MAINESUPREMEJUDICIALCOURT ReporterofDecisionsDecision: 2020ME122Docket: Cum-19-48Argued: March2,2020Decided: October22,2020Panel: MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HUMPHREY, andHORTON, JJ., and HJELM and CLIFFORD,

A.R.JJ.*Majority: MEAD,GORMAN,JABAR,HUMPHREY,andHORTON,JJ.,andCLIFFORD,A.R.J.Dissent: HJELM,A.R.J.

THEBANKOFNEWYORKMELLON

v.

DANIELLESHONEetal.HORTON,J.

[¶1] In this appeal from a residential foreclosure judgment of the

SuperiorCourt(CumberlandCounty,Warren,J.),wearecalledupontoclarify

the criteria under the business record exception to the hearsay rule for

admittinginevidencerecordsthatabusinesshasobtainedfromanotherentity

andintegratedintoitsownrecordsoroperations.SeeM.R.Evid.803(6).Our

decisions since 1984 have endorsed two conflicting interpretations of

Rule803(6)asitrelatestointegratedbusinessrecords,andthiscaseaffordsan

* Although not present at oral argument, Active Retired Justice Clifford participated in the

developmentof this opinion. SeeM.R.App.P. 12(a)(2) (“Aqualified Justicemayparticipate in adecisioneventhoughnotpresentatoralargument.”).

2

opportunitytoresolvetheconflict.Weherebyreaffirmtheinterpretationfirst

set forth in our 1984 decision in Northeast Bank & Trust Co. v. Soley,

481A.2d1123,1127(Me.1984),whichisconsistentwiththewidelyaccepted

interpretation of the identical federal rule, see U.S. Bank Tr., N.A. v. Jones,

925F.3d534,537(1stCir.2019).Weconcludethatarecordthatonebusiness

hasreceivedfromanotherisadmissibleunderRule803(6)withouttestimony

aboutthepracticesofthebusinessthatcreatedtherecord,provided,first,that

the proponent of the evidence establishes that the receiving business has

integrated the record into its own records, has verified or otherwise

established theaccuracyof thecontentsof therecord,andhasreliedon the

record in the conduct of its operations, and, second, that the opponent of

admission has not shown that the record is nonetheless not sufficiently

trustworthytobeadmitted.

I.BACKGROUNDANDPROCEDURALHISTORY

[¶2]Wedrawthefollowingbriefaccountofthiscasefromtheprocedural

recordandtheevidenceofferedorreferencedattrial.

[¶3]In2015,TheBankofNewYorkMelloncommencedthisforeclosure

actionagainstDanielleShoneandMichaelBuck.TheBank’scomplaintalleged

thatin2005,BuckhadtakenoutaloanfromAmerica’sWholesaleLenderand

3

that, tosecureBuck’sperformancepursuant to thepromissorynote for that

loan, ShoneandBuckhadexecutedamortgageonaPortland property they

owned.Althoughtheoriginallenderandmortgageewerethird-partyentities,

theBankallegedthatitultimatelyacquiredthenoteandmortgage.TheBank

alsoallegedthatBuckhadstoppedmakingpaymentsontheloanin2008.

[¶4] The court held a bench trial on the complaint in October 2018.

There,theBankofferedanexhibitcontaininganoticeofdefaultandrightto

curepurportedlysenttoShoneandBuckbythelawfirmretainedbyBayview

LoanServicing,whichservicedthenoteandmortgagefortheBank,alongwith

apurportedU.S.PostalServicecertificateofmailing.TheBankfirstattempted

toqualifytheexhibitforadmissioninevidencebycallinganemployeeofthe

law firm to testify about that office’s procedures for creating and mailing

notices of default, but the court barred that testimony because the Bank’s

witness list had not properly identified the prospectivewitness by name or

capacity. The Bank next attempted to submit an affidavit from a law firm

employeeasamechanismforadmittingthenoticeitselfpursuanttoM.R.Evid.

902(11).ThecourtdidnotallowtheBanktousethatprocedurebecauseithad

4

not,asrequiredbytherule,providedShoneandBuckwithreasonableadvance

noticethatitwouldseektodoso.1

[¶5] TheBankthenattemptedtopresentatestimonial foundationfor

the exhibit through James D’Orlando, a litigation manager employed by

Bayview.AfterD’Orlandotestified,thecourtexcludedthenoticefromevidence

because the Bank failed to present evidence that D’Orlando had personal

knowledgeaboutthelawfirm’spracticesrelatingtothecreationandmailingof

noticesofdefaultandrighttocure.BecausetheBankwasthereforeunableto

provethatithadsatisfiedthenoticerequirementsimposedby14M.R.S.§6111

(2018),2 the court entered judgment for Shone and Buck.3 After the court

1Neitherofthoserulingsisatissueonthisappeal.

2This statute was recently amended to change the procedure for providing the notice.SeeP.L.2019,ch.361§§1-2(effectiveSept.19,2019)(codifiedat14M.R.S.§6111(2-A)(2020)).

3Although,intheend,thetrialinthiscasewaslimitedtotheBank’sattempttoenterinevidencethe notice of default and right to cure, the Bank does not suffer the same fate as theplaintiff-mortgageeinWilmingtonSavingsFundSociety,FSBv.Abildgaard,2020ME48,229A.3d789.There, after the court excludeda similarnotice fromevidence butbefore theplaintiff presentedevidenceoranofferofproofthatcoveredtheremainingelementsofaforeclosurecase,theplaintiffvoluntarilyresteditscase-in-chief,andthecourtenteredjudgmentforthedefendant.Id.¶4. Onappeal,weheldthatastheresultoftheplaintiff’schoicetorestwithoutpresentingevidencethatcouldsatisfyallelementsofitscase,wewererequiredtoaffirmtheadversejudgmentirrespectiveofwhetherthecourt’sevidentiaryrulingwaserroneous.Id.¶5.

Here,incontrast,atShoneandBuck’sownsuggestion,thepartiesandthecourtagreedthat,asthefirststepinthetrial,becauseofthepotentiallydispositivenatureofthatissue,theBankwouldpresent evidence to try to establish that the notice was an admissible business record. AfterexcludingthedocumentfollowingD’Orlando’stestimonybutwithouttheBankhavingresteditscase,thecourtproceededtoenterjudgmentagainsttheBank.EventhoughtheBankdidnotmakeanyofferofproofastotheremainingelementsofitsclaim,itisclearthattheBankdidnotproceedinawaythatforfeiteditsargumentonappealasthemortgageedidinAbildgaard.Thus,ifonremandthe

5

deniedtheBank’smotiontoalteroramendthejudgmentorforanewtrial,the

Bankappealedtous.See14M.R.S.§1851(2020);M.R.App.P.2A.

[¶6]Afterthiscasewasinitiallybriefedonappeal,weinvitedtheparties

andanyamici to fileadditionalbriefson thequestionofwhetherweshould

“consideradjustingapplicationof...[MaineRuleofEvidence]803(6),totrack

application of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 803(6) as addressed in U.S. Bank

Trust,N.A.v.Jones,925F.3d534(1stCir.2019).”Inadditiontobriefsfiledby

theparties,wereceivedamicicuriaebriefsfiledbytheFederalHousingFinance

Agency;FullDisclosure,LLC;GeraldF.Petruccelli,Esq.;MaineAttorneysSaving

Homes;theMaineBankersAssociation;theMaineCreditUnionLeague;Maine

Equal Justice; the National Association of Consumer Advocates et al.; the

National Consumer Law Center; PHH Mortgage Corporation; and Pine Tree

LegalAssistance,Inc.

II.DISCUSSION

[¶7] The pivotal issue here centers on the foundational showing that

mustbemadetoadmitanintegratedbusinessrecord—thatis,arecordcreated

byoneentityandlaterintegratedintotherecordsofasecond,separateentity.

trialcourtdecidestoadmittheexhibitatissue,thecourtlikelywouldneedtoreopentherecordforafulltrialonallissues.

6

[¶8]Thetraditionalmethodofadmittingbusinessrecordsinevidence

pursuanttoRule803(6)isthroughthe testimonyofawitnesswithpersonal

knowledge of the practices of the business or other entity that created the

record.Theintegratedrecordsmethodisadifferentmethodthatapplieswhen

therecordhas,ineffect,becomeabusinessrecordofabusinessotherthanthe

business that created the record.4 See MRT Constr. v. Hardrives, Inc.,

158F.3d478,483(9thCir.1998)(“[R]ecordsabusinessreceivesfromothers

4 Underboth the traditionalapproachandthe integratedrecordsapproach, theproponentof

admittingabusinessrecordmustestablishthefollowing:

(A)Therecordwasmadeatornearthetimeby—orfrominformationtransmittedby—someonewithknowledge;

(B)Therecordwaskeptinthecourseofaregularlyconductedactivityofabusiness,organization,occupation,orcalling,whetherornotforprofit;

(C)Makingtherecordwasaregularpracticeofthatactivity.

M.R.Evid.803(6)(A)-(C).Under both approaches, theproponent of an exhibitmay satisfy these criteria through direct

evidenceoftheregularpracticesofeitherthebusinessthatcreatedtherecordorabusinessthathasintegrated,verified,andrelieduponarecordreceivedfromanotherbusiness.Ineachinstance,proofof the business’s regular practices can constitute circumstantial evidence of trustworthinesssufficient to justify the inference that the record was created in a manner that satisfies theRule803(6)criteria.SeeBocaInvesteringsP’shipv.UnitedStates,128F.Supp.2d16,18(D.D.C.2000)(“The theory [underlying Federal Rule803(6)] is that if a statement is recorded in the ordinarycourseofaregularlyconductedactivity,andifitistheregularpracticeofthebusinesstorecordsuchastatement,thereisasufficientlyhighdegreeoftrustworthinessinherentinthedocumenttoensureits truthfulness, making cross-examination of the person who prepared the document lessnecessary.”);U.S.Bank,N.A.v.Christmas,No.26695,2016OhioApp.LEXIS205,at*10(OhioCt.App.Jan. 22, 2016), vacated on other grounds, 54N.E. 3d 1267 (Ohio 2016) (“[A] courtmay admit adocumentasabusinessrecordevenwhentheprofferingpartyisnotthemakerofthedocument,iftheotherrequirementsof[Rule803(6)]aremetandthecircumstancessuggestthattherecordistrustworthy.Trustworthinessofarecordissuggestedbytheprofferer’sincorporationintoitsownrecordsandrelianceonit.”)(citationsomitted).

7

areadmissibleunderFederalRuleofEvidence803(6)whenthoserecordsare

kept intheregularcourseofthatbusiness,relieduponbythatbusiness,and

wherethatbusinesshasasubstantialinterestintheaccuracyoftherecords.”).

Thus,theintegratedrecordsapproacheliminatestheneedfortestimonyabout

thepracticesof theentity thatcreated therecordandshifts the focus to the

record’sstatuswithinthereceivingentity.

[¶9] Evidence of the receiving entity’s reliance on the record in the

regular course of its business is important because a business’s reliance on

informationinarecorditdidnotcreatehelpsdemonstratethetrustworthiness

of the record. Compare MRT, 158 F.3d at 483 (holding that invoices

incorporatedintoacompany’srecordswereadmissibleunderRule803(6)to

establishamountspaidbecausethecompanyreliedupontheamountsshown

intheinvoices),withN.L.R.B.v.FirstTermiteControlCo.,646F.2d424,429-30

(9thCir.1981)(concludingthatthird-partyrecordswerenotadmissibleunder

Rule803(6)toprovetheoriginoflumberbecausetherecipientbusinessdid

notrelyontherecordstodeterminethatorigin).

[¶10] On theotherhand, “merepossessionor ‘custody’of records . . .

does not qualify employees of the possessing party to lay the requisite

foundation, and reliance by the organization on records created by others,

8

althoughanimportantpartofestablishingtrustworthiness,withoutmoreisnot

sufficient.”2KennethS.Brounetal.,McCormickonEvidence§292,at476-77

(RobertP.Mostellered.,8thed.2020)(footnoteomitted).When“thebusiness

offeringtherecordsofanotherhasmadeanindependentcheckoftherecords,

hasintegratedthemintotheirownbusinessoperationinawaythatestablishes

trustworthiness or contains other assurances of trustworthiness, or can

establish accuracy by other means, the necessary foundation may be

established.” Id. at 477-48 (footnotes omitted); see also United States v.

Sokolow,91 F.3d 396, 403 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that the business records

exceptionmayapplytorecordsobtainedfromothersifthereceivingbusiness

obtains “adequate verification or other assurance of accuracy” (quotation

marksomitted)).

[¶11] The verification element of the integrated records approach

requiressimplythatthebusinessreceivingarecordestablishorconfirmthe

accuracy of the record in some way. See McCormick on Evidence § 292, at

477-78.Forexample,therecipientbusinessmaychecktherecordforaccuracy

beforeintegratingandrelyinguponitinitsownoperations.SeeU.S.BankTrust,

N.A.v.Jones,330F.Supp.3d530,543(D.Me.2018),aff’d925F.3d534(1stCir.

2019) (noting that the loan servicer “took steps to review the previous

9

servicer’s records in away that assured itself of the accuracyof the records

duringtheboardingprocessbeforeplacingitsownfinancialinterestatstake

byrelyingonthoserecords”). Anothermeansofverificationcouldbeforthe

receiving business to integrate and use the record in the course of its own

operationsinamannerthatconfirmstheaccuracyoftherecord. SeeUnited

Statesv.Ullrich,580F.2d765,771-72(5thCir.1978)(holdingthatthevehicle

inventoryschedulepreparedbythemanufacturerandreceivedbythedealer

was integrated and used in the dealer’s daily operations in a manner that

confirmedtheaccuracyoftheschedule).

[¶12]Regardlessofhowverificationoccurs,“[t]hecustodiancompany’s

independentcheckofthedocumentsactsasaproxyfortherequirementthat

therecordshavebeenpreparedbysomeonewithpersonalknowledgeofthe

recorded events. By verifying the documents, the custodian company is in

essence acquiring personal knowledge of the recorded events, and thereby

effectively adopting the entries in the documents as his own.” Air Land

Forwarders,Inc.v.UnitedStates,172F.3d1338,1348(Fed.Cir.1999)(Bryson,

J.,dissenting).

[¶13] Multiple federal circuit courts and numerous other states have

upheld the admission of integrated business records upon a showing of

10

verificationandrelianceonthepartofthereceivingbusiness,withouttheneed

fortestimonyfromtheoriginatingbusiness.See,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Adefehinti,

510F.3d319,325-26(D.C.Cir.2007);AirLandForwarders, Inc.,172F.3dat

1341-42;UnitedStatesv.Childs,5F.3d1328,1334-36(9thCir.1993);United

States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 223 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Jakobetz,

955F.2d786,801 (2dCir. 1992);United States v. Parker, 749F.2d628,633

(11th Cir. 1984); Ullrich, 580 F.2d at 772; United States v. Carranco,

551F.2d1197,1200(10thCir.1977);seealsoStatev.Fitzwater,227P.3d520,

531-36(Haw.2010);PizzaCorner, Inc.v.C.F.L.Transp., Inc.,792N.W.2d911,

913-14(N.D.2010).

[¶14] We adopted the federal courts’ integrated records approach to

Rule 803(6) in Northeast Bank & Trust Co. v. Soley, 481 A.2d 1123, 1127

(Me.1984),adecisionthathasneverbeenoverruledorquestionedandthatis

stillgoodlaw.

[¶15]InSoley,wedecidedthattheplaintiffbank’spracticeofobtaining

primerateinformationfromanotherbank,integratingtheinformationintoits

ownrecords,andrelyingontheinformationinitsoperationswassufficientto

support the admissibility of that information for its truth, without any

11

testimony by a witness with personal knowledge of the sending bank’s

practicesindevelopingtheinformation:

Here, the information was transmitted by an employee of thebanking institution which was the source of that information,whichinformationwasthenintegratedintotheplaintiff’srecordsandrelieduponbytheplaintiffinitsownbusinessoperations.Wehold that under these circumstances the schedule satisfied therequirementsofM.R.Evid.803(6)andwasproperlyadmitted.

481A.2dat1127.

[¶16]TheSoleycourtemphasizedthefactthatthereceivingentityhad

reliedupontheintegratedrecordsinitsownbusinessoperations.Seeid. In

extendingthebusinessrecordsexceptiontoincludebusinessrecordscreated

bysomeone“notwithinthe[proponent’s]organization,”id,weexplainedthat

theregularindiciaofreliabilityhadbeendemonstratedbecausethebankhad

an “obvious business incentive in assuring that this employee [of the

transmittingbankwhoreportedtheprimeratetothereceivingbank]would

havepersonalknowledgeofchangesintheprimerateandwouldreportthose

changesaccurately.”Id.

[¶17] Our endorsement of the integrated records approach in Soley

rested solidly on federal precedent. See id. (citing In re Ollag Constr. Equip.

Corp.,665 F.2d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1981) (emphasizing the receiving business’s

regular use of and reliance on integrated records);Ullrich, 580 F.2d at 772

12

(upholdingtheadmissionof“recordstransmittedbypersonswithknowledge

and then confirmed and used in the regular course of the dealership’s

business”)). Our holding in Soley also relied upon the factors confirming

trustworthiness enumerated in theNotesof theAdvisoryCommittee for the

FederalRulesofEvidence).481A.2dat1127n.3.

[¶18]EightyearsafterourSoleydecision,weconfirmedthatholdingby

notingthat“wehaverecognizedthatincertaincircumstancesbusinessrecords

mayincludeinformationpreparedoutsidethebusiness.”LeenCo.v.WebElec.,

Inc.,611 A.2d 83, 83-84 (Me. 1992). However, in Leen we upheld the trial

court’s exclusion of outside records,pointing out that such documents “are

admissibleonlyif theycontaintheindiciaofreliabilitythatformthebasisof

the business record exception.” Id. at 84 (quotation marks omitted). We

specifically discussed how the proponent of the records had failed to

demonstratethatreliability:

Here,Websought to introduce through the testimonyof itsownagent records of business correspondence prepared by others,withoutprovidinganyfoundationtosuggestthattherecordswerepreparedbyapersonwithknowledgeofthecauseofthedelaysorwerecreated in theordinarycourseofbusiness. The fact that adocumentisreceivedintheordinarycourseofbusinessdoesnotalonesatisfythefoundationalrequirementsofrule803(6).

Id.at84.

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[¶19] However,weadoptedadifferentviewoftheintegratedrecords

approachinamorerecentlineofcases,beginningwithBeneficialMaineInc.v.

Carter,decidedtwenty-sevenyearsafterSoley,andnineteenyearsafterLeen.5

2011ME77,¶13,25A.3d96.OurdecisioninCarterendorsedtheintegrated

recordsapproach,citingSoley:

The affiant whose statements are offered to establish theadmissibilityofabusinessrecordonsummaryjudgmentneednotbeanemployeeoftherecord’screator.See,e.g.,Ne.Bank&TrustCo.v.Soley,481A.2d1123,1127(Me.1984). Forinstance, iftherecords were received and integrated into another business’srecords and were relied upon in that business’s day-to-dayoperations, an employee of the receiving business may be aqualifiedwitness.

Id.(citationsomitted).

[¶20]DespiteitsrelianceonSoley,ourdecisioninCarterdepartedfrom

Soleybyrequiringthatthequalifiedwitnesshavepersonalknowledgeofthe

practices ofboth the business that created the recordand the business that

received it, a requirement that negates the entire point of the integrated

5Thedissentsuggests,DissentingOpinion¶38n.14,thatwearguablybegantodepartfromour

holdinginSoleyinStatev.Radley,inwhichwedecidedthatthetrialcourterredinadmittingbusinessrecordsofoneorganization“throughthetestimonyofawitnessemployedbyanentirelydifferentorganization,simplybecauseheremployerreliedonthatorganization’srecordsinitsownbusinessdealings.”2002ME150,¶16,804A.2d1127.WedistinguishedthesituationinRadleyfromthatinSoley,withoutoverrulingorquestioningSoley.Id.¶17n.2.WhatRadleystandsfor,inkeepingwithSoleyandourdecisiontoday,isthatreliancebyonebusinessupontherecordsofanother,withoutverificationorcorroborationoftheaccuracyoftherecords,isinsufficienttosupportadmissionundertheintegratedrecordsapproach.

14

records approachweadopted inSoley. See id. Even so, ourCarterdecision

containsno indication thatwe intended todepart fromourholding inSoley.

Also,theunderlyingfactsofCarterdidnoteveninvolveanintegratedrecords

issuebecausetherewasnoevidencethattheentitythatcreatedtherecordsin

question had sent them to another entity. Carter, 2011 ME 77, ¶¶ 2-8,

25A.3d96.Instead,Carterstandsforthepropositionthatanentity’sbusiness

recordscannotbeadmittedbasedonthetestimonyofawitnesswhohasno

personalknowledgeofthepracticesoftheentity.6

[¶21]InthreedecisionssinceCarter,wecontinuedtodepartfromour

holdinginSoley,stillwithoutsayingsoorexplainingwhy,bymaintainingthe

requirement that the proponent of admitting an integrated business record

presentfoundationaltestimonyaboutthepracticesofthebusinessthatcreated

therecord.SeeM&TBankv.Plaisted,2018ME121,¶¶24,31,192A.3d601;

DeutscheBankNat’lTr.Co.v.Eddins,2018ME47,¶14,182A.3d1241;KeyBank

Nat’lAss’nv.Est.ofQuint,2017ME237,¶13,176A.3d717.

6 InBeneficialMaine Inc.v.Carter,Beneficialwastheplaintiff inamortgage foreclosurecase.

2011ME77,¶2,25A.3d96.Thequalifyingwitness,whowastheaffiantinthemotionforsummaryjudgment,wasanemployeeofHSBC,anentitythatservicedtheloan.Id.¶3.Thewitnessattemptedto lay the proper foundation for the introduction of Beneficial’s records, notHSBC records thatcontainedintegratedrecordsfromBeneficial.Id.¶4.TheCartercourtheldthattheaffiantdidnothave first-hand information regarding Beneficial’s records and thereforewasnot able to lay theproperfoundationpursuanttoRule803(6).Id.¶¶15-17.

15

[¶22] AlthoughthesedecisionspostdateSoleyandLeen,noneofthem

overrulesordistinguishesSoleyorLeen,orevenacknowledgesanysubstantive

departurefromSoley’sholding.Indeed,twoofthefourdecisionsnominallyrely

onSoley—themostrecentofthefourdecisionscitestoSoley,asdidCarter.See

Plaisted,2018ME121,¶31n.10.

[¶23]Inotherwords,SoleyandLeenremaingoodlaw.Thus,although

thedoctrineofstaredecisissupportsfollowingCarter,7thecaseforreaffirming

ourholdinginSoleyalsorestsuponstaredecisis. Inthatsense,thequestion

beforeusislessamatterofhonoringstaredecisisthanamatterofresolvingthe

sharp and hitherto unexplained conflict between the two interpretations of

Rule803(6)thatwehaveendorsedatvarioustimessince1984.

[¶24] Rule803(6)wasrestyledin2014andthenamendedin2018to

align with its federal counterpart. See M.R. Evid. 803 Advisory Committee

7Thedissentadvancesseveralobjectionstoourendorsementoftheintegratedrecordsapproach,

includinganobjectionbasedonstaredecisis.DissentingOpinion¶¶54-61.GiventhatSoleypredatesCarterandhasneverbeenquestionedoroverruled, the integratedrecordsapproachhas itsownfoundationinstaredecisis.ThedissentalsocontendsthattheintegratedrecordsapproachrewritesRule803(6).DissentingOpinion¶¶32,65.Butthetraditionalapproachandtheintegratedrecordsapproach are two similar evidentiary paths to proving the same Rule 803(6) criteria. Bothapproachescallforfirst-handtestimonyaboutthepracticesofabusiness—eitherthebusinessthatcreatedtherecordorthebusinessthatreceivedtherecord—baseduponwhichitcanbeinferred,asamatterofcircumstantialevidence,thattherecordinquestionmeetstheRule803(6)criteria.Basedonitsviewthatwearerewritingtherule,thedissentalsocontendsthatweshouldbeengaginginrulemakingastheSupremeJudicialCourtratherthanopiningastheLawCourt.DissentingOpinion¶¶65-67.Thecontentionwouldbewell-takenifwewereadoptinganewinterpretationoftherule,butwearesimplyreaffirminganinterpretationoftherulethatwefirstendorsedthirty-sixyearsago.

16

Note—August 2018;M.R. Evid 803Maine Restyling Note—November 2014.

The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying both the 2014 restyling of

Rule803(6)andthe2018amendmentindicatethatthechangesinthelanguage

oftherulewerenotintendedtomakeanysubstantivechangeintherule,and

thereforeneitherof thesechanges toRule803(6) addressedorresolved the

conflictbetweentheSoleyandCarterlinesofcases.

[¶25] As our reliance in Soley on federal authority illustrates, we

regularlylooktofederalanalysiswheninterpretingourownidenticalornearly

identicalrules.See,e.g.,Statev.Gorman,2004ME90,¶¶30-31,854A.2d1164

(comparingM.R.Evid.Rule803(5)withFed.R.Evid.803(5));Statev.Discher,

597 A.2d 1336, 1342 (Me. 1991) (same). Reaffirming Soley aligns our

interpretation of Maine Rule of Evidence 803(6) with the widely accepted

interpretation that federal courts apply to the identical federal rule. It

promotes a uniformity of application of the business records exception in

Maine’s federal and state courts, and—in that sense—discourages

forum-shopping.

[¶26]TheoppositionoftheappelleesandsomeoftheamicitotheJones

and Soley integrated records approach appears grounded primarily in their

view that the recordkeeping practices of mortgage loan servicers such as

17

Bayviewaretoounreliabletojustifytheadmissionofarecordthatoneservicer

hasreceivedfromapriorservicerorotherentitywithouttestimonybasedon

personal knowledge regarding the practices and procedures of the business

that created the record. The lack of reliability of records submitted in

foreclosurecasesbysomeresidentialmortgagelendersorloanservicershas

been amply documented. See, e.g., HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Murphy,

2011ME59,¶15n.8,19A.3d815(noting“therecurringproblemoflenders

submitting unreliable affidavits and documents in residential foreclosure

proceedings”).

[¶27] Still, the recordkeeping shortcomings of some members of a

particular business sector should not drive our interpretation of a rule of

evidence that applies to the records of all businesses and,more broadly, as

Rule803(6)(B) indicates, to the recordsof any “organization, occupation, or

calling.”Iftherecordskeptbymortgagelendersorloanservicersinparticular

are categorically unreliable, more stringent proof requirements might be

appropriate.8Butthereisnogoodreasontorequireineverycasetestimony

basedonpersonal knowledgeof thepracticesof thebusiness that createda

8 For example, theMaine Legislature has enacted special requirements for collection actions

broughtbyconsumerdebtbuyers. See32M.R.S.§11019(2020);seealsoP.L.2017,ch.216,§6(effectiveNov.1,2017).

18

recordwhen thebusiness thatreceived therecordcanmeet the integration,

verification,andreliancecriteriaoftheintegratedrecordsapproach.

[¶28] Moreover, the federalandMaineversionsofRule803(6)guard

against the admission of untrustworthy integrated business records by

precludingadmission,evenwhentheproponentmakesan initial showingof

integration,verification,andreliance, if theopposingparty“show[s]thatthe

sourceofinformationorthemethodorcircumstancesofpreparationindicate

alackoftrustworthiness.”Fed.R.Evid.803(6)(E);M.R.Evid.803(6)(E).Lastly,

theintegratedrecordsapproachisonlyameansoflayingafoundationforthe

admissioninevidenceofarecord;itdoesnotpurporttodefineorestablishthe

weighttobegiventotherecord.

[¶29]Inthiscase,thetrialcourt’sexclusionoftheexhibitatissuewas

consistentwiththeCarterlineofcases,becausetheBankdidnotpresentany

first-hand testimony about the practices of the law firm that purportedly

createdandmailedthenoticesofdefault.

[¶30]Becausewetodayreaffirmtheintegratedrecordsapproachthat

weadoptedinSoley,underwhichsuchfoundationalevidenceisunnecessary,

wemust vacate the judgment and remand the matter for the trial court to

determine, based on the current record, whether the Bank’s exhibit, which

19

includes the two purported noticesofdefault and a separate purportedU.S.

Postal Service certificate of mailing, meets the integration, verification, and

reliancecriteriaforadmissioninevidenceasanintegratedrecord.9

Theentryis:

Judgment vacated. Remanded for furtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.

HJELM,A.R.J.,dissenting. [¶31]TheCourttodayremandsthiscaseforthetrialcourttoreconsider

itsrulingthatexcludedfromevidenceanintegratedbusinessrecordcriticalto

theBankofNewYorkMellon’sforeclosureclaim,withthenewdetermination

to be based not on Maine law but on a materially different standard for

admissibility that isused inother jurisdictions,notably anumberof federal

courts.

9 When admission of evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule is

challenged,“‘wereviewatrialcourt’sfoundationalfindingstosupportadmissibilityforclearerroranditsultimatedeterminationofadmissibilityforanabuseofdiscretion.’”Am.ExpressBank,FSBv.Deering,2016ME117,¶12,145A.3d551(quotingStatev.Abdi,2015ME23,¶16,112A.3d360).Thus,thedeterminationofwhethersomeorallofthematerialscontainedintheexhibitatissueisadmissiblebasedonthecurrentrecordshould,atleastinitially,bemadebythetrialcourt.Nothinginthisopinionshouldbetakentoimplyaviewregardingwhethertheexhibitshouldbeadmittedasanintegratedrecord.Inlightofouradoptionofadifferentevidentiarystandardthanwasarguedattrial,thecourtmayreopentherecordtoallowfurtherargumentbytheparties.Ifthecourtdecidestoadmittheexhibit,thetrialmayresumeonallissuesincontention.

20

[¶32]Toarriveatitsconclusion,theCourterrsintwofundamentalways.

The first is analytical. As the Court acknowledges, the trial court correctly

appliedMainelawthatgovernstheadmissibilityofbusinessrecords.SeeM.R.

Evid. 803(6). By nonetheless vacating the judgment, however, the Court

derogatesfromprinciplesofstaredecisisandimproperlydispenseswiththat

well-establishedMainejurisprudence—jurisprudencethatwehavedeveloped

overnearlythepastdecadeandthat isentirelyconsonantwithRule803(6).

Theseconderrorisstructural.BecausetheCourt’sreasoningisnotsupported

by a sound jurisprudential rationale, the Court must be seen as rewriting

Rule803(6), thereby improperly blending its nonadjudicatory authority to

promulgaterules in itscapacityastheMaineSupremeJudicialCourtwithits

adjudicatoryauthority,whensittingastheLawCourt,toconsiderappeals.For

thesereasons,Irespectfullydissent.

[¶33]Inthisopinion,IwillfirstreviewMaine’sgoverninglawthatthe

Court now abandons and discuss the reasons why that law should remain

controllingauthorityinMainecourts. Second,Iwillexplainthebasisformy

conclusionthattheremainingrationalefortheCourt’sdecisionwronglystrays

intoitsdiscreteregulatoryrulemakingfunction.

21

A. Maine’sLawonIntegratedBusinessRecords

1. Maine’sCaseLaw

[¶34]Theessentialissuepresentedinthiscasefocusesontheshowing

that, pursuant to Maine Rule of Evidence 803(6),10 must be made by the

proponentofanintegratedbusinessrecord—adocumentcreated,maintained,

andhandledbyoneentityandthentransferredtoandheldbyasecondentity—

fortherecordtobeadmittedinevidence.Theparticularrecordatissuehere

is a notice of default and right to cure purportedly mailed by the law firm

engaged by the mortgage servicer to the mortgagors, Danielle Shone and

MichaelBuck.

10Initscurrentformulation,MaineRuleofEvidence803(6)createsanexceptiontothegeneral

exclusionofhearsayevidenceandallowsthecourttoadmitabusinessrecord,i.e.,a“[r]ecord[]ofaregularlyconductedactivity,”ifthefollowingcriteriaaresatisfied:

(A)Therecordwasmadeatornearthetimeby—orfrominformationtransmittedby—someonewithknowledge;

(B)Therecordwaskeptinthecourseofaregularlyconductedactivityofabusiness,organization,occupation,orcalling,whetherornotforprofit;

(C)Makingtherecordwasaregularpracticeofthatactivity;

(D) All these conditionsare shownby the testimonyof the custodianor anotherqualifiedwitness,orbyacertificationthatcomplieswithRule902(11),Rule902(12)orwithastatutepermittingcertification;and

(E) Theopponentdoesnotshowthat thesourceof informationor themethodorcircumstancesofpreparationindicatealackoftrustworthiness.

22

[¶35]Initsopinion,theCourtstatesthatanintegratedbusinessrecord

is admissible pursuant to Rule 803(6) if the proponent presents, as a

foundationalpredicate,testimonyfromawitness,whoneednothavepersonal

knowledge of the originating entity’s record-related practices, that the

receiving entity merely integrated, verified, and relied on the document.

Court’sOpinion¶30.Overthecourseofnearlythepastdecade,however,we

have consistently and explicitly articulated two categorical foundational

elementsforanintegratedbusinessrecord,which,asIwilldiscussbelow,are

verydifferentfromtheelementsthattheCourtprescribestoday.First,ourcase

law establishes that the proponent of an integrated business record must

demonstrate that the record-related protocols of both the originating and

receiving entities meet the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C), which set

specificevidentiarystandardsforwhenthedocumentmusthavebeencreated,

how itwasmaintained, andwhether those business practiceswere routine.

Andsecond,tobea“qualifiedwitness”withinthemeaningofRule803(6)(D),

thefoundationalwitnessmusthavepersonalknowledgeaboutthoseprotocols

maintainedbyeachentity.

[¶36] It is manifest that the standard that the Court now adopts is

materiallydifferentfromthecriteriaprescribedincontrollingMainecaselaw.

23

Areviewofthosecasesdemonstratesthatourarticulationoftheevidentiary

standardswasnot,astheCourtseemstosuggest,unintentionalorinadvertent.

Indeed,theclearandexplicit languageweusedtoframethoserequirements

demonstratesthat,inthosecases,wemeantwhatwesaid.

[¶37]Thelineofcasesdefiningourcurrentjurisprudencebegannolater

thanour2011opinioninBeneficialMaineInc.v.Carter,2011ME77,25A.3d

96,11whichaddressedRule803(6)initsthen-existingformulation.12There,we

statedthatforanintegratedbusinessrecordtobeadmissible,theproponent

11Thearticulationofourcurrentstandardarguablyhaditsgenesisevenearlier,inStatev.Radley,

wherewestated,“TopermittheStatetoprofferthe[integratedbusiness]records.. .throughthetestimonyofawitnessemployedbyanentirelydifferentorganization,simplybecauseheremployerreliedonthatorganization’srecordsinitsownbusinessdealings,iswhollyunsupportedbyruleorlaw.” 2002ME 150, ¶16, 804A.2d 1127. We further stated that, instead, the proponentmustdemonstrate throughaknowledgeablewitnessthat theupstreamentitycreated,maintained,andtransmittedtherecordinawaythatsatisfiedtherequirementsnowfoundinRule803(6)(A)-(C).Radley,2002ME150,¶16,804A.2d1127.ThesearethecriteriafortheadmissibilityofanintegratedbusinessrecordthatweagainarticulatedbeginningnineyearslaterinBeneficialMaineInc.v.Carter,2011ME77,25A.3d96.DespitetheanalysiscontainedinRadley,however,forthereasonsIdiscussbelow, see infra n.14, that opinion may not constitute a full and clear demarcation from theevidentiary standard described in Northeast Bank & Trust Co. v. Soley, 481 A.2d 1123, 1127(Me.1984)—thestandardtowhichtheCourtnowreturns.Rather,thatchangeinourlawwasmoredefinitivelyestablishedinCarter.

12TheRulethenstatedinpertinentpartthatabusinessrecordwasadmissibleiftherecordwas

“made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a personwithknowledge,ifkeptinthecourseofaregularlyconductedbusiness,andifitwastheregularpracticeof thatbusiness tomake the . . . record . . . , all as shownby thetestimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, . . . unless the source ofinformation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack oftrustworthiness.”

Carter,2011ME77,¶12n.5,25A.3d96(quotingM.R.Evid.803(6)(Tower2010)).AsIdiscussinthe text, infra ¶¶ 39, 48-51, the current version of the Rule is substantively the same as theformulationoftheRulediscussedinCarter.

24

mustdemonstratethattheoriginatingentityroutinelyusedspecifiedprotocols

tocreatethebusinessrecord,maintainit,andtransmitittothereceivingentity,

allinawaythat,intheend,issufficienttoallowthereceivingentitytorelyon

it.Id.¶¶13-14.Thus,although,astheCourtstatestoday,Court’sOpinion¶9,

reliabilitygenerallyisgermanetotheevidentiaryframework,thereismoreto

it than thatbecause, aswe stated inCarter and subsequent cases described

below,therulestillrequiresfoundationalevidenceofcertainspecifichistorical

circumstances, which could then form the basis to allow some resulting

assurancethattheinformationintherecordisreliable.WealsostatedinCarter

that although the foundational witness need not be an employee of the

originating entity, that witness must—as the rule explicitly requires—be

“qualified,”whichmeansthatthewitnessmust“demonstrateknowledge”ofthe

originating entity’s specific record-related practices now described in

Rule803(6)(A)-(C).132011ME77,¶¶13-14,25A.3d96.

13TheCourtassertsthat,becauseCarterstatedthatthewitnessneednotbeanemployeeofthe

originatingentity,ouropinioninthatcase“endorsedtheintegratedrecordsapproach”thathadbeensetoutinSoley,481A.2dat1127.Court’sOpinion¶19.ForthereasonsIexplaininthetext,however,CartersupersededSoleybyarticulatingmateriallydifferentcriteriaforanintegratedbusinessrecordtobe admissible. Additionally,wehavenever held that, tobe “qualified”within themeaningofRule803(6)(D),thefoundationalwitnessmustbeanemployeeoftheentitywhoserecord-relatedpractices are being described in that witness’s testimony. The test for whether a witness is“qualified”restsonthenatureandsourceofthewitness’sknowledge,notthewitness’semploymentorcapacity.SeeM&TBankv.Plaisted,2018ME121,¶¶7-12,24,192A.3d601;DeutscheBankNat’lTr.Co.v.Eddins,2018ME47,¶12,182A.3d1241;KeyBankNat’lAss’nv.Est.ofQuint,2017ME237,

25

[¶38]AstheCourtcorrectlynotes,Court’sOpinion¶20,thosestandards

heightened the requirements for the admissibility of integrated business

recordsassetoutinourpreviouscaselaw,whichhadallowedthetrialcourtto

admit such evidence when there were merely “indicia of [the record’s]

reliability”—somethingthatcouldbedemonstratedbyaslittleasfoundational

evidence that the receiving entity had integrated the record into its own

records and relied on it. Ne. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Soley, 481 A.2d 1123, 1127

(Me.1984).14Carter’sclearandexplicitarticulationofmoreexactingcriteria

¶15,176A.3d717;Carter,2011ME77,¶¶13-14,25A.3d96.Thus,theCourt’sattempttoequatetheanalysesinCarterandSoleyisacuriousone.

14AsIstateabove,seesupran.11,inRadleyweatleastbeganourmoveawayfromtheapproachdescribedinSoleyafullnineyearsbeforeCarter.AtissueinRadleywastheadmissibilityofareportofafundstransferofferedbytheState.2002ME150,¶5,804A.2d1127.Thefoundationalwitness,whowasanemployeeofthereceivingentity,testifiedthatherofficehadreceivedthereportfromanotherentityandreliedon it—a foundationthatwassufficientpursuant toSoley. Id. Weheld,however,thatthewitnesswasnot“qualified”withinthemeaningofRule803(6)becauseshehadnoknowledgeofthemannerbywhichthesendingentitycreated,maintained,ortransmittedthereporttothereceivingentity.Id.¶15.Additionally,attrialtheproponent—theState—hadfailedtopresentanyevidenceofwhethertherecordwascreatedatornearthetimeoftheeventitdescribed,whetherthe recordwas created by someonewith knowledge of the event, andwhether the entity hadaregularpracticeofcreatingsucharecord.Id.¶16.ThesearethecriteriafortheadmissibilityofanintegratedbusinessrecordthatwearticulatednineyearslaterinCarter.BecauseinRadleytheStatehad failedtodevelopa foundation,basedon thetestimonyofawitnesswithknowledge, thatthesending entity’s record-related practices met the requirements that are now found inRule803(6)(A)-(C),weconcludedthatthetrialcourterredbyadmittingtherecordinevidence.Id.

InafootnoteinRadley,however,wedidbringintoquestionthescopeoftheholdinganditseffectonSoley. Id.¶17n.2,804A.2d1127. WeaddressedtheState’scontentionthatadmissionoftheintegratedbusinessrecordwasa“naturalextension”ofSoleybecausethefoundationalwitnesshadtestifiedthatthereceivingentityreceivedandreliedonit.Id.Werejectedthatentreatybecausethereportprovidedinformationthathadbeenreportedfromyetanotherunderlyingsourceandbecauseitdescribedthedefendant’sconductratherthan“objectiveandverifiable”informationsuchaswasinvolvedinSoley(informationaboutinterestrates).Id.

26

foradmissibility,however,canleavenodoubtthatweintendedtoimplement

those more refined and disciplined standards, which also, unlike those

described inSoley, track therequirementsas theywereplainlystated in the

rule.

[¶39] The entire body of the Maine Rules of Evidence was restyled

effectiveatthebeginningof2015,morethanthreeyearsafterweissuedour

decision inCarter. See2014Me.Rules15(effective Jan.1, 2015). Theonly

changetoRule803(6)createdbytherestylingwasthehelpfulseparationofthe

rule’s foundational elements into discrete subparts. Cf. M.R. Evid. 803(6)

(Tower2010).WhentheAdvisoryCommitteeontheMaineRulesofEvidence

presented the proposed restyled rules to the Supreme Judicial Court, the

Committeemadeexplicitthatthepurposeoftherestylingeffortwastomake

the language contained in the rules clearer while still “preserv[ing] the

substanceoftherespectiveruleswithoutchange.”AdvisoryCommitteeonthe

MaineRulesof EvidenceNote:ProposedRestyledRulesofEvidence [2014].

Therefore,attheveryleast,nineyearsbeforeCarter,ourdecisioninRadleysignaledalimitation

on the holding in Soleyby requiring the proponent to present testimony from a knowledgeablefoundationalwitnessthatthepracticesoftheoriginatingentitymettherequirementsnowsetoutinsubpartsAthroughCofRule803(6).ButRadleydidnotmakeacleanbreakfromSoleybecauseofthediscussioninthefootnotethatappearstohavedistinguishedSoleyinpartbasedondifferencesinthefacts.Radley,2002ME150,¶17n.2,804A.2d1127.IthereforetreatCarterastheanalyticaldivideeventhoughRadleycertainlypresagedthatdevelopmentbybringingSoleyintoconsiderablequestionthatmuchearlier.

27

Thismeansthat,althoughhavingoccasiontodosothroughitscomprehensive

reviewoftherules,theAdvisoryCommitteedidnotrecommendachangefrom

thewaywehadconstruedRule803(6)severalyearsearlierinCarter.Further,

ourconsiderationoftheproposedrestyledbodyofrulesalsopresenteduswith

theopportunitytorewriteorotherwiseclarifyRule803(6)inawaythatwould

alterCarter’sstandardsfortheadmissibilityofintegratedbusinessrecordsand

restore Soley’s. If our analysis in Carter had been mistaken, as the Court

concludestoday,wecouldandpresumablywouldhavedoneso.Butwedidnot,

andsothesubstanceofRule803(6)remainedthesame,andCarterremained

goodlaw.

[¶40] Whenwe first considered and applied restyledRule 803(6), in

KeyBankNationalAss’nv.EstateofQuint,wequoteddirectlyfromCarterand

reiteratedtherequirementfortheadmissibilityofintegratedbusinessrecords

thatthefoundationalwitness,ifanemployeeofonlythereceivingentity,must

have therequisiteknowledgeof theregularpracticesofboth theoriginating

andreceivingentities:“[a]qualifiedwitnessisonewhowasintimatelyinvolved

in the daily operation of the business and whose testimony showed the

firsthand nature of his knowledge.” 2017 ME 237, ¶ 15, 176 A.3d 717

(quotation marks omitted). But the foundational witness need not be an

28

employee of the originating entity, in which case the witness must have

“sufficientknowledgeofbothbusinesses’regularpractices” inameasurethat

demonstratesthereliabilityandtrustworthinessoftheinformationcontained

in thedocument. Id.(quotationmarksomitted). Weaffirmedthe judgment

enteredforthemortgagorbecausethetrialcourthadcorrectlyconcludedthat

themortgageedidnotdevelopfoundationalevidencethattheoriginatingentity

hadengagedintheregularbusinesspracticesmeetingtherequirementsofthe

ruleasexplainedinCarter.Id.¶19.Further,truetotheprovisionsoftherule

andtheAdvisoryCommittee’sexplanationoftheproposedrestyledrules,we

viewedrestyledRule803(6)ascontainingthesamesubstantiverequirements

asthepreviousversion.Seeid.¶¶14-15.Inotherwords,wereaffirmedthe

Carteranalysis,andthatcasethereforeagainremainedgoodlaw.

[¶41] Similarly, inDeutscheBankNationalTrustCo.v.Eddins, another

foreclosure case involvingan integratedbusiness recordwhere the restyled

versionofRule803(6)wasapplicable,weagainstatedthat,forthedocument

tobeadmissible,thefoundationalwitnessmusthave“adequateknowledgeof

theprocessesusedby the entity that created andpreserved thedocument.”

2018 ME 47, ¶ 12, 182 A.3d 1241. We also stated explicitly that “[t]he

incorporationofoneentity’srecordintotherecordsofthereceivingentityis

29

not a sufficient basis, by itself, for the admissibility of that record.” Id.

(emphasisadded).

[¶42]Themostrecentcaseinwhichweconsideredtheadmissibilityof

integratedbusinessrecordsisM&TBankv.Plaisted,2018ME121,192A.3d

601.There,thefoundationalwitnesswasanemployeeoftheoriginatingentity

and was familiar with that business’s record-related practices, but we

concluded that, because he had no “personal knowledge” of the receiving

entity’sbusinesspractices,theintegratedbusinessrecordinthepossessionof

the receiving entity was not admissible. Id. ¶¶ 7-12, 24. This again

demonstratesthattheproponent’sfoundationmustincludetestimonyfroma

witness with firsthand knowledge that the record-related practices of each

entitysatisfytherequirementsofRule803(6)(A)-(C).

[¶43] These cases—decided over the course of nearly a decade and

perhapslonger,seesuprann.11,14,andalldecidedunanimouslyandwithout

doctrinal interruption—establish thestandards thatgovern theadmissibility

ofintegratedbusinessrecordspursuanttoRule803(6).Thecasesconfirmthat

theproponentmustpresentevidencethatthepracticesofboththeoriginating

andreceivingentitiesmeetthespecificcriteriasetoutinsubpartsAthroughC;

anattempt toshowreliability insomeotherway fallsshort. Thecases also

30

requirethatthefoundationemanatefromoneormorewitnesseswho,tobe

“qualified”withinthemeaningofRule803(6)(D),musthaveactualfamiliarity

with the processes used by both the originating and receiving entities for

creating,handling,andretainingthebusinessrecordatissue.

[¶44] In contrast, the standard announced today by the Court allows

admissionofanintegratedbusinessrecordonfoundationalevidencethatthe

receiving entity integrated, verified, and relied on the document it received

fromtheoriginatingentity. Further,astheCourtdescribesthestandard,the

receiving entity can “verify” the record when that entity “simply

...establish[es]orconfirm[s]theaccuracyoftherecordinsomeway.”Court’s

Opinion ¶ 11 (emphasis added). That standard—particularly the highly

nonspecific criterion for how the receiving entity may verify a record’s

accuracy—is entirely at odds with, and is insufficient to satisfy, the plain

language of Rule 803(6) and our interpretive case law since at least 2011.

DespitethatlegalauthorityandtheclearrequirementsofRule803(6)(A)-(D),

basedontheCourt’sdecisiontoday,nolongerwilltheproponentberequired

topresentevidence,basedonthetestimonyofa“qualifiedwitness”aswehave

construed that term, seeCarter, 2011ME77,¶¶13-14,25A.3d96, that the

recordwasmadeatthetimeornearthetimeoftherecordedeventbysomeone

31

withknowledgeoftheevent,thatthedocumentwaskeptinthecourseofthe

originatingbusiness’sregularlyconductedactivity,andthatcreatingtherecord

wasamongtheoriginatingbusiness’sregularpractices.

[¶45] Notwithstanding the interpretationofRule803(6) itannounces

today,theCourtstatesthattherequirementsofRule803(6)willcontinueto

governtheadmissibilityofintegratedbusinessrecordsandthattheproponent

will stillberequired topresent foundational evidence fromwhich itmaybe

“inferred”thattheoriginatingentity’spracticessatisfythepredicateelements

in the Rule. Court’s Opinion ¶ 23 n.7. This assertion is belied by the very

evidentiarystandardtheCourtadoptshere.Foranintegratedbusinessrecord

tobeadmissiblefromnowon,theproponentwillneedonlypresentevidence

that the downstream entity received, verified, and relied on the document

created by the upstream entity. As I have discussed above, however,

Rule803(6) prescribes standards that aredifferent andmoreexacting. The

three steps to be taken by the receiving entity that the Court finds to be

cumulatively sufficient—receipt, verification, and reliance—do not bear any

meaningful orpredictable relationship to theparticularized requirementsof

theRule,whichcenteronashowingofspecificpracticesusedbytheoriginating

entity in creating, maintaining, and transmitting the document. See M.R.

32

Evid.803(6)(A)-(C). Despite theCourt’sattempts tominimizeorevenerase

the differences, the requirements prescribed by the Rule in fact are

qualitativelydistinctfromthemoretolerantcriteriatheCourtadoptstoday.

[¶46] The Court also asserts several times that within our current

jurisprudence there is a “conflict” regarding the admissibility of integrated

businessrecords.Court’sOpinion¶¶1,23,24.Isubmit,withrespect,thatthe

Courtiswrong.Ourdecisionsbeginningnolaterthanwiththe2011opinionin

Carterestablishaconsistentandclearsetofstandardsfortheadmissibilityof

integratedbusinessrecords.Thattheevidentiarycriteriaarticulatedinthose

casesmaydifferfromthosesetoutinoldercases,suchasSoley,doesnotcreate

an ongoing conflict. Rather, Carter and the cases that follow represent a

succession bywhich previous lawhas been superseded. Further, the Court

describesSoleyas“goodlaw”andstatesthattherewasnoindicationinCarter

ofanintentiontodepartfromSoley.Court’sOpinion¶¶20,23.Thatisplainly

notthecase,asismadeclearbyouranalysisanddiscussionoftheissueinour

opinions beginning with Carter—cases that the Court now effectively must

overruletoreinstatepre-Carterjurisprudence.15

15 Not once in itsopiniondoes theCourtdirectlystate that it isoverturning the lineofcases

beginningwithCarter,althoughthatisclearlywhattheCourtisdoing.

33

[¶47]Indoingso,theCourtwritesoffadecade’sormoreworthofour

decisions,beginningwithCarter(ifnotStatev.Radley,2002ME150,804A.2d

1127,seeinfrann.11,14)andcontinuingthroughPlaisted,because,theCourt

suggests, we did not pay enough attention to the admissibility standards

contained in earlier decisions and therefore decided those cases based on

oversightandinadvertence.SeeCourt’sOpinion¶¶20-22.Thatview,however,

cannotaccountforourexplicitarticulationofpertinentevidentiarystandards

inthecasesbeginningwithCarter,and,regrettably,itreflectsadiminutionof

theweightandsignificancethatshouldbeattributedtoourdecision-making

process,which,althoughcertainlynotinfallible,isexercisedwithcare,andwith

sensitivitytoandappreciationforourroleasthecourtoflastresort.

2. 2018AmendmenttoRule803(6)

[¶48]TheBankandseveralofitssupportingamiciplacesignificanceon

a2018amendmenttoRule803(6)(E),2018Me.Rules09§2(effectiveAug.1,

2018),tosupporttheconclusionthatweshouldnowinterprettheruleasdo

other jurisdictions, includingspecifically the federalcourtsas exemplified in

U.S.BankTrust,N.A.v.Jones,925F.3d534(1stCir.2019).16Idisagree.

16Inthatcase,theFirstCircuitstatedthatthereisnomaterialdifferencebetweentheMaineand

federalapproachestotheadmissibilityofintegratedbusinessrecords.U.S.BankTr.,N.A.v.Jones,925F.3d534,539&n.1(1stCir.2019). I respectfullysubmit thatthis isnotsobecause theanalysisdescribed in Jones tolerates the absence of any personal knowledge by the witness about the

34

[¶49] Themodestchange implementedby the2018amendmentdoes

nothavesucharadicaleffect.Theamendmentdidnothingmorethanfillagap

in the allocation of the burden of proof on a limited aspect of the rule, by

providingthattheburdentodemonstratealackoftrustworthinesssufficient

todefeatadmissionoftheproffereddocumentrestswiththeopponent,thereby

clarifying that the proponent is not required to demonstrate the absence of

indiciaofuntrustworthiness.17SeeM.R.Evid.803(6)(E).Theamendmentdid

not introduce the general consideration of a business record’s

untrustworthiness.Thatfactorwasalreadypresentinthepriorformulationof

therule.SeeM.R.Evid.803(6)(E)(Tower2017).Theamendmentalsodidnot

touch the specific predicate criteria for admission of a business record

containedinsubpartsAthroughC:whetherthedocumentwasmadeatornear

the time of the recorded event by, orwith information from, someonewith

originatingentity’srecordspracticesanddoesnotrequire theproponent topresent foundationalevidence that the record-related practices of the originating entity meet the requirements ofRule803(6)(A)-(C).Jones,925F.3dat538.TheseprinciplesruncontrarytoMainelaw,asisshownbymyreviewofourcaselaw.Indeed,innowabandoningMaine’scurrentcaselawandadoptingtheframeworkdescribedinJones,theCourtconfirmstheexistenceofthedifferencesbetweenthetwoapproaches.

17 As theresultof the2018amendment,Rule803(6)(E)nowprovides thatabusinessrecordmeetingthestandardssetoutintheremainingaspectsoftheRuleisadmissibleif“[t]heopponentdoesnotshowthatthesourceofinformationorthemethodorcircumstancesofpreparationindicatealackoftrustworthiness.”See2018Me.Rules09§2(amendingM.R.Evid.803(6)(E));seealsosupran.10(settingoutthecurrentRuleinitsentirety).

35

knowledge;whethertherecordwascreatedinthenormalcourse;etc.Further,

the amendment did not alter the basis or measure of knowledge that the

foundationalwitnessmusthave:thewitnessstillmustbe“qualified”pursuant

toRule803(6)(D),aconceptthatwehadaddressedandexplainedinourcase

lawoutlinedabove.

[¶50] The limitednatureof the2018amendment ismadeevenmore

apparentby thestatementoftheAdvisoryCommitteeon theMaineRulesof

Evidence,accompanying thesubmissionof theproposedrule amendment to

theSupremeJudicialCourt,thattherulechangewasnotsubstantive—itwould

not change the factors thatbearon thedeterminationof admissibility. M.R.

Evid.803AdvisoryCommitteeNote–August2018.AstheAdvisoryCommittee

explained,theamendmentmerelycodifiedthepracticethatwasalreadybeing

followed by Maine courts and litigants. Id. Both this description of the

amendmentandthenatureoftheamendmentitselfconfirmitsnonsubstantive

content,furtherundermininguseoftheamendmentasaspringboardtojustify

substantial substantive changes to separate components of the evidentiary

standard governing the admissibility of integrated business records. To

conclude that this limitedamendmentcontributes toawholesalerevisionof

36

theentireanalysisgoverningintegratedrecordsreadsfartoomuchintosucha

narrowrulechange.

[¶51]Inmyview,Mainelawisclear,andtheCourt’seffortstoteaseout

vestigesofpre-Carterjurisprudencefromcurrentcaselaw,seeCourt’sOpinion

¶¶19,22,donotchange that fact. Theproponentofan integratedbusiness

recordmustdemonstrate,throughtestimonyofawitnesswithknowledge,that

theoriginatingandreceivingentitieseachengagedinrecord-relatedpractices

that satisfy the requirementsofRule803(6)(A)-(C). Contrary to theCourt’s

conclusion,thereceivingentity’smereintegration,verification,andrelianceon

theoriginatingentity’srecordisnotsufficienttorendertherecordadmissible.

Seesupra¶¶44-45.

[¶52] At the trial in this action, the dispositive issue became the

admissibility of a notice of default and right to cure ostensibly created and

issuedbythelawfirmengagedbytheservicerofthemortgage.SeeBankofAm.,

N.A.v.Greenleaf,2014ME89,¶18,96A.3d700(statingthatproofofmailing

orotherauthorizedmethodofserviceisoneoftheelementsofaforeclosure

case);14M.R.S.§6111(3)(2018),repealedandreplacedbyP.L.2019,ch.361

§§1,2(effectiveSept.19,2019)(codifiedat14M.R.S.§6111(2-A)(2020)).The

Bank developed no evidence that the foundational witness, who was an

37

employeeof theservicer,oversaw,reviewed,orhadany familiaritywith the

lawfirm’sinternalprocessesforcreatingandmailingdefaultnotices,andthe

witnessdidnotdescribeanysuchprocessesthemselves,includingthemailing

process.AstheCourtitselfrecognizes,Court’sOpinion¶29,andcontraryto

theBank’scontentiononappeal,thetrialcourtcorrectlydetermined,basedon

that record and the current, controlling Maine law, that the Bank had not

qualifiedthenoticeasanadmissibleintegratedbusinessrecord.

[¶53]Becausethecourtcommittednoerrorwhenitexcludedthenotice,

the judgment should be affirmed, unless our cases, beginning with Carter,

establishingthestandardsfortheadmissibilityofintegratedbusinessrecords

should be overturned. This question directly implicates principles of stare

decisis.

3. StareDecisis18

[¶54] Ananalyticalcornerstoneof jurisprudence,thedoctrineofstare

decisis calls upon the courts to respect legal precedent in order to provide

18ItbearsnotethattheBankitselfhasnotexplicitlyassertedthatcurrentMainecaselawshould

beoverturned.Infact,whilethisappealwaspendingweraisedtheissueandinvitedthepartiesandamicitosubmitbriefsonthequestionofwhether,inlightoftheFirstCircuit’sdecisioninJones,weshouldchangethewayweapplyRule803(6)tointegratedbusinessrecords. Initssupplementalbrief,theBankthenassertedthatadoptionofJoneswouldactuallyclarifyratherthanchangeMaine’scurrentlawonintegratedbusinessrecords.Nonetheless,theBankalsoarguedthatthetrialcourtincorrectly appliedMaine’s current law to the evidence, therebymaking it unduly difficult for aproponenttoachieveadmissionofintegratedbusinessrecords—aparticularchallenge,presumably,formortgagees given that sequential ownership andmanagementofmortgages is common. See

38

“stability to the law and enable[] the public to place reasonable reliance on

judicialdecisionsaffecting importantmatters. Evenwhenwehaveacertain

uneasewiththeanalysisofapriordecision,wedonotoverrulethedecision

withoutacompellingandsoundjustification.” McGarveyv.Whittredge,2011

ME97,¶63,28A.3d620(Levy, J.) (quotationmarksomitted). As theChief

JusticeoftheUnitedStateshasrecentlystated,theprincipleofstaredecisis“is

groundedinabasichumilitythatrecognizestoday’slegalissuesareoftennot

sodifferentfromthequestionsofyesterdayandthatwearenotthefirstones

totrytoanswerthem.Becausetheprivatestockofreason...ineach[person]

issmall,...individualswoulddobettertoavailthemselvesofthegeneralbank

andcapitalofnationsandofages.”JuneMed.Servs.,L.L.C.v.Russo,---U.S.---,---,

140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quotation marks

omitted).

[¶55]Tobesure,respectforprecedentisnotanabsolutebarthatossifies

obsoletejudicialreasoningandconclusions.Dyerv.Me.Drilling&Blasting,Inc.,

2009ME126,¶28,984A.2d210;MacDonaldv.MacDonald,412A.2d71,74

HomewardResidential,Inc.v.Gregor,2015ME108,¶13,122A.3d947. Tothecontrary,thetrialcourt’sanalysiswasentirely faithful toMaine’scurrentevidentiarystandards. Consequently, theBank’scomplaintabouttheeffectofthecourt’srulingcanbeseen,atmost,asadefactochallengetoourpresentcaselawgoverningRule803(6),eventhoughtheCourthasnowproceededasiftheBankhadaskedusmoredirectlytooverruleourprecedent.

39

(Me.1980)(statingthatstaredecisisdoesnotrequire“judgesofthepresent,

wholiketheirpredecessorscannotavoidactingwhencalledupon,...toactas

captivesofthejudgesofthepast,restrainedwithoutpowertobreakeventhose

bondssowitheredbythechangesoftimethatattheslightesttouchtheywould

crumble”).Nonetheless,inordertopromotepredictabilityandstabilityinthe

lawandtoavoidarbitrariness,“appellatecourtsproceedwithgreatcarebefore

overrulingapriordecision,anddosoonlyaftercarefulanalysisandbasedona

compelling reason. We do not disturb a settled point of law unless the

prevailing precedent lacks vitality and the capacity to serve the interests of

justice.”Statev.Bromiley,2009ME110,¶6,983A.2d1068(citationomitted)

(quotationmarksomitted).

[¶56]Considerationsrelevanttowhetherprecedentshouldbecastaside

include whether the existing approach has “fallen into jurisprudential

disrepute and is disapproved in better-considered recent cases and in the

authoritative scholarly writings,” Dyer, 2009 ME 126, ¶ 28, 984 A.2d 210

(quotation marks omitted); whether “the passage of time and changes in

conditions”call forareassessmentofexistinglawtothepointof“reachinga

differentresult,”Est.ofGalipeauv.StateFarmMut.Auto.Ins.Co.,2016ME28,

¶15,132A.3d1190(quotationmarksomitted);andtheadministrabilityofthe

40

law at issue, JuneMed. Servs., --- U.S. at ---, 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J.,

concurring) (citing Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, --- U.S. ---, 138 S. Ct. 2448,

2478-79(2018)).

[¶57]Thiscasedoesnotpresentajustificationforabandoningcurrent

Maine law governing the admissibility of integrated business records. We

suggestedthoseevidentiarystandardsasearlyas2009inStatev.Radley,2002

ME 150, 804 A.2d 1127, see suprann.11, 14, andwe have articulated them

clearly and consistently since 2011 and as recently as 2018—hardly an

antiquatedbodyof law. Ourcaselawhasnotbecomeobsoleteorfalleninto

disreputeovertimebecauseofadvancesin legalthought. Cf.Dyer,2009ME

126,¶18,984A.2d210 (concluding thatdevelopments in the lawover the

previoushalf-centurywarrantedchangesinapplicableMainelaw).Thisisalso

not a situation where our current law creates such unfairness as to justify

rejectionofrecentprecedent.Cf.Myrickv.James,444A.2d987,999(Me.1982),

supersededbystatuteonothergroundsasstatedinSears,Roebuck&Co.v.State

TaxAssessor,2012ME110,¶1,52A.3d941(overturningMaineprecedentthat

we determined was “harsh and unjust” and “counterproductive to the

achievement of any principled conception of fair and even-handed justice”).

Further,thereisnosignificantdifficultyinadministering—i.e.,applying—the

41

rule (although, as is evident from the cases I review above, mortgagees

sometimes have difficulty at trial meeting the standards prescribed in

Rule803(6)).

[¶58] The divergence between Maine law and the law of other

jurisdictions,exemplifiedbyJones,isnotanewcircumstancethatwouldjustify

departingfromourprecedents.Jonesreliesonseveralfederalcasesgoingas

farbackas1992.925F.3dat537(citingUnitedStatesv.Doe,960F.2d221,223

(1stCir.1992)). AndheretheCourtitselfcitestofederalandstateappellate

courtopinions thatwere issueddecadesago. SeeCourt’sOpinion¶13. We

developed our modern-day standards for the admissibility of integrated

businessrecordsinourdecisionsbeginningnolaterthanCarterin2011,well

aftersomeothercourtshadputtheirlessstringentmodelinplace.Thismeans

that the approach described in Jones and elsewherewas available for us to

consider and possibly adopt throughout the entire time that we have been

articulating our different standard for the admission of integrated business

records.Nonetheless,wetookadifferentroute.

[¶59]Finally,theCourtstatesthatthereisbenefittointerpretingMaine’s

rule uniformlywith the construction found in other jurisdictions, in part to

discourageforum-shopping.SeeCourt’sOpinion¶25.WhentheMaineRules

42

ofEvidencewererestyledeffectivein2015,however,theAdvisoryCommittee

on theMaineRulesofEvidencepresented theproposedamendments to the

SupremeJudicialCourtwiththeexplicitexplanationthat“[r]estyledRule803

preserves the substantive differences between the Maine and the Federal

Rules.” M.R.Evid. 803MaineRestylingNote [November2014]. Thismakes

clear that therestyledruleswerenotproposed tous inorder tocreate that

uniformity—and infacttheywereintendedtopreservetheindependenceof

our own jurisprudence. Since then, we have done nothing to call that

frameworkintoquestion.Basedonthishistory,homogeneitybetweenMaine

lawandthelawofotherjurisdictions,whilenotwithoutsomeancillaryvalue,

isnonethelessnotanobjectivetobepursuedforitsownsake.19

[¶60] The question here is not whether the approach to integrated

businessrecordsembodiedinJonesisreasonable.Rather,theissuenowbefore

theCourtiswhetherMaine’scurrentcaselawgoverningRule803(6)iswrong.

Itisnot. AsIhavediscussed,ourcaselawgoingbackatleastasfaras2011

couldnotbeclearerinrequiringagreaterfoundationalshowingthanJonesand

19AnotherexampleofthelackofsymmetrybetweenMaine’srulesofevidenceandthefederal

rulesisthatthelatterincludearesidualhearsayexception.SeeFed.R.Evid.807.Maine’srulesdonot. SeeM.R.Evid.803MaineRestylingNote [November2014];M.R.Evid.803Advisers’NotetoformerM.R.Evid.803(February2,1976).

43

thecourtsofotherjurisdictionsinsiston,butthatdivergencedoesnotprove

Maine’scriteriatobeincorrect;theexistenceofoneapproachdoesnotprove

the other wrong. Rather, the difference in approaches simply represents

differentlevelsofsensitivitytothemeasureofreliabilitythatmustcharacterize

anintegratedbusinessrecordtoallowitsadmissioninevidence.Additionally,

Maine’s current approach has the benefit of faithfulness to the language of

Rule803(6)itself.WhattheCourtdoestodayissimplytoadoptoneapproach,

which isdescribed in Jones andhas existedall along, as thereplacement for

another,whichisdescribedinCarterandisdifferentbutinnowayincorrect.

In my view, to jettison a well-established and perfectly appropriate and

defensible legal standard established inMaine’s authoritative case lawdoes

damage to the safeguard and stability of legal precedent achieved through

adherencetothebasicprincipleofstaredecisis.

[¶61] Given the fundamental importance of respecting and following

precedent, and the absence of any rationale that constitutes a “compelling”

justification necessary for departing from settled and well-established law,

Bromiley,2009ME110,¶6,983A.2d1068,weshouldnotoverrulethecase

44

lawestablishingourcurrent jurisprudenceontheadmissibilityof integrated

businessrecords.20

B. TheCourt’sRulemakingAuthority

[¶62] For the reasons I have explained, there does not exist a sound

jurisprudential basis for the Court’s decision to change its construction of

Rule803(6)asapplicabletointegratedbusinessrecords.Asaresult,today’s

decisionmustbeviewedasadefactochangetothemeaningandcontentofthe

rule itself—something the Court may do pursuant only to its statutory

authority to promulgate the rules that govern judicial proceedings, not in

exerciseofitsappellateauthority.See4M.R.S.§§1,8,9-A,51(2020).

[¶63]Byconcludingthattheproponentneedpresentevidenceonlythat

thereceivingentityreceived,verified,andreliedonarecordgeneratedbythe

originatingentity,seeCourt’sOpinion¶30,theCourteffectivelyeliminatesthe

specific requirements imposed by Rule 803(6)(A)-(C) as they apply to

20TotheextentthattheCourtconcludes—withoutthebenefitofanyadvocacyonthepoint,see

supran.18,andwhilesimultaneouslystating thatCarter isentitled torespectasprecedent—thatCarterandthecasesthatfollowedwerethemselvesdecidedincontraventionofprinciplesofstaredecisis,Court’sOpinion¶23&n.7,theCourtcollaterallyattacksthosedecisions.Thisleavesonetowonderabout theconsequencesof theapplicationofRule803(6) to the judgmentsaddressed inthosecases,andthemanyadditionaljudgmentsthathavebeenissuedinthetrialcourtsbasedonourcurrentlawgoverningtheadmissibilityofintegratedbusinessrecords,notonlyinforeclosurecasesbutinallothertypesofcaseswheresuchrecordswerematerial.Additionally,thefactremainsthatourcurrentjurisprudenceisthelaw,sothequestionpresentedhereiswhetherweshouldnowrejectthatauthority.

45

integrated business records, namely, that the proponent must present

foundationalevidence that therecord“wasmadeatornear the timeby—or

frominformationtransmittedby—someonewithknowledge,”thatit“waskept

inthecourseofaregularlyconductedactivityofabusiness,”andthat“[m]aking

therecordwasaregularpracticeofthatactivity.”AsIhavediscussedabove,

supra¶¶44-45,therule,astheCourtnowinterpretsit,thereforewillnowallow

amateriallylesserfoundationalshowingthanisrequiredbytheplaintermsof

theruleforaprofferedintegratedbusinessdocumenttobecomeadmissiblein

evidence.

[¶64]TheCourtdescribesthisasanintegratedrecords“method,”which

itbasesonageneralizednotionofreliability.Court’sOpinion¶¶8-10.Nosuch

“method” exists within Rule 803(6), however. As written, the specific

requirementsoftherule,includingthosesetoutinsubpartsAthroughC,apply

irrespectiveofwhethertherecordisthatofasingleentityorisanintegrated

record. By construing the rule as it does, the Court effectively exempts

integratedbusinessrecordsfromtheparticularizedfoundationalpredicateset

outinsubpartsAthroughCandtherebyrewritestherulebyeliminatingthose

requirementsforsuchrecordstobeadmittedinevidence.21SeeRadley,2002

21AlthoughtheCourtdeniesthatitisrewritingRule803(6)becauseitissimplyreturningtoour

interpretationoftheRulefromtheSoleyera,Court’sOpinion¶23&n.7,thefactremainsthatthe

46

ME 150, ¶ 17, 804 A.2d 1127 (stating that the erroneous admission of an

integrated business record, where it is not supported by the foundational

requirements of Rule 803(6), cannot be transformed into a correct ruling

because, unlike the federal rules, see Fed. R. Evid. 807, the Maine Rules of

Evidencedonotincludearesidualor“catch-all”exceptiontothehearsayrule,

whichmightallowtherecordtobeadmissible).

[¶65]Whenpromulgatingoramendingrulesofcourt,theCourtinvokes

and exercises authority in its capacity as the Supreme Judicial Court. See

4M.R.S.§§1,8,9-A,51.Thatauthorityisseparateandmutuallyexclusivefrom

theauthorityweexercisewhen sitting as the LawCourt, an appellatebody.

Compare4M.R.S.§8 (rulemakingauthority),with4M.R.S.§§51,57(2020)

(appellate authority); see also State v. Doucette, 544 A.2d 1290, 1294

(Me.1988). Here, by effectively rewriting the way Rule 803(6) applies to

integratedbusinessrecords,theCourtisimproperlyexercisingitsregulatory

rulemakingpowersinanadjudicatorycontext.SeeConservatorshipofEmma,

2017ME1,¶¶1,10,153A.3d102(decliningtoansweraquestionreportedby

theKennebecCountyProbateCourtinpartbecausequestions“ofpolicy,with

constructionoftheRulenowembracedbytheCourtchangesthesubstanceandstructureoftheRuleasestablishedbyourcurrentcontrollingjurisprudence.ThisamountstoanamendmentoftheRuleitself.

47

long-ranging and far-reaching implications” are properly answered not

throughadjudicationbutthroughtherulemakingprocessinwhichtherelated

issues“canbeaddressedtogetherinanopenforum”).

[¶66]Ihavenoquarrelwiththesuggestionthatitmaybebeneficialto

reexamine the way Rule 803(6) should be applied to integrated business

records,atleastinforeclosurecases.TheBankanditsalliedamiciassertthat

Rule803(6), as we have construed it since 2011, imposes an unfair and

unnecessaryobstacletoadmittingthoserecords,whichcancontainnecessary

aspectsofproof in foreclosure caseswheremortgages areoften transferred

from one entity to the next and the servicing of a singlemortgage can also

change hands. See Plaisted, 2018 ME 121, ¶ 1, 192 A.3d 601 (noting the

challenges facedbymortgagees inprovinga foreclosurecasebecauseof the

industry’s “practice of securitization, spawning a byzantine mass of

assignments, transfers,anddocumentation” (quotationmarksomitted)). On

theotherside,severalamiciinsupportofShoneandBuck’spositionpointtoa

checkeredtrackrecordintheeffortsofmortgageestopresentsufficientand

reliableinformationaboutthehistoryofmortgagesonwhichtheyhavesought

toforeclose,andthoseamicipointtotheincentivethatmortgagees,servicers,

and others involved in administeringmortgages may have to simply adopt,

48

verify, andrelyononeanother’s records. See id.¶2 (“The law, therulesof

evidence, and court processes have not become more complicated in these

matters.Applyingestablishedlaw,however,hasbecomemoreproblematicas

courts address the problems the financial services industry has created for

itself.”(quotationmarksomitted));seealsoHSBCMortg.Servs.,Inc.v.Murphy,

2011ME59,¶15&n.8,19A.3d815.

[¶67]Althoughthisisadiscussionthatmaybewellworthhaving,itmust

occurinaforumotherthanthisappeal,wherewearecalledupontointerpret

andapplyRule803(6)asitexists.Thepropervehicletoaddresstheefficacyof

the current Rule to serve its purposes effectively in some or all contexts is

through the Advisory Committee on the Maine Rules of Evidence or other

interested persons or entities, and ultimately within the Supreme Judicial

Court,exercising its rulemakingauthority—adeliberativeprocess that likely

wouldrequireconsiderationofbroadempiricalindustry-widepracticesbased

on information that goeswell beyond the present record. For the Court to

defactorewritetheruleinthecontextofthisappealisanimproperexerciseof

itsrulemakingauthorityinanadjudicatoryproceeding.

49

C. Conclusion

[¶68] The trialcourtcorrectlyappliedRule803(6)andcommittedno

errorwhenitexcludedthenoticeofdefaultandrighttocure,directlyresulting

in the entry of judgment for mortgagors Danielle Shone and Michael Buck.

Further, there is no proper persuasive basis for casting aside our clear and

well-established jurisprudence governing the admissibility of integrated

businessrecords.Thejudgmentshouldbeaffirmed.

SantoLongo,Esq.,Bendett&McHugh,P.C.,Portland,andWilliamA.Fogel,Esq.(orally),SanDiego,California,forappellanttheBankofNewYorkMellonMarkA.Kearns,Esq.(orally),andMarkL.Randall,Esq.,Portland,forappelleesMichaelBuckandDanielleShoneJeremy Kamras, Esq., Arnold & Porter Kay Scholer LLP, San Francisco,California,foramicuscuriaeFederalHousingFinanceAgencyAndrea Bopp Stark, Esq., National Consumer Law Center, Boston,Massachusetts,foramicuscuriaeNationalConsumerLawCenterDaniel L. Cummings, Esq., and Michael T. Devine, Esq., Norman, Hanson &Detroy,LLC,Portland,foramicuscurieMaineCreditUnionLeagueDiane Cipollone, Esq., Yarmouth, for amici curiae National Association ofConsumerAdvocates,MarcDann, theDannLawFirm, JamesSturdevant, theSturdevantLawFirm,PhillipRobinson,andtheConsumerLawCenterLLCFrankD’Alessandro,Esq.,Augusta,foramicuscuriaeMaineEqualJustice

50

Jonathan E. Selkowitz, Esq., Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., Portland, foramicuscuriaePineTreeLegalAssistance,Inc.CatherineR.Connors,Esq., JohnJ.Aromando,Esq.,andSaraA.Murphy,Esq.,PierceAtwoodLLP,Portland,foramicuscuriaeTheMaineBankersAssociationBrettL.Messinger,Esq.,andElizabethM.Lacombe,Esq.,Portland,foramicuscuriaePHHMortgageCorporationKellyW.McDonald,Esq.,Murray,Plumb&Murray,Portland,foramicuscuriaeFullDisclosure,LLCThomasA.Cox,Esq.,Portland,foramicuscuriaeMaineAttorneysSavingHomesGeraldF.Petruccelli,amicuscuriaeproseCumberlandCountySuperiorCourtdocketnumberRE-2015-116FORCLERKREFERENCEONLY