIA Director: “He got no light on the basic reason for
US interest in Australia.” 29
The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) would also have seen changes to the US
Atomic Energy Act as a positive development. Throughout the 1950s, Air Force leaders
were strong advocates for an Australian nuclear force based on manned bomber aircraft,
as was Minister for Air, Athol Townley. On 12 September 1956, Townley wrote to the 30
Minister for Defence, Philip McBride, about the offensive strike capability of the
RAAF. He suggested increasing the effectiveness of Australia’s Canberra bomber
aircraft by arming it with a “tactical nuclear weapon.” If that was accepted in principle,
Townley continued, then it would be logical to acquire “tactical atomic bombs” for the
Sabre fighters. He added: 31
It will be many years before Australia will be in a position to produce its own nuclear weapons. If, however, supplies of these weapons could be made available from the United States of America, the necessary preparations could be made to store, prepare, and deliver them. 32
But simply getting information on such weapons, let alone supplies, was proving
impossible. Townley told McBride that attempts had been made to obtain information
from the US Department of the Air Force via the RAAF Air Attaché in Washington on
Ibid., 52–3.29
Alan Stephens, Power Plus Attitude: Ideas, Strategy and Doctrine in the Royal Australian Air Force 30
1921–1991, RAAF Air Power Studies Centre (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992), 147–8.
NAA: A5954, 1400/15, letter (Top Secret) from Athol Townley, Minister for Air and Minister for Civil 31
Aviation, to Philip McBride, Minister for Defence, 12 September 1956. The Sabre, specifically, the Avon Sabre, was the Australian variant of the American F-86 Sabre: “CAC CA-27 Avon Sabre A94-989,” Australian National Aviation Museum, http://www.aarg.com.au/cac-avon-sabre-a94-989.html (accessed 9 June 2015).
NAA: A5954, 1400/15, letter from Townley to McBride, 12 September 1956.32
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the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons from Australia’s Sabres. However, it was
apparent that such information would not be shared in the absence of an Australia-US
agreement on the exchange of atomic energy information. But rather than seek an 33
agreement for information on the weapons, Townley proposed that Australia pursue an
agreement for the weapons themselves. In his letter of 12 September, he asked McBride
to consider
the desirability of initiating action with a view to the Australian Government requesting the Government of the United States for an agreement to obtain tactical atomic weapons to be held in Australia for use in R.A.A.F. Canberra and Sabre aircraft in the event of war. 34
Clearly, Townley saw US nuclear weapons as an interim measure to Australia
developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. He also saw them as weapons to
be used in Australia’s region. RAAF historian Alan Stephens wrote that Townley
unequivocally stated his conviction that such weapons, if acquired and if necessary,
would be used in the “‘north-west approaches’” to Australia—in other words, Southeast
Asia. Furthermore, the fact that Townley and the RAAF were interested in acquiring 35
tactical nuclear weapons for the Canberra and the Sabres demonstrated just how
unaware they were of the size, weight and technical complexity of nuclear weapons. 36
Moreover, it showed that the Australians did not know how to use nuclear weapons and
Ibid. Walsh stated that that year, the RAAF asked the United States Air Force (USAF) for information 33
on the use of tactical nuclear weapons with the Avon Sabre aircraft, but the USAF declined to respond: Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 16, n.54.
NAA: A5954, 1400/15, letter from Townley to McBride, 12 September 1956.34
“Procurement of Nuclear Weapons, Use of by the Australian Forces, 12-9-65, CRS A7942/1, N78; 35
65/6/Air, Box 158, CRS AA1969/100, AA,” quoted in Alan Stephens, Going Solo: The Royal Australian Air Force, 1946–1971 (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1995), 365.
The Canberra would have struggled to carry just one ‘tactical’ weapon; in 1958, the only one in the 36
Royal Air Force (RAF) inventory weighed 1,590 kilograms and measured four metres in length, which prohibited delivery by the Sabre. Furthermore, with a nominal yield of 15–20 kilotons, the bomb was in the same category as those dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and thus could hardly be considered ‘tactical’: Lax, From Controversy to Cutting Edge, 11; and Stephens, Going Solo, 367.
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were dependent on the Americans for assistance. Consequently, Australian strategic 37
planners were denied access to information on the nation’s ability to deliver and utilise
nuclear weapons.
McBride submitted Townley’s proposal to the Defence Committee for its views on joint
Service elements of a possible approach to the US. McBride and Secretary of the 38
Department of Defence, Frederick Shedden, had agreed that no further action should be
taken until the Defence Committee’s reports on policy were in hand. Townley’s 39
proposal, which was initially referred to the Joint Planning Committee, gained 40
momentum with the Defence Committee. When Frederick Osborne took over the 41
portfolio from Townley one month later, he built-on his predecessor’s initiative. 42
Osborne and the Defence Committee “began a campaign to hold US tactical nuclear
weapons in Australia for delivery by RAAF Canberra and Sabre aircraft in the event of
war.” The intention “to hold” nuclear weapons was seemingly a viable alternative to 43
Cawte, Atomic Australia, 107. From 1957, Scherger changed the RAAF College syllabus so that there 37
was a greater emphasis on physics to ensure the service’s future leadership were intellectually prepared to command a nuclear air force: Stephens, Going Solo, 366.
NAA: A5954, 1400/15, “Procurement of Nuclear Weapons from U.S.A.,” letter (Top Secret) from 38
[Frederick Shedden], Secretary, [Department of Defence], to [G.E. Blakers], Secretary, Defence Committee, 4 October 1956.
NAA: A5954, 1400/15, letter (Top Secret) from McBride to Townley with note in footer from 39
[Frederick Shedden], 12 September 1956. NAA: A5954, 1400/15, Defence Committee Agendum No.173/1956 (Top Secret), “Procurement of 40
Nuclear Weapons from U.S.A.,” 5 October 1956. The principal officers of the Joint Planning Committee were the deputy chiefs of the armed services. The Committee’s role was “to report on matters of Joint Service interest referred to it by the Defence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee”: Karl Metcalf, “Near Neighbours: Records on Australia’s Relations with Indonesia: Joint Planning Committee” (Research Guides), NAA, http://guides.naa.gov.au/near-neighbours/chapter4/joint-planning-committee.aspx (accessed 21 October 2015).
Lax, From Controversy to Cutting Edge, 11. 41
On 24 October 1956, Osborne became Minister for Air, and Townley, Minister for Immigration: 42
Edwards, Crises and Commitments, 439; and Scott Bennett, “Townley, Athol Gordon (1905–1963),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University (ANU), http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/townley-athol-gordon-11876 (published in hardcopy 2002; accessed online 21 October 2015).
Cawte, Atomic Australia, 107.43
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procurement; as Walsh stated, “Nuclear weapons proponents in Australia knew that the
Americans had no intention of selling nuclear weapons.” The Defence Committee 44
concluded that US legislation would inhibit US President from 1953–61, Dwight D.
Eisenhower, from transferring nuclear weapons to Australia. The Defence Committee
stated in “The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” which it endorsed on 11
October 1956:
Unlike her major allies (the United States and the United Kingdom), Australia does not have any nuclear weapons. In view of her limited resources, the costs involved in their production in Australia would make this completely prohibitive. Present legislative provisions prevent the United States from making supplies of such weapons available to Australia. It is doubtful if the United Kingdom has sufficient stocks of her own at present to make any available. 45
The prospects of, and conditions for, Australian access to US nuclear weapons were
clarified in mid-December 1956. At a meeting of NATO, the US Secretary of Defence,
Charles Wilson, publicly announced the willingness of the US to supply modern
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 2. In his article, Walsh defined procurement as “gaining access to 44
nuclear weapons via a third party,” and stated that from 1956–63, three initiatives pertained to the procurement of nuclear weapons by elements in the Government: “1) discussions regarding the purchase of tactical nuclear weapons; 2) the acquisition of a nuclear capable delivery system; and 3) a proposal for nuclear weapons on-demand”: ibid. In his PhD dissertation, he offered a fourth: “a Department of Supply initiative for nuclear weapons cooperation”: Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 50. Walsh distinguished procurement from indigenous development, and also, nuclear sharing arrangements under NATO, which employ a dual key system, because “Australia’s intent was to acquire weapons that would be under purely national control.” Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 2. In other words, Walsh made a distinction between procuring and holding/hosting weapons. My use of the term ‘acquiring’ in this thesis however, includes procuring and hosting. Also, references to hosting in this thesis relate to both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons.
Defence Committee, “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” October 1956, in Frühling, A 45
History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, 208. The “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” otherwise known as the Strategic Basis papers, were the most important Defence strategic guidance documents in Australia. The purpose of the papers was “to prioritise possible and actual threats to Australia’s vital interests, and to develop the outlines of ‘a plan’…from which principles could be derived to guide the development and use of Australia’s armed forces.” They were drafted at regular intervals (typically every three years) by uniformed officers and civilian public servants, specifically, the Joint Planning Committee with input on international developments provided by the Joint Intelligence Committee. The papers were endorsed by the Defence Committee and thus represent their consensus view on the key aspects underlying defence policy. They were submitted to the government of the day for formal consideration, which led to Decisions by Cabinet. Therefore, the papers were “a key guidance mechanism at the interface between the government’s policy directive, and the Defence organisation’s professional advice.” They were often shared with Australia’s closest allies to inform them of the country’s policy until the late 1960s when they were classified ‘AUSTEO’ (Australian Eyes Only): Frühling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, 1–10.
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weapons to Western allies that were “capable of firing atomic charges”; however, “the
U.S. would retain possession of the atomic warheads.” Five days later, McBride wrote 46
to Casey for the likely reactions of the Americans and British to an Australian approach
for nuclear weapons. The Defence Minister, however, had been slow to follow-up on 47
the proposal originally initiated by Townley, having not contacted Casey for months
after receiving Townley’s correspondence. According to Stephens, with the US option
closed, Casey told McBride that there were no political factors preventing an approach
to the UK. Thus, the approach to the UK for nuclear weapons was Australia’s second 48
preference. Nevertheless, as the remainder of this discussion shows, Australian officials
continued to maintain an interest in acquiring US nuclear weapons.
One justification for Australia’s effort to acquire nuclear weapons was related to
SEATO. In his letter to Casey, McBride reminded him that contingency plans were in
place for SEATO forces to use nuclear weapons in response to Chinese Communist or
Viet Minh aggression that could not otherwise be controlled, and suggested that such
plans justified any Australian attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. It was also under 49
SEATO that the Defence Committee was convinced that Australian forces in operations
with British and American forces would be “supported by nuclear action” by the UK
and US when required. Such support, they thought, might have included their allies
having made “elements armed with and capable of using nuclear weapons” available to
“U.S. Offers Weapons to NATO,” Herald (Melbourne), 15 December 1956, 12.46
Stephens, Going Solo, 365–6.47
Ibid., 366.48
Ibid., 365.49
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Australian forces or “by making such weapons available to our forces in the field under
certain operational circumstances.” 50
If that was the case, and given the size of the American and British arsenals, why did
Australia believe it needed a nuclear capability? The Defence Committee, which felt
that the services would be considerably more effective if armed with low-yield kilo-ton
(KT) (tactical) nuclear weapons, offered the following reason:
The availability of these weapons would be of considerable importance to the Australian Services should a situation develop which require defensive operations in the north-west approaches to Australia, particularly if the support of the US or UK with nuclear weapons was not available at short notice. 51
But there were other less obvious reasons behind Australian interest in acquiring a
nuclear capability. Australian military officials claimed that Australia had to be able to
deploy and use the same weaponry as its allies if it were to be considered a full and
respected member in collective defence arrangements such as ANZUS and SEATO, and
thus avoid relegation to a secondary role with resulting diminished status and political
influence. Accordingly, “any thinking about the role of nuclear weapons revolved 52
around their tactical use in a war-fighting context, not their strategic utility as
instruments of deterrence.” Further, Australian officials viewed tactical nuclear 53
Defence Committee, “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” October 1956, in Frühling, A 50
History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, 208. Emphasis in original. See also Stephens, Going Solo, 365; and Cawte, Atomic Australia, 106–7.
“Defence Committee Report, 8 November 1956, A571 58/677,” quoted in Cawte, Atomic Australia, 51
107. Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 2–3.52
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 11, and also, 21–2.53
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weapons as sophisticated conventional weapons. It was also accepted that tactical 54
nuclear weapons would dramatically increase the firepower of military units, which
would therefore reduce the manpower and costs associated with maintaining a specific
level of firepower. For the RAAF, whose manpower and equipment had already been 55
reduced through economic austerity measures following World War II, nuclear weapons
were seen as a counter to its small force size. In essence, “In a world of limited 56
nuclear wars, Australia did not want to find itself at a disadvantage.” 57
Subsequently, and in spite of the limitations it anticipated (as noted above), the Defence
Committee deliberated approaching its great and powerful friends for tactical nuclear
weapons. It considered propositioning the UK given the contribution Australia had
made to the British nuclear weapons programme. However, the Defence Committee 58
favoured approaching the US in keeping with Australia’s general objective of making
Australian and American equipment compatible. This became government policy the
next year when Menzies stated in Parliament that Australia’s military equipment would
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 3.54
David N. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983), 55
22. Lax, From Controversy to Cutting Edge, 11.56
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 3.57
Cawte, Atomic Australia, 107. From 1952–57, Australia allowed the UK to conduct 12 atmospheric 58
nuclear tests on its territory: Lorna Arnold and Mark Smith, Britain, Australia and the Bomb: The Nuclear Tests and their Aftermath, 2nd edn. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), xi. (This is a revised and updated version of Lorna Arnold’s A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1987), and now includes material on, for example, the effect that tests at the Maralinga proving ground had on the environment and participants). For more on British nuclear tests on Australian territory, see for example: Peter Morton, Fire across the Desert: Woomera and the Anglo-Australian Joint Project 1946–1980 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service Press, 1989); and J. L. Symonds, A History of British Atomic Tests in Australia (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1985). Once British nuclear testing began in earnest, Head of the Department of Nuclear Physics at ANU and key adviser to Australian governments on US atomic tests at Bikini Atoll, Ernest Titterton, believed that Australia would eventually be given access to information on the construction of atomic weapons: Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 125.
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be standardised with that of the US for cooperation in Southeast Asia. Menzies was
saddened by the Government’s decision to deviate from the UK but he emphasised it
was in the national interest:
It may be thought by many honorable [sic] members, as it was thought by me when the proposals first came forward, that it is unfortunate that we should adopt a reequipment [sic] plan which appears to produce some divergence from the United Kingdom. But it seems to us clear that, having regard to Anzus and Seato [sic] and to our geographical situation, Australian participation in any future war must be in close association with the forces of the United States of America. 59
Air Marshal Frederick Scherger, then Chief of the Air Staff, on the other hand, was
more matter-of-fact about the decision: “Our nearest source of supply is America, which
is our one probable ally in the area, so it would be foolish of us to attempt to standardise
with anybody else’s equipment.” Historian David Lee stated that in making this 60
decision, “the Menzies government formalised its commitment to the strategy of
‘forward defence’”—of conducting military operations with the US in Asia and away
from Australia’s shores. 61
The Australian Government’s decision on the compatibility of equipment followed the
announcement by the UK that it would reduce its conventional forces. The British 62
Government’s decision was one of a series of significant and necessary changes made to
Menzies, CPD, House, 4 April 1957, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/59
hansardr80/1957-04-04/0113/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 16 September 2015), 5.
Rayner, Scherger, 168.60
Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century, 104.61
David Lowe, Australian Between Empires: The Life of Percy Spender (London: Pickering & Chatto, 62
2010), 143–4.
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curtail its defence programmes and spending in order to steady the British economy and
adapt to the new strategic environment. By the end of August 1955, its gold and dollar
reserves were falling by $100 million a month. As British PM from 1955–57, Anthony
Eden, put it, “The country was plainly attempting to do too much with the limited
resources at its disposal.” It was attempting to build much needed infrastructure and at 63
the same time withstand the heavy burdens of National Service and defence, the latter
being the largest item of government expenditure. It was the only US ally building its 64
own nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear weapons, and delivery systems, yet 65
these could not completely replace conventional forces in Europe or the Middle East,
which were still insufficiently mobile. The British economy “had somehow to meet
these various demands, at a time when every new weapon cost twice as much as its
predecessor.” It had garrison commitments to NATO that it was fulfilling in Germany, 66
a considerable number of overseas territories to guard, and it had security alliances to
sustain, such as SEATO. Further, it had to be prepared for limited war and able to adapt
its forces for global war should one eventuate. Yet the British economy was not
expected to be able to sustain the mounting strain from increased defence expenditure,
which was estimated to rise from £1,527 million in 1955 to £1,929 million in 1959. A 67
subsequent re-examination of British long term needs resulted in the reappraisal of
NATO strategy and the doctrine of reliance on nuclear deterrence, and generated an
opportunity to reduce the strength of the British armed forces. In a telegram to
Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden K.G., P.C., M.C.: Full Circle (London: 63
Cassell & Company Ltd, 1960), 313. Ibid., 313–5.64
Ibid., 370.65
Ibid., 363.66
Ibid., 370.67
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Eisenhower, Eden stated that while the British Government recognised the importance
of having some American and British forces on the ground in Europe under NATO
command, they were initially deployed to meet the threat of a Soviet land invasion. In
the immediate post-war period, the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe
enjoyed the advantage of having conventional forces far superior to the Western powers.
The advent of nuclear weapons, on which the NATO powers now relied to both deter
and repel aggression, meant that conventional forces were no longer the principal form
of military protection. 68
In contrast, Australia had neither sufficient conventional forces nor nuclear weapons to
deal with threats to its security. That the UK was no longer willing or able to manage
the distribution of power in the Asia-Pacific added to the perception that Australia
should have nuclear weapons to ensure its defence. The decision to begin withdrawing 69
British military forces east of the Suez Canal meant that the Australian Government was
confronted with the long-term possibility of strategic isolation. Also, despite Prime
Minister John Curtin’s statement in 1941 that Australia looked to the US and the
establishment of the ANZUS Treaty a decade later, Australian policymakers up to the
late 1950s, as illustrated by Menzies’ comments above, had wanted to maintain a strong
Ibid., 369 and 372–3.68
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 13.69
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level of defence cooperation with the UK. In the 1960s, Australian governments had a
concurrent focus on Empire Defence and American interests and strategy. 70
In July 1957, Australia managed to secure a Defence Agreement under the amended US
Atomic Energy Act. This included a promise from the US to give Australia atomic 71
information for the purposes of mutual defence, which was aimed at developing defence
plans and training personnel in the use of, and defence against, nuclear weapons. This
secret military information, which was channelled through the Australian Joint Services
Staff in Washington, was conditional on strict security requirements. A visit to Australia
by a US Military Information Control Committee, which was concerned with
procedures to secure such information and handling requirements, reflected American 72
concern over the adequacy of Australian security measures to safeguard such
information. This is further emphasised by the fact that final security and classification
arrangements were not approved by the relevant US authorities until August 1960.
According to historian Wayne Reynolds, it is clear from the scant archival record that
while the US shared information on atomic target analysis and battlefield operations,
Australia had “extremely limited” access to top secret atomic information. It was in 73
Ibid., 5, 12–3 and 28. For more on the concept of Empire Defence, Australia and nuclear weapons, see 70
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, passim. In the immediate post-war period, Australia’s foreign policy outlook was also heavily influenced by its participation in the sterling area. (To manage better the fluctuations in the pound sterling, the sterling Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth states established an “area” resulting in their currencies having a fixed value against one another despite floating against non-sterling states): David Lee, Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia’s Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy (Canberra: Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations, ANU, 1995), 6. For a contemporary assessment of the effects on Australia of the British withdrawal, see T.B. Millar, ed., “Britain’s Withdrawal from Asia: Its Implications for Australia,” (proceedings of a seminar conducted by the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, ANU, Canberra, 29–30 September 1967).
Cawte, Atomic Australia, 108.71
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 206 and 209–10.72
Ibid., 209–10.73
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this period, Leah argued, that Australia began to look at ANZUS as a nuclear alliance.
Only then did the notion of extended nuclear deterrence (END) start to emerge: “that
the United States should deter aggression with nuclear weapons on Australia’s behalf.” 74
However, the nuclear option and relying on END were not considered by policymakers
to be an exact binary choice; the latter did not become policy until the 1970s when
Australia eventually took a position on nuclear non-proliferation. The Agreement, in 75
Cawte’s view, “did not, however, spell out, any more than did ANZUS, an American
obligation to use nuclear weapons on Australia’s behalf.” In other words, this 76
Agreement lacked substance and the Government did not make further gains in terms of
obtaining a nuclear commitment from the US for Australia’s defence. As political
scientist Michael Mandelbaum noted, the only true nuclear alliances in the post-war
period were between the US and Japan, embodied in the bilateral Security Treaty of
1950, and NATO, which bound together the US and the states of Western and Southern
Europe; other US security arrangements, such as SEATO, proved much flimsier. 77
In 1957, a US Technical Mission visited Australia to evaluate the latter’s capacity to
manufacture US equipment. It noted the interest of the RAAF in nuclear weapons, and
the USAF agreed to examine the nuclear capability of Australian aircraft—the Avon,
Sabre and Canberra models—together with the Office of the Australian Air Attaché,
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 11 (emphasis in original), and also 17, 29 and 126. Leah stated that this 74
is demonstrated by the absence of records on statements about ANZUS and nuclear weapons prior to 1957: ibid., 13.
Ibid., 57 and 122–3.75
Cawte, Atomic Australia, 108.76
Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution, 148. Mandelbaum does not consider the Warsaw Pact—the 77
military organisation of the Soviet Union and the communist-governed states of Eastern Europe—a nuclear alliance as “it is not truly an alliance in the sense of a voluntary association”: ibid., 149.
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which was in contrast to its position a year earlier when it declined to respond to the
RAAF-initiated inquiry. According to Cawte, nothing seems to have come of this study,
other than
a vague promise that if US policy should seek to develop a nuclear capability among allied nations, the Australians would be first-priority recipients ‘to enhance [their] combat potential’—which they should bear in mind when choosing replacement aircraft. 78
While the Menzies Government already sought nuclear-capable delivery systems before
this “vague promise,” it likely influenced its decision in 1963 to purchase the 79
American reconnaissance bomber aircraft, the Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX)
(later known as the F-111), which is referred to later in this section.
It was not just Osborne and the RAAF that believed Australia should be encouraging the
US to give it access to nuclear weapons. One proponent was Percy Spender, Australia’s
longest serving Ambassador to the US from 1951–58. Spender, who “envisaged a very 80
atomic Australia,” had been involved in successful negotiations for the sale of
Australian uranium to the US throughout 1955–56, and for the sharing of information
Cawte, Atomic Australia, 108. Cawte did not provide the date of the visit in the text or citation. 78
However, a search for the archival record on the NAA catalogue using her citation reveals the year in the record title: NAA (Adelaide): D174, SA5280/2, “Visit of USA Technical Mission 1957.” Reynolds also referred to a visit to Australia in this period of a US mission with the same objective as stated by Cawte, but his discussion of it related to conventional forces. It is likely that both Cawte and Reynolds referred to the same visit. The difficulty in triangulating this information, which has been used differently by the authors, is compounded by the fact that Cawte cited an Australian archival record; Reynolds, a US archival record; and neither of them specified the date of the visit: Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 204.
For example, a search for a replacement aircraft for the Canberra bomber in 1954, which was 79
commissioned by the Government and led by Air Vice-Marshal A.M. Murdoch, included a requirement that the aircraft “had to be able to fly with the maximum possible bomb load from Singapore to Bangkok or from Darwin to Singapore with, if necessary, nuclear weapons”: Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, 150.
David Lowe, Percy Spender and the American Century. The Trevor Reese Memorial Lecture, Carl 80
Bridge, series ed. (London: Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, King’s College London, 2002), 2–3; and Lowe, Australian Between Empires, 143.
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on peaceful uses of atomic energy. According to Reynolds, he had been “chipping 81
away” at US officials to supply nuclear weapons to Australia since the Petrov Affair
(April 1954). In a despatch dated 24 December 1957, Spender pressed that Australia 82
could not afford “to sit back and wait” for a special arrangement with the US. It 83
reflected what his biographer David Lowe described as his “characteristic impatience,
aggressive manner and preparedness to know what was best for Australia [which] made
for an audacious style of diplomacy that sometimes left others gasping.” Spender 84
wrote:
We should lose no opportunity of impressing upon the United States government the importance of making interdependence a reality among ANZUS powers. We should, I consider, raise our target in regard to what help we might ask from the United States, particularly in the field of tactical atomic weapons. 85
An architect of the ANZUS Treaty, in his own words, Spender viewed this as a way of
“‘putting flesh on the bones of ANZUS’.” 86
Spender sent his cablegram at the end of what had been a troublesome year for
Australian strategic and defence planners. In addition to the British decision to
withdraw troops from Australia’s region, the Soviet Union launched the world’s first
Lowe, Australian Between Empires, 149. For Spender’s thoughts on the control of atomic weapons and 81
the consequences of nuclear war, see 127. Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 205.82
“Despatch No.5/57 from Spender, 24 December 1957, TS852/10/4/2, A1838/269, [NAA],” quoted in 83
ibid. Lowe, Australian Between Empires, 123.84
“Despatch No.5/57 from Spender, 24 December 1957, TS852/10/4/2, A1838/269, [NAA],” quoted in 85
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 205–6. Reynolds also included a shortened quotation earlier at 186.
“Spender’s letter to Casey, 25 June 1952, Spender Papers, box 1, fol. 3, MS4875, NLA,” quoted in 86
Lowe, Australian Between Empires, 146. See also David Lowe, “Spender, Sir Percy Claude (1897–1985),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, ANU, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/spender-sir-percy-claude-15475 (published in hardcopy 2012; accessed online 25 January 2015).
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ICBM, R–7(8K71), and the first earth-orbiting satellite, Sputnik 1, that triggered the
space race. Significantly, the ICBM development demonstrated that the US mainland
was no longer immune to a Soviet nuclear attack. This coincided with the period, as
noted above, when Australian policymakers had begun to concentrate on American
interests and strategy, and appreciate the notion of extended nuclear deterrence. These
developments “made Washington’s perceived commitment to the defense [sic] of its
allies much less credible” as Australian policymakers believed the US would be much
more reluctant to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia now that
American cities were vulnerable to nuclear attack. A major dilemma facing US 87
planners during this period was “how to reassure the allies over the American strategic
guarantee without at the same time encouraging nuclear proliferation.” For as the 88
well-known British Labour politician, and later Secretary of State for Defence (1964–
70) and Chancellor of the Exchequer (1974–79), Denis Healey, stated: “America’s allies
are unlikely to accept the new policy of limited atomic war unless they have the
appropriate atomic weapons in their own possession and under their own control.” The 89
US response was to place greater emphasis on designing nuclear strategy for continental
defence and deterring conflict in Europe, which was also a setback for Australia. 90
In some respects, cooperation with the US in the nuclear field continued to look
challenging for Australia by 1958. In April, US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles,
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 6, and also 24 and 33. For discussion on the effect of Sputnik on NATO 87
members, see Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 61. Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 80.88
“Denis Healey, ‘The Sputnik and Western Defense,’ [sic] Address at Chatham House, December 17, 89
International Affairs 44, no. 2 (1957): 148–149” quoted in Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 33–4. Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 18.90
! 149
delivered a statement to the US Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which resulted in a
discussion on the possibility of additional states acquiring a nuclear capability. Dulles,
in response to a question, was plain-spoken about Australia’s potential to do so.
According to an Australian Associated Press journalist, who attended the hearing and
provided a report on it to the Australian Embassy in Washington, Dulles stated that the
US was most unlikely to extend nuclear weapons technology to Australia. Dulles was
also reported to have said that Australia was closer to possessing the “necessary
technical knowledge” to develop weapons. However, Dulles noted that this was very
different from actually making and testing them, and for that, “I do not think they have
the financial resources,” Dulles stated. The Secretary of State also made it clear that
only states that already had achieved a nuclear weapons capability would be given
nuclear information, which effectively restricted information to the UK. 91
Despite the limitations imposed by the McMahon Act and US policy, atomic
information sharing between the US and Australia began to improve. This is perhaps
attributable to the Soviet launch of an ICBM and Sputnik, which, by providing the UK
with the opportunity to persuade the US to pool resources in order to meet the Soviet
technological threat, had paved the way for the restoration of American-British nuclear
information sharing. Australia received its first batch of information under the new 92
Defence Agreement when Australians officials were invited to observe the Eniwetok
NAA: A1209, 1957/4067, inward cablegram (I.6158), Australian Embassy, Washington, to Department 91
of External Affairs, 18 April 1958. On the influence of the Soviet ICBM and Sputnik on American-British nuclear information sharing, see 92
Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries: Prime Minister and After, 1957–66, Peter Catterall, ed. (London: Macmillan, 2011), xxxi and 64.
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“Hardtack” tests. Additionally, access to US nuclear weapons looked more promising 93
for Australia. Later that year, Scherger held discussions with his American counterpart,
Chief of Air Staff, General Thomas White, who informed him that the US had a variety
of tactical bombs ranging from five to 50 kilotons, and that a one kiloton weapon would
soon be tested. White privately told Scherger that he would be “quite happy to see a 94
cross-section of such bombs stored in Australia under American control and available
for use by us [Australia] with American agreement.” White however, had no authority to
make Scherger an offer. According to Stephens, “as White’s position was strictly 95
personal and contrary to official United States policy it carried no authority.” 96
Nevertheless, a US nuclear weapons store was apparently discussed at the ANZUS
meeting in March 1959. Reynolds noted that although the Australian archival record is
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 206. Twenty-two tests were conducted at Eniwetok 93
Atoll (now spelt Enewetak Atoll) in the Pacific as part of Operation Hardtack I between May and August 1958. The first 11 tests were carried out as Operation Newsreel. Of the 22 tests, 19 were conducted for weapons related purposes, two to evaluate weapons effects on targets, and one was a safety experiment. The US conducted a total of 77 nuclear tests that year, making 1958 the busiest to date. It concluded with Eisenhower entering into a unilateral testing moratorium on 31 October with the understanding that the Soviet Union also would refrain from testing. In September 1961, the Soviet Union resumed testing and the US followed suit: “United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945 through September 1992,” United States Department of Energy, Nevada Operations Office, Las Vegas, Nevada, December 2000, http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/publications/historical/DOENV_209_REV15.pdf (accessed 8 August 2015), vii, xi, 10–3, and 158–9.
Stephens, Going Solo, 367.94
“NAA: A7942, N78 Part 1, Scherger, note to File, 16 October 1958; and NAA: A1945 6/5/10, 13 95
November 1958,” quoted in Lax, From Controversy to Cutting Edge, 12. See also Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 206.
Stephens, Going Solo, 367.96
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classified, the US record reveals that such a store was contemplated as part of the
general distribution of the US nuclear arsenal. 97
Around this time, the Eisenhower Administration also indicated it was open to ‘nuclear
sharing’ and had started stationing tactical nuclear weapons throughout Europe under
NATO. Some US officials had considered installing nuclear weapons in Australia. In 98
1958, Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs from 1956–60,
Marshall Green, proposed stationing American ICBMs on Australian territory. 99 100
However, Leah who documented this proposal did not discuss it further. Nonetheless,
this limited information illustrates that nuclear sharing arrangements under Eisenhower,
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 206. At the NATO heads of government meeting in 97
December 1957, it was decided that a nuclear stockpile for NATO was to be established in case NATO forces needed access to nuclear weapons in a conflict with Warsaw Pact forces. Under this arrangement, the North Atlantic Council would authorise the release of NATO’s stockpiled warheads that would be matched to delivery systems already deployed to allies. The concept was developed in response to calls from France, over which it received allied support, for the US to supply NATO members with nuclear weapons (France had announced at a ministerial meeting of the Council a year earlier that it was pursuing its own nuclear arsenal). This would require the US to revise the McMahon Act, which restricted the provision of nuclear weapons technology and information to other countries. The stockpile concept, however, apparently avoided the need for revision because the warheads would remain in complete US ownership, custody, and control. The concept was also seen as a major step towards the European request and a way of planning for the deployment and use of weapons that US forces were already stockpiling in Europe: Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, 67 and 75–6. Perhaps the prospect of a stockpile of US nuclear weapons in Australia influenced the Government’s subsequent decisions regarding the procurement of nuclear-capable delivery systems, specifically, missiles and aircraft, discussed later in this section.
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 2. According to Julian Schofield, “Nuclear sharing is the deliberate or 98
permissive transfer between a donor and a recipient state of resources that facilitate a military nuclear capability, with the intention of affecting a change in the strategic environment of the international system, or for the purpose of bartering for vital resources”: Strategic Nuclear Sharing, Global Issues Series (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 2. For an excellent account of NATO nuclear sharing and negotiations from 1957–60 for missile deployments in Europe (the UK, Italy, and Turkey each agreed to station missiles on their territory, which required revisions to the McMahon Act), see Schwartz, NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas, ch.4. On NATO nuclear sharing in the 1950s and 1960s, see also: Schofield, Strategic Nuclear Sharing, ch.9; and Andreas Wenger, Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), ch.4, and more generally, Parts II and III.
From 1963–65, Green was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, and from 1969–73, 99
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific. He was US Ambassador to Australia from 1973–75: Marshall Green interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 13 December 1988 (initial interview date), transcript, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, Virginia, http://adst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/Green-Marshall.pdf (accessed 22 July 2015), 26 and 118. For an excellent account of Green’s contribution to the US foreign service, see Kent G. Sieg, “Marshall Green (1916– )” in Notable U.S. Ambassadors since 1775: A Biographical Dictionary, e-book edn., Cathal J. Nolan, ed. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1997), 117–123.
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 25–6 and 154, n.79.100
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which are associated with NATO and Europe, were originally considered to have a
broader geographical application, and that the notion of a nuclear capability for
Australia was not always generated by the Australian Government. While it is beyond
the scope of this thesis, Green’s proposal, and the reactions of the American and
Australian governments to it, are highly worthy of further research, particularly in light
of Barwick and Tange’s subsequent discussion during the Cuban Crisis about Australia
potentially hosting US nuclear weapons on its territory in the future.
Official documents in support of an Australian nuclear capability often referred to
NATO developments, and therefore “the actions of NATO countries appear to have had
a profound impact on nuclear thinking in Australia.” This interest in, and belief that it 101
should be part of, the general Western deterrent system continued into the subsequent
period. For Australian officials, nuclear sharing appeared to confirm that nuclear 102
weapons would become an integral part of modern warfare and that “any self-respecting
advanced, industrialized country would have its own atomic arsenal.” They also
believed that nuclear weapons would spread and have a greater role in the force
structures of the US and the UK. As the Defence Committee noted in 1958, modern
weapons systems had become so complex and expensive that unless nuclear warheads
were integrated for maximum effectiveness, they could not be justified. 103
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 2.101
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 44. Evidence of Australia’s interest in nuclear sharing and bases for 102
ICBMs in Europe from 1961–64, she noted, can be found in NAA: A1945, 186/4/29, “United States Proposals for Nuclear Detection Installations in Australia – Project High Noon,” 1961–1964: ibid., 158, n52.
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 2.103
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The influence of NATO developments on the Australian Government was demonstrated
in September 1958 when, according to Reynolds, Menzies suggested to the US that
Australia be given a “key to the cupboard.” This would enable Australia to draw on 104
the US nuclear weapons stockpile as the situation required. Reynolds concluded that 105
under this arrangement, the US would supply Australia with tactical nuclear weapons if
there was conflict in the Pacific. However, it seems that the Australian Government 106
was also influenced in this regard by the UK. Walsh stated that British Prime Minister,
Harold Macmillan, told Menzies at the beginning of that year (29 January 1958) that the
US did want any more nuclear powers, and that the UK eventually intended to depend
on American nuclear weapons via a “key to the cupboard” arrangement. This was a 107
clear signal to Australia of the dominance of the US in the nuclear field and, more
generally, the diminishing role and status of the UK. Although acquiring nuclear
weapons from the US or UK appeared unlikely, the Chiefs of Staff of the armed services
nonetheless maintained the view in 1959 that “Australia should seek to acquire nuclear
weapons, either under our own control or by some arrangement whereby we could be
assured that nuclear weapons would be available for our defense [sic].” The US 108
continued to provide Australia with some atomic information. Between November 1959
and December 1960, it received information on the feasibility of arming RAAF
Canberra aircraft with USAF Mark 7 atomic bombs, copies of US aircrew manuals for
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 206.104
Here I draw on Walsh’s definition of this type of arrangement: “Surprise Down Under,” 16, n.28.105
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 206.106
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 4. Walsh did not discuss this approach to the US and Reynolds did not 107
elaborate. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, this is another instance in Australia’s nuclear history that is highly worthy of further research.
“Memo from H.D. Anderson, Defense [sic] Liaison Branch to Mr. Heydon, External Affairs, July 8, 108
1959, ‘Australian Development of Nuclear Weapons and Australian Access to Information on Nuclear Weapons,’ NAA: A1838/269, TS680-10-1,” quoted in Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 48.
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weapons delivery, and instructions for maintaining "special stores” (a euphemism for
nuclear weapons). 109
By 1960, Australia was in the market for missiles to secure its northern defences. 110
British Defence Minister Duncan Sandys’ April 1957 White Paper, widely considered
the key document relating to a debate over air defence systems, stated the likely
dominance of missiles and the associated demise of manned aircraft. According to
Stephens, time has shown that Sandys’ claims were overstated. However, at the time,
Sandys’ Paper was convincing and contributed to confusion over force structure,
including within Australia’s RAAF, which “shifted its priority from aircraft to missiles
then back to aircraft.” When the RAAF reviewed the structure of the air defence 111
system in 1959,
the Air Staff stated that the basis of a modern air defence system was the surface-to-air guided weapon [(SAGW)], augmented by manned fighters and that ultimately a number of SAGW squadrons would be needed for the air defence of Australia. 112
Missiles would be prioritised over manned aircraft for air defence until the
mid-1960s. 113
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 206. Reynolds erroneously referred in the text to the 109
United States Army Air Force (USAAF) instead of the USAF, which has been inserted here. The USAAF was abolished in 1947 and the USAF was its immediate successor: “Guide to Federal Records: Records of the Army Air Forces [AAF],” National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/018.html (accessed 10 June 2015).
Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 65.110
Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, 143.111
Ibid., 144. Emphasis in original.112
Ibid.113
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The American Nike and the British Bloodhound were the two missile options that had
been narrowed down and were under consideration by the Departments of Air and
Defence in 1960. According to Walsh, British records reveal that the Australians
favoured Nike because it was nuclear-capable and more affordable, but following
British reassurances that Bloodhound would include a nuclear-capable missile (Mark
III) and, unlike Nike, would be upgraded over time, they were eventually persuaded and
opted for Bloodhound. But before the year was out, the British Treasury terminated
Mark III, despite vehement and unsuccessful protests from Defence officials that
Australia bought into Bloodhound precisely because it included a nuclear missile. 114
In November 1962 the Bloodhound Mark I—the non-nuclear version—entered into
Australian service with the RAAF. But by 1964, it was already obsolescent and, 115
“being limited to one role, represented poor security cost-effectiveness” compared to
the flexibility that aircraft could provide. Consequently, the Air Force reversed its
policy. Nevertheless, in what seems more of a coincidence than a deliberate measure, 116
the Menzies Government had shored-up its northern defences with SAGWs in the
immediate aftermath of the Cuban Crisis.
Although this example centres on Australian-British cooperation over missile
procurement, it is relevant to Barwick and Tange’s discussion during the Cuban Crisis
Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 65.114
It entered RAAF service with No. 30 Squadron: Stephens, Power Plus Attitude, 161, n.172.115
Ibid., 144.116
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for five reasons. First, Barwick and Tange’s discussion about the potential effects of US
offensive weapons and bases on Australian soil, which was prompted by the installation
of Soviet missiles and bases in Cuba with which they draw direct comparisons,
indicates that this phrase encompassed US nuclear warheads and missiles. Prior to 1959,
air defence policy prioritised aircraft over missiles, as shown in this preceding
discussion, and thus nuclear weapons acquisition—and much of the historiography on it
for that matter—has focused on the delivery of atomic bombs by aircraft. Barwick and
Tange’s discussion therefore reflects the air defence policy of the period. Second, while
there are clear differences between procuring nuclear-capable missiles and
contemplating hosting nuclear missiles, it demonstrates that Australia had previously
considered possessing nuclear-capable missiles. Third, it specifies Australian interest in
American nuclear-capable missiles. Fourth, it provides for the possibility that Barwick
and Tange contemplated hosting US nuclear weapons because Australia was still locked
into Bloodhound but without a nuclear-capable missile, which was apparently the
reason it pursued procuring the defence materiel in the first place. Fifth, the installation
of missiles on Australia’s northern shores is noteworthy in terms of how it relates to the
potential affect US nuclear weapons on Australian soil could have on Indonesia, which
is discussed later in this section.
Stephens wrote that from 1960 there was a change in Western attitudes towards the use
of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia. Exploiting advanced technology and weaponry
had earlier seemed the only response to overwhelming Communist manpower,
particularly in China as noted later in this chapter, now there were other considerations.
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Analysts believed that the Soviet Union had likely agreed to provide China with tactical
nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, which might have influenced the West in
terms of a first nuclear strike. Also, supposedly well-trained and well-equipped local
troops in Southeast Asian countries courtesy of American military aid programmes were
thought to have to some extent offset the manpower advantage held by the Communists,
and thus the West’s need to resort to nuclear weapons. Consequently, Australia’s
Washington Embassy advised Canberra that with regards to the effect this had on the
military balance, “there had undoubtedly been a shift in American thinking towards
placing greater emphasis on conventional forces and capabilities, and that considerable
doubt now existed over the use of tactical nuclear weapons.” Nevertheless, Australian 117
interest in acquiring nuclear weapons persisted.
In September 1961, Australia came very close to asking the US for nuclear weapons.
This was prompted by negotiations on a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) between the
nuclear weapons states: the US, the UK, and the Soviet Union. Earlier in the NTBT
negotiations, the Soviet Union had demanded that it cover listening posts in Australia in
light of it having hosted British nuclear tests. With the talks stalled, the UK asked
Australia if it could offer listening posts to the Soviets in an attempt to restart the
negotiations. The Australian Government believed that a NTBT could limit its 118
options for a nuclear capability. On 13 June 1961, Menzies submitted to Cabinet that 119
Stephens, Going Solo, 367–8.117
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 8–9.118
There are strong parallels here with the concerns of subsequent coalition governments about the 119
potential effect of the NPT on Australia’s nuclear ambitions. See: Walsh, “Unbuilt Bombs,” 78–8; Wilson, “Conflicting Interests,” passim, especially 111 regarding the Government’s secret relief over the collapse of early treaty negotiations between the superpowers in 1964–65; and Hubbard, “From Ambivalence to Influence,” passim.
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Australia should seek from the UK an agreement for nuclear weapons on-demand in
exchange for joining the NTBT. The PM proposed that Australia:
secure now from the United Kingdom recognition of an obligation to allow Australia the right of access to United Kingdom nuclear weapon ‘know how’ (or preferably … the right to draw on the U.K. nuclear weapons stockpile) in the event of important countries in the general Pacific and India [sic] Ocean areas acquiring nuclear capability. 120
Here, Menzies’ preference for procurement over indigenous development likely
reflected his predilection for the status quo of keeping nuclear weapons in the hands of
great powers (discussed later in this section) and defence on the cheap given
procurement was the more cost effective option. With the backing of Cabinet, 121
Menzies replied to Macmillan that the UK “either supply ‘full manufacturing data for
the production of operational weapons’ or ‘a more practical arrangement… for the
supply of ready-made weapons’.” Macmillan replied that, due to British-American 122
agreements, he could not meet Australia’s request without first consulting the US, but
offered to do so on Australia’s behalf. Following Macmillan’s response on 14 August
1961, Cabinet proceeded with its strategy to send the US the same request. But it
stopped delivery of the letter to Secretary of State Rusk, which was due to arrive in the
first week of September, when the Soviet Union resumed atmospheric testing on 1
September 1961. Although the superpowers continued to partake in NTBT negotiations,
an agreement appeared unlikely. Consequently, listening posts and the threat to
“[NAA:] A5818/2; Robert Menzies to the Cabinet, Nuclear Tests Conference: Control Posts in 120
Australia, Submission No. 1156, V6, p.13 (Secret),” quoted in Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 8. On the estimated high financial cost of developing a nuclear weapon, see Lax, From Controversy to 121
Cutting Edge, 12. “[NAA:] A1838/269, TS852/10/4/2/3; Letter from Prime Minister Menzies to Prime Minister 122
Macmillan, June 29, 1961, p.2 (Secret),” quoted in Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 8.
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Australia’s nuclear ambitions had been avoided. In his reply to Macmillan on 6 123
September 1961, Menzies recognised the limitations posed by the British-American
agreements and suggested that he defer lobbying the Americans until “circumstances are
more propitious.” 124
The US continued to share information on nuclear weapons with Australia in 1962. The
USAF sent Australia the staff officers’ field manual on the use of nuclear weapons, and
the Australian Army received information that enabled it to plan war games involving
tactical nuclear weapons. And of course, in October, Barwick and Tange 125
contemplated the effect the Cuban Crisis could have on Australia if in the future it
hosted US nuclear weapons on its territory.
Walsh stated that from September 1961 to October 1964, “it appears that the Australian
government took no additional steps to acquire access to nuclear weapons or weapons
information.” Reynolds has since demonstrated that Australia acquired access to 126
some nuclear weapons information in 1962. In terms of nuclear weapons acquisition,
this hiatus occurred in what Walsh described as “the attempted procurement phase”
from 1956–63, which preceded “the indigenous capability phase” from late 1964–72; 127
Australian officials seriously contemplated an indigenous nuclear capability in the wake
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 8–9.123
“PRO: DO 164/17; Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office from Canberra, No. 808, 124
September 6, 1961 (Top Secret),” quoted in Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 9. Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 207.125
Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 72.126
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 1, emphasis in original, and passim.127
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of the Chinese nuclear test and the first substantive steps by the British to withdraw
their forces from Asia. Oddly, Walsh’s attempted procurement phase covers a period 128
for which he claimed that the Government made no effort to acquire nuclear weapons.
More significant, however, is that Walsh’s conclusion and the dearth of scholarship on
Australia’s nuclear history for the period 1961–64, has left readers to infer that the
Australian Government had lost interest in acquiring nuclear weapons at that time, that
is, following its approach to the British during the NTBT negotiations. Luke Auton
drew that conclusion. In his doctoral dissertation completed just over a decade later, he
stated:
This illustrates that although it had concerns about limitations being placed on its options, the Australian government was not at this stage interested in the possession of nuclear weapons—an otherwise concerted effort towards such a goal would not have stopped at that point. 129
Auton confused the Government’s pause in its attempts to acquire allied nuclear
weapons after the NTBT negotiations collapsed with disinterest in their possession.
However, Tange’s minute suggests otherwise. The discussion on it in this thesis is
therefore highly significant to Australia’s nuclear historiography for two reasons. This
section of the thesis has shown that elements within Australian governments
demonstrated an interest in acquiring US nuclear weapons for Australia from 1954–61.
Thus, Barwick and Tange’s discussion during the Cuban Crisis of Australia potentially
hosting US nuclear weapons on its territory demonstrates that an interest in US nuclear
weapons continued into 1962. After all, had there been no interest in acquiring a nuclear
Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 73 and 300.128
Luke Thomas Auton, “‘A Sort of Middle of the Road Policy’: Forward Defence, Alliance Politics and 129
the Australian Nuclear Weapons Option, 1953–1973” (PhD diss., University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, 2008), 265. Emphasis added. I am grateful to Lachlan Clohesy for sharing with me this dissertation.
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capability for Australia, then the issue of foreign bases would not have been considered
by Australian officials in determining the Government’s policy on the crisis. Also, the
fact that this interest continued means that the Government’s decision in 1963 to
purchase the F-111, now appears less incongruous in the chronology of Australia’s 130
nuclear history, which as has been noted, is focused overwhelmingly on Australia’s
attempts to acquire British nuclear weapons. That is, until now there has been a
disconnect in the published literature between the unsuccessful approach to the UK and
subsequent cancelled approach to the US for nuclear weapons in 1961—which is
separated by an inferred lack of interest in acquiring nuclear weapons during the hiatus
from 1961–63—and the decision to purchase an American nuclear-capable aircraft in
1963. Tange’s minute overcomes this disconnect by providing evidence of a 131
continuing interest in US nuclear weapons throughout this period.
Menzies announced the decision in Parliament on 24 October 1963: CPD, House, 24 October 1963, 130
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1963-10-24/0140/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 26 July 2015). For more on the Government’s decision to purchase the aircraft, see Hanno Weisbrod, “Australia’s Decision to Buy the F-111,” The Australian Quarterly 41, no. 2 (1969): 7–27. For detailed accounts of the F-111 in Australian service, see: Lax, From Controversy to Cutting Edge; and Stewart Wilson, The Lincoln, Canberra & F-111, In Australian Service, Australian Air Power Collection, vol. 3 (Weston Creek, ACT: Aerospace Publications, 1989), 127–84.
In the 1963 search for a Canberra replacement, another nuclear-capable aircraft, the British TSR2, was 131
considered. In a meeting of Australian and British Defence Ministers in July 1961, the Australian representative was reported to have stated that “‘if Australia were to buy the T.S.R.II,’ it wanted ‘to be sure that nuclear weapons would be available’ as well”: “[NAUK:] DO 35/8287; Memo from N. Pritchard, [Acting Deputy Under-Secretary of State, CRO], to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, July 20, 1961, pp.1–2,” quoted in Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 64. It is unknown whether Townley negotiated access to US nuclear weapons as part of Australia’s decision to purchase the F-111, but this is worthy of further research. Certainly, the nuclear-capability of the American aircraft was not lost on key Australian officials: see the diaries of Minister for Air (1964–68), Peter Howson, The Howson Diaries: The Life of Politics, Don Aitkin, ed. (Ringwood, Victoria: Viking Press, 1984), 386; and Ambassador to the US (1958–64), Howard Beale, This Inch of Time, 170. While Beale, unlike Howson, was not explicit about the nuclear capability of the F-111, this conclusion can be elicited from his discussion of what would constitute a suitable replacement aircraft, particularly given his openness to nuclear weapons at that time: ibid., 87.
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Tange’s minute is further evidence of Australian officials having an interest in hosting
nuclear weapons. As noted earlier, Cawte and Leah only briefly mentioned two other 132
examples, and scholars have ignored the concept of hosting altogether. Instead,
Australia’s nuclear ambitions have been framed as a dichotomy: procure weapons from
allies, particularly the UK, or build an indigenous arsenal. The two phases defined by
Walsh (noted above) are a clear example of this dichotomy, and have been adopted by
other scholars. However, Barwick and Tange’s discussion on the possibility of hosting
nuclear weapons, and Cawte and Leah’s examples, sit outside this framework. This
thesis proposes that the way in which scholars have framed Australian nuclear history,
including Australian nuclear identity, therefore needs to be reconsidered to include the
concept of hosting nuclear weapons. 133
In his doctoral research, Walsh discovered that individuals and their ability to form
coalitions significantly influences nuclear decision-making, in terms of both nuclear
proliferation and nuclear restraint. Whether others within the Government had an 134
interest in hosting US nuclear weapons in 1962, and whether this led to any decision-
This is a form of nuclear sharing within Schofield’s definition; see n.98.132
The study on Australian nuclear identity is Leah and Lyon, “Three visions of the bomb.” Leah and 133
Lyon claimed that three visions—essentially, ideals and frameworks about nuclear weapons—characterise Australian nuclear identity: the “Menzian,” “Gortonian,” and “disarmer” visions, the first two being named after PMs they believed best outlined the central tenets of the position. In addition to inherent problems with their framework (such as the inaccuracy that arises from labelling these visions after PMs, especially the Menzian vision; the absence of scholarship on the formation of identity; their reliance on public policy statements to the exclusion of archival records and the related historiography on Australian nuclear ambitions; and their use of evidence out of its historical context), the concept of hosting does not fit within it. At best, and despite these other issues, it would sit between the first and second visions, so described, of nuclear weapons remaining in the hands of great powers and Australia’s need for its own nuclear capability. While the authors referred to a statement made in 1995 by Australian Prime Minister from 1991–96, Paul Keating, as an example of “a relatively rare and somewhat uncomfortable attempt to straddle two of the visions,” hosting is another example that illustrates that this straddling of visions is not indeed rare, and instead, indicates that there are inherent problems with their framework: ibid., 471. I am grateful to Lyndon Burford, with whom I discussed this article at length, for his input on Australian nuclear identity in relation to the concept of hosting.
Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” passim.134
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making outcomes, requires further investigation beyond the scope of this thesis. But the
fact that it was Barwick and Tange who considered the potential effect of the crisis on
Australia’s nuclear ambitions, that is, the two most senior officials of the Department of
External Affairs, is nonetheless highly significant. It is also worth recalling here another
External Affairs official, Spender, and his advocacy for a nuclear weapons capability for
Australia. Yet Walsh wrote that Australia’s nuclear decision-making story can generally
be understood as “a contest between two powerful coalitions: the military and the
civilian atomic energy agency pushing the nuclear weapons option and the combined
forces of the Department of External Affairs and Treasury opposing it.” Also, in his 135
study on Australia and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
Christopher Hubbard detailed how External Affairs led the push for the Treaty’s
signature against vehement opposition from ‘the bomb lobby’, describing the
Department as “anti-nuclear.” While there is no doubt that several individuals in the 136
military, particularly the Air Force, and the Australian Atomic Energy Commission
(AAEC) were the strongest advocates for a nuclear weapons capability, and that other
individuals within External Affairs later provided leadership on the NPT, these claims
are not representative of the Department, or at the very least, the positions put forth by
some of its most senior officials up to that point. In his book on Australia’s nuclear
ambitions, former Australian diplomat Richard Broinowski wrote that “The battle lines
Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 14. Emphasis added.135
Hubbard, “From Ambivalence to Influence,” 529, 535 and 541. Australian nuclear weapons 136
proponents that made-up the ‘bomb lobby’ included right-wing parliamentarians, mainly those in the coalition and the Democratic Labor Party; nuclear physicists at the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), especially Baxter; military leaders, for example, Scherger and Rear Admiral G. J. B. Crabb; and elements within the Departments of Defence, National Development, and Supply, as well as Prime Minister and Cabinet under Prime Minister John Gorton: ibid., 540–1; and Broinowski, Fact or Fission?, 52–3.
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were not drawn so much between ministers or departments, as amongst them.” 137
Sweeping statements about External Affairs and Australian post-war nuclear ambitions
are therefore inaccurate and misleading.
In order to help further contextualise this discussion on the significance of Tange’s
minute to Australia’s nuclear history, it is also worth noting some broader observations
about the historiography, specifically: the dearth of scholarship on the period 1961–63;
the lack of integration of this literature with studies on Australian foreign and defence
policy and military history; and its general complexity. In terms of the gaps in the
historiography, Reynolds acknowledged in Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb the
challenges that come with researching subjects involving nuclear weapons given the
limitations placed on the archival record:
Research has obviously been a significant problem on an issue such as this. Working on defence and foreign affairs files on issues such as atomic weapons has more in common with archaeology than with contemporary history. Much has been classified and only scattered fragments are available to the public researcher. I have not been able to see many key files … All that is left is to discern a pattern from the fragments left in various archives and personal papers. 138
Broinowski, Fact or Fission?, 48. Emphasis in original. Broinowski’s account concentrates on the role 137
of the Department of External Affairs (later the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)) and those who served it in shaping Australia’s nuclear policies and activities. Although he did not set out to provide an ‘insider’s perspective’, Broinowski had a long career with External Affairs having joined the Department in 1963. He held a variety of positions during his postings to Tokyo (1965), Rangoon (1970–1), Tehran (1972–3), and Manila (1975–77). From 1979–82, he was the Executive Director of the Japan Secretariat in Canberra. Broinowski was Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1983–85), the Republic of Korea (1987–89), and Mexico, with concurrent accreditation to the Central American Republics and Cuba (from 1994). He was also General Manager of Radio Australia from 1990–91. Since retiring from DFAT in 1997, Broinowski has held academic appointments: “Richard Broinowski: President of AIIA NSW,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/about-us/our-people/richard-broinowski/ (accessed 8 October 2015). Leah also acknowledged that many within External Affairs lobbied ardently for an Australian nuclear capability: Australia and the Bomb, 48.
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, vii.138
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This is evidenced by the sparse and scattered nature of the declassified material
available on Australian interest in US nuclear weapons. Significant gaps in Australia’s
nuclear historiography also indicate that there is much more to explore. Despite the
centrality of nuclear weapons to the Cuban Crisis, scholars of Australia’s nuclear history
had not thought to examine the Government’s reaction to, and policy on, the situation. It
is likely that there are other issues with a nuclear dimension awaiting investigation.
Moreover, studies pertaining to the period in which Australian governments had nuclear
ambitions—including those on Australian foreign and defence policy, military history,
and the memoirs and biographies of Australian officials—have either overlooked or
inadequately addressed nuclear issues (on both energy and weapons). For example, 139
the official histories of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts from 1948–
75, which deal with the political, social, diplomatic, and military aspects of Australia’s
commitments, do not discuss the nation’s relationship with nuclear weapons or its
nuclear ambitions. This is despite the emphasis in these official histories on the
influence that the strategic environment and alliance dynamics had on the development
and implementation of defence policy. These were also factors underlying Australian
interest in either acquiring or developing a nuclear capability. This oversight is made all
the more astonishing by the fact that the authors of these histories had unrestricted
Broinowski made this point in 2003 regarding the scholarship relating to Australian foreign policy 139
having stated that “An analysis of Australia’s nuclear diplomacy is clearly overdue”: Fact or Fission?, 1. Also in 2003, Reynolds stated that a vast amount of Australian military history after World War II is concerned with what happened—and to whom—and what is lacking is an assessment of Australian strategic outlook. Australian scholars, he claimed, have not engaged with the broader issues that confronted the US or the UK in the post-war period, such as nuclear strategy and deterrence. Thus, Reynolds argued that what is needed is an integration of government planning on what was unknown with the operational aspects of the nation’s military history: Wayne Reynolds, “On Writing About Australian Military History after the Second World War: The Need for Integration,” Australian Historical Studies 121 (2003): 169–71.
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access to all relevant Australian government records and the availability of, at the very
least, Cawte’s landmark study to which none of them referred. Consequently, 140
Australia’s relationship with the bomb, rather than being dealt with as another aspect of
Australia’s foreign and defence policy, has become a niche area of study that is under-
represented in the broader and official Australian political narrative.
Cawte’s Atomic Australia was published in 1992. The first volume in that official histories series, 140
Edwards’ Crises and Commitments, was also published that year and therefore could not have engaged with her study. Edwards, who is also the general editor of the series, nonetheless had unrestricted access to relevant Australian government records. Despite this, Edwards made no mention of Australian governments’ interest in a nuclear capability, even when he discussed the 1962 Strategic Basis paper outlined earlier: Edwards, Crises and Commitments, 247–8 and passim. In the subsequent official history, To Long Tan, which was published only a year after Cawte’s study, McNeill mentioned in passing that training scenarios in the early 1950s, as well as annual exercises based on the Strategic Basis papers conducted by the Chief of the General Staff from 1957–60, envisaged the possible use of nuclear weapons. (Atomic weapons were not included in the 1964 exercise and McNeill did not stipulate if their possible use was contemplated in the 1961–63 exercises). However, McNeill’s discussion of these exercises was to illustrate the emphasis on Southeast Asia in Australian strategic thinking, its effects on the Army, and that these exercises came remarkably close to predicting the circumstances in which combat forces were committed to Vietnam; he did not discuss Australian nuclear strategic thinking or ambitions: Ian McNeill, To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War 1950–1966. The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1993), 4, 10–13 and 14. The other official histories in that series that were published after Cawte’s study, do not cite her work nor later examples in the historiography, nor make any reference whatsoever to Australian nuclear weapons ambitions: Brendan G. O’Keefe, Medicine at War: Medical aspects of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asia 1950–1972. Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1994); Chris Coulthard-Clark, The RAAF in Vietnam: Australian Air Involvement in the Vietnam War 1962-1975. Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1995); Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966. Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1996); P.G. Edwards, A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War 1965-1975. Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1997); Jeffrey Grey, Up Top: The Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955–1972. Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1998); Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War 1967-1968. Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 2003); Ashley Ekins with Ian McNeill, Fighting to the Finish: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War, 1968-1975 (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2012). Given the emphasis in these texts on Australia’s strategic environment and defence capabilities in the post-war period, that the official histories do not even acknowledge Australian governments’ nuclear weapons ambitions is remarkable. Furthermore, Edwards’ 2014 study on Australia and the Vietnam conflict, which is based on this official histories series and is therefore broader than the title suggests, also does not engage with the extensive historiography on Australia’s nuclear weapons ambitions available to it (cited at n.11); Edwards simply made a single, passing reference to Gorton’s interest in an Australian nuclear capability: Peter Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War (Sydney: NewSouth Publishing, 2014), 193.
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Additionally, as Leah rightly articulated, “Australia’s relationship with nuclear weapons
is complex, ambiguous, distant, and multilayered.” Her observation may partly 141
explain the stark differences in views in the historiography, which reflect the various
disciplinary approaches and diverging theoretical perspectives of scholars. This has, as
Luke Auton aptly stated and demonstrated, “complicated our understanding of the most
fundamental of issues.” Consequently, the scholarship is challenging with which to 142
engage, and integrate with other research, but it is not impossible. Auton acknowledged
that these diverse opinions and new perspectives in the historiography have nonetheless
resulted in “a more balanced representation of the salient facts.” This, he concluded, 143
is the most important development thus far; “because Australia is so routinely
referenced as both a potential proliferant and model of nuclear restraint, the more
comprehensive the historiographical basis for discerning its previous nuclear intent, the
better.” However, it is clear that there is still much to be clarified and discovered 144
about Australia’s Cold War nuclear ambitions, particularly in terms of their effect on the
Australian-American alliance in the early 1960s.
Tange and Barwick’s consideration of Australia hypothetically hosting American
nuclear weapons aligns with the Defence Committee’s appreciation in 1962 of a nuclear
capability for Australia. Significantly, Tange, in his capacity as Secretary of External
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, viii.141
Auton, “Opaque Proliferation,” 567.142
Ibid. Auton’s views are a strong example of the diverse opinions and new perspectives in the 143
historiography with which he is at odds. Auton, who focused on nuclear weapons acquisition (procurement), argued that Australia simply wanted to give the impression that it wanted such weapons to achieve policy objectives, specifically, to maintain an allied presence in its region and induce its allies to increase its defence efforts there. He claimed it was never interested in possessing nuclear weapons. This is contrary to the consensus position that Australia sought a nuclear weapon capability and for military purposes: Auton, “‘A Sort of Middle of the Road Policy’,” abstract (unnumbered), 4, 262–3, and passim.
Auton, “Opaque Proliferation,” 567.144
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Affairs, was a member of that Committee. His civilian company included: E.W. Hicks,
Secretary of Defence, who also chaired the Committee; Bunting as Secretary of the
Prime Minister’s Department; and C.L.S. Hewitt, then Acting Secretary of the
Department of Treasury. The services were represented by: Chairman of the Chiefs of
Staff Committee, Air Marshal Scherger; Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice Admiral 145
Henry Burrell; Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Reginald Pollard; and
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Hancock. In January 1962, the Defence 146
Committee endorsed an updated “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy” paper. It
had not formally reviewed Australia’s strategic environment and capability options
since 1958, having endorsed its last policy paper in January 1959. In the 1962 paper, 147
the Defence Committee made the following statement regarding Australia and nuclear
weapons:
The acquisition of a nuclear capability by Australian forces would vastly increase our defensive and offensive strength and would also enhance the value of our contribution in operations under collective arrangements. Moreover, in the future some weapon systems will be dependent on nuclear warheads for their effectiveness. 148
The Defence Committee then clarified that in light of the security provided by
Australia’s treaty arrangements, notably ANZUS (discussed later in this chapter), in
By virtue of this position, Scherger was Australia’s chief military representative to meetings on 145
ANZUS, SEATO and ANZAM. He was also Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee. In March 1965 while still in this role, Scherger was promoted to the rank of Air Chief Marshal. He was the first member of the RAAF and the first Duntroon graduate to receive this promotion: Rayner, Scherger, 144, 148, 149 and 170.
NAA: A4311, 698/2, Minute by the Defence Committee at meeting on 25 January 1962, 26 January 146
1962. The Secretaries of the Prime Minister’s Department, and the Departments of External Affairs and Treasury, became members of the Defence Committee from 1957: Menzies, CPD, House, 4 April 1957, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1957-04-04/0113/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 20 July 2015), 6.
Frühling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945, ix.147
NAA: A4311, 698/2, “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” endorsed by Defence Committee, 148
25 January 1962, 21, para. 67.
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which the US is nuclear-armed, there was “no immediate requirement for an
independent Australian nuclear capability.” Also, the Defence Committee determined
that while Australia’s priorities with its limited resources lay in “improving the strength
and effectiveness of our forces in the conventional field,” Australian forces insofar as
possible should have “a potential capability to operate with nuclear weapons and in the
face of nuclear opposition.” 149
In light of the deteriorating strategic environment since the previous review and
Australia’s limited defence capacity, the Defence Committee determined that a US
presence in the region was imperative for Australia’s security and that of the region.
However, it was concerned that Australia may have trouble persuading the US to
maintain its regional military presence and assist it if necessary. Reflecting on SEATO
and ANZUS, the Defence Committee stated in the memorandum accompanying the
policy paper:
Unless Australia can support these treaty arrangements with force contributions commensurate with her vital interest in preventing a communist victory in South East Asia, and commensurate with her resources, it will become more difficult to encourage the United States to retain an effective military presence in South East Asia and to assist in our security in time of need. 150
The need to maintain US forces in Australia’s region was of particular concern to Tange,
who for some time had been disturbed by the inadequacy of Australia’s defence
Ibid., para. 68. Emphasis added.149
NAA: A4311, 698/2, memorandum by Defence Committee accompanying “Strategic Basis of 150
Australian Defence Policy,” endorsed by Defence Committee, 25 January 1962, 3, para. 4.
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capabilities. In 1955, and thus early in his tenure as Secretary of the Department of
External Affairs, Tange reported:
it is imperative to have stationed in, or available for, South East Asia adequate conventional forces which would…deter potential aggression by making it clear in advance that no swift victory could be achieved before atomic weapons were brought into use […] I would be the first to recognize that one can only open up rather gingerly with the Americans the proposition that somebody should provide more conventional forces for service in the Asian area. 151
It was therefore considered important not simply to maintain but to increase the
American presence in the region. However, as Tange intimated, increased conventional
forces would be a difficult matter to broach with the US, which was concentrating on
continental Europe. The UK, on the other hand, was moving towards a reduction in its
defence programmes, and subsequently, its forces “east of Suez”. By the early 1960s
“Both Washington and London were sending increasingly sharp signals that they
wanted to see Australia pay more of the price for its own defence.” According to 152
Australian Ambassador to the US, Beale, who reflected on that period in his memoir,
“The United States had for some time been urging Australia to make a greater defence
effort in her own interests.” At the ANZUS Council meeting in Canberra in May 153
1962, Rusk stated that the US wanted more support from its allies in Vietnam and asked
Barwick to contribute instructors. Commander-in-Chief Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt,
who was likewise in Canberra, also submitted proposals for an Australian contribution
to Vietnam to the service chiefs. On 24 May 1962, Townley announced that Australia
“Report from Arthur Tange, the Australian Embassy in Washington, DC, to the Department of External 151
Affairs, ‘The Role of Conventional and Nuclear Forces,’ June 10, 1955. In ‘UK-U.S. Defense Policy (NATO General Statement of Policy,’ NAA: A4968, CS 25/16/18,” quoted in Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 16.
Edwards, A Nation at War, 23.152
Beale, This Inch of Time, 173.153
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would commit up to 30 military instructors to Vietnam at the invitation of the South
Vietnamese Government. The team of 29 personnel landed in Saigon on 3 August 1962
where they joined their leader Colonel F.P. (Ted) Serong, who had arrived on 31 July
1962; the date marked Australia’s entry into the conflict. The commitment was a
political gesture urged by the Department of External Affairs, which saw an opportunity
to show Australia’s willingness to stand by the US in Vietnam in case Australia ever
needed American defence support. It also served Australia’s strategy of “forward
defence”. As Townley stated, “if the Communists were to achieve their aims in Viet 154
Nam [sic] this would gravely affect the security of the whole South East Asian area and
ultimately of Australia itself.” In other words, if Vietnam had a strong, militarily 155
effective Communist government, the rest of the “dominoes” in Southeast Asia were
expected to fall quickly. Thus, as per Bell’s summary of the dominant assessment found
in official documents, “the Australian national interest required and necessitated
American combat intervention in Vietnam, since only that would prevent a rapid
Communist victory there.” 156
However, Tange was not only interested in increasing Australia’s conventional capacity
in this earlier period. For example, he endorsed the proposal to procure tactical nuclear
weapons from the British. Like other officials, he doubted that the UK would share its
atomic assets, but he agreed to proceed with the approach “if only to get a firm
Ian McNeill, To Long Tan, 37–8 and 42. 154
“Press Statement by the Minister for Defence, Mr Townley, on 24th May, 1962,” in Current Notes, vol. 155
33, no. 5, May 1962, 36–7. Bell, Australia’s Alliance Options, 33. Emphasis in original.156
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statement, in place of our present conjectures.” Walsh noted that these doubts were 157
likely encouraged by the “non-committal stance” of British Prime Minister Macmillan
in his meetings with Menzies. The lack of British commitment and their need to 158
check with the US before pursuing arrangements with Australia probably encouraged
the latter to approach the US directly for nuclear weapons. That said, the British were
keen to help the Australians but careful not to upset the Americans. 159
Tange’s openness to US nuclear weapons may have been attributed to the fact that he
“was realistic about the divisibility of the nuclear alliance.” If Australia was threatened
with a massive conventional or nuclear attack, he did not believe Washington, with its
nuclear weapons, would be willing to threaten to retaliate. The dispute over West 160
New Guinea, for example, had demonstrated to the Australians that the US would not
automatically take its side on issues involving Indonesia. Thus, hosting US nuclear
weapons was perhaps considered one way of securing the US presence in the region and
the perceived benefits of possessing a nuclear deterrent and capability.
A further issue noted by the Defence Committee in its “Strategic Basis of Australian
Defence Policy” of January 1962 was the uncertainty surrounding Indonesia’s political
alignment. Indonesia had received substantial military assistance from the Soviet Union,
“[NAA:] A7942/1 BN78-1, Memo from Arthur Tange, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs 157
to the Acting Secretary, Department of Defence, Procurement of Nuclear Weapons for Australian Forces, January 22, 1958, p.2,” quoted in Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 58.
Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 58.158
Ibid., 56–8.159
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 42. This was also the view of Scherger: ibid.160
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and it was felt that this would strengthen the position of Indonesia’s Communist party,
which was the world’s third largest after those of the Soviet Union and China. 161
According to Leah, officials feared as early as 1956 that Indonesia might agree to
station Soviet nuclear missiles on its territory. While the Indonesian Army’s anti-162
Communist stance and US economic aid and advice offset Communist influence to
some extent, Indonesia was expected to continue to shift towards “an essentially
authoritarian socialist society” with communists and non-communists participating in
government. The Defence Committee concluded that “Unless the anti-communist
influence of the army can prevail Indonesian neutrality is likely, therefore, to continue
on balance to favour communist interests as opposed to those of the West.” Indonesia’s
future political alignment was therefore “of vital importance to Australia’s security.”
Indonesia could be a direct threat to Australia’s security, or under particular forms of
government, “a useful barrier to communist expansion southwards.” The Defence
Committee recognised that “The rapidly increasing military strength of Indonesia is of
great potential strategic significance to Australia” given its “formidable inventory of
modern land, air and naval weapons, mainly from communist sources.” Although it was
felt that it would be some time before Indonesia could use its new weapons effectively,
and an immediate and overt military response in attempt to resolve the West New
Guinea dispute was not anticipated, the Defence Committee realised that Indonesia’s
increasing military capacity would “undoubtedly give her greater confidence in
pursuing her claim [to the territory] by more aggressive means.” The Defence
Committee thought it probable that Indonesia would instead increase armed
NAA: A4311, 698/2, “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” endorsed by Defence Committee, 161
25 January 1962, 7, para. 21. Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 13. Leah added, “This was noted in a report entitled ‘Atomic Energy 162
(Civil Defense) [sic],’ May 30, 1956, NAA: A1838/276, CS 720/10/8”: ibid 149, n.11.
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infiltrations, attempts to promote political and physical resistance to the Dutch within
the territory, and diplomatic pressure on the West, all of which would “increase the risk
of incidents which could lead to hostilities.” The Defence Committee concluded that
regardless of Communism’s growth in Indonesia, there was increasing potential for
friction between Australia and Indonesia regarding the latter’s claim to territorial waters
and related air space, which “would prejudice [Australia’s] right of passage through the
area.” The Defence Committee felt that this potential for friction would remain despite
any “favourable changes in political control” and may worsen with disputes over West
and East New Guinea and the Borneo territories. 163
At the time there was a good deal of concern within Australia about Indonesia’s
activities and ultimate objectives. There seemed to be multifarious threats to regional
stability, and Australian defence strategy and planning should be read with that in mind.
Clearly, Indonesia posed challenges for Australian security, and so too did the Cuban
Crisis. Combined, the two matters could be highly problematic. In the copy of the
minute filed, which is likely Dunn’s as his name is underlined, the following sections
were highlighted: the Soviets have long objected to foreign bases with an offensive
capacity; the US may need to emphasise Soviet deception and secrecy regarding the
weapons and bases in Cuba; and Australia’s vulnerability to a Soviet blockade should
American nuclear weapons be located on its soil in the future and targeted on the Soviet
Union cannot affect its policy on the crisis. Importance was therefore placed on 164
NAA: A4311, 698/2, “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” endorsed by Defence Committee, 163
25 January 1962, 7–8, paras. 21–5. NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, minute, Tange to Harry, Forsyth, Dunn and Robertson, 23 October 164
1962.
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foreign bases and their implications. Concern over the recent build-up of Soviet military
materiel in Indonesia and the Communist influence (both Soviet and local) there likely
would have been exacerbated by Soviet activities in Cuba. Barwick and Tange were
alive to the fact that the installation of American nuclear weapons in Australia could
provoke a response from the Soviet Union commensurate with the US policy towards
Cuba. Presumably, this would involve Indonesia. But there was also the possibility,
which was likely on Barwick and Tange’s minds, that Indonesia could become another
Cuba. The installation of nuclear weapons in either country would increase dramatically
the potential for friction, if not hostilities, between the two nations. Furthermore, a
quarantine would exacerbate existing tensions over territorial boundaries and air space.
According to Edwards, Tange had urged the Defence Committee since late 1962 to
improve Australia’s capacity “to give military backing to its diplomacy,” especially
regarding Indonesia. Tange did so because “He could not accept the apparent
willingness of Hicks and the service chiefs to rely on American support under the
ANZUS and SEATO treaties.” However, as shown earlier, these were long-held 165
views of Tange. In light of this, the dramatic changes to the strategic environment prior
to 1962, and the pressure being exerted by its major allies, it is likely that Tange began
pressing these points about Australia’s defence capacity on the Defence Committee
much earlier than Edwards stated. Rather, it seems that it was not until the divergence of
views between the US and Australia over West New Guinea, which demonstrated that
the Americans were not guaranteed to side with the Australians on matters affecting
Edwards, Arthur Tange, 137.165
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their region and security, that Tange’s cogent views were heeded. The eventual inclusion
of Tange’s concerns in the Defence Committee’s Strategic Basis paper and
accompanying memorandum for 1962 is indicative of recent events, but also of Tange’s
influence.
There is a clear parallel between Tange’s minute of his discussion with Barwick during
the Cuban Crisis and the Defence Committee’s statements regarding Australia’s need for
a nuclear capability. The Defence Committee advised that Australia had a need for a
nuclear capability, but not an independent one: the acquisition of nuclear weapons from
one of its allies addressed this recommendation, and hosting US nuclear weapons on
Australian soil was one scenario that was contemplated by Barwick and Tange. In light
of Tange’s involvement in the Defence Committee and his personal views on Australia’s
defence capabilities, he probably believed that the realisation of this scenario would
have secured the US presence in the region and enhanced Australia’s defence capacity,
and thus security.
Tange’s minute of his discussion with Barwick was consistent with the Government’s
reply to a UN inquiry on nuclear weapons conducted early in 1962. The Government’s
reply provides a clear statement of Australia’s policy on nuclear weapons and reveals
the hypocrisy in its policy on the Cuban Crisis with which Soviet delegates to the UN,
as shown below, would later take issue. On 4 December 1961, the UN General
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Assembly adopted resolution 1664 (XVI) on the question of disarmament. In April 166
1962 in accordance with the resolution, Acting Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant,
reported to the UN Disarmament Commission on his inquiry to member states
as to the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive in the future nuclear weapons on their territories on behalf of any other country. 167
In Barwick’s reply to the inquiry on 15 March 1962, he began by noting that the
Australian Government well understood the dangers that could arise from an increase in
the number of nuclear powers. Australia, he noted, did not manufacture or possess
nuclear weapons; near the end of his statement, he also clarified that Australia was not
then seeking them. Barwick then quoted at length an excerpt from Menzies’ statement
to Parliament on 19 September 1957:
There is advantage for the world in having nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and in no others. The Great Powers, apart from their enormous resources, are sufficiently informed about the deadly character of these weapons to find themselves reluctant to cause a war in which they are used. The possession of these violent forces is, in the case of these great nations, a deterrent not only to prospective enemies but to themselves. But should the manufacture of nuclear weapons be extended to a number of other powers, great or small, the chances of irresponsible action with calamitous repercussions in the world would be materially increased. 168
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1664 (XVI), “Question of disarmament,” 4 December 166
1961. I am grateful to Lyndon Burford for providing this reference and the subsequent two references to UN Disarmament Commission documents.
United Nations Disarmament Commission, “Letter from the Acting Secretary-General to the Chairman 167
of the Disarmament Commission transmitting a report on the inquiry conducted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI),” 2 April 1962, 1–3.
United Nations Disarmament Commission, “Addendum 2 to the Report of the Acting Secretary-168
General on the Inquiry conducted in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI): Replies from Members to whom the Inquiry was addressed,” DC/201/Add.2, 2 April 1962, 5 and 7. Barwick’s reply was also included as an annexure to “Disarmament and Nuclear Tests” in Current Notes, vol. 33, no. 4, April 1962, 27–8.
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Despite the Government’s desire to limit nuclear weapons capabilities to the few great
powers, in 1957 the number of states in possession of nuclear weapons, and the 169
number of nuclear weapons, were expected to increase. Menzies spoke publicly of the
advantages of the status quo, but Eden felt there was little the UK could do to maintain
it. Reflecting on this time in his memoir, Eden wrote:
The period when the deterrent of nuclear power held the world in awe is fading. The wider manufacture and ownership of nuclear weapons spreads familiarity and with it an instinctive drift and carelessness. Nor are we entitled to remonstrate with others for making the weapons we have made. The numbers within the circle will grow and it has as yet no rules. 170
Eden was aware that the UK would be accused of hypocrisy if it spoke out against what
is now referred to as nuclear proliferation, which did indeed ensue; the number of
nuclear weapons states steadily increased and peaked in the 1960s before the
introduction of the NPT in 1968. Furthermore, Menzies’ confidence that the US and 171
the Soviet Union would be reluctant to cause a war involving nuclear weapons
ultimately would be tested over Cuba.
Returning to the UN inquiry, Barwick declared that Australia’s policy and the reasons
for it, which has been reaffirmed by Australian delegations to the UN since 1957,
remains as stated above. Continuing this line of argument on the rights of Great Powers,
Barwick wrote that “Australia recognizes the right of the nuclear Powers to conclude
agreements for the stationing of their nuclear weapons wherever military necessity
This was the Government’s general policy in late 1959: Walsh, “Surprise Down Under,” 6–7.169
Eden, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden K.G., P.C., M.C., 578–9.170
Walsh, “Bombs Unbuilt,” 319.171
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requires.” Australia therefore placed no limits on the nature of allied defence 172
assistance. Also, Tange’s minute—written just seven months later—suggests that
hosting nuclear weapons would enable such weapons to remain “in the hands” of Great
Powers but in a way that Australia could reap the supposed benefits of their possession.
As has been demonstrated, the acquisition of a nuclear capability for Australia was of
interest to the Defence Committee. While some scholars have emphasised that certain
individuals, particularly military officers, some politicians and other officials, drove
Australian nuclear ambitions, this response to the UN inquiry was a clear statement 173
of the Government’s policy on nuclear weapons acquisition. Barwick declared to the UN
inquiry, again reiterating what Menzies had stated publicly in September 1957, that
“Australia cannot undertake that under no circumstances will Australian forces in the
future be armed with nuclear weapons.” Barwick stated that the Australian Government,
in formulating its defence policy,
must take account of the emergence in the area of East Asia and the Western Pacific of a military Power of great dimension and some ambition. This Power is convinced of the inevitability of war and is consciously working for the elimination of the type of society of which Australia is a part. It already has massive conventional forces, which it has used against the forces of the United Nations, and has nuclear weapons potentialities which may be close to fulfilment. It has indicated that the production of nuclear weapons is indeed its aim. 174
United Nations Disarmament Commission, “Addendum 2 to the Report of the Acting Secretary-172
General on the Inquiry conducted in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI): Replies from Members to whom the Inquiry was addressed,” DC/201/Add.2, 2 April 1962, 5–6.
See, for example, Cawte, Atomic Australia, 106–9. For discussion of Cawte on this point, see Auton, 173
“Opaque Proliferation,” 563. Walsh also discussed backchannel conversations between Australian military officers and British defence officials regarding the procurement of tactical nuclear weapons, stating that in August 1957, Scherger directly, if informally, requested such weapons, likely without Menzies’ knowledge: “Surprise Down Under,” 3–5.
United Nations Disarmament Commission, “Addendum 2 to the Report of the Acting Secretary-174
General on the Inquiry conducted in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI): Replies from Members to whom the Inquiry was addressed,” DC/201/Add.2, 2 April 1962, 6.
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China, which was not then a member of the UN and seemingly did not deserve naming,
obviously was the power to which Barwick referred. As a Communist state in
geographical proximity to Australia, China was of major concern to the Menzies
Government, and to its neighbours. As one writer put it, “Looming over everything was
the fear of Communist China.” In the words of Alan Watt, Australian diplomat and 175
Secretary to the Department of External Affairs from 1950–54, Australia regarded
the Peking regime not only as an aggressor in Korea but also as the main threat to long-term stability in South-East Asia. The Liberal-Country Party Government under Sir Robert Menzies was strongly anti-Communist in outlook, and interpreted Chinese Communist policy as the most belligerent form of Communism […] the Australian Prime Minister and successive Ministers for External Affairs since December 1949 have all at one stage or another seen the Peking regime as Australia’s greatest long-term threat. 176
When border disputes between India and China worsened in 1962 with conflict erupting
in October simultaneous to the Cuban Crisis, Australia supplied India with rifles and
ammunition valued at £1,025,000—and offered further military supplies up to an
additional £675,000—“on the understanding that they would be used only for the
purpose of resisting Chinese Communist aggression.” As early as 1957, Australian 177
and British officials had agreed that Australia should have tactical nuclear weapons as a
possible deterrent against potential Chinese aggression. 178
Rayner, Scherger, 148.175
Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938–1965 (London: Cambridge University 176
Press, 1967), 246. Of the £2,000,000 assistance Australia offered India, there was £300,000 worth of blankets, military 177
clothing and wool tops. The balance was for military supplies, which were initially offered on credit, but later gifted: “Press Statement by Sir Garfield Barwick, 22nd November, 1962,” in Current Notes, vol. 33, no. 11, November 1962, 64–5; and “Statement by the Minister for External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick, 10th March, 1963,” in Current Notes, vol. 34, no. 3, March 1963, 22. See also Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 234–5. For an excellent, contemporary summary of the Sino-Indian dispute and its relation to the question of Tibet, see Gregory Clark, In Fear of China (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1967), 33–61.
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 15 and n.28, 150. Note: The correct citation for the archival record 178
noted at n.28 is: NAA: A1209, 1957/5380.
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China had extensive conventional forces and in 1955 had commenced a programme to
develop nuclear weapons. However, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee reports 179
“reveal that little of substance was actually known about Chinese nuclear
capabilities.” The Defence Committee did not expect China to have the bomb until 180
around 1966, but the explosion of its first nuclear device in 1964 demonstrated that 181
Chinese atomic research and development had been greatly underestimated.
During Barwick’s visit to Washington in 1963, he was asked by the US Secretary of
Defense, Robert McNamara, what Australia’s reaction would be to the acquisition of
nuclear weapons by China. Barwick replied that he thought this “would impel opinion
towards the belief that Australia itself should have nuclear weapons.” McNamara 182
responded that this would be the natural and obvious reaction, for a country with a small
population confronted with an enormous population must naturally turn to the notion
that nuclear weapons were its best protection. While this does not indicate whether 183
nuclear weapons acquisition was on or off Australia’s agenda at this time, it
“China” (country profiles), Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/ 179
(accessed 21 September 2015). Wilson, “Conflicting Interests,” 110. This is obvious in the reports prepared between 1961–63: NAA: 180
A1838, 666/62/28, JIC (AUST [Australia]) report (’61) 28, Final, “The Development or Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons and the Means of Delivery by Communist China up to the End of 1966,” May 1961, and JIC (AUST) report (’62) 28, Final, “Advanced Weapon Development in Communist China: The Development or Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons and the Means of Delivery by Communist China up to the End of 1967,” May 1962 (these reports are contained in the same file); and NAA: A1838, 666/63/28, JIC (AUST) report (’63) 28, Final, “Communist China: Advanced Weapon Systems,” July 1963. This latter report covered the period up to 1968.
NAA: A4311, 698/2, “Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy,” endorsed by Defence Committee, 181
25 January 1962, 2, para. 5, and 4, para. 12. The language used regarding the timing of the anticipated explosion of a Chinese nuclear device differs in the paper—at para. 5, the Defence Committee employed the phrase “after 1966,” and at para. 12, “by 1966”—which illustrates the uncertainty of Australian officials in light of the vague intelligence on the subject.
“From an ANZUS briefing paper on Nuclear Arrangements in Asia of 17 June 1965, signed by C.G. 182
Woodard, Policy Planning Officer, External Affairs, [External Affairs] file 625/4/6,” quoted in Broinowski, Fact or Fission?, 51.
Broinowski, Fact or Fission?, 51.183
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demonstrates what would have prompted its interest and action, as well as the fact that
Barwick and McNamara were alive to these strategic considerations. It is unclear
whether anything further came of this conversation.
Reflecting on the UN inquiry, Barwick up to that point had been regionally-focussed.
However, he acknowledged that recent technological advances had created a sense of
global nuclear vulnerability: “no power which is concerned with its security can 184
ignore developments in any part of the world, however distant.” Furthermore, Barwick
stated that Australia “seriously doubts the effectiveness of regional agreements for the
limitation of nuclear weapons in any area of the world,” inferring his Government’s
disapproval of the notion of nuclear weapon-free zones (NFZs), discussed in the next
chapter. Thus, the ineffectiveness of regional agreements was attributed to the
intercontinental capabilities of nuclear weapons technology. Barwick also asserted that
while some states could envisage participating in such agreements, Australia, in light of
the region to which it belonged, could not. 185
In concluding Australia’s response to the inquiry, Barwick highlighted several
challenges in proceeding with the approach suggested in Resolution 1664. While he
stressed Australia’s “most earnest support for all genuine efforts to both general and
For more on the concept of global nuclear vulnerability, see Benoît Pelopidas, “The closest we ever 184
came to nuclear war: New insights on the ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’ and the 1995 Black Brant event” (presentation delivered at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California, 11 August 2015). I am grateful to Benoît Pelopidas for sharing his presentation with me.
United Nations Disarmament Commission, “Addendum 2 to the Report of the Acting Secretary-185
General on the Inquiry conducted in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 1664 (XVI): Replies from Members to whom the Inquiry was addressed,” DC/201/Add.2, 2 April 1962, 6.
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complete disarmament and more immediately a ban on nuclear test explosions, under
effective international inspection and control,” he asserted that the undertakings
envisaged in the Resolution could not be formulated or ratified separate to broader
matters regarding controlled disarmament. “[I]n the strategic calculation of military
deterrence, nuclear weapons and conventional forces,” he argued, “are inextricably
bound together.” As was noted earlier, this indicates nuclear weapons were thought of
more as tactical weapons with battlefield application. Nor would Australia consider the
undertakings without the following: the involvement of the nuclear powers (to whom
the inquiry was not addressed); “certainty that all militarily significant States” would be
addressed (again, a reference to China which was not a UN Member State); and some
guarantee that satisfactory verification procedures could be introduced (a point that
Barwick would later emphasise regarding the dismantlement of the Soviet bases in
Cuba). Furthermore, Australia was “prevented” from giving any undertakings consistent
with the Resolution because of “its belief that nations must be free to look to their own
security in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter.” 186
Barwick’s reply to the UN inquiry came under scrutiny in a parliamentary debate on
disarmament and nuclear tests on 15 May 1962. The debate, which mostly focused on 187
Ibid., 6–7.186
Debate resumed from 5 April 1962, the date on which Barwick had delivered a ministerial statement 187
on “Disarmament and Nuclear Tests” and tabled the Government’s response to the UN inquiry: CPD, House, 15 May 1962, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/hansard80/hansardr80/1962-05-15/toc_pdf/19620515_reps_24_hor35.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf#search=%221960s%22 (accessed 12 October 2015), 2318. Barwick’s statement had come about as a result of Calwell’s request to Menzies on 7 March 1962 “for a Government statement on ‘the urgent necessity for an international agreement with adequate safeguards to end the testing of nuclear weapons by all nations and to provide for universal disarmament’.” Calwell further requested that Menzies submit to the House a resolution similar to the one adopted by the Commonwealth PMs at the last Prime Ministers’ Conference on 17 March 1961. Menzies replied that he and Barwick had discussed Calwell’s requests and agreed to “take the steps necessary to allow an effective debate” in the House: Calwell, CPD, House, 15 May 1962, 2318.
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the decision of the US to resume testing following the Soviet Union’s breach of the
nuclear test moratorium that had been in place from 1958–61, highlighted bipartisan
support for the banning of nuclear weapons tests by all nations and arrangements for
verification that an agreement to do so would be observed. Calwell, who opened the
debate, mostly agreed with Barwick’s statement to the House, noting that any
differences that MPs possibly had were a matter of “differences of expression rather
than of principles.” One of his criticisms of Barwick’s statement however, was that it
lacked value because it did not address the Antarctic Treaty, in which Antarctica was
declared a NFZ, or the possibility of negotiating with its signatories to have the
boundaries of that zone extended to cover the rest of southern hemisphere. In fact, this
was part of a broader ALP goal “to extend the spirit of that treaty to all dealings
between the nations, and our objective, in geographical terms, must be to extend the
peaceful areas until they cover the great globe itself.” The ALP had campaigned at the 188
1961 federal election on the notion of a NFZ for the southern hemisphere, and as shown
in the next chapter, the concept regained momentum in the immediate aftermath of the
Cuban Crisis giving the ALP an opportunity to further emphasise this aspect of their
policy platform.
While Menzies did not mention Calwell’s reference to NFZs, it is clear that the issue
drew his ire as did others’ alleged criticism of Barwick’s reply to the UN inquiry, as
evidenced by his reply to the Leader of the Opposition:
Calwell, CPD, House, 15 May 1962, 2318–21.188
! 185
Should Australia, not a nuclear power herself—remember that in all these matters—permanently contract herself out of permitting nuclear weapons to be used in war or defence or in the grave arbitrament of war on her soil? Because I did hear suggestions that when the Minister for External Affairs (Sir Garfield Barwick) said we were not prepared to give a permanent undertaking to that effect, he was under criticism. Under criticism! Have we reached the very ecstasy of suicide in Australia? Are we prepared to say that come war, come peace, come any circumstances, nobody shall bring a nuclear weapon on our soil or discharge a weapon of that kind there? Are we bent on self-destruction, or are we prepared to sit up and wake up to the fact that those nuclear powers which are on our side in the contest of freedom, cannot protect us if we warn them off the premises in perpetuity. 189
Thus, by May 1962, it was now the PM who was emphasising—this time to Parliament
—that Australia’s great and powerful friends could put nuclear weapons on Australian
territory. It exemplifies Menzies reconciling Australia’s acquisition of a nuclear
capability with its policy of nuclear weapons remaining in the hands of great powers.
Barwick had stated to the House that nuclear weapons were the only way to keep the
superior conventional forces of the Soviet Union in check. Proposals for NFZs, he
claimed, would weaken the nuclear deterrent without weakening Communist strength in
conventional arms. Menzies reiterated that a NFZ in the southern hemisphere would
weaken Australia’s defences. However, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, Gough
Whitlam, argued that Australia’s defences would be promoted if its neighbours accepted
the proposal. Whitlam also made the point that the balance of deterrents between the US
and the Soviet Union would remain the same if the southern hemisphere became a
NFZ. Notwithstanding Labor’s emphasis on the importance of NFZs, sections of the 190
Party maintained an openness to Australia having a nuclear capability. Whitlam stated:
Menzies, ibid., 2326.189
Whitlam, ibid., 2327 and 2329.190
! 186
We say that the number of nations which has nuclear weapons should be limited to the present number … More specifically, we say that the initiative of all the nuclear nations in declaring the area from the South Pole to 60 degrees south a nuclear-free zone should be extended to cover the whole of this hemisphere. If any other country in this hemisphere manufactured or acquired or received nuclear weapons, admittedly Australia would have to consider its position; but Australia should not be the first country in the southern hemisphere to manufacture or acquire or receive nuclear weapons. 191
Whitlam implied that the ALP position on NFZs, and subsequently a nuclear capability
for Australia, was therefore conditional on regional nuclear proliferation. It indicated
that the Government and the Opposition were possibly less polarised than they
appeared: both acknowledged that under certain circumstances Australia may find itself
in possession of a nuclear capability. Whitlam’s statement, against the backdrop of
Labour’s demands for a NFZ, meant the ALP position was unclear.
While the Treasurer Harold Holt did not take issue with this particular point, he
demanded that the ALP declare where it stood on U Thant’s “straightforward request” of
“whether we [Australia] would permit the use of nuclear weapons in our defence, and
whether Australia would ever be permitted to become a base for the use of nuclear
weapons in our defence.” Holt antagonised the Opposition over its position claiming 192
its members were “hopelessly divided” on the issue. Holt stated that when the matter
came before the Labor Party’s Federal Executive, members were split, with Calwell
casting the deciding vote. The matter was then presented to Labor’s Caucus for its vote
on a resolution, of which Holt read an excerpt: “the Government … ‘Should assure the
United Nations that Australia, in its desires to make the Southern Hemisphere a nuclear-
Ibid., 2329. Emphasis added.191
Holt, CPD, House, 15 May 1962, 2331.192
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free zone, will renounce nuclear tests, stock-piling and bases on Australian soil.’” The 193
Caucus voted 50 votes to 27 to refer the matter to the ALP Federal Conference to
determine Labor’s policy. Holt pressed that, not only was the Opposition divided, its
elected representatives had refused to determine policy on a matter vital to Australia’s
security, having chosen instead to leave the matter in the hands of officials not known,
or accountable, to the electorate. 194
Holt was rehearsing an argument that would resurface in the 1963 federal election
campaign when Menzies frequently referred to the “thirty-six faceless men” that
decided Labor policy. The 1963 ALP Federal Conference became a political issue unto
itself when Calwell and Whitlam were photographed waiting outside a meeting of the
Conference—having been asked to leave proceedings—while it determined, of all
matters, Labor policy on US military bases in Australia without input from the
parliamentary leaders. Labor’s policy on bases was therefore an issue confronting the 195
Party well before the 1963 election.
In highlighting Labor’s policy-making process, Holt sought to draw attention to the
significance of Caucus’ decision given that the House was almost evenly divided. As he
noted, “Two adverse by-elections could mean that Labour [sic] would govern this
Quoted by Holt, ibid.193
Holt, CPD, House, 15 May 1962, 2331–2.194
For a very brief outline, and the infamous photograph, of the “thirty-six faceless men” incident, see 195
“The 1961 election” and “Lessons of the Split” on “8. Labor and the Cold War, 1951–1967” (timeline), Labor History, Chifley Research Centre, http://www.laborhistory.org.au/timeline#timeline/item/21/48 and http://www.laborhistory.org.au/home#timeline/item/21/49 (accessed 14 October 2015).
! 188
country.” The 1961 election was near disastrous for the Menzies Government. It had 196
lost favour with many of its supporters, particularly those in business, after imposing a
credit squeeze, and unemployment had reached 2.4 percent. According to Downer, 197 198
neither he nor his fellow Cabinet members, including Menzies, realised how they had
lost touch with commerce, industry, and important sections of the electorate. A 199
landslide swing to the ALP in Queensland returned the coalition government with an
effective majority of only one in the House (once the speaker was appointed). It was 200
the closest federal election in Australia’s history, and while the Menzies Government
was victorious, it had lost 30 seats and did not have a majority in the Senate. It was 201
against this background in which the ALP almost took office that Holt asked:
If Labour [sic] had been in government and U Thant’s letter had arrived, what would the Labour [sic] government have done by way of reply to that letter? Would it have said, ‘Sorry, we cannot give you an answer to this until we have referred the matter to our federal conference’? After all, that is what the Labour [sic] Party is telling the Australian people now. 202
Les Haylen (ALP Member for Parkes), who followed Holt in the debate, did not deny
the Treasurer’s claims regarding Labor’s processes or voting outcomes on the matter.
Instead, he embraced the internal party debate as a “tribute” to the ALP “that with some
men strong enough to take one view, and others to hold another, the matter was taken
peacefully, through a democratic process, to caucus,” and unable to arrive at a decision
Holt, CPD, House, 15 May 1962, 2332.196
Garfield Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick’s Reflections and Recollections (Sydney: The 197
Federation Press, 1995), 164. Denis Murphy, Hayden: a political biography (London; Sydney: Angus & Robertson Publishers, 198
1980), 2. Alexander Downer, Six Prime Ministers (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 1982), 13.199
Murphy, Hayden, 2.200
Mary Elizabeth Calwell, I Am Bound to be True: The Life and Legacy of Arthur A. Calwell (Preston, 201
Victoria: Mosaic Press, 2012), 150. Holt, CPD, House, 15 May 1962, 2332.202
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there, to the Federal Conference. This though, did nothing to trounce Holt’s claims 203
about Labor’s Parliamentary Party having not determined a policy on the matter, and
one that would not leave its members divided. Nor did his response to Holt’s question
about how the ALP would have replied to U Thant’s letter; Haylen simply stated that he
would not have responded in the same manner as Barwick:
I would much prefer to go to the federal conference of my party than do what the Minister did, using the external affairs power and using his constitutional authority to write direct to U Thant … on the most vital issue that we have had before us—non-nuclear and nuclear clubs. He elected to do that—the little bantam dictator that he is—and would not bring the letter to this House until forced to do so. 204
The remainder of Haylen’s contribution to the debate, and the speeches of Eddie Ward
(ALP Member for East Sydney) and Gordon Bryant (ALP Member for Wills),
demonstrated rather than disproved the division among Labor ranks. Haylen and Ward
spoke of the horrors of nuclear weapons, nuclear tests, and the risk of nuclear war; the
morality and irrelevancy of nuclear tests (that they should be stopped irrespective of
whether it was Khrushchev or Kennedy performing them); the importance of NFZs; and
the need to ban both nuclear weapons and tests. Neither member commented on
bases. Haylen acknowledged, “There are plenty on my own side who disagree with 205
my views.” Given his and Ward’s outright objections to nuclear weapons, they would 206
not have accepted the view that circumstances could arise in which Australia would
Haylen, ibid., 2334.203
Ibid.204
Les Haylen and Eddie Ward, CPD, House, 15 May 1962, 2333–43.205
Haylen, CPD, House, 15 May 1962, 2335.206
! 190
need to reconsider its position on NFZs, and thus a nuclear capability, as Whitlam had
inferred. However, Bryant reiterated the position put forward by Whitlam:
We do not contend that we should step forth and say, ‘We renounce this for ever’. We say that in the present situation we would not use nuclear weapons and that we do not want other people to use them. The same applies, of course, to our relations with other nations. Indonesia, India and Malaya have no nuclear weapons; neither have the South American nations. All we ask is that they shall say together, ‘Unless the situation takes a turn for the worse, we shall not use them and we shall undertake not to co-operate with anybody else who uses them’. We have already agreed on this as regards the Antarctic area. All we ask is that the agreement be gradually extended all over the planet. That is all we of the Opposition have to say about this, and that is what the Government should have written in reply to U Thant. 207
Thus, like his Deputy Leader, Bryant acknowledged that while the ALP was pushing for
a NFZ for the southern hemisphere, it was not “for ever” and could be overturned if the
situation was to take “a turn for the worse,” presumably circumstances involving
regional proliferation. Again, this was in stark contrast to Haylen’s vociferous protest
against the existence of nuclear weapons and their possession by any power.
Both Government and Opposition members were mindful of the uncertainty of the
future, but Bryant criticised the Government for not doing more in the present. The
Government’s response to the Acting Secretary-General, Bryant contended, read as
though the UN resolution had asked Australia to accept uncritically a predetermined
position. He argued that Australia should be a leading member of the UN, but the
Government had quashed the aspirations expressed in the UN resolution, its reply
containing
Gordon Bryant, ibid., 2349.207
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paragraph after paragraph of non-specifics, generalities and cliches [sic], in which the Minister for External Affairs made it clear to U Thant that Australia, so far as the Government is concerned, does not think there is any hope of doing anything. In fact he made it look as though the Government could not care less. 208
The Menzies Government certainly did not display any initiative on the matter and was
acting to preserve its nuclear weapons options. Essentially, Bryant believed that given
that nuclear weapons were not then present in Australia’s region, the Government
should have been doing more to keep them out. He stated:
the honorable [sic] member for Bradfield (Mr. Turner), the Treasurer and the Prime Minister seem to be on the verge of saying, ‘We are prepared to establish nuclear bases on Australian soil’. I believe that the Australian people would reject that out of hand for, as the Deputy Leader of the Opposition pointed out, the moment we accept these weapons on Australian soil, the moment we take action to make Australia a nuclear base, we provoke our neighbours to do likewise. 209
That in fact was exactly what the Government was saying it was prepared to do. It was
conscious of how this would be perceived by its neighbours, particularly Indonesia, as
is shown by Tange’s minute. What was clear was that the Menzies Government was not
going to make any commitments that in any way prohibited Australia from acquiring
nuclear weapons in the future. While the debate highlighted the divisions within the
ALP on the matter and ambiguity over its position, the coalition on the other hand had a
clear policy, behind which members presented a united front to Parliament in May,
reiterating their support for Barwick’s reply to the UN inquiry. As noted above, Barwick
made it plain in his reply to that inquiry that Australia recognised the right of the
nuclear weapons states to make agreements to station their nuclear weapons where
Ibid., 2348.208
Ibid., 2349.209
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military necessity requires. Barwick’s discussion with Tange during the Cuban Crisis
only a matter of months later, which is reflected in the latter’s minute, is therefore
wholly consistent with the Government’s response to the UN. The next chapter shows
that in the same vein that Australia was careful not to make any commitments that
prohibited it from acquiring nuclear weapons in the future, it was careful not to make
commitments to the US during the crisis that were beyond its legal or ethical
obligations.
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4
Australian Legal and Ethical Commitments to the US
With the US facing, as Menzies put it, “a very grave threat at close quarters,” External 1
Affairs officials considered Australia’s legal and ethical commitments to its most
important ally. As noted earlier, Australia was a party with the US to two regional
security treaties: SEATO and ANZUS. SEATO was quickly deemed irrelevant in
relation to the Cuban Crisis for as one official stated, it “clearly does not involve us in
obligations for the defence of the U.S.A. itself.” ANZUS, however, received thorough 2
analysis. This chapter examines the views of Australian officials regarding the nature of
Australia’s commitment to the US. It shows how officials contemplated the legality of
the Kennedy Administration’s actions and their legal, political, and geo-strategic effects.
This chapter argues that uncertainty over Australia’s legal commitments to the US,
anxiety over the repercussions of the Administration’s actions, and a general reluctance
to become involved in the Caribbean situation, helped shape the Menzies Government’s
narrow policy on the Cuban Crisis.
The ANZUS Treaty had its origins in the immediate post-war years. This was a period
of increasing tension between the US and Western European countries on one side, and
the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries on the other. This East-West tension
also affected the Asia-Pacific region. There were newly independent states, those still
R.G. Menzies, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House of Representatives (House), vol. 1
37, 23 October 1962, 1781. NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, Secret paper titled “The Cuban Crisis,” prepared by W.D. Forsyth for 2
Garfield Barwick, Department of External Affairs (External Affairs) undated, 4–5.
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trying to break free from European empires, plus divided and occupied states.
Additionally, the Cold War was underway with communism seen to be advancing. From
1947–49, India, Pakistan and Ceylon obtained independence from the UK, and in 1949,
Indonesia obtained independence from the Netherlands. From 1945, Indochina had been
in turmoil, France failing to reassert its colonial authority following Japan’s surrender.
In Malaya and Burma, insurgents caused problems for the colonial authorities with
Burma winning independence from the UK in 1948. In China, communist forces had
made advances against the National Government, which resulted in the inauguration of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949 and the flight of the
Nationalist leaders to Formosa. Following World War II, Korea was divided into two
hostile regimes, and after its surrender, Japan was occupied by the US and its wartime
allies, including Australia. It was in this context that Australian governments pursued a
regional security arrangement with the US in what must have appeared to them to be an
increasingly hostile and uncertain security environment in Asia and Southeast Asia. 3
Initially, however, the US showed no interest, its attention concentrated on finalising
security arrangements in Europe. The unwillingness of the US to enter into regional
security pacts in the Asia-Pacific meant that Australia had little choice but to integrate
its defence policy closely with that of its Commonwealth allies, specifically the UK.
Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson, Pamela Andre, eds., The ANZUS Treaty 1951, Documents on 3
Australian Foreign Policy (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), xxvii. Simultaneously, Australia wanted to secure a peace treaty with Japan to ensure it could never again threaten its security: ibid. In endorsing the notion of a peace treaty that would allow Japan to rearm, the Australian Cabinet insisted on a regional security agreement with the US as a quid pro quo: David Lee, Australia and the World in the Twentieth Century (Beaconsfield, Victoria: circa, 2006), 97. On Australian desires to enhance security in Southeast Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, see Derek McDougall, “The Malayan Emergency and Confrontation,” in Munich to Vietnam: Australia’s Relations with Britain and the United States since the 1930s, Carl Bridge ed. (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 130–9.
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Nonetheless, the Australian Government continued to lobby for a Pacific security
arrangement involving the US, Australia’s interest having been revived in 1949 by
Communist gains in China and the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty, which saw
the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 4
The ANZUS Treaty, a tripartite security pact between Australia, New Zealand, and the
US, was signed on 1 September 1951 in San Francisco and came into force on 29 April
1952. It was Australia’s first major treaty with a state outside of the Commonwealth 5
that involved military commitments. As historian Trevor Reese noted, the exclusion of
the UK from the tripartite agreement was significant in that it resulted in a break with
Commonwealth tradition. Prior to World War II, policymakers and the wider settler 6
population in Australia were caught up in a colonial British identity when security
alignment with the UK was reflexive, resulting in active Australian support for its
military ventures. Bell wrote that Australia’s commitment to the UK “was generally
regarded as comprehensive, mutual, automatic, not needing to be defined in writing,
stemming not from choice but from happenstance.” In contrast, ANZUS represented a 7
shift away from an automatic, colonial identity-driven alliance to a contractual
arrangement, and thus it highlighted Australia’s growing sense of independence and 8
unique national identity. ANZUS was neither comprehensive nor automatic, but instead
Holdich et al, The ANZUS Treaty 1951, xxviii–xxxi. For example, ANZAM was established in August 4
1949 for the defence of the Malayan area by the UK, Australia, and New Zealand: ibid., xxx. For the key Australian official documents on the Treaty covering the period 1949–52, see Holdich et al, 5
The ANZUS Treaty 1951. Trevor R. Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States: A Survey of International Relations, 6
1941–1968 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs and Oxford University Press, 1969), 131. Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 7
1988), 199. Ibid.8
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required an act of political will at a certain time by both parties. Bell noted that
“Perhaps one might more precisely say that it depended on a choice by Australia and
acquiescence by the United States.” While the alliance therefore was based on 9
deliberate choice and a common interest in a stable balance of power in world politics,
Australian and American officials valued ANZUS very differently. As Bell put it, “What
was seen as a vital necessity by the Australians was something to be accepted with a
resigned shrug by the Americans.” Since the 1960s, ANZUS has been a cornerstone of 10
Australian foreign and defence policy. Its significance in this regard, as well as the
contractual nature of the alliance, is reflected in the following interpretation of the
Treaty by Australian senior officials in relation to Australia’s obligations to the US in
the Cuban Crisis.
On 23 October 1962, First Assistant Secretary of the Department of External Affairs
(Division IV), Ralph Harry, prepared Barwick for possible parliamentary questions
regarding Australia’s obligations to the US under the ANZUS Treaty. Harry was the
ideal person to brief Barwick. A law graduate and Rhodes Scholar, he claimed to have
written the first draft of the ANZUS Treaty. He was then Counsellor in the Pacific 11
Section and was one of the key officials that assisted Spender, then External Affairs
Minister, and Alan Watt, the Department’s Secretary, with the terms of the Treaty and
negotiation of its passage. Harry was a distinguished Australian public servant and 12
Ibid.9
Ibid.10
John Harry, “Benign master of diplomacy,” Sydney Morning Herald, 24 October 2002, http://11
www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/23/1034561547232.html (accessed 6 April 2013). Ibid.; Peter Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins (Crows Nest, New South Wales (NSW): 12
Allen & Unwin, 2006), 55–6; and Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1969), 106.
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diplomat whose career in External Affairs spanned almost four decades (1940–78). He
joined the newly-formed Department in 1940, and after a short intervening period in the
Australian Imperial Force serving as an officer and intelligence analyst mainly in New
Guinea, he was recalled to the Department in 1943. In the late 1940s, Harry was posted
to Australia’s legations in Ottawa and Washington. He was a member of Australia’s
delegation to the San Francisco Conference of 1945 that saw the establishment of the
UN, and a UN delegate from 1948, and was therefore involved in the formation of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Atomic Energy
Commission. Following an intermission in Canberra from 1949 during which he was
involved in the ANZUS negotiations, Harry became Consul-General and UN
representative in Geneva (1953–56) and Australian Commissioner in Singapore (1956–
57). Again, Harry returned to Canberra where his intelligence and external affairs
background equipped him well as Director of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service
(ASIS) (1957–60). From 1960–65, he was First Assistant Secretary in External Affairs,
during which time he led several of Australia’s delegations to the UN. Within the
Department, he was responsible for managing Australia’s Antarctic policy and treaty
relations. 13
Harry went on to serve Australia in several senior posts as Australian Ambassador to Belgium and the 13
European Community (1965–68), South Vietnam (1968–70) during the Vietnam War, the Federal Republic of Germany (1971–75), and as Permanent Representative to the UN (1975–78). In his retirement, he was Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) from 1979–81, and also published numerous works, including in Esperanto. Harry was made CBE in 1963 and AC in 1980: John Harry, “Benign master of diplomacy;” and John Legge, “Obituary Ralph Harry, 1917–2002,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 57, no. 1 (2003): 151–2. While he did not discuss the Cuban Crisis in his diaries for 1962–64 (which are scrapbooks of ephemera rather than personal journals) nor his three memoirs, the latter are insightful particularly regarding his diplomatic postings: 1962 diary, Box 11, Papers of Ralph Harry, 1941–1988, MS Acc 08/180 (unprocessed instalment), NLA (I am grateful to Kate Boesen, Reference Librarian, Pictures and Manuscripts Branch, for facilitating access to this aspect of Harry’s collection); Ralph Harry, No Man Is a Hero: Pioneers of Australian Diplomacy (Sydney: Arts Management, 1997); Ralph Harry, The North Was Always Near, Australians in Asia No. 13 (Nathan, Queensland: Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, November 1994); and Ralph Harry, The Diplomat who Laughed (Richmond, Victoria: Hutchinson Group, 1983).
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In a memorandum accompanying a copy of the treaty, Harry provided specific advice to
Barwick on Australia’s obligations to the US under ANZUS in relation to the Cuban
Crisis. He began with Article III of the treaty: “The Parties will consult together
whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence
or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.” The US, Harry advised, 14
was not obliged to consult Australia regarding the crisis because “the threat from Cuba
could not be regarded as ‘in the Pacific’.” He then turned his attention to Article IV, 15
which states: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of
the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would
act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” 16
“Armed attack” is defined in Article V of the Treaty and is deemed to include “an armed
attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories
under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in
the Pacific.” Harry advised that a literal reading of Article IV (incorporating the 17
definition of armed attack in Article V), could mean that “an armed attack outside the
Pacific would not bring ANZUS into action.” Nevertheless, US metropolitan territory
had not been subjected to an armed attack. 18
Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America [ANZUS Treaty], 14
signed 1 September 1951, San Francisco (entry into force generally 29 April 1952), Australian Treaty Series 1952, no. 2, (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service), Article III.
National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAA): A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, memorandum on 15
“Australian Obligations under the ANZUS Treaty in relation to the Cuban Situation,” Ralph Harry to Barwick, 23 October 1962.
ANZUS Treaty, Article IV.16
ANZUS Treaty, Article V.17
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, memorandum on “Australian Obligations under the ANZUS Treaty in 18
relation to the Cuban Situation,” Harry to Barwick, 23 October 1962.
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Harry was an expert on the treaty and he delivered his opinion to Barwick with
confidence, but it seems that the pressure of an afternoon parliamentary sitting left little
time for Harry to seek the views of others. For it was only after Harry provided Barwick
with his memorandum that he sent a note to Forsyth suggesting to his colleague that he
may think it worthwhile to obtain the opinion of Alf Body, the Department’s Legal
Adviser, on Australia’s ANZUS obligations to the US in the Cuban Crisis. Forsyth 19
contacted Body who, on the same day, provided a short yet comprehensive
interpretation of Australia’s ANZUS commitments. According to Body, the difficulty
was to know whether the phrase “in the Pacific area” contained in Article IV regarding
an armed attack justified the reference to metropolitan territory in Article V. He
concluded: “In short I rather think that Article IV is the paramount article. i.e. that the
armed attack has to be in the Pacific area to bring the Treaty into play.” However, in his
final remark, which he noted in parentheses, Body cautioned against a literal
interpretation of ANZUS: “(But would Australia wish to employ the interpretation in the
event of an attack, say, on Australia’s west coast).” When Forsyth subsequently 20
provided Barwick with a detailed departmental briefing on the Cuban Crisis, he
reiterated Harry’s initial advice and added Body’s caution: “Whether the mainland of
U.S.A. is thus excluded is not perfectly clear and we might not wish to exclude parts of
Australia which are not ‘in the Pacific’ (e.g. Western Australia, South Australia, etc.).” 21
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, handwritten note attached to memorandum on “Australian Obligations 19
under the ANZUS Treaty in relation to the Cuban Situation,” Harry to Forsyth, 23 October 1962. I am grateful to Garry Woodard for identifying Alf Body as the person whose opinion was sought and to Allan Patience for facilitating Mr Woodard’s assistance.
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, handwritten note regarding memorandum on “Australian Obligations 20
under the ANZUS Treaty in relation to the Cuban Situation,” Alf Body to Forsyth, 23 October 1962. NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, Secret paper titled “The Cuban Crisis,” prepared by Forsyth for 21
Barwick, undated, 5.
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The Indian Ocean is clearly not in the Pacific and previously, security dilemmas
affecting Australia’s western seaboard or lines of communication had been left to
Australia to manage with the UK. The British withdrawal from the region and the
extension of US power into the Indian Ocean, particularly the installation of the US
naval communications station at North West Cape in 1963, later became convincing
evidence that Australia’s west coast was within the treaty’s scope. Also, during
Confrontation, Canberra received assurances from Washington in 1964 that Malaya,
Singapore and Northern Borneo were considered in “the Pacific area”, which would
have been deemed encouraging in terms of the treaty’s geographical application. By
1968, Australian international relations scholar, T. B. Millar, was certain there were no
geographical restrictions on the treaty area to Australia’s detriment: “The United States
is not going to mark a spot on the Australian coast as being the limit of application of
ANZUS.” But at the time of the Cuban Crisis, External Affairs officials were 22
uncertain as to the geographical boundaries of ANZUS.
While these legal and geo-strategic interpretations of the Treaty would have been
stimulating reading for Barwick, the lawyer-cum-minister, the fact remained that it was
unclear whether Australia was legally obliged to commit to the US over the Cuban
Crisis. What is clear, however, is that these External Affairs officials were acutely aware
of Australia’s interests in terms of its commitment to its American ally. The officials
were guarded in their advice: they were careful not to over-commit Australia to the US,
that is, beyond its treaty obligations. Nor did they want to breach Australia’s obligations
T. B. Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1968), 119–20.22
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or be too fastidious in their interpretation in case this encouraged any reluctance on the
part of the US to aid Australia’s defence in the future. As Beale summarised (albeit in
relation to Australia’s involvement in Vietnam), “it was not the letter of the ANZUS
Treaty upon which we had to rely, but the spirit in which it was responded to by the
other party in time of need.” Millar added that the significance of ANZUS also lay in 23
what other governments—who were not parties to the Treaty but involved in a situation
with one of the parties—thought about the nature of the Treaty relationship. These 24
elements, of course, continue to change with time and circumstances. As Millar put it:
No treaty is static. Every relationship must be continuously cultivated if it is to be maintained. At any point in time, one party to a treaty may appear to be giving more than it is receiving (or, ‘producing’ more than it is ‘consuming’) but presumably it would not continue to do this if national interests were not simultaneously or potentially (in its own estimate) being served. 25
However, any attempts to cultivate and maintain the Australia-US alliance under
ANZUS in the years immediately preceding the Cuban Crisis were dependent on the
efforts of, and relationships between, Australian and American politicians, diplomats,
and public servants. Although the ANZUS Council agreed to assemble annually at its
first meeting in August 1952, the Treaty was not considered sufficiently relevant to
justify a meeting from October 1959 to May 1962. This was the longest period 26
between meetings. It confirmed for the Australian government that, if it wanted to be
better informed of US policy, routine diplomatic contact was inadequate. While the 27
Howard Beale, This Inch of Time: Memoirs of Politics and Diplomacy (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne 23
University Press, 1977), 167. Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy, 120.24
Ibid.25
Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, 143; and Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy, 121.26
Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, 144.27
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ministers (Barwick; US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; and New Zealand PM and
Minister of External Affairs, Keith Holyoake) agreed that the Council meeting on 8–9
May 1962 in Canberra had been “extremely useful in further strengthening the close and
friendly working relationships,” they also agreed “to take advantage of their presence at
other international conferences to consult in between regular meetings of the
Council.” Furthermore, the ANZUS Council was organised so that it could meet at any 28
time, and while it was expected that it would not be convened regularly, it could meet in
an emergency or crisis. The Cuban crisis, however, did not prompt a meeting of the 29
ANZUS Council.
This was not the first occasion that Australia was cautious about its commitment to
assist the US under ANZUS. In 1954 the Australian Government refused to support a
proposed US intervention in Indo-China. The US proposed an agreement that would 30
make Australian military assistance automatic following “overt unprovoked military
aggression in the Pacific.” However, the Australian Government did not want to be
locked into a position. Rather, it wanted to retain flexibility to evaluate the
circumstances in which it would decide to use armed force. Tange described the
Australian standpoint:
ANZUS Council, “ANZUS Council Meeting: Communique,” in Current Notes on International Affairs 28
(Current Notes), vol. 33, no. 5, May 1962, 7. Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, 143.29
Millar, Australia’s Foreign Policy, 121.30
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As we understand… what they are seeking is to ensure unity of action if there is Chinese intervention in Indo-China or aggression elsewhere… We agree in the principle… that there should be joint resistance… and we would wish to do nothing to discourage resolute action by the Americans to defend the security of Asia… This however does not exhaust the situations which in American eyes might constitute ‘unprovoked and overt aggression.’ 31
Essentially, Australia did not wish its participation in US military campaigns in Asia to
be inevitable. 32
Even if the Treaty was interpreted rather narrowly, it was recognised in a discussion in
1954 between Australian and American officials regarding Chinese aggression in
Southeast Asia that some situations in neighbouring regions may have a spill over effect
into the Pacific, thereby activating the treaty. Australian officials reported that the US
felt that although the Treaty was “strictly confined” to the Pacific, effects of Chinese
intervention in Indo-china would rapidly extend into the ANZUS area and, “therefore,
[were] a matter in which we were directly interested and on which the U.S. was obliged
to consult us.” While a spill over from the Cuban Crisis into the Pacific and the 33
potential activation of ANZUS was not a policy consideration contemplated by
Australian officials in October 1962, External Affairs officials did consider the
“Letter from Tange, Secretary of External Affairs, to Sir Philip McBride, acting Minister for External 31
Affairs, June 9, 1954. ‘Geneva Conference–Indo China. Action in the Event of Overt Chinese Communist Aggression–United States’ Proposed Minute for Adoption by Members of the ANZUS Treaty,’ NAA: A5954, CS 2297/5,” quoted in Christine M. Leah, Australia and the Bomb (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 25.
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 26. On the applicability of ANZUS in relation to Chinese aggression 32
towards Indo-China, see ibid., 27. “Inward cablegram from Australian embassy in Washington, DC, June 5, 1954. Text of informal 33
‘talking paper’ given by Dulles to Munro and Spender. In ‘Geneva Conference–Indo China. Action in the Event of Overt Chinese Communist Aggression–United States,’ Proposed minute for adoption by members of the ANZUS Treaty, NAA: A5954, CS 2297/5,” quoted in Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 27.
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possibility of NATO forces becoming involved in the crisis and its escalation into global
war.
In addition to the ANZUS Treaty, Australian officials analysed the applicability of the
North Atlantic Treaty to the Cuban Crisis on 23 October 1962. In the view of the
Department of External Affairs, although Cuba was outside the area covered by the
North Atlantic Treaty, US claims about Cuba’s offensive capacity, which could
seemingly be used to strike the mainland of North America, meant the crisis was clearly
within its scope. Under Article 4 of the Treaty: “The Parties will consult together 34
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence
or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” Furthermore, Article 5 of the Treaty
states:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them… will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. 35
Geographically, an armed attack is deemed to include, according to Article 6 (1), the
territory of the parties in Europe or North America or the islands under the parties’
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, [External Affairs, specific author/s unknown], Paper titled “Cuba. 34
Points for Public Presentation” with annotations, 23 October 1962, 2–3. “The North Atlantic Treaty: Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 35
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm (accessed 20 November 2015).
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jurisdiction in the North Atlantic, north of the Tropic of Cancer (a handwritten note
highlighted that “the tropic runs 30 miles north of Havana”). 36
In light of these Articles, External Affairs concluded that the applicability of the Treaty
was not limited to security threats from the Soviet Union or its European satellites.
Moreover, in addition to the US, NATO members “would clearly be involved” in the
Cuban Crisis if the US invoked Article 4 of the Treaty, and also by Articles 5 and 6 of
the Treaty following a Cuban attack on the US or US forces within the Treaty area. 37
Officials also noted Kennedy’s comments in his national address. As stated in chapter
one, the President had declared that the US would “regard any nuclear missile launched
from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet
Union on the United States requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
Union.” 38
Although they had little information about the reactions of NATO members to US plans
for “a blockade of Cuba,” External Affairs officials were of the general impression that
NATO members, “whatever the public attitudes that they may have adopted, have grave
misgivings about [the] United States handling of the Cuban situation.” They also
specifically noted the misgivings of the British, since the Foreign Office emphasised to
Ibid.; and NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, [External Affairs, specific author/s unknown], Paper titled 36
“Cuba. Points for Public Presentation” with annotations, 23 October 1962, 3. The annotation was repeated on the next page but it noted it was “about” 30 miles.
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, [External Affairs, specific author/s unknown], Paper titled “Cuba. 37
Points for Public Presentation” with annotations, 23 October 1962, 4. Ibid.; and John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (JFK Library): Papers of John F. 38
Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Speech Files, JFKPOF-041-018, “Radio and television report to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962,” http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-041-018.aspx (accessed 3 August 2015), 3.
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an Australian representative in London “the absence of evidence that Cuba has received
offensive weapons from the Communist Bloc.” The Foreign Office, in other words, 39
was not convinced by US claims. One reason for these misgivings may have been the
potential for NATO to become involved in a situation about which it had not been
properly consulted.
Since the 1970s, historian Joan Hoff has described the modus operandi of US foreign
affairs as “independent internationalism”. Hoff argued that “the country’s first
inclination for most of [the twentieth] century has been to act unilaterally whenever
possible and to cooperate with other nations only when absolutely necessary.” Only
when the US was unable or unwilling to solve a diplomatic issue through unilateral
action, did it look for cooperative methods to pursue its objectives. The way in which 40
the US handled the Cuban Crisis and engaged with its allies about its course of action
strongly reflects independent internationalism.
The ExComm secretly deliberated on the Cuban situation for a week before President
Kennedy unilaterally determined the US course of action. As discussed further below,
his initial, and unilateral, decision was to establish a quarantine. Subsequently, Kennedy
issued a three-part offer to Khrushchev, which Khrushchev accepted. It included: a
public deal wherein the US promised not to invade Cuba if the Soviet Union removed
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, [External Affairs, specific author/s unknown], Paper titled “Cuba. 39
Points for Public Presentation” with annotations, 23 October 1962, 4. Joan Hoff, “The American Century: From Sarajevo to Sarajevo,” Diplomatic History 23, no. 2 (1999): 40
286.
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its missiles; a private ultimatum that the US would attack Cuba within 24 hours if the
Soviet Union rejected the offer; and a secret promise to remove US missiles from
Turkey within six months. Again, each component of this offer represented a unilateral 41
decision and action by the US. When the US corresponded with other nations during the
crisis, either bilaterally or multilaterally through the UN and Organization of American
States (OAS), this was to seek endorsement for its course of action; it was not genuine
cooperation. Kennedy’s letter to Menzies in which he sought Australia’s support for the
US resolution in the UN, which was discussed in Chapter 1, is a case in point. In the
crisis, the US informed its allies of its course of action over Cuba; it did not consult
them.
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan wrote in his diary that during the crisis,
President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and National Security adviser
McGeorge Bundy had been “in continuous touch” with him and the British Foreign
Secretary Alec Douglas-Home. Additionally, British Ambassador to the US David
Ormsby-Gore was frequently at the White House. Macmillan’s comments were in
response to claims by the Opposition that the Kennedy Administration had failed to
consult the British Government on the crisis. But regular information sharing is not 42
consultation. Nevertheless, Macmillan felt that “The European and other allies had no
real grievance about non-consultation.” He believed that the Kennedy Administration’s
“About the Crisis: History of the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Cuban Missile Crisis, Belfer Center for 41
Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/background/ (accessed 12 August 2015).
Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries: Prime Minister and After, 1957–66, Peter Catterall, ed. 42
(London: Macmillan, 2011), 517–8 (4 November 1962).
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decision to send Dean Acheson to Europe to brief the NATO Council “was more than
correctness demanded.” 43
Australia was unperturbed by the unilateral action of the US and its lack of consultation
with allies. In some respects, it was due to officials lacking awareness of Australia’s less
privileged position. When London’s Daily Telegraph cabled Australia’s Department of
Prime Minister on 24 October and questioned whether it was aware of the crisis on 19
October, an adviser on foreign affairs and defence, Allan T. Griffith, simply supposed 44
the newspaper was “sniffing for a ‘lack of consultation’ story.” Griffith mistakenly
assumed that Australia was notified of the crisis on the same day as the UK. This issue 45
of consultation was raised in Parliament by the ALP Member for Hughes, Les Johnson.
He asked Menzies whether Australia had conferred with the UK prior to his
parliamentary statement and, if not:
Is this the first time that Australia has taken a position capable of involving this country in war without consulting the United Kingdom? Does this development signify that Australia has cut its traditional ties with the United Kingdom and now slavishly follows the policies of the United States of America? 46
Menzies responded that Johnson was
Ibid., 517 (4 November 1962).43
See NAA: A1209, 1962/912 (folio 41), telegram (unnumbered) with annotations, Daily Telegraph to 44
PM’s press office, 24 October 1962. See ibid., memorandum, Allan T. Griffith to John Bunting, 24 October 1962.45
Les Johnson (ALP, Member for Hughes), CPD, House, vol. 37, 25 October 1962, 1939.46
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in error in thinking that on all occasions of this kind we are under an obligation to consult some other country before we express our own views. Frequently we have done so; sometimes we have not done so. This was a matter of singular moment and of some urgency. We gave it consideration at once — the same morning. We did not propose to remain silent on a matter of this kind or to fail to discharge the duty to inform honourable members of the view taken by the Government. 1
What Menzies did not, of course, disclose was that Canberra had attempted to contact
Whitehall, but was unsuccessful. The Menzies Government had therefore opted to
respond promptly to the US regarding the crisis, unaware of the British position. The
Opposition thus inferred from Menzies’ apparent alacrity an uncritical adherence to US
foreign policy.
The issue of consultation on the Cuban Crisis had no effect on the Government’s
formulation of its policy. Since World War II, Australia had done its utmost to involve
itself in the strategic and defence planning of its great and powerful friends, but to no
avail. One report in 1955 noted “we are wasting our time” attempting to find out 2
information on US planning; “We have been trying to open a mythical door to the room
where this is done. There is a door but no such room. The door leads to the garden
path!” Past experience had taught Australia that obtaining information from the US was 3
an achievement in itself, let alone being consulted on it. Seemingly, the Menzies
Government did not expect to be consulted by the Kennedy Administration over its
Ibid.1
On Australia’s unsuccessful attempts to obtain information on US planning in Southeast Asia, as well as 2
NATO planning, see Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 16, 26 and 123. On the difficulties faced by Australian Ambassador to the US in the 1950s, Percy Spender, in assessing American defence policy, see David Lowe, Australian Between Empires: The Life of Percy Spender (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010), 154. “‘Review of ANZAM Planning by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.’ File No. 4 from Mr Casey’s 3
discussions in Washington at ANZUS Council meeting, 1955, NAA: A5954, CS1465/1,” quoted in Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 26.
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course of action in Cuba. This was possibly because, unlike its allies in NATO, it was
less likely that it would become involved. Australia, therefore, was not perturbed when
it was not consulted. This is confirmed by the absence of archival records to the
contrary. It is also supported by the following cogent assessment of US-Australia
relations in this period by former US Ambassador to Australia from 1973–75, Marshall
Green, whom we met earlier in this chapter:
During my time in Australia I guess that my principal task was one of trying to redefine our relationship, which had been too much a dominant US relationship, with the United States telling Australia what to do. The whole question of consultation was involved. And by consultation I did not mean merely advance notice but really consulting. This became a really important issue. We failed on occasion to do it, and it caused a real blowup [sic] in Australia. 4
Green was ambassador at a very difficult juncture in Australian-American relations. He
assumed his post shortly after the Australian Labor Party (ALP), under the leadership of
Gough Whitlam, took office after 23 years in Opposition. For 17 of those years,
Menzies was PM. Australia-US relations were much friendlier under Coalition than 5
Labor governments. Some Labor politicians were critical of the US and its policies, 6
and the Coalition accused the ALP of being anti-American on numerous occasions, as is
discussed in the next chapter. Such criticism caused an early and serious rift between the
Marshall Green interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 13 December 1988 (initial interview date), 4
transcript, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, http://adst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/Green-Marshall.pdf (accessed 22 July 2015), 121. The Liberal Party and Country Party, which formed the Coalition Government, had been in office from 5
1949–72: “Prime Ministers and Opposition Leaders: Prime Ministers since 1901,” Australian Electoral Commission, http://www.aec.gov.au/Elections/Australian_Electoral_History/pm.htm (accessed 11 August 2015). Marshall Green interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 13 December 1988, 118.6
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Nixon Administration and the Whitlam Government, which prompted the need to
redefine the alliance. This partly explains this shift in consultative behaviour. 7
In his oral history, Green implied that, before Whitlam came to power, the US did not
make an effort to consult Australia. This is consistent both with Hoff’s thesis on US
independent internationalism and the Menzies Government’s lack of expectations or
concerns over having not been consulted by the US on the Cuban situation. Green also
characterised the alliance in this earlier period as being under US domination. It is
noteworthy that this is an American perspective of the relationship. While his
assessment is not entirely fair or accurate in that it suggests that Australia was
subordinate to the US, it does portray the inequality in the relationship that Australia at
times experienced in, for example, the difficulties it faced in obtaining information on
strategic and defence planning. As the next section shows, Australia also had trouble
obtaining information from the UK, in this case on the crisis, with whom it did seek
greater consultation.
Returning to the issue of the potential involvement of NATO in the Cuban Crisis,
External Affairs officials considered this problematic for Australia. While Australia was
not a NATO member, the possible involvement of key allies in Europe and North
America exacerbated Australian concerns about its own security. As demonstrated
further below, External Affairs officials were anxious about the capacity of its allies to
Ibid., 118–24. See James Curran, Unholy Fury: Whitlam and Nixon at War (Carlton, Victoria: 7
Melbourne University Press, 2015).
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assist Australia to defend against threats in its own region if its allies became entangled
in the Cuban situation. Also, uncertainty over the level of support Australia was
expected to provide to the Western allies should the crisis escalate would likely have
been of concern.
Reese accurately described NATO as “both a model and a menace” for Australia. It was 8
the type of security arrangement that Australia wanted for the Pacific and with the US,
which eventually culminated in the ANZUS Treaty. However, NATO highlighted 9
Australia’s geographic isolation. The states with which Australia liked to associate in
international politics—the UK, the US, and Canada—belonged to an exclusive
European and North American defence organisation. It implied that American and
British attention would be centred on Europe to the neglect of the Pacific, and important
policy decisions would be made in a forum where Australian views would not be
heard. Forums where Australian officials could share views with the US, such as the 10
ANZUS consultations, occasionally appeared to the American participants in the early
years “to consume time rather pointlessly”: much more was happening in Europe,
Northeast Asia, and the Middle East than in the Pacific. The Australian Government 11
was concerned that the US and UK would increasingly be preoccupied with Europe,
especially in the event of conflict with the Soviet Union, and neither therefore would be
able to assist Australia to defend against threats to its security. This was a point Tange
Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, 109.8
The connection between NATO and ANZUS is reflected, for example, by the fact that the treaties are 9
similarly worded, which is a result of External Affairs official Harry having lent heavily on the North Atlantic Treaty when he wrote the first draft of ANZUS:
Reese, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, 109–10.10
Coral Bell, Australia’s Alliance Options: Prospect and Retrospect in a World of Change (Canberra: The 11
Australian Foreign Policy Publications Program, ANU, 1991), 28.
! 213
consistently stressed, and one that was raised by External Affairs officials with 12
relation to Cuba and during the Cuban Crisis.
On 6 September 1962, the Australian Embassy, Washington, highlighted to the
Department of External Affairs, Canberra, the volatility of Berlin in light of Soviet
activity in Cuba. The Embassy’s cablegram was based on an account that senior
journalist at the Washington Post, Chalmers Roberts, had received from Republican
leader, Senator Everett Dirksen, following bipartisan discussions with Kennedy and
Rusk regarding Cuban developments (4–5 September). A key point that emerged from
those discussions was “Any move on the U.S.A’s part could bring a reaction in the
Caribbean and Latin America and could accelerate action in Berlin—and the Berlin
situation was quite critical.” Others in attendance at the White House noted that
Kennedy placed particular emphasis on the potential for the Soviet Union to react in
Berlin “and that he mentioned South-East Asia as well.” Thus, just weeks before news 13
of the Cuban crisis broke, US sources indicated that the Kennedy Administration
believed the Cuban situation could prompt a Soviet reaction in Australia’s region.
On 9 October 1962, the Australian Embassy, Washington, cabled the Department of
External Affairs, Canberra, about its meeting with William G. Bowdler from the Office
of Regional Political Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and Robert T. Follestad
Leah, Australia and the Bomb, 16.12
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.21907), Australian Embassy, Washington (Washington 13
Embassy) to Department of External Affairs, Canberra (External Affairs), 6 September 1962, 1–2.
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from the Office of Cuban Affairs. Bowdler and Follestad advised that the US State 14
Department had been satisfied with the most recent meeting of the OAS (2–3 October)
where foreign ministers acknowledged that “Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba presented
the most urgent and serious problem in the Americas.” The Cuban crisis would 15
demonstrate just how serious the situation was. Consequently, in Bowdler’s view, the
US “needed all the cooperation it could get from all of its allies,” wrote the Embassy.
For Cuba was dangerous, not only in terms of “the global conflict” but because it gave
the Soviet Union the opportunity to antagonise opinion within the US, the Embassy
continued in its summary of Bowdler’s comments. The final paragraph of the cablegram
brought the problem of Cuba closer to home for Australia:
It was possible to envisage a situation where United States public opinion would become so emotional as to force the Administration to reallocate its priorities in foreign policy to the detriment of key areas such as Berlin and South East Asia. 16
The Government was therefore on notice as to the serious effect that Cuba could have
on global and regional stability. Significantly, less than a fortnight before the Cuban
crisis, Australian and US officials had already discussed the potential for Cuba to force
the US to reallocate its priorities; in other words, shift resources away from Australia’s
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.24933), Washington Embassy to External Affairs, 9 14
October 1962, 1. The Embassy simply referred to “Bowdler (Inter-American Affairs desk officer) and Follestad (Cuban desk officer).” Their full names and offices have been inserted here. For Bowdler, see “Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume XII, American Republics: List of Persons,” U.S. Department of State Archive, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xii/35277.htm (accessed 13 March 2016). It is likely that the Follestad from the Office of Cuban Affairs in October 1962 was Robert Follestad who, in March 1963, was the Officer in Charge of the Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in March 1963: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Edward C. Keefer, Charles S. Sampson, and Louis J. Smith, eds. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), Document 302: “Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v11/d302 (accessed 13 March 2016).
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.24933), Washington Embassy to External Affairs, 9 15
October 1962, 1. Ibid., 2.16
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region. The onset of the nuclear crisis would therefore have made the reallocation of US
priorities all the more likely.
For Australia, the potential for a Soviet reaction in Southeast Asia and the possible
reallocation of US priorities away from the region was of great concern, which the
Cuban crisis only served to heighten. In other words, it was critical that the crisis did
not deflect American attention from Australia’s region. External Affairs informed
Australia’s embassies accordingly: “[i]t may be feared that the Russians will seek, under
cover of American preoccupation with Cuba, to move against Berlin.” This was 17
deeply concerning to the Menzies Government because it needed “to prevent a situation
arising which would concentrate United States attention on the Caribbean and Europe,
and thus reduce her capability to take effective action, if necessary in South-East
Asia.” As shown in the previous chapter, Australia sought to maintain a US presence 18
in its region to assist it to defend against communist threats.
In addition to Barwick and Tange’s concerns about the quarantine, any precedent it may
set, and its implications for Australia’s nuclear ambitions, External Affairs officials also
had misgivings regarding its legality. Tange was briefed on blockades by Department
officials and advised that state practice seems to have overruled the views of theorists.
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, paper on “Points for Public Presentation” with annotations (author 17
and audience unknown; likely Harry or Forsyth to Barwick), 23 October 1962, 2. NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, outward cablegram (O.19418), External Affairs to Australian Mission 18
to UN, New York, and Australian Embassy, Washington, 20 October 1962 [sic], correct date: 29 October 1962, 2. See also NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 2, outward cablegram (O.19506), External Affairs to Australian embassies in New York (UN), London, Lagos, Dar Es Salaam, Paris, The Hague, Cairo, Tokyo, and all other posts except Dili, 27 October 1962, 3.
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When blockades are executed under the UN Charter by united navies to prevent war,
their imposition, Tange was advised, is serious but justified; beyond the UN Charter,
many jurists deemed it illegal. Forsyth wrote on Tange’s briefing paper: “no clear
positive legal basis appears.” British PM, Harold Macmillan, also privately expressed 19
the same opinion, albeit more firmly. In his diary, he referred to the blockade as
“patently ‘illegal’.” Macmillan correctly predicted that, consequently, the blockade
would “cause a great deal of trouble with neutral and even with friendly countries.” 20
Although the timing of the briefing paper to Tange is unclear, it is highly unlikely that
the legality of the quarantine was overlooked by Barwick. As noted earlier in this
chapter and Chapter 2, Barwick had a supreme legal mind. It is probable that the
questionable legality of the quarantine shaped the Government decision's to support the
US resolution in the UN. The Organization’s approval of the US resolution would have
given US actions legal sanction, and therefore, legitimised them. As shown in Chapter
2, Barwick and Trade Minister, John McEwen, were specific in the language the Prime
Minister should employ in his parliamentary statement on the crisis. Chapter 6 shows
however, that Australia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, James Plimsoll, was less
calculated in articulating the nature of Australia’s support.
The quarantine posed further legal dilemmas in terms of international maritime law. The
Department of External Affairs later informed its embassies that “the ‘stop and search’
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, briefing paper to Arthur Tange, External Affairs, 23 October 1962.19
Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries, 509–10 (22 October).20
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of ships could be in conflict with doctrines of the freedom of the high seas, and may be
challengeable under international law,” and subsequently, it advised them of the
Australian Government’s “reservations on accepting the principle of a ‘quarantine’.” 21
Officials in the Department of Prime Minister also had misgivings about the quarantine.
Nimmo, who had delivered the documents on the crisis to Menzies at home early on the
morning of 23 October, queried with Bunting whether US allies including Australia,
however unlikely, may be asked to assist with the “blockade” by providing ships. He
cynically remarked to Bunting: “These days, the Americans are continually looking for
friends to join with them in their various enterprises.” Nimmo was reluctant to
contribute to the quarantine and directly assist the US in the crisis. He suggested to
Bunting that “any endorsement by Cabinet of the latest U.S. action should be in terms
of support of a principle which in no way leaves us open to be called upon by the U.S.
to play a part in these physical activities.” There may not have been a clear legal basis 22
for Australia to become involved in the Cuban Crisis under the ANZUS Treaty, but
Nimmo was certainly reluctant to make any commitments on moral grounds. His
reluctance, coupled with a careful legal reading of Australia’s ANZUS obligations by
External Affairs officials, demonstrates a lack of enthusiasm on the part of Australian
public servants in wanting to assist the US in the crisis.
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, outward cablegram (O.19418), External Affairs to Australian Mission 21
to UN, New York and Australian Embassy, Washington, 20 October 1962, correct date: 29 October 1962. NAA: A1209, 1962/912, J. F. Nimmo to John Bunting, Department of Prime Minister, 23 October 22
1962.
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Aside from its questionable legality, the quarantine was also a cause for concern insofar
as it set a precedent. For some in the Menzies Government, a quarantine could have
ramifications for Australia should it host American bases and weapons in the future, as
discussed in the previous chapter. This exact issue was raised by Soviet delegates to the
UN, B. Ivanov, Political Affairs Counsellor of the Soviet Permanent Mission, and V.
Lessiovski, Deputy Director of the Programme Division of the Soviet’s Technical
Assistance Board, with Australian diplomat, Richard A. Woolcott, at the UN in New
York. A career diplomat, Woolcott's first posting was, interestingly, to the Australian
Embassy in Moscow. According to Woolcott, Ivanov asked him “what, for example, 23
would happen if the Soviet Union imposed a blockade on say, Turkey or on Australia if
she was to accept American nuclear weapons on her territory and if the Soviet navy at
the request of China imposed a naval blockade of Australia.” As Chapter 3 24
demonstrated, this issue had been contemplated by officials in External Affairs. In his
response, Woolcott focused on the undoing of the “delicate nuclear balance” that, to
date, had been maintained between the US and the Soviet Union. This supposed 25
“balance” and the dynamic between the superpowers during the crisis and the Cold War
more generally, was a subject on which he would later reflect. In his memoir, Woolcott
wrote that the crisis
He was later Ambassador to Indonesia, the Philippines, and the UN, as well as High Commissioner to 23
Malaysia, Ghana, and Singapore. From 1988–92, he was the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Richard Woolcott, The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings (Sydney: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2003); and “Richard Woolcott,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/aiia-authors/richard-woolcott/ (accessed 14 July 2017).
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 3, record of conversation, Woolcott with Ivanov and Lessiovski, 25 24
October 1962. Ibid.25
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offered a good example of how a handful of people in the White House and the Kremlin, absorbed by the great struggle for global influence and caught up in the politics and exercise of power, would pursue their own interests, notwithstanding the fact that their decisions could affect the whole world.
The pursuit of national interests was a challenge facing every state. The Soviet officials
at the UN had hit the crux of Australia’s dilemma: how could it support the US in the
crisis in a way that furthered its interests? What effect would narrow support for the US
have on its most significant ally? Would Australia be abandoned when it needed the
defence assistance of the US or would it find itself entrapped in a conflict?
The reactions of Australian public servants towards US actions over Cuba reveals
volumes about alliance dynamics. According to Michael Mandelbaum:
Allies may quarrel about anything. The most serious, most basic, and most common source of friction, however, is what is after all the heart of any alliance: a state’s commitment to fight for its ally. That commitment poses two dangers; every member of an alliance has, potentially, two fears. One is that the alliance will not work, that he will be abandoned in his hour of need. The other is that the alliance will work too well, that he will be entrapped in a war he does not wish to fight. 1
These concepts of the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment were further
developed by Glenn H. Snyder, who referred to this as “the alliance security dilemma.” 2
Nimmo’s reluctance to contribute to the quarantine and provide direct support to the US
in the crisis is a classic example of the fear of entrapment. He did not want to see
Australia “called upon by the U.S. to play a part in these physical activities.” In other
words, he did not want Australia to become “entrapped” in the crisis. Mandelbaum
Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima 1
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 151. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1997). I am grateful to 2
Jeffrey Knopf at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey for drawing my attention to Snyder’s scholarship and its relationship to my research.
!220
acknowledged that “Entrapment is extraordinarily dangerous when it means being
swept into a nuclear conflict.” However, it was US policy, not the nuclear nature of the 3
crisis, which seems to have been the basis of Nimmo’s reluctance. He implied that
Australia should not become involved in the crisis because it represented another
example of US adventurism. As the next chapter demonstrates, this was an issue
Australia experienced first-hand regarding its trade relationship with Cuba.
Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution, 152.3
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5
Australia-Cuba Trade:
An Irritant in Australia-US Relations 1
Before the 1980s, scholars of international relations and diplomatic history in Australia
had been inclined to stress the issues of conflict and power over the study of the
international political economy. Since then, however, scholars and policymakers in
Australia have highlighted the increased significance of the “‘economic dimension’ in
Australia’s international relations.” David Lee wrote in 1995 that “It would be
unthinkable now to think of offering an account of Australian foreign policy which did
not address both its geo-economic and geo-strategic dimensions.” It also would be 2
remiss to do so in this thesis. Thus, with strategic considerations having been examined
in Chapters 2 to 4, this chapter focuses on trade and its connection to the Australian
Government’s policy on the Cuban Crisis.
In Chapter 2, it was noted that when Cabinet deliberated on the crisis, Prime Minister
Menzies asked whether Australia had any trade with Cuba. The Minister for Trade, John
McEwen, stated that he was not aware of any. With that, no further consideration was
given to the issue. This chapter confirms, however, that Australia and Cuba were 3
trading and that Australia was benefitting significantly from increased sugar exports
Inspiration for the title of this chapter was drawn from Guto Thomas’ doctoral dissertation title: Guto 1
Rhys Thomas, “Trade and Shipping to Cuba 1961–1963: An Irritant in Anglo-American Relations,” (PhD diss., University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2001), 125. David Lee, Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia’s Postwar Foreign and Defence 2
Policy (Canberra: Allen & Unwin in association with the Department of International Relations, ANU, 1995), 1. National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAA): A11099, 1/59, Cabinet Notebook, 23 October 1962.3
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courtesy of the trade embargo the US had imposed on Cuba. Moreover, this chapter
demonstrates that Australian-Cuban trade had the potential to cause a rift in the
Australia-US alliance. Accordingly, McEwen’s response to Menzies, and the silence of
Minister for External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, who was also aware of Australian-
Cuban trade and the political issues it posed, are interrogated in this chapter. While the
Cabinet did not discuss during the crisis Australia’s trade with Cuba (nor with the US as
a result of its embargo on Cuba), remarkably, this appears to have had no effect on the
Government’s policy on the crisis nor did its policy appear to have had an effect on its
trade relationships. Matters relating to Australian-Cuban trade under discussion at the
time of the crisis were treated as separate issues. Australia, it is worth noting, continued
to trade with Cuba after the crisis.
The chapter begins with an overview of the Australian-Cuban trade relationship from
the 1950s to the early 1960s. This is the first time that relationship has been
documented. An outline of the US embargo on Cuba follows. This explains the trade 4
restrictions the US imposed on Cuba and the extent of its sensitivity towards its allies
trading with the Caribbean island. These opening sections provide the necessary
background to the main discussion on matters concerning Australian-Cuban trade under
the US embargo, deliberated on before and during the Cuban Crisis.
Moreover, a history of Australian-Cuban relations has not been published. Studies on Australian foreign 4
policy that refer to Cuba do so under the umbrella of the Caribbean, and make few, if any, meaningful references to Australia’s relations with the island, let alone examine the history of that relationship. See, for example, Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations: In the World of the 1990s (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 312. Additionally, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) website only provides a historical background on Australia-Cuban relations since the two states formally established diplomatic relations in 1989, and concentrates on events since 2009 when the Australian and Cuban foreign ministries signed a Memorandum of Understanding: “Cuba: Cuba country brief,” DFAT, Australian Government, http://dfat.gov.au/geo/cuba/Pages/cuba-country-brief.aspx (accessed 18 April 2016). The information detailed in this section therefore relies heavily on primary sources.
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An Overview of Australian-Cuban Trade, 1952–64
A trade relationship between Australia and Cuba was established before World War II.
In the post-war years, trade between the two states was minimal. The official statistics 5
on the total value of Australia’s exports to, and imports from, Cuba for 1952–64 are
presented in Table 1 on the next page: 6
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, letter from J. G. Crawford, Secretary, Department of Commerce and 5
Agriculture, to [Arthur Tange], Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra (External Affairs), 17 October 1955. The figures are calculated according to the Australian financial year, which begins 1 July and ends 30 6
June the following year. Figures for the financial years preceding 1952 could not be located among the relevant NAA files. The United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) is comprehensive and highly useful, however it only contains trade data from 1962 onwards: UN Comtrade, “Read Me First (Disclaimer): Every User of UN Comtrade should know the coverage and limitations of the data,” http://comtrade.un.org/db/help/uReadMeFirst.aspx (accessed 18 January 2016). While figures from financial year 1964–65 onwards are available, only data up to 1963–64 is relevant to the Cuban Crisis and thus was included in Table 1. The figures in Table 1 were drawn from the following records found in NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1: letter from R. G. Casey, [Minister for External Affairs], to A. S. Fordham, British Ambassador to Cuba, 16 May 1958 (figures for 1952–57); “Trade with Cuba,” memorandum by R. A. Peachey, [Head of Economic Relations Branch, External Affairs], for [Ralph] Harry, [First Assistant Secretary, Division IV], External Affairs, 16 October 1962 (figures for 1957–62); and “Australian Trade with Cuba,” letter from L. D. Thomson [(Economic Relations Branch)] for the Acting Secretary, [External Affairs], to Australian High Commission, Ottawa, 14 August 1964 (figures for 1962–64). The figures listed in Table 1 were rounded to the nearest one thousand pounds sterling by the official statistician. For example, the total value of exports for 1954–55 was £133.00. It is therefore noteworthy that Australia exported goods to Cuba that year, even though this figure was rounded to nil and excluded from the official statistics: NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” memorandum from W. A. Vawdrey, [Department of Commerce and Agriculture], to Mr Body (likely Alf Body of External Affairs), 26 January 1956. Precise, rather than rounded, figures are also available for 1956–57. That year, the total value of exports to Cuba was £508.00 (rounded up to £1,000.00), and the total value of imports from Cuba was £8,109.00 (rounded down to £8,000.00): NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Trade of Australia with ‘Cuba’ during the year ended June, 1957.” It is therefore plausible that Australia exported goods to Cuba in 1960–61, but that the total value of exports was a nominal figure that was rounded down, and subsequently, excluded from the official statistics.
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Table 1: Total value of Australian imports from, and exports to, Cuba for financial years 1952–64.
As shown in Table 1, Australia was a small but regular importer of Cuban goods. In this
period, imports were mostly tobacco and cigars, a commodity for which the Caribbean 7
island is well-known. In 1962–63, in the financial year of the crisis, Australia imported
approximately £13,000 worth of Cuban cigars. 8
Financial Year Imports from Cuba Exports to Cuba
1952–53 £24,000.00 £9,000.00
1953–54 £16,000.00 £1,000.00
1954–55 £24,000.00 —
1955–56 £26,000.00 £3,000.00
1956–57 £8,000.00 £1,000.00
1957–58 £23,000.00 £6,000.00
1958–59 £38,000.00 £2,000.00
1959–60 £54,000.00 £1,000.00
1960–61 £49,000.00 —
1961–62 £48,000.00 £37,000.00
1962–63 £20,000.00 £1,000.00
1963–64 £57,000.00 £378,000.00
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Trade of Australia with ‘Cuba’ during the year ended June, 1957”; and 7
ibid., “Australian Trade with Cuba,” letter from Thomson to Australian High Commission, Ottawa, 14 August 1964. See also NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Trade with Cuba,” memorandum by Peachey for Harry, 16 October 1962, regarding imports from Cuba for 1960–61. NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Organization of American States: Resolution on Cuba,” handwritten 8
annotation (author unidentifiable) dated 25 September 1964 on M. R. Booker’s, First Assistant Secretary, Division II, record of conversation with H. E. Senor Don Juan P. Gallagher, Peruvian Minister on 24 September 1964.
! 225
Menzies was often photographed smoking a cigar. The PM, it was reported, smoked six 9
cigars a day, which he cut back to two when on election campaign tours in order to save
his voice. At Cabinet meetings, a box of cigars was always provided for ministers. 10 11
According to Menzies’ daughter, Heather Henderson, people knew the PM enjoyed
cigars and sometimes he received them as gifts. “Havana cigars were his preference
[but…] whatever he was given he would smoke.” Yet, despite Menzies’ regular cigar-12
smoking, the presence of cigars in the Cabinet room, and his preference for Cuban
cigars, remarkably, no Cabinet member thought to question McEwen when he told the
PM he was unaware of any trade between Australia and Cuba. With regards to the basis
of Menzies’ question, Henderson advised “never underestimate my father’s sense of
humour.” Regardless, the PM never challenged—then or at a later date—the
information he was given.
See, for example, the following images: Baillieu Library, University of Melbourne: Digitised 9
Collections, Special Collections, Robert Menzies Collection, MENZ00256_00001, “Robert Menzies holding a cigar and movie camera in West Germany,” July 1956, http://www.menziescollection.esrc.unimelb.edu.au/objects/D00000277.htm (accessed 10 March 2016); ibid., MENZ00226_00001, “Robert Menzies in West Germany,” http://www.menziescollection.esrc.unimelb.edu.au/objects/D00000247.htm; ibid., MENZ00238_00001, “Robert Menzies with a cigar and cup of coffee in West Germany,” http://www.menziescollection.esrc.unimelb.edu.au/objects/D00000259.htm.
George Kerr, “We’ve Shocked Mr Menzies…,” Argus (Melbourne), 28 November 1955, 4.10
Alexander Downer, Six Prime Ministers (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 1982), 18.11
Heather Henderson, telephone conversation with author, 25 August 2017. There is a box of Cuban 12
cigars in the R.G. Menzies collection at the National Museum of Australia (NMA): “Wooden cigar box for 25 Partagas Cuban cigars,” http://collectionsearch.nma.gov.au/object/114098 (accessed 4 March 2016). Another cigar box in the collection is likely to be of Cuban origin: “Cigar box for Principales Pure Havana Leaf,” http://collectionsearch.nma.gov.au/object/114101 (accessed 4 March 2016). The latter box is not a well-known brand of Cuban cigar. It is possible that it was one of many brands that became extinct following the Revolution: Andrew, La Casa Del Habano, telephone conversation with author, 10 March 2016. It is also possible that it was an American or European-made cigar that contained Cuban tobacco leaf. Both the US and Austria, for example, purchased Cuban tobacco leaf. See Max Freedman, “Last Trade Links with Cuba: Tobacco now chief US import,” Guardian (Manchester, UK), 9 June 1961, 14; and NAA: A3211, 1964/2494 Part 1, “Cuba and Austria: Trade Agreement,” statement by Export Services Branch, Board of Trade, London, 4 February 1958. The NMA advised that, in light of its file on the collection, “they were most likely personal belongings rather than anything presented in a public capacity”: Mikhala Harkins, Duty Curator, NMA, email to author, 16 March 2016. Henderson confirmed that she had donated the cigar boxes. I am grateful to Heather Henderson, Andrew at La Casa Del Habano, and Mikhala Harkins for their assistance with my enquiries.
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Australia has exported a miscellany of items to Cuba. In 1952–53, the main export item
was wool tops, and in 1956–57, essential oils. In 1961–62, in the financial year ending 13
immediately before the crisis, Australian exports to Cuba increased significantly with
the export of cattle. In 1963–64, in the financial year after the crisis, Australian 14
exports to Cuba continued to increase. Tractor tyres and tubes valued at £26,780.00
accounted for part of the total export value. However, the dramatic increase was
attributable to a large consignment of Australian wheat valued at £334,664.00, which
China had diverted to Cuba. China gifted the wheat to Cuba following Hurricane 15 16
Flora, one of the deadliest Atlantic hurricanes recorded. 17
Despite the desire of Australian governments to increase trade between Australia and
other states, including Cuba, several external factors hampered the export of 18
Australian goods to Cuba. In October 1955, Secretary of the Department of Commerce
and Agriculture, John Crawford, told his colleagues that the prospects of increased trade
with Cuba were “not bright” because of US competition and the lack of a direct
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” memorandum from Vawdrey to Body, 26 13
January 1956; and ibid., “Trade of Australia with ‘Cuba’ during the year ended June, 1957.” In 1954–55 (for which no exports were listed in the official statistics as outlined in n.6) over 90 percent of total exports valued at £133.00 consisted of louvers (windows and parts): NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, handwritten file note by Gardner, Department of Trade, undated.
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Trade with Cuba,” memorandum by Peachey for Harry, 16 October 1962.14
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” letter from Thomson to Australian High 15
Commission, Ottawa, 14 August 1964. NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, inward savingram (I.29438) with handwritten annotations, Australian 16
Government Trade Commission, Hong Kong, to External Affairs, 28 October 1963. “1963–Hurricane Flora,” Hurricanes: Science and Society, http://www.hurricanescience.org/history/17
storms/1960s/flora/ (accessed 2 February 2016). For example, during Dr. Santiago Claret’s visit to Australia in November 1954 as part of the Cuban 18
Goodwill Mission to Southeast Asia, he was told that Australia was interested to know the prospects of increasing its exports of particular goods to Cuba: NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, letter from Crawford to [Tange], 17 October 1955.
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shipping service. The foreign exchange position was also unfavourable. However, it 19 20
was US policy after the Cuban Revolution that posed the most challenges for Australia,
and other states, willing to trade with Cuba.
The US Embargo on Cuba under the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations
Having overthrown the government of Fulgencio Batista, Fidel Castro assumed power
in Cuba on 1 January 1959. Although the US was quick to recognise the revolutionary
socialist government six days later, it soon grew suspicious of the leader’s economic
reforms and his relationship to communism. The US sought to force Castro’s demise 21
by isolating Cuba diplomatically and economically. This included continuing an arms 22
embargo against Cuba, which the US had imposed in March 1958. A series of 23
measures and counter-measures, many succinctly summarised by Nigel D. White, led to
increasing hostility between the two states:
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, letter from Crawford to [Tange], 17 October 1955.19
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” memorandum from Vawdrey to Body, 26 20
January 1956. Patrick J. Haney and Walt Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo: The Domestic Politics of an American 21
Foreign Policy (Pittsburgh, US: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 13–4. US plans for Castro’s demise also included assassination, which was first committed to paper on 11 22
December 1959: ibid. For further discussion on the numerous attempts on Castro’s life, the US establishment of a paramilitary force for deployment to Cuba, US propaganda activities, and the sabotage and terrorism undertaken in Cuba by the CIA in this period, see Fabián Escalante, The Cuba Project: CIA Covert Operations, 1959–62, 2nd edn. (Melbourne: Ocean Press, 2004).
Salim Lamrani, The Economic War Against Cuba: A Historical and Legal Perspective on the U.S. 23
Blockade (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2013), 23.
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In response to the Cuban government’s expropriation of US-owned farmlands greater than 1,000 acres, President Eisenhower prohibited US refineries in Cuba from refining crude oil from the Soviet Union, significantly cut the Cuban sugar quota, and imposed an economic embargo on all trade with Cuba except for food and medicine. In response, President Castro confiscated US oil refineries in Cuba, nationalised US and foreign owned properties, and expelled a significant number of US embassy staff. 24
These measures culminated in the US placing an embargo on Cuba in October 1960
when President Eisenhower repealed Cuba’s sugar quota and invoked the Trading with
the Enemy Act 1917 (US). This effectively banned all exports from the US to Cuba,
except food and medicine on humanitarian grounds. The significance of the 25
cancellation of the sugar quota is noteworthy. In 1960, the US import quota for Cuban
sugar was 700,000 tonnes. Sugar accounted for 80 percent of Cuba’s exports to the US
and employed nearly a quarter of the Cuban population. In December 1960, Eisenhower
extended the US embargo on Cuban sugar for the first quarter of 1961. 26
In January 1961, the US severed diplomatic relations with Cuba. By then, President
Kennedy was in the Oval Office and, with regards to US policy towards Cuba, simply
picked up from where his Republican predecessor had left off. In March 1961, Kennedy
continued the US embargo on Cuban sugar imports until 1962. In April, he authorised 27
the failed CIA-backed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. In September, Congress
passed the Foreign Assistance Act 1961 (US), which prohibited foreign aid to the Cuban
Nigel D. White, The Cuban Embargo under International Law: El Bloqueo (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 24
2015), 100. See also Haney and Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo, 14–5. Ibid.; and NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Statement on Cuban Policy,” Office of Public Services, Bureau 25
of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. (Department of State), undated, 1. Lamrani, The Economic War Against Cuba, 24.26
Ibid.27
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government. Additionally, it authorised Kennedy to execute a full embargo on trade
with Cuba, which he invoked by means of Executive Order 3447, the Trading with the
Enemy Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. A total US embargo of Cuba, which also
proscribed drugs and food products, took effect on 7 February 1962. 28
From March 1962, US measures against Cuba took an extraterritorial turn. That month,
Kennedy extended the embargo to include items containing Cuban materials, even those
manufactured in other states. From August, states assisting Cuba were automatically
excluded from the US Agency for International Development programme. On 16
September 1962, the Kennedy Administration inaugurated a “blacklist” of all ships that
conducted commercial relations with Cuba, irrespective of their country of origin, and
prohibited them from docking in US ports. In early October, the same month as the 29
nuclear crisis, the Administration proposed further and wide-ranging restrictions on
commercial shipping to Cuba. 30
The shipping restrictions, which are discussed in more detail later in this chapter, made
trade with Cuba extremely challenging and thus were effective in further isolating the
Caribbean island economically from the West. According to the US State Department,
free world trade with Cuba declined from $1.3 billion US dollars (USD) in 1959 to
approximately $247 million USD in 1962, a drop of 83 percent. Much of the decrease
Ibid.28
Ibid., 25.29
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “U.S.A.: Restrictions on Shipping to Cuba,” memorandum by Peachey for 30
Harry, 23 October 1962.
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was a result of a decrease in US-Cuban trade from $881 million USD in 1959 to $7.2
million USD in 1962, of which $6.5 million USD entered the US in the first three
months of that year because of commitments made prior to the embargo. The US 31
measures therefore had, and would continue to have (the embargo is still in place), a
devastating effect, especially on the Cuban economy.
In February 1963, the Kennedy Administration barred the shipment of US government-
financed cargoes from the US on foreign flag vessels engaged in trade with Cuba on or
after 1 January 1963. That year it also placed further prohibitions on American 32
citizens conducting financial transactions with Cuba under the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations. These measures were intended to stop Cuba from using the dollar in its
international trade. Additionally, the Administration froze all Cuban assets in the US
and tightened its ban on travel to the island by American citizens. 33
What is clear from the preceding discussion, as political scientists Patrick J. Haney and
Walt Vanderbush have identified, is that “The embargo of Cuba is not a monolith;
rather, it is made up of several components,” from trade restrictions to travel bans, and
the like. In that respect, the embargo is comprehensive and far-reaching in magnitude. 34
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Statement on Cuban Policy,” Office of Public Services, Bureau of Public 31
Affairs, Department of State, undated, 1. NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, copy of a White House National Security action memorandum titled “U.S. 32
Government Shipments by Foreign Flag Vessels in the Cuban Trade” from McGeorge Bundy to ExComm, 5 February 1963.
Lamrani, The Economic War Against Cuba, 26; and White, The Cuban Embargo under International 33
Law, 101. Haney and Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo, 2.34
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Because the embargo ended Cuba’s trade links with the US and severely curtailed those
with the West, it increased Cuba’s dependence on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 35
would replace the US as Cuba’s major trading partner. Thus, as the embargo took effect,
Cuba moved into the Soviet sphere, and “the embargo became embedded in the politics
of the cold war.” 36
The US embargo of Cuba had a direct and worldwide effect on commercial shipping
and other states’ trade relations with both Cuba and the US. The US, however, was not
content with its domestic laws having extraterritorial effects. The Eisenhower and
Kennedy administrations wanted their allies to likewise impose trade restrictions on
Cuba. However, as the next section demonstrates, Australian governments did not
acquiesce to approaches by either administration. As shown in Table 1, Australia
continued to trade with Cuba.
Australian-Cuban Trade under the US Embargo on Cuba
Australian and US government views diverged significantly on the subject of trade with
Cuba. This section examines those views in terms of their effect on the alliance and
their relationship to Australian policy on the Cuban Crisis. The discussion concentrates
on the Menzies Government’s dealings with the Kennedy Administration, which went to
the greatest lengths to isolate Cuba from trading with US allies, but begins with an
Lamrani, The Economic War Against Cuba, 25.35
Haney and Vanderbush, The Cuban Embargo, 11.36
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exchange with the Eisenhower Administration. This set the tone for how Australia
would carefully manage its alliance with the US and its trade with the Caribbean island.
On 9 September 1960, the US State Department sent a request to the Australian
Embassy, Washington, for Australia’s cooperation in prohibiting the export of military
materiel to Cuba. The State Department noted that North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) members and Japan had already received and accepted the request. The US
restricted the export to Cuba of
‘any kind of combat or non-combat military equipment’ including ‘civilian aircraft of any type, military communications equipment, unarmed patrol vessels, landing craft or other vessels of military utility as well as spare parts for all such equipment’, jeeps and trucks. 37
In a letter (classified secret) to G. A. Rattigan, Comptroller-General of the Department
of Customs & [sic] Excise, H. D. Anderson of the Department of External Affairs
advised that restricting the export of the majority of these items did not appear to be
problematic; in any case, export of arms or warlike stores to Cuba in peacetime would
require Cabinet authorisation. However, there was “some doubt” as to the scope of the
Cabinet decision on the “Export of Arms and Warlike Stores from Australia in Time of
Peace,” specifically, whether there was authority under that decision “to prohibit in
peacetime the export of civilian aircraft, or—if for civilian use—of jeeps and trucks.”
Consequently, Anderson advised the Embassy to inform the State Department that in the
interest of mutual consultation on the subject, “we would certainly wish to inform and
NAA: A425, 1971/6758, “Arms Shipments to Cuba & the Dominican Republic,” letter (classified 37
secret) from H. D. Anderson for the Secretary, External Affairs, to [G. A. Rattigan], Comptroller-General, Department of Customs & Excise (Customs & Excise), 14 November 1960.
! 233
consult the United States if any question arose of supply to Cuba […] of arms or
warlike stores in the categories mentioned.” In effect, the Australian Government
declined the US request. According to Anderson, the wording was specifically chosen in
order “to avoid committing ourselves in advance to a ‘blanket’ prohibition of all the
items mentioned.” In light of this advice, the Department of Customs & Excise was
instructed to consult the Department of External Affairs on all applications to export
warlike stores, civil aircraft, trucks or jeeps to Cuba. Thus, Australia’s judicious 38
management of its geo-strategic and geo-economic interests in relation to Cuba began in
1960: it acknowledged US concerns in the interests of maintaining the alliance, but it
was careful not to place wide-ranging prohibitions on exports to Cuba to avoid
unnecessarily restricting Australian-Cuban trade. Australian governments upheld this
position throughout the early 1960s but, as shown below, they found doing so most
challenging under the Kennedy Administration.
On 16 February 1962, First Assistant Secretary in the Department of External Affairs,
Ralph Harry, noted that, at a social event, he was asked by the Chargé d’Affaires at the
US Embassy in Canberra, William Belton, whether Australia “had had occasion to take
an attitude on trade with Cuba.” Harry replied that he did not understand what Belton
meant by “taking an attitude.” Harry stated that Australian-Cuban trade was not large,
which subsequently led to a discussion about negotiations underway regarding the sale
Ibid. For the Cabinet decision, see NAA: A4638, SET 1, “Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet: 100 – Export 38
of Arms and Warlike Stores from Australia in Time of Peace,” 27–28 June 1950. Regarding Cabinet authorisation, see section (A)(iii) of the Cabinet decision. By October 1964, the only goods exported to Cuba in terms of the categories of warlike stores, civil aircraft, trucks or jeeps were tyres: NAA: A425, 1971/6758, minute paper, W. W. Moore, Acting Assistant Comptroller-General (General), to [Kenneth Anderson], Minister, Customs & Excise, 8 October 1964, 1.
! 234
of two aircraft by a Cuban airline to two Australian airlines. In his record of 39
conversation, Harry recounted: “I said I had never quite understood the rationale of the
U.S. trade ban on Cuba. After all the U.S. traded with [the] U.S.S.R. Was it because
Cuba had expropriated the property of U.S. nationals?” Harry wrote that Belton
responded that
U.S. policy was based on actual attempts by Cuba to foment revolution in other American states—not just ideological propaganda but actual organisation of Communist revolts. For this reason the U.S. wished to deny Cuba foreign exchange. 40
Thus, the US saw its trade restrictions as essential to preventing states like Cuba from
emerging in the Western hemisphere. For the US, politics and economics were
inseparable. It was something of which Australian Ambassador to the US from 1951–
58, Percy Spender, was cognisant. In a letter to Menzies in 1952 in which he detailed
carefully plans to intertwine Australia’s trade and finance with the US, Spender advised:
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Cuba—Sale of Aircraft,” Harry’s record of conversation with W. Belton, 39
Chargé d’Affaires, US Embassy on 10 February 1962, undated. Belton was Charge d’Affaires for almost nine months between the ambassadorships of William J. Sebald and William C. Battle. He was ordinarily Deputy Chief of Mission, Canberra, which was a post he occupied from 1960–63: William Belton interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 19 November 1992, transcript, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Arlington, Virginia, http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Belton,%20William.toc.pdf (accessed 21 January 2016), 34–8. Regarding the aircraft sales, Ansett-ANA (Australian National Airways) and Trans-Australia Airlines (TAA) were negotiating with El Cubana, the Cuban government airline, to purchase one Viscount aircraft each: NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” submission by W. D. Forsyth, Assistant Secretary, Division II, [External Affairs], to [Barwick], Minister [for External Affairs], 5 April 1962, 1.
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Cuba—Sale of Aircraft,” Harry’s record of conversation with W. Belton, 40
Charge d’Affaires, US Embassy on 10 February 1962, undated.
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I must add that economic co-operation with the U.S.A. has important political and security aspects for Australia that I hardly need do more than merely mention to you. The United States official is not as inclined as his United Kingdom counterpart to draw a firm line between political and economic co-operation and to regard as friendly those countries that co-operate politically even though they will not co-operate economically. In laying plans for our economic future we must not ignore the political and strategical [sic] implications. 41
Regarding Cuba, Australia would learn first-hand the importance the US placed on
economic cooperation.
The Australian Government deplored Castro’s Cuba but saw no reason to discontinue
trading with it, even if its views conflicted with those of the Kennedy Administration.
This was consistent with Australia’s relations with other communist states. Australia
aligned itself with the West against the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China
(China) despite continuing to trade with both states. Regarding China, Australia actively
encouraged and cooperated in activities that, with hindsight, might be judged as
detrimental to its interests. For example, Australia, under Liberal-Country Party 42
coalition governments, did not recognise China and vigorously opposed it replacing
Taiwan in the UN. The absence of any further discussion of Harry and Belton’s 43
conversation among the archival records suggests that meanwhile, the governments, or
the American Government to be more precise, were content to let the matter lie.
“Letter, Spender to Menzies, 29 April 1952 [Spender Papers, Box 1, fol. 3, MS4875, NLA],” quoted in 41
David Lowe, Australian Between Empires: The Life of Percy Spender (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2010), 151.
Gregory Clark, In Fear of China (Melbourne: Lansdowne Press, 1967), 163.42
China was admitted in 1971. See Claire Clark, “Australia in the United Nations,” in Australian Foreign 43
Policy: Towards a Reassessment, Claire Clark, ed. (North Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1973), 130 and 139–42.
! 236
The Australian Government’s willingness to maintain economic relations with Cuba,
despite finding its philosophy repugnant, was comparable with the Canadian
Government’s attitude. Neither government had a desire to follow the US lead and
impose a trade embargo on Cuba. On 2 February 1962, Canadian Prime Minister, John
Diefenbaker, made it plain that Canada would determine its own policy on the issue,
and was quoted as having stated that it would do so “having regard always to the need
of maintaining intact the determination of the free world to resist communism.” His
statement was in response to US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who had made
statements to the press “to the effect that earnings by Cuba on her exports to Canada
might be used ‘to promote communist subversion in neighbouring countries.’” 44
Subsequently, the press had anticipated that the US would attempt to persuade its allies
to restrict trade with Cuba. That said, the US had not made any “normal diplomatic 45
approach” to Canada or, as far as the Canadian Department of External Affairs was
aware, other NATO allies as at 9 February 1962 to impose a comparable trade embargo
on Cuba. Nor was Australia officially approached by the US once the latter’s full 46
embargo on Cuba took effect on 7 February 1962. Nevertheless, by mid-February 47
1962 US officials had made informal diplomatic approaches to Western allies, such as
Australia and Canada, regarding their trade relations with Cuba. Harry’s conversation
with Belton outlined above is one example of such an approach. While the US was
aware of Australia’s trade with Cuba, Canada, as a neighbour of the US and key
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Cuba and O.A.S.,” inward savingram (I.3315), Australian High 44
Commission, Ottawa to External Affairs, 9 February 1962, 2. “U.S. May Seek U.K. Cut in Trade with Cuba,” Financial Times (London), 5 February 1962, 15.45
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Cuba and O.A.S.,” inward savingram (I.3315), Australian High 46
Commission, Ottawa to External Affairs, 9 February 1962, 1. However, Cuba was discussed when US Under Secretary of State, George Ball, visited Ottawa at the beginning of that month: ibid.
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, handwritten annotation on inward cablegram (I.4122), Australian Embassy, 47
Washington (Washington Embassy) to External Affairs, 20 February 1962.
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member of the region, was clearly under much closer scrutiny and criticism from the
US. Australia, nonetheless, began to pay careful attention to US sensitivity over Cuba.
In mid-March 1962, Australian subsidiaries of US parent firms enquired with the
Department of Customs & Excise whether it would grant licences for the export to Cuba
of train, tractor and truck parts to the value of approximately £3,500,000.00. This was a
consequence of the US trade embargo on Cuba as the US firms could no longer supply
spare parts for their machinery. The Department of Customs & Excise informed the
Department of External Affairs, which advised that while Australia did not prohibit
trade with Cuba, the “political implications” warranted consideration. Specifically, there
was concern as to
the possible adverse reaction in the U.S.A. if Australia appeared to be helping Cuba circumvent the American embargo and […] the U.S. Government’s attitude to Australian subsidiaries of U.S. firms becoming the instrument for such circumvention. 48
However, there were also political implications in Australia to consider, specifically,
“the current unemployment situation,” if exports of such high value were denied. By 49
February 1962, 131,500 people were unemployed, the greatest number since World War
II. The Australian subsidiaries were asked to submit export licence applications for 50
consideration. 51
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” memorandum from R. H. Gardner, 48
[Americas and South Pacific Branch, External Affairs], to Mr. McNicol, 15 March 1962. Ibid.49
Paul Davey, The Nationals: The Progressive, Country and National Party in New South Wales 1919 to 50
2006 (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2006), 181. NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” memorandum from Gardner to McNicol, 51
15 March 1962.
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On 20 March 1962 External Affairs sought British and Canadian policy on exports to
Cuba of this nature, as well as those of strategic significance, to assist with their
deliberations. Essentially, the issues to be determined were whether Australia would 52
permit: goods of US origin imported to Australia to be transhipped (or re-exported) to
Cuba, and goods manufactured by Australian subsidiaries of US firms to be exported to
Cuba. Meanwhile, the US demonstrated how it would deal with actions perceived
contrary to U.S. export regulations. On 22 March 1962, it temporarily denied US export
privileges to British export-import firm, Latin American Development Co. Ltd.
According to a United States Information Service bulletin on the matter, the decision
was made to stop the firm from obtaining US goods for transhipment to Cuba while
investigations regarding a violation of US export regulations were being undertaken. 53
The Bureau of International Programmes of the US Department of Commerce, which
was conducting the investigation, was said to have stated that the British firm had
“persisted in attempts to place orders with U.S. suppliers” for spare parts for oil
processing equipment “even after being informed that the goods would not be licensed
by the United States for direct or indirect shipment to Cuba.” The US suppliers were
instructed to ship the parts to the UK but they were not informed that they would then
be shipped to Cuba. The US suppliers however, who were credited for their “alertness,”
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, outward cablegram (O.4661), External Affairs to Australian High 52
Commission, London, Australian High Commission, Ottawa, and Washington Embassy, 20 March 1962. NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “British Firm Temporarily Denied U.S. Export Privileges,” United States 53
Information Service bulletin, 22 March 1962, forwarded by memorandum from G.D. Vincent, Trade Relations Officer, Trade Office, Australian High Commission, London, to [W.A. Westerman], Secretary, Department of Trade, 26 March 1962. In the memorandum, Westerman was simply referred to by his position; his full name has been inserted here. See John Farquharson, “Westerman, Sir Wilfred Alan (1913–2001),” Obituaries Australia, National Centre of Biography, ANU, http://oa.anu.edu.au/obituary/westerman-sir-wilfred-alan-1022 (accessed 6 April 2016).
! 239
prevented the sales from proceeding. One Australian official noted that the US could 54
stop the “re-export” (transhipment) of goods from Australia “in the same way.” 55
On 5 April 1962, Assistant Secretary in Division II of the Department of External
Affairs, W. D. Forsyth, prepared a submission for Barwick on Australian trade with
Cuba. This was by then in response to two enquiries received by the Department of
Customs & Excise: an export licence application from Overseas Business Associates
Pty. Ltd. valued at £1,000,000.00 (Australian) to export agricultural tractors and spare
parts to Cuba for railway and agricultural machinery, half of which would be of US
origin and transhipped from Australia to Cuba, and the other half of Australian origin;
and an enquiry from Broken Hill Propriety Company Limited (BHP) regarding
“whether they may tender for 10,000 tons of steel ingot for Cuba,” valued at
£300,000.00 (Australian). Forsyth explained that these approaches stemmed from the
US trade embargo of Cuba, the latter now needing to source spare parts for its stock of
US machinery from alternative suppliers. Australia (as well as Canada) was considered
“an obvious choice” in light of its advanced industrial development and capability to
fabricate equipment and parts, and thus, further enquiries of this nature were
anticipated. Consequently, ministerial direction on Australia’s future policy was
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “British Firm Temporarily Denied U.S. Export Privileges,” United States 54
Information Service bulletin, 22 March 1962, forwarded by memorandum from Vincent to [Westerman], 26 March 1962.
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, handwritten note (author unknown) dated 11 April 1962 on the slip “With 55
the Compliments of the Secretary, Department of Trade” covering the memorandum from Vincent to Westerman, 26 March 1962.
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necessary because “the question of Australia’s trade relations directly concerns our
relations with the U.S.A.” 56
Having summarised the American, Canadian, and British trade policies towards Cuba,
Forsyth advised Barwick that Australian policy could range between the two extremes
of “complete freedom of trade and a total embargo.” He outlined five possible policies
for the Government. First, Australia could choose not to intervene, leaving the decision
in the hands of individual exporters. This was the British policy. Henry A. A. Hankey, 57
Head of the Foreign Office’s American Department from 1956–62, advised the 58
Australian High Commission, London—in confidence—that the Foreign Office did not
want to appear to have intervened against Castro nor jeopardise the British Embassy in
Havana whose reports were valuable, not only to the UK, but to the US. In terms of
shipping, it was up to the firms involved to decide if they wanted to undertake trade
with Cuba. If they enquired with the British Government whether they should do so,
that is what they would be told. However, they would also be advised that the US may
make their future trade activities more difficult. Second, Australia could impose a 59
trade embargo on Cuba, just like the US had done. Third, it could prohibit the
transhipment of goods of US origin to Cuba, which was Canadian policy. Fourth,
Australia could apply the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” submission by Forsyth to [Barwick], 5 56
April 1962, 1–2. Ibid., 2–3.57
“A Directory of British Diplomats,” updated 8 March 2016, http://www.gulabin.com/58
britishdiplomatsdirectory/pdf/britishdiplomatsdirectory.pdf (accessed 13 March 2016), 222. NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.7056), “Exports to Cuba,” Australian High 59
Commission, London to External Affairs, 23 March 1962, 1–2.
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(COCOM) list to Cuba, which was also Canadian policy. These controls prohibited the 60
export of strategic materials to “European and China Communist Bloc areas,” and had
their origins in Paris in 1949 when the NATO states (except Iceland) and Japan met to
formulate a common policy. Fifth, Australia could apply the “China differential.” 61
Aside from the US which imposed a trade embargo, only Australia, Canada, and Turkey
imposed special restrictions on trade with China. The “China differential” listed a 62
range of banned export items, including steel, tractors, and railway equipment.
However, there was an “exceptions” procedure under which items could be exported
with ministerial approval, and previously, steel had been approved for export. This was
relevant because the items that formed the basis of the enquiries to the Department of
Customs & Excise (for example, the agricultural tractors, spare parts for railway and
agricultural machinery, and steel ingot) came under the “China differential.” 63
To summarise Australia’s economic relations with China, the government took into
serious consideration the views of the US—which was strongly opposed to trade with
China, in addition to Cuba—particularly regarding strategic items. But within those
limits, Australia traded extensively with China in what it classed as non-strategic
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” submission by Forsyth to [Barwick], 5 60
April 1962, 3. This “Paris Group” established COCOM to manage its daily business and it is from the Coordinating 61
Committee that the lists derive their name: NAA: A425, 1971/6758, minute paper, Moore to [Kenneth Anderson], Minister for Customs & Excise, 8 October 1964, 2.
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” submission by Forsyth to [Barwick], 5 62
April 1962, 3. However, the Australian High Commission, Ottawa, advised External Affairs on 27 March 1962 (and thus prior to the preparation of this submission) that Canada simply maintained one export control list and that a “separate China differential has not existed for some years”: ibid., “Exports to Cuba,” inward cablegram (I.7398), Australian High Commission, Ottawa to External Affairs, 27 March 1962.
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” submission by Forsyth to [Barwick], 5 63
April 1962, 3.
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items. Political scientist Henry S. Albinski described Australia’s restrictions on China 64
as “a very successful exercise in realpolitik,” which could “variously be regarded as
inconsistent, secretive, or hypocritical. But at bottom it is pretty much a case of having
one’s cake and eating it too.” Albinski argued:
Maintaining a stiff strategic materials policy helps to placate America, to make her more sympathetic towards expressed Australian views on international questions in general, and perhaps even softens her objections to Australia’s non-strategic trade with China. Maintaining the ‘China differential’ also serves to deter potentially embarrassing political criticism at home. 65
What was to be determined therefore was whether, in terms of trade, Cuba should
receive the same treatment as China. What was certain was that the Australian
Government had experience managing differences with the US over trade policy.
There were a number of factors to consider in determining the appropriate policy or
combination of policies on Australia’s future trade with Cuba. Expanding markets in
Cuba meant new outlets for Australian exports, which aligned with the Government’s
export drive. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that Cuba’s limited foreign currency
and the reluctance of Australian exporters to sell on credit could hamper Australian-
Cuban trade. The other factor, and one that weighed heavily, was the effect of
Australian-Cuban trade on Australia-US relations. Forsyth noted that while the US had
not formally approached Australia about its trade with Cuba, the Americans had
commented informally at the time of the negotiations for the purchase of the Cuban
Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938–1965 (London: Cambridge University 64
Press, 1967), 244. Henry S. Albinski, “Australia and the Chinese strategic embargo,” Australian Outlook 19, no. 2 (1965): 65
127–8. See also, Henry S. Albinski, Australian Policies and Attitudes toward China (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), chs. VI and VII.
! 243
aircraft “that they hoped our trade with Cuba would not be expanded to any significant
degree.” It was felt that the US, having imposed an embargo on Cuba, would not
appreciate Australia replacing them in that market. It was necessary for Australia to
consider US sensitivity towards trade with Cuba, and thus, the possibility of restricting
its own trade with the Caribbean island for the following reasons: the importance of the
US alliance to Australia’s defence; the special relations between the two states under
ANZUS; the position taken by the US towards Cuba, and was considered by the White
House and Congress “as a threat to the security of the American hemisphere”; the
possibility that Australia may need “to invoke United States economic pressure against
Indonesia should that country ever become Communist,” a concern that was discussed
in Chapter 3; and Australia’s need for US support regarding trade issues, such as
American understanding of Australian concerns over the UK possibly joining the
European Economic Community (EEC), or Common Market, as it was widely known. 66
UK interest in entering the Common Market was the cause of much concern for the
Australian Government, which, as has been noted, was already facing economic
difficulties. Fifteen to 20 percent of Australia’s exports went to the UK where they were
accorded preferential treatment, and thus the Government was worried about the 67
“‘serious adverse consequences’ for the Australian economy from a loss of a preferred
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” submission by Forsyth to [Barwick], 5 66
April 1962, 4. National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, US (NARA): Record Group 67
(RG) 59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File (CDF), 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/4-1461, “Biweekly Economic Review No. 13 for the period ended July 7, 1961” (official use only, except as indicated) prepared by Eddie W. Schodt, First Secretary of Embassy, for the Ambassador [to Australia], [William J. Sebald], and forwarded by American Embassy, Canberra (American Embassy) to Department of State, Washington, 7 July 1961, 2 (section official use only). For more on Sebald and his ambassadorship, see “U.S. Chiefs of Mission to Australia: William J. Sebald,” Embassy of the United States, Canberra, Australia, http://canberra.usembassy.gov/history/chiefsofmission/sebald.html (accessed 13 April 2016).
! 244
position in the U.K. market.” It was also concerned that UK membership in the
Common Market could weaken the Commonwealth. Although the Australian 68
Government was already working to expand Australia’s export markets, the US
Embassy in Canberra believed Australia’s anxiety over the potential loss of its
preferential market in the UK intensified its search for alternative markets. When 69
McEwen was asked by a journalist at a press conference whether the Department of
Trade was in fact studying other outlets for Australian exports in case the UK entered
the Common Market, the Minister stated “No, I wouldn’t for a moment reveal the
defeatism implicit in that.” Nevertheless, trade missions had visited Asia and South 70
America in January 1962 and would travel to the Caribbean and Central America in 71
mid-October 1962. The mission, however, did not visit Cuba. 72
Meanwhile, Australia’s need to obtain US understanding over its concerns regarding the
UK and the Common Market was proving difficult. At a press conference on 26 April
1962 following an overseas tour to the US, Canada, the UK, and the EEC member
NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 68
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/4-1461, “Biweekly Economic Review No. 14 for the period ended July 21, 1961” (official use only, except as indicated) prepared by Schodt for the Ambassador [to Australia, Sebald], and forwarded by American Embassy to Department of State, Washington, 21 July 1961, 2 (section unclassified).
NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 69
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/1-562, “Semi-Annual Economic Summary, Second Half 1961” (unclassified) prepared by Schodt for the Charge d’Affaires ad interim, [William Belton], and forwarded by American Embassy to Department of State, 1 February 1962, 9. Regarding Belton, see n.39.
“Trade Minister Not Confident of Continuing Access to Markets of U.K. and Europe,” Age 70
(Melbourne), 27 April 1962, 6. NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 71
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/1-562, “Semi-Annual Economic Summary, Second Half 1961” (unclassified) prepared by Schodt for the Charge d’Affaires ad interim, [Belton], and forwarded by American Embassy to Department of State, 1 February 1962, 9.
NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 72
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/1-562, “Biweekly Economic Review No. 12 for the Period Ended June 7, 1962” (official use only, except as indicated) prepared by Schodt for the Charge d’Affaires ad interim, [Belton], and forwarded by American Embassy to Department of State, Washington, 8 June 1962, 4 (section unclassified).
! 245
states, McEwen criticised the US over its trade policies and its opposition to the UK
continuing trade preferences should it enter the Common Market. He again delivered a 73
sharp public criticism of US policy towards the Common Market in May 1962, referring
to several “elements” which were of “grave concern” to Australia. The US Embassy in 74
Wellington told US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that Australia thought the US was
selfishly interested in a system of free trade for its own goods. As the US Embassy in
Wellington put it: “Australia feels US feathering its own nest and in process destroying
their sheltered market in UK.” It was a brusque but accurate assessment of what 75
McEwen would be reported as having stated to the press just days later. However,
Menzies’ visit to the US in June 1962 to discuss Common Market developments was
reported positively in the press. The Age reported that McEwen’s comments “had
irritated but had not moved” the US, whereas now, the two states were “nearer to 76
harmony on Common Market problems.” The Age editorialised that the joint 77
communique, in which Australian and US officials agreed to a commodity-by-
commodity study of the effect on their trade of UK entry into the Common Market, was
“the strongest indication that some shift has in fact taken place in the American
attitude.” What was clear was that trade was a significant factor to be considered and 78
managed in Australia’s relations with the US.
“Trade Minister Not Confident of Continuing Access to Markets of U.K. and Europe,” Age, 27 April 73
1962, 6. “Trade Minister in Sharp Reply to Mr. Rusk: ‘U.S. Not Living Up to Own Precepts’,” Age, 14 May 74
1962, 1. NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 75
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/1-562, incoming telegram (secret) (control: 7122), from [US Embassy], Wellington, to Secretary of State, [Dean Rusk], Department of State, received 10 May 1962.
John Bennetts, “Mr. Menzies’ Mission: Significant American Shift on Market Policy,” Age, 22 June 76
1962, 2. “Accord Near on Market Approach,” Age, 22 June 1962, 1.77
“Something Has Been Gained” (editorial), Age, 22 June 1962, 2. On the commodity-by-commodity 78
study, see “Differences with U.S. Reduced: Mutual Approach on Market Possible,” Age, 22 June 1962, 4.
! 246
Forsyth recommended that Australian policy on trade with Cuba, at least initially,
“should lie somewhere between the two extremes” that he had suggested; that is,
between an embargo and non-intervention. There was no reason, Forsyth wrote, for
Australia to impose a trade embargo on Cuba: it was not involved in the US dispute
with Cuba; members of the Organization of American States (OAS) had refused to
impose one and thus there was little justification for Australia doing so; nor had the US
asked Australia. Nonetheless, given the close relationship between Australia and the US,
it was hoped that the former could explain to the latter that the policy so determined
represented “a reasonable balance between our external policy (alliance with the
U.S.A.) and our domestic policy (need for widening our markets overseas),” which was
intended “not to have a major effect on [the] strength of the Castro regime and the
capacity of Cuba to finance Communist subversion in other American states.” 79
In his submission, Forsyth acknowledged that the attitude of Australia towards trade
with Cuba was comparable to that of Canada. Canada did not believe its aversion to
Castro’s Cuba provided justification to cut off diplomatic and trade relations. However,
in respect for the US, it was unwilling to circumvent the embargo. Forsyth wrote that
Australia therefore could follow Canada’s lead in terms of prohibiting the transhipment
of goods of US origin, and applying the COCOM list, to Cuba. In terms of the
transhipment of goods of US origin, the political disadvantages (Australia being seen to
permit circumvention of the US embargo) were deemed to outweigh the few
commercial advantages (handling commission) to the Australian business community.
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” submission by Forsyth to [Barwick], 5 79
April 1962, 4.
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Regarding the COCOM list, this could be justified in terms of Cuba’s increasing
association with the Communist bloc and the risk of strategic items being transhipped to
communist states. Forsyth added that Australia could unofficially apply the “China 80
differential” and “exceptions” procedure to Cuba so that the Minister for External
Affairs could examine each export application on its merits, thus providing for some
flexibility in its policy. This would enable Australia to tell the US that exports to Cuba
were treated in the same manner as exports to China, “and that domestic considerations
would make it difficult for us to impose further restrictions on Cuba.” It would also
immediately impose ministerial control on Australian trade with Cuba, which could be
modified at a later date “in the light of U.S. views or our own more detailed
examination of Australian interests.” Subsequently, Forsyth sought authorisation from 81
Barwick for the Department of External Affairs to discuss with the Department of Trade
the three points below “as a basis to be recommended to Cabinet for [Australia’s] future
trade policy with Cuba”:
(i) prohibition on the trans-shipment of goods of U.S. origin to Cuba; (ii) the application of the C.O.C.O.M. list to Cuba; [and] (iii) the unofficial application of the China ‘differential’ to Cuba with an ‘exceptions’ procedure, under which each application covering items not on the C.O.C.O.M. list would be examined on its merits. 82
Before Barwick could give his authorisation, discussions between the two departments
were already underway. On 6 April 1962, an External Affairs official noted that he had
informed Mr. Bassett of Trade of Forsyth’s submission. Bassett advised that it was the
“policy” of Trade Minister, McEwen, to “oppose sanctions.” Bassett and Senior Deputy
Ibid., 5.80
Ibid., 5–6.81
Ibid., 6.82
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Secretary of the Department, George Warwick Smith, “dislike[d] the use of the China
differential for Cuba.” While this discussion was not an official representation of the 83
Minister’s views, it was an early indication of the Department’s reluctance to restrict
Australia’s trade with Cuba.
The Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Arthur Tange, also disliked the
suggestion regarding the China differential. On 9 April 1962, Tange told Forsyth that
while he agreed with the other suggestions regarding the transhipment of goods of US
origin and the COCOM list, he was “sceptical about Parliamentary attitude to applying
the ‘China differential’ to Cuba.” He continued:
China differential is based on China the unpurged aggressor? Cuba has merely confiscated property. There is no U.N. verdict against her (as in the case of China). How can unilateral trade punishment by Australia be justified? 84
Tange was reluctant to overreact to Cuba’s confiscation of property, just like Harry had
been when Belton informally approached him regarding Australian-Cuban trade in
February 1962. Tange’s reference to the absence of a UN verdict against Cuba also
demonstrated that he was mindful of how Australian trade restrictions on Cuba would
be perceived by the international community. In essence, Tange considered the
application of the China differential inappropriate and unjustified.
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Exports to Cuba,” handwritten note (author unknown) dated 6 April 83
[1962], [External Affairs]. In the note, Warwick Smith was simply referred to by surname; his full name and position have been inserted here. See John Farquharson, “Warwick Smith, George Henry (1916–1999),” Obituaries Australia, National Centre of Biography, ANU, http://oa.anu.edu.au/obituary/warwick-smith-george-henry-1003 (accessed 6 April 2016). Contrary to the obituary, he was “Senior Deputy Secretary” rather than “Deputy Secretary,” as this was a separate position: Directory to the Office of the Governor-General, the Parliament, the Executive Government, the Judiciary, Departments and Authorities (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, December 1962), 153.
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” memorandum from Forsyth to [Barwick], 84
9 April 1962. Question mark and parentheses in original.
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Two days later, Barwick approved Forsyth’s recommendation for External Affairs and
Trade to discuss the matter. He also provided perceptive feedback on the policy
suggestions contained in the submission:
I think we shall lose no respect from America nor endanger our relations in any respect if we allow our own self-interest to manifest itself — indeed weigh heavily in any judgement we make in individual cases. This line of thought would lead me to resist item (iii) when a final decision is to be taken. 85
Barwick was also opposed to unofficially applying the China differential to Australia’s
trade with Cuba. His feedback suggests that he saw no value in doing so because, in
judging individual cases, decisions would always be made in Australia’s interests and
such interests would outweigh any risk to Australia’s relations with the US.
Significantly, Barwick’s comments demonstrate his confidence to resist US pressure—
albeit informal—to conform to US policy towards Cuba, and thus independence of
thought in Australian foreign and trade policy.
On 16 April 1962, Head of External Affairs’ Economic Relations Branch, R. A.
Peachey, wrote to the Secretary of the Department of Trade, Alan Westerman, for his
Department’s views on the submission. McEwen had returned from his overseas tour 86
on 27 April, and yet it took over a month for Trade to respond. When it finally did, its 87
position was consistent with that initially put forward by Bassett and Warwick Smith.
According to Director of Trade Relations, W. A. McKinnon, McEwen was of the view
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” submission by Forsyth to [Barwick], 5 85
April 1962, 1. NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” letter from Peachey for the Secretary, 86
[External Affairs], to [W. A. Westerman], Secretary, Department of Trade, 16 April 1962. “Trade Minister Not Confident of Continuing Access to Markets of U.K. and Europe,” Age, 27 April 87
1962, 6.
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that, in addition to the prohibition on arms and warlike stores, Australia should restrict
the transhipment of goods of US origin to Cuba. McKinnon emphasised, however, that
this should be the only additional restriction. This was in light of the fact that the US
had not formally asked Australia to restrict further its trade with Cuba, and the policies
of the UK and other European states. Moreover, Australia had recently expanded its
trade promotional activities to Central and South America, and thus, the Department did
“not wish to see any unnecessary impediment to the development of trade in the
region.” McKinnon concluded by stating that if, for political reasons, External Affairs
supports applying further restrictions on Cuban trade, such as the COCOM list and
China differential, then McEwen feels the matter should be submitted to Cabinet. In the
interim, export of goods on the COCOM or China differential lists should be
permitted. 88
By the end of May 1962, External Affairs and Trade were in agreement on a prohibition
on the transhipment of goods of US origin to Cuba. However, Barwick, was now away
and his Department was uncertain as to whether they could approve the existing export
requests (except for the aspects related to transhipment of US goods)—subject to the
China differential—on the “strength” of his comments in response to Forsyth’s
submission. One External Affairs official suggested that they could inform Trade as to
how they would proceed and that they “wanted the policy matter to be held over” until
Barwick’s return. But this turned out to be unnecessary. Mr. Bakewell from the 89
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” letter from W. A. McKinnon, Director, 88
Trade Relations, Department of Trade, to [Tange], 25 May 1962. NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, handwritten note (author unknown) dated 31 May [1962], [External 89
Affairs].
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Department of Customs & Excise advised that the “heat has gone out of current requests
from Australian exporters for deals with Cuba.” Seemingly, too much time had passed 90
since the business opportunities arose and the Australian exporters approached Customs
& Excise, let alone their receipt of an outcome. One External Affairs official laid the
blame squarely with the Trade Minister, who was also the Deputy PM and leader of the
Country Party: “This is a very good case of Mr. McEwen’s numerous roles proving an
embarrassment.” 91
In early June 1962, External Affairs advised Customs & Excise that the Departments of
External Affairs and Trade had agreed to prohibit the transhipment of goods of US
origin to Cuba, but no decision had yet been made regarding the application of the
COCOM list or the China differential. In the interim, Customs & Excise were advised
to refer to External Affairs any applications to export Australian goods to Cuba that
were within these categories. Bakewell confirmed his Department would do so and
assured the External Affairs official that “Customs was completely in the hands of E.A.
[External Affairs] on trade with Cuba.” It was from External Affairs that Customs &
Excise “took their instructions […] not from Trade.” Thus, trade with Cuba was not 92
the responsibility of the Department of Trade, as one would expect, but the Department
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Trade with Cuba,” memorandum to [Economic Relations Branch], 90
External Affairs (recipient unknown), from [Americas and South Pacific Branch], External Affairs (author unknown), 8 June 1962.
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, handwritten note (author unknown) dated 31 May [1962], [External 91
Affairs]. For more on McEwen and the positions he held, see C. J. Lloyd, “McEwen, Sir John (1900–1980),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, ANU, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/mcewen-sir-john-10948 (published in hardcopy 2000, accessed online 22 April 2016).
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Trade with Cuba,” memorandum to [Economic Relations Branch], 92
External Affairs (recipient unknown), from [Americas and South Pacific Branch], External Affairs (author unknown), 8 June 1962.
! 252
of External Affairs. This, it seemed, was due to the political implications that arose from
trade with Cuba and its effect on US relations.
However, by the start of August 1962, the heat was back on exports to Cuba. The
Department of Customs & Excise was once again being pressed by potential Australian
exporters regarding the transhipment of goods of US origin to Cuba. In a memorandum
to Barwick, Forsyth explained that Australia’s position remained unchanged since April:
the transhipment of goods of US origin to Cuba, which would be interpreted by the US
as circumvention of its trade embargo on Cuba, “would have an unfavourable effect on
Australian-United States relations and would bring Australia little commercial
benefit.” On 7 August 1962, Barwick approved Forsyth’s recommendations, in light of 93
the views he and McEwen held, that Customs & Excise “take the necessary steps” to
prohibit the transhipment of goods of US origin to Cuba, and that deliberation on
further restrictions on Australian-Cuban trade “on the grounds that for practical
purposes Cuba is a member of the Communist Bloc, should be deferred for future
consideration, if necessary.” Two days later, Customs & Excise were instructed 94
accordingly and informed that Trade had advised that McEwen agreed with this course
of action. In terms of Australia applying further restrictions, it would not do so until 95
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” memorandum from Forsyth to [Barwick], 93
2 August 1962, 1. Ibid., 2. In terms of “necessary steps,” Customs & Excise could restrict the transhipment of such goods 94
under the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations No. 5 of 1958. NAA: A425, 1971/6758, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” letter from Peachey for the Secretary, External 95
Affairs, to [Rattigan], Comptroller-General, Department of Customs & Excise, 9 August 1962. A copy of this letter can be found in: NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Strategic Exports—Controls Policy towards Cuba.”
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October 1964 when the new Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck, brought
Australia’s trade with Cuba to Cabinet for it to formally determine policy. 96
On 12 September 1962, Customs & Excise questioned External Affairs on the
application of the decision on transhipment to the entirety of a consignment. That is,
where a consignment consisted of goods of US origin and goods of Australian origin,
whether the prohibition applied to the latter—in this case, the export to Cuba of
Australian railway equipment and agricultural tractors and parts. H. A. Forbes, First
Assistant Comptroller-General (General), also sought confirmation that the decision
applied to the transhipment of goods of US origin via Australia to Cuba, even if those
goods were not imported for transhipment. Harry sent Barwick a memorandum on the 97
subject on 19 October 1962. Harry stated that a determination on the transhipment of
goods not originally imported for transhipment “would involve a possibly difficult
decision turning on motive.” The result, nevertheless, would be circumvention of the
US trade embargo on Cuba, which could damage Australia-US relations. He
recommended including this example within the prohibition, which, he noted, did not
restrict the export of goods of Australian origin. Barwick concurred. He gave his 98
opinion on 23 October 1962, the same day that news of the Cuban Crisis broke in
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” Cabinet submission no. 48, submitted by 96
Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs, 1 October 1964. A copy of this submission can be found in: NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Strategic Exports—Controls Policy towards Cuba.”
NAA: A425, 1971/6758, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” letter from Forbes to [Tange], 12 September 97
1962. A copy of this letter can be found in: NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Strategic Exports—Controls Policy towards Cuba.”
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” memorandum from Harry to [Barwick], 98
19 October 1962.
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Australia. It is also noteworthy that on that date, Peachey provided Tange and the 99
senior officials in External Affairs with a summary of the measures considered and
decisions taken with respect to Australian-Cuban trade since the US imposed a trade
embargo on Cuba in February 1962. His memorandum also appears to have been sent
that day to the Minister’s office. Its timing, and the fact that it simply contains 100
background information, suggests that it was produced for that purpose. Interestingly, it
was not the subject of any discussion.
On 25 October 1962, and thus in the midst of the Cuban Crisis, Peachey sent a letter
clarifying Barwick’s decision to Rattigan. First, Peachey explained that Barwick had
determined that the prohibition on the transhipment of goods of US origin via Australia
to Cuba was “absolute” and thus not limited to goods intended only for transhipment
from their Australian entry point nor goods immediately transhipped. Second, 101
Peachey stated that apart from the restrictions contained in the Customs (Prohibited
Exports) Regulations No. 5 of 1958, there were no prohibitions or controls on the export
to Cuba of goods of Australian origin. 102
Ibid. with handwritten annotation from Barwick, 23 October [1962]. His note, which had been typed 99
and affixed to the bottom of the memorandum due to the illegibility of the handwriting, was initialled “G. E. B. 23.10” [Garfield Edward Barwick, 23 October 1962].
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Cuba: Strategic Controls,” memorandum from Peachey with 100
handwritten annotation “returned from Minister’s office,” to [Tange] and Messrs Harry, Waller, Forsyth, Kelly, Truscott, Dunn, External Affairs, 23 October 1962.
NAA: A425, 1971/6758, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” letter from Peachey for [Tange] to [Rattigan], 101
25 October 1962. A copy of this letter can be found in: NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Strategic Exports—Controls Policy towards Cuba.”
NAA: A425, 1971/6758, “Australian Trade with Cuba,” letter from Peachey to [Rattigan], 25 October 102
1962. Subsequently, Customs & Excise clarified to The Collector in each state the Government’s policy on exports to Cuba: NAA: A425, 1971/6758, “Exportation of Goods to Cuba,” memorandum from Rattigan to The Collector (New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania), 29 October 1962.
! 255
The timing of the clarification was not lost on one Customs & Excise official when
writing about Australian-Cuban trade in 1964. Rather than reflecting on the decision,
which had been under discussion since March 1962, the official simply referred to these
“arrangements which were formulated at the time of the Cuban crisis in 1962.” This 103
comment, however, is misleading. The “arrangements” were clarified rather than
formulated in October. More significantly, the official implied that the two issues were
connected when in fact, they were treated as entirely separate matters.
The Kennedy Administration did not want goods of US origin in Cuba and the
Department of External Affairs was willing to facilitate this by prohibiting the
transhipment of such goods via Australia. However, it is clear that External Affairs had
no interest in prohibiting the export of Australian goods to Cuba, a point it clarified at
the height of the Cuban Crisis. The significance of this, given the political situation,
should not be overlooked: Australia continued to maintain trade relations with Cuba,
who was involved in a nuclear standoff with the US, Australia’s most important ally.
Thus, although the Menzies Government was antagonistic to Fidel Castro’s political
views, it was happy to see Australian-Cuban trade endure, and continue to treat politics
and economics as separate issues.
Australia was not alone. Canada also maintained trade relations with Cuba at this time
and vowed to continue to do so despite the crisis. The Canadian Minister of Trade and
NAA: A425, 1971/6758, minute paper, Moore to [Kenneth Anderson], Minister for Customs & Excise, 103
8 October 1964, 1.
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Commerce, George H. Hees, was asked in Parliament on 24 October 1962 whether “In
view of the present international situation, has the government changed its policy with
regard to trade with Cuba?” Hees replied “that policy remains the same.” The 104
decision of the Australian Government not to impose further trade restrictions on Cuba,
and to continue trading with it, just like Canada, was also significant because,
immediately before the crisis, the Kennedy Administration had made trade with the
Caribbean island all the more difficult for its allies.
At the beginning of October 1962, the Kennedy Administration announced that it was
proposing to impose restrictions on the shipment of goods to Cuba. The Australian 105
Embassy, Washington, confirmed this move on 5 October 1962. The restrictions, 106
which had the potential to significantly affect Australian-Cuban trade, would: close US
ports to all shipping of states that had any vessels carrying arms to Cuba; deny US
government cargoes to the foreign flag ships of owners whose vessels were employed in
trade with Cuba or the Soviet bloc; prohibit American-owned vessels from shipping
goods to Cuba; and close US ports to any ship that, on a continuous voyage, was
employed in trade between the Soviet bloc and Cuba. The restrictions compounded 107
“Trade: Cuba—Inquiry as to Change of Policy,” Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 25th 104
Parliament, 1st session, vol. 1, 24 October 1962, 888, on Canadian Parliamentary Historical Resources, http://parl.canadiana.ca/view/oop.debates_HOC2501_01/882?r=0&s=1 (accessed 7 April 2016).
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Cuba,” inward cablegram (I.24450), Australian High Commission, 105
London to External Affairs, 4 October 1962. NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Cuba,” inward savingram (I.24685), Washington Embassy to External 106
Affairs, 5 October 1962. NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “U.S.A.: Restrictions on Shipping to Cuba,” memorandum by Peachey for 107
Harry, 23 October 1962. According to William C. Burdett, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, “Soviet bloc” included China but excluded Yugoslavia: NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Cuba,” inward cablegram (I.24450), Australian High Commission, London to External Affairs, 4 October 1962. The cablegram simply included Burdett’s surname and a partial reference to his position; the full details have been inserted here. See: “Foreign Relations, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters: Persons,” U.S. Department of State Archive, http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/kennedyjf/xxv/6030.htm (accessed 7 April 2016).
! 257
what was, as previously noted, a comprehensive embargo. Their purpose was to
increase shipping costs associated with trade between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba by
preventing vessels that delivered goods to Cuba from collecting US cargoes for
shipment to Europe, leaving them “to return across the Atlantic empty.” The 108
restrictions would prove successful: in October, 65 “free world” ships called at Cuban
ports; by January 1963, the number had dropped to 14. 109
The UK had concerns about the effect of the restrictions. Like Australia and Canada, 110
the UK was not ready to place an embargo on Cuba, which the British Board of Trade
was earlier reported as considering “too much like economic warfare.” Such 111
measures simply did not align with British PM Harold Macmillan’s global vision of
“interdependence.” In the words of the editor of Macmillan’s diaries, Peter Catterall, the
PM thought that
giving poorer countries access to world markets and raising their productivity, would also benefit the richer, both in terms of trade and security, not least by reducing the attraction of communism to those sections of the globe then heading to independence. 112
NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Cuba,” inward savingram (I.24638), Washington Embassy to External 108
Affairs, 4 October 1962. Of the 14 free world ships docking at Cuban ports in January 1963, the US Maritime Administration 109
identified five from the UK, and the rest from Greece, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Panama, and Sweden: NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “U.S. Restrictions on Cuba-bound Shipping,” extract from Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 9–16 February 1963. Keesing’s is an independent world news archive.
See, for example, NAA: 714/3/8 Part 1, “Cuba,” inward cablegram (I.24501), Australian High 110
Commission, London to External Affairs, 4 October 1962. NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.7056), “Exports to Cuba,” Australian High 111
Commission, London to External Affairs, 23 March 1962, 1. A copy of this cablegram can be found in: NAA: A1838, 714/3/8 Part 1, “Strategic Exports—Controls Policy towards Cuba.”
Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries: Prime Minister and After, 1957–66, Peter Catterall, ed. 112
(London: Macmillan, 2011), xxxi.
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The US embargo on Cuba had the opposite effect. It reduced the Caribbean island’s
access to international markets and left it little choice but to pursue closer relations with
the Soviet Union. Additionally, the US restrictions posed major problems for British
shipping. The Foreign Office, which well-understood the “intensity of United States
feeling on this subject,” was “anxious to demonstrate a willingness to co-operate.” 113
However, as Anthony D. Parsons, Assistant Head of the American Department from
1961–64, emphasised to the Australian High Commission, London, in October 1962,
“in respect of Cuba as of communist China, United States and United Kingdom views
are poles apart.” The Foreign Office was aware that, in terms of the British position, 114
the “United States are simply not impressed.” But Macmillan also felt that the US did 115
not appreciate the British position. He wrote in his diary on 3 October 1962 that
President Kennedy was “angry with us for not being willing to join in a boycott or
blockade.” Macmillan continued:
He is either unwilling or unable to understand that we cannot give orders to British shipping, esp. [especially] ships on charter, to avoid going to Cuba without legislation. (In war, of course, it’s different. But we are not at war with Cuba)[.] Nor does he realise the violence of the feeling of British shipowners against American government and their discrimination, subsidies and other methods of injuring British shipping. 116
Essentially, the British Government was not able to direct (legally) British shipping nor
did it wish to feel the wrath of British shipowners. In the days and weeks before the
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.7056), “Exports to Cuba,” Australian High 113
Commission to External Affairs, 23 March 1962, 2. NAA: 714/3/8 Part 1, “Cuba,” inward cablegram (I.24501), Australian High Commission, London to 114
External Affairs, 4 October 1962. In the cablegram, Parsons was simply referred to by surname; his full name and position have been inserted here. See Sir Anthony (Derrick) Parsons interviewed by Jane Barder, “British Diplomatic Oral History Project,” Devon, UK, 22 March 1996, DOHP 10 (transcript), British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/Parsons_Anthony.pdf (accessed 7 April 2016), 4–7.
NAA: 714/3/8 Part 1, “Cuba,” inward cablegram (I.24501), Australian High Commission, London to 115
External Affairs, 4 October 1962. Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries, 502 (3 October 1962). Emphasis and parentheses in original.116
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Cuban Crisis, according to Guto Thomas “the crescendo of disquiet reached new
heights;” clearly, trade measures towards Cuba were “an irritant” in Anglo-American
relations.” 117
Anglo-American differences, however, were temporarily set aside during the Cuban
Crisis. Thomas argued that
when the problem or crisis being confronted was of a truly military or strategic nature, as opposed to economic or mercantile, the ‘special’ parts of the ‘special relationship’ eclipsed the underlying tensions over trade and shipping. 118
In other words, as a result of the nuclear crisis, some aspects of the Anglo-American
relationship “eclipsed” such hostility over trade and shipping policies. Here, Thomas
referred to Anglo-American cooperation in intelligence. During the crisis, “The British
Embassy in Havana was America’s eyes and ears in Cuba, with diplomats engaged in
gathering information for the consumption of the US intelligence community.” 119
However, Thomas’ use of the term eclipse should be emphasised; “an eclipse,” he
noted, “by definition, is short-lived.” Once the crisis ended, there were signs that 120
Anglo-American cooperation over Cuba demonstrated during the crisis, was also likely
to end. The Foreign Office’s American Department determined that a continuation of
the tough US policy stance towards Cuba would “raise problems for our shipping and
Thomas, “Trade and Shipping to Cuba 1961–1963,” 125.117
Ibid., 126.118
Ibid., 171 and 133–6.119
Ibid., 126.120
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for our commercial and political relations with both Cuba and the United States.” By 121
all indications, such policies would continue, and would result in further friction with
British policies. Thus, the “tensions—suppressed and eclipsed for such a short time 122
by the greater threat of missiles in Cuba—now re-emerged as an irritant in relations.” 123
Although Australian-American relations were not strained to the same degree, this was
also true for Australia. The Cuban Crisis suppressed and eclipsed complete
consideration of Australia’s trade with Cuba and its effect on the US alliance.
Significantly, Australian officials did not contemplate the US quarantine of Cuba in the
context of existing US trade and shipping restrictions on Cuba; their focus was on its
legality. Also, friction between Australia and the US was not quick to re-emerge, as in
the British case, but it would nevertheless resurface 12 months after the crisis—and
much worse than before—when the Menzies Government felt President Kennedy’s
wrath over a large shipment of Australian wheat to Cuba. 124
The Department of Trade believed only one Australian company could be directly
affected by the shipping restrictions announced at the beginning of October 1962. That
was Rigryth, which operated one small ship for exporting cattle and sheep to Central
“[Nicholas J. A.] Cheetham [Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Consular, American and 121
Central Europe)] to [Harold] Caccia, [Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs,] ‘Cuba’, Secret, October 30 1962. (AK 1261/412) FO 371/162395,” as quoted in ibid., 170. For the diplomats’ first names and positions, which have been inserted here, see “A Directory of British Diplomats,” updated 8 March 2016, http://www.gulabin.com/britishdiplomatsdirectory/pdf/britishdiplomatsdirectory.pdf (accessed 13 March 2016), 95 and 81 respectively.
Thomas, “Trade and Shipping to Cuba 1961–1963,” 170.122
Ibid., 173.123
See NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Cuba – Economic relations with Australia.”124
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and South America. In informing the Department of External Affairs of the potential
effect of the restrictions, Trade proposed that it would simply advise Rigryth privately
of the US decision, and “publish the text of the eventual U.S. announcement imposing
the restrictions in ‘Overseas Trading’ as a general warning to exporters.” 125
One External Affairs official was apprehensive about Trade’s decision simply to publish
the announcement of the restrictions. In a note to Forsyth, which was forwarded to
Peachey, the official wrote:
I presume that publication of the U.S. announcement in Overseas Trading by Trade would not imply that the Australian Government had agreed that the measures were appropriate. If it carried such an implication we would need further authority before agreeing. We should keep in close touch with Washington about when the eventual announcement will be made. It is likely to spark questions about our political attitude to Cuba. I suggest that replies should be along the line that developments in Cuba pose serious problems for the U.S. and Latin America in general. In our view they are primarily problems for countries in the region, to be handled by regional machinery. 126
It is clear that this official did not wish to indicate that the Australian Government
believed that the US trade restrictions on Cuba were appropriate. Within External
Affairs, there was opposition to the US trade restrictions on Cuba and concern that
Trade’s actions could be misconstrued as an endorsement of the US restrictions, without
the proper authority of either the Minister or Cabinet. Additionally, regarding the
Australian Government’s political attitude towards Cuba, the official suggested that
Australia take the view that the developments in Cuba posed problems for the US and
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Trade with Cuba,” memorandum by Peachey for Harry, 16 October 1962.125
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, handwritten note by “H. D.” (author unknown), Americas and South 126
Pacific Branch, External Affairs, for Forsyth, 18 October 1962. Emphasis in original.
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Latin America and should be managed by regional machinery. Less than a week later
during the Cuban Crisis, the Australian Government adopted this exact position. In his
parliamentary statement on the crisis, Menzies, as noted in Chapter 1, stated that “the
Americas are therefore being submitted to a very grave threat at close quarters.” Also,
he expressed his appreciation for Kennedy’s reference to “regional defensive
agreements”—in other words, the Rio Treaty and OAS—which were essential for “the
common safety” of those in the Americas. Essentially, the Australian Government 127
saw Cuba as primarily a problem for the US and Latin America, both in terms of trade
and the Cuban Crisis. However, as this thesis argues, each issue required careful
management of the US alliance.
Although the US restrictions might only have affected one Australian company, they
had the potential to significantly affect Australian-Cuban trade, which was already very
small. It is likely that it was Rigryth that exported the cattle to Cuba in 1961–62, which
was the export item, as stated earlier, that saw the total value of Australia’s exports to
the island go from nil in 1960–61 to £37,000.00 in 1961–62. This was a great increase
given that the aggregate total value of exports for the years 1952–60 was only
£23,000.00 (see Table 1). Thus, by imposing such sweeping restrictions on the shipment
of goods to Cuba, the US was effectively interfering in Australian-Cuban trade. As the
total value of exports to Cuba returned to £1,000.00 in 1962–63, it is difficult to tell
whether this was because the cattle exports in the previous financial year were an
anomaly or because of the effects of the US restrictions. What is clear, however, is that
R.G. Menzies, “International Affairs: Ministerial Statement,” Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 127
(CPD), House of Representatives (House), vol. 37, 23 October 1962, 1781.
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Australian-Cuban trade continued irrespective of both the US embargo on Cuba, and
importantly, the Cuban Crisis.
Given the Australian Government’s ability both to express antipathy for Castro’s Cuba
and to maintain trade relations, this situation may not seem overly surprising. As was
noted in Chapter 2 and should be recalled here, Australia saw the crisis as
predominantly a US-Soviet dispute. In other words, Cuba is largely absent from
Australia’s Cuban Crisis experience. The Australian Government saw the Soviet Union
as responsible for the crisis. In the Cabinet deliberations and Menzies’ parliamentary
statement, references are made to the deceitful activities of the Soviets; the Cubans do
not rate a mention. Thus, the diminished role and responsibility the Australian
Government allocated to Cuba could explain its willingness to continue to pursue its
geo-economic interests during what it considered to be a regional crisis for the US and
its neighbours. Nevertheless, the fact that these shipping restrictions were proposed at
the start of October 1962 and their potential effects were being deliberated by
departmental officials on 16 and 23 October 1962 — thus, during the Cuban Crisis—128
makes McEwen’s response to the PM in Cabinet regarding Australian-Cuban trade, all
the more remarkable.
As Minister for Trade, McEwen should have been aware of Australia’s history of trade
with the Caribbean island. As shown in Table 1, the previous financial year had been
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “Trade with Cuba,” memorandum by Peachey for Harry, 16 October 1962; 128
and ibid., “U.S.A.: Restrictions on Shipping to Cuba,” memorandum by Peachey for Harry, 23 October 1962.
! 264
Australia’s best since 1952 in terms of the highest total value of exports to Cuba. It was
also clear from the discussions with the Department of External Affairs that there was
no desire to restrict Australian-Cuban trade. McEwen’s response to Menzies, therefore,
was incorrect and misleading. If McEwen was indeed unaware of Australian-Cuban
trade, then he was completely out of touch with the day-to-day business of his
Department. It suggests that his contribution to the preceding discussion on export
licences and Australian trade restrictions towards Cuba—which unfolded just months
prior to the Cuban Crisis—was perfunctory rather than meaningful, and that it was
Trade officials, rather than the Minister, with whom Barwick and the External Affairs
officials actually engaged. This was, as one official suggested, possibly the result of
McEwen occupying too many roles. Even if McEwen’s response was intended to reflect
an honest belief that Australia did not at that time have any exports en route to Cuba, his
answer nevertheless implied the absence of trade between the two states, and with that,
there was no discussion on trade. Consequently, the Cabinet was not given any sense of
the challenges associated with trade with Cuba, such as its potential effect on the
Australia-US alliance. Whether the US, as a result of the nuclear crisis, would further
pressure allies to cease trading with Cuba and how Australia would juggle its geo-
strategic and geo-economic interests, for example, were issues that simply were not
taken into consideration.
It is also clear from the preceding discussion that, given the political issues involved
(and, specifically, US sensitivity over Cuba), External Affairs, not Trade, was given the
responsibility for managing Australian-Cuban trade. While the Trade Minister should
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have been able to respond with accuracy to the PM’s question, curiously, the External
Affairs Minister, who was clearly aware of Australian-Cuban trade, did not correct him
nor offer more information. It is possible that Barwick did not intervene in order to
avoid embarrassing McEwen. More likely, however, he simply did not consider the
issue relevant in terms of the Government’s policy on the crisis nor one that needed to
be brought before Cabinet. Barwick was confident in the way he and External Affairs
were handling Australian-Cuban trade, including any pressure or disapproval from the
US. Also, Barwick and McEwen had agreed months earlier that Cabinet’s views would
not yet be sought on Australian-Cuban trade.
While McEwen and Barwick did not discuss Australian-Cuban trade with Cabinet, it
should be noted that no records have been located in which the subject was raised by
officials in the Departments of External Affairs and Trade, either with each other or
their respective Ministers. It is possible, therefore, that the ministers’ oversight followed
that of their staff, who apparently had not thought to brief them on the subject before or
after the Cabinet meeting. This is despite, for example, External Affairs officials
contemplating the potential effect that US restrictions on shipping to Cuba could have
on Australian trade, just weeks before news of the crisis broke. Regardless, the fact that
Australian-Cuban trade was mishandled by McEwen and not handled at all by Barwick
and External Affairs during the crisis is astonishing given the deliberations on the
subject throughout 1962. Moreover, that an issue as significant as Australia-US
differences over trade with Cuba failed to enter into the minds of policymakers during
the Cuban Crisis is extraordinary.
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Bittersweet: Soaring Sugar Exports Amid Concerns over US Shipping Restrictions
For the Australian sugar industry, the US embargo on Cuba was bittersweet. Australia,
as this section shows, was able to export an increasing amount of sugar, including to the
US, as a result of the latter’s embargo on Cuba. However, US shipping restrictions
introduced in October 1962 had the potential to interfere with Australian sugar
shipments. Thus, the US embargo on Cuba not only complicated Australia’s trade with
the Caribbean island, but also posed problems for Australia’s trade with the US.
The US, as a result of cutting Cuban sugar imports from late 1960 and imposing a full
trade embargo on Cuba, began to look for alternative exporters of sugar. Australia, the
world’s fourth largest producer of cane sugar, was an obvious consideration. While 129
Australia did not benefit immediately from the fallout between the US and Cuba in this
regard, the US ordered Australian sugar in 1961 to replace some of what Cuba 130
previously supplied. That year, Australia also exported sugar to Canada, Hong Kong,
Japan, New Zealand, and the UK—which was essentially the only European importer of
Australian sugar. At the beginning of 1962, Cuba withdrew its sugar from the world 131
market. At that time, world supply of sugar far outweighed demand. However, the US 132
NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 129
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/1-562, “Queensland—A Current Economic Survey” (unclassified section), from Knox Lamb, American Consul, American Consulate, Brisbane, to Department of State, 11 April 1962, 4.
NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 130
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/1-460, “Quarterly Economic Summary—Australia: April–June 1960” (unclassified) prepared by William E. Knight II, First Secretary of Embassy, for the Ambassador [to Australia, Sebald], and forwarded by American Embassy to Department of State, 4 August 1960, 5.
NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 131
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/1-562, “Queensland—A Current Economic Survey” (unclassified section), from Lamb to Department of State, 11 April 1962, 4.
“No Cuban Sugar For Export: London Prices Up £2 A Ton,” Financial Times (London), 1 February 132
1962, 1.
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did not believe Australia would have any difficulties offloading its “record exportable
surplus” of sugar that year. In an economic report for the period July to September
1962, US Ambassador to Australia, William C. Battle, was told that “The favorable [sic]
selling position results from the Cuban situation which has stimulated large purchases
of Australian sugar by the U.S., Japan, Korea and other markets.” 133
Australia, therefore, was expected to profit from the breakdown in relations between the
US and Cuba. It was estimated that Australia would earn £47 million (Australian) in
export income from sugar in 1962–63, which would reflect a gain of £13 million
(Australian) compared to the previous season, Australia having produced a record 1.8
million tonnes. Again, the US Embassy attributed Australia’s anticipated position to
increased purchases of Australian sugar by the US and other former importers of Cuban
sugar. As predicted, Australia exported over a million tonnes of raw sugar in 1962. 134 135
Although the Department of Trade considered that only Rigryth might be affected by
the US shipping restrictions introduced in October 1962, the Colonial Sugar Refining
Company (CSR), a leading supplier in the Australian sugar industry, advised the
Government that it was “worried” about the effect these restrictions could have on trade
NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 133
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/8-362, “Quarterly Economic Summary” (unclassified) prepared by Schodt for [William C. Battle], Ambassador [to Australia], and forwarded by American Embassy to Department of State, 6 November 1962, 9.
NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 134
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/1-562, “Biweekly Economic Review No. 1 for the Period Ended January 3, 1962” (unclassified) prepared by Donald W. Lamm, First Secretary of Embassy, for Ambassador [to Australia], and forwarded by American Embassy to Department of State, 7 January 1962, 3.
“Historical Events: Key Dates in the History of the Australian Sugar Industry,” Australian Cane 135
Farmers Association, http://www.acfa.com.au/sugar-industry/historical-events/ (accessed 13 April 2016).
! 268
with the US. By the mid-1960s, CSR, which largely controlled the industry, was one 136
of the world’s top one hundred companies and one of Australia’s only large Australian-
owned companies. It was also the sole export agent of the Queensland Sugar 137
Corporation, and up to 1992, had been the only Australian company awarded an
eligibility certificate from the US Embassy to export the sugar quota allocated to
Australia by the US. Thus, CSR was particularly “concerned about its arrangements 138
for chartering vessels for sugar shipments to the United States.” As a result, the
Department of External Affairs sought further information from Washington in order to
assess more accurately the effect of the proposed restrictions. The restrictions would 139
likely have been a concern for the Australian Government given the importance of this
commodity to the Australian economy, and particularly in light of the recent increase in
exports. Australian public intellectual, Donald Horne, offered a frank explanation as to
why the Government would have been troubled by the restrictions: “Favourable
treatment of the sugar industry is built into Australian politics because so much
employment in Queensland depends on it and because, like other export industries, it
helps the balance of payments.” 140
The interest of the UK in joining the Common Market also had the potential to sour
what had otherwise been sweet success for the Australian sugar industry. In an
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “CSR,” handwritten file note (author and date unknown).136
Donald Horne, The Lucky Country (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1971 (3rd rev. ed.)), 181.137
Industry Commission, “The Australian Sugar Industry,” report no. 19 (Canberra: Australian 138
Government Publishing Service, 6 March 1992), http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/sugar/19sugar.pdf (accessed 17 April 2016), 88 and 96.
NAA: A1838, 838/1 Part 1, “U.S.A.: Restrictions on Shipping to Cuba,” memorandum by Peachey for 139
Harry, 23 October 1962. Horne, The Lucky Country, 181.140
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economic review sent to the US State Department, Battle acknowledged that Australian
sugar exports would be adversely affected by UK entry into the Common Market. 141
Thus, while markets for Australian sugar were expanding, these same markets, and
those of other commodities, were also considered under threat.
Yet none of this was discussed by Cabinet, External Affairs or Trade officials during the
Cuban Crisis. The crisis made it abundantly clear that relations between the US and
Cuba were under further strain and highly unlikely to improve in the short-term. This
would have indicated that the US would continue to import sugar from alternative
sources, such as Australia, which would have had consequences for the Australian sugar
industry, and thus, the Australian economy. Given the time Australian officials spent
examining the political effects of Australian trade with Cuba prior to the crisis and the
focus on the Australian export drive, it is surprising that the likelihood of ongoing
hostility between the US and Cuba and the implications of this on trade, were not
contemplated.
This chapter has shown that Australia maintained a trade relationship with Cuba despite
McEwen’s claims to the contrary. Trade with Cuba had become an irritant in relations
between the US and several of its allies but, in the lead up to the Cuban Crisis, Australia
had come under less criticism than Canada and the UK. Nevertheless, the Australian
NARA: RG 59, General Records of the Department of State, CDF, 1960–63, from 843.00/1-460 to 141
843.0051K/1-362, box 2495, file 843.00/1-562, “Biweekly Economic Review No. 15 for the Period Ended July 19, 1962” prepared by Battle, and forwarded by American Embassy to Department of State, 20 July 1962, 6.
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Government was mindful of US sensitivity on the subject and took its highly restrictive
trade and shipping measures towards Cuba into serious consideration in its deliberations
regarding Australia’s export trade with Cuba and the US, particularly throughout
February to October 1962. Essentially, the Australian Government was determined not
to let the US embargo on Cuba inhibit its trade with the island. However, the
Government also benefited from the US embargo on Cuba in that it opened-up new
markets to the Australian sugar industry. Clearly, the Government was doing its utmost
to maintain and further Australia’s economic interests. However, Australian
policymakers, remarkably, did not consider Australia’s trade relations with Cuba or the
US during the Cuban Crisis. The fact that they did not do so illustrates that, on this
particular occasion, geo-economic security was not a foreign policy concern. However,
given that the issue was raised in Cabinet, albeit swiftly dismissed, demonstrates that it
remained an important factor in Australian foreign policy decision-making. Australian
trade with Cuba required careful management of the US alliance; the Menzies
Government was able to do both in furtherance of Australia’s geo-economic and geo-
strategic interests. According to Lee, Australian foreign policy decisions in the
immediate post-war period reflected a search for security that was “both an attempt to
promote Australia’s national economic well-being in the new multilateral economic
world order and an attempt to assure Australia’s security in the politico-strategic sense
in the Cold War.” The findings of this thesis demonstrate that attempts to manage 142
geo-economic and geo-strategic interests continued beyond the first years of Australia’s
Cold War. The next chapter shows how the Government managed Australia’s interests in
practice through its implementation of Australia’s policy on the Cuban Crisis.
Lee, Search for Security, 6.142
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6
Initial Implementation of Australia’s Policy on the Crisis at
Home and Abroad
International relations scholar Christopher Hubbard claimed that “Australia’s geography
and security alliances have, to some extent, placed it on the periphery of world events.”
As a stable democracy, middle power, and enduring ally of the US in the Pacific,
“Australia, despite its relatively modest size and military potential, has often regarded
itself as able to influence events within its own region.” However, on the global stage,
Hubbard asserted, Australia has generally considered itself “economically, politically
and diplomatically small enough to be able to run its own race.” Simultaneously, other
states have regarded Australia “as sufficiently important to matter in the councils of the
northern democracies.” Whereas Chapters 2 to 5 focused on Cabinet’s formulation of 1
its policy on the crisis and the factors that influenced it, this chapter centres on the
influence of the Menzies Government’s policy at home and abroad. It begins by
examining local and then foreign reactions to the Government’s policy in order to
determine its effect during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the most intense period
of the crisis.
Earlier chapters have shown that the Cabinet and bureaucrats in Canberra were more
concerned about maintaining Australian security during the crisis by successfully
managing the US alliance than they were with its nuclear nature. While there is little
Christopher Hubbard, “From Ambivalence to Influence: Australia and the Negotiation of the 1968 1
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, no. 4 (2004): 527.
!272
evidence to suggest that during the crisis Australians prepared for nuclear conflict, this
chapter demonstrates that the Cuban situation prompted some Australians to question
the adequacy of the nation’s security and its preparedness for nuclear war. It shows how
such concerns were reflected in public reactions to the Government’s new defence
programme, launched in the middle of the crisis, as well as post-crisis questions in
newspapers and journals over civil defence measures, specifically, emergency health
plans and bunkers. Further, this chapter argues that Australians concerned about
Australia’s security and civil defence measures had little influence on the Menzies
Government’s policy on the crisis.
Australian officials in Canberra were conscious of the potential for the crisis to start a
global, thermonuclear war. However, the Government only acknowledged this
possibility in its second public statement on the crisis, a statement that it delivered after
the most intense period of the crisis had passed. Throughout the crisis, Australian
officials located at the UN in New York perceived the nuclear threat differently from
those in Canberra. That is, the Australian UN delegation was, because of its proximity
to Cuba, acutely aware of the nuclear threat the crisis posed. However, this thesis
contends that Australian officials in both Canberra and New York were naive in their
understanding of thermonuclear weapons because they mistakenly emphasised
geographical isolation over the broad-reaching impact of such weapons.
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Although the Cabinet in Canberra saw Australia on the periphery during the Cuban
Crisis—a security issue facing the US and its region that was beyond Australia’s sphere
of influence—this chapter demonstrates that, on the world stage of the UN in New
York, the Australian delegation sought to influence Member States outside its region to
support the US resolution in the Security Council, and that it was successful in doing so.
Australia did not exactly “run its own race,” to use Hubbard’s phrase, in that it did not
advocate its private views regarding the US position on the crisis, which have been
outlined throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, the Government urged support for the
Kennedy Administration in an effort to manage and maintain its alliance. The Australian
delegation, especially Permanent Representative to the UN, James Plimsoll, worked
hard to garner support for the US resolution among Member States (in anticipation of a
General Assembly vote) and influenced representatives of other democracies who
sought his counsel on the crisis.
The chapter commences with an overview of the Menzies Government’s new defence
programme, Australian public reactions to it, and its nexus with the Cuban Crisis. This
is followed by an examination of the concerns of some Australians regarding the
nation’s preparedness for nuclear war and nuclear war itself. The Government’s second
public statement on the crisis is then considered in detail, as are the views of the
Australian delegation to the UN in New York on the nuclear threat posed by the crisis.
This provides significant insight into Australian understandings of thermonuclear
weapons. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the interactions that the Australian
delegation to the UN in New York had with other Member States during the crisis and
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an analysis of the influence it was able to exercise in favour of the US resolution before
the Security Council.
Australia’s New Defence Programme
On 23 October 1962, events in Federal Parliament were “overshadowed” by the Cuban
Crisis. This shifted slightly on 24 October 1962 when Minister for Defence, Athol 2
Townley, announced in Parliament the Menzies Government’s new three-year defence
programme. It was estimated to cost £650 million that, compared to the last programme,
included what Townley described as a “substantial” increase of £30 million. This
“significant expansion of defence spending,” he stated, “is essential in the present state
of international affairs, which demands a policy of unceasing and effective defence
preparedness.” The new programme saw, for example, an increase in Army personnel
by 3,500, the purchase of 30 Mirage jet fighter aircraft, and funding allocated for Bell
HUIB Iroquois and heavy-lift helicopters, transport aircraft, landing craft, and weapons.
There were no major developments for the Navy, which was already undergoing
modernisation initiated under the previous plan. Major daily newspapers, including the 3
Advertiser and the Examiner, reported that Townley had emphasised that the defence
programme was not static and that “The Government will keep the situation under
constant review, and will not hesitate to make any adjustments that might be desirable in
the light of developments.” The Defence Minister had also noted that events in Cuba
“Canberra Commentary: Prime Minister’s Better Appreciation Of U.N.,” Sydney Morning Herald, 30 2
October 1962, 2. CPD, House, vol. 37, 24 October 1962, 1877–85. See also “£650m. Plan for Defence,” Advertiser, 25 3
October 1962, 3; and “Increase in Aust. defence spending,” Examiner, 25 October 1962, 6.
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and North-East India had “added cause for grave concern.” The Cuban Crisis, however, 4
would not interfere with the estimated delivery of the destroyers being built in the US. 5
However, the coincidental timing of the programme launch with the Cuban Crisis, that
is, with a major international crisis underway and the threat of nuclear war looming,
was problematic for the Menzies Government.
The Menzies Government was widely criticised over the new programme for failing to
adequately prepare Australia’s defence in an unstable world. Initial criticism directed at
the Government came from its own Liberal backbenchers, as well as those associated
with the defence community, such as the Returned Sailors’, Soldiers’ and Airmen’s
Imperial League of Australia (RSSAILA) and former soldiers. Critics on the
Government’s backbench lamented the Government’s expenditure on defence, arguing
that the situations in Southeast Asia and on the India-China border necessitated
increased spending. They were led by Wilfrid Kent Hughes (Liberal Member for
Chisholm).
Ibid., 1878 and 1885. See also “£650m. Plan for Defence,” Advertiser, 25 October 1962, 3; and 4
“Increase in Aust. defence spending,” Examiner, 25 October 1962, 6. Question from Sam Benson (ALP, Member for Batman) to Townley (Liberal Party, Member for 5
Denison), CPD, House, vol. 37, 24 October 1962, 1861; and Townley, ibid., 1879. See also “£650m. Plan for Defence,” Advertiser, 25 October 1962, 3.
! 276
Illustration 4: Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 1962, 2.
Speaking in a debate on the defence programme, Kent Hughes charged that the defence
policy of the Government, of which he was a part, was “inadequate” to meet Australia’s
overseas commitments or domestic defence requirements. His descriptions grew more
harsh the longer he spoke, having later referred to the policy as “pathetic, pusillanimous
and out of all proportion to Australia's commitments in both cases.” With feelings of
“grave disappointment and general disillusionment almost amounting to desperation,”
he claimed that “the Government is out of touch with the thinking of the people who are
seriously disturbed particularly as a result of recent events.” Kent Hughes was well-6
known for his outspoken views on Australia's defence:
CPD, House, vol. 37, 25 October 1962, 1982 and 1984.6
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Restrained only by his sense of propriety, and by an idiosyncratic view of party loyalty, he became a prophet of gloom on the communist threat in Asia and Africa; he accused Menzies of knowing nothing about the ‘Far East’ and caring less; and he attacked the government’s deficiencies in preparing Australia’s defences. 7
While he congratulated Menzies and the Government “on the firmness and swiftness of
the decision” regarding the Cuban situation, he noted that “words in themselves are not
sufficient.” 8
The Sydney Morning Herald was likewise critical of the Government regarding defence.
Describing the programme as “puny,” the newspaper lambasted the Government in its
editorial of 10 November 1962 for what it considered to be an “attempt to shuffle off
responsibility on to Service leaders,” whom it defended by explaining that they were
simply doing the best they could with the funds they had. It added: “It is the
Government and the Government alone which has decided that defence should have a
low priority; that Australia is in no immediate danger; that there is no threat from
Indonesia.” The newspaper accused the Menzies Government of putting Australia’s
defence preparations on a footing reminiscent of the 1940s. Australia, it argued, would
no longer be afforded the time to prepare for a conflict once hostilities commenced, in
terms of raising and training an army comparable to the one it had in World War II.
Although it believed the Government had an “astonishingly unreal assessment of the
basic requirements of Australia’s security,” it considered the stand of the ALP equally
I. R. Hancock, “Kent Hughes, Sir Wilfrid Selwyn (Billy) (1895–1970),” Australian Dictionary of 7
Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University (ANU), http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/kent-hughes-sir-wilfrid-selwyn-billy-10723/text19001 (published in hardcopy 2000; accessed online 2 July 2017). Wilfrid Kent Hughes, CPD, House, vol. 37, 25 October 1962, 1983.8
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disappointing. The notion of a nuclear-free-zone (NFZ) would only be reasonable, it
claimed, if there were global general disarmament. Any agreement not to manufacture,
acquire or receive nuclear weapons “would mean the virtual renunciation of our
alliances with nuclear Powers,” it stated. The Sydney Morning Herald also published 9
the criticisms of the RSSAILA and a number of critical letters to the editor.
The RSSAILA felt that more needed to be done and more money spent to increase the
number of Australian military personnel. In documenting the views of the RSSAILA,
the Sydney Morning Herald suggested that defence spending was so low that sending
Australian troops into combat was comparable to a death sentence. The newspaper
quoted RSSAILA National Treasurer and former Air Vice-Marshal F.M. Bladin, who
stated that “Australia’s defence spending was far too low to put into the battlefield a
force which could survive until help arrived from overseas.” NSW State President, W.
Yeo, claimed that “Australia’s defence has never been weaker,” and asserted that the
government should impose a defence tax to obtain the funds so that it could provide
modern weapons. Yeo also suggested how personnel could be increased to build a force
that could stand-up to Indonesia. Consequently, the RSSAILA congress urged the
Menzies Government “to do all in its power to maintain a fully effective and adequately
trained defence force equipped with up-to-date weapons,” and furthermore, “to give 10
“Defence Preparations on a 1940 Basis,” Sydney Morning Herald, 10 November 1962, 2.9
“Defence Spending Criticised By R.S.L.,” Sydney Morning Herald, 31 October 1962, 4. The 10
newspaper erroneously referred to the RSSAILA as the “Returned Servicemen’s League (RSL).” It became the Returned Services League of Australia (RSL) in October 1965: RSL (South Australia Branch), “National RSL History,” http://rslsa.org.au/rsl-history/ (accessed 12 December 2017).
! 279
Australia nuclear weapons and sufficient aircraft to deliver them to the territory of any
prospective enemy.” 11
The Air Force Association (AFA) also held its annual conference in the first week of
November 1962. The Federal Council’s decision to advise the Government that
Australia’s defence depended on air power, specifically bombers capable of carrying
nuclear armed missiles, was perhaps unsurprising given that only a week earlier, the
world stood on the brink of nuclear war and the Menzies Government had launched its
new defence programme. 12
Criticism and concern regarding the adequacy of Australia’s defence preparedness was
expressed by Australia’s daily metropolitan newspapers. A Sydney Morning Herald
editorial provided the sharpest critique:
The Government’s emphasis continues to be on the protection our allies, and especially the United States, afford us. There is no faintest recognition of the very real possibility that the crisis arising out of the Cuban situation could tie our allies’ hands and leave us alone to face Indonesian expansionism with pitifully inferior forces. Yesterday’s statement on defence was not the announcement of a defence program; it was an announcement that the Government had abdicated its national responsibilities. 13
The Sydney Morning Herald’s claims of Government complacency and an ill-prepared
defence force, were recurrent themes in letters to the editor. One letter writer, W.
“Nuclear Weapons Urged,” ibid. Victorian delegates objected to this decision, but only on the grounds 11
that nuclear weapons would consume the defence budget. As one Queensland delegate noted, Victorian views were based on the assumption that Australia would have to pay for its nuclear weapons.
“Plea On Defence,” Sydney Morning Herald, 4 November 1962, 40.12
“Abdication of National Responsibility,” Sydney Morning Herald, 25 October 1962, 2.13
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Forrest, called the Menzies Government “complacent about Australia’s pathetic defence
program” because it considered Indonesia “friendly.” Distrustful of Australia’s
neighbour, Forrest advocated that the Menzies Government acquire nuclear weapons to
defend against, and to deter, a potentially “unfriendly Indonesia.” Forrest wrote: “A
small population is best defended by the most powerful modern weapons. Some nuclear
stations up north would be a powerful deterrent against aggression.” Another letter 14
writer, Eric Campbell, offered no solutions to Australia’s defence problems but was
adamant that Menzies’ oratory skills were not the answer. He stated: “The silver tongue
of a brilliant Prime Minister may be a powerful weapon for silencing his critics, but it is
a rather poor substitute for an efficient Army if someone comes knocking at our door.” 15
The newspapers also received letters from ex-servicemen. Retired Rear-Admiral H.J.
Buchanan, for example, criticised the Menzies Government regarding its strategic
planning and method of allocating defence funds. For Buchanan, President Kennedy’s
decision to draw on US sea power in the Cuban Crisis added to the numerous historical
examples where “control of the sea is a vital issue in peace no less than in war.” He
advocated that Australia should base its defence on a maritime strategy, determining the
resources Australia could provide for its own security and that on which Australia
would rely on its “powerful friends.” Having actively participated in Australian defence
planning in the immediate post-war period, he claimed that “the procedure of offering
“Australia Needs Nuclear Weapons,” letter to the editor, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 November 1962, 14
2. Eric Campbell, “Defence Of Australia: Both Flanks In The Air,” letter to the editor, Sydney Morning 15
Herald, 12 November 1962, 2.
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the Services a sum of money and leaving them to scramble for what each regards as a
fair share was putting the cart before the horse.” 16
Buchanan’s claim that the Services were scrambling among themselves for funding was
telling of Australia’s expenditure on defence. In a letter to the editor of the Sydney
Morning Herald, another retired Rear Admiral, Alec B. Doyle, blamed the Australian
public for Menzies governments’ limited defence budgets. Doyle recalled the
government’s earlier defence efforts following the 1951 election, which involved:
recruitment, the reintroduction of compulsory military training, the dispatch of forces to
Korea and Malaya, and the establishment of the ANZUS Security Treaty. Such efforts,
he argued, received inadequate support from the wider community because “it was
interested primarily in securing more leisure and a higher material standard of living.”
One letter writer, J.M. Smail, maintained that, rather than focusing on procuring
materiel at the best price, the Government should invest in Australian industry to ensure
the country had the capacity to keep waging war. This, nevertheless, required 17
substantial investment. Returning to Doyle, he concluded that “Governments remain in
power only while they do what the mass of the people is prepared to accept.” 18
Therefore, in Doyle’s view, the Government’s spending on defence was hamstrung by
what was deemed acceptable to the public. It is likely that the Menzies Government
considered that the Cuban Crisis would seemingly provide it with an ideal atmosphere
H. J. Buchanan, “The Defence Of Australia: ‘Cart Before The Horse’,” letter to the editor, Sydney 16
Morning Herald, 19 November 1962, 2. J. M. Smail, “Capacity To Wage War: Importance Of The Industrial Factor,” letter to the editor, Sydney 17
Morning Herald, 3 November 1962, 2. Alec B. Doyle, “Public Apathy To Defence: Sacrifice And Effort Needed,” letter to the editor, Sydney 18
Morning Herald, 13 November 1962, 2.
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in which to declare an increase in defence spending. Unfortunately for the Government
however, the Cuban Crisis brought the possibility of conflict, especially nuclear
conflict, to the forefront of the public’s mind, and as demonstrated above, led many to
question Australia’s defence capabilities and preparedness.
Wayne Reynolds, whose scholarship on Australia’s relationship with nuclear weapons
was discussed in detail in Chapter 3, asserted that historians have never adequately
explained why Menzies was criticised for not spending enough on defence at a time
when war loomed large. Reynolds claimed that Menzies in fact “prepared Australian
defences by strengthening industry. [Menzies] prepared not for war in Asia but for
global war, and one in which the use of nuclear weapons would be commonplace.” As 19
shown in the latter part of this chapter, Menzies considered that only the Great Powers
should possess nuclear weapons. Some government officials disagreed. Philip Baxter,
Vice-Chancellor of the New South Wales University of Technology from 1955–69 and
chairman of the Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC) from 1956–72, “saw
the military potential of nuclear power, and wanted Australia to have the capacity to
build its own nuclear deterrent.” In Menzies’ view, Australia’s defence was best 20
served, not by steep increases in the defence budget, but by smart investment in its
alliances with its great and powerful friends. Indeed, his governments made modest
Wayne Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb (Carlton South, Victoria: Melbourne University 19
Press, 2000), 1.
This was in a part-time capacity barring 1969–72 when he became full-time chairman following his 20
retirement from the University of New South Wales. He also represented Australia on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) board of governors in 1957 and from 1964–72, having held the chairmanship from 1969–70: Philip Gissing, “Baxter, Sir John Philip (1905–1989),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, ANU, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/baxter-sir-john-philip-12185 (published in hardcopy 2007; accessed online 21 July 2015).
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financial investments in defence. Australia’s expenditure on defence in the early 1960s
was as low as 2.7 percent of gross national product, a figure “lower than any prosperous
country except New Zealand.” Thus, comparatively, Australia spent little on defence. 21
Despite the increased expenditure under the new programme, many criticised the
Menzies Government for such a paltry defence effort.
One contemporary academic claimed at the time that “While officially we [Australia]
undertook a major defence effort in order to secure and carry influence in our alliances,
in reality we relied upon our alliances to relax our defence effort.” This was apparent 22
in Townley’s statement on the new defence programme in which he emphasised that
“the main threat in the world today, can only be countered by the enhanced strength
which comes from collective security.” He added: “we make a worth-while [sic] 23
contribution to the security and stability of our more exposed friends. In turn, we attract
the support of allies should we be threatened.” 24
Australia’s dependence on its allies and its policy of what is commonly referred to as
“defence on the cheap”, has consistently run counter to the views of British and
American governments. Both the UK and the US have wanted to see Australian
governments make a greater contribution towards their country’s defence needs. The
Donald Horne, The Lucky Country, 3rd rev. edn. (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1971), 194. 21
That New Zealand lagged behind Australia is noteworthy given that it saw so much of its own defence bound up with Australia.
Professor B.B. Beddie quoted in ibid., 195.22
Townley, CPD, House, vol. 37, 24 October 1962, 1878–9. See also “£650m. Plan for Defence,” 23
Advertiser, 25 October 1962, 3. Ibid., 1879.24
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UK made this point as early as 1946 at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference
when, in light of its limited post-war capacity, it emphasised the need for the Australian
Government to increase its efforts. The diminished defence capabilities of the UK also
highlighted to Australia the necessity of continuing its wartime relationship with the US
during peacetime. 25
The criticism that accompanied the launch of the Menzies Government’s defence
programme and the Cuban Crisis did not prompt any immediate changes to Australia’s
new defence programme. In his comments on the 1963 Budget, the Treasurer, Harold
Holt, referred to a large expansion in the armed services with a progressive increase in
defence expenditure in subsequent years. This, he noted, prompted a full review of the
situation in Southeast Asia “‘in the light of our treaty arrangements’.” In fact, it was 26
not until 10 November 1964, that Menzies tabled in Parliament a comprehensive review
of Australia’s defence forces, which resulted in the decision to increase manpower
significantly. The review, Menzies claimed, followed “‘a deterioration in our strategic
position’.” This illustrates that, for the Menzies Government, the nuclear threat posed 27
by the Cuban Crisis and its potential repercussions were not significant enough to
warrant any immediate changes in Australia’s strategic position.
Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson, Pamela Andre, eds., The ANZUS Treaty 1951, Documents on 25
Australian Foreign Policy (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), xxviii. Quoted in Harry Rayner, Scherger: A biography of Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger KBE CB 26
DSO AFC (Canberra: Australian War Memorial (AWM), 1984), 152. R.G. Menzies, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House of Representatives (House), 10 27
November 1964, http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1964-11-10/0145/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf (accessed 27 August 2017), 1.
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Nevertheless, bureaucrats in the Department of External Affairs were deeply concerned
about the impact of the Cuban Crisis on Australia’s strategic position. Specifically, they
were worried about the detrimental effect the crisis and any potential war could have on
the capacity of the US to assist Australia to defend against regional communist threats.
This was exacerbated by increased tensions between the US and the Soviet Union over
Berlin. Australian politicians and bureaucrats in External Affairs contemplated whether
the Soviet Union would move on Berlin while the West was preoccupied with Cuba,
which would result in crises on two fronts. Consequently, External Affairs advised
Australian diplomats abroad that it was necessary “to prevent a situation arising which
would concentrate United States attention on the Caribbean and Europe, and thus reduce
her capability to take effective action, if necessary in South-East Asia.” The absence 28
of cablegrams on the nuclear threat posed by the Cuban Crisis compared with several
discussions on its possible effects on the Australia-US alliance and Australian regional
security, suggests that the latter subject was of greater concern to the Menzies
Government.
National Archives of Australia, Canberra (NAA): A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, outward cablegram (O.28
19418), Department of External Affairs, Canberra (External Affairs) to Australian Mission to UN, New York, and Australian Embassy, Washington (Washington Embassy), 20 October 1962 [sic], correct date: 29 October 1962 (as noted on the final page of the cablegram), 2. See also NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 part 1, paper on “Points for Public Presentation” with annotations (author and audience unknown; likely an External Affairs official to Garfield Barwick, Minister for External Affairs), 23 October 1962, 2.
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Australia’s Preparedness for Nuclear War
As noted in the previous section and in Chapter 2, the Menzies Government was not
preoccupied by the nuclear nature of the threat posed by the Cuban Crisis. More
specifically, the Government did not perceive a direct nuclear threat to Australian
territory during the crisis. This is demonstrated by official records that contain no
discussion of such a threat. Remarkably, for example, there are no references to the
nuclear nature of the crisis in the Cabinet notebook, nor the cablegrams of the
Department of External Affairs. The Government’s perception of the nuclear threat
however, is consistent with the views of the wider Australian population towards
nuclear weapons in the early 1960s.
Poll data provides insight into the threat perceptions of Australians in the years either
side of the Cuban Crisis. Australians were asked: “Do you believe the Western countries
and Russia can continue to live peacefully together, or is there bound to be a major war
sooner or later?” Of the 1,650 Australians polled before the Cuban Crisis in 1961, 43
percent believed the countries could live in peace and 37 percent believed war was
likely (20 percent were listed as “other”). Similar numbers of people polled believed in
the possibility of peace and war. When 1,900 Australians were polled in 1963, and thus
after the crisis, 58 percent believed the countries could live in peace and only 26 percent
believed there would be war (16 percent were listed as “other”). Thus, in 1963, the 29
majority of Australians polled believed that peaceful coexistence between the West and
David Campbell, Australian Public Opinion on National Security Issues, Working Paper No.1 29
(Canberra: Peace Research Centre, ANU, 1986), 27, cited in Alan Dupont, Australia’s Threat Perceptions: A Search for Security (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, ANU, 1991), Annex C, 100.
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the Soviet Union was possible and they did not anticipate a major war. This is
significant given how perilously close the superpowers had come to nuclear annihilation
in 1962, and given that in this period, a major war possibly involved the use of nuclear
weapons. Also, it is difficult to believe that the Cuban Crisis did not influence those
polled given the timeframes in which interviews were undertaken. Seemingly, to the 58
percent of people polled that believed the countries could live in peace, aversion of a
major and nuclear war over Cuba, was possibly evidence of peaceful coexistence. While
this poll obviously sampled a small section of the population, contemporary views
detailed below indicate that such beliefs were consistent with those of the Menzies
Government in this period in terms of strategic and civil defence planning.
In the Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy of January 1962, the Defence
Committee concluded that “there would be no threat of nuclear attack except in global
war.” Even if such circumstances arose, in the Defence Committee's assessment,
“Australia would not be an early or primary target for nuclear attack.” Such an
assessment naturally had consequences for civil defence planning. The Defence
Committee stated: “During the early stages of global war, Australia and her Island
Territories would have no significance to the communist bloc and would therefore be
unlikely to be subjected to nuclear attack.” It concluded, therefore, that “any substantial
diversion of resources to Civil Defence is not warranted.” 30
Stephan Frühling, ed., A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945 (Canberra: Defence 30
Publishing Service, Department of Defence, 2009), 294.
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Australian civil defence policy had reflected such low nuclear threat perceptions since
the late 1950s. In September 1959, Minister for the Interior, Gordon Freeth, announced
the reorganisation of Australia’s Civil Defence Directorate. This announcement
prompted the only major debate on civil defence during the Cold War. In his
parliamentary statement, Freeth described the nuclear threat to Australia as remote but
not to “be ruled out entirely.” He stated that the civil defence programme “should be
consistent with the overall defence policy and programme and related at any time to the
assessment of the strategic situation.” Accordingly, Freeth concluded that as a nuclear
threat to Australia was unlikely, a diversion of resources from the armed forces to civil
defence could not be justified; it was “not warranted at the present time,” he stated. 31
Freeth’s statements, which were consistent with the advice of the Defence Committee,
demonstrate that although civil defence should have been consistent with defence
policy, it was not considered part of that policy, and therefore, was treated as a separate
issue. The Menzies Government’s response to the nuclear threat posed by the Cuban
Crisis is therefore consistent with its low nuclear threat perception reflected in strategic
planning documents and civil defence policy. Significantly, the crisis did not prompt the
Government to reconsider its strategic plans or civil defence preparedness.
Australian civil defence policy and planning reflects an immature understanding of
thermonuclear weapons. Rapid developments in nuclear weapons technology in the
1950s marked a new and more dangerous phase of the nuclear arms race. The first
successful test of a thermonuclear device, which was performed by the US at Eniwetok
Gordon Freeth (Liberal Party, Member for Forrest), CPD, House, vol. 24, 29 September 1959, 1521.31
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Atoll on 1 November 1952, was 500 times more powerful than the first plutonium
bombs and 1,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. By March 1954, the 32
US and the Soviet Union had each produced a deliverable thermonuclear weapon. 33
The major threat posed by thermonuclear weapons is their enormous explosive power,
which can be packed into small, light-weight packages deliverable by missiles. Thus, 34
as more powerful nuclear weapons with better accuracy, invulnerability, and deliverable
at greater speeds were developed, the danger intensified. It would take hours for the first
US nuclear weapons to reach their targets; they weighed thousands of pounds and were
deliverable by hulking strategic bombers. Technological developments in the 1950s,
such as ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), enabled nuclear
warheads to traverse oceans and continents in minutes rather than hours. 35
Subsequently, such developments placed all countries within range of nuclear attack and
radioactive fallout. A country’s geography, in terms of its distance from other states and
its greatness in size, was no longer advantageous. In his memoirs in 1960, British Prime
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 126–7. For a useful overview of the differences 32
between thermonuclear weapons and earlier nuclear weapons technology, see “Types of Nuclear Weapons,” Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission: Preparatory commission for the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty organization, https://www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/types-of-nuclear-weapons/ (accessed 15 August 2015).
The US monopoly on the hydrogen bomb ended on 12 August 1953 when the Soviet Union exploded a 33
thermonuclear device. Unlike the US device, the Soviet one could already be assembled into a deliverable bomb since its dimensions matched those of the first atomic bomb. However, contemporary US assessments determined that this device was more like a boosted atomic weapon than a “superbomb”—as the highly powerful hydrogen bombs were then known. Historian on Soviet nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, David Holloway, pointed out that the Soviet Union nevertheless had managed to produce a deliverable hydrogen bomb six-months ahead of the US; see David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956, e-book edn. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), 305–8 and 317. Reynolds incorrectly dated the Soviet Union’s first thermonuclear test 20 August 1953: Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, 127. The US tested its first deliverable thermonuclear weapon on 1 March 1954; see “Types of Nuclear Weapons,” CTBTO Preparatory Commission. Holloway also stated that “even if one takes the view that [the 1953 device] was not a ‘real’ thermonuclear bomb,” the Soviet Union tested a superbomb on 22 November 1955, just 20 months after the US had conducted an equivalent test: Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 317. For further discussion on the 1955 test, see 314–7.
“Types of Nuclear Weapons,” CTBTO Preparatory Commission.34
See David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its 35
Dangerous Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 15.
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Minister from 1955–57, Anthony Eden, remarked on the changes brought about by
thermonuclear weapons:
One consequence of the evolution from the atomic to the hydrogen bomb was to diminish the advantage of physically larger countries. All became equally vulnerable. I had been acutely conscious in the atomic age of our unenviable position in a small and crowded island, but if continents, and not merely small islands, were doomed to destruction, all was equal in the grim reckoning. 36
Such technological developments were also addressed in contemporary popular culture.
For example, Nevil Shute’s 1957 novel On the Beach, which was later adapted for
screen in the 1959 Stanley Kramer film of the same name, tells the story of Australians
coming to terms with the end of life on Earth following the outbreak of nuclear war in
the northern hemisphere. 37
Scholars have recognised that technological developments in weaponry and delivery
systems prompted new understandings of the relationship between nuclear weapons and
geography. In her book Australia and the Bomb, Christine Leah stated: “Nuclear
weapons contract time and space; they ‘connect’ allies (especially those in faraway
lands such as Australia) in a way that was not possible before without forward
deploying substantial conventional forces to the ally’s territory—a costly exercise.” 38
Equally, nuclear weapons also connect enemies in a way not previously possible.
Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden K.G., P.C., M.C.: Full Circle (London: 36
Cassell & Company Ltd, 1960), 368. Nevil Shute, On the Beach (London: The Book Club, 1957); and IMDb, “On the Beach,” http://37
www.imdb.com/title/tt0053137/?ref_=nv_sr_2 (accessed 21 June 2017). Christine M. Leah, Australia and the Bomb (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 126.38
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Despite the convincing effects of technological developments in nuclear weaponry,
some have failed to recognise how such changes have prompted new understandings of
the relationship between thermonuclear weapons and geography. For example,
international relations scholar Jacques E. C. Hymans, claimed in one of his published
case studies on Australia and the nuclear weapons option in the period 1949–99:
It is hard to see why Australia, a country blessed with a supremely ‘lucky’ geographical position, was so eager to participate in Western nuclear defenses—thereby raising its significance as a Chinese or Soviet nuclear target. 39
While nuclear weapons bases were in fact geographically distant from Australia, to
suggest its geographical position was both fortunate and relevant in the thermonuclear
age reflects a naivety regarding the capabilities and effects of such weapons and
associated technologies. Hymans' repetition of outdated perceptions in 2000, which, as
shown in this section, were outdated in the early 1960s, is therefore remarkable.
Such naivety over thermonuclear weapons is reflected in civil defence policy and plans
of the Menzies governments in the 1950s and early 1960s. As shown above, geography
became irrelevant following technological developments in nuclear weaponry and
delivery systems in the late 1950s. But it nevertheless continued to play a significant
part in the strategic defence policy and planning of the Menzies governments. Bizarrely,
at the height of the Cold War, the Menzies governments considered that Australia’s
geographic isolation from the major powers and its allies both protected it from nuclear
threats, thus rejecting the need for civil defence policy and planning, and exposed its
Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Isotopes and Identity: Australia and the Nuclear Weapons Option, 1949–1999,” 39
The Nonproliferation Review 7, no. 1 (2000): 1.
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vulnerability in terms of its defence capacity thus driving its desire to secure a US
presence in its region and to acquire nuclear weapons. Remarkably, even the possible
acquisition of nuclear weapons did not prompt the Menzies governments to re-evaluate
the potential change in threat level that would be brought about by their possession.
Some in the Menzies Government however, had a much less insouciant attitude toward
nuclear weapons and war. Unlike policymakers in Canberra, Australian delegates to the
UN in New York were highly cognisant of the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear
conflict during the Cuban Crisis. For Australian UN delegate, Richard Woolcott, the
crisis was an anxious time. In an interview aired on Australian Broadcasting
Corporation (ABC) Local Radio during the fiftieth anniversary of the crisis, Woolcott
told listeners: “I was, frankly, deeply personally worried about not only the future of my
family [in Kuala Lumpur], but the future of New York, Moscow, and indeed the impact
this would have on the whole world.” Woolcott also read the following poem, which 40
he wrote during the crisis:
Poem by Richard Woolcott, “Cuban Missile Crisis special” (presented by Richard Fidler), ABC Local 40
Radio, broadcasted 15 October 2012, http://www.abc.net.au/local/stories/2012/10/15/3610878.htm (accessed 15 October 2012). The programme was also broadcasted on ABC Radio National on 17 October 2012.
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As the sun sinks through the torn red edges of the skyline, one wonders if it will rise again tomorrow. As the stench of catastrophe rises from the newspapers at supper, as the lights of the city come on, twinkling, beckoning, beautiful to us now, one wants to see them again tomorrow. Days which yesterday seemed like dusty milestones on the dreary road to death, weeks which withered, fell away like autumn leaves, now seem precious. Each day welcomed with warmth and tenderness, as it lives into the next, its straining fingers gripping the ledge overhanging the abyss of self-destruction. Outside the tension has turned into a crisis, enveloping the jousting giants who have created it. The hurricane rages, menacing, incomprehensible, while in its eye the innocent sleep fitfully, uncomprehendingly, hopefully waiting for the dawn for the sun to rise again. 41
In his moving yet ominous poem, Woolcott articulated the sense of dread,
precariousness, and helplessness that he, and likely others, felt over the potential
outbreak of nuclear war. The reference to the superpowers⏤“jousting giants”⏤
suggests that there was little other actors could do to influence and resolve the crisis. In
his reflections on the crisis in his memoir, he stated that it was “instructive in that it
revealed the lack of real power and influence of the United Nations in a situation in
which the two superpowers came into direct and serious confrontation.” Significantly, 42
Woolcott’s poem also reveals that one’s proximity to nuclear missile bases influences
their perception of the threat. That is, from his location in New York⏤a target within
striking range from Cuba⏤Woolcott perceived the threat posed by the Cuban Crisis to
be more severe than officials located afar in Canberra.
Ibid.41
Richard Woolcott, The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings 42
(Sydney: HarperCollinsPublishers, 2003), 202.
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As this chapter demonstrates, several sections of the Australian population had similar
reactions to Woolcott over the Cuban Crisis. For many, the crisis brought home the
dangers posed by thermonuclear weapons. Moreover, and as shown in the remainder of
this section, the crisis prompted increased interest among the wider Australian
population about civil defence and the adequacy of Australia’s preparedness for nuclear
war. This was not the case in the US. According to historian Alice L. George, there was
a decline in interest in civil defence among Americans in the years following the Cuban
Crisis. While a theoretical discussion on nuclear deterrence is beyond the scope of this 43
thesis, it is worth noting here that contrasting reactions regarding civil defence reflect
different understandings of nuclear deterrence, and this warrants further research. Some
theorists have argued that the Cuban Crisis is an example of when nuclear deterrence
has worked. As Benoît Pelopidas demonstrated in “We all lost the Cuban Missile
Crisis,” such an argument is conceptually flawed because it assumes there is a universal
or consistent interpretation of nuclear deterrence. Significantly, this thesis shows that 44
different states, even allies, and the communities within those states, have different
understandings of nuclear deterrence. In Australia, the reactions to the crisis of other
legislative bodies, professional associations, a school, and the media, which contrast
with the Menzies Government’s response and are discussed below, demonstrate
different understandings of nuclear deterrence within Australia.
See Alice L. George, Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chapel 43
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 161–2. Prior to the crisis, US civil defence agencies by comparison were highly active in attempting to prepare local communities for nuclear war. For example, information bulletins produced by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in early February 1961 outlined: fallout shelter promotion campaigns; the release of a film on civil defence in schools; and a civil defence programme focused on rural youth, which included the distribution of civil defence information kits. These bulletins can be found in NAA: A1209, 1957/5644.
Benoît Pelopidas, “We all lost the Cuban Missile Crisis: Revisiting Richard Ned Lebow and Janice 44
Gross Stein’s landmark analysis in We All Lost the Cold War,” in The Cuban Missile Crisis: A critical reappraisal, Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes, eds. Cold War History Series (Oxon: Routledge, 2015), 165–82.
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An external affairs matter, the Cuban Crisis was obviously the business of the
Commonwealth Parliament. While discussions on civil defence were not documented
during the crisis at the federal level, that is, in the Cabinet Notebook, departmental
cablegrams, or Hansard (House of Representatives and Senate), such discussions were
had in other Australian legislative bodies, specifically, the New South Wales Parliament
(as outlined in Chapter 1), the Australian Capital Territory Advisory Council, and the
Sydney City Council. The crisis sparked discussions in these forums regarding civil
defence, specifically, that state, territory or city’s preparedness for nuclear war.
At a meeting of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Advisory Council (later the
Legislative Assembly) on 3 December 1962, Council member Robert Picton Greenish
expressed strong concern about the protection available to Canberra residents from
nuclear attack. Greenish moved: 45
That it be recommended to the Minister that immediate action be taken to provide suitable underground bomb shelters, including protection as much as possible from nuclear attack, in the suitable areas such as Mount Ainslie, and Black Mountain, in the A.C.T to enable all citizens to receive some protection from such attacks.
Not wanting to appear alarmist to other members of the Council, Greenish then stated:
From September 1961–64, the Council consisted of twelve members: eight elected and four appointed 45
each by the departments of Works and Railways, Home Affairs, Health, and the Attorney-General. Established so that ACT residents had representation on local issues, the Council was replaced by a Legislative Assembly in 1974. See Chris Monnox, “ACT Advisory Council Elected Members, 1930–1974,” ACT Government: Libraries (February 2012), http://www.library.act.gov.au/find/history/frequentlyaskedquestions/personal_stories/act_advisory_council,_1930-1974 (accessed 13 August 2014).
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I don’t wish it to be understood that this motion is moved from any sense of panic or near-panic over the Cuban situation which occurred a few weeks ago and happily resulted in a lessening of tensions at that time, but as Mr. Kennedy made his speech many of us were looking to our local civil defence measures, and we found them very lacking.
Greenish’s comments affirm both the little attention that the Menzies Government had
paid to civil defence and the influence that the Cuban Crisis had on his reflections.
Greenish had in fact queried Canberra’s civil defence preparedness on 5 November
1962 (two meetings prior).
The establishment of underground bomb shelters was in fact under consideration by the
Sydney City Council following the most intense period of the Cuban Crisis. At its
meeting on 29 October 1962, the Council commissioned a report on the use of the city’s
tunnels as war shelters. Motivated by “the uncertain international situation,” the Council
wanted to assess the feasibility of their use as a civil defence measure for citizens
against fallout, blast, etc., from atomic and other missiles.” The following day, readers 46
of the Sydney Morning Herald were informed of the Council’s discussions and
actions. Alderman G. Roper asserted that many lives could be saved using the 47
numerous tunnels beneath Sydney, and according to the newspaper, Roper claimed that
the numbers of tunnels was unlikely to be rivalled by any other comparable city. The
“international situation” also pressed Alderman C.L. Kyle to ask when the federal
government would appoint a civil defence controller for Sydney; the Council had
agreed to pay half of the controller’s salary. Lord Mayor Alderman H.F. Jensen advised
City of Sydney Archives, Sydney: 6767/62, Minute by the Town Clerk, “Civil Defence - Question of 46
use of tunnels under City as shelters for citizens,” 31 October 1962. See “City’s Tunnels To Be Considered As War Shelters,” Sydney Morning Herald, October 30, 1962, 6.47
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that a report would also be produced on this matter. The Council minutes demonstrate 48
that the international situation―the Cuban Crisis―had prompted the Sydney City
Council to evaluate Sydney’s civil defence capacity and the measures it could take if the
city faced nuclear attack. Despite the most intense period of the crisis having passed,
Council urged that the reports be made with haste. This suggests that the Council
recognised at that time the proximity of thermonuclear war, that Australia was within its
reaches, and the precarious situation that remained. Sydney City Council however, was
an exception: the international situation and civil defence were not discussed by the
Melbourne or Brisbane city councils. 49
While the Sydney City Council considered ways it could aid its constituents, residents
of Burnie, Tasmania, were encouraged to contemplate their own survival. At the peak of
the Cuban Crisis, pamphlets issued by the Commonwealth Directorate of Civil Defence
titled “Survival From Nuclear Warfare” were disseminated to primary school students.
The pamphlet, which Tasmanian daily newspaper the Mercury described as “blood-red”
in colour, opened with an illustration of a ruined school made of reinforced concrete
located 500 yards from the epicentre of the Hiroshima atom-bomb. Although parents of
the students acknowledged that they were the intended recipients of the pamphlets, at
least some were outraged that such information had been delivered directly to their
children. One parent told a newspaper reporter that “there was probably no better means
of spreading panic in the community.” He added: “My children were so alarmed that all
Ibid. See also City of Sydney Archives, Sydney: 6767/62, Minute by the Town Clerk, “Civil Defence – 48
Question of use of tunnels under City as shelters for citizens,” 31 October 1962. Public Record Office of Victoria, Melbourne: VPRS 8910, P1 Unit 94, Minute Books of Council 49
Meetings, Sydney City Council, 1962–1963; and Brisbane Square Library, Brisbane: BCA0001, Minutes and Proceedings, Brisbane City Council, 1962.
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they could think about was Cuba, to read all they could in newspapers of the situation,
and to listen to wireless news bulletins.” 50
The anxiety induced in children by the prospect of nuclear war was witnessed in the US.
The Sydney Morning Herald reported on 4 November 1962 that according to Sibylle
Escalona, a doctor at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine, psychiatrists were
treating thousands of children throughout the US because of their fear of nuclear war.
Many children, as young as four and five years old, were frightened by passenger planes
flying overhead, concerned that they would drop atom bombs. Others were scared of
rain and snow or refused to drink milk, believing that they were “poisoned” by fallout.
Escalona claimed that children’s fears are caused by adults; that is, increased fear felt by
adults results in increased fear experienced by children. She issued a booklet “Children
and the Threat of Nuclear War” to help parents to support their children and prevent
them from becoming “nuclear neurotics.” Escalona's booklet seemingly would have 51
been a useful accompaniment to the civil defence pamphlet.
The sole reference to Burnie Primary School in the Mercury, as well as Hobart’s other
daily newspaper the Examiner, suggests that it was the only school to disseminate such
pamphlets. This indicates that this action was instigated by the school and not by the
federal or state governments, nor their agencies. That Burnie Primary School therefore
“Nuclear pamphlet objection,” Mercury, October 25, 1962, 2. See also “Protest at Burnie on N-50
pamphlet,” Examiner, October 25, 1962, 2.
“Tots scared of H-Bombs: Under medical care,” Sydney Morning Herald, 4 November 1962, 41.51
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felt it necessary to distribute these pamphlets during the crisis shows it was acutely
aware of the seriousness of the situation and its potential ramifications, even for
Australia’s most southern state. While the pamphlets and the crisis had provoked
anxiety in the children of Burnie, it is difficult, however, to ascertain the reaction of
Burnie residents to the crisis. Their response, as outlined in the newspapers, was
focused on the careless dissemination of the pamphlets.
While the Commonwealth Directorate of Civil Defence advocated a message of
survival, the crisis almost passed without mention in one popular women’s periodical.
In the editorial column of the Australian Women’s Weekly Dorothy Drain wrote:
The coiner of the word ‘brinkmanship’ must be gnashing his teeth. He should have saved it for the past couple of weeks when it came into its full flower of meaning.
It now seems (or it did when this went to press⏤one must be careful not to make rash forecasts) that Christmas will come after all. The overseas cards were worth posting. With continuing luck, their destinations will be there. 52
This was the only reference to the crisis found in the issues published between October
and November 1962. Dorothy Drain’s comments regarding brinkmanship, that the 53
existence of destinations would continue, and that one should avoid rash forecasts,
indicate that she recognised the significance and precariousness of the crisis. However,
her apparent relief that Christmas would be celebrated and her reference to overseas
cards suggests that the crisis was an event felt on foreign shores, not in Australia.
Although major news stories are within the magazine’s scope, it seems that Australia
Dorothy Drain, “It seems to me,” Australian Women’s Weekly, 14 November 1962, 4.52
There was no mention of the crisis in the issues published on 24 October, 31 October, and 7 November 53
1962, or in subsequent issues published on 21 November and 28 November 1962.
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was considered beyond the reach of nuclear war. This may also explain why
preparedness for such an event was not urged in the Australian Women’s Weekly in
comparison to American periodicals. 54
It was not the only periodical that made reference to the crisis in the context of future
events. George Molnar, cartoonist for the Sydney Morning Herald, suggested that a
resolution of the crisis would be timely given the forthcoming Melbourne Cup—
Australia’s most famous horse race.
Illustration 5: Sydney Morning Herald, 2 November 1962, 2.
The crisis prompted the Australian medical profession’s peak organisation, the
Australian Medical Association (AMA), to reflect in its journal on Australia's readiness
to attend to the “medical consequences of thermonuclear war.” In an article of the same
George, Awaiting Armageddon, 161–2.54
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name, the AMA characterised Australians, “rightly or wrongly, realistically or not,” as
ignorant of the effects of nuclear conflict.
To most of us this sort of thing seems remote in distance and possibility as compared with the prospect in the northern hemisphere. In particular, we have not been exposed to the torrent of spoken and written words on the subject that has been poured out in North America, and we know nothing of the widespread debate over community preparedness and the conflict over such things as group and household shelters. At least on the surface, to use the ugly but apt modern phrase, most Australians could not care less. Even the Cuban situation has not shaken us greatly. 55
The Sydney Morning Herald brought the concerns of the AMA to the public’s attention.
In its article “Medical Plans For Nuclear War Urged,” it opened with, and therefore
emphasised, the organisation’s criticism of Australians having a “could-not-care-less”
attitude. The AMA surmised as to why this was the general consensus: 56
This may be foolish complacency. It may be our response to a half-realized sense of helplessness. Certainly it is better than panic or a community anxiety state. But it is regrettable if it indicates the deliberate assumption of an ostrich posture. 57
The AMA proffered Australia’s geographic location as a possible explanation for the
complacency of its population in terms of preparedness. Prime Minister Menzies had in
fact perpetuated this view. In his parliamentary statement, Menzies concentrated on the
threat the Cuban Crisis posed to the Americas. Such references to the crisis positioned 58
it as a regional issue, which indicates that there was a perception that a nuclear conflict
between the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the US could be confined to the Caribbean. As
AMA, “Medical Consequences of Thermonuclear War,” Medical Journal of Australia 2, no. 19 (10 55
November 1962): 759–60. See “Medical Plans For Nuclear War Urged,” Sydney Morning Herald, November 20, 1962, 10.56
AMA, “Medical Consequences of Thermonuclear War,” 759.57
R.G. Menzies, CPD, House, vol. 37, 23 October 1962, 1780–1.58
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noted earlier in this chapter, this possibly explains the Government’s silence during the
crisis regarding civil defence preparedness. Moreover, and as discussed in the next
section, this demonstrates a level of naivety about the technological effects of
thermonuclear weapons.
It was not unreasonable, therefore, that the AMA concluded that most Australians
believed they were beyond the reach of nuclear war. Furthermore, the Cuban Crisis had,
for the most part, left Australians unshaken. In her seminal study on Australia’s nuclear
ambitions, Alice Cawte drew the same conclusion. Cawte claimed that in the decade
following World War II, “Australia’s distance from areas of international tension had
also given rise to a measure of complacency about nuclear weapons.” The AMA did, 59
however, suggest a way forward:
The least we can do is to become reasonably informed and to determine our attitude, whatever it may be, on a responsible basis. Not least of those on whom the community tends to depend, members of the medical profession need to face the issues involved, indeterminate though many of the answers may seem to be. 60
The remainder of the article offered considerations for practitioners that had been raised
in a symposium published in the New England Journal of Medicine. Like those 61
conducting the symposium, the AMA urged its members to act because “no single group
Alice Cawte, Atomic Australia: 1944–1990 (Australia: New South Wales University Press, 1992), ix.59
AMA “Medical Consequences of Thermonuclear War,” 759.60
Massachusetts Medical Society, “The Medical Consequences of Thermonuclear War,” New England 61
Journal of Medicine 266, no. 22 (31 May 1962): 1126–45.
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is so deeply involved in and committed to the survival of mankind as is the medical
profession.” 62
There was inadequate time for sections of the Australian population to formulate their
position on the Cuban Crisis, coordinate with each other, and mobilise, before the
Government swiftly formulated and announced Australia’s policy on the crisis. The
inability of organisations to influence the Menzies Government during the crisis was not
an unusual or isolated case. In his official history of Australia’s involvement in
Southeast Asian conflicts from 1948 to 1965, Peter Edwards claimed that the
Government did little to foster informed public debate on foreign policy issues. This, he
stated, was partially attributable to the view that “at times of international crisis, the less
said the better […] A slip of the tongue or a misreported comment could have disastrous
consequences.” This was certainly true of the Government during the Cuban Crisis: it 63
made only two public statements on the subject, and rather than delivering them to the
press, it delivered them to the Parliament. Edwards also attributed the Government’s
reluctance to encourage debate on foreign policy matters as being due to its faith in its
policy-making method and decisions, which it felt did not need to undergo the
electorate’s scrutiny. Edwards wrote:
AMA, “Medical Consequences of Thermonuclear War,” 759. See also, ibid., 1126.62
Peter G. Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of 63
Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1965. The Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948–1975 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1992), 380.
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as the years passed, the Menzies Government also gave the impression that it was increasingly confident of the wisdom of its fundamental approach and saw little need to have that approach questioned or debated, even when⏤perhaps especially when⏤ministers entertained some private doubts. 64
The Menzies Government’s confidence in its decision-making during the Cuban Crisis
was evident in the swiftness with which it determined and declared its policy. As
demonstrated in Chapter 4, the Government, specifically External Affairs, had doubts
about the US handling of the crisis. The Government considered it imperative that such
views be kept secret to avoid jeopardising the US alliance. There is no documentary
evidence that the Government sought intentionally to keep its doubts regarding the
handling of the Cuban Crisis from the Australian electorate’s purview. Nevertheless, the
combination of private doubts and confidence described by Edwards perpetuated the
Government’s disengagement with the public on matters of foreign policy during the
Cuban Crisis.
This section has shown that at the time of the Cuban Crisis, the Menzies Government
and the wider Australian population placed little importance on the threat of nuclear war
and its potential effects. This is reflected in: the absence of documents demonstrating
civil defence was deemed to be important during the Cuban Crisis by the Cabinet or
other federal government departments and agencies; Australian strategic and defence
planning documents developed prior to the crisis in which civil defence received little
attention; in the main parliamentary statement on civil defence outlined above in which
the Government prescribed a limited investment in civil defence; in Menzies’
Ibid.64
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parliamentary statement during the Cuban Crisis in which the Government’s focus on
the nuclear threat facing the Americas suggested that Australia was geographically
remote from a nuclear conflict involving the superpowers, and its effects; and the
reactions of those for whom the crisis prompted questions over Australia’s preparedness
for nuclear war, which indicated that civil defence measures were not in place.
Contemporary and later analyses on nuclear war and civil defence labelled Australians
complacent and suggested that such attitudes stemmed from a confidence in Australia’s
remote geographical position. While Richard Woolcott’s reflections on the crisis
demonstrated that geographical location was relevant to how the nuclear threat the crisis
posed was perceived and understood, most Menzies Government officials and the wider
Australian population had a rather naive view of thermonuclear weapons. This was
evidenced in the Menzies Government’s second parliamentary statement on the crisis,
which is discussed in the next section.
The Menzies Government’s Second Public Statement on the Cuban Crisis
In his assessment of Australian foreign policy in action, Gordon Greenwood stated that
some matters could and should have been raised in the UN and their resolution
attempted there. He wrote:
There were many questions which could and should be properly referred to the international organisation, and a settlement by this means was often worth attempting even if there was the probability that in some instances a solution would not be forthcoming. 65
Gordon Greenwood, “Australian Foreign Policy in Action,” in Australia in World Affairs, 1961 - 1965, 65
Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper, eds. (Melbourne: F. W. Cheshire for the Australian Institute of International Affairs, 1968), 51.
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The Menzies Government had encouraged such an approach. While Australia
deliberately framed its support for the US in terms of its UN resolution, it did not
depend on the UN to resolve the Cuban Crisis. The Government’s view on such a
solution was put eloquently to Parliament by Barwick on 6 November 1962 when he
delivered the Menzies Government’s second parliamentary statement on the Cuban
Crisis. It was a subject that the Government had not publicly discussed since 25 66
October 1962. Parliament had adjourned in the midst of the crisis, and by the time it
returned, the most intense period was over. Labor Member for Yarra, J. F. Cairns, asked
Menzies on 25 October whether he would “undertake not to involve Australia in any
irrevocable decision, and to recall the Parliament if there should be any accentuation of
the gravity of the present crisis.” But the PM had no interest in predicting events or
making such undertakings. At no stage was the Parliament recalled during the recess. 67
In his detailed statement, the Minister for External Affairs provided the Parliament with
a comprehensive account of the crisis. It had unfolded so swiftly that it was coming to
an end as suddenly as it had begun. Barwick therefore considered it necessary to ensure
the Parliament, and the Australian public, were adequately informed of events. He
began by repeating key points from Kennedy’s address that laid the blame on the Soviet
Union. He asserted that “Disaster was averted,” and thus the crisis resolved,
CPD, House, vol. 37, 6 November 1962, 2049–54.66
J.F. Cairns (ALP, Member for Yarra) and R.G. Menzies, CPD, House, vol. 37, 25 October 1962, 1940.67
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only by the prompt and decisive action taken by the United States in conjunction with its regional powers in the Organization of American States, by the use of the machinery of the United Nations, and by the restraint exercised by the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in the course of negotiations for a peaceful issue to the crisis. 68
Barwick noted that “The Soviet challenge had to be met and the threat removed for the
sake of the peoples of the Americas immediately and newly threatened.” Significantly
however, he added:
Peoples in many parts of the world are allied for defence with the United States. If the United States had proved unable to defend herself and her Latin-American friends against the threat from Cuba how much could peoples thousands of miles away, faced with similar threats and pressures, have relied on United States assurances that she would assist to defend them? 69
For Australia and other allies of the US, the Cuban Crisis presented a litmus test: was
the US dependable in the face of a regional communist threat? As emphasised
throughout this thesis, Australia’s defence against communism hinged on American
support. The Menzies Government pledged its support, albeit limited, to the American
UN resolution, in order to obtain a maximum gain: the maintenance of its most
important alliance in furtherance of its geo-strategic interests. It is unsurprising then that
Barwick, like Menzies, emphasised the importance of regional arrangements recognised
under the UN Charter in dealing with security threats. Clearly mindful of Australia’s
arrangement with the US under ANZUS, Barwick stated, “In this crisis the need for and
the efficacy of regional defence have been demonstrated.” 70
CPD, House, vol. 37, 6 November 1962, 2049.68
Ibid., 2050.69
Ibid., 2053.70
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Barwick also credited the UN for the role it played in the Cuban Crisis regarding its
resolution. He stated:
The United Nations clearly had a role to play, not merely in providing a forum in which the parties could seek to find a peaceful solution to the situation, but in itself actively promoting a basis for such a solution. Recourse to the United Nations offered a way of avoiding an armed conflict which might have escalated into nuclear war […] The United States did not regard the mere reference of the question to the United Nations as being in itself a solution or as necessarily producing a solution, and retained the right to act to protect itself and its allies if the United Nations failed to assure them of protection. However, the efforts of the United Nations […] deserve the highest praise. The strength which the initiative and determination of the President provided—a strength which the United Nations would not otherwise have had—has been used to good purpose so far and its use will, I hope, bring a secure solution. 71
Barwick simultaneously commended and criticised the UN. The Government was aware
that the passing of the American resolution was unlikely, and although there was still
hope that a UN solution was achievable, Australia recognised that the US and the Soviet
Union were the only ones capable of, and thus ultimately responsible for, bringing about
an end to the crisis.
Illustration 6: Sydney Morning Herald, 26 October 1962, 2.
Ibid.71
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Nevertheless, as the next section shows, Australia played an active part at the UN
during the crisis by encouraging support for the US position.
Australia at the United Nations, New York
Since the UN was founded, Australian governments have placed great importance on its
capacity to maintain peace, but not at the expense of Australia’s bilateral relations with
its major allies, the UK and the US. In other words, its alliances took precedence over 72
the UN and its role in international affairs. As this thesis shows, this approach reflects
the Menzies Government’s policy on the Cuban Crisis. As discussed in Chapter 1,
Menzies declared to Parliament on 23 October 1962 that its Permanent Representative
to the UN, James Plimsoll, had been instructed “to do all in his power” to support the
passing of the US resolution before the Security Council (even though Australia did not
sit on the Council). It is therefore necessary to examine Australian activity at the UN 73
during the crisis. This section discusses Australia’s efforts to monitor closely
developments at the UN. It examines Plimsoll’s actions at the UN and compares them
with the views of those in Canberra. It also evaluates whether, during the crisis,
Menzies demonstrated a new appreciation for the UN. Finally, this section explores the
Government’s understanding of the role of the UN in resolving the crisis.
On this point regarding the Labor government under Prime Minister Ben Chifley from 1945–49, see 72
Roger Holdich, Vivianne Johnson, Pamela Andre, eds., The ANZUS Treaty 1951, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), xxviii.
Menzies, CPD, House, vol. 37, 23 October 1962, 1780–1.73
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Recognising that Australia was not a party principal to the crisis and having determined
that the Cuban situation was a regional crisis facing the US, officials in Canberra
appointed themselves as observers of the crisis. The departments of External Affairs,
Defence, and Prime Minister closely monitored the crisis as it unfolded in Washington
D.C., Moscow, Havana, and at the UN in New York. In addition to copies of
communiques provided by allies, Canberra-based officials sought and received
numerous cablegrams from Australian legations around the world. Such correspondence
revealed: the political positions chosen by other governments; how such positions were
reported in their local media; and how the crisis and political responses to it were
perceived by their populations. Canberra was inundated with such a large volume of 74
information from its overseas posts that one External Affairs official expressed concern
that the teleprinter would get clogged. For this Canberra-based official, a crisis of 75
another kind was at hand. However, for officials in Canberra, who had already
formulated and announced Australia’s position on the crisis, such information was of
little value in a policy-making context, and very little was forwarded to Plimsoll to
support him in his interactions with other UN diplomatic missions.
In contrast to policy-makers in Canberra, Plimsoll and Australia’s delegation to the UN
in New York played a more active part during the crisis having been appointed by
Canberra as advocates for the US resolution before the Security Council. Throughout
the Cold War, the Western powers emphasised the importance of presenting a unified
See NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Parts 1–3, correspondence, various dates.74
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, note with handwritten contributions from various External Affairs 75
officials, 25–29 October 1962, attached to inward cablegram (I.26445), Australian Embassy, The Hague, to External Affairs, 24 October 1962.
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front in the fight against communist expansionism. In his memoir in 1960, former
British Prime Minister Eden wrote:
The West has a common faith and a common philosophy; it must express both, in thought and action everywhere and always. The interests of allies cannot be regarded as vital in one area and expendable in another, without danger to the whole structure of the alliance. There must be the same unity of purpose and action in a cold war as in a hot. Failure to observe this obligation has resulted in great gains to the communist powers in these post-war years. 76
For Australia, it was essential that it stood firm with the US, its most important ally, to
ensure its own protection and that of the alliance. Given that all states are concerned
with the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN in New York was a
forum in which such a unified front could be displayed. Naturally, it was a hive of
activity during the Cuban Crisis. As shown below, the Australian delegation, especially
Plimsoll, played an active part at the UN as the crisis unfolded by attempting to garner
support from member states for the US resolution should the matter go before the
General Assembly.
Plimsoll led Australia’s delegation to the UN in New York from 1959-63. While this
was a challenging period for the UN, according to Plimsoll’s biographer Jeremy
Hearder, this was “The Highlight of His Career.” One US official considered Plimsoll 77
Eden, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden K.G., P.C., M.C., 580.76
Jeremy Hearder, Jim Plim: Ambassador Extraordinary: A Biography of Sir James Plimsoll (Ballarat, 77
Victoria: Connor Court Publishing, 2015), ch.5. See also Jeremy Hearder, “Sir James Plimsoll: Mandarin Abroad,” in The Seven Dwarfs and the Age of the Mandarins: Australian Government Administration in the Post-War Reconstruction Era, Samuel Furphy, ed. E-book (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2015), 241–6. For an outline of the challenges facing the UN in this period and Australia’s position on such issues, see Claire Clark, “Australia in the United Nations,” in Australian Foreign Policy: Towards a Reassessment, Claire Clark, ed. (North Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1973), 129–57.
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“a real authority on the United Nations.” Highly respected for his intelligence, deep 78
interest in international affairs, work ethic, and the valuable contribution he made to
Australia’s foreign policy and diplomatic service over 35 years, Barwick described 79
him as “one of our great diplomats.” Kenneth Bailey, Secretary of the Attorney-80
General’s Department and Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth from 1946-64, 81
knew of the Minister’s affection for Plimsoll having referred to Barwick as Plimsoll’s
“warm admirer.” In terms of his relationship with Menzies, Plimsoll felt that his long 82
sojourn in Canberra before travelling to New York had enabled him to develop “some
understanding of the Prime Minister's mind.” He also had a great working relationship
with other UN permanent representatives, regardless of political orientation. 83
Plimsoll’s conversation with South African Foreign Minister, Eric Louw, on the
morning of 23 October 1962 is a vivid example of his efforts to garner support for the
American UN resolution. At that time, South Africa’s position on the crisis was not yet
known. Louw had approached Plimsoll to discuss the Cuban situation prior to speaking
with anyone else and had requested that their discussion remain “very confidential.” In
Marshall Green interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 13 December 1988 (initial interview date), 78
transcript, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, http://adst.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/09/Green-Marshall.pdf (accessed 22 July 2015), 119.
See, for example, Robert O’Neill, “The Launch of Jim Plim by Jeremy Hearder” (book launch at the 79
Australian Institute of International Affairs (NSW branch), The Glover Cottages, Sydney, 16 June 2015), transcript, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/jim-plim-ambassador-extraordinary/ (accessed 15 July 2015), 2–3; and foreword, Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1996-2007 in Hearder, Jim Plim, viii.
Garfield Barwick, A Radical Tory: Garfield Barwick’s Reflections and Recollections (Sydney: The 80
Federation Press, 1995), 162. Jack E. Richardson, “Bailey, Sir Kenneth Hamilton (1898–1972),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, 81
National Centre of Biography, Australian National University (ANU), http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/bailey-sir-kenneth-hamilton-9404 (published in hardcopy 1993; accessed online 17 December 2014).
NAA: M1505, 1009, personal letter from Bailey to Plimsoll, 18 March 1962.82
Hearder, Jim Plim, 126 and 140.83
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a cablegram sent to External Affairs in Canberra and classified “secret,” Plimsoll
provided a detailed account of Louw’s “considerable misgivings” about President
Kennedy’s national address. Plimsoll also comprehensively described the arguments he
had made in an effort to change the Foreign Minister’s mind. Louw told Plimsoll that 84
South Africa had consistently opposed communist aggression, but he did not believe
that delivering arms to another state was tantamount to aggression. The US, he noted,
was doing this around the world with its bases in, for example, the UK and Western
Europe, to whom it also supplied arms. Plimsoll emphasised that the weapons in the
Cuban situation were “offensive missiles bringing within range Washington, New York,
Cape Canaveral and a large part of the industrial complex of the United States.” He also
told Louw:
I did not think it was logical to equate apparently similar actions by different countries in different parts of the world. It was not valid to say that because the United States was doing something in one place the Soviet Union could do it somehwere [sic] else. We had to look at the total world picture and recognize that there was a delicate balance of power in the world as a whole which was made up of disparate elements on each side. Anything which upset this delicate balance by radically altering a single major element was like a stone setting off an avalanche and constituted a danger to world security. 85
In essence, Plimsoll argued that by placing missiles in Cuba, the Soviet Union had
altered the strategic nuclear balance. Plimsoll was drawing on the national address of
President Kennedy, who had made much of the Soviet Union’s statement on 11
September 1962, specifically:
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.26386), James Plimsoll, Australian Mission to 84
United Nations, New York to External Affairs, 23 October 1962, 1–2. Ibid., 1.85
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that ‘the armaments and military equipment sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes’, that ‘there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons…for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance Cuba’, and that ‘the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.’ That statement was false. 86
In doing so, the Soviet Union’s actions, according to Kennedy, prompted “a deliberately
provocative and unjustified change in the status quo.” The President also noted:
Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to the peace. 87
Clearly, Plimsoll put forward these arguments from the President’s address to Louw in
an effort to garner support for the US position on the crisis. Interestingly, Kennedy’s
broadcast was the only occasion that year that Plimsoll had watched television. 88
Only hours before Kennedy’s address, National Security adviser McGeorge Bundy
insisted that the President “reassure the European allies that the American response in
Cuba was primarily aimed at protecting Berlin and reinforcing European security.” The
President agreed that these were good points that the US had not emphasised enough in
its communications with heads of state; Kennedy instructed that ambassadorial and
diplomatic briefings “should stress America’s credibility on Berlin and the preservation
of the strategic balance.” He reasoned that he wanted North Atlantic Treaty
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (JFK Library): Papers of John F. Kennedy, 86
Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Speech Files, JFKPOF-041-018, “Radio and television report to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, 22 October 1962,” http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-041-018.aspx (accessed 3 August 2015), 1–2.
Ibid., 2.87
Hearder, Jim Plim, 145.88
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Organization (NATO) allies to feel fully informed and consulted “so that they didn’t
react to the blockade as a symptom of America’s Cuba fixation.” Clearly, the same 89
points—especially the importance of preserving the strategic balance—were made to,
and propagated by, Australian officials, as evidenced by Plimsoll’s conversation with
Louw.
However, at the time of the crisis, Kennedy and several of his advisers privately held
the view that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba had not entirely altered the
strategic balance. Sheldon Stern, historian at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
and Museum (JFK Library) from 1977–99, demonstrated this in his ground-breaking 90
analysis of the ExComm tapes—Kennedy’s secret recordings of the ExComm meetings,
which were gradually declassified during Stern's time at the JFK Library. At an 91
ExComm meeting on 16 October 1962—the day Kennedy was informed of the Soviet
missiles in Cuba—Bundy questioned the strategic importance of the missile
deployment. Mindful of the position the US had already taken publicly on the Soviet
build-up in Cuba, Bundy stated:
Sheldon M. Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality (Stanford, 89
California: Stanford University Press, 2012), 90. Regarding the US attitude to Cuba, Kennedy stated that most of the allies “think that we’re slightly demented on this subject”: ibid., 47.
“Sheldon M. Stern,” Thomas B. Fordham Institute: Advancing Educational Excellence, http://90
edexcellence.net/about-us/fordham-staff/sheldon-m-stern (accessed 4 May 2016). “The JFK White House Tape Recordings,” JFK Library, https://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-91
History/White-House-Tape-Recordings.aspx (accessed 28 August 2017).
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quite aside from what we’ve said and we’re very hard-locked on to it, I know: what is the strategic impact on the position of the United States of MRBMs [medium-range ballistic missiles] in Cuba? How gravely does this change […] the strategic balance? 92
US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara responded that he did not think the Soviet
missile deployment to Cuba had altered the strategic balance, a view he noted that was
in opposition to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their Chairman, General Maxwell D.
Taylor, acknowledged that the missiles may have psychological and political
significance in addition to military, to which Bundy replied with a cynical laugh, “Oh
[…] I asked the question with an awareness [of the political picture].” Kennedy also 93
had told ExComm on 16 October:
It doesn’t make any difference […] if you get blown up by an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] flying from the Soviet Union or one that was ninety miles away. Geography doesn’t mean that much…After all this is a political struggle as much as military. 94
As discussed earlier in this chapter, geography was of little relevance in the
thermonuclear age; this was a concept the US President clearly understood. While there
were political as well as military implications regarding the strategic balance of states,
it was the result of a missile launch, more so than the location of its launchpad, that was
of greater import.
Even though the President and some of his key advisers did not think the strategic
balance had changed, a week later, the Administration crafted a statement for the
Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory, 86. Bundy knocked on the table for emphasis as 92
he said the words “strategic balance.” Ibid.93
Ibid., 21.94
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American people and the rest of the world that claimed the opposite. What is
noteworthy in terms of Australia’s crisis experience is that Plimsoll was persuaded by,
and propagated, such claims. This is despite technological developments in nuclear
weapons and the superiority of the US arsenal being well-known. Awareness of 95
nuclear weapons technology and the capabilities of the US arsenal inform
understandings of strategic balance. Plimsoll’s attempt to convince Louw that there had
been a change in the strategic balance demonstrates the Australian Ambassador’s
naiveté about US strategic claims and his limited understanding of advances in nuclear
weapons technology.
After submitting to Louw these arguments about strategic balance, Plimsoll gave the
Foreign Minister a copy of Menzies’ parliamentary statement. Louw then asked
Plimsoll whether, if the crisis escalated to world war, “Australia would be in it boots
and all with the United States.” Plimsoll responded in the affirmative: 96
See Desmond Ball, “The Strategic Missile Programme of the Kennedy Administration, 1961–95
1963,” (PhD diss., Australian National University, 1972). NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.26386), Plimsoll to External Affairs, 23 October 96
1962, 2. The phrase “boots and all” is a colloquialism defined as “completely; with all your strength or resources”: Macquarie Australian Slang Dictionary (Macquarie University, New South Wales: The Macquarie Library, 2004), 25. That the South African Foreign Minister chose to use this phrase is unusual. It was a favourite expression of Australia’s Labor Prime Minister from 1945–49, Ben Chifley: D. B. Waterson, “Chifley, Joseph Benedict (Ben) (1885–1951),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National Centre of Biography, ANU, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/chifley-joseph-benedict-ben-9738 (published in hardcopy 1993; accessed online 5 May 2016). The Australian press regularly employed the phrase in its coverage of major issues of his prime ministership, such as bank nationalisation and the coal miner’s strike. See, for example, “Boots And All!” (cartoon), Sunday Times (Perth), 19 October 1947, 4; “Boots And All Chifley” (cartoon), Tribune (Sydney), 13 July 1949, 6; and “‘Boots and All’ Report: Fadden Describes Chifley’s Talk as ‘Plain Nonsense’,” Morning Bulletin (Rockhampton, Queensland), 22 July 1949, 1.
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Australia was wholly supporting the United States. Australia would take the view that anything that threatened the security of the United States or would make it hesitate to defend its allies would be a threat to our own security. 97
In essence, Plimsoll conveyed to Louw that the strategic and geo-political situation was
such that Australia’s commitment to the US was, indeed, “boots and all.” Australia
relied on the US to assist in its defence. Consequently, the successful management of
the US alliance was of paramount importance to the Menzies Government. This thesis
has shown, however, that the Menzies Government had a number of private concerns
regarding the US handling of the crisis, and it argues that such concerns underscored its
decision to pledge its support specifically for the American resolution in the UN on the
crisis. Plimsoll’s expression of Australia’s support for the US, therefore, was seemingly
greater than officials in Canberra intended.
In terms of the legality of the quarantine, discussed in Chapter 4, Plimsoll was also
more forthright in his views than officials in Canberra. While Plimsoll was in agreement
with the Department of External Affairs that the US could rely on the Organization of
American States’ (OAS) endorsement of the quarantine in the absence of UN approval,
he noted: “In the last resort, however, we would have to maintain that irrespective of
legality the United States and other American countries are acting in this way from the
simple motive of survival.” In other words, American actions under the threat of 98
nuclear war trumped principles of international law. While Plimsoll was instructed to do
NAA: A1838, 262/12/8/1 Part 1, inward cablegram (I.26386), Plimsoll to External Affairs, 23 October 97
1962, 2. Ibid., 1.98
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“all in his power” to support the American UN resolution, his comments departed from
Canberra’s more cautious response.
On 30 October 1962, Plimsoll disclosed (in-confidence) to the American UN delegation
Australian anxieties regarding the quarantine. This was despite the efforts of Prime
Minister Menzies and other Canberra officials to exclude such anxieties from its public
statements and private communications with US officials. Adlai Stevenson, the US
Permanent Representative to the UN, subsequently informed US Secretary of State,
Dean Rusk:
Australian Cabinet in recent days had been concerned by, and given serious consideration to, long term effects of US quarantine of Cuba as precedent on Australia which is an island nation. The Australian Government had ‘of course’ not wanted to complicate the matter by raising this in any way with us. 99
Stevenson was correct: the Australian Government had never intended to raise such
anxieties with the US. Plimsoll, however, obviously considered it necessary to draw
American attention to these concerns, specifically the issue of precedent and the effect
this could potentially have on Australia’s geo-strategic interests. Nevertheless, Plimsoll
seems to have made this disclosure in such a way that it demonstrated Australia’s
faithfulness as a US ally. Plimsoll did not disclose the Government’s concerns until 30
October, and when he did so, he was discreet. This was likely to avoid any doubt being
cast on the extent of Australia’s support at the height of the crisis, and consequently, the
strength and solidarity of the Western and Australia-US alliances.
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, US (NARA): RG59, CDF, 99
1960–63, Box 1682 (NND 949524), 743.00/6–762, airgram (A-611), Stevenson to Rusk, 30 October 1962. This airgram can also be found in RG59, CDF, 1960–63, Box 1335 (NND 949599), 643.00/7–2860.
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It is worth noting that officials in Canberra seemingly were unaware of Plimsoll’s
disclosure to Stevenson and the latter’s communique to Rusk. Such evidence was found
among declassified US government records held at the National Archives and Records
Administration, College Park, Maryland (NARA). No records have been located in
Australian archives authored by Plimsoll or any other official that demonstrates that
those in Canberra were aware that such information had been shared.
This disclosure is a clear example of Plimsoll exercising his own judgement in
implementing Australian foreign policy. Interestingly, some officials were aware that
Plimsoll occasionally acted independently. According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs
from 1996-2007, Alexander Downer, who had worked for Plimsoll in Brussels as his
Third Secretary:
There were times when Plimsoll would judge the instructions coming from Canberra as so futile he would not carry them out. This did not mean he would ignore the government’s policy objectives. It did mean, though, that if he thought the government’s tactics to achieve its goals were foolish, he would gently bury them. 100
Plimsoll evidently took such an approach during the Cuban Crisis. Moreover, it appears
that while External Affairs had made their anxieties plain in their cablegrams to the
Permanent Representative, Plimsoll took the instruction to “do all in his power”
literally. This is demonstrated by his conversation with the South African Foreign
Minister that Australia was in the crisis “boots and all” with the US, and his disclosure
to Stevenson regarding Australia’s concerns about the precedent set by the quarantine.
Hearder, Jim Plim, viii-ix.100
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Plimsoll’s behaviour suggests that, in light of Downer’s comment, he considered the
Government’s “tactics” to support the American UN resolution as “foolish.” His actions
indicate that he thought Australia needed to be more forthright in demonstrating its
unequivocal support for the US in an effort to successfully manage the Australia-US
alliance. While arguably Plimsoll went further than Canberra intended, seemingly, he
did so to facilitate the Government’s policy objectives.
One scholar has claimed that the Australian Government’s inclusion of the UN in its
policy on the Cuban Crisis reflects Prime Minister Menzies’ greater appreciation for the
Organization. In his study on Australia and UN reform, Roderic Pitty discussed the
Menzies Government’s support in the early 1960s for modestly expanding the non-
permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Decolonisation saw many newly
independent states join the UN in the 1950s and 1960s, which had a dramatic effect on
the character and composition of the General Assembly. By 1963, developing states
formed the majority in the General Assembly, and there was increased pressure to
expand the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council from six to 10.
On 17 December 1963, Australia supported this change by way of Resolution 1991A,
even though this brought to an end the convention of Commonwealth states having a
reserved seat on the Security Council. Pitty argued that this demonstrated that “in the 101
context of a United Nations transformed by decolonisation,” a more representative
While the General Assembly vote passed in 1963, the membership of the Security Council could only 101
be changed by amending the UN Charter. This required ratification by all of the permanent members of the Security Council and two-thirds of the General Assembly. Eventually this occurred and elections for non-permanent seats took place in 1965: Roderic Pitty, “Australia and UN reform,” in Australia and the United Nations, James Cotton and David Lee, eds. (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, 2012), 384, 386 and 388–9. For more on the number of Afro-Asian states that joined the UN between 1950 and 1972 and the effect this had on voting in the General Assembly, see Clark, “Australia in the United Nations,” 137–8.
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Security Council was of greater importance to Australia than the preservation of a
Commonwealth seat. Pitty suggested that Australia’s support for this reform, while
significant, was not necessarily unexpected; there were signs of change in Australia’s
attitude towards decolonisation and the UN:
Although Australia had adopted an ‘unnecessarily legalistic’ view in refusing to support anti-colonial resolutions at the United Nations because of the phrasing of a single clause, there had been some change in Australian voting on such issues between 1961 and 1963. 102
To further illustrate his point, Pitty stated that Menzies had “expressed a new
appreciation of the United Nations during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962.” 103
The source of his claim was a newspaper article published on 30 October 1962 in the
Sydney Morning Herald. 104
The political correspondent, who had written the article, made much of the fact that
Menzies and Calwell had each expressed to Parliament their hope that the crisis would
be resolved in the UN. While Calwell’s “expression of confidence in the United
Nations” was seen as predictable, “Menzies’ equally definite recognition of that body as
the world’s main hope of averting the tragedy of a nuclear war” was considered
surprising. The reason, the correspondent claimed, was that during the 1950s, Menzies
Ibid., 389. On the quote “unnecessarily legalistic,” Pitty cited Clark, “Australia in the United Nations,” 102
139. According to Clark, Australia (under a Liberal government) would reject a resolution over the wording of a single clause “even if the general tenor of the resolution was acceptable.” It was decided at ministerial level in 1971 to change this approach; the Australian UN representative could support a resolution that otherwise would have been opposed on legalistic grounds, if its general tenor conformed with government policy: ibid., 153.
Pitty, “Australia and UN reform,” 389.103
Ibid., 488. This was the only reference Pitty made to the crisis. For the article, see “Canberra 104
Commentary: Prime Minister’s Better Appreciation Of U.N.,” Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1962, 2.
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and his Ministers derided H.V. Evatt for his efforts to seek UN action in response to
world crises, the PM “sneering” repeatedly at the Organization. Evatt was Leader of 105
the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and Opposition from 1951 to 1960. He had played an
active part in the establishment of the UN and had energetically placed Australia on the
international stage as Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs from 1941 to
1949 under the Curtin and Chifley Governments. The correspondent concluded that 106
as Evatt had left Parliament, “Menzies has obviously changed his tune and would
probably prefer all his old sneers to be buried and forgotten.” In essence, the 107
correspondent believed that Menzies’ announcement of Australia’s policy on the Cuban
Crisis in Parliament on 23 October 1962 reflected newfound personal appreciation for
the UN, a position he could now take in Evatt’s absence. Pitty, in citing this article,
perpetuated this claim and used it to intimate that Menzies’ greater appreciation for the
UN reflected Australia’s openness to UN reform. However, as shown below, the
correspondent was mistaken in his conclusions, and consequently, Pitty’s reference to
those views is misleading.
The Australian Government’s support for the American UN resolution offers no basis on
which to revise Menzies’ well-known contempt and distrust for the Organization. In the
late 1940s, Menzies and his Liberal-Country Party colleagues in Opposition, repeatedly
lambasted the Labor Government, accusing it of, for example, “revolutionising
“Canberra Commentary: Prime Minister’s Better Appreciation Of U.N.,” Sydney Morning Herald, 30 105
October 1962, 2. G. C. Bolton, “Evatt, Herbert Vere (Bert) (1894–1965),” Australian Dictionary of Biography, National 106
Centre of Biography, ANU, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/evatt-herbert-vere-bert-10131 (published in hardcopy 1996; accessed online 29 April 2016).
“Canberra Commentary: Prime Minister’s Better Appreciation Of U.N.,” Sydney Morning Herald, 30 107
October 1962, 2.
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Australian foreign policy through misplaced faith in the new United Nations.” The
Coalition contended that the Government was meddling in the array of disputes facing
the General Assembly instead of accepting the Cold War and cementing Australia’s
alliances with the UK and the US. Once the Coalition was in government, negative 108
experiences for Menzies involving the UN resulting from the Suez Crisis in 1956 and
the U2 Affair in 1960, fostered his personal lack of enthusiasm for the Organization.
In what is considered the first detailed history of Australian foreign policy, Alan Watt, 109
Australian diplomat and Secretary to the Department of External Affairs from 1950–54,
wrote that Menzies’ “intellectual distrust of paper constitutions and international
organisations such as the United Nations,” was a factor that clouded his judgement on
the Suez Crisis. 110
In May 1960, the Soviets discovered and shot down an American U2 spy plane in their
airspace. The incident provoked enormous tension between the two superpowers,
culminating in the collapse of the Paris Summit a fortnight later. After the UN session
began in September, the US approached Menzies to appear before the General
Assembly to dissuade calls for the US and Soviet Union to meet again. Following the
Paris Summit, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower did not want to meet with Soviet
David Lowe, Menzies and the ‘Great World Struggle’: Australia’s Cold War, 1948–1954 (Sydney: 108
University of New South Wales Press, 1999), 19–20. David Lowe, Percy Spender and the American Century, The Trevor Reese Memorial Lecture, Carl 109
Bridge, series ed. (London: Menzies Centre for Australian Studies, King’s College London, 2002), 1. Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy 1938–1965 (London: Cambridge University 110
Press, 1967), 306–7.
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Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Menzies obliged, and with the agreement of the US and
UK, proposed an amendment that any summit involve the “Big Four,” thereby avoiding
a confrontation between the superpowers. According to Australian Ambassador to the
US from 1958–64, Howard Beale, Menzies’ amendment was “overwhelmingly lost.” It
obtained few votes and seemingly, the US and the UK—which had helped mastermind
it—had done little to garner support for it. It also drew a strong personal attack from
Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, whose proposal Menzies had amended. 111
Menzies’ first visit to the UN was, as Beale so delicately put it in his memoir, “an
unpleasant episode.” Consequently, the PM “left the United Nations with no high
opinion of that body as an impartial deliberative assembly.” Two years later, Menzies 112
declared his views on the UN in Parliament.
In a debate in March 1962 following Barwick’s ministerial statement on the West New
Guinea dispute, Leader of the Opposition and the ALP, Arthur Calwell, accused the
Government of having “failed to take the initiative in the United Nations to uphold the
principles of the Charter” and garner support “for the principle of self-determination for
the people of West New Guinea,” especially from the US and the UK. Calwell also had
stated that “The Labour Party’s [sic] policy is unswerving loyalty to the United Nations.
That, of course, means unswerving loyalty to the ideals of the United Nations, not to
power blocs, vetoes and log-rolling campaigns by interested parties.” This was a “trap,”
he claimed, into which the Government had fallen. “It has no independent voice; it
Howard Beale, This Inch of Time: Memoirs of Politics and Diplomacy (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne 111
University Press, 1977), 138–41. Ibid., 141.112
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merely supports the strength.” In light of his UN experience, Menzies responded by 113
suggesting that the ALP had no real sense of realpolitik and the inner workings and
procedures of the Organization, and that he was dissatisfied with its effectiveness:
The only answer that comes up in the speech of the Leader of the Opposition as repetitively as the beat of a metronome is, "The United Nations". Does not the honorable [sic] gentleman know that this matter has been before the United Nations? Does he not know that if this matter were taken to the Security Council a dozen times the Soviet Union would veto whatever view was taken? Does he not know that this matter has been the subject of resolution after resolution in the General Assembly? 114
Consequently, Menzies considered Australia’s management of its alliances with the US
and the UK of greater importance than general support for the UN. The PM concluded:
This idea of transferring your burden to the United Nations is no policy at all. It becomes worse than no policy at all—if, as the honorable [sic] gentleman did, one sets about jeering at what he calls the power blocs and log-rolling campaigns by interested parties. Of course, honorable [sic] members will understand that that is a reference to our old-fashioned belief that, when it comes to peace or war in this part of the world, where Great Britain and the United States stand is of vital moment to this country. According to honorable [sic] members opposite this is old-fashioned stuff. In their view we should not be interested in what he describes as power blocs. Thank God, we have a power bloc in the world! It will be a poor day for Australia if, in the name of some theoretical idea about the United Nations, we abandon our lines of communication with, to repeat my own phrase, our great and powerful friends. No country in the world more than ours needs great and powerful friends. I am all for them. I believe that the people of Australia are for them, and I believe that any policy pursued by us which would put at risk our friendship with those countries would be rejected by every sensible person in the country. 115
Thus, just seven months before the Cuban Crisis, Menzies continued to demonstrate a
lack of enthusiasm for the UN. He was certainly not going to risk Australia’s alliances
Arthur Calwell, CPD, House, vol. 35, 29 March 1962, 1154 and 1161.113
R.G. Menzies, ibid., 1163.114
Ibid., 1163–4.115
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with its major allies for unequivocal support for an Organization whose effectiveness he
doubted.
There is no evidence to suggest that Menzies had grown fonder of the UN by the onset
of the Cuban Crisis. Menzies made only four references to the UN in Parliament during
the crisis. The first three are found in his parliamentary statement of 23 October 1962.
In that statement, as has been noted earlier, the PM expressed his appreciation for
President Kennedy’s reference in his national address to “the vital importance of
regional defensive agreements—agreements which are authorized by the United Nations
Charter and which are necessary for the common safety of those living within the
region.” He also stated: “We welcome the readiness of the United States of America to
bring the matter promptly before the United Nations.” Menzies then stipulated that the
US would request an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council where it would table
its resolution, which Plimsoll had been instructed to support even though he did not sit
on the Security Council. The only other occasion during the crisis when Menzies 116
referred to the UN was on 25 October 1962. J. F. Cairns, who was concerned about the
implications of the quarantine, asked Menzies:
Will he consider associating Australia with action taken in the United Nations and elsewhere, directed to the vital task of preventing a clash between American and Russian ships in the vicinity of Cuba? Further, will he support similar action to remove what both Cuba and the United States consider to be threats to their security? 117
Menzies, CPD, House, vol. 37, 23 October 1962, 1780–1.116
Cairns, ibid., 25 October 1962, 1940.117
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Menzies responded that he thought he had already declared the Government’s policy.
He stated that the American UN resolution
is one eminently calculated to relieve this tension. It puts the onus, it is true, on the other people to dismantle these offensive weapons and to refrain from supplying them, but it also states that if this is done, the quarantine measures adopted could be lifted and should be lifted, and that the whole matter should be dealt with under United Nations supervision. That seems to us to be a method admirably within the spirit of the charter and admirably consistent with the general policy of the Government. 118
In his reply, Menzies simply reiterated and expanded on his parliamentary statement. It
is important to note that Cairns had asked Menzies to comment on the action taken in
the UN regarding the Cuban Crisis. In other words, the PM had not volunteered to
speak on the subject. Thus, the Sydney Morning Herald political correspondent
conflated Menzies’ announcement of the Government’s policy on the Cuban Crisis, and
his response to a parliamentary question on the subject, with a new and more favourable
personal stance on the UN. Clearly, there is no evidence to suggest that the PM had a
“better appreciation” of the Organization.
On one level, the Australian Government’s support for the American UN resolution was
unsurprising. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Australia—mostly under the prime
ministership of Menzies—voted with the Western powers at the UN on all significant
Cold War matters. This included draft resolutions submitted by the Soviet bloc in the
early 1960s regarding Cuban grievances against the US. In that sense, Australia’s 119
Menzies, ibid.118
Clark, “Australia in the United Nations,” 140. Australia also consistently voted with the Western 119
powers throughout the 1940s except on an international regime for Jerusalem and the General Assembly’s consideration of a declaration on human rights: ibid., 135.
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support for the US resolution on the Cuban Crisis was consistent with its voting
behaviour in this period. Therefore, Australia’s support for the Western powers in the
UN, specifically, its desire to maintain Western alliance unity and its strong ties to its
“great and powerful friends,” reflects the influence of key policy factors discussed in
this thesis, more so than a newfound personal commitment to the UN.
Any noticeable shift in the Menzies Government’s attitude towards the UN was not
necessarily a result of Evatt’s departure from Parliament, as much as it was Garfield
Barwick’s arrival, particularly during his tenure as Minister for External Affairs from
1961–64. According to Clark, Australia’s voting behaviour at the UN underwent “a brief
change” from 1961 to 1963. Australia went from abstaining on resolutions regarding
colonialism and territories to voting in favour of questions on the same subjects. Clark
did not offer an explanation for this change. The most likely explanation is Barwick’s 120
influence as Minister for External Affairs in this period. Barwick’s fresh approach to
Australian foreign policy, as evidenced by his involvement in helping shift the
Government’s policy on the West New Guinea dispute outlined in Chapter 2, correlates
with Australia’s changing attitude on matters relating to colonialism and territories. That
Australia reverted back to its old voting behaviour in the mid-1960s gives credence to 121
this theory; Barwick left Parliament for the High Court in 1964 and no longer shaped
Australia’s role in international affairs. It was Barwick who, with the support of his
Department, led and managed the Australian response to the Cuban Crisis, emphasising
the role of the UN.
Ibid., 145.120
Ibid.121
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The Menzies Government’s second parliamentary statement on the Cuban Crisis, which
was delivered by Barwick and detailed earlier in this chapter, clearly demonstrates the
Minister’s appreciation for the UN. Unlike the Government’s first statement that, as was
shown in Chapters 1 and 2, was prepared and delivered by the PM, significantly, it was
the Department of External Affairs and the Minister that drafted and gave the second
statement, respectively. Barwick, unlike Menzies, was keen for Australia to play an 122
active and constructive role in the affairs of the UN. Clark wrote in 1973 that
The challenge for the Government of a democracy which, quite properly, must be accountable for its actions in the United Nations, is to explain the complexity and consequently the slowness of decision-making on many issues of substance and to clarify the significance of those issues. In Australia this is especially necessary, given widespread doubts about the usefulness of the Organization. 123
During the Cuban Crisis, Barwick was asked in Parliament about the resolutions that
had been tabled in the UN Security Council. Barwick responded that he would table all
of the key UN documents on the crisis in Parliament. He later advised that he would 124
place them in the library for MPs to view. These documents formed a two-volume 125
dossier titled Documents on Cuba. By making these documents available and 126
providing a summary of events in his parliamentary statement, External Affairs had
tried to make the crisis more accessible to MPs by demystifying its complexity in terms
of the way in which it was unfolding at the UN. Barwick and the Department had also
attempted to show the UN in a positive light, in terms of its handling of a crisis. This
open collaboration among the Minister and the Department, however, would end with
Barwick, CPD, House, vol. 37, 6 November 1962, 2050.122
Clark, “Australia in the United Nations,” 155.123
Calwell and Barwick, House, CPD, vol. 37, 25 October 1962, 1933.124
Barwick, ibid., 2041.125
Documents on Cuba, vols. 1 (22–25 October 1962) and 2 (24 October–5 November 1962) 126
(Department of External Affairs: Canberra, 1962).
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Barwick’s tenure. It would fade away, much like the Cuban Crisis did for Australians.
Having first heard about the Cuban Crisis on Tuesday morning, by the following
Monday, Australians were waking-up to news that the most tense period of the crisis
was over. The Cuban Crisis had ended as quickly as it had begun.
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Conclusion
Fifty-five years ago, the US and the Soviet Union stood on the brink of nuclear war over
Soviet missiles in Cuba. Since then, the Cuban Missile Crisis has been recognised as a
defining moment in the twentieth century. In the past twenty years, declassified
government records have revealed indeed how close the parties came to nuclear
conflict. The declassification of records belonging to other foreign governments and the
subsequent research undertaken on state responses to the Cuban Crisis, as outlined in
the Introduction, have generated a wave of studies that has revealed the truly global
nature of the Cuban Crisis. It seems remarkable, given the abundance of literature on
the crisis, that still more could be written on this subject. As files continue to be
declassified around the world, scholars are discovering new information and re-
evaluating earlier understandings of this event. Australia’s policy response to the crisis,
which has not, until now, received detailed examination, makes a significant
contribution to this extensive scholarship on the crisis.
As a history and policy analysis, this thesis could not be understood without being
placed in the context of examining Australia in the Cold War in the early 1960s. Much
of that history, as noted in the Introduction, has not been written. In addition to
addressing a historiographical gap on the Cuban Crisis, this thesis has therefore had to
address historiographical gaps in the history of Australia’s relationship with nuclear
weapons and Australia-US and Australia-Cuba trade relations in order to explicate
Australia’s policy response. For that reason, the scope of this thesis has been narrowed
!333
so that the Government’s policy could be explained and placed in such a context. There
are, nevertheless, avenues for further research, specifically on Australia and the crisis
itself. For example, a broader examination of reactions to the crisis across the Australian
community is warranted, including the reactions of political parties outside the
Australian government.
This thesis has also concentrated on the Menzies Government’s policy on the crisis in
the context of the Australia-US alliance. This focus is validated by the central part that
the US played in the crisis, and the fact that the US alliance was, at this time, the most
significant diplomatic relationship for Australia in terms of its geo-strategic and geo-
political interests. The British influence, while still important, had waned. That the
Menzies Government sought the British reaction to the crisis but determined its policy
unaware of such views, is testament to this evolution in Australian-British relations.
That said, a separate study on the changing relationship between Australia and the UK
in the context of the Cuban Crisis that, for example, examined in detail the
correspondence between Menzies and Macmillan, is a topic suitable for further study.
Research for this thesis has also revealed useful sources on the reactions of the
Australian population, such as the views on the crisis of trade unions and peace
organisations. Although excluded from this thesis for the lack of influence these
organisations had on the Menzies Government’s policy formulation and
implementation, they are worthy of further research, particularly in terms of expanding
the existing scholarship on Australian anti-nuclear activism and the peace movement.
********
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On 23 October 1962, Prime Minister Menzies addressed Parliament on the Cuban
Crisis. He welcomed the decision of the US to bring the matter before the UN and
pledged Australia’s support for the American resolution to be tabled in the Security
Council. Chapter 1 showed that Menzies delivered his parliamentary statement with
little advance notice of the Cuban situation and with limited information regarding the
Kennedy Administration’s initial plan of action. Australian intelligence agencies were
informed of the situation as a result of intelligence cooperation arrangements that
existed between Australia and the US. The nature of this cooperation during the crisis
was brought to light in this thesis through oral histories and correspondence with former
military intelligence officials. While this chapter demonstrated the closeness of the
Australia-US alliance in this regard, the nature and amount of information shared could
not be ascertained; a cloak of secrecy still surrounds such records. This chapter also
corrected Prue Torney-Parlicki’s claims that Australia had significant advance notice of
the crisis. In fact, the Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C. and therefore the
Department of External Affairs, was aware that the British and Canadians were better
informed. However, officials in the Department of Prime Minister were less cognisant
of Australia’s lack of advance notice.
Even though Menzies received a personal message from President Kennedy and an
advance copy of his address, for the Prime Minister and Australian officials in Canberra
and Washington, Kennedy’s broadcast on 22 October (US Eastern Standard Time) was a
critical source of information, particularly in terms of the Administration’s initial,
seven-step response. Officials, and many in the general public, listened to the President
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via Voice of America. His address, and Menzies’ parliamentary statement that shortly
followed, were reported in Australia’s daily metropolitan newspapers, most reproducing
the leaders’ statements in their entirety. Unlike the US and the UK where the Cuban
Crisis was a television crisis, as Chapter 1 showed, Australians heard about the crisis on
the radio and read about it in the newspapers. Access to news media and the frequency
of reporting varied across Australia, but it was nonetheless plentiful and informative.
Shortly after President Kennedy’s address, the Australian Cabinet met and deliberated
on the Cuban Crisis. It was the first agenda item for discussion at a meeting that had
already been scheduled. In its initial discussion of the crisis, the Cabinet formulated a
policy on the matter. Chapter 2 examined the Cabinet’s discussions in detail. The
Cabinet Notebook demonstrated that it was the Minister for External Affairs, Garfield
Barwick, who led the discussion and he, along with External Affairs, would continue to
take the lead in managing Australia’s policy response to the crisis. Barwick’s leadership
in Cabinet contrasts with the literature on Menzies’ behaviour in Cabinet. The PM did
not dominate the ministers with his views nor did he demonstrate brilliance on the
matter. Nevertheless, he consulted Cabinet on the crisis, which was also then noted in
some Australian major daily newspapers. This is contrary to a claim that he did not do
so, a claim communicated to the President the following year. The Kennedy
Administration was thereby misinformed. The Menzies Government too had been given
false impressions. It was advised by the US State Department that it was the first
government to pledge support for the US. While Australia was indeed swift in pledging
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its support, New Zealand was the first to do so publicly, and the British had privately
communicated their support prior to Kennedy’s address.
The Cabinet Notebook illustrates clearly that the US alliance was of paramount
importance to the Cabinet in its formulation of Australia’s policy on the crisis. It was
careful to keep its policy narrow rather than prepare a detailed statement, but it
nevertheless sought to demonstrate that its support for the US was unequivocal. The
reasons for the Menzies Government’s narrow yet unequivocal support for the US in the
Cuban Crisis were explored in Chapters 3 to 5.
Chapter 3 studied Australia’s policy response to the Cuban Crisis in the context of
Australia’s nuclear ambitions in this period. It demonstrated that some Australian
officials were mindful of the potential effect the crisis could have on their interest in
hosting US nuclear weapons on Australian soil. Australia was keen to secure American
interest in Australia’s region and enhance Australia’s defence capabilities. But the
Minister and Secretary of External Affairs, Garfield Barwick and Arthur Tange
respectively, were acutely aware of the complexity and difficulties of this position. In
effect, but not intent, Australian desires aligned with Cuban objectives. Just as Cuba
wanted their ally’s weapons on their soil, so did Australia. Barwick and Tange agreed
that this could not interfere with the government’s policy on the Cuban Crisis at the
expense of the US alliance on which Australia so heavily relied for its defence. In
explaining this position, it was necessary to provide a detailed background on
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Australia’s nuclear history in this period, an understudied subject. Much of this chapter
therefore makes a new and important contribution to the historiography on Australia’s
relationship with nuclear weapons. This chapter illustrates that Australia’s nuclear
ambitions shaped its narrow policy response on the crisis.
This narrowness was also influenced by its uncertainty over its legal and ethical
commitments to the US in the Cuban Crisis. Chapter 4 showed that External Affairs
officials reviewed the relevance of the ANZUS Treaty to the crisis and were unclear as
to its applicability. While they were mindful not to over-commit Australia to the Cuban
situation, External Affairs officials concluded that it was best not to interpret the Treaty
too narrowly in fear that the US would interpret the Treaty similarly in the future. As
shown in Chapters 3 and 4, Australia relied on the support of the US to defend against
regional communist threats. It was therefore in Australia’s geo-strategic interests to
successfully manage and maintain its alliance with the US.
The crisis however, posed major problems in this regard. Chapter 4 showed that
External Affairs officials were concerned about whether the US could provide such
defence assistance if it was pre-occupied on two fronts: Berlin and Cuba. The
quarantine was also a cause for concern both in terms of its legality—it was in effect a
blockade—and because of the precedent it set. For some Australian officials cognisant
of Australia’s nuclear ambitions, as detailed in Chapter 3, the latter point was highly
problematic for Australia, an island nation.
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US actions were also problematic in terms of Australia-Cuba trade. While Menzies
questioned whether the Cabinet needed to take trade into consideration in formulating
its policy on the Cuban Crisis, astonishingly, it did not do so. The Trade Minister
advised the PM that Australia did not have any trade with Cuba. In fact, as shown in
Chapter 5, it had a healthy trade relationship that had been a source of great tension in
Australia-US relations. Although the Menzies Government did not support Fidel Castro
in terms of his politics, unlike the Americans, Australia saw politics and economics as
separate issues. Trade was an important factor that was noted and then overlooked
during the Cuban Crisis, and consequently, it was not considered in the Government’s
formulation of its policy.
Chapter 6 examined the Menzies Government’s implementation of its policy in the
initial, most tense, days of the crisis. It showed the low nuclear threat perception held by
Australian officials located in Canberra, compared with those at the UN in New York.
Such threat perceptions affected civil defence planning and preparedness. It was on this
issue that sections of the Australian community reacted most strongly regarding the
crisis. There was also a strong response to the Government’s new three-year defence
plan, which it launched the day after news of the crisis broke in Australia. The
Government was heavily criticised for the programme, which many claimed was
inadequate for the defence of Australia. In the new programme and in its parliamentary
statement, the Government emphasised the importance of collective defence,
specifically the US alliance, a theme that underlines Australia’s policy response to the
Cuban Crisis.
! 339
Conversely, the Government was applauded for its approach towards the UN. Chapter 6
shows the difficult relationship Menzies had with the Organization. While Australia’s
policy on the Cuban Crisis did not demonstrate a new found appreciation for the UN as
had been claimed, Barwick was more complimentary of the Organization. Throughout
the crisis, Australia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, James Plimsoll, worked
feverishly to garner support for the US position. He was well-respected within the UN
and had a close working relationship with the American delegation. Nevertheless, his
expression of Australia’s support for the US resolution, as shown in Chapter 6, was less
contained than those in Canberra had indicated. Plimsoll even confidentially passed on
the Cabinet’s concerns to US Permanent Representative to the UN, Adlai Stevenson,
without Canberra’s knowledge.
While publicly Australia was perceived to be a faithful American ally, this thesis has
argued that the Menzies Government’s policy response to the Cuban Crisis was more
calculated than the Prime Minister’s parliamentary statement suggested, and the
Kennedy Administration perceived. The thesis has revealed that the Menzies
Government developed a narrow policy, carefully managed the US alliance in the light
of Australia’s defence needs, and in doing so, kept Australia’s national interests in sharp
focus.
! 340
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