the baltic fleet and the kronstadt mutiny

University of Glasgow

The Baltic Fleet and the Kronstadt MutinyAuthor(s): Evan MawdsleyReviewed work(s):Source: Soviet Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Apr., 1973), pp. 506-521Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/150800 .

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THE BALTIC FLEET AND THE KRONSTADT MUTINY By EVAN MAWDSLEY

MANY Western writers have regarded the Kronstadt mutiny of 2-I8 March I921 as symptomatic of a general Soviet crisis. Considerable attention has been given to the causes of the mutiny, but to general rather than local causes, largely because these accounts have been concerned with Kronstadt as a symptom.

Without doubt, the catastrophic economic situation in Soviet Russia was a major factor leading to the uprising, but the general crisis is simply too general adequately to explain the origins of this specific historical event. There is a tendency to forget that a naval mutiny occurred, a revolt of men living under unusual conditions; it was not just a revolt of peasants in naval dress. To increase our understanding of the mutiny we must look very closely at the organization within which it took place, the Baltic Fleet.

In 1920 the Baltic Fleet was attempting to weather a major crisis, one which was probably unavoidable. This fleet crisis has received little attention in the West. Four major types of problem were involved in the crisis: material, personnel, administration and morale. I shall examine each in turn and try to show how it contributed to the crisis; then I shall attempt to suggest some reasons for the transformation of the fleet crisis into armed mutiny.

Ships and supplies Problems of material had been apparent since the revolution and even

since 1914. For one thing, the Baltic Fleet had been progressively reduced since the summer of 1917 when, at peak strength, it had included eight battleships, nine cruisers, over 50 destroyers, about 40 submarines, and several hundred auxiliary vessels. By the 'campaign' (ice-free season) of I920 the active ships of the fleet, which were concentrated in the Active Detachment (Deistvuyushchii otryad or DOT), consisted of a pair of battleships, i6 destroyers, half a dozen submarines, and a flotilla of minesweepers. Some vessels had departed for inland waters, and others had been lost in I9I8 and 1919, but the fuel shortage was the most important element; during the summer and



507

autumn of 1918 most of the older ships were laid up at Kronstadt or on the Neva.'

At the beginning of 1920 the Soviet government hoped to increase the effective strength of its Baltic Fleet, and some refits had been begun during the winter. But the situation turned out to be peredyshka (breathing space) rather than peace, and the resumption of fighting prevented much progress. The appointment of an energetic new commander-in-chief, F. F. Raskol'nikov, produced little change, and neither did a Council of Labour and Defence order of 23 October I920.

During the following winter the situation became even more threatening because there appeared to be insufficient fuel to save all ships from the cold. S. S. Kamenev, Main C-in-C of the Red Army, warned the fleet command that a system of priorities should be established to preserve the most important vessels.2

The material problems involved more than just numerical weakness. The economic crisis reduced food supplies in an area distant from food sources; shortages were made worse by the over-centralized food supply system, Oprodkomflot. In December I920 the Political Section (Polit- otdel) of the Kronstadt Naval Base reported that 'the provisions question among the personnel of the fleet and the fortress has become acute'. At a fleet party conference held in January 1921 there was sharp criticism of Oprodkomflot.3 Clothing, furthermore, was in such short

supply that at the beginning of 1921 many units had still not received their uniform quota for I9I9. In fact, during the mutiny a large number of sailors were unable to participate as they had no boots.4

1 A. L. Fraiman (resp. ed.), Baltiiskie moryaki v bor'be za vlast' sovetov (L., 1968), pp. 200-3, 285; A. K. Drezen (ed.), Baltiiskii flot v Oktyabr'skoi revolyutsii i grazhdanskoi voine (M.-L., 1932), p. 285. A neglected source is Drezen's collection of documents, drawn largely from what was known as the Morskoi otdel of the Leningrad Department of the Central Historical Archive (LOTsIA); although the collection ends in December 1920 the documents are essential for an understanding of the naval causes of the Kronstadt mutiny. The work led to difficulties for Drezen and his collaborators. One highly critical review, noting that 'Comrade Stalin's letter to the editors of the journal Proletarskaya revolyutsiya has gone right past the author . . and the compilers', accused Drezen of popularizing Trotskyism and demanded a new edition (Morskoi sbornik, 1933, no. 2, pp. 195-203).

2 Drezen, op. cit., pp. 274-8, 282-3, 309; D. A. Kovalenko, Oboronnaya promyshlennost' Sovetskoi Rossii v I918-1920 gg. (M., I970), p. 371; V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th edn. (M.-L.), vol. 41, p. 392. Useful information on the Baltic Fleet is provided by Royal Navy intelligence reports. The following are helpful on Raskol'nikov's attempts to strengthen the fleet: from Adm. I37/1688- Report of 17 November 1920 (pp. 366-74) and Report from Reval of 5 February 1921 (p. 576). 3 A. S. Pukhov, 'Kronshtadt i Baltiiskii flot pered myatezhom I921 goda', Krasnaya letopis', 1930, no. 6(39), pp. 149-51, i68, I96; Drezen, op. cit., pp. 309-10; Adm. x37/i688-Report from Reval of 9 November 1920 (pp. 246-7), Report from Petrograd of ii November 1920 (p. 253), Report from Riga of 9 November 1920 (p. 339), Report from Reval of 8 February 1921 (p. 665).

4 Pukhov, op. cit., pp. 151-2; Drezen, op. cit., pp. 310-11; Adm. I37/1688- Report from Petrograd of x November I920 (p. 253); S. M. Petrichenko, Pravda o Kronshtadtskikh sobytiyakh (1921), p. 21.

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THE BALTIC FLEET AND

Material problems thus had two effects on the fleet. On the one hand, it was impossible to maintain a strong sea-going force in the Baltic; this doomed the surviving nucleus to inactivity. On the other hand, even the men of this nucleus could not be properly supplied.

Personnel Also acute were personnel problems. Previous discussions of this

question have been at least partly misleading. Some Soviet historians, anxious to dissociate the baltiitsy of 1917 and I919 from the Kronstadt mutineers, have attempted to show that in I920 there had been a marked change in the composition of the men in the fleet-and particularly in the DOT and at the Kronstadt Naval Base where the mutiny took place. As one Soviet historian put it in an 'official' history of the Civil War, the men of the fleet comprised 'the scum of Petrograd Port, failed secondary school students, captured Makhnovites and Denikinites'.5 A number of Western accounts have accepted this view, perhaps because of a desire to link the Kronstadt rebels with the rebellious countryside of I920.6

Certainly, some change had occurred. The peak 'enlisted' strength of the Baltic Fleet in early I9I7 had been 83,870 ratings and warrant officers. This began to decline in the autumn as revolutionary detachments departed, as the older 'classes' were demobilized, and as the younger men demobilized themselves. The process was accelerated by the Sovnarkom decree of 29 January/II February 1918, which created the Workers' and Peasants' Red Fleet (RKKF). This was, in reality, a decree of demobilization, stating that henceforth the fleet would be manned on a volunteer basis. The volunteer system did not last very long, however, because sailors were needed not only for the ships of the fleet but also for the land front and for the river flotillas. In August I918 Sovnarkom ordered the mobilization of the five youngest tsarist classes, but even though older men were mobilized later the situation remained difficult. Although the drafting of sailors into front-line land detachments ended in December I918, all through 1919 men were being drafted from the Baltic Fleet to the river flotillas. In April 1920 there were I7,200 ratings in the Baltic Fleet and 21,400 in the other flotillas.7

5 S. Uritsky, 'Krasnyi Kronshtadt vo vlasti vragov revolyutsii', in Grazhdanskaya voina (M., 1928), vol. I, p. 362. The argument was put forward most completely by Pukhov in 'Kronshtadt i Baltiiskii flot pered myatezhom ... ' (see footnote 3 above).

6 Paul Avrich, Kronstadt 192I (Princeton, I970), pp. 89-90; Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Armed: Trotsky 1879-I92I (London, 1970), p. 512; George Katkov, 'The Kronstadt Rising', St. Antony's Papers, no. 2 (1959), p. 21.

7 V. V. Petrash, Moryaki Baltiiskogo flota v bor'be za pobedu Oktyabrya (M.-L., I966), p. I5; Institut Marksizma-Leninizma, Dekrety sovetskoi vlasti (M., 1957-64), vol. i, p. 435, vol. 3, pp. 252-3; Drezen, op. cit., pp. 287, 297.

5o8



THE KRONSTADT MUTINY

The demands of the Civil War did not permit a simple solution to the personnel problems. Four distinct attempts were made in I920.

First, in April the Republic Revolutionary Military Council (RVSR) ordered that former sailors serving in the Red Army should be transferred to the RKKF. Second, after Raskol'nikov's arrival a number of men were drafted to the DOT from naval depots in Moscow and else- where. Third, some Io,ooo new recruits were called up for the Baltic Fleet in the autumn. Fourth, the recruitment of volunteers was begun with the end of the Civil War; on 24 December I920 the RVSR announced provisional regulations for the recruitment of sailor- volunteers aged 17 to 26.8

Although the number of ratings in the Baltic Fleet as a whole rose by i December 1920 to 24,914-still 1,079 below the establishment- the basic composition of the DOT did not change greatly. The most important point is that the o0,000 new recruits were trainees, not replacements. They were formed into 'Detachments of Young Sailors'. The term 'young sailor' was a euphemism for 'conscript', and these men were in training depots in Petrograd, not at Kronstadt; furthermore, as at i December only 1,3I3 of a planned total of 10,384 had arrived. It also seems unlikely that the new volunteers could have been appearing in large numbers by the end of February 1921; those that did arrive were probably in Petrograd and not aboard the ships of the DOT.9

From the developments described above-remobilization, difficulties in finding suitable replacements-and from statistical data, it would appear that the situation in the DOT was quite different from what some previous writers have suggested: the majority of men seem to have been veterans of I917. This is not to suggest that the DOT was a miniature of the 1917 Baltic Fleet and socially identical with it; the sailors of 192I were the result of a process of natural selection in which the most revolutionary and the most active had gone to the front or the flotillas. Nevertheless, the relevant point is length of service, and available information indicates that as many as three-

quarters of the DOT ratings-the Kronstadt mutineers-had served in the fleet at least since the World War.l0

8 S. Efimov, 'Partiinoe stroitel'stvo v Voenno-Morskom Flote v gody grazhdanskoi voiny', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 197I, no. 4, p. I8; Pukhov, op. cit., pp. I56-61. 9 Drezen, op. cit., p. 299.

10 Of the 2,028 ratings aboard the DOT battleships Petropavlovsk and Sevastopol' at the time of the uprising, 20-2% had begun service before 1914, 59% between 1914 and 1916, 14% in 1917, and 6-8% from 1918 to I921 (S. N. Semanov, 'Likvidatsiya antisovetskogo Kronshtadtskogo myatezha 192I goda', Voprosy istorii, 1971, no. 3, p. 28). According to other data for the DOT as a whole on I January 1921, 23'5% could have been drafted before I911, 52% from I9II to 19I8, and 24'5% after 1918 (Pukhov, op. cit., p. I60).

The question of changes in the social composition of the fleet is a difficult one. The main point is that the ratings-whether worker or peasant-had been serving too long,

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By the time of the rising the demobilization of the older classes had hardly begun. On i December the RVSR ordered the gradual demobilization of the armed forces, but the demobilization which began in the Baltic Fleet on 13 January I92I applied to personnel under 19 and over 32, and certain specialists were excluded. Many men had been serving for half a dozen years or more, and in the winter of I92o-21 the Civil War finally seemed over. Demobilization must have been a major issue in the winter of I920/21; one commissar reported that at meetings the men refused to discuss politics-they were interested only in demobilization.ll It is unlikely that the limited plans of the government could have satisfied these restless sailors.

Looking at the contribution of personnel problems to the fleet crisis, it seems reasonable to challenge the previous interpretation. The composition of the DOT had not fundamentally changed, and anarchistic young peasants did not predominate there. The available data suggest that the main difficulty was not, as the Soviet historian A. S. Pukhov stated, that the experienced sailors were being demobilized.l2 Rather, they were not being demobilized rapidly enough.

Administration The most complicated problems were administrative. Before

February I9I7 the fleet administration had been straightforward; the officer corps was in complete control, and there was a strict military hierarchy. In the new era, however, the authority of the officers was rapidly eroded as rivals appeared in the form of the democratic organizations. The most important of these were the individual ship committees and the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet (Tsentrobalt). What might be termed 'naval democracy'-a fleet equivalent of 'workers' control'-advanced very rapidly from the autumn of 1917, and at the end of the year Tsentrobalt replaced the old C-in-C. Contrary to the hopes of the lower deck, however, naval democracy was not compatible

but the question of social change deserves some comment. Soviet historians disagree over the nature and effect of the class composition of the fleet even for the pre- revolutionary era. Also, the nature of Russian society and the migrations of the Civil War period make the distinction between workers and peasants a difficult one to draw. Finally, Soviet sources do not provide consistent figures: Pukhov maintained that in the Kronstadt Naval Base and Fortress party organization 28-3% were workers and 66'7% peasants in September 1920, while Drezen stated that in the Baltic Fleet as a whole 65-6% were workers and 34'5% peasants in March 1920 (Pukhov, op. cit., p. 177; Drezen, op. cit., p. 296). It is interesting that a recent Soviet article on Kronstadt made no attempt to support Pukhov's claim. Rather, it asserted that there had been a change in the 'social-psychological' characteristics of the sailors (Semanov, op. cit., p. 28).

"1 S. M. Klyatskin, Na zashchite Oktyabrya (M., 1965), p. 450; Pukhov, op. cit., pp. Ix6-2, I87; M. V. Kuz'min, Kronshtadtskii myatezh: Populyarnyi ocherk (L., 193I), p. 24. 12 Pukhov, op. cit., p. i6I.

TIHE BALTIC FLEET AND 5I.o




with efficiency, and in February I9I8 the pendulum began-very slowly-to swing back the other way. A few days after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk Tsentrobalt was replaced by a smaller body. In May a civilian Main Commissar, a communist, was appointed from the centre. Seven months later the fleet administration was made congruent with Red Army practice when the Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) of the Baltic Fleet was set up.

The end of the era of naval democracy and the crystallization of the new administration came in January I9I9 with the visit to Petrograd of the People's Commissar for Army and Navy Affairs (Narkomvoenmor), L. D. Trotsky. This visit followed a disastrous naval raid on Reval in which the shortcomings of the fleet administration had been made very clear indeed. Trotsky dismissed the local Chief of Naval Forces, a former admiral, but attempted to bolster the power of other former officers. The ship committees were abolished, their place being taken by appointed ship commissars. The only surviving 'democratic' organizations were the ship party collectives, but these were now intended to be no more than a link between the men and the newly created political wing of the RVS, the Baltic Fleet Politotdel. The collectives were ordered not to interfere with the activities of the commanders or of the commissars.l3

By the following winter, that of I919/20, serious faults in this administrative system had become evident, and during I920 the situation worsened. The organization was a complicated one, and each of its major elements should be briefly considered.

The military leadership of the fleet was entrusted-in theory, at least-to the komsostav (commander staff), the majority of whom had been officers in the tsarist navy. Three important points can be made about the komsostav. First, they were very careful about exerting authority, and while this minimized tension between commanders and crew it did not make for efficiency. Second, there was a great shortage of komsostav and 'specialists' (spetsialisty, former NCOs). Thus, the 'normal' administration of the fleet was further weakened. Finally, attempts to solve the first two problems by creating new command personnel who were both popular and reliable met with no success. The Red Army certainly included a large number of former tsarist officers, but a major effort had been made there to train 'Red Commanders'. Such expedients were not applicable to the RKKF because 'naval training was much more specialized, and NCOs could not be transformed quickly into komsostav.l4 During the Civil War the Baltic Fleet

13 R. N. Mordvinov, Kursom 'Avrory': Formirovanie Sovetskogo Voenno-morskogo flota i nachalo ego boevoi deyatel'nosti (M., 1962), p. 308; I. M. Ludri, 'Korabel'nve komitety', Oktyabr'skii shkval (L., 1927), pp. 86-87; Drezen, op. cit., pp. I64-6.

14 Drezen, op. cit., pp. 295, 297, 319-20, 325; Pukhov, op. cit., pp. 173-4.

5II




had to rely, more than did the Red Army, on former tsarist officers; this seriously weakened the 'regular' administration.

Because of the nature of the command cadres and also because the inactivity of the fleet minimized the significance of operational questions, the 'political' leadership assumed great importance. It consisted of the central party apparatus-the Politotdel-and the commissars assigned to various units. This political leadership was made up largely of former ratings with some 'civilians'.

Another administrative force was the Petersburg Committee of the RKP(b), led by Zinoviev. The conflict between this large civilian party organization and the Baltic Fleet military party organization was a major factor in the difficulties of I920.

Finally, the administered must be considered. Within this group were the mass of rank-and-file party members, who were no longer the minority they had been in I9I7 and I918. The net had been cast so wide during the 'Party Week' of October I919 that afterwards from one-half to one-third of the Baltic sailors were connected with the RKP(b).l5 Because the fleet party was now a mass organization it became the sounding-board for mass dissatisfaction. The new party members were prepared to criticize the situation in the fleet, and they disliked the idea of centralized control over party work; the head of the Politotdel went so far as to say-in the late spring of I92o-that the recruiting drive had introduced into the party collectives 'a mass of selfish, narrow-minded, and anarchistic devils'.l1 This new mass dissatisfaction bore considerable resemblance to the demands for naval democracy which had been put forward in 1917 and I918.

The conflict between these various elements became obvious early in 1920. The most important of the RVS commissars, a civilian and a veteran Bolshevik named Vyacheslav Zof, attempted to utilize the peredyshka to tighten up the administration. An RVSR order of 22 January I920 had made uniform the political structures of the Red Army and the RKKF, and when Zof tried to implement this he was accused of trying to introduce almy discipline and a form of dictatorship into the fleet. Dissidents, both commissars and ordinary communists, held a series of meetings and finally forced the summoning of the Baltic First All-Fleet Party Conference. Opening on 7 March 1920, the conference was the first large meeting in the fleet since the Fifth- and final-Congress of the Baltic Fleet in July I918. It was a stormy conference; the conduct of the Politotdel was sharply criticized, but no solution was found. The Petersburg Committee finally intervened to calm things.17

16 Drezen, op. cit., pp. 26I, 297; Efimov, op. cit., p. 17. 16 Kuz'min, op. cit., pp. 25-27. 17 Ibid., pp. 25-28; Efimov, op. cit., p. 15; Pukhov, op. cit., pp. 175-6.

5I2




Zof's difficulties were partly personal, because he was an outsider. His naval service had begun only in January 1919, and he was not well thought of by the sailors.18 However, there were more general difficulties. At issue was the question of discipline and control versus naval democracy. The old controversy of I9I7 and I918 had not been resolved, it had only been suppressed during I9I9 in the battles with the Whites. Inactivity, a mass party, and the various problems brought it out in a new form in 1920.

The temporary solution was the transfer of Zof, another RVS commissar, and a number of political workers from the fleet after the conference. Clearly, however, a strong individual was needed to deal with the administrative difficulties.

The role of Fedor Raskol'nikov is one of the more neglected aspects of the Kronstadt mutiny.19 A few months older than Tukhachevsky, Raskol'nikov was the one outstanding naval 'Red Commander' of the Civil War. Trotsky described him as 'a trained sailor and a militant revolutionary'. He became a Bolshevik in I9I0 while a student in

Petrograd, and he helped produce Zvezda and Pravda; in 1917 he

organized the Kronstadt Bolsheviks and was one of the leaders of the

July demonstrations. Between 19I4 and I9I7 he studied at the Detached Naval Cadet Classes, graduating as a sub-lieutenant; after October he applied his knowledge as a staff commissar, on the Volga

18 G. D. Kondakov, 'Zametki o Kronshtadtskom myatezhe', Kronshtadtskii myatezh: Sbornik statei, vospominanii i dokumentov (L., I931), pp. 56-57. Zof was also a Czech, which may have added to his difficulties.

19 The reasons for this are interesting. Although Raskol'nikov supported Trotsky during the trade union controversy of I920-21, he had an important career in later years. Ambassador to Afghanistan from I921 to 1924, he was prominent in the literary bureaucracy between I924 and I930. Raskol'nikov left Narkompros, probably as a result of the crisis there, and between I930 and 1938 was a diplomat (A. P. Konstan- tinov, F. F. Il'in-Raskol'nikov (L., 1964); V. S. Zaitsev, 'Geroi oktyabrya i grazhdanskoi voiny', Voprosy istorii KPSS, I963, no. 12, pp. 93-94). In this period it would have been difficult for a Soviet historian to criticize Raskol'nikov's actions in 1920-21; it is perhaps significant that only in 1930, possibly when Raskol'nikov was in trouble over his role in Narkompros, did the Soviet historian Pukhov criticize him in Krasnaya letopis'. The situation changed drastically when Raskol'nikov openly denounced Stalin from France-where he died in September 1939; for a number of years he was completely ignored. He reappeared in the late I950os, once again as a hero of the revolution. Unfortunately, his biography-written by A. P. Konstantinov and published in I964-included only two pages on his eight months as C-in-C of the Baltic Fleet. Today, Raskol'nikov's name is once more under a cloud; he was recently condemned as one who 'in fact went against Leninism, participated in factional struggles' and 'deserted to the enemies' camp and slandered the party and the Soviet. government' (B. Golikov et al., 'Za leninskuyu partiinost' v osveshchenii istorii KPSS', Kommunist, I969, no. 3, p. 75). Raskol'nikov himself ignored this episode in his. collection of autobiographical essays, Rasskazy Michmana Il'ina (M., 1934); in contrast to other revolutionary adventures it was not something to talk about. Thus, looking in general at the data on Raskol'nikov, it can be said that since he was either a hero or an 'unperson'-and because the Kronstadt affair was politically embarrassing- an accurate assessment of his role in 1920-21 must be pieced together from various sources.




and Kama, with a Baltic task force, and-finally and most successfully- as commander of the Volga-Caspian Flotilla.20

Raskol'nikov was assigned to the Baltic in June 1920. This must have been due in part to his success in regaining control of the Caspian. Taking command there in June I9I9, he had finally spurred the flotilla to activity; in May 1920 it captured the remnants of the White Caspian flotilla.21 Trotsky, as Narkomvoenmor, was well acquainted with Raskol'nikov from the Kresty Prison in I917 and from the Naval Staff, Kazan', and the RVSR in 1918. Thus, the appointment of the young Red Commander to carry out a two-fold task in the Baltic Fleet-to improve operational readiness and to sort out the political problems- was quite understandable.

Raskol'nikov was given considerable power within the Baltic Fleet. His predecessor, a former rear-admiral named Aleksandr Zelenoi, carried the title only of 'commander' (nachal'nik); Raskol'nikov's title was 'commander-in-chief' (komanduyushchii). Zelenoi had been care- fully watched by other members of the Baltic RVS; Raskol'nikov enjoyed a form of edinonachalie. Dual power existed only at a lower level, where the ostensible political leader was the Assistant C-in-C (Political), N. N. Kuz'min.22 Raskol'nikov was the first fully responsible commander of the fleet since Vice-Admiral A. I. Nepenin, who had been shot dead by a mutineer in March I917. The enhanced power of the new C-in-C ought to have made his task easier, but in fact Raskol'nikov aroused the same kind of hostility as had Nepenin.

It soon became clear that Raskol'nikov represented a 'new broom'. Like Zof, Raskol'nikov attempted to strengthen the central political

20 Jan M. Meijer, The Trotsky Papers (The Hague, 1964), vol. I, p. o16; Zaitsev op. cit., pp. 91-93.

21 B. Babinin, 'Boevye operatsii Krasnogo flota po ovladeniyu Kaspiiskim morem v 1920 godu', Pyat' let Krasnogo flota (Petrograd, 1922), pp. I05-32.

22 An obvious choice for Zelenoi's replacement would have been A. V. Dombrovsky, his chief of staff. Dombrovsky, a former tsarist senior officer, was in fact made commander of naval forces in the Black Sea; this post may have been seen to demand more military and less political preparation (ibid., pp. 213-14). According to British intelligence sources, Raskol'nikov was aided by an Assistant C-in-C (Military), P. N. Leskov. Leskov had been a vice-admiral in the tsarist navy (Adm. I371686-DNI report of I8 October 1920, p. 426). It is important to use Russian command titles precisely. The pinnacle of power in the tsarist forces was the 'Supreme C-in-C' (Verkhovnyi Glavnokomanduyushchii); the comparable figure in the civil war Red Army, Vatsetis or S. S. Kamenev, bore the title of 'Main C-in-C' (Glavno- komanduyushchii) (during the World War officers with this title had commanded fronts, i.e. army groups). In the World War a 'C-in-C' (Komanduyushchii) was in charge of a fleet or an army; in the civil war he commanded a front or an army. From late 1918 there was a Komanduyushchii morskimi silami Respubliki (Komorsi) in charge of the whole RKKF. In the navy during the World War a 'commander' (nachal'nik) commanded only an element of the fleet such as a battleship 'brigade', but from 1918 to 1920 there was a nachal'nik morskikh sil (namorsi) commanding a whole fleet. This meant that the status of a fleet leader had fallen from that of an army C-in-C (in the World War) to that of commander (nachal'nik) of an army division.

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apparatus. On 15 June 1920, shortly after Raskol'nikov's appointment, the fleet Politotdel was given higher status and renamed Pubalt, the Political Administration of the Baltic Fleet.23 A whole series of steps were taken to tighten up the organization and improve discipline.

The 'new broom' induced a reaction. For one thing, the intermediate cadres objected to the appointment of men from outside. As a reformer, however, Raskol'nikov had to reshuffle his commissar-and command- cadres, and this involved appointing some of the men he had brought from the Caspian. The best writer on Kronstadt, A. S. Pukhov, believed that Raskol'nikov acted unwisely:

The firm intention of the newly assigned C-in-C of the Baltic Fleet ... to restore the fleet to health, to introduce into the political life of the fleet a vital force, was implemented by methods which were not completely correct . ..

Pukhov added that the new C-in-C provoked 'sharp dissatisfaction' within the party organization-and even among the sailors-when he appointed, without discussion, new komsostav and political workers.24 The commissar of the reserve battleship Gangut later recalled that a very bad impression was made by the fleet staff aboard the flagship Krechet by men 'who had come from the East'-that is, presumably, from the Caspian-and who received all the rations they wanted.25 It is not unreasonable to suggest that part of this anger stemmed from the appointment of new cadres from outside.

One important political worker who clashed with Raskol'nikov was his own immediate subordinate, N. N. Kuz'min. A veteran Bolshevik nine years older than Raskol'nikov, Kuz'min came to the Baltic not from the Caspian flotilla but from the RVS of the 6th Detached Army in the north. Instead of this possibly independent-minded Old Bolshevik, Raskol'nikov seems to have actually used as his political subordinate the head of Pubalt, a man named E. A. Batis. When a major crisis developed in the fleet Raskol'nikov was opposed by Kuz'min and supported by Batis.

Raskol'nikov also fell out with Zinoviev's Petrograd party organization over basic administrative questions. The main issue was whether political work in the fleet was the responsibility of the armed forces or of the local civilian party organizations; in the latter case both the Kronstadt Naval Base and the Petrograd Naval Base would have come under the authority of the Petersburg Committee. Zinoviev had, in fact, been trying for some time to assert his control, and before June 1920 the Petersburg Committee set up a Military Section (Voennyi otdel) which was intended to control all armed forces party work in

23 Efimov, op. cit., p. 5I. 24 Pukhov, op. cit., p. I87. 25 Ibid., pp. 166-7; Kondakov, op. cit., p. 57.

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Petrograd-including work at the Petrograd Naval Base. Only one of the section's six members would have been from the fleet.26

Raskol'nikov-possibly with Trotsky's support-was moving in the opposite direction. The formation of Pubalt enhanced the status of the fleet apparatus. Furthermore, a new politotdel was created at the Petrograd Naval Base in the heart of Zinoviev's territory. Three months later the C-in-C went a step further when Pubalt separated the Kronstadt Politotdel from the Kronstadt civilian party committee. As might have been expected, Zinoviev's organization resisted these new measures. In November the Petersburg Committee suggested once again that all political activities within its territory-and this included Kronstadt-should be transferred to the civilian organizations.27

Many of the rank-and-file communists were hostile to Raskol'nikov. In part, this was similar to the attitude of the political organizers; both groups sensed that Raskol'nikov represented centralization. In addition, and like Zof, Raskol'nikov attempted to improve discipline. He actually introduced a 'Discipline Week' and reduced leaves. The resulting hostility, particularly in regard to leave, was mentioned in British intelligence reports; Soviet sources relate that there were disturbances aboard the battleship Sevastopol' and demands to talk with the C-in-C.28

The hostility of the rank-and-file to Raskol'nikov was superimposed upon their 'traditional' hostility to the party bureaucracy. Party democracy was a continuing issue, and the nizy-or lower party echelons-were constantly complaining against the verkhi-or upper echelons. In November 1920 base delegate meetings, meetings organized at the grass roots, were calling for twice-yearly conferences of all the men of the fleet-not just of the communists. Also proposed were bi-monthly base conferences, rotation of the fleet party leadership, equality of pay for all personnel, and-in general-closer contact between the party leadership and the masses. Most likely, the demands of the mass membership were taken up by the intermediate cadres, who also had a grudge against the C-in-C and the leadership of Pubalt; if so, they were playing with fire. In any event, an attempt was made to meet these mass demands. On i December Batis, head of Pubalt, agreed to rotate commissars, and in the following month a number were reassigned.29

26 Drezen, op. cit., pp. 320-3. 27 Efimov, op. cit., p. I5; Pukhov, op. cit., pp. 193-4, 204-5. 28 Pukhov, op. cit., pp. I67-8; Drezen, op. cit., p. 326. The British documents

may be found in Adm. I37/1685 and I37/1688. 29 Pukhov, op. cit., pp. 179-80, I85. It would not seem that much sympathy was

felt by the masses for the opponents to Raskol'nikov in the party leadership. During the mutiny the insurgents replied thus to Soviet charges of White leadership: 'We

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Raskol'nikov may have hoped to reduce this mass opposition by carrying out a purge of the party, eliminating the most hostile elements. The purge took the form of a change of party membership cards and was called a 're-registration'. By the time it ended, on 25 October 1920,

nearly 23% of RKP(b) members in the fleet had been excluded.30 Despite the purge, unrest within the party simmered on.

The final blow to Raskol'nikov came when 'higher' politics began to be debated within the fleet party. The trade union controversy was becoming very heated throughout the entire RKP(b), and Raskol'nikov and Batis supported Trotsky's outspoken platform of strict control over the trade unions. It is not difficult to understand why those (at all levels) who resented the new C-in-C's attempts to restore discipline and to control the fleet party organization should have used the trade union question to attack him, particularly as his was the minority position. The spokesman for the opposition to Raskol'nikov was his political 'assistant', Kuz'min. Behind Kuz'min stood another man who rejected Trotsky's trade union line-Zinoviev.

A stormy meeting of fleet communists took place at the Petrograd Naval Base on 13 January I921. In its aftermath Raskol'nikov and Batis complained-in a telegram to the Central Committee-that Kuz'min had associated Trotsky with dictatorship and Zinoviev with

party democracy, and that one sailor-delegate had resurrected the komitetshchina by asserting that military (voennye) methods were not applicable to the fleet. The telegram provoked an uproar. A new meeting of 3,500 naval communists was held on 19 January. Trotsky himself spoke, but without success; it should be remembered that Trotsky was not only leader of the 'opposition' but also, as Narkom- voenmor, the government official in charge of the navy. The delegates sent to the Central Committee their own message-approved by the Bureau of the Petersburg Committee-which denied the allegations of Raskol'nikov and Batis. It was added that Trotsky's views were held

by only a small minority; the majority were agreed that trade union methods were as unsuitable for the aimed forces as military methods were for the trade unions.31

One remarkable result of this upheaval was that Raskol'nikov gave

have just one general-Kuz'min, the Baltic Fleet Commissar-and he has been arrested' (Pravda o Kronshtadte: Ocherk geroicheskoi bor'by Kronshtadtsev protiv diktatury Kommunisticheskoi partii (Prague, 1921), p. 57). 30 Pukhov, op. cit., p. 176; Efimov, op. cit., p. I7; Krasnyi Baltiiskii flot, no. 96(i84), 23 September 1920, p. 3.

31 Pukhov, op. cit., pp. I88-91; M. V. Kuz'min, 'Ghnezdo melkoburzhuaznoi kontrrevolyutsii', in Kronshtadtskii myatezh: Sbornik statei, vospominanii i dokumentov, p. 24. According to M. V. Kuz'min. Raskol'nikov used the Baltic Fleet printing presses to produce Trotskyist literature.

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up his post of C-in-C. The circumstances, the exact date, and the extent of power surrendered remain uncertain; it is known that Raskol'nikov stayed on in a passive capacity and was officially dismissed only on 2 March-the day the uprising really began.32

The climax of the administrative disagreements, which had been evident all through 1920, came at the Second Party Conference of the Baltic Fleet (12-18 February). Raskol'nikov, no longer C-in-C, was overcome by his opponents. His list for the presidium was decisively rejected, as was Pubalt's proposed agenda. Pubalt was condemned as bureaucratic, isolated, unsystematic and powerless. Pubalt, it was claimed, had destroyed all initiative from below and reduced political work 'to the level of inter-office memos'. The theses of the Petersburg Committee were accepted on one key point-all party work was to be taken over by the local civilian committees.33 This was, in reality, the collapse of the political apparatus of the Baltic Fleet, and with this the back of the fleet administration was broken.

The administrative aspects of the fleet crisis were very important. By February 1921 the various elements of administration were clearly not working together. Raskol'nikov had inherited a difficult situation and, unfortunately, he had made it worse. The departure of the young C-in-C meant that there was now no administration, and it was in this condition that the fleet drifted into the Kronstadt uprising.

Morale The final problem to consider is that of morale. This is difficult

to assess. One can prove that supplies were scarce, that the men had been serving for a long time, or that the fleet administration was shaky at best, but the question of morale-of 'mood'-is a difficult one. Yet it is a question of considerable importance.

Put at its simplest and most obvious, the morale of the Baltic Fleet of the RKKF was not that of a normal military organization. Trotsky described the tsarist fleet as follows:

The life conditions . . . nourished the live seeds of civil war. The life of the sailors in their steel bunkers, locked up there by force for a period of

32 Semanov, op. cit., p. 32. According to a recent general history of the Soviet Navy, Raskol'nikov was replaced by his chief of staff on 27 January (N. A. Pitersky (ed.), Boevoi put' Sovetskogo Voenno-Morskogo Flota (M., I964), p. 570). A British intelligence report stated that he was removed on 7 February (Adm. 137/1688- Report from Helsinki, I2 February I921 (p. 656)). According to Pukhov, Raskol'nikov transferred command functions to his chief of staff and assumed personal command of the political sphere (op. cit., p. 188); this may explain the 'resignation' of 27 January. Raskol'nikov's biographer gave few precise details, but claimed that he was removed at his own request (Konstantinov, op. cit., p. I48).

33 Pukhov, op. cit., pp. 194-6; Kuz'min, 'Gnezdo melkoburzhuaznoi kontrrevolyutsii' (see footnote 3I above), p. 33.

518 THE BALTIC FLEET AND




years, was not much different even in the matter of food from that of galley slaves.34

Although the officer caste had disappeared, other conditions had not basically changed. The accumulating problems must have seriously affected the morale of the lower deck. Inadequately supplied as they were, bound involuntarily to service, poorly led by powerless officers and by communists who could not agree among themselves, was it surprising that the men were demoralized? A further factor was that there was so little activity. Some destroyers and minesweepers had put to sea in August 1920, but the DOT battleships-with their crews- had remained in port. This was not really a fleet, it was a collection of men living in the ruins of a fleet. It would seem a reasonable guess that morale reached a low ebb in the winter of 1920/2I.35

From crisis to mutiny This, then, was the fleet crisis of 1920, a crisis which would have

been of considerable interest even without the Kronstadt mutiny. The crisis was probably unavoidable, given that the Baltic Fleet was kept in being but with a low priority. It was small and thus inactive; it was poorly supplied. There had been no real peace to permit a solution of the various problems. Trained men were needed and the tired veterans could not be released; a volunteer fleet might have had higher morale and greater professionalism, but circumstances would not

permit such a fleet. The postwar form of administration had not yet been decided upon, and it was difficult to find a solution to the streams of complaints, which were bred by the situation. The balance between naval democracy and the traditional hierarchy had not yet been achieved and could not be achieved so long as the fleet party was divided within itself. Finally, and forming part of a vicious circle, morale was low. This made solutions to the other problems harder to find; at the same time, morale could not be raised until conditions improved.

* * *

I would like to consider, briefly, some aspects of the way in which the fleet crisis was transformed into the Kronstadt mutiny.

One interesting point about the naval problems was that they applied to the whole Baltic Fleet, not just to those units at Kronstadt. At least half the DOT was at the Petrograd Naval Base, as were the reserve

34 Leon Trotsky, The History of the Russian Revolution (London, x967), vol. I, p. 245.

36 The commissar of the DOT reported on the harmful effect of inactivity in July 1920 (Drezen, op. cit., pp. 324-5). Other Soviet sources have discussed the low 'mood' (Pukhov, op. cit., pp. I64-73; Kuz'min, Kronshtadtskii myatezh: Populyarnyi ocherk, pp. 30-33). British documents also testify to low morale (Adm. 137/I688).

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dreadnoughts Gangut and Poltava and the 'Young Sailors' from southern Russia. The Petrograd sailors had long been recognised as less well disciplined than the kronshtadtsy. In late 1920 the fleet newspaper noted that at Kronstadt there were none of the dandies one found in Petrograd: 'Red sailors prevail at Kronstadt.'36 Furthermore, when the workers went on strike in February I92I the Petrograd sailors were much closer to the trouble than were their comrades at the other end of the Sea Canal.

There were, in fact, some incidents at the Petrograd base. On 26 February, the third day of the strike wave, the crew of the Petrograd- based destroyer Azard protested against the sending of patrols of armed communists into the town. The crew of another destroyer, Garibal'di, even passed an anti-Soviet resolution. It is known that Kronstadt delegates were allowed to speak aboard the reserve dreadnoughts.37

In general, the situation was calm, however. On 27 February a meeting of 7,000 Petrograd sailors was held and addressed by Kalinin, Zinoviev and Kuz'min. Despite some opposition, an anti-strike resolution was passed: 'Men and women workers to your benches! To work! The sailors and Red Army men will watch over the Republic!'38

The marked difference between Petrograd and Kronstadt makes clearer the unique features of the island fortress. It is crucial for an understanding of the Kronstadt mutiny to see that-as in I905, 1906 and 1917-serious political disturbances could break out quite easily. It is possible that the insularity of the kronshtadtsy led them to exaggerate the importance of the strike wave; something similar had occurred in July I9I7. A more important result of insularity was that it gave the rebels a certain confidence and facilitated their actions. The seizure of power was simplified by the small size of the town and the concentration of the population. If the dispersed Petrograd sailors had set out to take power they would have had to win over a civil population much larger than themselves. At the naval town of Kronstadt there was no such difficulty. Anywhere else there was the danger of 'loyalist' forces arriving almost immediately. This actually happened in the south coast area, but it was unlikely at Kronstadt itself. The forces of order would have to attack, if not the main front of a first-class fortress, at least a readily defensible position.

One final point should be made. The administrative problems

36 G. Yasinsky, 'Kronshtadt', Krasnyi Baltiiskiiflot, no. 96(I84), 23 September 1920, p. 2.

37 Pukhov, op. cit., p. 2I2; Kuz'min, 'Gnezdo melkoburzhuaznoi kontrrevolyutsii', p. 27.

38 A. S. Pukhov, 'Kronshtadt vo vlasti vragov revolyutsii', Krasnaya letopis', I93I, no. I(40), pp. 8-9.

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probably contributed most to the transformation of protest into open rebellion. The leadership of the fleet had been smashed in the winter controversies. It was indicative of the state of the fleet that when trouble began no thought was given to the navy's putting its own house in order. The official dismissal of Raskol'nikov on 2 March and his replacement by a revtroika were meaningless formalities; Tukhachevsky, the overall commander, was put in charge of restoring order.39 It was much too late for the fleet leaders to do anything.

The Kronstadt mutiny, like most historical events, has no simple explanation. Certainly, the crisis of War Communism was an important factor, but it does not, in itself, explain events. Another cause of great importance was the crisis in the Baltic Fleet. Neither of these crises could have been avoided, at least in their entirety. The same cannot be said of the mutiny, but clearly it was closely related to both of the other crises. Of these, the specific problems of the Baltic Fleet were probably as important as the general crisis of Soviet Russia.

University of Glasgow

39 Semanov, op. cit., p. 32.

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the baltic fleet and the kronstadt mutiny

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